UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1 UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY ORDER OF BATTLE: GULF ALLIANCE – GULF AND TIJUANA… [600320]

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1
UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY ORDER OF BATTLE:
GULF ALLIANCE – GULF AND TIJUANA CARTELS
(OSIEL CÁRDENAS GUILLÉN AND BENJAMI N ARELLANO FE LIX)

27 APRIL 2007 UPDATE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Mexico are under siege as 2007 begins. Felipe
Calderón, inaugurated as president of Mexi co on December 1, 2006, took immediate action
against the cartels by sending Federal police and tr oops into the state of Michoacán. Within days,
there were arrests of senior members of the major DTOs, including men affiliated with the Gulf Alliance. This group, an alliance of the Gulf and Tijuana Cartels (the Tijuana Cartel is also
known as the Arellano Félix Organization, or AF O) and some smaller DTOs, represents one
major side of the ongoing war between the cartels in Mexico (the other major antagonist is the
Sinaloa Alliance, consisting prim arily of the Sinaloa and Jua rez Cartels). In recent years, the
Gulf Alliance has been difficult to track, due to the imprisonment of its primary leaders, its
volatile and fluctuating nature, and the growth of its enforcer branch Los Zetas. As a result of the
recent government action, its situation is even more unstable. To survive, it will have to regroup
and battle for its position. It is far more likely that Los Zetas or another element of the Gulf
Alliance will become dominant. (U//FOUO) Many senior leaders of the Gulf Alliance have been imprisoned, and some, including the head of the Gulf Cartel, have been extradited to the Un ited States. However, operations of the affiliated
organizations continue. Within the partnership, th e Gulf Cartel had been ascendant, largely as a
result of the growing strength and presence of Los Zetas, which was begun by a group of former
Mexican special forces troops who switched their alle giance from their country to the head of the
Gulf Cartel, Osiel Cá rdenas Guillé n. The Gulf Alliance is battling for control of drug smuggling
routes along the U.S.-Mexico bo rder and routes and markets in Mexico. The violence that is
characteristic of the cartels is now spilling over the border into the United States. The
destabilization caused by the Mexican enforcement action is likely to increase the level of
violence throughout Mexico, as the DTOs try to eliminate rivals, eliminate enforcement personnel, reestablish thei r primacy, and reorganize with new lead ership, and as elements of this
cartel battle each other. (U//FOUO) Besides the immediate issues of DTO violence, crime, and drug tra fficking, there is also concern
that their smuggling routes may be attractive to terrorist organizat ions for bringing materiel and
operatives into the United States. While it is generally accepted that there is no ideological affinity between the DTOs and Islamist terror gr oups, it is possible that the DTOs would contract
their services to other organizations for the right price, as they do now with affiliated traffickers
and other smugglers. To date, there is no ev idence that this has occurred. (U//FOUO)

As with all such alliances, various groups and leaders may move in a nd out of the alliance
umbrella. (U//FOUO)

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UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMPOSITION

This alliance between the Gulf Cartel,1 which began operations out of Matamoros, Reynoso,
Miguel Alema n, and Monterrey on the Gulf of Mexico (i t once controlled nearly all trafficking
into east Texas from Colombia around the Gulf of Mexico and the Yucata n peninsula), and the
Tijuana Cartel,2 which has operated out of Baja Califor nia on Mexico’s west coast (and once
controlled all drug routes into California), was created by the cartels’ respective leaders, Osiel Cardenas Guille n (“El Mata Amigos,” literally “t he friend killer”) and Benjami n Arellano Fe lix,
in a jailhouse agreement after their arrests.
3 Until recently, the two had adjoining cells; to some
degree, each has continued to exert influence, if not control, over thei r operations. (U//FOUO)
Of the two, in recent years the Gulf Cartel has b een more organized, more violent, and dominant.
(U//FOUO) Each cartel has a corporate, hierar chical structure that includes state bosses, enforcers, transport
bosses, and retail dealers, along with a hos t of support operations, including lookouts,
surveillance, and communications. Structure is so mewhat fluid given the vagaries of arrests,
deaths, and injuries; this also allows for a stea dy flow of replacements and fairly constant upward
mobility in the ranks. As of the first quarter of 2007, this alliance was particularly unstable, with
most of the senior leadership of the Tijuana Cartel behind bars in Mexico or the United States
4
and the Gulf Cartel’s Ca rdenas Guille n extradited and awaiting trial in the United States.
(U//FOUO)
IDEOLOGY

The overriding interest of the alliance is to increase wealth and amass power in the interests of
creating wealth. (U//FOUO)
Despite the prevalence of death im ages in Mexican culture (for ex ample, annual Day of the Dead
celebrations and profuse representa tions of skeletons in folk ar t), some recent reports have
suggested a cultural connection between the DTOs and the worship of La Santa Muerte, usually
described as a cult-like de votion to “Saint Death.”
5 Statuettes of the figure—a robed skeleton
holding a sickle—can be found in many Mexican shops on the border. Alleged worship of the
figure, combined with promises made by DTOs that the family of anyone who dies in service of
the cartels will be provided for, and recent use of beheadings as a tactic , have been cited in
support of a cultural connection between DTOs and radical Islamist terrorism. (U//FOUO)
However, this most likely reflects local cultural characteristics overlaid with traditional organized crime behaviors (e.g., caring for the families of dead “soldiers”) and the unwitting
influence of news and electronic media. Televisi on news reports have ina dvertently proliferated
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) used else where (i.e., in Iraq) to disparate groups around
the world, even while censoring the most gruesome material. The Internet has been a mechanism
for radical groups to disseminate to the general public unedited video of beheadings and other
tactics, which may serve as in spiration for other criminal and terrorist groups. (U//FOUO)

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UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

The Gulf Alliance has aimed to expand its markets and control the drug supplies and routes to,
through, and from Mexico into the United States. The strategy is simply to eliminate those who
stand in their way by cooption, bribery, intimidation, and assassination. (U//FOUO)

TARGET SELECTION

Government officials, including po lice authorities and elected offici als, may be offered bribes for
assistance or for looking the other way when confronted with the group’s ac tivities. In 1997,
bribes were estimated at $6 billion annually for all DTOs;6 they have undoubtedly increased
since then. Bribes may be monetary or goods and se rvices. If bribery does not work, the next step
is usually intimidation in the form of threats or attacks on the targeted individual’s property or
associates, including family. T hose who still resist are subj ect to kidnapping, torture, and
execution. The choice for officials, and incr easingly for journalists , is commonly called plata o
plomo —silver or lead, money or a bullet, life or death.7 (U//FOUO)
Examples of “plomo” carried out by Mexican DTOs include the following:

• On 13 June 2005, Edmundo Fernández Corral wa s executed on the outskirts of Ciudad
Juárez. His assailants were not identified. He had been the Chihuahua Municipal Chief of
Police Special Forces for less than nine hours.
8
• On 16 June 2005, Pedro Madrigal was shot and killed outside his home in Mexico
City. Madrigal had been a member of the Policia Federal Preventiva (PFP,
Federal Preventive Police) for nearly si x years. In November 2004, he became
Coordinator for PFP activitie s at the Mexico City International Airport.
Subsequently, the PFP’s efficiency grew. In June 2004, Madrigal discovered 300
kilo of cocaine hidden in boxes contai ning winter clothing. The boxes had come
from Colombia. Madrigal also developed a reputation for spotting illegal aliens
and their traffickers.9
• In February 2006 the newsroom of the da ily newspaper El Mañana was stormed
by two gunmen with semi-automatic wea pons and a grenade. A reporter was
critically injured.10 The newspaper’s editorial di rector was murdered in 2004.11
• On Saturday, 21 April 2007, Durango stat e police commander Sergio Munoz was
abducted as he left his hous e. At least 10 gunmen in two SUVs grabbed him.
Following the abduction, two pol ice officers manning a roadbl ock were killed in a
shootout. Munoz’ body was dumped on a di rt road 250 miles north of Durango
city.12
In early 2006, the Inter American Press Association rated no rthern Mexico along the U.S. border
as the most dangerous place in Latin America for journalists. The Arellano Felix Organization is
believed to have been behind th e murder of Francisco Ortiz Fr anco, editor of the prominent
magazine Zeta, which covered drug dealing extensively. (U//FOUO)

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UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Besides deterring enforcement, actions of this sort terrify the gene ral population, discouraging
them from going to the authoriti es and instead forcing them to cooperate with the cartels.
(U//FOUO) In addition to the kidnapping, torture, and murder of government officials and journalists,
13 the
narcotraficantes have also attacked performers.14

In November and December 2006, singer Valentín Elizalde was shot and killed in Reynosa after performing a song sympathetic to the Sinaloa Cartel; Javier Morales Gómez, of the musical group Los Implacables del Norte, was murdered in Michoacán state (the group had recorded songs about the Arellano Fé lix family); and threats have been made
against the Tucanes of Tijuana, who have sung the praises of
Sinaloa traffickers. Recently, threats and taunts, along with
video of Elizalde’s autops y, have shown up on YouTube.
15
As a result of the attacks and threats against musicians,
concerts have been cancelled and disc jockeys ha ve avoided playing songs by particular artists.16
(Songs about the drug trade and traffickers are known as narcocorridos and are an outgrowth of
Mexico’s tradition of corridos, ballads that often re late local history .)17 (U//FOUO)
To expand markets and control routes, the Gu lf Alliance targets other drug or criminal
organizations that it believes are ob structing its business operations.18 This has been going on
across Mexico and has become increasingly vi cious, with torture and execution, including
beheadings. There are also reports of bodies be ing thrown from airpla nes, although it appears
that this is a means of disposal for the dead rather than an execution method.19 (U//FOUO)

