UACES 48th Annual Conference [630214]

UACES 48th Annual Conference
Bath, 2 -5 September 2018

Copyright of the papers remains with the author. Conference papers are works -in-progress – they
should not be cited without the author's permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are
those of the author(s).

Panel 610: Managing the European Union's Borders and Public Responses to the Refuge
Crisis

www.uaces.org

State of emergency, public anxiety and the discursive construction of migration as a threat
during the current migration/refugee crisis

Edina Lilla Mészáros1

Abstract
During the past years it has become fashionable to declare state of humanitarian emergency in case of
migratory movements, perceived by the country of destination as an extraordinary event, in order to justify the
introduction of heavy securitizing measure s or to avert the burden of responsibility to the fellow member states or to
the EU. The state of emergency rhetoric was used by Italy on several occasions when dealing with great migratory
waves from the late 90s’onwards. The current refugee/migration crisis revived the state of emergency rhetoric used
by various EU and non -EU countries, such as Greece, Hungary, Italy or Macedonia. The declarations of state of
emergency enabled various state leaders to elaborate measures wh ich under normal conditions wouldn’t be
allowed, varying from the closure of Schengen borders, to the building of technical fences and the deployment of the
national army etc. These measures subscribe within a successful act of securitization as elaborated by the
representatives of the Copenhagen School. Accordingly, this study aims to investigate the existing link between the
use of the state of emergency rhetoric during the current refugee/migration crisis in Hungary and the elaborated
governing processes, translated through the implementation of certain extraordinary policy measures. Concerning
the theo retical pillar of the research we propose to implement Giorgi o Agambe n’s state of exce ption paradigm.

Introduction2
What image the a verage EU citizen currently has about the phenomenon of migration is also
largely influenced by the mass media . The citizens’ threat perception can be enhanced by well -targeted
media advocacy campaigns, to which they will react by exerting pressure on the key decision -makers in
order to manage the situation. Conducive to reassure and comfort the citizen, and to nurture its feelings of
personal and societ al security, the political elite will respond by elaborating specific securitization
rhetoric and will take the necessary measures to tackle the situation.3 However, one has to keep in mind
that many times the leading tone appearing in the press coverage c oncerning a migration crisis is given by
the governing elite, public discourse interpreting the crisis being shaped by politics. In this situation the
media serves the interests of the governmental apparatus. Thereby, it may be concluded that there is a
reactive link between the predominant media coverage and the official governmental rhetoric on
migration.4
The current refugee/migration crisis started in 2015 makes no exception of this, so our research is
aimed at identifying the role of the predominant narrative on migration (with a special emphasize on the

1 PhD. Teaching Assistant, University of Oradea, Romania, edina_lilla@yahoo.com
2 See: Edina Lilla Mészáros , “A Deconstruction of the Immigration Rhetoric during the Current Refugee Crisis”,
Eurolimes 22 , Editura Universității din Oradea, Oradea, 2016, 95 -96.
3 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 38,
no. 5 (December 2000): 762 –766.
4 Edina Lilla Mészáros, “ A Deconstruct ion of the Immigration Rhetoric,” …, 95 -96.

state of exception rhetoric ) in the construction of public belief and the elaboration of various governing
processes concerning migration and asylum .
Accor ding to Laclau and Mouff’s discourse theoretical approach , every aspect of social life in
governed by power and their concepts of hegemony and social antagonism, and the prevailing ideology of
political force will produce a hegemonic power discourse throug h which it will reproduce power relations
aimed at the preservation of its hegemony within society. By this we mean that, every era has its own
hegemonic power discourse, and that currently the immigration is a threat and the state of emergency
over mass migration have become such h egemonic discourse types in government policy.
As highli ghted before, the state of emergency /exception or humanitarian crisis rhetoric occupies a
central position within the current study, as undertaking a thorough historical resea rch of the discursive
practices of various Western Europ ean decision -makers, made us come to the conclusion that recently the
state of emergency rhetoric has become an indispensable part of the securitization process , turning into an
ubiquitous governance practice in the modern day management of migration flows in the EU and not
only. Also, the declaration of the state of emergency has become a precondition for the intervention of the
army, the closure of the border , the reintroduction of border cont rol within Schengen , the erection of
barbed wire fences , the speeding of various review processes concerning asylum, not to mention the
introduction of amendments to the already existent legislation on migration, asylum, criminal code,
criminal procedure a ct etc.
Furthermore, we wish to validate the following hypothesis, according to which there’s a
correlation between the declaration of the state of emergency and the empowering of state leaders as the
successful construction of a real/perceived threat s in discourse and the subsequent legitimacy to act
received from the public opinion, enables them to pass beyond the tradit ional boundaries and take
measures and elaborate policies that under normal condition s wouldn’t be possible , Therefore, we stress
that governments (the securitizing actors) declaring state of emergencies will strive to uphold the existent
status quo , by del iberately nurturing the anxiety and threat perception of the public by weaponizing the
problem of migration. In this equation they become agent provocateurs , namely actors that exploit a
given migratory situation, accommodate to it and after its succ essful engineering as a threat i n every
existent media platform they introduce mostly exclusionary measures and policies designed to halt and
manage the situation.
In order to demonstrate the hypothesis and to reach the objectives set within the current study, we
have structured it into three main parts. The first part contains the theoretical pillar , briefly focusing on
Giorgio Agamben’s state of exception paradigm . In order to familiarize the reader with the practice of the
state of emergency rhetoric , in the second part of the research we have proposed a case study of a
country that has already used this scenario on various occasions during migratory events . Among all the

