U.S. Army Field Artillery Relevance on the Modern Battlefield [622856]

U.S. Army Field Artillery Rele vance on the Modern Battlefield
CSC 2004 Subject Area Artillery

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: U.S. Army Field Artillery Relevance on the Modern Battlefield

Thesis: Military operations in support of the Global War on Terror, and particularly
those in Iraq, provide valuable insight into the relevance of the U.S. Army field artillery’s
relevance on the modern battlefiel d and its required capabilities.
Discussion: As the US Military embarked upon th e Global War on Terror, the US Army
Field Artillery found itsel f bombarded by questions of its co ntinued relevance. Artillery
was noticeably absent from Operation Anac onda in Afghanistan, the Department of
Defense cancelled the Crusader Howitzer Pr ogram, and pundits que stioned whether the
artillery was still relevant. As the dust se ttled from these events, the Army was deeply
involved in Operation Iraqi Free dom. The force structure in Iraq was almost half as small
as that for Operation Desert Storm and the Ar my’s artillery to mane uver force ratios were
the smallest since the late-19
th Century. The service was trading mass for speed and
agility. While an important contributor to the Army’s success in the major combat
phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the artill ery was not without its shortcomings.

Conclusions: The artillery must take a hard look at these trends and shape the future
artillery force into one that is agile in its deployability a nd mobility while complementing
the effects of other joint fires assets. It is impossible to predict with absolute certainty the
artillery’s relevance in future conflicts. However, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
have proven that the key to success on the modern battlefield is not any one means
of fire support but the successful integratio n of the full spectrum of lethal and non-
lethal joint fires. While the future remains to be seen, US Army Field Artillery can best
posture itself for relevance by consistently improving its cont ribution to the joint fire
support team in support of combined arms operations.

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i TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …… iii
CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND ………………………………………………………………………………………1
INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. ..1
A STRUGGLE FOR RELEVANCE ……………………………………………………………………………..2 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM………………………………………………………………………..3 BACKGROUND ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… ..5
CRUSADER ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. …….6
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………………………………… …..7
CHAPTER 2. ARTILLERY IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM …………………………………8
INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. ..8
ESSENTIAL FIRE SUPPORT TASKS ……………………………………………………………………….11 M7 BRADLEY FIRE SUPPORT TEAM VEHICLE ……………………………………………………12 M109A6 PALADIN INTEGRATION …………………………………………………………………………14 TIMELINESS …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. …..16
COUNTERFIRE…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. ..18
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN……………………………………………………..19
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………………………………… …21

CHAPTER 3. FIELD ARTILLERY’S CONTINUED RELEVANCE: LESSONS
LEARNED AND REQUIRED CAPABILITIES …………………………………………………………….23
INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 23
GENERAL SUPPORT FIELD ARTILLERY……………………………………………………………….23 DUD RATE ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. ……28
COUNTERFIRE RADAR …………………………………………………………………………………………32 SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES …………………………………………………….36 DIGITAL FIRE SUPPORT ……………………………………………………………………………………….38 FORCE PROTECTION …………………………………………………………………………………………….39 SENSE AND DESTROY ARMOR MUNITION …………………………………………………………42
LONG RANGE ADVANCED SCOUT SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM ……………………………44
CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. …45

CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS …………………………………….47
ACRONYM APPENDIX ……………………………………………………………………………………………….50
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY …………………………………………………………………………………52

ii FIGURES

Figure 1-1. M39 ATACMS………………………………………………………………………………………….. …..3
Figure 2-1. OIF Area of Oper ations and Combat Units ………………………………………………………10
Figure 2-2. M7 BFIST …………………………………………………………………………………………… ……..13
Figure 2-3. 3rd Infantry Division Artiller y M109A6 Paladin in Iraq ……………………………………..15
Figure 2-4. 101st Airborne Division (Air Assa ult) Artillery in Iraq ……………………………………..20
Figure 3-1. MLRS Deliv ered ICM Submunition ……………………………………………………………….29
Figure 3-2. HIMARS Firing in Support of SOF Operations ………………………………………………..37

iii PREFACE

I began research on this paper in order to provide some insight into the U.S. Army
field artillery’s role on the modern batt lefield. A decade of peacekeeping operations
around the globe, after Operation Desert Storm in 1991, found the field artillery
conducting presence patrols and manning ch eckpoints rather than delivering cannon,
rocket, or missile fires in support of combat operations. Additionally, post-9/11
operations in Afghanistan in 2001 saw field artillery units on th e sidelines as U.S. forces
engaged in combat operations. My research fo cused on exploring the fi eld artillery’s role
on the modern battlefield through an analysis of the artillery’s historical roles and
missions contrasted with present-day operational needs. At the heart of my research are
first-person accounts from comman ders and staff officers that participated in Operation
Enduring Freedom (October 2001 – Present) as well as Operation Iraqi Freedom (March
2003 – Present). I supplemented these accoun ts with secondary analyses of force
structure and “big picture” perspectives of post-9/11 military operations from military officials, policy experts, and hi storians. All of these source s guided my critical analysis
of the field artillery’s co ntinued relevance and corres ponding recommendations for
change. I would like to express my gratitude to the commanders and staff officers of the
3
rd Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division whose fi rst-person accounts of combat
operations made this paper possible and to Lieutenant Colonel Bill Bennett and Doctor
Don Bittner for their invaluable mentorship as my faculty advisors. Finally, I would like
to especially thank my wife Amy for her support and untiring patie nce through all of the
research, writing, and editing of this docum ent over the last eight months.

1 CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION
As the U.S. military embarked upon the Global War on Terror, the U.S. Army
field artillery found itself bombarded by questio ns pertaining to its relevance. While
proudly earning the title “Ki ng of Battle” for its vital c ontributions in every major
operation since the Revolutionary War, the arti llery’s role in military operations seemed
to be diminishing upon the conclusion of the Co ld War. While critic al to the successful
maneuver of Cold War legacy ground formati ons in Operation Desert Storm, the field
artillery’s relevance seemed to be in decline in the ensuing ten years. The U.S. Army
deployed artillery units to support stability operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The artillerymen contributed much in the way of ma npower, transportation
resources, targeting, and deterrence over the c ourse of these operations. However, these
new roles were not exactly in keeping with the field ar tillery’s mission “to destroy,
neutralize, or suppress the en emy by cannon, rocket, and missile fires and to integrate all
fires into combined arms operations.”
1 The field artillery’s core competency of
delivering these cannon, rocket, and missile fires was mostly limited to firing
illumination rounds in support of presence patr ols. Whether the 105mm howitzers of the
Army’s light forces or the 155mm howit zers and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
(MLRS) of the Army’s heavy forces, the decad e of the 1990’s was one of relative silence

1 U.S. Army Field Artillery School, “Field Artillery Mission,” sill-www.army.mil ,
<www./pao/mission.htm> January 2004.

2 for the field artillery. The field artille ry’s post-Operation Desert Storm dormancy
provided fertile ground for questions regarding its relevance.

A STRUGGLE FOR RELEVANCE
The military’s transition to a wartime footing after 11 September 2001 raised
questions of the field artillery’s relevance. Soon after, the Army deployed forces to
Afghanistan in order to bri ng the fight to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Based upon the
speed with which President George W. Bu sh and Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld wanted to bring forces to bear in the austere and landlocked environs of
Afghanistan, the deployed forces were tailored to trade mass and overwhelming
firepower for flexibility and ag ility. Notably absent from the deployment manifests were
field artillery weapon systems.
At the same time, some within the Army were questioning the artillery’s ability to
provide effective close s upport to maneuver operations. 2 Based upon the refinement of
deep battle doctrine using less ons learned from Operation Dese rt Storm, the field artillery
had developed tactics, techniques, and pro cedures (TTP) to complement the new Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) that made its debut in Desert Storm and was capable
of ranges beyond 150 Kilometers (Km). With th is new munition, the field artillery could
now accurately strike, “at enemy forces that were not yet engaged and destroy enemy
capabilities that would have an im mediate impact on the close battle.”3 The shift in the
field artillery’s conceptual focus to such deep strike interdiction mi ssions caused some to

2 LTC Robert R. Leonhard, “Classical Fire Support vs. Parallel Fires,” Army Magazine 51, no.4, April
2001, 47-50.
3 Boyd L. Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle (Fort Sill, OK: United States Army Field Artillery
Center and School, 1994), 23.

3 call into question the field ar tillery’s dedication to its traditional role of supporting
maneuver forces in the close fight.

Figure 1-1. M39 ATACMS4
Finally, in May 2002 the Department of Defense canceled the Army’s Crusader
cannon system, a system that only a few mont hs before had been termed a “critical
delivery system” by Army leadership.5 The loss of this “next generation” howitzer meant
to replace systems outperformed and outranged by the current artillery forces of allies and potential foes alike, only posed additio nal questions with regards to the field
artillery’s future.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
In March 2002, the United States, with assistance from coalition partners,
commenced Operation Anaconda in Afghani stan. The mission: to destroy massed
Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanist an’s Sha-e-Kot Valley. MG Franklin
Hagenback, commander of the 10
th Mountain Division and CJ TF Mountain in Anaconda,

4 White Sands Missile Range Museum, www.wsmr-history. org, <www.wsmr-
history.org/AtacmsAction3.htm>
5 MG Toney Stricklin, “Field Artillery: Releva nt, Trained, and Ready…Two Years Later,” Field Artillery
(July-August 2001): 4.

4 remarked that he did not even consider bringing the unit’s 105 mm howitzers because
they could accomplish th e mission without them.6 In retrospect, he felt particularly
confident in this decision given the limited rotary winged lift assets, significant lift
limitations at high altitude, a nd the rough terrain that woul d have made re-positioning
towed howitzers extremely difficult. Instead, units from the 101st Airborne Division and
the 10th Mountain Division relied upon close air support (CAS) for heavy firepower and
mortars for immediate and mobile fire support.
Operation Anaconda was significant becau se the American forces accomplished
their mission in the largest engagement of Operation Enduring Freedom to-date by
relying upon fire support assets other than the field artillery. The mo rtars provided an all-
weather, responsive asset that was light enough to transport by helicopter in high
elevations, had a very small foot print with regards to strategic lift, and was organic to the
infantry units employed in the fight. Th e CAS aircraft were self-deployable,
complemented the mortar’s range limitations, and in-turn their limited responsiveness
was complemented by the mortar’s immediate responsiveness. Even the lightest field
artillery howitzers would have required addi tional strategic lift assets to transport
equipment and personnel from the U.S. to Afghani stan. Once in theater, they would have
required additional CH-47 helicopters for transport. Such dedicated lift was unavailable given the premium placed on tempo and agility from the operation’s beginning. While possibly an aberration of terrain and initial-en try lift requirements, the artillery’s absence
during Anaconda only added to a growing list of Army operations since Operation Desert
Storm that did not employ its fires.

6 MG Franklin L. Hagenback, “Afghanistan: Fire Su pport for Operation Anaconda,” interview by Robert
H. McElroy and Patrecia Slayden Hollis in Field Artillery (September-October 2002): 8.