INTERNAL STRUCTURES AND OR GANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

Each cartel has a variety of operational orga nizations. Some have specific functions—
transportation units, wholesale and retail sales units for distribution, money laundering units, and
enforcement units (hit squads). Others may gradually become vertical organizations—mini-
cartels dealing with all aspects of the business from production to street sales. These often evolve
from the hit squads. (U//FOUO) The most significant enforcement group in the Gulf Alliance is Los Zetas,
20 affiliated with the
Gulf Cartel. Los Zetas’ influen ce is growing, and the group is the likely successor to the Gulf
Cartel; a separate Universal A dversary Order of Battle examines this group. Others groups of
sicarios (hitmen) are Los Texas21 and Los Chachos,22 although occasionally Los Chachos, or
another group with the same name, reportedly have worked with the Sinaloa Alliance.
(U//FOUO)

Francisco Ortiz
Franco

Valentín Elizalde

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UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LOS TEXAS

Los Texas,23 a border gang in Coahuila and Tamaulipas with cells in San Antonio and Laredo,
TX, has been run by Arturo Marti nez Herrera, “El Texas,” from his prison cell. He is currently
serving a 36-year sentence. Besides drug dealin g, Los Texas is involved in kidnapping, violent
enforcement for the Tijuana Cartel, and perhaps smuggling of illegal aliens. In 2000, Mexican authorities raided the prison La Loma in Tama ulipas, where many members of Los Texas were
held. They found cocaine, marijuana, U.S. a nd Mexican currency, three 12 gauge shotguns, and
“a number of sharp-edged weapons.” Some cells we re welded shut so that they could not be
searched by the authorities. Mattresses had been set on fire to keep officers from entering the
prison. There was also a security monitoring system run from the ce ll of Guillermo Marti nez
Herrera (presumably Arturo’s brother). The gang also had a number of safe houses outside the
prison. Sixteen officials, includ ing the prison director, guards, and wardens, were held under
suspicion of cooperating with the Los Texas inmates. (U//FOUO)
Los Texas has had a long rivalry with Los Chachos and engaged in a shootout with Los Zetas in February 2003.
24. (U//FOUO)

LOS CHACHOS

The role of Los Chachos25 is somewhat more ambiguous than those of the other groups. Los
Chachos began as a transborder car theft ring, and th en turned to drugs. It was originally based in
Anahuac, Monterrey, and Reynoso, with 50–60 core members. In the mid-1990s, it was one of
two drug gangs that controlled the city of Tijuana.26 Two of its leaders were allegedly
assassinated by the Ca rdenas Guille n faction in 2002, perhaps because there were signs it was
aligning with the Sinaloa Cartel. It is believed to have reorganized under new leadership aligned
with the Arellano Fe lix faction. Los Chachos was run by a former Judicial Police officer,
Dionisio Román García, who was killed by Arturo Gu zmán Decena, the first leader of Los Zetas,
the Gulf Cartel’s hit squad. This was allegedly the first task put to Los Zetas by Ca rdenas
Guillen, who resented Los Chachos’ efforts to esta blish themselves in Ciudad Miguel Alemán,
Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros and Reynosa, all Gulf Cartel plazas. (U//FOUO)
LOS ZETAS

Los Zetas are the most significant paramilitary gr oup associated with this alliance. Unlike the
others, the founding Zetas had a strong military background and brought the cartel a level of
discipline and training not previously seen.
27 Los Zetas have increased their role in the Gulf
cartel to such an extent that, in conjunction with the arrests of senior leaders of the Gulf Alliance,
they may be in a position to carry on the battle against the Sinaloa Alliance in their own right.
Therefore, they warrant a separate Univ ersal Adversary Order of Battle. (U//FOUO)

LA FAMILIA

La Familia is believed to be associated with the Gulf Cartel. Several days before the murder of
singer Valentín Elizalde, it bought a half-page newspaper ad in Michoacán blaming other DTOs
for the bloodshed in the area. La Familia, also known as La Familia Michoacana, gained some

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UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY prominence in late 2006 with proposals to limpiar (clean) the state of all DTOs trafficking in
methamphetamine.28,29 (This propaganda effort is reminiscent of ads by Sinaloa Alliance
operative Edgar “La Barbie” Valdéz Villarreal, which claim that the police and other officials were demanding payments from him.) This call effectively was directed against the Sinaloa
Alliance, which has become a major methamph etamine producer, serving both the U.S. and
Mexican methamphetamine markets. La Familia reportedly has 4,000 members in the 113 cities
of Michoacán, and each “employee” has a $1,500 −$2,000 monthly salary. It employs only
natives of Michoacán and operates like a modern business entity; indeed, it refers to itself as la
empresa (the enterprise). It spends $1.5 million a month on bribes. Whether this is the same
Familia that is believed to have tossed five se vered heads onto the floor of a bar in Uruapán in
September 2005
30 is unclear; there a ppear to be at least two groups in Mexico that have been
called La Familia. La Familia may have provide d an anonymous tip to the Mexican government
of a shipment of ephedrine on a Chinese ship. The container holding the ephedrine, a precursor
for methamphetamine, was seized on December 6, 2006 before it could be sent on to ”super
labs” in Michoacán. (The Drug Enforcement Admini stration defines a super lab as a laboratory
“capable of producing 10 pounds or more of me thamphetamine within a production cycle,” and
believes that about two-thirds of methamphetamine in the United States comes from these larger
labs which are increasingly in Mexico.)31 (U//FOUO)
Across all the DTOs, once an individual or group reaches a certain level of achievement or
leadership, they are potential competitors to hi gher-ranking members within the cartel. This
rivalry may even transcend fam ily bonds. Leaders work to control and co- opt potential rivals,
and to prevent the perception that they are weak or ineffective. It is significant that both
Cardenas Guille n and Benjami n Arellano Fe lix have apparently maintained a high degree of
control over their organizations from their pris on cells, at least until recently. Arellano Fe lix has
a large family, and various members have taken ove r operations as the need arises. It is believed,
for example, that his sister Enedina is running this cartel following the a rrest in 2006 of their
brother Francisco Javier Arellano Fe lix.
32 Cardenas Guille n has had the expert ise and loyalty of
Los Zetas, although there are recent signs (especially since his ex tradition to the United States)
that Los Zetas are operating mo re independently. Both Benjami n Arellano Fe lix and Ca rdenas
Guillen are believed to have had acce ss to cell phones while in Mexi can prisons (as noted below,
Mexican authorities are now making efforts to block cell phone signals to and from prisons), and
both were allowed visitors, who may have been di rectly associated with their respective DTOs.
(U//FOUO)
EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS AND INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL TIES

External and inter-organizational ties include suppliers in South Amer ica (Colombia, Peru,
Venezuela), transshipment alliances with organizations in Central America,33 and
wholesale/retail arrangements with domestic gangs in U.S. cities.34 There are also indications of
links to Russian organized crime in Mexico.35 The Arellano Fe lix brothers have been accused of
meeting with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the leftist rebel group in
Colombia. A recent shipment of methamphetamine precursors was seized on a vessel from China
36 (it is uncertain which drug group in Mexico was expected to receive the shipment).
(U//FOUO)

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UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In July 2006, a Peruvian judge wa s assassinated by alleged hit men fr om the Tijuana Cartel as he
ate at a restaurant near his office in Peru. Peru vian officials believe the order to kill the judge
came from a prison holding members of the cartel.37 The judge was presiding over the trial of
more than 20 men in Peru believed to be associated with the Tijuana Cartel.38 (U//FOUO)

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION AND STRENGTH

Since 2000, all of the Mexican DTOs have been attempting to expa nd their territory . The level of
violence has increased along the U.S.-Mexican border, particular ly around the “plazas” that
serve as entry points to the United States, and has spilled over onto U.S. territory. Equally significant, Mexico’s increased role as a producer, processor, and transshipper and its growing
population of drug users have led to previously unknown and vicious levels of violence within
that country. Finally, current enforcement operations may signi ficantly change the geographic
locations and strength of pa rticular groups. (U//FOUO)
There is no headquarters for eith er cartel in this alliance. Many leaders and lieutenants are in
prison. Other members float in a network of ope rations, residences, and safe houses. (U//FOUO)

The Tijuana Cartel’s operations originally covere d the area from Baja California to Sinaloa, but
as a result of arrests, deaths, and the spread of the Sinaloa traffickers, their operations are now
more limited.39 Despite this, elements of the carte l are present in the following states:
• Baja California Norte
• Baja California Sur
• Sonora
• Sinaloa
• Zacatecas
• Nayarit
• Jalisco • Michoacán
• Oaxaca
• Federal District of Mexico
• Puebla
• Quintana Roo
• Chiapas (U//FOUO)