western European count ries, Italy has one of the highest record s of declaring state of emergencies or
humanitarian crisis during mass mi gratory movements, given also the country’s geographic location,
cultural, economic and historical ties with third countries generating migrat ion. Within this section, our
attention shall focus on analyzing the discourses and the elaborated policies by Italy following the
declaration of state of emergency as a consequence of the influx of migrants triggered by the Arab Spring ,
the state of emergency enabling the government to elaborate security packages, to sign agreements with
countries generating migration, to amend asylum laws and reintroduce border co ntrols within the
Schengen area . By choosing this case study , we wished to demonstrate that when declaring a state of
emergency during the current refugee/migration crisis, Hungary was only following a modus operandi
and a precedent previously set by some Western European cou ntries (like Italy, France etc. ), thus
identifying several patterns of convergence between the elaborated discourses and the implemented policy
actions and governance practices.
The third section is dedicated to shed light on th e discursive practices used by Hu ngary as it has
been highly affected by the refugee crisis, migrants mostl y using i t as a transit country in their way
towards Austria, Germany or the Nordic countries. Here we will try to demonstrate that Hungary did
nothing but to follow the emergency scenario and text book previously successfully used an d implemented
by Italy on so many occasions, which al so led to the empowering of its state leaders, who consequently
had managed to consolidate their domestic power, but also their prestige on the international level.

Gorgio Agamben and the state of exception paradigm
Looking up the state of exception collocat ion in the specialty literature, we find out that it’s not a
novel concept, and it goes by various denominations, varying from state of siege , state of emergency , and
martial law. Even if it has a lot variation s all of them refer to the same practice , when the urgent nature of
a situation (what could be label led as emergency) leads to the suspe nsion of the civil law, investing the
securitizing actor (executive branch /government ) that has declared it with fu ll powers, enabling it to take
all the necessary measures in order to tackle the emergency situation. In case of natural disasters it is a
common practice to declare state of emergency, which will make possible for the executive to deploy the
army, the National Guard or to have access to emergency funds without the prior approval of the
legislative power, the Parliament, as it would be mandatory in a normal si tuation. Thus, the state of
emergency alters the existent balance of power between the executive and the legislative, favourin g
mostly the executive branch, which through a decree could legitimize policy measures that otherwise ,
would violate the normal political order ( status quo ). However, we must highlight the difference what the
launch of the state of emergency makes in a democratic versus a totalitarian/authoritari an regime. As the
latter operate most of the time in a permanent state of exception without a real urgency, the difference is

