Youth, Europe and the Nation: The [619718]

Youth, Europe and the Nation: The
Political Knowledge, Interests and
Identities of the New Generation ofEuropean Youth
Daniel Faas
Europe is undergoing considerable demographic, economic, cultural and socio-political
change. National citizenship identities have been challenged by the simultaneous
processes of European integration and the migration of people into and across Europe.
This paper explores how the current generation of youth relates towards Europe, and
highlights the factors affecting their political knowledge, interests and identities. Although
the article draws on mainly qualitative data from a study into the political identities of
native youth and youth of Turkish descent in England and Germany, the results have
implications for all European countries [1]. The research indicates that, in countrieswhich promote European agendas and where schools and curricula emphasise an
inclusive concept of Europe (e.g. Goethe Gymnasium in Stuttgart), young people have
high levels of knowledge about Europe and make Europe part of their hybrid identities.
However, in countries where governments and schools marginalise European agendas
(e.g. Millroad School in London), young people struggle to relate positively to Europe,
especially in working-class contexts where national(istic) agendas come to the fore. The
article raises important questions about the possibilities of promoting inclusive
governmental and curriculum approaches and offers ways in which the knowledge and
identity gaps between youth in different European countries could be addressed.
Introduction
The need for pan-European youth studies is increasing in importance as a result of
social, demographic, economic, political and cultural changes in contemporaryEurope. Many European Union (EU) countries have become culturally diverse
Correspondence to: Daniel Faas, Faculty of Education, University of Cambridge, 184 Hills Road, Cambridge
CB2 2PQ, UK. Email: [anonimizat]
ISSN 1367-6261 (print)/ISSN 1469-9680 (online) #2007 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13676260601120161Journal of Youth Studies
Vol. 10, No. 2, May 2007, pp. 161 /C1181

societies and, at the same time, the increasingly supranational context in which
political and educational systems are operating has challenged national agendas and
identities. Notions of European identity and citizenship have been promoted by both
the European Commission and the Council of Europe during the past two decades.Arguably, the most important inter-governmental agreement on the Europeandimension in education was the 1988 Resolution adopted by the Council of Ministersof Education, prompting educators to ‘ strengthen in young people a sense of
European identity and make clear to them the value of European civilisation and of
the foundations on which the European peoples intended to base their developmenttoday’ (Council of Ministers of Education 1988, p. 5; emphasis added). Plans weremade at the 1990 Rome summit to include European citizenship in the 1991
Maastricht Treaty, which theoretically provided the EU with the legal framework of
its involvement in all the educational levels of the national educational systems of itsmember states [2]. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty foresaw the encouragement of amore active and participatory citizenship in the life of the Union based on the
complementarity of EU citizenship and national citizenship (Council of the European
Union 1997). This is similar to what the EU proposed in its new Constitution, whereArticle I-10 states that ‘every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of theUnion. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship; it shall
not replace it’ (Council of the European Union 2004).
Despite these unifying calls for European identity and citizenship and a European
dimension in education, all EU countries are presently autonomous in matters of
education, which makes it difficult to develop a common approach to these policy
initiatives. For example, Germany was a founding member of the Europeanintegration project and, as a result, schools and the curriculum throughout the1980s and 1990s were used to construct a ‘Europeanised national identity’ (cf. Risse &
Engelmann-Martin 2002; Soysal et al . 2005). Building on various earlier initiatives to
implement a European dimension in German schools (e.g. the 1978 ‘Europe in theClassroom’ document), in 1990 the Standing Conference of the Ministers ofEducation ( Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK)) published the revised policy document
‘Europe in the Classroom’ ( Europa im Unterricht ) in response to the 1988 Resolution
of the Council of Ministers of Education. The 1990 document stated that the goal ofeducation must be ‘to awaken in young people the consciousness of a European
identity ; to prepare them to be aware of their responsibilities as citizens of the
European Community; and to promote mutual learning with young foreigners to
foster the ability to feel mutual solidarity’ (KMK 1990; emphasis added). In 1992, theKMK published a further review of progress and recommendations. The particularareas for development were identified as foreign languages as part of vocationalqualifications; political and cultural education; school exchanges; school links; and
teacher exchanges (KMK 1992). Several German federal states (such as Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg in 1994) subsequently overhauled their curricula to implement a
European dimension. Since 1990, European Schools (i.e. schools that particularlyemphasise a European dimension) have been set up across Germany.162 D. Faas

England, by contrast, has responded very differently to these calls for a European
educational dimension. There was little reason why the country should reconceptua-
lise her national identity in European terms and the processes of European
integration have not seriously affected English policy-makers. The Europeanisationof British national identity was undercut by the special relationship with the UnitedStates; the geographical detachment from continental Europe; and England’s post-war role in the Commonwealth. Europe did not appear among the cross-curricular
themes and dimensions of the 1988 National Curriculum. The Department of
Education and Science responded to the 1988 Resolution of the Council of Ministersof Education on the European dimension in education, stating that the government’spolicies were aimed at ‘ promoting a sense of European identity ; encouraging interest
in and improving competence in other European languages; and helping students to
acquire a view of Europe as a multicultural, multilingual community which includesthe UK’ (Department of Education and Science 1991; emphasis added). Unlike theCouncil of Ministers of Education, the Department of Education and Science’s
response employed a weaker language; for example, the key phrase ‘strengthen in
young people a sense of European identity’ became ‘promoting a sense of Europeanidentity’ . However, advice and curriculum guidance on precisely what content andform the European dimension should assume has not matched official British
concerns with other parts of the curriculum (e.g. multicultural education). Unlike in
Germany, the curriculum is not in direct control of the government and there is roomfor English schools (and young people) to make their own sense of Europe.
The aim of this paper is to explore how young people relate to Europe; and to
reveal the factors affecting their political knowledge, interests and identities. Whilethe data I draw upon derive from a larger project designed to explore how Germanand English national agendas are reshaped by European and multicultural agendas at
government level and what consequences these triple agendas have for the political
identities of youth (Faas 2007), this article focuses on differently located groups ofEuropean youth in relation to the European agenda. I chose to compare Germany andEngland because these two European countries adopted rather different approaches
to protect national identities. While England has marginalised European agendas and
argued at length over what it means to be British, Germany has underplayedmulticultural agendas and struggled to fit minority ethnic communities like theTurkish Muslims into its Europeanised concept of nationhood. Within these two
countries, I decided to compare two types of secondary schools, one in a
predominantly working-class environment and the other in a mainly middle-classarea, to learn more about the role of social class for youth identities. I also chose tocompare native youth and youth of Turkish origin, an ethnic group that arguably isnot European. The Turkish Muslims are an under-researched and disadvantaged
group (especially in England). None of the scant research on Turks in both Germany
(e.g. Auernheimer 1990; Sen & Goldberg 1994) and England (e.g. Ku ¨c¸u¨kcan 1999;
Enneli et al. 2005) has hitherto explored their responses to Europe, and the factors
affecting their European political knowledge, interests and identities. The fact that theJournal of Youth Studies 163