5 BACKGROUND

During the ten years between Desert St orm and the Global War on Terror, the
field artillery focused much of its trai ning and doctrine development upon shaping
operations several hundred kilometers beyond the FLOT. Besides counterfire, an increasingly important mission for general support artillery was the at tack of high payoff
targets such as SCUD launchers, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) for close air
support, and SEAD for attack aviation units deep into the battlespace. The ATACMS
munition first employed during Desert Stor m provided range and accuracy capabilities
superior to its predecessor the Lance missile system opening the deep battlespace to
tactical commanders for the first time.
While the field artillery was developing ne w variants of ATACMS and the tactics,
techniques, and procedures to employ them, many in the Army thought this new deep
focus came at the cost of support to maneuve r forces engaged in the close battle.
Indicative of this suspicion wa s an article written in 2001 by a retired infantry officer.
LTC(Retired) Robert Leonhard’s article on artillery support summed up many in the
maneuver community’s misgivings regarding th e field artillery’s dedication to the close-
fight. LTC Leonhard wrote that the artillery could no longer in tegrate fires with infantry
and armor units because of a parallel fire s upport system that only s upports the attack of
an artillery-devised High Payo ff Target List (HPTL). This parallel fires system is in
direct contravention of fire support’s clas sical role of providing fires to support the
maneuver commander’s needs. The result of th is parallel fires system is fire support
unresponsive to the fluid targeting requirement s of maneuver warfare in order to place
“the main-effort unit into the enemy’s rear where it can cause c onfusion, disruption, and

6 defeat.” Furthermore, Leonhard writes, “Our doctrine no longer emphasizes close
coordination between task forces and fire s, and the technology and the tactics,
techniques, and procedures we employ in the field absolutely banish the maneuver
commander from the now-mysterious world of fire support.”7 Leonhard does not deny
the importance of the field artillery to combin ed arms operations, but he decries the lack
of a “customer support” ethos in the field artillery with th e dangerous effect of denying
maneuver commanders the synchronized fires needed to successfully complete their
mission. Leonhard’s article articulated what ma ny in the Army viewed as fact.

CRUSADER

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s decision to cancel the Army’s Crusader
howitzer program soon after Operation An aconda in May 2002 further called into
question the field artillery’s role in the cu rrent and future operati ng environments. In
announcing the cancellation, Rumsfeld referred to the Crusader as a Cold-War relic
designed for fighting large Soviet armored form ations on the plains of Northern Europe;
hence, it was of dubious value in the rapi dly changing non-linear ba ttlefields of the War
on Terror.8
The Defense Department reasoned that th e risk associated with Crusader’s
cancellation could be mitigated by the development of precision munitions for current cannon systems. However, it went against th e Congressional testim ony of Army Chief of
Staff General Eric Shinseki, who stated that precision guided weapons and close air
support may be more accurate, “ [but] if you ha ve imprecise locations or if you just know

7 Leonhard, “Classical Fire Support vs. Parallel Fires,” 48.
8 Scott Shuger, “Outgunned: What th e Crusader Cancellation Really M eans to the Army,” 23 May 2002,
MSN.Com , URL: <slate.msn.com/id/2066158/>, November 2003.

7 there’s enemy force out there, but you don’t have them accurately located, precision
doesn’t help you much.”9 In spite of this and other te stimony by senior Army officials,
another vote of no confidence was cast for the Army’s view of modern warfare and
correspondingly the field artiller y’s place on future battlefields.

CONCLUSION

Looking through the combined lens of Operation Anaconda, the questions of
close support, and the Crusader cancellation, the field artillery appeared to be on the
verge of irrelevance just as the Global War on Terror commenced. Make no mistake, the
War on Terror introduced challenges throughout the U.S. Army as it transitioned from a
heavy force without a peer competitor stru ctured to fight symmetric foes on linear
battlefields to a lighter and mo re expeditionary force. The challenges appeared especially
daunting for the field artillery as special operations forces and light infantry units took the
fight to the terrorists using fire support pr ovided by air launched pr ecision munitions and
mortars rather than cannon, rocket, or missile fires. Additionally, the Department of
Defense cancelled the field artillery’s one and only new deliv ery system with no
identified replacement.
In March 2003 the U.S. military embarked on the largest operation to-date in the
post-9/11 era, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Due to Iraq’s large standing army, ability
to employ chemical weapons, and numerous urba n areas Iraq presented a difficult test of
the military’s emphasis on tempo and agility that had worked so well in Afghanistan. The operation would further prove a test of the U.S. Army’s field artillery forces and
their ability to support rapid and decisive warfare.

9 Shuger, “Outgunned: What the Crusader Ca ncellation Really Means to the Army.”

8 CHAPTER 2
ARTILLERY IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

INTRODUCTION
The Army deployed to Operation Iraqi Free dom with a proporti on of artillery to
maneuver forces lower than that of any major campaign since the Spanish American
War.10 In Operation Desert Storm, a committed division could expect to receive one or
two reinforcing brigades of artillery; how ever, in Operation Iraqi Freedom the 101st
Airborne Division (A ir Assault) and 3rd Infantry Division (Mechan ized) went into battle
with only their organic division artilleries. This lack of additional artillery support was
significant because it forced the weighting of a division’s main effort maneuver brigade
with a reinforcing artillery battalion drawn from a supporting effort maneuver brigade.
While often drawn from a brigad e in reserve, the non-linear na ture of the war meant that
every brigade was constantly in contact and, at times, without artille ry in direct support.11
This put artillery fires at a premium for brigade commanders because, while extremely
effective during the conflict, mortars were lim ited in their range capabilities and close air
support was degraded in a dverse weather conditions.
Throughout Iraqi Freedom commanders relied on the field artillery to provide
counterfire in order to destroy enemy cannon and rocket systems. These counterfire
operations were extremely important in setting the conditions for the rapid attack of U.S.
forces towards Baghdad. The Iraqi artillery outranged and outnumbered the U.S. artillery

10 MG(R) Robert Scales, “Artillery’s Failings in th e Iraq War: United States Must Focus on Range and
Precision,” Armed Forces Journal (November 2003): 44.
11 COL Daniel Allyn, Commander of 3rd Brigade 3rd Infantry Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
interview by the author, 10 December 2003.

9 and even uncoordinated harassing fires coul d adversely impact the operation by slowing
down the tempo of U.S. forces. The U.S. Ar my also relied on th e artillery for close
support in adverse weather conditions such as the 24-26 March 2003 “mother of all”
sandstorms. The Iraqi Fedayeen mounted c ountless attacks during this period due to the
limitations it placed on coalition airpower; howev er, all-weather artille ry and mortar fires
delivered “danger close” to friendly positions complemented direct fire weapon systems
and prevented many 3rd Infantry Division uni ts from being overrun.12
Seen through the eyes of maneuver and field artillery commanders from the 101st
Airborne and 3rd Infantry Divisions, the field artillery was absolutely relevant because it
provided timely and accurate fires and integrat ed all available fire support systems into
combined arms operations. Fire support inte gration was essential in every attack made
by the maneuver units and set the conditions fo r its domination in the direct-fire fight.13
Field artillery units did provide some l ong-range shaping fires during the conflict;
however, at the tactical level these primarily consisted of co unterfire missions that had as
their sole purpose maintaining freedom of maneuver for their supported units.
Everything the field artill ery did with respect to artillery fires and fire support in general
was joined at the hip with the maneuver comm ander’s and their intent . Hence, the field
artillery played its traditiona l role- unlike in Afghanistan.
Field artillerymen accomplished this e ffective support during Operation Iraqi
Freedom because the ethos of artillery as a supporting arm to maneuver units is ingrained
in Army doctrine, new equipment must al low artillerymen to mesh much more
seamlessly into maneuver formations, and b ecause the artillery was flexible in its

12 Scales, “Artillery’s Failings in the Iraq War: Unite d States Must Focus on Range and Precision,” 46.
13 Allyn, interview by the author.

10 adaptation to a very complex environment. However, it was the art of fire support that
served as the thread to tie all of these factors together. Without artillerymen and
maneuver commanders and staffs assuming the responsibility for fire support as a
coherent team, the best doctrine, equipment, and even flexibility will not amount to
much. Army forces during Iraqi Freedom did work as an effective fire support team, which made the field artillery relevant, and in fact critical, to decisive operations.

Figure 2-1. OIF Area of Operations and Combat Units14

14 “Major Combat Units in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Field Artillery 8, no. 5 (September-October 2003): 3.

11 ESSENTIAL FIRE SUPPORT TASKS

Essential fire support task (EFST) doctrine ensured that there was not a parallel
system of fires but rather one system that supported the needs of the maneuver
commander. While initially developed as a tool in support of the military decision making process, EFSTs proved themselves more valuable as a philosophy of support than as paragraphs in an operations order. The Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma
defines an EFST as, “a task for fire support to accomplish that is required to support a
combined arms operation…failure to achie ve an EFST may require the (maneuver)
commander to alter his tactical or operational plan.”
15 The definition alone makes it clear
that fires are to be planned and executed by a combined arms team in accordance with the maneuver commander’s intent and the unit’s mission.
The EFST doctrine, first put forth by Fort Sill in a May 1998 white paper,
provided a fire support focus to the field ar tillery that paid gr eat dividends during
Operation Iraqi Freedom. One exam ple illustrates this: in the 3
rd Infantry Division’s 3rd
Brigade Combat Team (BCT), the brigade commander personally reviewed and approved
EFSTs developed by the fire support coordi nator (FSCOORD) in conjunction with the
rest of the brigade staff and with addi tional input from subordinate task force
commanders.16 The EFSTs focused the artillery on providing fires at the right place and
right time to support critical maneuver tasks su ch as bridge seizur es, and they focused
maneuver units by tasking them to get a fo rward observer in position to observe these

15 Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department (FSCAOD), Essential Fire Support Task
(EFST) (Ft Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Pr e-Command Course Slides, April 2001).
16 LTC Doug Harding, Commander of 1st Battalion, 10th Field Artillery, 3rd Infantry Division in Operation
Iraqi Freedom, telephone interview by the author, 2 December 2003.

12 critical targets.17 The significance of this cannot be understated because it not only
concentrated the artillery’s planning and execu tion on close maneuver support, but it also
helped to bring the artillery and maneuver arms together as a fire support team dependent
upon one another for success.
As previously stated, it was not the inte rjection of a few EFSTs into operations
orders that led to the artillery’s success during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In fact, one
artillery battalion commander from the 101st Airborne Division commented that the
“lengthy EFST process [consistently traine d at home-station and the combat training
centers]…we found to be of little or no use.”18 Instead, it was the support mindset
amongst artillerymen, the shouldering of respons ibility for fire support tasks by maneuver
commanders, and the fusion of these two concepts into a focused fire support team that
resulted in success for both. Artillerymen we re not tied to supporti ng a high payoff target
list as a product of the planning process; ra ther, they provided fires with the agility
required to support maneuver units during operations in a fast-paced non-linear
environment.

M7 BRADLEY FIRE SUPPORT TEAM VEHICLE
The M7 Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST ) vehicle was yet another enabler of
the artillery’s ability to de liver critical fire support for maneuver. The M7 BFIST
provided a capability sorely missing during Operation Desert Storm when the Army’s
heavy units employed the M981 Fire Support Team Vehicle (FIST-V) vehicle whose

17 LTC Ernest Marcone, Commander of 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor, 3rd Infantry Division in Operation Iraqi
Freedom, telephone interview by the author, 12 December 2003.
18 LTC Henry W. Bennett, Commander of 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101st Airborne Division in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, interview by LTC Pitts, U.S. Army Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group
(OIFSG), 22 May 2003.