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States of Mexico
The group grows poppies in Sinaloa, Nayarit, Jalisco, and Michoacán, and processes the gum
into heroin.40 (U//FOUO)
The Gulf Cartel controls most drug traffickin g along the Gulf Coast of Mexico. It has been
involved in a “robust action” to ta ke over territory in the state of Nuevo Leon and the city of
Nuevo Laredo. In 2005, the Gulf Cartel had a presence in as many as 22 Mexican states,41
including:
• Tamaulipas
• Nuevo León
• Veracruz
• San Luis Potosí
• Jalisco, Michoacán
• Querétaro
• Oaxaca • Chiapas
• Tabasco
• Campeche
• Tabasco
• Yucatán
• Quintana Roo
• Coahuila. (U//FOUO)

For dealing pharmaceuticals, the cartel has a presence in Sinaloa and Tijuana.
42 (U//FOUO)

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Cities of Mexico

The Gulf Cartel accounted for 15% of the cocaine coming into the United States from Mexico
between 1999 and 2002.43 Around the same time, the Tijuana Cartel supplied more than 30% of
cocaine in the United States, ei ther directly or by allowing ot hers to use its routes for a
commission.44 (U//FOUO)
Both groups, like other traffickers, have been ex tending their operations southward to vertically
integrate their operations and s upply a growing population of drug us ers in Mexico. This alliance
is believed to have a presence in at least 22 Mexican states (estimates vary). Their alliance enhances their strength in states and cities wh ere each already had a presence, and eliminates a
source of competition and strife, at least as long as the alliance structure can be maintained. (U//FOUO)
TACTICS AND OPERATIONS

As the battle of the cartels has grown, tactics fo rmerly used infrequently against those perceived
as enemies or detrimental to drug trafficking ha ve become strategicall y important to expanding
the cartels’ areas of operations . Several subgroups, including Lo s Zetas, engage in kidnapping
and hostage taking, torture, assa ssination, arson, raids, disinf ormation operations (to make it
appear other cartels have committed crimes), intimidation, and psychological operations (as byproducts of the other activ ities) for the Gulf Alli ance. To date, the subgroups have not engaged
in significant seizures or sabotage, nor have they used or indica ted an interest in weapons of
mass destruction (WMDs). (U//FOUO)
COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

This alliance has kept the two cartels alive, al though at this point the Tijuana Cartel has been
hard hit by recent U.S. and Mexican enforcemen t efforts, and the Gulf Cartel’s subgroup Los

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UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Zetas appears to be slowly increasing its range and effectiveness, perhaps aiming to overtake the
original organizations. (U//FOUO) Control in specific areas, like Nuevo Laredo, fluctuat es periodically between this alliance and its
primary foe, the Sinaloa Alliance.
45 (U//FOUO)
However, during this period of combat between the alliances, the percen tage of drugs in the
United States that come from or through Mexico has increased dramaticall y, indicating that even
as DTO dominance changes, the market expands to accommodate all, at least temporarily,
46 and
the DTOs have the manpower and other resour ces to fill any gaps in supply lines. The 2006
National Drug Threat Assessment suggested that although the amount of drugs coming into the
United States was relatively stable, the purity of cocaine—the largest segment of the drug
market—might have declined.47 This implied some success in interdiction, although far more
members of the apparently weaker Gulf Alliance th an of the Sinaloa Alliance have been arrested.
The 2007 National Drug Threat Assessment, how ever, noted that coca production was higher
than previously estimated; cocaine availabili ty in the U.S. was essentially unchanged;
methamphetamine production had migrated to Mexi co as a result of domestic enforcement;
Mexican heroin had made inroads in southeastern and Midwestern states; and marijuana potency
has increased as a result of Mexican crops derived from California marijuana strains.48
According to the report, the amount of cocaine “lost or seized in tr ansit toward the United
States” has doubled from 2000 to 2005.49 This all suggests that interd iction efforts have had little
effect. In addition, Mexican DTOs have “areas of influence” in at least 31 U.S. States, from
California to New Hampshire and Texas to North Dakota.50 Their agents of influence may be
domestic or local gangs with connections to th e cartels, rather than act ual cartel members.
(U//FOUO)
According to Martínez, the Tijuana cartel had lost (a s of early 2005):

• two leaders
• seven financial operatives
• 10 lieutenants
• 43 hit men
• 33 public officials
• 7,367 collaborators and distributors.
51 (U//FOUO)

These numbers have been augmented considerably with the recent arrests of several members of
the Arellano Félix family. (U//FOUO) At least 36,000 individuals associated with drug tr afficking have been arrested in Mexico in
recent years,
52 many from this alliance. Undoubtedly mo re will be detained if the Mexican
government continues the crackdown begun in early 2007. Despite the combined effects of the
war between the DTOs and the crackdown by the Mexican government, the best possible result
is likely to be ongoing disruption of trafficking (r ather than elimination or significant reduction),
making the drug business more difficult. However, su ch disruption appears to come with the cost
of increased violence in th e general society. (U//FOUO)

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UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT

Radicalization is not applicable to the Gulf Alliance. (U//FOUO)
Recruitment is effected through family and so cial bonds. In addition, those without primary
contacts of this sort are “recruited” thr ough the appeal of wealth and power, a potent
combination in a country with an annual pe r capita income of approximately $10,000 (2005
estimate).
53 (U//FOUO)

TRAINING

There is generally no formal training; “recruits” learn the ropes on the job. Los Zetas reportedly
have operated training camps fo r their recruits. (U//FOUO)

LOGISTICS

Despite an essentially hierarchical structure, the cartels and alliance exhibit network characteristics in the growing use of the in ternet and electronic co mmunications (cell phone,
satellite phone, radio comm unications) to arrange a nd track deals and operat ions. Elements of the
cartels monitor and intercept police electronic communica tions. (U//FOUO)
Imprisoned leaders can relay information thr ough their visitors, including attorneys, fake
attorneys, fake human rights workers, and family, and, until recently, through cell phones (Mexico is in the process of installing equipm ent to block cell phone calls in its major prisons).
54
(U//FOUO)
Government interference is dealt with through bribery, intimidation, and execution ( plata o
plomo ”— the choice offered to officials). (U//FOUO)
The wealth provided by drug trafficking allows purchases on the legal and illegal weapons
markets, access to sophisticated communications and electronic surveillance equipment, and purchases of other necessary tangible supplies. It also allows the corruption of government
officials through bribes and favors. (U//FOUO) Vehicles used by the paramilitary groups may be purchased or obtained through car thefts in the
United States.
55 (U//FOUO)
“Gatekeepers” keep an eye on the border and cont rol the flow of drugs across the border. The
gatekeepers are basically ground tr affic controllers, coordinating shipments with their knowledge
of logistics and of enforcement tactics. They are also responsible for collecting any “taxes” on
drug or other shipments using the routes they control.
56 Presumably this is done via electronic
communications (cell phones, radios), and fr om lookouts, scouts and operators on the ground.
(U//FOUO) Members of all cartels have gone to ground in the past, hiding out in safe houses, isolated
properties, and even such natura l settings as caves. (U//FOUO)

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UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Although not the primary means of moving drugs, small aircraft are sometimes used to transport
cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine within miles of the U.S. border, where they
are offloaded and transported overland57 or through tunnels. The Tijuana Cartel has used
backpackers to transport marijuana across th e desert into the United States. (U//FOUO)
Among the vehicles used by the alliance are SUVs, pickups, and other vehicles, some armored and some reportedly equipped with smoke di spensers. Weapons include blunt and edged
weapons, handguns, automatic rifles, fragmentation grenades, rockets, and rocket launchers. One
leader of Los Zetas was arrested with a number of weapons, including an FN Herstal rifle with
cartridges capable of perforati ng the strongest armor. In 2005, Me xican Federal police in Baja
California (where Tijuana is located) seized more than 1,100 illega l weapons. Most were
smuggled from the United States.
58 One unconfirmed report has suggested that Mexican DTOs
may have SA-7 shoulder-launched missiles.59 (U//FOUO)
Repatriation and laundering of funds generated by drug trafficking, like the trafficking itself,
adapts to changing circumstances. DEA estimates that $8.3 −$24.9 billion in wholesale proceeds
is generated, removed, and laundered via bulk cash and monetary instruments smuggling, wire
remittances, and the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE). Bulk cash smuggling is the primary method used.
60 Drug proceeds smuggled into Mexico are deposited into casas de cambios
(exchange houses) and then wire-transferred to accounts at U.S. or other foreign banks,
essentially legitimating the funds . Armored cars bring the cash ba ck into Mexico, where it is
deposited into a U.S. bank account on behalf of a casa de cambio or financial institution.
(U//FOUO) Wire transfers are generally done in amounts le ss than $3,000 to avoid reporting requirements.
(U//FOUO) Some funds, instead of being deposited at casas de cambios in Mexico, are smuggled into other
Latin American countries and may enter the BM PE. In the BMPE, drug proceeds (dollars) are
exchanged for pesos. The dollars are then sold to importers who use them to purchase legitimate
goods which are then smuggled acr oss international borders as contraband. Using this method,
banking, tariff and tax requireme nts are thwarted, and the dr ug proceeds are repatriated.
(U//FOUO) Open-system stored-value cards, which are sim ilar to credit and debit cards, are becoming
increasingly popular, as they require no documen tation or identification and can have value
added or withdrawn at ATMs. Othe r electronic means, such as electronic gold, are also used.
(U//FOUO)
PERSONALITIES