not notic eable, and even in case of the securitization process, there’s no need for the approval of the
referent object (population) as the state leaders can take whatever measures they consider necessary. On
the other hand , in case of democratic regimes the state of exception/emergency can have negative
repercussions, as by violating the prevalent state of affairs , it could enable the instauration of a temporary
constitutional or benevolent dictatorship ”that could use emergency powers to uphold the law even while
appearing to violate i t.”5
In the light of those mentioned above , we could identify the perils behind such practice , which
used frequently not only violate the existent political order and democratic ruling, but also invest the state
leader who declares it , with infinite powers . The amount of power gained this way might push the leader
to resort to this practice, even if the situation might not justify it, by offering a distorted and manipulated
image of the facts to the public, with the purpose of consolidating its power.
Besides natural disasters, we could also find the state of emergency collocation used in case of
humanitarianism, international humanitarian or military interventions, but also here the declaration of
emergency serves as a speech act that enables the continuat ion of warfare by different means.6
When elaborating his thesis, Giorgio Agamben departed from the liaison identified by Carl
Schmitt between the state of exception and the principle of sovereignty, defining the sovereign as the
person who “ decides on the state of exception .”7, while he described the state of emergency as “a
temporary suspension of the rule of law on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now given a permanent
spatial arrangement, which as such nevertheless remains outside the normal or der.”8Agamben places the
state of emergency scenario in the realm of the concentration camps used by the Nazi Germany during the
Second World War . In Agamben’s perspective, the state of emergency originates from the French concept
of state of siege , which was issued in the French Constituent Assembly’s decree of 8 July 1791 during the
French Revolution. The ‘e´tat de sie`ge’ should be distinguished from the concepts of ‘e´tat de guerre’
and ‘e´tat de paix’ (state of war or of peace), giving green light to a situation in which the military
commander takes over all the functions and powers that normally belong to a civilian authority in order to
maintain order.9 The Acte additionel to the Constitution of 1815 explicitly stated the possibility of the
declaration of the state of siege by law.10

5Greg Beckett, “The Politics of Emergency, ” Reviews in Anthropology , Vol. 42:2, ( 2013 ): 88.
6 Ibid., 89.
7 Giorgio Agamben , State of Exception, Translated by Kevin Attell (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press ,
2005), 1.
8 Idem, The Omnibus. Homo Sacer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017), 139.
9 Idem, State of Exception, 11; Miriam Ticktin, “Policing and Humanitarianism in F rance: Immigration and the Turn
to Law as State of E xception, ” interventions , Vol. 7:3, (2005): 359.
10 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, 11-12.

According to Mark Salter, we should not think about the state of emergency discourse and
practice only from a historical perspective, or from the lens of humanitarian crisis and interventions or the
newest developments such as the war on terror and the fight against Jihadi terrorism, which all indicate
nothing but the rise of the executive power, but we sh ould try to decipher the state of emergency from the
perspective of the border, the border itself being a permanent state of exception , as it includes some while
excluding others. Wi thin this equation, the border enables the government to exercise normal biopolitical
power inside the te rritorial frontier of the state , the “governmental procedures of examinat ion at the
border institutionalizing a continual state of exception at the frontier .”11 Thereby, we can conclude that
the border12 is closely linked to the sovereign as the border and the border authorities play an essential
role in determining whether someone is entitled or not to enter into a political community.

The immigration wave s triggered by the Arab Spring and the state of exception/ emergency
declared by the Italian government
During the past decades it has become quite popular among Western European politicians to
declare a state of emergency in case of migratory movements, perceived by the country of destination13 as
an extraordinary event, in order to justify the introduction of exclusionary securitizing measures, or to
avert the burden of responsibility to the fellow Member States or the Eur opean Union . Italy provides us
with a good examp le in this matter accordingly we have chosen it as one of our case studies. Furthermore,
we wish to prove that during the cur rent refugee/migration deadlock, Hungary when de claring state of
exception/emergency or humanitarian crisis did nothing but follow ed a precedent set by its fellow
Western EU Member S tates.
Looking at the trajectory of Italy, one could see that in this country due to the frequency of
natural disasters (su ch as earthquakes, cyclones and volcanic eruptions ) the declarations of state of
emergencies are quite common. Since the end of the Cold War , Italy has been experiencing migratory
movements, which prompted the state leaders to declare state of emergency on various occasions.
In 200214 after the arrival of a ship carrying not more than 900 Kurdish immigrants, the Italian
government declared a state of emergency , urging the initiation of joint naval patrols in the Mediterranean
Sea hand in hand with other EU countries. This discourse formed pa rt of a highly restr ictive rhetoric

11 Mark B. Salter, “When the exception becomes the rule: borders, sovereignty, and citizenship, Citizenship Studies ,
Vol. 12:4, (2008): 365.
12 Borders represent a legal admission by a sovereign into the domain of his/her authority and protection.
13 Or in other cases by the transit country.
14 See Edina Lilla Meszaros, Security Dimension of New EU External Communication: the Duplicity of Borders as
Surveillan ce and Access Points ”, Communicating the EU Policies beyond the Borders. Proposals for Constructive
Neighbour Relations and the New EU’s External Communication Strategy. Oradea: Editura Universității din
Orade a, 2013 , 218-220.