13 engine could not maintain pace with maneuver forces, was not survivable against even
small arms fire, and provided a very lim ited targeting/C2 capability. Conversely, the
BFIST during OIF maintained operational te mpo (OPTEMPO) with even the fastest
maneuver systems, was survivable, and could pr ovide precise grid coordinates within 50
meters at ranges exceeding 8,000 meters to supporting fire delivery units.19

Figure 2-2. M7 BFIST20
These new capabilities allowed the BFIST to support maneuver formations from
the front, to include advance-guard maneuve r companies. Fire supporters could now
fight their way to observation posts with th e 25 mm chain gun and achieve first round fire
for effect at all times with th eir inherent targeting accuracy.21 During one engagement a
“BFIST took out several trucks and multiple tr oops” and at another point in the battle
took up positions with the lead elements of its Task Force.22 The BFIST proved itself
invaluable to maneuver commanders as a sens or platform able to maintain OPTEMPO
and survive on the non-linear battlefield. The BFIST’s survivability, OPTEMPO, and

19 Scott R. Gourley, “M7 Bradle y Fire Support Team Vehicle,” Army Magazine , July 2002, 2; LTC
Harding telephone interview.
20 United Defense Inc., www.uniteddefense.com, < www.uniteddefense.com/pr/gra_bradm7.htm>
21 COL David Perkins, Commander of 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
interview by the author, 16 December 2003; Jeffrey Sanderson, Commander of 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor,
3rd Infantry Division in Op eration Iraqi Freedom, telep hone interview by the author , 3 December 2003.
22 CPT Lee, Commander B Company, 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor, 3rd Infantry Division in Operation Iraqi
Freedom, interview by Master Sergeant West of the OIFSG, 15 May 2003.

14 targeting accuracy improvements provided essential fire support to maneuver
commanders over extended distances and at rapid speeds during Operation Iraqi
Freedom. In such a fluid environment, maneuver commanders required immediately
responsive fires and th e BFIST delivered.

M109A6 PALADIN INTEGRATION
Integration of M109A6 Paladin howitzers into maneuver formations was another
hallmark of OIF operations that allowed fo r timely and accurate fires in support of
maneuver. During operations, Paladin batteries were often integrated into lead maneuver
formations. This forward positioning of artille ry allowed the Paladins to range targets in
support of the close fight at all times. Because the 3
rd Infantry Division unit fought the
war primarily in combat column formati ons along high-speed avenues of approach, a
single maneuver task force could be tens of kilometers in length.23 Placing the artillery at
the rear of these formations was not an op tion due to the range capabilities that would
have been lost and the premium placed on each tube due to a lack of reinforcing artillery.
One example of this close integration was in the 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor of the
3rd Infantry Division whose co mmander commented, “The way I fought the artillery is I
had the lead battery right behind the lead company.”24 His supporting ar tillery battalion
commander underscored the importance of his ar tillery’s integration with maneuver units
by stating, “If (I) would not have had firing ba tteries directly behind the lead maneuver

23 LTC Jeffrey Sanderson, Commander Task Force 2-69 Armor; 3rd Infantry Division in Operation Iraqi
Freedom, telephone interview by the author, 3 December 2003.
24 LTC Earnest Marcone, Commander of 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor, 3rd Infantry Division in Operation Iraqi
Freedom, interview by COL(R) Fontenot and LTC Degen of the OIFSG, 22 October 2003.

15 company they would have had issues with range in supporting maneuver.”25 The task
force conducted maneuver rehearsals with th e artillery units so the Paladins could
complement the task force scheme of mane uver and conduct battle drills in accordance
with task force standard operating procedures (SOP). These rehearsals paid tremendous
dividends at each of the batta lion’s five bridge seizures, to include the battalion’s
successful seizure of a key bridgehead acro ss the Euphrates on 2 Ap ril 2003 at Objective
Peach. Because of their forward positioni ng and understanding of the scheme of
maneuver, the Paladins were able to provi de critical obscurati on and suppression in
support of the bridge seizures while concurrently firing cr ew-served weapons in defense
of the battery and task force positions.26

Figure 2-3. 3rd Infantry Division Artillery M109A6 Paladin in Iraq27
The image of a field artillery battery simu ltaneously providing di rect and indirect
fires is a powerful symbol of the challenges faced by the comb ined arms team in Iraq and
in the challenges to be faced in future conf licts as well. Gone are the days of massed

25 LTC Lackey, Commander of 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 3rd ID in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
interview by LTC Pitts of the OIFSG, 18 May 2003.
26 Marcone, telephone interview by the author.
27 Silver State News Service, www.silverstatenews.com,
<www.silverstatenews.com/newssec tions/WarOnTerror/>

16 linear formations with several brigades of reinforcing artillery. What are needed are
lighter more agile units conducti ng operations faster than th eir adversary’s can react.
With this “lightening of the load”, ever y weapon system must count. Much like the
BFIST, the Paladin made artillery fires count because it helped to facilitate a responsive
fire support team amongst artillerymen and their supported maneuver units.

TIMELINESS
The field artillery provided timely art illery fires to maneuver forces during
Operation Iraqi Freedom due to extremel y responsive clearance of fires and mission
processing procedures amongst maneuver and ar tillery units. OIF’s high-tempo and non-
linear battlefield created a complex environmen t for the delivery of fires. Units were
moving at such a rapid pace that, at times, formal boundaries were almost impossible to
emplace and fires to the flank of a movement called by one company would sometimes be observed by the trail company. In order to prevent fratricide, situational awareness of
friendly unit locations was critical as well as the close cooperation between artillery and
maneuver units in the clearance process.
Prior to the start of hostilities, many ma neuver commanders were concerned with
the timeliness of artillery fires based upon their experiences at the Army’s combat
training centers (CTC) at Fort Polk, Lousia na; Fort Irwin, Califo rnia; and Hohenfels,
Germany where responsive fires are ofte n non-existent on a much slower paced
battlefield where linear operations are the norm.
28 An artillery battalion commander in
the 3rd Infantry Division described th e artillery’s training dilemma:
The brigade commander [based upon previous combat experience]
always believed in artillery, but the guys you have to sell are the ones who

28 Perkins, interview by the author.

17 have never seen or have never known what artillery can do. They actually
saw [during OIF] how effective arti llery was at the company and platoon
level and it made believers of them …Our NTCs and CTCs never, ever
replicate the effects of artillery.29

Exacerbating these problems are the time re quired for observer controllers to safe
missions, and the time lags between firing a mission and a “fire marker” dropping an artillery simulator at the targ et location. Maneuver commanders are trained not to expect
timely artillery delivered fires during su ch exercises and the correspondingly low
expectations are evident in LTC Leonhard’s “parallel fire s” philosophy. Based on these
experiences, the prospect of the rapid non-lin ear operations being planned for Iraq only
exacerbated these concerns. These concerns were unjustified: the maneuver and artillery
fire support team called for, cleared, and delivered fires in an average time of
approximately two minutes.
30
The artillery delivered timely fires in support of maneuver units due to close
cooperation with them. It was accomplished through well-rehearsed voice clearance of
fires drills and calls for fire, and rapid digital fire direction procedures within the artillery
battalions. With a grid announced over maneuver command nets, and silence being consent to fire, fire support officers were able to gain clear ance from maneuver unit
commanders and quickly send their calls over the radio to the firing unit.
31 The rapidity
of fires were absolutely required for Ir aqi Freedom’s fluid operations tempo and
contributed to the overall forces agility, agai n because of the effectiveness of the fire
support team.

29 LTC Lackey, interview by LTC Pitts.
30 Perkins, interview by the author; Sanderson, telephone interview by the author; Harding, telephone
interview by the author.
31 Sanderson, telephone interview by the author.

18 COUNTERFIRE

Counterfire operations during Operation Ira qi Freedom were extremely successful
in protecting friendly forces from Iraqi ar tillery and facilitating their freedom of
maneuver. In the 3rd Infantry Division’s area of ope rations alone, they acquired Iraqi
artillery fire almost 1,800 times and fired 74 counterfire missions in response. As a
result, no American soldiers were lost to enemy artillery fire.32 The importance of
effective counterfire was evident at An Na siriyah where much of the division halted
movement and delayed their advance on Baghdad due to Iraqi artillery fire. Movement
proceeded only after counterbattery fires sile nced the Iraqi guns over the course of a two-
hour counterfire fight.33 Regarding this fight, the brig ade commander noted, “ The Iraqis
had a lot of artillery, he used it extensively, but the combin ation of Paladin howitzers and
the Q36 radar was deadly. If he didn’t move, he was dead. The 1-10 FA fired about 1,000 rounds during the battles around An Nasiriya h. The Iraqis [as a result] very seldom
massed fires.”
34
Artillerymen also showed tremendous ad aptability in dealing with the Iraqi
mortars. The Iraqis often delivered mortar fire in urban envir onments by firing a few
rounds and ducking into buildings a few moments after firing . Countering this raised
concerns about collateral dama ge. Fire supporters in the 101st Airborne Division faced
with attacks by single mortars found a proper response: “rather than shoot counter-battery
with HE, we did it with illum [illumination rounds] to let them know we are tracking

32 CW3 Brian L. Borer and LTC No el T. Nicolle, “Acquisition!: 3d ID Counterfire in OIF,” Field Artillery
8, no. 5 (September-October 2003): 46.
33 COL Daniel Allyn, Commander of 3rd Brigade, 3rd ID during Operation Iraqi Freedom, interview by Mr.
Art Durante of the OIFSG, n.d.
34 Allyn, interview by Mr. Art Durant e of the OIFSG.

19 him…[it was] very effective. The enemy would break contact.”35 These non-lethal
counterfire missions restored freedom of maneuver for friendly infantry. The 101st also
used the Q36 radars in concert with Army aviation for counterfire effects. The Iraqis
would fire mortars from the back of pickup a nd then immediately displace. According to
an artillery battalion commander in the 101st:
Firing [with artillery] at a rapidly displacing target such as a mortar
in a pickup truck was ineffective. What did work was having the Kiowa
Warriors [scout helicopters] on sta tion and on the brigade fires net and
when an acquisition occurred they woul d fly to the acquisition and take
out the target before th e vehicle could displace.36
The sole focus of these counterfire mi ssions was the support of friendly maneuver
units. Even a small amount of inaccurate arti llery or mortar fire was enough to disrupt
and delay the movement of friendly fo rces for significant amounts of time.
37 Because of
this, counterfire was critical in maintaining the operation’s fast tempo and thus limiting the Iraqi force’s ability to eff ectively react. Counterfire wa s another aspect of artillery
support in Operation Iraqi Freedom that prove d crucial to the succe ss of rapid operations
on a non-linear battlefield.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN

The artillery continued to provide effec tive fire support during military operations
in urban terrain (MOUT). Artillerymen of the 101
st Airborne Division became especially
adept at providing timely and accurate fires wi th limited collateral damage to civilians,
their property, and infrastructure such as schools and hospitals in urban areas. At Najaf,

35 LTC Randall Barnes, Commander of 3rd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101st Airborne Division in
Operation Iraqi Freedom and others, interview by LTC Pitts of the OIFSG, 24 May 2003.
36 LTC Kevin Batule, Commander of 2nd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101st Airborne Division in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, interview by Lieutena nt Colonel Pitts of the OIFSG, 23 May 2003.
37 Sanderson, telephone interview by the author

20 artillery units were very successful empl oying high explosive (HE) projectiles with
variable time (VT) fuzes. The HE/VT comb ination resulted in airbursts that were
devastating against dismounted in fantry but had little or no e ffect on adjacent structures.
“In at least one instance, friendly troops were clearing the lower floor s of a building when
HE/VT swept the roof of enemy soldiers. This was confirmed by the infantrymen who
looked out the window to see the dead and wounded foe fall past them.”38

Figure 2-4. 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Artillery in Iraq39

The 101st Airborne Division employed their arti llery observers in several different
ways to ensure responsive fires to mane uver units while at the same time avoiding
collateral damage. Due to limited fields of observation in many urban areas, fire support
officers assigned several observers to the same target and integrated OH-58 Kiowa
Warrior helicopters into their observer plan s. This integration provided a redundancy
that ensured the availability of observed arti llery fires in order to mitigate the risk of
collateral damage.