Turkish Muslims are the largest immigrant group in Germany (2.4 million people)
but a relatively small and heterogeneous in England (200,000 people) has littlesignificance in this context because most of the fieldwork was conducted at the
institutional level in an inner-city borough of Stuttgart and London where the
Turkish Muslims formed the largest minority ethnic community.
Theorising and Researching Political Identities
The research was informed by the insights offered by post-structuralist theory,
particularly notions of a fragmented society in which identities (and concepts such as
Europe) are seen as multidimensional, hybrid and fluid. The work of Caglar (1997),Mac an Ghaill (1999), Tizard and Phoenix (2002) and Dolby (2001) is particularlyimportant for this study as it shows that the concept of identity is not a product, buta complex and multifaceted process of negotiation. Post-structuralist theorists, suchas Foucault (1980, 1988) and Derrida (1981), believe that there is no individual ‘I’
that interacts with the social context but that the only way an ‘I’ comes to exist is
through the productive power of discourse. Secondly, post-structuralist approachesallow contradiction and multiple categories of identity and, most importantly, thesemultiple shifting identities do not have to be reconciled. Thirdly, a post-structuralisttheoretical framework challenges the idea of a single monolithic truth and identity (as
opposed to the Enlightenment and modernity) and regards all absolutes as
constructions. Finally, post-structuralist approaches typically rely upon predomi-nantly qualitative methodologies, allowing young people to conceptualise theiridentities in their own words.
Drawing upon notions of multiple, fragmented and discursively produced
subjectivities, Brah (1996, p. 124) argued that identity may be understood as ‘thatvery process by which multiplicity, contradiction, and instability of subjectivity issignified as having coherence, continuity, stability; as having a core [ …] that at any
given moment is enunciated as the ‘‘I’’’ . Brah’s conceptualisation of identity leaves
open the possibility for individuals to feel strongly about their identities, to construct
subjects that can be ‘spoken’ . Hall (1996, p. 5) goes further to maintain that identityproduction also involves processes ‘which attempt to ‘‘interpellate’’ , speak to us orhail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses’ . Hall (1996) has alsosuggested that, within a post-structuralist framework, identities can be understood as
‘performed’ . The notion of performativity (Butler 1997), particularly relating to
students’ negotiations of their political identities, was important for the design of thisproject because, from a deconstructionist position, performative suggests that ethnicand political identities are a continual establishment and articulation of binaries. Thelinking of techniques of the self (Foucault 1988) and performance opens up anexploration of the ways in which the social context mediates how subjects deal with
the lived realities of specific institutional locations (Mac an Ghaill 1999).
The concept of identity/identities , meaning the communities young people felt they
belong to, was also crucial for the conceptualisation of this study. In contrast, the164 D. Faas

notion of identification (Skeggs 1997) refers to the reasons and discourses students
employed to identify with a particular community (e.g. Europe). It is also importantto differentiate between hybrid (e.g. Hall 1992; Mercer 2000; Tizard & Phoenix 2002)
and hyphenated identities (e.g. Caglar 1997). Hybrid identities, according to Bhabha
(1990), can be understood as ‘mixed’ identities that emerge as a result of theinterconnections between diasporic or ethnic affiliations and political identities suchas ‘being European’ [3]. In contrast, the notion of hyphenated identities, asunderstood by Caglar (1997), relates more to territorial or political identities, suchas African American, rather than the emergence of a new identity. Hyphenationimplies that an individual continuously mediates between two disparate cultures andterritories. It is hard to know whether the young people in my research developedhybrid or hyphenated identities. However, the fact that many young peopleconstructed their identities along ethnic and political dimensions, rather thanmediating between two territories, suggests that the notion of hybrid identities isperhaps more accurate when analysing contemporary youth identities.
Research Methodology and Design
The design of the broader study combined quantitative and qualitative methods. At
the macro-political level, which set the agendas for schools, I analysed and comparedEuropean Commission and national government documents on citizenship andEurope. At the institutional level, questionnaires were distributed in the openingstages of the project to about 100 students in each of the four secondary schools. Theaim was to obtain broad insights into how students positioned themselves in relationto national and European citizenship identities. Then, I conducted six focus groupinterviews of four to five students in each school (single-sex and mixed native youthand youth of Turkish descent). The focus group method was chosen because itallowed me to explore the language different groups of students used to negotiatetheir political identities. This approach enabled me to follow up issues of the surveydata analysis in more in-depth focus group interviews. The value of focus groups thuslied in the opportunity to listen to how students talked about Europe and the nation.Finally, I interviewed a total of 32 students (eight in each school). While the focusgroup method used group dynamics to elicit information, the individual studentinterviews built up personal profiles and thus allowed students to tell their personalstories regarding the research topic. Additional interviews with the Head, theCitizenship Education coordinator, the Head of Geography and the Head of ReligiousEducation in each of the schools were conducted to gain insights into the role schoolsplay in shaping students’ positioning in relation to Europe and the nation-state.
In this article, I draw mainly upon the qualitative data obtained from focus groups
and semi-structured interviews with young people. Although I had some a priori
codes based on the interview schedules, I gradually adapted the thematic categorieswhile reading through the transcripts. I looked at the ways in which studentsresponded to questions and positioned themselves with particular discourses (e.g.Journal of Youth Studies 165