developed under the Berlusconi right -wing government . Contrary to the he avy narrative against
immigrants and illegal immigration, the government turned a blind eye on widespread illegal residence or
work, which was used to fill in the labour shortages favouring a double discursive approach, which was
increasingly prohibiting in rhetoric bur more lax in p ractice. The state of emergency card was also used by
Italy in 2008, facing a continuous influx of illegal migrants from Libya, this time declared by the Italian
Minister of Interior as a “national emergency status […] due to the exceptional inflows of
immigrants ”.15Presenting this event as an exceptional migratory situation , justified the introduction of
restrictive measures against irregular immigrants under the paccheto sicurezza16 or security package. As
the former u ndersecretary , Alfredo Montavono underlined the aim of this se curity package was not to
transform Italy into an inhospitable country, but to prevent the entry of those who don’t respect the
rules.17This event was highly mediatised, in the television constantly being broa dcasted images of
satura ted migrant centres, which contributed to the radicalization of the public opinion towards these
immigrants , getting their approval for the introduction of confining measures.18
As a result of the uprisings in North Africa (Arab Spring) between January and April 2011,
around 25.000 North African immigrants (mostly from Tunisia and Lib ya) arrived at the shores Italy,
seeking asylum or international protection .19 The avalanche of refugees reached a peak point in February
and M arch of 2011, when on the small fishery island of Lampedusa arrived some 14.400 Tunisian
nationals.20In response to this migratory situation , Italy has declared a state of humanitarian emergency ,
simultaneously developing a strategy to resolve the problem by a discursive construction of threat. Here
can be observed a deviation from a mere national emergency status declared in 2008 to a humanitarian
one “characterizing the discursive shifts in European mediated communication on migration”21, as noted
by Karin a Horsti. After the Italian government declared a situation of humanitarian emergency22,
appointed a commissioner entrusted with special powers by the executive order ( Ordinanza del
Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri , OPCM No. 3924/2011), also developing a device plan in order to

15A. D. F., Maroni, “Ci aspettiamo trentamila arrivi, in Il Messaggero, Interviste – Ministro Roberto Maroni” [We
expect thirty thousand arrivals , in Il Messaggero , Interviews – Minister Roberto Maroni] , 30 July 2008.
16 Interviste Sottosegretario Alfredo Mantovano, “La Libia non rispetta gli accordi” [Libya does not respect the
agreements] , quotidiano 'L'Avvenire' August 1, 2008.
17 L'obiettivo è rendere il nostro Paese non inospitale, bensì impedire l'ingresso di chi non è in regola.
18 Michela Ceccorulli, “ Saving the Lives’: Analysis of a Discourse on Irregular Migration in the Mediterranean,” EU
Grasp Working Paper , no. 27 (December, 2011): 7.
19 Ruben Zaiotti, “The Beginning of the End? The Italo -French Row over Schengen and the Lessons of Past Crisis
for the Future of Border Free Europe,” European Union Centre of Excellence (EUCE), Dalhouse University,
Occasional Paper , no. 12 (June 2011): 5.
20Frontex, “Fron tex FRAN Quarterly Issue 3,” Warsaw, July –September 2011, 5.
21Karina Horsti , “Humanitarian Discourse Legitimating Migration Control: FRONTEX public communication.” in
Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives , ed. Michi Messier, Ruth Wodak and Renee Schroeder (Vienna: Springer
Science & Business Media, 2012), 297.
22Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 21128/2002 declaring a state of emergency, last DPCM
49972/2010