As indicated, through the decades during which th e cartels have operated, no single leader is
dominant or indispensable; many others are availa ble to move in as gaps are created. Alliances
are fluid and can be broken over a difference of opinion about how to proc eed or over deliberate
action by one faction against anothe r. Decision making is centralized as long as a leader is seen
as legitimate; if that perception dissipates, a multitude of factions may arise. (U//FOUO)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
13
UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GULF CARTEL

Osiel Cárdenas Guille n (“El Mata Amigos,” “El Sen or,” “El Costroso”)
Cárdenas Guille n heads
the Gulf Cartel. Born May 18, 1967, he was facing various U.S. and Mexican charges when he was arrested after a shootout at his home in Matamoros in 2003. Ca rdenas Guille n
may have been a state police officer at one time.
61 He was brought
into the Gulf Cartel by its founder, Juan Garci a Abrego. He continued to run the cartel from his prison cell, despite being
moved from La Palma (where his ally from the Tijuana Cartel, Benjami n Arellano Fe lix, was
also incarcerated) to the Almoloya de Juárez prison. He reportedly nearly escaped from La
Palma twice, along with Benjami n Arellano Fe lix and a kidnapper named Daniel Arizmendi (“El
Mochaorejas”).
62 On January 19, 2007 he was extradited to Texas to face charges of drug
trafficking and murder.63 (U//FOUO)
Cárdenas Guille n integrated Los Texas into his organizatio n, and he has been a major factor in
the development of the internal market for i llegal drugs in the Mexican cities of Reynosa,
Matamoros, and Nuevo Laredo.
64 (U//FOUO)

Also while in prison, Cárdenas Guille n was rumored to be the sponsor of celebrations of
Children’s Day. At a bullfight ring in Piedras Negras in 2004, as a tape recording lauded
Cárdenas Guille n’s role in the event, children were give n drinks and gifts, including bicycles. A
similar party was held in Reynosa. In Tamaulipas, 17,000 adults and children at a similar celebration in the baseball stadium received cards noting Cárdenas Guille n’s sponsorship, even
as they enjoyed clowns, music, and a wr estling match. In 2006, there was yet another
celebration. Publicity a nnouncing the party made profuse use of the letter “Z,” which local
papers interpreted as a reference to Los Zetas.
65 (U//FOUO)
At a recent court appearance in Texas rece ntly, a reporter described Cárdenas Guille n as short,
balding, and known to favor “a gold-plated .45-calib er pistol whose grips were decorated with
ruby-encrusted panthers and skulls.”
66 He is scheduled to be tried in Brownsville, TX in late
2007. The United States had offered $2 million for his arrest. (U//FOUO) Miguel Treviño Morales

Described as the Gulf Cartel’s regional leader or gatekeeper in the Nuevo Laredo area, Treviño
Morales is said to control at least five cells of assassins, about 15 per cell. In January 2007, an

Osiel Cárdenas Guille n

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14
UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY arrest warrant was issued in Texas for Trevi ño Morales in connection with a double homicide.67
(U//FOUO) Eduardo (or Jorge) Costilla Sa nchez (“El Coss”)

Costilla Sánchez is the head of the cartel’s operation in Matamoros and leader of a band of sicarios (paid assassins) called Los Sierra,
which murdered a local reporter.
68 This may be the same person
sometimes listed as Jorge Costilla Sanchéz, who is also known as El Coss and who reportedly does not get along with the head of Los Zetas, Heriberto Lazcano. He was born in 1971. The United States is
offering a $5 million reward for his arrest.
69 (U//FOUO)
Arturo Guzmán Decena (deceased)

According to one account, Guzmán Decena was a Mexican soldier who was reportedly trained
by the Israelis in paramilitary operations. He left the army in 1998 at the age of 41 and began
recruiting other military experts to form Los Chachos. Los Chachos were located in Ciudad
Miguel Alemán, Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros, and Reynosa. Another account claims he was a commander of the Federal Judicial Police in Rey nosa prior to signing on with the Gulf Cartel.
70
He became Z-1, the first leader of Los Zetas. He reportedly killed a police lieutenant in Reynosa,
a journalist in Matamoros, a lawyer for the Carr illo Fuentes family in Monterey, and the leader
of Los Chachos, Dionisio Roman García, among others. He was killed by Mexican soldiers at a fast food restaurant in Matamoros in 2002. (U//FOUO) . Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano (“El Lazca,” “El Verdugo”)

The third leader of Los Zetas, Z-3, Lazca no is a former member of Grupo Aeromo vil de Fuerzas
Especiales (GAFES), the Mexican special forces from which many of the original Zetas came.
He is currently tasked with battling for the dr ug market based in Nuevo Laredo and extending
into the United States via Interstate 35, and he lives in Ciudad Miguel Alema n. Lazcano is
believed to be responsible for the murder of Fr ancisco Ortiz Franco, co-editor of the crusading
weekly Zeta de Tijuana , which reported extensively on DT Os. His primary operators are
Cipriano Mendoza (“El Remy”) and Ernesto Zatara in (“El Taca”), both also ex-military.71 “El
Verdugo” (The Executioner) reportedly li kes to feed his victims to lions.72 There was an as-yet
unconfirmed report that Lazcano may have been killed in early March 2007 during a shootout at a racetrack in Santa Fe, Veracruz.
73 (U//FOUO)
Antonio Ezequiel Cárdenas Guille n (“Tony Tormenta”)

Cárdenas Guille n ran the cartel after his brother Osie l was captured, but was regarded as
inefficient. He has been involved in the war ag ainst the Sinaloa Allian ce. His group is known as
Los Escorpiones.
74 (U//FOUO)

Jorge Castillo Sánchez

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
15
UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Antonio Arcos Medina (“El Ton on”)
Arcos Medina is responsible for ope rations in the state of Michoaca n. He was wounded in 2006
in a shootout.
75 (U//FOUO)
Dionisio Román García (deceased)

Román García headed Los Chachos until he was kill ed by the leader of Los Zetas. Román García
was kidnapped in Nuevo León and executed in Ta maulipas. He had been with the Judicial
Police. (U//FOUO)
TIJUANA CARTEL/ARELLANO FÉLIX ORGANIZATION (AFO)

Arellano Félix Siblings

Benjamín Arellano Félix (“Alberto Arredondo
Zazueta,” “Licenciado Zatarain,” “El Min”)
Born in the early 1950s, Benjami n is currently in La
Palma, a Mexican prison, and is a prime candidate for extradition to the United States. He describes himself as a housing contractor. He and his brothers ran the Tijuana Cartel for more than a decade; brother Ramón, killed in a police action in 2002, was the cartel’s enforcer for many years. The Arellano Fe lix
family was accused of the 1993 murder of Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo of Guadalajara, who some claimed was mistaken for rival trafficker Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzma n Loera, and of the
Tijuana chief of police in 1994. Benjami n’s wife and
four children were born in the United States and reportedly now live in San Diego, for their pr otection after a disagreement between Benjam ίn
and Cárdenas Guille n.
76 The uncle of the Arellano Fe lix brothers and their sister Enedina is
Miguel Ángel Fe lix Gallardo, who began as a trafficker in Sinaloa. Fe lix Gallardo was arrested
in 2002 for involvement in the murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena. Upon his arrest, the Arellano Fe lix brothers got the western ha lf of his territory. Benjami n was arrested in March
2002 in Puebla, Mexico. In July 2003, Benjami n and his brothers Eduardo and Francisco were
indicted in the United States for racketeering, conspiracy to import and distribute drugs, and
money laundering. (U//FOUO)
Benjamin and Ramón, prior to
Ramón’s death in 1992
Benjamín Arellano Félix, under arrest

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
16
UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The Arellano Félix orga nization has also been accused of dealing with the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the late 1990s.77 While it is logical that Mexican traffickers
would deal with Colombian producers, and FARC’s involve ment in drug production and
trafficking has been well-documented, claims th at the Tijuana Cartel provided weapons in
exchange for cocaine have not been publicly substantiated. (U//FOUO)
Francisco Javier Arellano Félix (“El Tigrillo”)

The youngest Arellano Félix brother, born in
1969, Francisco has tried to take the place of Ramón as head of the enforcers, but is said not to have the right personality. However, he is still regarded as one of the organization’s
leaders,
78 if only by name. He has been called
a “playboy with a vicious streak” and “imprudent and violent.”
79 When he was
arrested in August 2006 in international waters off of Baja Califor nia, he tried to claim
he was someone else. He has been linked to 20 murders in the United States and Mexico, in addition to drug smuggling, m oney laundering, and bribery. He was indicted in July 2003 in
San Diego on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), drug and money
laundering charges. (U//FOUO)
Enedina Arellano

Enedina is the financial chief of a chain of dr ug stores, construction companies, hospitals, and
hotels in Tijuana, Guadalajara, and Morelia. She has been accused of money laundering and is
married to Luis Raul Toledo Carrejo, who also is part of the organization.
80 At least one observer
believes she actually “holds the reins” of the Tijuana Cartel.81 (U//FOUO)