European, national). When I tried to deconstruct the multiple meanings of these
narratives I was guided by MacLure (2003), who argued that one of the mostcommonplace ways in which texts are stitched together is through the setting up ofbinary oppositions (e.g. ‘us’ and ‘them’). ‘One ‘‘side’’ comes to meaning through its
difference with respect to a constructed ‘‘other’’ which is always lacking, lesser or
derivative in some respect’ (MacLure 2003, p. 10). The space opened up by languageor discourse, she argues, is an ambivalent one; it is both productive and disabling.Without distance, we would not be able to imagine others as distinct from ourselves.However, my analyses can only provide an account of my reading(s). Otherresearchers might put together the truths in different ways.
The four schools matched in terms of the percentage of minority ethnic Turkish
students, inner-city location (London and Stuttgart) and social intake. They had somesimilarities and some differences in relating to Europe, as summarised in Table 1.
The young people therefore will have experienced quite contradictory and different
messages about Europe. More specifically, Tannberg Hauptschule mediated national
agendas through a dominantly European and, arguably, at times a Eurocentricapproach (e.g. the Head of Religious Education argued that ‘if a religious symbol wasallowed in class then it should be the cross and not the headscarf; we are stillChristian Occidental [white and European]’). The Tannberg curriculum emphasisedEuropean agendas in subjects such as Geography and History. For example, inGeography, the entire Year 7 (ages 12 /C113) was spent looking at Europe and students
were given a geo-political overview of Europe before they studied either France or
Great Britain, the physical and human geography of northern Europe, Mediterranean
countries as well as the changing landscape of Europe. Goethe Gymnasium, whileallowing young people to keep their cultural and ethnic identities, emphasisedEurope as a common bond and thus interpreted the concept of Europe differentlyfrom Tannberg Hauptschule (which I would call ‘multicultural Europeanness’). Theschool prospectus stated that ‘the ethos of our school is characterised by mutualrespect and tolerance towards other people. Our students learn the manifoldness ofEuropean languages, cultures and mentalities and can thus develop their own
identities within our school. [ …] Europe as a cultural area is one of our guiding
principles’ .
In contrast, as a result of England’s rather lukewarm approach to Europe,
European issues were a relatively low priority in the two London schools (cf. Table 1).Millroad School, which reasserted the concept of cultural pluralism, offered only
limited acknowledgement of the processes of Europeanisation. The school prospectus
reveals that the school ‘recognises that the social, cultural and linguistic diversity inour community is an important resource and an aspect of our ethos we seek topromote and celebrate. [ …] We give our young people the knowledge and personal
strength to be good citizens in a multicultural world’ . The present Geographycurriculum, for instance, only has one European teaching unit in Y ear 8 (Italy: aEuropean country) while highlighting the importance of an international perspectivewith units on Japan and Brazil in addition to local and national issues. Darwin School166 D. Faas

emphasised Britain as a common bond (identity) but, like Millroad, made little
efforts to integrate students on the basis of European membership. ‘The school strives
to be a high-performing inclusive community school, fully committed to activecitizenship and academic excellence. We value all who learn and work here;promoting a strong sense of community within and beyond the school’ (school
prospectus). Since neither of the two London schools had high levels of promotion of
Europe, young people struggled to a greater (Millroad) or lesser (Darwin) extent torelate positively to Europe, and they were also less knowledgeable about the EU.
Geo-political Knowledge and Interests
The different prioritisation of European agendas at government level and in school
curricula is an important factor affecting the political knowledge of, and interest in,
Europe and the EU among the new generation of youth. For example, young peoplein the two German schools had significantly higher scores when asked to locate 10European countries correctly on a geo-political map of Europe than their counter-
parts in the two English schools.
Table 2 shows that over 80 per cent of students in the German sample correctly
identified the location of six western-central European countries. In contrast, only
one country (Britain) was correctly identified by eight out of 10 students in the
English sample. Eastern European countries (Poland and Ukraine) and Turkey werethe least correctly located countries. On average, 62.6 per cent at Tannberg versus 77.3per cent at Goethe compared favourably to 34.4 per cent and 48.9 per cent fromMillroad and Darwin School, respectively. Students in the middle-class-dominated
schools (Goethe and Darwin) were also significantly better at locating European
countries on a map than students in the working-class-dominated schools (Tannbergand Millroad).T able 1 Summary of the profiles of the German and English secondary schools.
Germany England
Tannberg
HauptschuleGoethe
GymnasiumMillroad
SchoolDarwin
School
School
population320 students,
18% Turkish564 students,
5% Turkish1204 students,
26% Turkish1507 students,
2% Turkish
Location Working-class
inner-cityMiddle-class
inner-cityWorking-class
inner-cityMiddle-class
inner-city
European issues
(a) Languages English only English, French French, Spanish French, German
(b) Geography
and HistoryEntire Year 7
Geography, halfof Year 6 HistoryEntire Year 6
Geography, halfof Year 7 HistoryOne unit in Year
8 Geographyand HistoryOne unit in
Years 7 and 8Geography andHistoryJournal of Youth Studies 167

Y oung people in the two German schools in Stuttgart, particularly at Goethe
Gymnasium, also had a wider range of opinions when talking about Europe. For
example, Leo (a German boy at Goethe) argued that ‘I think about the expansion,
and I also cast my mind back to Columbus. Europe used to be the centre of the world;many things started here’ , thus alluding to the industrial revolution in eighteenth-
century England as well as the ‘discovery’ of America by Christopher Columbus in
1492. Semra (a Turkish girl) alluded to the European Union’s official motto ‘Unitedin Diversity’ , and the girls also referred to the decade-long debate among policy-
makers and politicians about the future structure of Europe:
D.F.: What comes to your mind when you hear the word ‘Europe’?
Semra: Well, Europe consists of countries that have got together, a community with
the same currency. But you can’t say that that’s a giant country cos there are
different languages and you can’t say that Europe is one culture. The people arekind of similar but there are nevertheless other cultures and France isn’t likeGermany and it’s different in England. Europe just has the same currency but notthe same language and culture.Nilgu ¨n:For me, Europe is more geographical. It’s also more simple that you can
move from one country to another. There’s the Euro, but I don’t really like it. I
mean, people think that all Europeans are the same but, in reality, there are quitedifferent cultures. I’ve got relatives in France and when we crossed the border itlooked quite different. It’s not one country.Sevilin: You can’t change the cultures, only the laws. I don’t think there‘ll ever be
something like a United States of Europe. That’s somehow not possible. Maybe it’s
just a term cos in America each state has its own laws too but the language andculture is the same, and that’s not the case in Europe.Zeynep: They all see themselves as Americans.
Unlike students at Goethe Gymnasium who were able to engage in discussions about
Europe, Tannberg students only listed some concepts (e.g. the Euro) when they heard
the word Europe and preferred to talk about local and national political issuesT able 2 Students’ correct location of countries on a map of Europe.
Germany
(per cent)England
(per cent)Tannberg
(per cent)Goethe
(per cent)Millroad
(per cent)Darwin
(per cent)
Britain 85.6 85.1 76.8 93.5** 81.3 89.1
Germany 89.6 51.0** 85.3 93.5 37.4 65.3**
Spain 86.1 52.4** 78.9 92.5* 38.3 67.3**
Finland 25.7 8.7** 15.8 34.6** 4.7 12.9*Italy 94.1 64.4** 89.5 98.1* 54.2 75.2**Turkey 66.8 33.2** 58.9 73.8 33.6 32.7
Portugal 81.2 37.5** 74.7 86.9 28.0 47.5**
Poland 58.9 14.4** 48.4 68.2* 11.2 17.8*France 85.6 56.7** 75.8 94.4** 43.0 71.3**Ukraine 30.2 10.6** 22.1 37.4* 12.1 8.9*
Average 73.3 41.4** 62.6 77.3 34.4 48.9
*Significance below 0.05, **significance below 0.01.168 D. Faas