38 COL William L. Greer and others, “101st DivArty: Fighting with Artillery Fires in an Urban
Environment,” Field Artillery 8, no. 5 (September-October 2003): 17.
39 LTC Henry W. Bennett, Commander 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101st Airborne Division during
OIF.

21 The 3rd Infantry Division’s experience in M OUT was much the same. In built-up
areas such as Baghdad, Iraqi forces would defend road intersections and buildings
overlooking those intersections. One armor battalion commander, “realized that just
about every road junction and intersection wa s a likely enemy locat ion, so the artillery
fired on these locations before the friendly forces approached them.”40 Using HE/VT on
the rooftops and HE with a point detona ting (PD) fuze on the intersections, maneuver
commanders would effectively clear the ke y terrain of enemy forces while on the
approach march. As with the 101st Airborne Division’s experience, this tactic mitigated
collateral damage while maintaining constant pressure on the enemy.
Operations in Iraq’s many urban envir onments were of tremendous concern to
commanders prior to the commencement of hos tilities. Maneuver commanders were
particularly concerned that th ey would be limited to direct fires and some precision
guided aircraft-delivered munitions due to c oncerns over collateral damage. But given
the accuracy and adaptability of the fire s upport team, artillery fires were delivered with
great effect in spite of the unique challenges of urban terrai n. Artillerymen remained in
continuous support of maneuver operations th roughout several operations in a MOUT
environment.

CONCLUSION

Field artillery was relevant during Operat ion Iraqi Freedom because it remained
dedicated to supporting friendly maneuver fo rces throughout the operation. In spite of
the rapid tempo of operations in desert, swamp, and urban terrain the artillery remained in

40 LTC Jeffrey Sanderson, Commander of 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor, 3rd Infantry Division in Operation Iraqi
Freedom, interview by Mr. Art Durante, 13 May 2003.

22 the fight without pause. Op erations during OIF proved that the field artillery has not
abandoned its mission of providing close fire support to maneuver commanders and that
it is extremely relevant in the current operating environment. Whether delivering
artillery fires or synchronizing joint fires in support of maneuver uni ts, the field artillery
provided the desired effects at th e right place and at the right time during OIF. This ethos
of support permeated everything the artillery di d. At it’s essence, this mentality of
unwavering support is why the ar tillery was relevant in OIF and why it must remain at
the forefront of artillery doctrin e, training, and equipping if the arm is to remain relevant.

23 CHAPTER 3
FIELD ARTILLERY’S CONTI NUED RELEVANCE: LESSONS
LEARNED AND REQUIRED CAPABILITIES

INTRODUCTION
While the field artillery was extremely relevant during Operation Iraqi Freedom,
it was not without its shortfalls. Equipment and doctrine lessons learned require that the
artillery focus upon improving existing capabili ties to more effectively provide fire
support. Critical issues such as the organi zation of general support artillery and dud rates
unacceptable to maneuver commanders have a direct impact on the artillery’s future
relevance. If supported commanders refuse to employ an artillery capab ility then it must
be changed or removed altogether from the i nventory. The same holds true for systems
unable to deliver a needed capability to supported commanders and supporting artillerymen such as artillery firefinder radars . The artillery’s shortf alls require critical
observation through the lens of fire support as it pertains to faster and more agile
operations where every fi re mission counts.

GENERAL SUPPORT FIELD ARTILLERY

The Army should re-evaluate its general s upport artillery force structure in order
to remain relevant on future non-linear bat tlefields where strategic deployability and
agility at all echelons is essent ial. The Army’s general suppo rt artillery provides fires to
division and corps commanders and usually co nsists of longer-range cannon and rocket
systems than the direct support artillery prov iding fires for maneuver brigades. The bulk
of the Army’s general support field artillery assets are found within the field artillery
brigades organic to the Corps Artillery supporting each Corps. Predominantly MLRS-

24 based units capable of firing the ATACMS out to 300km, th e field artillery brigades
provide the corps commander with an all weat her fire support asset capable of shaping
the commander’s deep battlespace in concert wi th other joint fires assets such as fixed
wing fighters and bombers. The Army last reformed its general support assets in the mid-1970s. The Army’s Division Restructuring Progr am of the time found:
That corps artillery seemed to fi ght its own battle at times, while
division artillery fought its own…corps artillery and divisi on artillery did
not seem to coordinate their effort s effectively and acted relatively
independent of each other. Both practices dated back to World War II. Corps artillery and division artillery did not seem to coordinate their
efforts effectively and acted rela tively independent of each other.
41

As a result of the restructuring program, th e relationship between the corps and division
artilleries was changed from one of inde pendent operations to a more mutually
supporting role where:
The corps general support field artillery group [was placed] in a
reinforcing role to give the division th e first priority in the use of corps
artillery and the authority to posit ion corps artillery units where the
division felt that they coul d best contribute to the battle…[also,] the Field
Artillery School renamed…the corps ar tillery group the brigade to bring
the name in line with the designation of maneuver units.42
Such a structure served the Army well duri ng Operation Desert Storm where, after the
six-month Desert Shield buildup, two Army corp s with multiple field artillery brigades in
each helped to defeat the Iraqi Army in Kuwait in less than 100 hours about which MG Barry McAffrey, Commander 24
th Infantry Division, stated, “Our enormous success was
due, in large part, to the artillery.”43

41 Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle: 1971-1991 , 4.
42 Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle: 1971-1991 , 6.
43 Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle: 1971-1991 , 61.

25 While the field artillery brigades made an important contribution to Operation
Desert Storm by providing deva stating massed fires in suppo rt of combined operations,
lessons from Operation Iraqi Fr eedom point to the need for a change in their organization
and structure. While the forces in Operati on Desert Storm had approximately six months
to build combat power prior to conducting o ffensive operations, the “running start” used
in OIF precluded such a buildup and, as a re sult, limited the employment of general
support field artillery assets. According to the V Corps Artillery operations officer:
Base plan called for up to six field artillery brigades and three
target acquisition detachments. Be cause of running start option it was
reduced to basically two FA Brigades , one in General support reinforcing
and one in reinforcing…at the start of the war both were at a distinct
disadvantage. The 214th [field artillery brigade] had one battalion, 2-4 FA,
and the 41st [field artillery brigade] ha d only one battalion, 1-27 FA.
Additional battalions did not close until well into the war.44
The resultant general support artillery force structure resulted in the 214
th Field Artillery
Brigade providing fires to V Corps and the 3rd Infantry Division with a single MLRS
battalion and the 41st Field Artillery Brigade providing fires to V Corps and the 101st
Airborne Division with a single MLRS battalion.
Besides the strategic lift issue, there was an inherent training issue in the field
artillery brigades supporting the 3rd Infantry and 101st Airborne Divisions with no prior
habitual association save the V Corps “Vic tory Scrimmage” command post exercise a
few weeks prior to commencing offensive ope rations. Just as OIF’s “running start”
precluded a six month strategic buildup like Operation Desert Shield, so too did it
preclude a great deal of training between supported and supporting forces without a

44 LTC Robert Cheatham, G-3 of V Corps Artillery interview by LTC Pitts, U.S. Army Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group (OIFSG), 7 May 2003.

26 habitual relationship. The 41st field artillery brigade commander remarked on supporting
the 101st Airborne Division prior to commencing offensive operations:
The TTPs (Tactics Techniques and Procedures) on how they bring
the fire plan together are a little diffe rent. On the general support side of
the house with what we have worked through previously with the 11th
Aviation, we have a robust C4ISR capability embedded with the 11th
Aviation. We have all worked underneath V Corps. The 101st is a
FORSCOM unit, so although they have that robust C4ISR capability also,
it is different priorities…but we have rehearsed with them in “Victory
Scrimmage”.45
As a result of the OIF force packaging, di vision commanders were receiving supporting
fires from one artillery battalion through a fiel d artillery brigade headquarters with little
previous training or integration into that divisi on’s operations.
While the field artillery brigades did pr ovide timely and accura te fires in support
of the corps commander as well as the divi sion commanders, it was in spite of their
organization. At the completion of combat operations LTG William Wallace, the V Corps Commander remarked upon the general s upport artillery force st ructure, “I think,
perhaps, we’ve got too much artillery in the fo rce structure, if the Ai r Force is going to be
as available as it proved to be in this campa ign. I’m not suggesting we do away with all
the field artillery brigades, but I am sugge sting that the brigad es could be a little
smaller.”
46 In a subsequent interview he remark ed, ”The whole war was fought with two
reinforcing [general support] field artillery battalions, not brigades. Had two brigade
headquarters but each had only one battalion. Suggests to me there is too much
reinforcing artillery in the Army.”47 Just as the Army changed the general support

45 COL Charles Otterstedt, Commander of 41st Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps Artillery, interview by
COL MacLean, V Corps Command Historian, 14 March 2003.
46 LTG William Wallace, Commander V Corps, interview by COL MacLean, V Corps Command
Historian, 15 April 2003.
47 LTG William Wallace, Commander V Corps, interview by LTC Kirkman of the OIFSG, 14 May 2003.

27 artillery force structure in the 1970s to pr ovide the divisions with a more dedicated
general support capabil ity, the Army should carry this ch ange a step further by providing
the divisions with a more robust general suppo rt capability and e liminating many of the
field artillery brigade headquarters at corps level in the process.
The Army should only retain one field artil lery brigade per corps. This one field
artillery brigade will provide the corps co mmander with long-range, primarily ATACMS,
fires with which to shape the corps battlespace and as a complement to other joint fires.
The brigade would be general support to th e corps and may require only one or two
battalions depending upon the mission. The Ar my’s ten divisions would receive an
additional general support arti llery battalion organic to thei r organization. For the heavy
divisions this would be a HIMARS battalion in addition to its general support MLRS
battalion. For the light divisi ons, this additional general support artillery would be a
HIMARS battalion in lieu of its 155mm M198 battery. Such a stru cture would provide
heavy and light division commanders with addi tional organic firepower that is deployable
via C-130 and which, with the fielding of GM LRS (60Km range), will obviate the need
for significant ATACMS support from corps. Additionally, the HIMARS battalion as an
organic unit will allow the division commander to conduct short notice combat operations
with general support artillery that is fully integrated into th e division’s training plan and
communications architecture. Such a for ce structure would pr ovide the corps and
division commanders with a rapidly deployabl e organic fires capabili ty and reduces the
need for significant amounts of general s upport field artillery brigades and their
corresponding headquarters in the Army’s force structure.

28 DUD RATE

The dud rate associated with Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM) limited
their use during OIF. This should be redu ced for all cannon and rocket systems. The
submunitions were first employed by the US during the Vietnam War. They are designed
to produce anti-personnel effects and the dua l-purpose variants found in rockets and
heavier caliber (155 mm) cannon projectiles penetrate armor as well.48 Government
testing and operational use since their incep tion point to dud rates in excess of 10% for
artillery delivered ICM currently in the U. S. inventory. A volley of 12 multiple launch
rocket system rockets alone would resu lt in 1,236 unexploded bo mblets, out of 7,728
total, spread out over an area of 120,000 to 240,000 square meters.49 This would present
a significant danger to military personnel as well as civilian s and possibly hinder
operations.
Twenty-two soldiers were killed and fifty-eight wounded by unexploded
submunitions after the first Gulf War.50 The danger posed to military personnel and
civilians prompted several Congressional inquiries and a January 2001 memo from
Secretary of Defense William Cohen setting less than 1% as the dud rate goal for all
DOD cluster munitions in development. N one of the artillery-delivered bomblets
employed during OIF achieved this threshold.