Eduardo Arellano Fe lix (“El Gualin”)
A surgeon who runs his own clinic and a graduate of the Autonomous University of Guadalajara,
Eduardo was an adviser to Benjamín
82 and is one of his brothers. In 1998, he and his wife and
two children were burned when a propane tank on a grill exploded at their home in Tijuana. The
wife and children drove to a hospital in San Di ego. Eduardo got by with Mexican treatment, as
he was unwilling to risk arrest by crossing the border.83 He is expected to take on a more active
role in the cartel now that Fran cisco has been arrested. He wa s indicted in July 2003 in San
Diego on RICO, drug and money laundering charges. (U//FOUO)

Francisco Javier
Arellano Félix Under arrest,
August 2006

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17
UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Efraín Pérez Arciniega (or Pasuengo) (“El Efra”)
Arrested in 2004, Pérez Arciniega “d irected and supervised the AFO’s
counterintelligence programs for th e AFO and was involved in multiple
kidnappings and assassinations.”
84 He was indicted in July 2003 in San
Diego on RICO, drug and money laundering charges. (U//FOUO)
Jorge Aureliano Fe lix

Arrested in 2004, he is “a former Mexican police officer who conducted
security operations, coordinated ac quisition of armored vehicles and
weapons, and collected taxes on behalf of the AFO from independent drug
traffickers operating in Tijuana.”85 He was indicted in July 2003 in San
Diego on RICO, drug and money laundering charges. (U//FOUO)

Manuel Martínez Gonzaléz

Arrested in 2002 with Be njamín Arellano Félix, he was in ch arge of money laundering for the
cartel and of security for the Arellano Félix family.
86 (U//FOUO)
Manuel Aguirre Galindo (“El Caballo”)

Aguirre Galindo was a founder of the car tel, negotiator with other groups,
and confidante of Benjami n. He is believed to be semi-retired now and one
account has him living with his family in San Diego.
87 However, in
September 2006 the United States targeted his long-term financial associates, including his son, Manue l Francisco Aguirre Ramos, in a
money-laundering scheme involving seve ral front companies. This action
froze their assets and prohibited U.S. citizen s and companies from doing business with the
identified individuals and companies. The pr ess release announcing this action stated that
Aguirre Galindo was a fugitive.
88 He was indicted in July 2003 in San Diego on RICO, drug and
money laundering charges.89 (U//FOUO)
Humberto Rodríguez Bañuelos (“La Rana”)

He is a principal lieutenant to Aguirre Galindo, and was arrested in 2001. (U//FOUO)
Gilberto Camacho Valles and Francisco Beltrán

These men are Tijuana Cartel operators in Tijuana. (U//FOUO)

Efraín Pérez
Arciniega

Jorge
Aureliano Fe lix

Manuel Aguirre
Galindo

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18
UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Arturo Villareal Heredia
Villareal Heredia was arrested in 2006 with Francisco Javier
Arellano Félix and is described as an assassin for the cartel. He was believed to be in charge of enforcement operations and the transport of drugs through Tijuana.
90 (U//FOUO)

Marco Villanueva Fernández
Fernández was arrested in 2006 wi th Francisco Javier Arellano
Félix and is described as an assassin for the cartel.
91
(U//FOUO) Gustavo Rivera Marti nez

A gunman and bodyguard for Enedina,
92
Rivera Marti nez graduated from Bonita
Vista High School in California and has
relatives in the United States. After th e arrest of Franci sco Javier Arellano
Felix, a U.S. law enforcement official told a reporter that Rivera Marti nez
was likely to share operation of the cartel with Eduardo Arellano Fe lix.
Rivera Marti nez has been in charge of day-to-day operations.93 He was
indicted in July 2003 in San Die go on RICO, drug and money laundering
charges. (U//FOUO)

Arturo Villareal Heredia

Marco Villanueva Fernández

Gustavo Rivera
Martinez

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19
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Gilberto Higuera Guerrero (“El Gilillo”) and Ismael Higuera Guerrero (“El Mayel”)
These brothers are the sons of the man responsible for transporting cocaine via small aircraft or go-fast boats. Both have been in custody in Mexico, Ismael since 2000 and Gilberto since August 2004 at La Palma.
94 Along with
Francisco Javier Arellano Félix and Efraín Pérez Pasuengo, Gilberto, who was responsible for security for the cartel leaders, has helped lead the battle ag ainst the Sinaloa Alliance.
95 (This may be the
same person identified as Gilberto Figueroa Guerrero who, with Carlos
Francisco Cázares Beltrán and Guillermo López Palomera, operated for the cartel in El Valle and Tecate.) He and Ismael were extradited to the
United States in January 2007. They are charged “as co-defendants in
the Arellano-Felix drug cartel ca se, for racketeering (RICO), drug
trafficking and money laundering offens es.” Ismael allegedly served as
a chief lieutenant and was responsib le for the cartel’s day-to-day
operations in Mexico, including th e transshipment of cocaine and
marijuana into Mexico and onward into the United States, and the collection of payment. Ismael alle gedly supervised drug shipments
from Mexicali, Mexico, into the U.S, and also acted as an enforcer,
engaging in kidnapping, torture, and murder.
96 Both men were indicted
in July 2003 in San Diego on RICO, drug and money laundering
charges. (U//FOUO) Zataráin Family

These family members are Tijuana cartel operato rs in Mazatlán, la Noria, and Culiacán. An
apparent member of this family (bas ed on surname) is allegedly a Zeta.
97 (U//FOUO)
Pedro Avilés (deceased)

The family of Avilés controls Sonora. Avilés, now deceased, was a major drug trafficker in the
late 1960s and 1970s. (U//FOUO) Luis Valencia (“La Mona Peinada”)

The Valencia family has been linked in news reports to both the Tijuana Cartel and Sinaloa
Cartel. Luis and his cousin Armando Valencia run a smaller cartel from Michoacán called the
Cártel de Los Valencia. (U//FOUO)

Ismael Higuero
Guerrero and
Gilberto Higuero
Guerrero
Gilberto Higuero Guerrero

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20
UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Marcos Arturo Quiñones (“El Pato”)
Arturo Quiñones is a former member of th e Logan Heights gang of San Diego who was
reportedly recruited in the late 1980s or ear ly 1990s. He was born in about 1969. In 2002, U.S.
authorities believed he was a key enforcer for the Tijuana Cartel, running a hit squad.
98 He was
arrested in 2003 in Tijuana. (U//FOUO) Jaime Ocampo

Arrested in 2004 in Rosarito Beach, Baja Califo rnia after a police purs uit of suspects in the
abduction of two police officers, Ocampo lived in Chula Vista, CA. He reportedly confessed to
kidnappings and killings for the Arellano Fe lix family. Two other men, Jose Roque (also from
San Diego) and Erick Ballester os, were arrested with him.
99 (U//FOUO)
Ivonne Soto Vega (“La Pantera”)

This mother of two lived in Bonita, CA for many years and was arrested in Tijuana in 2001
under suspicion of money la undering for the Arellano Fe lix family.
100 Subsequent reports
claimed she was part of an operation that laundered at least $120 million for the family.101
(U//FOUO) José Manuel Ruelas Martínez

An alleged money launderer, along with Soto Vega, Ruelas Martínez had a home in Chula Vista,
CA. He was arrested in Mexico in 2003. The pai r’s method was to take cash profits to Mexico
hidden in cars. The cash was brought to money exch ange houses that were registered with the
Mexican government but never op erated other than for the DTO. A representative of the
exchange house would bring the money back into the United States, declaring amounts over $10,000 as profits from that business. Once it wa s declared, it could be treated as legal.
102 Ruelas
Martínez reportedly was connected to a photo business and a restaurant supply business.
(U//FOUO) Sergio Rubalcava Sandoval

Rubalcava Sandoval is a former Baja California state police commander who was arrested in
2004. He was believed to be a senior San Diego li nk for the Tijuana cartel. His Bonita, CA home
was seized, along with two cars and a boat.
103 (U//FOUO)

CULTURE

Like members of organized crime, Mexican dr ug traffickers often lead double lives. They may
be devoted to their families, yet have a string of mistresses and illegitimate children. Ruthless with traitors and incompetents, they can be exce edingly generous with friends and subordinates.
Good and evil as understood by most people are con cepts that do not apply in this setting. The
good person is the one who serves the organization, whereas the evil person is the one who does
not. The law, the government, the military, and the police are all things to be eliminated or

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21
UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY coerced through fear or greed to serve the traffickers, as ar e competitors. Mexican drug
traffickers have a strong work ethic within the context of their goals a nd are dedicated to the
pursuit of dominance of their markets, increa sed power, and financial wealth. (U//FOUO)
As with other criminal and noncriminal organizat ions, family members often join the family
business. This is true, as noted above, for both the Gulf and Tijuana Cartels. Beyond this, loyalty
is fluid and depends on the extent to which it is seen as paying off in greater wealth, power, and
influence. (U//FOUO)