instead. The predominantly working-class background of young people at Tannberg
Hauptschule may have been a reason for this. For example, the group of four nativeGerman boys I interviewed were happy to talk about notions of tax reform,
unemployment, apprenticeship places, and also mentioned the job competition they
face with ‘foreigners’ , as the following quotation demonstrates:
D.F.: What do you see as important political issues nowadays? What interests you?
Jan: Well, the war and stuff. There was a war in Iraq. If an Iraqi lives here, then
there’ll be prejudices again although he can’t do anything that he’s Iraqi.Michael: I haven’t watched the news for half a year.
Florian: I don’t know what’s going on in politics. I mean, the things that I need to
know, apprenticeship places and stuff like that, I know. But other things don’tbother me. And even if it interested me I couldn’t do much about it anyway. So, Ijust can’t be bothered.Dominik: Well, I haven’t watched any news either for the past week. I’m only
interested in unemployment, that the foreigners get a job and take our jobs away.They work for less money, on the black market and stuff, and take the chances awayfrom others.
These young people did not perceive European and global political topics to be
particularly relevant to their lives (except for the war in Iraq). And although both
German and Turkish youth to whom I spoke engaged in a discussion about the
possibilities of a Turkish EU membership, their general knowledge about Europe andthe EU seemed to be rather limited. The Turkish students at Tannberg listed someconcepts including ‘the Euro’ , ‘the EU’ , ‘western world’ and ‘advanced rich countries’ ,
but were unable to engage in a wider discussion about Europe and the EU. Tamer, for
example, alluded to the ‘united in diversity’ motto of the EU (cf. Council of theEuropean Union 2004) and Ugur referred to the EU’s peace-keeping role:
D.F.: What do you know about Europe, about the European Union?
T amer: It’s a community.
Y eliz: That’s what I think too.
Umay: I don’t know. I’m not so sure.
T amer: It’s a community of different countries.
Cari: EU, countries that belong together; they talk about politics of different
countries; they have negotiations and debate what they can do. It’s a strong,political team.Y eliz: If a country needs help then the other EU countries will help. They have
treaties with each other.
Ugur: The European Union is a good thing; we don’t have war today.
Native German students in the study also revealed some factual knowledge about
Europe and the EU. For example, the group of boys and girls referred to notions of
power as well as transatlantic and inner-European relationships. Not only wasSebastian aware of the strength of the common currency, but he and T obias alsoalluded to the political and economic benefits of a united Europe. Drawing upon theJournal of Youth Studies 169

dispute over the Iraq War in 2003, Jessica reminded the boys that Europe still does
not speak with one voice:
D.F.: What do you know about Europe and the EU?
Franziska: The Euro.
T obias: I think it’s better now when it’s Europe than when the countries were alone.
We are too weak. We would have no chance, for example, against America. TheEuro strengthens everything, of course. And the English always say ‘travel toEurope’; they still think they are on their own. That’s a bit silly what they think, Ijust find that the wrong attitude.Sebastian: Well, I think the deutschmark used to be weaker than the dollar. Now
the dollar’s become weaker than the Euro. And when you’re together, when you’re acommunity, you’re a lot stronger than on your own.Jessica: Lots of languages, lots of cultures, well, I think that Europe is really a
comprehensive image although the countries don’t always stick together. You couldsee that with the Iraq war and America, some countries supported America.
Germany didn’t. And that’s where you can see that the countries don’t really always
stick together.
In contrast, native and Turkish students’ knowledge of, and interest in, European
issues was much more limited in the two English schools, particularly at MillroadSchool where the young people I interviewed struggled to talk about Europe in
political terms. For example, the group of British girls did not appear to know much
about the expansion of the EU on 1 May 2004 despite the fact that this discussiontook place days before this event. Their discourse very much focused on thedisagreement between France and England regarding the Iraq War:
D.F.: What do you know about Europe, about the European Union?
Ellie: [laughing] Nothing!
Katie: Nothing.
D.F.: What is happening at the moment in Europe?
Ellie: Erm, there’s a lot of disagreement about the Iraq war, whether it should have
happened and stuff. Because, um, England was very go for it, and I know Francewas very very against it and I think that’s I dunno which other countries, but I thinkthere were quite a lot more that were saying we shouldn’t do it, and the English
government, even though most of the people in England didn’t want it to happen,
decided to go ahead with it anyway.D.F.: In the UK, they are now talking about this European Constitution; they want
a referendum for that. Have you heard of that recently?Katie: Like, I read a lot of newspapers and I watch some news, but I’ve never heard
of that. Well, they may not, you know, advertise it as much as they should do. Noneof us here heard that; so that must mean that they’re not doing as much as they canto make people know that it’s expanding.
The girls were not aware of the current debate about a European Constitution, and
Katie pointed towards what she perceived as a low media representation of Europeanissues in England. Other British students I interviewed, such as Robert, claimed that
the political and educational marginalisation of European agendas in England led to170 D. Faas

his poor knowledge about Europe and its institutions. ‘The European parliament is
never like televised, we don’t know what they actually, if Parliament [Westminster]passes a bill we’ll know about it, I don’t know what goes on in the Europeanparliament’ . Similarly, Turkish respondents had difficulties to make sense of howEurope and the EU work in political terms, as the following quotation from thediscussion with four boys and girls underlines:
D.F.: What do you know about the European Union or Europe?
Baris: European Union, what’s that?
Sarila: Well, nobody knows nothing about it basically.
Baris: What’s the European Union?
Sarila: You think I know?
Baris: I heard about it, but I don’t know what it is.
Sarila: Me neither.
Halil: Is it the power?
Baris: I’m asking you.
Sarila: I don’t really know, no.
Halil: Cos the Union *
Baris: The Union’s a bunch of people that decides something, but I don’t know.
Halil: It’s the only power.
Other students in the sample, such as Olcay, referred to the Turkish EU
membership bid when asked what they know about Europe in political terms.Europe was seen through a Turkish national (i.e. familiar) lens. Those who arguedagainst membership typically said that Turkey’s laws and morals do not meetEuropean standards and that the country is very poor with a great deal of people
being homeless. Similarly, in their discussions about Europe and the EU, many
young people I interviewed at Darwin School struggled to talk about the EU, ascan be seen in the following quotation from the discussion with a group of fiveBritish girls:
D.F.: What sorts of things do you know about Europe and the European Union?
Anne: Not much!
Victoria: It’s really difficult, *
Anne: I don’t know anything.
Victoria: *totally out of my depth.
Elizabeth: It’s quite confusing cos it changes so much, that people *
Anne: The Euro.
Sophie: There’s places part of it [indistinct]
Elizabeth: Oh, isn’t there a referendum or coming up for something or other?
Victoria: A what? What’s that?
Elizabeth: I dunno. I just heard it, walking through my house and the news was on
somewhere, this whole thing about *
Victoria: What’s a referendum?
Elizabeth: I don’t know.
Anne: I know about the euro because I was in Ireland when it was going through.
Victoria: They don’t have it in Ireland.Journal of Youth Studies 171