48 U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-09.60 (Draft), Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Multiple
Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, September 2002),
1-13.
49 Human Rights Watch, A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions (Washington DC: Human Rights
Watch, May 2002): 1.
50 Paul Wiseman, “Ground Forces Won’t Use Improved Cluster Bombs Until At Least 2005,” USA Today ,
11 December 2003, A7.

29

Figure 3-1. MLRS Delivered ICM Submunition51

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 101st Airborne and 3rd Infantry Divisions fired the
vast majority of their missions using high explosive cannon munitions rather dud
producing ICM. The 3rd Infantry Division’s Assistan t Division Commander remarked,
“In hindsight, the division carried to o much dual purpose improved conventional
munitions (DPICM) and not enough high expl osive (HE) field ar tillery ammunition
because the actual use of HE was much gr eater than the planni ng factors predicted.”52
All three direct support arti llery battalions in the 101st Airborne Division went to war
with little or no ICM, opting instead for high explosive (HE) munitions. As one artillery
battalion commander commented, “the dud rate of the DPICM, is something that needs
attention I believe, and we have to unde rstand what is happening with dud producing
munitions, particularly when a light infa ntry force is going to come in behind.”53 This
was in spite of the significan t ICM included in their unit ba sic load but left-behind in
Kuwait. The mechanized 3rd Infantry Division had an even greater percentage of ICM in
its unit basic load, but maneuver brigade and task force commanders as well as their

51 U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-09.60 (Draft), Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Multiple
Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Operations ), 1-7.
52 BG Louis Weber, Assistant Division Commander (Support) 3rd Infantry Division in Operation Iraqi
Freedom, interview by Mr. Fontenot of the OIFSG, 24 September 2003.
53 Bennett, interview by LTC Pitts; Barnes, interview by LTC Pitts; LTC Batule, interview by LTC Pitts.

30 supporting artillery commanders were unanimous in their concern for the effect of duds
on their forces and the Iraqi civilians.54 As a result, the predominant munition fired was
HE in spite of it being only one -sixth of their basic load.
HE fires were extremely effective agains t both dismounts and armored vehicles.
ICM was fired by the 3rd Infantry Division only due to, “a resupply problem [with HE] at
the end [of combat operations] and [we] had no option but to fire DPICM” according to
the Division Artillery Commander.55 The ICM missions also had tremendous killing
power against dismounted enemy and armored vehicles. However, HE remained the munition of choice throughout th e conflict with ICM fired as a last resort after careful
targeting to avoid built-up areas during Phase IV operations. In spite of these deliberate
preventative measures, Iraqi civilians were killed and wounded by artillery-delivered
submunitions with forty civilians reported ly killed in the town of Hillah alone.
56
In order to mitigate the risk of dud su bmunitions while still achieving ICM’s
destructive effects, the field artillery should ensure that fu ture ICM munitions achieve a
dud rate of less than 1%. The next generation of ICM munitions currently in development includes the guided MLRS (G MLRS) rocket that carries 404 ICM
submunitions, vice 644 submunitions in the standard M26 rocket, to ranges beyond 60 kilometers. The unclassified GMLRS opera tional requirements document of 18 April

54 Allyn, interview by the author; Perkins, intervie w by the author; Marcone, telephone interview by the
author; Sanderson, telephone interview by the author; Harding, telephone interview by the author; Bennett,
interview by LTC Pitts.
55 COL Thomas Torrance, Commander of 3rd Infantry Division Artillery in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
interview by Lieutenant Colonel Pitts of the OIFSG, 11 May 2003.
56 Paul Wiseman, “Cluster Bombs Kill in Iraq, Even After Shooting Ends,” USA Today , 11 December
2003, A1.

31 2001 establishes a threshold hazardous dud rate of less than 1% and an objective of 0%.57
Based upon developmental testing ending in December 2002, the GMLRS achieved an
average dud rate of 3.9%, an improvement over the current MLRS ICM dud rate of
approximately 16% but still not meeting the requirement.58 The Army should ensure that
GMLRS meets the less than 1% requirement prior to full rate production if the munition
is to be relevant in future operations.
Additionally, the Army is developing a GMLRS variant with an HE warhead
called GMLRS Unitary. Based upon current procurement estimates, the Army will purchase almost three times as many ICM rockets as HE rockets by fiscal year 2018.
59
Keeping in mind the effectiveness and predom inant use of HE munitions in Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the Army should reassess th e quantities and perhaps produce a higher
ratio of GMLRS Unitary to GMLRS rocket s to better support future operations.
The dud rate issue with ICM and its corre sponding role on the future battlefield
are extremely important because they relate di rectly to relevance. Artillery unit basic
loads, and the inventories that support them, are built around ICM. This is especially true
for the rocket and 155 millimeter cannon forces. Originally developed for use against Warsaw Pact armored formations on the plai ns of Europe during the Cold War, the
current ICM design’s time is long past. Iraq i Freedom only highlighted the Army’s need
for killing munitions without duds.

57 Department of the Army, Unclassified Operational Requirements Document for MLRS ACAT II and III
Systems Prepared for Milestone III Decisions (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 18 April 2001),
18.
58 U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (USATEC), Unclassified System Evaluation Report for the
GMLRS (Alexandria, VA: USATEC, March 2003).
59 Product Manager-Guided MLRS (GMLRS), (Draft) Modified Integrated Program Summary (MIPS) for
GMLRS with Unitary Warhead (GMLRS Un itary) Milestone B Decision Review (Redstone Arsenal, AL:
PM-GMLRS, 2 March 2003).

32 COUNTERFIRE RADAR

While counterfire operations were su ccessful against Iraqi artillery, the
AN/TPQ37 (50 Km planning range) and AN/TP Q36 (25 Km planning range) firefinder
radars used to detect enemy artillery expe rienced serious problems in the areas of
reliability and positioning. Across both the 101st Airborne and 3rd Infantry Division
Artilleries (2 x Q37 and 3 x Q36 radars ea ch), the firefinder radars had significant
maintenance issues. The 3rd Infantry Division Artillery Commander, commenting on his
counterfire radars remarked, “Our firefinder radars had significant maintenance issues.
When they are working they are the greatest. [We] had one Q-37 down almost 14 days.
[We] had a Q36 down for the entire 21 days.”60 The 101st Airborne Division fared little
better, with Q36 radars across the divisi on artillery down intermittently throughout the
operation.61
This lack of reliability had serious co nsequences for the positioning of these
already scarce assets. As Q36 and Q37 radars in support of main effort units went down
intermittently, artillery commanders with th e supporting effort maneuver forces were
forced to re-position their rada rs. The radars were often re-positioned over long distances
given the non-linear natu re of operations in order to suppor t the main effort . All this re-
positioning took place while both the main and supporting efforts were pressing the fight forward and often in contact.
As a result, radar coverage was sometimes lacking at critical junctures in the
fight. Within the 3
rd Infantry Division’s area of operations, the 3rd Battalion, 69th
Armor’s seizure of a bridge across the Euphrat es was an essential task for the V Corps

60 Torrance, intervie w by LTC Pitts.
61 Barnes, interview by LTC Pitts; Batule, interview by LTC Pitts.

33 Commander. This bridge crossing, at Object ive Peach, was just one such critical time
when counterfire coverage was lacking. Th e battalion commander noted that as they
began the operation, “the Q36 was broken a nd we thought we had Q37 coverage but we
didn’t.”62 The battalion’s Alpha Company receiv ed significant incoming artillery fire,
from an Iraqi 152 millimeter battalion, on th e nearside of the bridgehead. While
sustaining no casualties, the enemy artille ry did delay the company’s operations.
Fortunately, the majority of Iraqi artillery fire fell into the Euphrates without adjustment
and the battalion was able to seize the bridge.63
At Objective Peach, and throughout OIF, the Iraqi artillery while superior in tube-
strength and range capability was largely ineffective. The Iraqis relied heavily on pre-planned targets and were usually unable to ad just these fires after losing most of their
observers to direct fire engagements.
64 In the case of Objective Peach, if the Iraqis had
massed their fires more accurately on the bridge head the problems with radar availability
and positioning would have negatively impact ed the V Corps’ scheme of maneuver and
cost the lives of many more Americans.
The field artillery must provide conti nuous counterfire coverage to supported
commanders in future operations. This capability is especially vital to operations such as
OIF where mass was sacrificed for speed and agility. Against an enemy well-trained in
and well-equipped for artillery operations, successful counterfire operations will be
essential to maintaining this operational te mpo and agility. To accomplish this, the Army
must develop new firefinder radar systems that, at a minimum, are more reliable than the

62 LTC Earnest Marcone, Commander of 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor of the 3rd Infantry Division in Operation
Iraqi Freedom, interview by LTC Manning of the OIFSG, 15 May 2003.
63 Marcone, telephone interview by the author.
64 Marcone, telephone interview by the author.

34 current Q36 and Q37 radars, more deployable, and able to support maneuver units in high
tempo operations. The Q37, in particular , “lacks sufficient range, accuracy, mobility,
survivability, sustainabili ty, and deployability by one C-130, to provide required
operational support for curre nt and future forces.”65 As the Army procures increasing
numbers of precision munitions such as GMLRS and the GPS-guided Excalibur 155mm
projectile, sensor coverage of the battlefi eld becomes even more critical to provide
accurate and timely targeting information w ith mobile sensors to support high-tempo
non-linear operations. The Q47 radar curren tly under development will be accurate to
within 50 meters of actual ta rget location at ranges beyond 100 Km and capable of rapid
transport by two CH-47 medium lift helicopter sorties, but it will not be fielded until
2008 at the earliest.66 In the interim, the Army shoul d consider providing each division
artillery with additional Q 36 and Q37 radars for a redundancy that ensures maneuver
units do not lack counterfire coverage and retain their freedom of maneuver.
The Army should also consider eq uipping its conventional forces with
Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar (LCMR) currently under development for the U.S.
Special Operation’s Command (USSOC OM) whose primary purpose is:
To detect, locate, and report hos tile locations of enemy mortar,
artillery, or other indirect fire as sets…[and] because SOF operations are
conducted forward of conventional un its [in a non-linear battlespace],
ARSOF require an omni-directional detection capability…the LCMR
provides mortar and artillery fire detection capability out to 5,000
meters……potential threat forces and capabilities range from
sophisticated, regular military forces and highly trained

65 Department of the Army, Unclassified Operational Requirements Document for Phoenix Battlefield
Sensor System (AN/TPQ-47) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 27 October 2003), 10.
66 Department of the Army, Unclassified Operational Requirements Document for Phoenix Battlefield
Sensor System (AN/TPQ-47) , 12.