MISCELLANEOUS DATA

The two major cartels in the Gulf Alliance have been seriously wounded in their war against the
Sinaloa Alliance by virtue of arrests and extr aditions. However, subgroups in the alliance
continue to fight against elements of the Si naloa Alliance and Mexican government forces.
Despite the fact that the Gulf Alliance has had the special military expertise of Los Zetas, the
Sinaloa Alliance has been quite effective in att acking the established ba ses and routes of its
enemy along the border. However, the Sinaloa A lliance has not yet established control. The
continuing importance of Sinaloa and Sonora for production and transshipment of an array of
drugs means that the Sinaloa Al liance can continue its smuggling operations through Arizona, if
necessary, while working to deny other areas to the Gulf Alliance. Government enforcement
efforts have chipped away at th e capabilities of the Gulf Allian ce, but Los Zetas are likely to
survive both the government and Sinaloa. (U//FOUO) During this period of combat between the alliances , the percentage of drugs in the United States
that come from or through Mexico has increased dramatically, indicating that the market has
expanded enough to accommodate all DTOs, regardle ss of which one is dominant at any given
time. (U//FOUO)
In addition, despite the fact that 36,000 individuals associated with drug trafficking have been
arrested in Mexico, including thousands associat ed with the Gulf Alliance, no significant dent
had been made in the level of trafficking as of the end of President Vicente Fox’s term of office,
in December 2006. This suggests that despite th eir problems, the DTOs have found effective
means to thwart governmental effo rts to control them. Whether they will be able to regroup after
the offensive initiated by President Felip e Calderón remains to be seen. (U//FOUO)
The recent arrests and extraditions of member s of the Gulf Alliance, which may lead to
additional information on individu als connected to the group, combined with the structure of
Spanish names (which often include the father’s surname followed by the mother’s surname),
make Social Network Analysis a potentially us eful tool in tracking alliance members. Such
tracking could well extend beyond Me xico’s borders to identify conne ctions in the United States
and other countries. (U//FOUO)

THREAT TO CONUS

Drug abuse and related crime constitute a significant public safety threat to the continental United States (CONUS). (U//FOUO)

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Drug abuse carries familial, social, and criminal costs. Families suffer the emotional and financial burden of dealing with a member wh o is abusing drugs, and they may also be the
victims of criminal acts, as the abuser needs m oney to sustain the habit. Society is burdened by
public health costs and issues, and the need for protection (with its concomitant costs) from both
drug abusers and the criminal acts of traffickers at all levels. (U//FOUO)
Of greater significance in this analysis, how ever, is the possibility that the shipping and
distribution systems of the Gulf Alliance and successor organizations could be used by terrorists,
including radical Islamists, to smuggle people or materiel into the United States. Although there
is no evidence to date that this has occurred, it is a potential threat to national and homeland
security. The major smuggling r outes along the southern bord er of the United States—and by
inference the routes most likely to offer success—are controlled by the Mexican DTOs, who
charge fees or commissions for their use by others. There has been no suggestion that any of the
DTOs pick and choose among potential customers; ra ther, if an individual or group can pay the
fee, what they transport appears to be of no concern to the DTO. (U//FOUO)
This situation is complicated, however, by the cu rrent crackdown by Mexican authorities and to
a lesser extent by American authorities. The DTOs have stepped up their violence within
Mexico, with more kidnappings and murders than ever. Many of these are directed at Mexican
officials. It is legitimate to ask how far the DT Os are willing to go to ensure their survival.
Would they risk the destruction of the Mexican state, directly or indirectly? The men and in
some cases women who run the DTOs are criminals, but they are not stupid. It is doubtful that
the violence has yet reached a level at which they have to consider whether their actions truly
threaten the survival of Mexico as a sovereign nation, but should it reach that point, one factor in
their decision must be the likely U.S. reaction to chaos and lawlessness on the border, potentially
creating a breeding ground for logi stical and support sites for crim inal and terrorist activity
against U.S. entities. (U//FOUO) On 21 September 2001, in an address to Congre ss and the American people, President George
Bush said, “From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will
be regarded by the United St ates as a hostile regime.”
104 Recently, one ship carrying
methamphetamine precursors from China was seized off Mexico, and another with millions of dollars worth of drugs destined for Mexico was seized off Panama. No open source information
is available as to the extent to which these syst ems, to get drugs into Me xico, are controlled by
the DTOs and are also available to “clients” for a fee, and although it is logical to assume this is
possible, it is not currently reas onable to assume it is likely. However, should these routes be
used to transport weapons, particularly weapon s of mass destruction, any U.S. response is
complicated immensely by the friendly relations between the United States and Mexico.
(U//FOUO) In conjunction with that rela tionship, the United States is providing radiation detection
equipment for several Mexican ports. These po rts are taking on more shipping headed for the
United States, as many U.S. ports, including those in the Los Angeles area, are at full capacity.
The DTOs have probably established international shipping connections (most likely including recognized shippers, customs brokers, dockworke rs and others within the industry). Drugs

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23
UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY brought in via legitimate shipping through Mexican ports still require tran sport through Mexico
and across the border. This is another possibl e route for extremists and their materiel.
(U//FOUO) There have been claims that Islamic terrorist s have already been sm uggled over the border,
although to date none of these claims has been substantiated in open sources and the limited
evidence for such claims is not compelling.
105 In 2005, the figures for illegal alien apprehensions
along the southern border were as follows:
• 86.1% were Mexican.
• 12.8% were from elsewhere in Latin America
• 0.3% from Canada and China
• 0.8% (9,041 individuals), from other countries including but not limited to countries “of
special interest,” those most likely to be the points of origin for Islamic terrorists.106

In FY2005, across the United States, apprehensions of individuals from special interest countries
included:
• 55 illegal aliens from Afghanistan
• 291 from Egypt
• 153 from Indonesia
• 165 from Iran
• 165 from Iraq
• 309 from Jordan
• 125 from Lebanon
• 5 from Libya
• 39 from Algeria
• 238 from Morocco
• 792 from Pakistan
• 40 from Saudi Arabia.107 (U//FOUO)

Most illegal immigrants are seek ing political freedom or economi c betterment, yet these numbers
suggest that the DTOs have the potential to pr ovide a service, wittingly or unwittingly, to those
who wish to enter the United States for the pur pose of engaging in terrorist acts. (U//FOUO)
There is no indication that there are ideological or religious incentives or obstacles for the DTOs
to service terrorist operators. Pragmatically, there are incentives in the form of fees paid, whether
DTO cooperation is witting or not . Assuming the DTO is aware of the nature of any cargo or
materiel it transports, the potential reaction of the U.S. government to any act of terrorism that
had connections to Mexico might be a disin centive, although this is difficult to judge.
(U//FOUO) But what about terrorist organi zations, particularly radical Islamic groups—would they be likely
to operate outside of their own networks of sm all, trusted, compartmentalized groups? Are the
Mexican DTOs likely partners for them? It may be improbable that there would be direct contact
in which the Mexicans would be aware of the iden tity or ultimate goal of the extremists. What
may be the most likely scenario is one in wh ich any arrangements with a Mexican DTO are

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
24
UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY handled through another criminal organization which has its own connections with radical
extremists. It is already clear that Mexican DTOs have connections with Asian organized crime;
there are suggestions of contacts with Russi an organized crime. Drug producers in South
America provide cocaine and other drugs to tra ffickers in Europe. Ther e are a number of ways
potential terrorists could make use of Mexi can DTOs while maintaining some degree of
separation. (U//FOUO) However, in early 2007, it is questionab le whether any of the Mexican DTOs would be appealing
to extremists. Enforcement efforts by both th e Mexican and U.S. governments and the warfare
between the DTOs make using a ny DTO a questionable proposition. Just as there is no evidence
that such cooperation has occurred in the past, it is at least for the mome nt not likely to occur.
(U//FOUO)

Developed for the United States Depar tment of Homeland Security’s
National Preparedness Task Force, Preparedness Directorate,
by Applied Marine Technology, Inc.’s In telligence and Terrorism Analysis Group

Please contact Ms. Magdalena Bajll, De partment of Homeland Security, at
Magdalena.A.Bajll@dhs.gov , with any feedback, comments or questions.

Endnotes

Composition
1 “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002,” Library of Congress, February 2003.
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-f iles/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf.
2 Ibid.
3 Stratfor, “Mexico: The New Kingpi n’s Rise,” February 21, 2005, http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/
read_article.php?id=244486.
4 “U.S. Official Cites Anti-Drug Stra tegy Progress in the Americas,” NewsBlaze, March 31, 2006,
http://newsblaze.com/story/2 0060331090808t sop.nb/newsblaze/TOPST ORY/Top-Story.html.
5 Sara Carter, “Of Special Interest,” Inland Valley Daily Bulletin , December 29, 2006, http://www.dailybulletin.com/
beyondborders/ci_4917114.

Target Selection
6 “McCaffrey – Drug Lords Kill ‘Hundreds’ of Me xican Cops, Spend $6 Billion to Bribe Others,” Reuters , March
25, 1997, http://www.pdxnorml.org/032797.html. Also in “Drug War in the United States,” Congressional Record,
March 9, 1999, quoting then-head of the Drug Enforcement Administration Tom Constantine.
7 Thomas S. Davidson II, CW4, “Operation Secure Mexico,” Foreign Military Studies, June 2005, Ft. Leavenworth,
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/op-secure-mex/op-secure-mex.htm.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Letta Taylor, “Land of Outlaws,” Newsday, April 16, 2006.
http://www.newsday.com/news/ nationworld/world/ny-wolare104704661apr 16,0,3751762.story?coll=ny-worldnews-
print
11 Diego Cevallos, “Mexico – Reporters Targeted by Drug Related Violence in Nuevo Laredo,” IPS, February 7,
2006, http://www.alterinfos.org/spip.php?article229.