Arguably, the limited coverage of European issues in the British mass media and the
failure of schools to promote a European dimension alongside multicultural
education in the National Curriculum (cf. Tulasiewicz 1993; Convey & Merritt
2000) were all responsible for this low level of knowledge of, and interest in,
European issues. Similar reasons can be deployed to justify the difficulties the sample
of Turkish students had to engage in European political discourses. Some Darwinstudents referred to ‘power’ , ‘opposition to America’ and ‘community of countries’ .
Typically, however, Turkish interviewees neither knew the purpose of the EU nor how
European institutions work. This can be seen in the following quotation from the
discussion with a group of male and female students:
D.F.: What do you know about the European Union or Europe actually?
Adem: It happened after World War Two; France and Germany, they like made an
agreement, and then loads of other countries joined or something.
Neylan: What happens when you’re in the EU anyway?
Afet: Nothing, you’re just
Adem: No, you get to, the United Nations.
Neylan: What do you get?
Adem: You get into the United Nations.
Neylan: So what, who cares? Why can’t the whole world be in it? That’s not fair.
Adem: Cos they’re not.
Neylan: It’s just stupid!
Although political knowledge and interest is not necessarily the basis of political
identities, the evidence in my research suggests that it nevertheless affected theidentity formation processes of the current generation of European youth.
Y outh and European Political Identities
As a result of Goethe Gymnasium’s liberal approach of emphasising Europe as a
common bond and the European curricular dimension, both native youth and
youth of Turkish descent engaged in a discussion and felt positive about Europe
although there is still room for students to enhance their European politicalknowledge. Most Goethe students made European identification dependent on
stays abroad (e.g. ‘I only know Germany; if I was living in Spain for a few years,
then I’d more say that I’m European cos I’d be familiar with different countries’),
parental influence (e.g. ‘my parents experienced a lot and tell me a lot about other
countries and cultures), and the school curriculum (e.g. ‘we learn a lot of
European languages in school and talking in Italian or French to other people
makes me feel partly European’).The following excerpts indicate that the young
people I talked to felt positive about Europe:
D.F.: To what extent do you see yourself as European?
Ali: Erm, of course I’m European. Europe is very big and is getting bigger and
bigger. And when Turkey joins the EU it’ll be even bigger. Europe is getting more
and more important to me cos of Turkey. [ …]172 D. Faas

Samuel: Europe, the EU, plays an important role in my life. When I go abroad it’s
just so simple. There are hardly any border controls and it’s just getting easier and
easier. The countries are not on their own anymore and are together; and there are
no borders anymore, very open. [ …]
Mariam: I feel European because of the Euro. The Euro impacts on your life. I
mean, in the newspaper they always talk about the Euro, Eurozone, Europe and soand I’ve noticed that the countries are getting closer and closer and not every
country has its own policy. And the economy has grown together too. And you can
travel to other countries without any problems at the borders.
Ali linked European identification with Turkey’s role in Europe and the EU whereas
the two German students focused upon European elements in their lives, including
the Euro and free movement within several European countries. The abovestatements were suggestive of the fact that the processes of European integration,
be it the expansion to include countries like Turkey (e.g. Ali) or deeper political and
economic cooperation (e.g. Mariam), also seemed to contribute to students’
identification with Europe.
Paradoxically, despite having some knowledge about Europe as we saw earlier,
neither the native German nor the Turkish students at Tannberg Hauptschule saw
themselves as ‘European’ . Perhaps the at times Eurocentric approach made it difficult
for young people to relate positively to Europe as a political identity. Europe, for
these Turkish youth, was not separate from the concept of being German *‘being
German’ , in other words, equals ‘being European’ . Hence, most of the Turkish
students I interviewed argued that they felt European only ‘because I live here in
Germany [ …] we are Germans and Germany is part of the EU’ . In contrast, each of
the four Turkish boys in one focus group claimed that ‘I don’t think I feel part of
Europe [ …] I feel more Turkish’ . These findings suggest that Turkish students who
privileged their Turkishness over German national identity had no connection to
Europe, whereas those who prioritised the German part of their hybrid political
identities were able to feel European. Some (German) Tannberg youth employed the
image of a chain of identities arguing that Stuttgart, Germany and Europe were allinterlinked and thus sites for identity formation:
D.F.: Where do you feel you belong to?
Dominik: Stuttgart, or Germany.
Jan: Stuttgart, Germany and Europe.
D.F.: Why?
Dominik: Don’t know.
Jan: Stuttgart belongs to Germany and Germany is part of Europe.
Michael: Well, I mean, I was born in Stuttgart, grew up in Germany and Germany
belongs to Europe.
Florian: I live here and when somebody lives in a country, then he’s a citizen of that
country and that’s why we also belong to Europe, Stuttgart and Germany.Jan: If someone asks me, then I say, I am now living in Stuttgart but I was born in
Berlin. I’ve hardly said European really. Maybe that’s just a habit that you don’t
really say that yet, but when you are more used to it [Europe], then you would say
that.Journal of Youth Studies 173

In contrast, in England, where successive governments have reinforced national
agendas and identities through citizenship education and developed multiculturalschool policies while marginalising the European dimension (despite the 1991 policy
statement to promote a sense of European identity, cited earlier), young people
struggled to relate positively to Europe as a political identity. For example, atMillroad School in London, the group of Turkish boys construed the notion ofEurope in monocultural terms:
Yildiran: Let’s say I go to India or something, or I don’t know, I’m just giving Egypt
or America or any other Canada, Canada or something then I would say ‘ah, I’mcoming from Europe’ , basically that’s about ‘I’m coming from Europe’ but I’m notlike, you know European or anything.Muhammad: I wouldn’t even say Europe, you can’t say I’m European.
D.F.: Why not?
Muhammad: Unless your races country is a European country as well …like where
your from, whether your first country is in Europe cos basically we’re used to seeingwhite people, white people as European, so basically *
Yildiran: English people.
Muhammad: I would say I live in Europe but I’m not European.
Onan: Yeah same, because you’re not living all around Europe, you’re just living in
one country.Khan: Erm, the thing is that if you was Europe, yeah, you’d like understand that,
you know, I come from Europe, cos you know yeah, but I can’t say I’m Europeancos I’m not Christian.Muhammad: I don’t say I’m Christian, I say I believe in Christianity but I don’t say
I’m Christian, that’s the same as saying I’m from Europe but I’m not European.
The notion of ‘being European’ did not sit comfortably with any of the Turkish boys
in this group; most notably Muhammad, for whom identification is based upon the
concept of ‘race’ rather than residence. Like the Turkish students, the British students
I spoke to positioned themselves outside the notion of Europe by drawing upon amodified version of the theme of us(English or British) and them (continental
Europeans), as shown in the following excerpt:
Joey: Don’t really see ourselves as part of Europe. It’s more like all the countries that
are joined together and we’re just sort of the odd one out that drives on the left andhas the pound.Eddie: Yeah, because we’re sort of separated, we’re an island off Europe. We’re not,
yet, because I don’t see myself as part of Europe really. We’re off Europe, just offEurope.
Kelly: Yeah, it’s like they always say British and then they say European. Like, when
you say European, for me I think of places like, erm, erm, countries like …like I
can’t think of, like-Eddie: Switzerland and France. And like places further down.
Joey: Probably Germany actually.
Kelly: Yeah. And it’s like, cos its right [indistinct] island, but in a way, and we are
different in similar in ways, like you know.174 D. Faas