35 terrorist/paramilitary elements to relatively untrained and ill-equipped
insurgency forces67

Such a purpose statement, written prior to 9/ 11, applies to conventional forces engaged in
the Global War on Terror as much as it does for special operating forces (SOF). This
man-portable system, capable of being “jum ped” via parachute by two soldiers, would
provide an extremely mobile and omni-d irectional sensor capability and provide
complementary counterfire coverage to ma neuver units. Scouts, or other forward
reconnaissance units could employ such a lightwe ight sensor forward of the main body so
that maneuver elements are always covered by a counterfire umbrella regardless of the
maintenance status or positioning of the firefinder radars. OIF highlighted the need for sensors that are reliable and can maintain operational
tempo with maneuver units. This is particular true with regards to counterfire coverage,
the lack of which can deny friendly forces freedom of maneuver and limit their mobility in a non-linear environment. As the Army moves to a greater reliance on precision
munitions with a commensurate reduction in tube-strength, particul arly in the area of
general support field artillery, sensors will beco me as important if not more so than the
delivery systems themselves. Relying on one Q36 radar per maneuver brigade and two
Q37 radars per division is simp ly not enough to retain consiste nt counterfire coverage in
a fast-paced non-linear environment. Add itional sensors are needed that ensure
redundant coverage as well as mobility on the battlefield.

67 Department of the Army, Unclassified Operational Requirements Document for Lightweight Counter-
Mortar Radar (LCMR) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 28 February 2001, 1-2).

36 SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
A watershed event for the field artillery during OIF was the placement of a field
artillery unit in direct support of special op erations forces (SOF). A platoon of three
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) supported SOF operations
throughout. The launchers fired a total of forty Army Tactical Missile System
(ATACMS) missiles against artillery, air defe nse, surface-to-surface missile, and infantry
target sets.68 Special forces soldiers worked cl osely with the launchers, forming a 24/7
all-weather capable sensor to shooter link that successfully struck all forty targets.69
The HIMARS mission in Iraq was extremely significant as it demonstrated that
the field artillery is no longer tied to its historical role of supporting c onventional ground
maneuver forces. The artillery has historical ly been incompatible with the small-scale
and often covert operations of SOF due to de ployability issues and its inherently large
firing signature. The HIMARS, however, prov ides a long-range prec ision capability that
is C-130 transportable and ready for operations within a few minutes of landing. As SOF
continue to take a leading role in the Globa l War on Terror, the fiel d artillery now has a
system to provide them with respons ive and accurate all-weather fires.
In spite of the HIMARS su ccess in support of SOF during OIF, there is a dearth
of field artillery involvement with the SOF community as a whole and specifically with
the Army Special Forces. At the 2003 Senior Fire Support Conference at Fort Sill the
commander of the U.S. Army John F. Ke nnedy Special Warfare Center and School
(USJFKSWCS) stated that:

68 Product Manager-High Mobility Artille ry Rocket System (PM-HIMARS), HIMARS: Operation Iraqi
Freedom (Redstone Arsenal, AL: PM-HIMARS).
69 Neil Baumgardner, “Special For ces Used HIMARS During Operatio n Iraqi Freedom,” Defense Daily
218, no. 41 (28 May 2003): 1.

37 Special Forces will continue to conduct Unconventional Warfare
with indigenous resistance forces, as well as unilateral or combined
Strategic Reconnaissance and Direct Ac tion in the entire ty of Battlespace
in support of the strategic main e ffort and/or Conventional Forces,
necessitating responsive Pr ecision Joint Fires (both lethal and non-lethal)
with virtually unconstrained reach…[Special Forces need] joint fires expertise at all critical juncture s (coordination an d operational)…[But
there exists] no standing joint fires element within the SF Groups…[and]
Joint Fires Elements (JFE) must be established and trained for each Special Forces based JSOTF.
70
MG Lambert’s words point to a vacuum in the area of fi re support to Army Special
Forces. The field artillery should move quickly to fill this void w ith the dedicated fire
support expertise it has long pr ovided to conventional forces.

Figure 3-2. HIMARS Firing in Support of SOF Operations in Western Iraq.71

Field artillerymen have hist orically taken the lead in planning, coordinating, and
executing the duties and responsib ilities of fire support elements and fires and effects
coordination cells (FECC) in support of conve ntional echelons from platoon to echelons
above corps. The field artillery should exte nd its fire support expert ise to the realm of
Special Forces by establishing a fire support element, led by an artilleryman, in each
Special Forces Group. Such an arrangement wo uld provide the Special Forces units with

70 MG Lambert, Commander U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
(USJFKSWCS), Joint Precision Fires in Support of Special Operations Forces (Fort Sill, OK: Senior Fire
Support Conference, November 2003).
71 Product Manager-High Mobility Artille ry Rocket System (PM-HIMARS), HIMARS: Operation Iraqi
Freedom (Redstone Arsenal, AL: PM-HIMARS).

38 expertise in joint fires integration and also enhance the field artill ery’s relevance in the
Global War on Terror through its support to the war’s lead combatant command,
USSOCOM. Such an arrangement would cause:
The Field Artillery to think be yond imbedded constructs of support
to Army Corps, Divisions, Brigades , Units of Employment, and Units of
Action…[The] FA should be the lead intellectual impetus to place fires
wherever, and whenever they are needed in battlespace. Both lethal and non-lethal…to enable the joint force to fight more effectively in the information age environment.
72

DIGITAL FIRE SUPPORT

Artillery and maneuver commanders were pleased with the performance of
digital communications systems such as th e Advanced Field Artillery Data System
(AFATDS) during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Th is was particularly true in its fire
direction role from battalion and battery/p latoon fire directio n centers where the
computers provided accurate and timely tec hnical and tactical di gital fire direction
directly to the firing platforms.
73 The one AFATDS complain t common amongst artillery
commanders was the software complexity at th e battery and below. Rather than a “one
size fits all” software package for fire suppor t elements (FSEs) and FDCs from the corps
down to a platoon, commanders need a much simpler fire direction system at the battalion level and below.
74
Unlike the AFATDS, the digital forward en try devices (FEDs) used by observers
to initiate fire missions at the tactical level were not effective during OIF. While the fire
support teams (FISTs) and combat observa tion laser teams (COLTs) from the 101st
Airborne and 3rd Infantry Divisions are all equipped with the FED, they did not use the

72 MG Lambert, Joint Precision Fires in Support of Special Operations Forces.
73 Harding, telephone interview by the author.
74 LTC Lackey, interview by LTC Pitts.

39 device to initiate fire missions.75 This was partially due to its range limitations, but many
commanders insisted on voice communications be tween the observer in contact and the
fire direction center providi ng the fires. Their insisten ce was not due to a fear or
ignorance of digital communications, but an acknowledgement of the human dimension’s
importance at the tactical level.
While modern cannon and rocket systems are more accurate than ever before,
“fires are slower, impersonal and sequestered in a fire support stovepipe isolated from
maneuver” when initiated by observers with digital devices.76 A digital email message
cannot express the urgency of the soldier in contact. Currently, the Field Artillery School
is “aggressively pursuing” th e development of the Palm Forward Entry Device (PFED)
and lightweight FED (LFED) as replacements for the FED.77 The Army should stop both
programs and divert its resources to others that will enhance the warfighter’s needs.
Based upon Iraqi Freedom, and the overdue acknowledgement of the human nature of
men in contact, digital entry devices are not relevant to providing fires to maneuver and
the Army should spend its scarce resources on pr ocuring other more worthwhile systems.

FORCE PROTECTION

The field artillery should enhance its tact ical force protection capabilities in order
to provide sustained supporting fires in future operations. Specifica lly, more crew-served
weapons and better protection for key leader s are needed to increase survivability.
Operation Iraqi Freedom’s non-linear battle field meant that a ll units within the

75 Bennett, interview by LTC Pitts; Batule, interview by LTC Pitts; Harding, telephone interview by the
author.
76 COL Gary H. Cheek, “Why can’t Joe get the lead out?,” Field Artillery (January-February 2003): 34.
77 MG Michael D. Maples, “2002 State of the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery (November-December 2002):
4.

40 battlespace were frequently in contact w ith Iraqi forces and not just the forward
maneuver units. Within such a fluid battle space, equipping and tr aining the total force
for close combat becomes more crucial than ever before.78
MLRS batteries are a prime example of units in great need of such training and
equipping. Doctrinally, MLRS units:
Are positioned and fight well fo rward and use their "shoot-and-
scoot" capability to improve survivab ility. Forward positioning is critical
to accomplishing unit missions. When providing close support in the offense, MLRS units move with the maneuver forces they support, stop to
fire as required, and then move rapidly to rejoin the formation.
79
MLRS launchers do not have any crew-serve d weapons capability and instead rely upon
the above-mentioned “shoot-and-sc oot” tactic. While an eff ective tactic against enemy
counterfire, “shoot-and-scoot” pr ovides little or no protec tion from a lightly motorized
infantry force or even lightly armed insurgen ts that could easily pur sue and destroy such
a high value asset. Likewise, the prototype HIMARS rocket launchers that debuted in
Operation Iraqi Freedom in support of SOF have no crew-served weapon. This is an
even greater vulnerability compared to the tracked MLRS because the HIMARS platform
is built from an unarmored truck chassis.
Weapon platforms are not the only item s requiring additional force protection
measures. Commanders led their units from the front during OIF, constantly pushing
forward of the main body to coordinate with adjacent units an d reconnoiter potential
firing positions. While absolutely nece ssary for mission accomplishment, leaders
conducted these forward reconnaissance missi ons in soft-skinned high mobility multi-
purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) were extr emely vulnerable to even the smallest

78 Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 246.
79 FM 3-09.60, MLRS TTP , 1-1.

41 caliber weapons. The 3rd Infantry Division Artillery Commander emphasized this issue
when he stated, “In our firing batteries we put steel around our weapons but none around
our leaders including platoon l eaders, platoon sergeants, firs t sergeants, [and] battery
commanders [who] were all out th ere in soft skin vehicles.”80 During a reconnaissance of
his unit’s follow-on positions, a battery commander from the 3rd Infantry Division was
killed when his soft-skinned HMMMWV was am bushed with small-arms fire and rocket
propelled grenades. Although nothing will ev er completely mitigate the risk of
leadership from the front, pr oviding key leaders with armo red HMMWVs equipped with
a crew-served weapon is an absolutely e ssential first step in improving leader
survivability.
Improving the survivability of artillery weapons platfo rms and vehicles for key
leaders, is an investment in sustained fire support for future operations. With OIF as an
example, future conflicts promise to be even more fast-paced and decentralized in order
to create an operational tempo to which the en emy cannot react in time. As a result, the
Army will continue to trade mass for fast er deployability and employability as it
restructures the force. In su ch a lean and agile force, every weapon system counts. This
is especially true for the artillery syst ems that provide a commander with his most
significant all-weather, twenty -four hour fire support capabi lity. Given this additional
importance as well the expectation of even more non-linear battlefields, increased force
protection capabilities for the artillery are absolutely essential.

80 Torrance, intervie w by LTC Pitts.

42 SENSE AND DESTROY ARMOR MUNITION
On 21 March 2003, artillery units fired the Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM)
munition for the first time in combat at the battle for Tallil air base.
SADARM is a “smart” artill ery submunition designed for
precision engagement of self-propelled howitzers as well as other lightly
armored vehicles…Each 155mm howitzer round delivers two
submunitions. Once dispensed, the submunition deploys a parachute-like deceleration device. At a pre-dete rmined distance from the ground, the
submunition ejects the deceleration device and deploys another device to stabilize and rotate the submunition. As the submunition falls and rotates,
it searches the ground with a millimeter wave sensor (both active and passive) and an infrared sensor array… If the sensors dete ct a target, the
submunition fires an explosively formed penetrator at the target. If no
target is detected, the submuniti on is designed to self-destruct.
81

With no special targeting pr ocedures besides a minimum safe distance from friendly
troops of two kilometers, units fired the rounds successfully at Iraqi tank formations. The
1st Battalion, 10th Field Artillery reported killing one T-62 tank with only two SADARM
rounds, and the 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery reported similar results against the more
modern and better protected T-72 tank.82 In spite of these successful missions,
SADARM is only available in limited quantities from the program’s low rate initial
production.
The Army decided in 1999 not to proceed into full rate production based, in part,
on a submunition reliability of 44% which fell far short of the 80% requirement during its
initial operational test83 However, the Army used flaw ed targeting and fire direction
procedures in developmental and operational testing when compared with its employment

81 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) DOT&E Annual Report to Congress (Washington,
DC: Department of Defense, 1998), IV-1.
82 Harding, telephone interview by the author; Lackey, interview by LTC Pitts.
83 Department of Defense, Defense Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) DOT&E Annual Report to
Congress , IV-3.