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12 “3 police killed in northern Mexico,” Associated Press/MySA.com, April 21, 2006.
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/M/MEXICO_ VIOLENCE?SITE=TXSAE&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=
DEFAULT
13 James C. McKinley, Jr., “A War in Mexico: Drug Runners Gun Down Journalists,” The New York Times,
November 6, 2002, http://www.periodico26.cu/english/features/war021106.htm.
14 Laurence Iliff, Alfredo Corcha do, “Sour notes in drug-turf war: Mexican musicians targeted,” Seattle Times.
December 19, 2006, http ://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ html/nationworld/2003484 546-narcosongs19.html.
15 http://youtube.com/watch?v=v57bwSsUtjI.
16 Iliff and Corchado, op. cit.
17 It is unclear why singers and musical groups would continue to record songs that put them in jeopardy. A brief
discussion of narcocorridos as information warfare is available at “INFO WARFARE, NARCOCORRIDOS, AND
YOUTUBE,” April 9, 2007, http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globa lguerrillas/2007/04/info_warfare_na.html , It
may be that some are receiving payments or threat s from DTOs to continue their musical efforts.
18 Mary Jordan and Kevin Sullivan, “Border Police Chief Only Latest Casualty in Mexico Drug War,” The
Washington Post, June 16, 2005, http://www.washingtonpos t.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/15/
AR2005061502553.html.
19 http://www.impunidad.com is an outgrowth of the In ter American Press Association’s Unpunished Crimes
Against Journalists project. http://www.impunidad.com/toplevel/fenixEn.htm.
20 Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “Armed grou p challenges Mexico’s police and army,” Special Warfare, May 2004,
http://www.findarticles. com/p/articles/mi_m0HZY/is_4_16/ai_n6361555.
Internal Structures and Organizational Dynamics
21 “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002,” Library of Congress, February 2003,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-f iles/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf.
22 Ibid.
23 “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002,” Library of Congress, February 2003,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-f iles/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf.
24 Mario A. Rodríguez, “El poder de los ‘zeta,’” Monogr afías.com, October 2006. http://www.monografias.com/
trabajos28/poder-zetas /poder-zetas/shtm.
25 Ibid.
26 Sara A. Carter, “Here we are prisoners,” San Bernardino Sun, December 8, 2006,
http://www.sbsun.com/news/ci_4911458.

Training
27 Information on Los Zetas is slowly becoming available. This section was developed primarily from the following
sources: Kaitlin Bell, “Long-sought Zetas ga ng ‘crony’ now behind bars,” The Monitor, December 2, 2005,
http://www.themonitor.com/SiteProces sor.cfm?Template=/GlobalTemplates/Details.cfm&StoryID=10418&Section
=Valley. Karen Black, “New Generation of Drug Lords Takes to Streets of Nuevo Laredo, Mexico,” Ft. Worth Star-
Telegram, September 7, 2003.
Jesse Bogan, “Guatemala troops tied to border drug war,” San Antonio Express-News, August 18, 2005,
http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/crime/stories /MYSA081805.1A.cartel_trainers.17cd4a8d.html.
Brendan M. Case, Alfredo Corchado, Laurence Iliff, “Officials develop clearer picture of Zetas,” El Universal,
March 21, 2005, http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id_nota=9851&tabla=miami. Gustavo Castillo, David Carrizales, Marti n Sanchez Treviño, Javier Valdez Ca rdenas, “Capturan en Monterrey a
uno de los li deres de Los Zeta y a 25 personas ma s,” La Jornada, August 17, 2005, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/
2005/08/17/005n1pol.php. Alfred Corchado, “Mexican Zetas Extending Violence Into Dallas,” Dallas Morning News, February 20, 2005,
http://www.dallasnews.com/s/dws/news/longter m/stories/022005dnnatzetas.869f0.html.
Alfredo Corchado, “Cartel enforcers operate in Dallas,” Dallas Morning News, December 13, 2005,
http://www.dallasnews.com/sh aredcontent/dws/news/longter m/stories/061905dnmetmimicourtsider1.222c83b4.html
Alfredo Corchado, Lennox Samuels, “Video offers brutal glimpse of drug cartels,” Dallas Morning News,
December 7, 2005, http:// www.dallasnews.com/s/dw s/news/world/stories/
DN-dvd_01int.ART.North.Edition2.13b62772.html.

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Jorge Alejandro Medelli n, “Ve EU in ‘Zetas’ gran amenaza,” El Universal, March 24, 2005,
http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id_nota=123289&tabla=nacion.
Juan Arvizy Arrioja, “M exican Drug Commandos,” KPHO-News5, May 19, 2005, http://www.kpho.com/global/
story.asp?s=3366962&ClientType=Printable. “Mexican Soldiers Becoming Drug Cartel Hit Men,” Associated Press, June 21, 2005, http://www.newsmax.com/
archives/articles/2005/6/21/142208.shtml.
Alberto Najar, “La tierra de nadie, la tierra de los narcos,” La Jornada, June 19, 2005, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/
2005/06/19/mas-najar.html.
Claudio F. Orenday, “Operan en Baja California,” El Observador Diario, September 8, 2005,
http://elobservadordiario.com/modul es/news/article.php?storyid=126.
Silvia Otero, “Kaibiles entr enan a sicarios, confirman,” El Universal, October 31, 2005,
http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/no ticia.html?id_nota=25140&tabla=primera.
Manuel Pineda, “La hidra del narco ajusta cuentas,” Contralinea, 2005, http://www.contralinea.com.mx/c14/html/
sociedad/la_hidra.html.
Jerry Seper, “Ex-Troops aiding drug traffickers,” The Washington Times, February 24, 2005,
http://www.washtimes.com/nationa l/20050224-123713-6092r.htm.
Mark Stevenson, “AP Exclusive Interv iew: Mexican Army Deserters Start War for Control of Border City,”
Associated Press, October 11, 2003, http://www.rr-bb.com/archive/index.php/t-111517.html.
Mark Stevenson, “Mexican police arrest allege d hitman in huge border town shootout,” Associated Press, October
29, 2004, http://www.nctimes.com/articles/200 4/10/30/news/nation/17_29_1910_29_04.txt.
“Testimony of Chris Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, and the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security and Claims,” Nove mber 17, 2005, http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/
swecker111705.pdf. Bernard R. Thompson, “Mexican drug lords, influence and violence,” Mexidata.info, November 7, 2005,
http://www.mexidata.info/id667.html.
28 “El costo de la ‘pacificación,” El Diario de Coahuila, December 3, 2006. http://www .eldiariodecoahuila.com.ms/
newsadmin/preview.php?id=12842.
29 Sam Logan, “The Curse of Methamphetamine in Western Mexico,” International Security Network , December
11, 2006, http://www.mexidata.info/id1165.html.
30 “Factbox – Facts about Mexico’s growing drug war,” Reuters AlertNet, November 30, 2006.
31 Timothy J. Ogden, Drug Enforcement Administration, “Fighting Meth in America’s Heartland: Assessing Federal,
State, and Local Efforts,” Testimony before the House Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources , June 27, 2005. http://www.dea.gov/pubs/cngrtest/ct062705.html
32 Robin Emmott, “More women rule, and die, in Mexico’s drug gangs,” Reuters, April 20, 2007. Retrieved from
signsonsandiego.com.

External Relationships and Inter-Organizational Ties
33 “International Narcotics Control Strate gy Report,” March 2006, U.S. Departme nt of State, http://www.state.gov/p/
inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/pdf/index.htm.
34 “Drugs and Gangs, Fast Facts,” U.S. Department of Justice, 2005, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs11/13157/
index.htm.
35 “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002,” Library of Congress, February 2003,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-f iles/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf.
36 Reuters, “Mexico police seize 20 tons of meth ingredient,” CNN, December 7, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/
WORLD/americas/12/07/mexico.meth.reut/index.html.
37 Alfredo Corchado, “Mexican dr ug cartels move into Peru,” Dallas Morning News , January 8, 2007. For additional
background on Mexican dr ug traffickers in Peru, see also Angel P aéz, “Mexican Cartels Dig In Their Heels,” Inter
Press Service News Agency, August 28, 2006. http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34489
38 It is unclear from news reports whether the prison from which the orders to kill the judge came was in Peru or
Mexico, although based on additional details derived from seve ral reports it appears the prison was in Peru. If this
inference is accurate, it raises questions about communications between the prisoners and other members of the
cartel, whether in Mexico or Peru: why would it have been necessary for the orders to come through prisoners? The
political situation in Peru at the time must also be considered. Vladimiro Montesinos, former top aide and spymaster
for disgraced former Peruvian presid ent Alberto Fujimori, had been accused of accepting payments from Mexican

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cartels in exchange for allowing the uninterrupted flow of cocaine (see, for example, Paéz, op. cit.). It is possible
that ascribing drug-related criminal activities to non-Pe ruvians and indicted former officials served political
purposes of the current Peruvian administration. Without ad ditional information, it is difficult to determine if the
Tijuana Cartel in particular, and Mexican DTOs in general, are establishing their own operations in Peru or dealing with local operators.