Joey: Especially now because we’re sort of less tied to Europe and more tied to
America, we’re sort of very westernised.
Similarly, at Darwin School, Europe played a less important role in the lives of young
people compared with local and national identities. Despite being interested in the
EU and aware of England’s position within Europe, including the referenda on the
single currency and the proposed Constitution, Mustafa (a Turkish boy) did not see
himself as European:
D.F.: To what extent would you see yourself as European?
Mustafa: I don’t really see myself as European, because, erm, I don’t know, I just,
erm, I’m not sure because I’d sort of be like failing my argument now if I said that I
don’t see myself as European because if I was born in Europe I’d see myself as
European, but I’m not born there so I guess I call myself British, cos I was born here
and, like growing up here, since day 1. That’s it.
D.F.: That’s interesting that you are saying that, because you were born in England,
and England has been part of the EU for decades, and now you were just saying ‘I’mnot born in Europe’?
Mustafa: But the thing is, I don’t see as England being a strong …I know they’re
quite strong in Europe, but I guess like I think like Europe’s sort of latching onto
England, and I think England’s more distant from Europe, even though they’re
quite strong contenders in the European Union. Now if you’ve seen the news,
they’re actually thinking to vote not to be key contenders in the European Union,
so they’ll be more of the people that’s on the marginal lines of Europe, instead ofthe core players of the, like Germany or France.
Native British students at Darwin also referred to the country’s separateness and
struggled to position themselves within a European discourse. In the following
discussion, the British students who took part in the mixed-sex focus group agreed
that Europe is a rather irrelevant, distant community with which they have nothing
much to do. The discussion thus shows how Europe is defined as a geographical zone
and too broad a category to identify with:
D.F.: What role would you say Europe plays in your life?
Adam: Nothing.
Charles: Nothing, whatsoever.
Clara & Olivia: [murmur agreement]
Adam: Wouldn’t really like it to play much of a role either.
Charles: It’s got nothing to do with me, it’s a bit irrelevant.
Charlotte: You wouldn’t say you were French cos that’s in Europe.
Adam: It’s just a zone.
Charles: You wouldn’t say ‘hello, I’m European’ .
D.F.: Why wouldn’t you say that?
Adam: Cos you’re an individual from many different places, in Europe.
Charles: European is too broad a generalisation to class anyone as, whereas British
obviously is much smaller, has less minorities, less groups to put yourself in, so its
easier to say ‘Y es I am British’ , but even in England, even in London, few people
would say ‘yes I’m British’ , they’d say ‘I’m from London’ , ‘I’m from Essex’ , ‘I’m fromJournal of Youth Studies 175

Kent’ , or, ‘I’m from Oaks’ , cos people like to give themselves the smallest
community to put themselves within, so they can feel more special.
The tension between Englishness (or Britishness) and Europeanness is played out in
the above passage. The girls felt that by saying you are from England it is ‘kind of
more personal, a more detailed answer of where you actually come from’ whereas
saying you are European could mean many different things.
The above discussions indicated that social class positioning also affected young
people’s political identities (although it was not possible within the limits of this
research to determine the relative importance of this factor). Privileged backgrounds
worked differently in each country. German and Turkish students at Goethe
Gymnasium in Stuttgart, which promoted European alongside multicultural values,
had the best opportunities of relating to Europe as a political identity (national /C1
European identities). Their privileged backgrounds allowed them to take part in
school exchanges and to travel across Europe, and thus benefit from the opportunities
associated with Europe. Y outh at Darwin School in London also benefited from their
socio-economically advantaged backgrounds and the school’s promotion of an
inclusive national identity. However, as a result of England’s ambivalent approach to
Europe, as well as a curricular emphasis on national and multicultural values, the
British and Turkish middle-class students I interviewed developed ethno-national
identities. In contrast, as a result of their mainly working-class backgrounds, youth at
Millroad School and Tannberg Hauptschule privileged their national identities and
did not consider Europe part of their hybrid identities.
Table 3 summarises, from a comparative research point of view, what we have
learnt about young people’s European knowledge, interests and identities.
There are very few other comparative studies of young people’s political identities
[4]. Notable are those of Convery et al. (1997) and Gordon et al. (2000). For
example, Convery et al . adopted a post-positivist stance to argue that a much greater
proportion of native youth felt ‘totally European’ (47.9 per cent) compared with
Afro-Caribbeans (five per cent) and Asians (10.1 per cent) while 40 and 43.4 per cent
of Afro-Caribbeans and Asians, respectively, felt ‘partly European’ compared with
31.8 per cent of native students. Arguably, the model of comparative research into
students’ identities was developed by a series of five Eurobarometer surveys ( The
Young Europeans ) (European Commission 1982, 1989, 1991, 1997, 2001a). Questions
on national and European identities have also been included in the Standard
Eurobarometer since 1992 (European Commission 1992 /C1). For example, in 2002, 38
per cent of Europeans regarded themselves as ‘(nationality) only’ , 48 per cent as
‘(nationality) and European’ , seven per cent as ‘European and (nationality)’ and four
per cent as Europeans only. Since 1992, there have always been more people who feel
to some extent European than people who solely identify with their own nationality.
However, the sense of sharing a common identity has not become more widespread
over the years, suggesting that the gap between European political elites and the
public (and between countries) regarding European citizenship and identity is not176 D. Faas