43 in OIF. According to the Department of Defense’s Director, Operational Test &
Evaluation (DOT&E):
It appears that the Army’s doctr ine of firing 24 rounds at each
target is inefficient. With one ex ception, the targets th at were killed
during the LUT [limited user test] were hit in the firs t 12 rounds…As was
observed during firings in prior t echnical testing and IOT [initial
operational test], targets that are hit are generally killed. In addition, 60
percent (114/190) of the submunitions had no targets in their footprint.
This may be improved by leveraging Firefinder’s increased accuracy in
locating individual guns (as opposed to the entire threat battery). A
doctrine that targets individual guns, rather than the whole battery, may
provide a more efficient use of SADARM rounds.84

Results from OIF where only two, versus tw enty-four, rounds were fired at each
individual tank seem to lend cr edence to DOT&E’s hypothesis.
Based on SADARM's successful employ ment during OIF, the Army should
consider additional developmental and operational testing using fire direction and targeting procedures more in line with thos e used during OIF. In the words of the 3
rd
Infantry Division Artillery Commander, “SADARM was the big winner [during OIF].
We had a 50% kill rate using SADARM.”85 The bottom line is that units in contact need
the lethal precision that SADARM provided against armored targets during Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Such a capability is especially vital as the Army continues to trade mass
for agility and deploys its Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. These Stryker Brigades
consist of light armored vehicles that, while more strategically deployable than the M2
Bradley fighting vehicle or M1 A1 tank, are not nearly as su rvivable. These units, in
particular, will need an effective standoff capability against an enemy’s armored vehicles. Besides the potential for pr ecision strike and reduced munitions consumption, an

84 Department of Defense, Defense Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) DOT&E Annual Report to
Congress , IV-4.
85 Torrance, interv iew by LTC Pitts.

44 effective SADARM munition would mitigate the need for the high number of ICM
munitions in unit basic loads tailored for targ eting large armored formations. Whether or
not the SADARM munition itself survives thes e further reviews is unimportant. What
should be done is to leverage the lessons learned from Ira qi Freedom with the baseline
SADARM technology in order to provide maneuve r commanders a precise and lethal fire
support capability.

LONG RANGE ADVANCED SCOU T SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

Even though COLTs organic to direct suppor t artillery battalio ns often provided
supported commanders with their most fo rward-deployed fire support sensors during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, they were not equi pped with effective observation devices to
initiate fire missions. The COLTs are equipp ed with the ground vehicular laser locater
designator that is unable to laze on the m ove and relies on a thermal sight with very
limited range for night operations. COLTs in the 3rd Infantry Division relied upon the
brigade reconnaissance troop’s Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System
(LRAS3) to initiate their calls for fire.
The LRAS3 provided an all-weather targ et acquisition capab ility due to its
forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) and extremely accurate target location beyond ten
kilometers day or night.86 Brigade commanders formed the COLTs and brigade
reconnaissance troop (BRT) into detachments able to screen forward or to the flanks of
the brigade formation. The detachments were al so used to great effect in overwatch of
target areas of interest providing first r ound fire for effect accuracy. However, the

86 Defense Daily, “Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3),” DefenseDaily.Com , URL:
<www.defensedaily.com/progprof/ar my/lras3.pdf> January 2004.

45 COLTS had to relay the calls for fire from th e BRT to the artillery battalion because they
lacked the LRAS3.87
Equipping the COLTs with the LRAS3 would make them more relevant as fire
support sensors and provide the supported co mmander with greater fl exibility in their
employment. Doctrinally, the COLTs provide the supported commander with
“independent observers to wei ght key or vulnerable areas.”88 Due to their reliance on the
LRAS3, the COLTs were unable to conduct these independent missions. While the
marriage of BRT and COLTs was a successful ad hoc technique to provide the supported
brigade commanders with eyes forward for in telligence as well as targeting, there is
currently a mismatch between capabilities and equipment. Equipping the COLTs with
the LRAS3 will allow them even greater employment flexibility and correspondingly
improve their ability to provide commanders with fire support.

CONCLUSION

The field artillery was relevant during Operation Iraqi Freedom because it
provided timely, accurate, and agile support to maneuver forces on a rapidly changing
non-linear battlefield. Likewise, the artillery must take a hard look at its shortcomings by
focusing on how they affected artillery deliv ered fire support and rapidly make the
appropriate changes. The Army must shape its force structure, acquisition of improved
field artillery materiel, and doctrine development based upon the lessons learned from
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Improvement in thes e three areas alone will move the artillery
from a linear battlefield focus reminiscent of the Cold War and into a more agile force

87 Allyn, interview by the author..
88 U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-09.4 (Draft), Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Fire
Support for Brigade Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2003), F-1.

46 able to support maneuver commanders on th e non-linear battlefields across the full
spectrum of conflict, high intensity to support an d stability operations, seen thus far in the
Global War on Terror.

47 CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Contrary to many indicators at the commencement of the Global War on Terror,
the field artillery has been extremely releva nt in the war’s opening phases but it is too
early to ascertain the artillery’s relevance in the broader context of the Global War on
Terror. This is because the fight against te rror promises to be a very long one, and the
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq only its opening shots. Additionally, the unique
characteristics of the different tactical environments in Iraq and Afghanistan point to an
ever-increasing requirement for tactical agility and flexibility on the part of U.S. forces.
The artillery must be flexible in rapidly id entifying and adapting its force based to face
future challenges in the broade r campaign against terror.
The field artillery that entered the Globa l War on Terror on 9/11 must change if it
is to be relevant in winning the war. The pr e-9/11 field artillery emphasized the first half
of its mission, “ To destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket, and
missile fire and to help integrate all fire support assets into combined arms operations.”89
with a focus on big weapon systems such as the Crusader and massed field artillery
brigades supporting divisions in contact. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; however,
point towards a focus upon the la tter half of the mission and th e integration of all fires,
lethal and non-lethal as well as joint, into combined arms operati ons. Field artillerymen
in Afghanistan are manning howitzers and mort ars in support of maneuver units. They
are further coordinating the ex ecution of close air support and information operations. In

89 U.S. Army Field Artillery School , “Field Artillery Mission.”

48 Iraq the U.S. Army fought an economy of fo rce mission, with regards to artillery tube
strength. In spite of this, commanders adjust ed their support relati onships to weight the
main effort and ensured that the guns were pushed forward with lead maneuver
companies. Additionally, the number and avai lability of counterfire radars and other
sensors to accurately detect targets proved mo re vital to operations than sheer numbers of
tubes.
While ultimately successful, the artiller y’s support of maneuver operations did
fall short in some key areas such as counter fire and munition dud rates. Critical force
protection and observation capabilities also lim ited artillery delivered fire support. The
commensurate adjustments to these shortcomi ngs must come quickly and must ultimately
support the fire support need s of maneuver commanders. Ju st as the operational force
must become more agile in its operations, it mu st also become more agile in its ability to
change. Gone is the forty-year Cold War ag ainst a symmetric foe, and here to stay are
operations against foes as different as the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s
regime in Iraq with less than eighteen months separating th e start of both operations.
Finally, the fire support aspect of artill ery operations must guide these necessary
changes. “Fire support is too important to be left to fiel d artillerymen alone.”90 The field
artillery is a vital component of and integrator of lethal and non-lethal fires as part of a
broader fire support team and not as a stand- alone arm. Operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq have proven time-and-time again that the ke y to success is not ju st artillery support,
close air support, or mortar support. Instea d, it is the complementary effects from these
and other lethal and non-lethal fire support systems that effectively support combined

90 Sanderson, telephone interview by the author.

49 arms operations. While the future course of the Global War on Terror remains to be seen,
the U.S. Army Field Artillery can best pos ture itself for relevance by consistently
improving its contribution to the fire support team and combined arms operations.

50 ACRONYMS

AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Data System
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System BCT Brigade Combat Team BG Brigadier General BFIST Bradley Fire Support Team (vehicle) BRT Brigade Reconnaissance Troop CAS Close Air Support C O L C o l o n e l COLT Combat Observation Laser Team C P T C a p t a i n CTC Combat Training Center C4ISR Command Control Co mmunications Computers
Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance
DOT&E Director, Operati onal Test & Evaluation
DPICM Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition EFST Essential Fire Support Task FDC Fire Direction Center FECC Fires Effects Coordi nation Center
FED Forward Entry Device FIST Fire Support Team FIST-V Fire Support Team Vehicle FSCOORD Fire Support Coordinator FSE Fire Support Element GMLRS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System HE High Explosive HIMARS High Mobility Arti llery Rocket System
HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle HPTL High Payoff Target List ICM Improved Conventional Munition JFE Joint Fires Element JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council Km Kilometer LCMR Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar LFED Lightweight Forward Entry Device LRAS3 Long Range Advanced Scout Sensor System LT Lieutenant LTC Lieutenant Colonel LTG Lieutenant General MAJ Major
MG Major General
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System MOUT Military Operations in Urban Terrain

51 NTC National Training Center
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom OPTEMPO Operational Tempo PD Point Detonating PFED Portable Forward Entry Device SADARM Sense And Destroy Armor Munition SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defense SOF Special Operations Forces SOP Standard Operating Procedures TTP Tactics Techniques and Procedures USSOCOM United States Sp ecial Operations Command
V T V a r i a b l e T i m e

52 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:

Department of the Army. Unclassified Operational Requirements Document for
Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar (LCMR) (Washington, DC: Department of the
Army, 28 February 2001) provides the techni cal and operational requirements for
the lightweight counterfire radar under development for USSOCOM.
Department of the Army. Unclassified Operational Requirements Document for MLRS
ACAT II and III Systems Prepared for Milestone III Decisions (Washington, DC:
Department of the Army, 18 April 2001) provides the technical and operation al
requirements such as dud rate for th e GMLRS precision munition currently in
development.
Department of the Army. Unclassified Operational Require ments Document for Phoenix
Battlefield Sensor System (AN/TPQ-47) (Washington, DC: Department of the
Army, 27 October 2003) provides the techni cal and operational requirements for
the next generation coun terfire radar system.
Department of Defense. Defense Op erational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) DOT&E
Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1998)
provides excellent insight into the reas ons for the SADARM cancellation as well
as some perceived flaws in the Army’s doctrinal employment of the munition.
Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department. Essential Fire Support Task
(EFST) (Ft Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Arti llery School, April 2001) provides the
doctrinal definition of an EFST.
Greer, COL William L. and others. “101
st DivArty: Fighting with Artillery Fires in an
Urban Environment.” Field Artillery 8, no. 5 (September-October 2003) presents
the challenges faced by art illerymen in providing artillery fires to maneuver
forces in an urban environment.
Product Manager-Guided MLRS (GMLRS). (Draft) Modified Integrated Program
Summary (MIPS) for GMLRS with Unitary Warhead (GMLRS Unitary) Milestone
B Decision Review (Redstone Arsenal, AL: PM -GMLRS, 2 March 2003) gives
the projected purchase quantities of GMLRS and GMLRS Unitary rockets.
U.S. Army. Field Manual 3-09.4 Tactics, Techniques, and Pr ocedures for Fire Support
for Brigade Operations (Draft) (Ft Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery School,
June 2002) provides doctrinal descriptions of fire suppor t procedures in support of
for maneuver brigade operations.