Geographic Location and Strength
39 Robert J. Caldwell, “Winning the long battle against the Tijuana Cartel,” San Diego Union-Tribune, June 20,
2004, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20040620/news_mz1e21caldwe.html.
40 Martínez, Abraham G., “Quién es quién en el narco en México,” La Critica, January 10, 2005,
http://www.lacritica.com/mx/index2.php?option=content&do_pdf=1&id=837.
41 Gustavo Castillo Garcia, “La Guerra entre ca rteles, sin cuartel; 800 ejecutados en lo que va del año,” La Jornada,
August 7, 2004, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2005/08/07/006n1pol.php.
42 Martínez, op. cit.
43 “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002,” Library of Congress, February 2003,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-f iles/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf.
44 Ibid.

Tactics and Operations
45 James Pinkerton and Ioan Grillo, “The fight for Nuevo Laredo,” The Houston Chronicle, May 8, 2005,
http://www.americas.org/item_1943.
Tactics and Operations
46 “National Drug Threat Assessment,” U.S. Department of Justice, February 2005, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/
pubs11/12620/index.htm.
47 “National Drug Threat Assessment,” U.S. Department of Justice, January 2006, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/
pubs11/18862/index.htm.
48 National Drug Intelligence Center, US DOJ, “Nationa l Drug Threat Assessment 2007,” October 2006.
49 Ibid, p.4.
50 Ibid., p.33.
51 Abraham G. Martínez, “Quién es quién en el narco en México,” La Critica, January 1, 2005.
52 Danna Harman, “Mexicans take over drug trade to US,” Christian Science Monitor, April 16, 2005,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0816/p01s03-woam.html.

Radicalization and Recruitment
53 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook,” http://www.cia.gov/cia/publi cations/factbook/rankorder/
2004rank.html.

Logistics
54 E. Eduardo Castillo, “Federal agents take over second to p-security prison to stem corruption, jailhouse crime,”
San Diego Union Tribune, January 26, 2005, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/mexico/
20050126-1521-mexico-prisonproblems.html.
55 Alberto Najar, op. cit.
56 Adam Beam and John Monk, “Drug pipeline flows from Mexico to S.C.,” Charlotte Observer, April 15, 2007.
http://www.charlotte.com/115/story/86369.html ; “Mexico: The Vital Role of ‘Gatekeepers’ in the Smuggling
Business,” Stratfor, December 22, 2006.
57 Donnie R. Marshall, Administrator, Drug Enfo rcement Agency, “DEA Congressional Testimony,” U.S.House of
Representatives Committee on the Ju diciary Subcommittee on Crime, March 29, 2001, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
pubs/cngrtest/ct032901.htm.
58 Oakland Ross, “Border No Barrier To Weaponry,” Toronto Star, April 24, 2006, http://www.mapinc.org/tlcnews/
v06/n514/a08.htm.
59 David Aponte, Juan Arvizy Arrioja, “Zetas might have missiles,” El Universal, February 12, 2005,
http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id_nota=9397&tabla=miami.
60 National Drug Intelligence Center, “National Drug Threat Assessment 2007,” October 2006,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/p ubs21/21137/mlaund.htm.

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Personalities
61 Alberto Najar, op. cit.; Associated Press, “Key Play ers in the Americas’ Drug Trade,” November 7, 2004,
http://www.wtopnews. com/indes.php?nid=389&sid-613675.
62 Martínez, op. cit.
63 A list of those extradited on January 20, 2007 and some background on each individual is available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/January/07_ag_030.html.
64 Ibid.
65 Frontera NorteSur, “Drug Dealers Sp onsor Children’s Day in Mexico,” Mexidata.info, May 8, 2006,
http://www.mexidata.info/id885.html.
66 Juan A. Lozana, “Boldness, violence kept drug kingpin atop Mexican cartel,” Dallas Morning News, February 9,
2007, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcont ent/APStories/stories/D8N6D3AO0.html.
67 Alfredo Corchado, “Drug turf war advances into ‘safest city in Mexico,” Dallas Morning News, February 12,
2007, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/new s/world/stories/021307dnintmonterrey.f933dd.html.
68 Alberto Najar, op. cit.
69 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Se busca por la FBI,”
http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/fugitiv es/cei/costilla_j_spanish.htm
70 J.Jesús Blancornelas, “Arturo y Osiel,” Zeta, December 2002, http://www.sur acapulco.com/mx/anterior/2002/
diciembre/03/opinion.htm.
71 Brendan M. Case et al, op. cit.; Alberto Najar, op. cit.
72 Alfredo Corchado, “Mexico vows to keep fighting drug trade,” Dallas Morning News, January 21, 2007.
73 “Indigan posible muerte de El Lazca, líder de Los Zetas,” El Milenio, March 6, 2007.
http://www.milenio.com/tampico/milenio/nota.asp?id=472088
74 Alberto Najar, op. cit.
75 Ibid.
76 http://www.state.gov/p/inl/narc/rewards/8707.htm; Debo rah Amos, “How Officials Jolted a Cocaine Cartel,”
ABCNews Nightline, September 28, 2002, http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=128536.
77 This has been reported by a number of media outlets but there has been limited evidence made public. On
November 29, 2000, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher released a statemen t saying “The Office of the
Attorney General in Mexico announced on November 23 that Mexican and Colombian officials have exposed a
major link between the Arellano Felix Organization in Mexico and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC). The link was announced after Colombian Dr. Carlos Ariel Charry Guzman and Mexican Enrique
Guillermo Salazar Ramos were ordered held for arrest and tr ansferred to the Almoloya de Juarez federal prison in
Mexico. Evidence shows FARC guerrillas supplied cocaine to the cartel in exchange for cash and possibly
weapons.” (Statement at http://www.ciponline.or g/colombia/112901.htm ) Note the word “possibly” regarding
weapons. Although the arrest and subsequent investigation were announced with some fanfare, there have been no
public updates; indeed, there is no report of the current whereabouts of Charry Guzman.
78 Alberto Najar, op. cit.
79 Onell R. Soto, Anna Cearley, O tto Kriesher, “Mexican cartel’s leader is seized off Baja coast,” San Diego
Tribune, August 17, 2006.
80 Alberto Najar, op. cit.
81 Martínez, op cit.
82 Ibid.
83 Media Awareness Project, excerpt from Robert Caldwell, “Silver or Lead,” San Diego Union Tribune, July 9,
2000, http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n961/a06.html?298676.
84 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administrati on, “Major Cartel Lieutenants Arrested in Mexico,” June 7, 2004.
85 Ibid.
86 “Criminal Organization of the Arellano Felix: Main Arrests,” Government of Mexico, March 10, 2002.
http://www.pgr.gob.mx/cmsocial/press02/mar/b21402.html
87 Media Awareness project, op. cit.
88 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Exposes Fronts for the Arellano Felix Drug Kingpin Organization,”
September 28, 2006. http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp120.htm and Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Recent
OFAC Actions,” Sept. 28, 2006. http://www.treas.gov /offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20060928.shtml
89 Department of Justice, “12 Leaders of Mexican Narcotics Cartel Indicted,” July 8, 2003.
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/July/03_ag_403.htm

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90 Soto, Cearley, Kriesher, op. cit.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Soto, Cearley, Kriesher, op. cit
94 Ibid.
95 Martínez, op. cit.
96 U.S. Department of Justice, “Statement of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzalez on Extradition of 15 Mexican
Drug Traffickers and Other Criminals,” January 20, 2007.
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/January/07_ag_030.html
97 The Minneapolis Star Tribune ran an article on July 9, 2006, by Paul McEnroe, “The Route to Minnesota,” that
profiled Alberto Zatarain. Zatarain is described as a Minn esota contact for a Mexican dr ug cartel who took delivery
every few months of methamphetamines from Mexico, collecting as much as $25,000 a month. Arrested at age 23, he allegedly controlled Minnesota and North Dakota. Although the article suggests he was affiliated with the Sinaloa
Cartel, it is likely that he was actually connected with a part of the Gulf Alliance that was involved in
methamphetamine production in Sinaloa state. Th e full article is available at http://www.drug-
rehabs.org/content.php?cid=3879&state=Minnesota.
98 “Local Gang Member Rises in Drug Cartel,” NBCSanDiego.com, November 18, 2002. www.nbcsandiego.com/
news/1791807/detail.html.
99 Anna Cearley, “Leading liv es of quiet desperation,” San Diego Tribune, June 28, 2004.
100 Ibid.
101 Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Mexican Money-Laundering Cell Named
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin,” Washington File, January 12, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/
news/2005/01/sec-050112-usia01.htm.
102 Anna Cearley, “U.S. freeze s assets tied to cartel,” San Diego Union Tribune, January 13, 2005.
103 Cearly, June 28, 2004.
104 Transcript of President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, September 20, 2001.
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/
105 For example, see “Return to Terrorist Alley, ” a report on TV station KVOA in Arizona,
http://kvoa.com/Global/story.asp?S=2545055 , in which a Muslim prayer rug and a diary in Arabic found near the
border are implied to be evidence of possible terrorist infiltration. Similar charges were made repeatedly by
Representative Solomon Ortiz (D, TX). However, to date no indictment, convictions or evidence presented in other
trials has supported such charges.
106 Amy Wu, “Border Apprehensions: 2005,” DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, November 2006.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/pu blications/ois_apprehensions_fs_2004.pdf
107 “Deportable Aliens Located by
Region and Country of Nationality: Fiscal Year 2005,” DHS Office of Immigration Statistics,
http://www.dhs.gov/xi mgtn/statistics/publications/YrBk05En.shtm