closing. Although these mainly quantitative studies give us a broad insight into youth
identities, little if any account has been provided of young people’s voices to theseissues. In contrast, this article has not only considered the complexity of factorsaffecting young people’s European political knowledge, interests and identities, but
has also discussed the ethnic and political dimensions of young people’s hybrid
identities.
Concluding Remarks
The different prioritisation of European agendas in Germany and England was clearly
an important factor in explaining the differences between the political knowledge and
identities of youth; whereas the school dynamics (ethos and curriculum approaches)were amongst the most important factors affecting young people’s responses within
one country. The article therefore raises important questions about the appropriate-ness of both the National Curriculum guidelines in England and the school curriculaof subjects such as citizenship, geography and history, where European topics arecurrently only marginally included. Unlike in Germany where each type of secondaryschool has a mandatory curriculum for all ages and levels with very limited studentchoice below Y ear 11 (ages 16 /C117), the English system promotes subject specialisa-
tion at an early age and allows for young people to drop history, geography andforeign languages (i.e. subjects that are particularly suitable for promoting ‘Europe’)
at Key Stage 4 (ages 14 /C116). The findings of this study not only suggest that it might
help the new generation of European youth forge a loyalty to Europe if schoolstransformed nation-centred curricula into more inclusive learning approaches, butalso highlighted the educational discrepancies within the EU. In order to avoid suchT able 3 Factors affecting young people’s European knowledge and identities.
Germany England
Tannberg
HauptschuleGoethe
GymnasiumMillroad
SchoolDarwin
School
Macro-political
levelVery strong European dimension Weak European dimension
Institutional level
(a) Location Working-class
inner-cityMiddle-class
inner-cityWorking-class
inner-cityMiddle-class
inner-city
(b) European
topicsMany Many Few Few
(c)School
approachesEurocentric
educationMulticultural
EuropeannessCelebrating
diversityMulticultural
Britishness
(d)European
knowledgeHigher Higher Lower Lower
(e)European
identitiesW eak
ethno-
nationalPartial
national /C1
EuropeanW eak
nationalW eak
ethno-
nationalJournal of Youth Studies 177

gaps, it might be worth considering the potential of European educational standards
(i.e. a European core curriculum with specified standards that all students in the EU
must attain within a certain period) without falling into the normative trap of
asserting that Europe is the ideal and only way forward.
Another example that highlights the gaps between European countries is the role of
foreign language learning. There have been different responses to the European
Commission’s recommendation that all pupils should master at least two European
languages in addition to their own by the end of their compulsory education
(European Commission 2001b). In Germany, for instance, several federal states
introduced legislation by which compulsory foreign language learning starts in thefirst year of primary school and sixth-form students are obliged to take one European
language other than German as one of their A-level subjects. In England, by contrast,
language learning beyond the age of 14 ceased to be compulsory in September 2005
and the government suggested that ‘whilst not making it a compulsory part of the
National Curriculum, we will give each child an entitlement to learn a language at
primary level by 2010’ (Department for Education and Skills 2002, p. 4). Arguably,
only three years of compulsory foreign language learning is ‘a retrograde step’ (e.g.
Nuffield Foundation 2002) that could disadvantage British youth in terms of
European job opportunities and EU funding to study abroad.
The evidence in this article also suggests that in countries with strong European
agendas (e.g. Germany) and where Europe is conceptualised as an inclusive multi-
ethnic concept, young people from diverse ethno-religious backgrounds relate
positively to Europe. In contexts of strong European agendas and where Europe is
constructed in ethnocentric/Eurocentric terms, minority ethnic youth like the Turkish
Muslims seemed to privilege ethno-national identities. In contrast, the findings
suggest that in countries with weak European agendas (e.g. England) and where
Europe is marginalised in school curricula, young people struggle to relate to Europe.
While some countries see Europe as a common bond that may hold the different
racial and ethno-religious communities together at a time of increasing globalisation,
others (like England) promote national agendas for example through citizenshipeducation. Regardless of whether one wants to promote an inclusive concept of
Europe or the nation-state or both, the underlying question is also how to integrate
minority ethnic youth into host societies and how to respond to their particular
educational needs. If we want to increase young people’s European political
knowledge, interests and identities, then we need to promote both diversity and
solidarity . And if we want to connect young people with the EU project, then we
should address their ‘information gaps’ (Chisholm 1997) by promoting initiatives
such as Ploteus (provides information on learning opportunities and exchanges), the
European Youth Portal (www.europa.eu/youth) and the Youth Foundation.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the British Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the
Cambridge European Trust and Clare Hall College Cambridge for sponsoring the178 D. Faas

research upon which this article is based; and the Hellenic Foundation for European
and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) for inviting me to present some of my findings to
European experts.
Notes
[1] An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Halki International Seminar in Spetses,
Greece, June 2006.
[2] The 1993 Green paper on the European dimension in education suggested ways of
cooperation among students, parents, teachers and administrators, and thus sought for
enactment of Article 126 of the Maastricht Treaty (Council of Ministers of Education 1993).
[3] For some theorists (e.g. Yuval-Davis 1997; Modood 2000) the notion of hybridity or
hybridisation remains insufficient in providing an alternative to essentialist conceptualisa-tions of identity. However, rather than focusing on notions of hybridity per se , this article
acknowledges that identities shift and change and are affected by the social context (e.g.
macro-political, schools) young people live in.
[4] Other comparative European youth studies focus more on young people’s attitude towards
Europe and the EU, such as Chisholm et al. (1995), Angvik and von Borries (1997) and von
Borries (1999).
References
Angvik, M. & von Borries, B. (eds) (1997) Youth and History: A Comparative European Survey on
Historical Consciousness and Political Attitudes among Adolescents ,K o¨rber-Stiftung, Ham-
burg.
Auernheimer, G. (1990) ‘How black are the German Turks? Ethnicity, marginality and interethnic
relations for young people of Turkish origin in Germany’ , in Childhood, Youth, and Social
Change: A Comparative Perspective , eds L. Chisholm, P . Bu ¨chner, H. Kru ¨ger & P . Brown, The
Falmer Press, Basingstoke.
Bhabha, H. K. (1990) Nation and Narration , Routledge, London.
Brah, A. (1996) Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities , Routledge, London.
Butler, J. (1997) The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection , Stanford University Press,
Stanford.
Caglar, A. S. (1997) ‘Hyphenated identities and the limits of ‘‘culture’’’ , in The Politics of
Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community , eds T. Modood & P .
Werbner, Zed Books, London.
Chisholm, L. (1997) Building citizenship with a European dimension: where are we now? A
preliminary analysis of Young Europeans 1997 data , Unpublished Manuscript, European
Commission, Brussels.
Chisholm, L., Du Bois-Reymond, M. & Coffield, F. (1995) ‘What does Europe mean to me?
Dimensions of distance and disillusion amongst European students’ , in European Yearbook on
Youth Policy and Research: The Puzzle of Integration , ed. Circle for Youth Research
Cooperation in Europe, de Gruyter, Berlin.
Convery, A., Evans, M., Green, S., Macaro, E. & Mellor, J. (1997) Pupils’ Perceptions of Europe:
Identity and Education , Cassell, London.
Convey, A. & Merritt, A. (2000) ‘The United Kingdom’ , in Education in a Single Europe , eds
C. Brock & W. Tulasiewicz, Routledge, London.
Council of Ministers of Education (1988) ‘Resolution of the Council and the Ministers of
Education: meeting within the Council on the European dimension in education of 24 May
1988, 88/C/177/02’ , Official Journal of the European Communities , vol. C 177, pp. 5 /C17.Journal of Youth Studies 179