handle the situation. This plan set out the objective of returning as many individuals as possible to their
country of origin or departu re and to prevent new arrivals in the future. The first step towards the
implementation of th e objective constituted the signing of a bilateral agreeme nt between the Italian
Minister of Interior Roberto Maroni and his Tuni sian homologue , Habib Essid, in which the newly
elected Tunisian government committed itself to collaborate in the facilitation of the return of its citizens
in exchan ge for economic aid and new equipment s for the Tunisian coast guard.23This special
commissioner received green light to set up “facilities” or spaces where the immigrants from Lampedusa
can be hold or detained. The or iginal plan was to confine the emergency within the Sicilian territory,
mainly in Lampedusa, but then , when the situation on the island got out of hand, the government
acknowledged that it had to distribute the arrived migrants throughout the national terr itory. In Giuseppe
Campesi’s viewpoint th ese detention spaces born under the emergency -powers umbrella have been
managed in a situation of complete uncertainty as to their nature and the legal status of their guests . He
was further stressing that the Itali an government deliberately created this situation so that the landed
migrants would not be handled under the legal status of proper asylum seekers or under the legal
status of illegal immigrants.24 The Italian government was heavily criticiz ed by the international public
opinion and NGOs like the Amnesty International for not providing proper conditions to these immigrants
groups, the international media being echoed of the precarious situation in which these people had to live,
confined within the spaces created in internment areas, temporary camps, and institutional settings of
which legal status remained unclear. According to the Amnesty International the Italian government
failed to meet its human -rights obligations in dealing with the thousands of Tunisian migrants on the
island of Lampedusa, stressing that the Italian government allowed the living conditions of the Tunisians
to reach a maximum crisis point, with only minimal amounts of water available, and litt le access to basic
sanitary facilities.25The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) report had also
revealed that the reception centres in Lampedusa were not suitable holding facilities for irregular
migrants, in particular Tunisian s, who we re imprisoned without even having an access to a judge.26The
vast majority of these immigrants were held i n Lampedusa well beyond the time needed for the delivery
of first -aid and for the identification process, and on many occasions refugees were not infor med of the
exclusion and repatriation sentences issued on their names.27Facing these charges , the former Italian

23 Ruben Zaiotti, op. cit , 2011, 5
24 Giuseppe Campesi, The Arab Spring and the Crisis of the European Border Regime: manufacturing emergency in
the Lampedu sa Crisis , EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2011/59, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Mediterranean Programme, Florence, 10.
25Bill Chappel, “Amnesty Faults Italy for conditions in Lampedusa, ” 1st April, 2011.
26 Migrants at Sea Blog, PACE Rep ort: Lampedusa Reception Centres Not Suitable Holding Facilities for Migrants,
accessed July 23, 2018.
27 Giuseppe Campesi, op. cit, 10

prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi has washed his hands, blaming the new Tunisian government for the
formed situation, which according his view “h as done little to stop the exodus of people fleeing the
country's recent unrest”.28
On the field of rhetoric, Italy has developed a double discursive strategy, one when dealing with
supranational actors like the EU, and another when approaching the sub -national actors. In its dialogue
with the European institutions the Italian government emphasized the “humanitarian emergency
situation”, building up its rhetoric on making comparisons between the “biblical exodus” and the current
migratory influx, conferring its discourse a highly exaggerated and manipulative tone. Italy has played the
role of the recalcitrant victim ,29martyrizing itself, demanding more solidarity and assistance from the EU
institutions and fellow Member S tates through various channels of the m edia.30As the former Italian
minister of Interi or, Roberto Maroni has stated: “we are facing a biblical exodus, and yet the European
Union is doing nothing. It is turning a deaf ear. I have not heard any word from President Barroso. Italy
has been left on its own […]: people fleeing an unstable country need international protection”.31
On the other hand, during the dialogue with the sub -national actors (national institutions, local
governments, political parties, politicians, public opinion) was used the c oncept of securitarian
emergency, recalling the imagery of natural disasters, with w hich the Italian public was already familiar
with. “The Tunisian crisis is a humanitarian catastrophe, just like that which unfolds in the aftermath of
an earthquak e. We accordingly must proceed in just the same way as w e would following an earthquake
on the basis of the same first -aid principles”.32 Linking migration with words like catastrophe or
earthquake signified a deliberate return to the well known rhetoric of security and public order, where the
immigrants were portrayed as threat s to the eve ryday existence of citizens, to public or societal security.
By making the audience believe in this subtle manipulative discourse, was legitimized the partial
suspension of the regular political process, brea ching the r ules, which normally would be irrevocable.33
Besides declaring a state of emergency , the Italian government asked Frontex , the EU agency responsible
for the management of the external borders to initiate a join t operation, called Hermes . Hermes was
designed to help Italy to deal with its self declared humanitarian crisis34, but its impact was questioned.

28Bill Chappel , op. cit .
29 Ruben Zaiotti, op. cit ., 3.
30See: Edina Lilla Meszaros, “The Pillars of Schengen Crumbling at the First Light Blow of Wind?! The Franco –
Italian Fray over Schengen,” in European Union in crisis?! , eds Edina Lilla Meszaros and Mirela Mărcuț, The
Volume of the Scientific Session of the Students from European Studies and International Rel ation s, First Edition
(Oradea, 2012), 99 -103.
31 Roberto Maroni quoted in the Corriere della Sera, 14th February 2011 translated by Giuseppe Campesi.
32Giuseppe Caruso, Special Commissioner for Emergency Management, quoted in Il Messaggero , 14 February 2011,
translated by Giuseppe Campesi.
33 Edina Lilla Meszaros, The Pillars of Schengen Crumbling…, 98.
34 The main objective of Hermes was to detect and prevent illegitimate border crossings to the Pelagic Islands, Sicily
and the Italian main land.