U.S. Army. Field Manual 3-09.60 Tactics, Techniques, and Pr ocedures for Multiple
Launch Rocket System Operations (Draft) (Ft Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery

53 School, September 2002) provides doctrinal descriptions of rocket artillery
systems and munitions employment.
U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (USATEC). Unclassified System Evaluation
Report for the GMLRS (Alexandria, VA: USATEC , March 2003) provides an
analysis of the GMLRS precision mun ition’s performance based upon technical
testing prior to beginning low rate initial production.

Interviews:

Allyn, COL Daniel. Commander 3
rd Brigade, 3rd ID during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Interview by Mr. Art Durante of the OIFSG in Iraq, n.d., provides good
information regarding the effectiveness of counterfire missions, SADARM
effectiveness, and the LRAS3.
Allyn, COL Daniel. Commander of 3
nd Brigade, 3rd ID during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Interview by the author, 10 December 2003 provides excellent insight into many
facets of artillery support to COL Allyn’ s brigade from the relevance of the
artillery to capabilities required for the future artillery force.
Barnes, LTC Randall and others. Commander 3
rd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101st
Airborne Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Interview by LTC Pitts of the
OIFSG west of Mosul, Iraq, 24 May 2003 provides good information on counterfire missions, some shortcomings of the counterfire radars, and not using
DPICM due to the dud rate problems.

Batule, LTC Kevin and MAJ David Burwell. Commander and Operations Officer 2
nd
Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101st Airborne Division du ring Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Interview by LTC Pitts of the OIFSG in Iraq, 23 May 2003 provides good information on unit basi c loads, firefinder radar problems, use of OH-58D
Kiowa Warrior helicopters as observers, and artillery fired at “danger close”
ranges.
Bennett, LTC Henry W. and MAJ Ken Keyho. Commander and Operations Officer 1
st
Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101st Airborne Division du ring Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Interview by LTC Pitts of the OIFSG in Iraq on 22 MAY 03 provides good insight into DPICM’s dud rate issue, movement of artillery units behind
infantry formations, accuracy of rocket assi sted projectile mun itions, the lack of a
formal military decision making process, and the requirement for voice calls for fire.

54 Cheatham, LTC Robert G., Jr. V Corps Arti llery Operations Offi cer during Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Interview by LTC William Pitts of the OIFSG in Baghdad, Iraq, 7
May 2003 provides a good recounting of Co rps Artillery operations during the
war with a particular emphasis on Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)
firings.
Hagenback, MG Franklin. “Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation Anaconda.”
Interview by Robert H. McElroy and Patrecia Slayden Hollis. Field Artillery
(September-October 2002) details fire support from a commander’s point-of-
view. Its most useful insight is th e commander’s rationa le for not employing
artillery in Afghanistan.
Harding, LTC Doug. Commander of 1-10 FA, 3
rd ID during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Interview by the author, 2 December 2003 provides excellent insight into the
delivery of fires by LTC Harding’s ba ttalion and many lessons learned from
Operation Iraqi Freedom and capabilities re quired for the future artillery force.
Lackey, LTC James. Commander 1
st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 3rd ID during
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Interview by LTC Pitts of the OIFSG in Iraq, 18 May
2003 provides good information on firing the sense and destroy armor munition (SADARM), the maintenance problems w ith his AN/TPQ36 counterfire radar,
and the positioning of his firing units within maneuver formations.
Lee, CPT James and others. Commander Bravo Company, 3
rd Battalion, 69th Armor
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Inte rview by MSG West of the OIFSG in
Baghdad, Iraq, 15 MAY 03 provides good insigh t into Bradley Fire Support Team
(BFIST) vehicle opera tions during the war.
Marcone, LTC Ernest and others. Co mmander Task Force 1-69 Armor, 3
rd ID during
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Interview by LTC Manning of the OIFSG in Baghdad,
Iraq, 15 May 2003 provides good insight into th e impact of no counterfire radar
coverage at the beginning of a bridge seizure.
Marcone, LTC Ernest. Commande r Task Force 1-69 Armor, 3
rd ID during Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Interview by COL(R) Font enot and LTC Degen of the OIFSG at
FT Leavenworth, KS 22 October 200 3 provides good insight into the
incorporation of artillery firing units in his task force order of march and the
impact of no counterfire ra dar coverage at the beginning of a bridge seizure.
Marcone, LTC Ernest. Commander of 3
rd Battalion, 69th Armor, 3rd ID during Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Interview by the author, 12 December 2003 provides excellent insight into many facets of artillery s upport to LTC Marcone’s armor battalion
and in particular the critical role of counterfire in his uni t’s five bridge seizures.

55 Otterstedt, COL Charles G. Commander 41st Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps Artillery
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Inte rview by COL French MacLean, V Corps
(Forward) Historian, for the OIFSG in Ku wait, 14 March 2003 is of some use in
providing the unit’s mission prior to beginning operations.
Perkins, COL David. Commander of 2
nd Brigade, 3rd ID during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Interview by the author, 16 December 2003 provides excellent insight into many
facets of artillery support to COL Perkin s’ brigade from the relevance of the
artillery to capabilities required for the future artillery force.
Sanderson, LTC Jeffrey. Commander Task Force 2-69 Armor; 3
rd ID during Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Interview by Mr. Durante of the OIFSG in Iraq on 6 April 2003 provides a good account of artillery’s e ffectiveness from a maneuver commander
just out of contact.
Sanderson, LTC Jeffrey. Commander Task Force 2-69 Armor; 3
rd Infantry Division in
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Telephone interview by the author, 3 December 2003 provides excellent insight in to artillery support and fire support in general to a
maneuver commander during Op eration Iraqi Freedom.
Torrance, COL Thomas. 3
rd ID Division Artillery Comm ander during Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Interview by LTC Pitts of the OIFSG in Iraq, 11 May 2003 provides good insight into the unit’s combat system availability, SADARM effectiveness,
lack of range with organic artillery sy stems, the challenges with fighting the
counterfire fight for the di vision, and the need for increased force protection for
key leaders.

Wallace, LTG William S. Commander V Co rps during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Interview by COL French MacLean, V Co rps (Forward) Historian for the OIFSG
in Baghdad, Iraq 15 April 2003 provides se veral excellent insights into the
artillery’s effectiveness within the Corp s. Specifically, LTG Wallace discusses
the successes with SADARM, the target ing process, and precision guided
munitions. He also discusses the limite d employment of corps artillery general
support artillery units because they were unable to deploy in a timely manner.
Wallace, LTG William S. Commander V Co rps during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Interview by LTC Kirkman of the OI FSG in Iraq, 14 May 2003 provides good
insight into the lack of reinfo rcing artillery during the war.
Weber, BG Louis. Assistant Di vision Commander (Maneuver), 3
rd ID. Interview by Mr.
Fontenot of the OIFSG at FT Leavenworth, 24 September 2003 provides good insight into the division’s use of high explosive (HE) artillery munitions versus
the dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) due to hazardous dud rate problems. He further details the HE shortages experienced by the division
because unit basic loads were mostly DPICM.

56 Secondary Sources:

Baumgardner, Neil. “Special Forces Used HIMARS During Operation Iraqi Freedom.”
Defense Daily 218, no. 41 (28 May 2003) provides a brief description of
HIMARS operations in OIF. The article provides extremely limited insight into
HIMARS combat operations with sp ecial operations forces.
Borer, CW3 Brian L. and LTC Noel T. Nico lle. “Acquisition!: 3d ID Counterfire in
OIF.” Field Artillery (September-October 2003) provi des good insight into the
employment of counterfire radars within the 3
rd Infantry Division.
Cheeks, COL Gary. “Why Can’t Joe Get the Lead Out.” Field Artillery (January-
February 2003) charges that the artiller y has lost the human dimension of fire
support. The article provides excellent support for this argument as well as a
recommended path ahead for field artille ry command and control systems.
Dastrup, Boyd L. Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973-1991 (Fort Sill, OK: United
States Army Field Artille ry Center and School, 1994) provides excellent insights
into the challenges facing the Army as it shifted focus from Vietnam to the Cold
War in Germany and the corresponding changes to the field artillery’s
organization, doctrine, and equipment.
Defense Daily. “Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3).”
DefenseDaily.Com. URL: <www.defensedaily.com/p rogprof/army/lras3.pdf>.
January 2004 provides specifications for the LRAS3.

Gourley, Scott R. “M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle.” Army Magazine 52, no. 7
(July 2002) provides a good overview of the BFIST to include its fielding
schedule and capabilities.
Human Rights Watch. A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions (Washington, DC:
Human Rights Watch, May 2002) provides a ve ry detailed account of nations that
employ explosive submunitions, the dud rate s associated with each munition type,
and the number of people killed or wounded by duds by country.
Lambert, MG Geoffrey. Joint Precision Fires in Support of Special Operations Forces
(Fort Sill, OK: Senior Fire Support Conf erence, November 2003) is an excellent
overview of the fire support capabilities that Army Special Forces want from the
field artillery.
Leonhard, LTC(R) Robert. “Classical Fire Support vs. Parallel Fires.” Army 51, no. 4
(April 2001) provides an inte resting critical analysis of close fire support
shortcomings from a maneuver perspective.

57 Maples, MG Michael. “2002 State of the Field Artillery.” Field Artillery (November-
December 2002) provides useful information on what the future field artillery will
look like. It provides specifics on the need for greater strategic mobility as well as increased quantities of precision-guided munitions.
Murray, Williamson and MG(R) Robert Scales. The Iraq War: A Military History
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003) is a
good source for background informati on on Operation Iraqi Freedom and
provides some limited figures of U. S. and Iraqi artillery capabilities.
Product Manager-High Mobili ty Artillery Rocket System (PM-HIMARS). HIMARS:
Operation Iraqi Freedom (Redstone Arsenal, AL: PM-HIMARS, 2003) provides
some basic information regarding the operation of a HIMARS platoon in support
of special operations forces (SOF) in Operation
Scales, MG(R) Robert. “Arti llery’s Failings in the Iraq War: United States Must Focus
on Range and Precision.” Armed Forces Journal (November 2003) provides an
excellent analysis of the artillery’s successes and shor tcomings during Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
Shuger, Scott. “Outgunned: What the Crusader Cancellation Really Means to the Army.”
23 May 2002, MSN.Com. URL: <slate.msn.com/id/2066158/>. November 2003
opines that the cancellation of the Crus ader signals the Pentagon’s downplaying
of field artillery’s future role on the battlefield.
U.S. Army Field Artillery School. “Field Artillery Mission.” sill-www.army.mil. URL:
< sill-www.army.mil/pao/mission.htm >. January 2004 provides the mission
statement of the Field Artillery.
Wiseman, Paul. Cluster Bombs Kill in Iraq, Even After Shooting Ends (USA Today, 11
December 2003) details the problems cau sed by unexploded, artillery-delivered
submunitions in Iraq.
Wiseman, Paul. Ground Forces Won’t Use Improved Cluster Bombs Until at Least 2005
(USA Today, 11 December 2003) details the U.S. Army’s plan to modernize its artillery-delivered submunitions in order to reduce their dud rate.