Council of Ministers of Education (1993) Green Paper on the European Dimension of Education ,
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg.
Council of the European Union (1997) ‘Treaty of Amsterdam’ , Official Journal of the European
Communities , vol. C 340, 10 November, pp. 145 /C1172.
Council of the European Union (2004) Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe , [Online]
Available at: http://europa.eu/constitution/index_en.htm (accessed 11 October 2006).
Department for Education and Skills (2002) Green Paper 14-19: Extending Opportunities, Raising
Standards , [Online] Available at: http://www.dfes.gov.uk/14-19greenpaper/ download/DfES-
LanguageLearning.pdf (accessed 17 October 2003).
Department of Education and Science (1991) EC, UK and Council of Europe Resolutions in Relation
to the European Dimension in Education , [Online] Available at: http://www. neelb.org.uk/
cass/languages/euro-pean/zl00017l.htm #resolutions (accessed 16 April 2003).
Derrida, J. (1981) Positions , trans. A. Bass, Athlone, London.
Dolby, N.E. (2001) Constructing Race: Youth, Identity and Popular Culture in South Africa , State
University of New York Press, Albany, NY.
Enneli, P ., Modood, T. & Bradley, H. (2005) Young Turks and Kurds: A Set of ‘Invisible’
Disadvantaged Groups , Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York.
European Commission (1982) The Young Europeans , Brussels, European Commission.
European Commission (1989) The Young Europeans , Brussels, European Commission.
European Commission (1991) The Young Europeans , European Commission, Brussels.
European Commission (1992 /C1)Standard Eurobarometer , [Online] Available at: http://europa.
eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm (accessed 11 October 2006).
European Commission (1997) The Young Europeans , European Commission, Brussels.
European Commission (2001a) The Young Europeans , European Commission, Brussels.
European Commission (2001b) Special Eurobarometer Europeans and Languages , [Online] Available
at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/ebs_147_summ_en. pdf (accessed
22 November 2002).
Faas, D. (2007) ‘Turkish youth in the European knowledge economy: an exploration of their
responses to Europe and the role of social class and school dynamics for their identities’ ,European Societies , vol. 9, no. 5 (forthcoming).
Foucault, M. (1980) ‘Truth and power; the subject of power; and two lectures’ , in Power/Knowledge:
Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972 /C177, ed. C. Gordon, Harvester, Brighton.
Foucault, M. (1988) ‘T echnologies of the self’ , in Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel
Foucault , eds L. Martin, H. Gutman & P . Hutton, Tavistock, London.
Gordon, T., Holland, J. & Lahelma, E. (2000) Making Spaces: Citizenship and Difference in Schools ,
Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Hall, S. (1992) ‘New ethnicities’ , in ‘Race’, Culture and Difference , eds J. Donald & A. Rattansi, Sage
Publications, London.
Hall, S. (1996) ‘Who needs identity’ , in Questions of Cultural Identity , eds S. Hall & P . du Gay, Sage
Publications, London.
Ku¨c¸u¨kcan, T. (1999) Politics of Ethnicity, Identity and Religion: Turkish Muslims in Britain , Ashgate,
Aldershot.
Kultusministerkonferenz (1990) Europa im Unterricht: Beschluss der Kultusminister-konferenz vom
08.06.1978 in der Fassung vom 07.12.1990 , [Online] Available at: http:// bebis.cidsnet.de/
faecher/feld/europa/unterricht_dateien/kmkeuropa.htm (accessed 26 March 2003).
Kultusministerkonferenz (1992) Zur europa ¨ischen Dimension im Bildungswesen: Beschluss der
Kultusministerkonferenz vom Juni 1992 , Sekretariat der Sta ¨ndigen Konferenz der Kultusmin-
ister der La ¨nder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn.
Mac an Ghaill, M. (1999) Contemporary Racisms and Ethnicities: Social and Cultural Transforma-
tions , Open University Press, Buckingham.180 D. Faas

MacLure, M. (2003) Discourse in Educational and Social Research , Open University Press,
Maidenhead.
Mercer, K. (2000) ‘A sociography of diaspora’ , in Without Guarantees: In Honour of Stuart Hall , eds
P . Gilroy, L. Grossberg & A. McRobbie, Verso, London.
Modood, T. (2000) ‘Anti-essentialism, multiculturalism and the ‘‘recognition of religious groups’’’ ,
inCitizenship in Diverse Schools , eds W. Kymlicka & W. Norman, Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Nuffield Foundation (2002) Nuffield Languages Team responds to the 14 to 19 Green Paper , [Online]
Available at: http://www.earlystart.co.uk/nuffield-green.htm (accessed 9 October 2002).
Risse, T. & Engelmann-Martin, D. (2002) ‘Identity politics and European integration: the case of
Germany’ , in The Idea of Europe: from Antiquity to the European Union , ed. A. Pagden,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Sen, F. & Goldberg, A. (1994) Tu¨rken in Deutschland: Leben zwischen zwei Kulturen , Verlag C.H.
Beck, Mu ¨nchen.
Skeggs, B. (1997) Formations of Class and Gender: Becoming Respectable , Sage, London.
Soysal, Y., Bertilotti, T. & Mannitz, S. (2005) ‘Projections of identity in French and German history
and civics textbooks’ , in The Nation, Europe and the World , eds H. Schissler & Y. Soysal,
Berghahn Books, Oxford.
Tizard, B. & Phoenix, A. (2002) Black, White or Mixed Race? Race and Racism in the Lives of Young
People of Mixed Parentage , Routledge, London.
Tulasiewicz, W. (1993) ‘The European dimension and the national curriculum’ , in The Multicultural
Dimension of the National Curriculum , eds A. S. King & M. J. Reiss, Falmer, London.
von Borries, B. (1999) ‘A cross-cultural comparison of students’ concepts of Europe’ , in European
Yearbook on Youth Policy and Research: Intercultural Reconstruction , ed. Circle for Y outh
Research Cooperation in Europe, de Gruyter, Berlin.
Yuval-Davis, N. (1997) ‘Ethnicity, gender relations and multiculturalism’ , in Debating Cultural
Hybridity: Multicultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-racism , eds P . Werbner & T.
Modood, Zed Books, London.Journal of Youth Studies 181