Although the member states made available a few aircrafts, and roughly 50 Frontex experts were
involved, the operation did not have the desired impact upon the thousands of arrived migrants. Therefore
in the media, Italy continuously demanded more solidarity from the other Member states, even Italy’s
Interior Minister has affirmed his disappointment towards Frontex.35
Even if Cecilia Malmström, the EU ’s former Commissioner for Home Affairs, described this
event as “matter of great importance for the EU as a whole, not just a bilateral issue”36, she utterly refused
the humanitarian emergency scenario , perceiving the inflow into Lampedusa as an ordinary case of
illegal immigration, which shall be managed by normal border -control measures.

The 2015 refugee/migration crisis and the revival of the state of exception/ emergency scenario
in Hungary
Already after the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015 Vikt or Orbán announced his intent ion to
regulate the incoming migration to Hungary, starting a campaign demonizing migrants in the media,
stigmatizing them as threats to national security37. In February 2015, Antal Rogán, the Minister
responsible for the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office launched a securitization rhetoric warning the
Hungarian public opinion of an upcoming migration wave to Europe, labelling them as economic
migrants threateni ng Hungary, asking the authorization of the people for the implementation of harsh
immigration policies. In his speech can be identified certain elements, which will become recurring in the
Hungarian governmental rhetoric on migration, such as: migrants ta ke the jobs of the people , and
Hungarians have to pay for their stay , or that Hungary shouldn’t walk on the path of multiculturalism .38
In early May of 2015 the Hungarian government began a “National consultation on migration and
terrorism” linking terroris m to the migration issue and later in June a highly controversial anti –
immigration billboard campaign. This “National consultation on migration and terrorism” was nothing
but a questionnaire containing 12 questions and a letter written by the PM Viktor Orb án mailed to all
citizens entitled to vote (approximately 8 million people) from the beginning of May 2015, expecting to
be returned by the 1st of July. This consultation stirred up the still water, initiating widespread criticism
from both native and Euro pean/international advocacy organizations and researchers. Moreover, the
Hungarian PM appeared for a debate concerning this consultation in front of the European Parliament on

35 Leonhard den Hertog, Revolutions and their immigrants: EU’s response , prepared for UACES Student Forum,
Session 1, Panel B EXXACT Panel of EU’s policy towards Africa: United in diversity?, New Frontiers in European
Studies : UACES Student Forum 12th Annual Conference , 2011, 11
36Cecilia Malmström Member of the European Commission responsible for Home Affairs Immigration flows,
“Tunisia situation,” (EP Plenary Session Strasbourg, Sp eech 11/106, 15 February 2011 .
37 Szalai András and Gőbl Gabriella, „Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hunga ry,” CEU Working Paper
(Central European University, Center for EU Enlargement Studies) (30 November 2015): 2.
38„Rogán: tenni k ell valamit a bevándorlás ellen” [Rogan: something must be done against the immigration],
Mandiner , 2015.

the 19th of May.39Expecting more feedback from the citizens, in June 2015 the gov ernment launched an
online version of the consultation. The costs of the national consultation were estimated to have exceeded
1 billion HUF and from the 8 million people to whom it has been sent only a bit more than 1 million
responded, however more than 90 percent of them agreed that the EU's immigration policy has failed and
stricter regulations were needed. According to the respondents, those migrants who cross the Hungarian
borders illegally should be returned as soon as possible, as Hungary and Europ e can’t accommodate
everyone. Consequently, the Hungarian government has taken certain measures, such as the construction
of a temporary technical fence (barbed wired fence) at the Hungarian -Serbian and Croatian -Hungarian
border, the strengthening of the p olice, also creating the legal background for the involvement of the army
assisting the law enforcement authorities at the southern border for the alleviation of the great migratory
pressure. The decision to close the green border with Serbia and to build a 175 km long40 and 4 m high
fence came on the 17th of June 2015 . The construction of the fence at Mórahalom actually started on the
13th of July with the involvement of the army , and the fact that its erection had been finalised much befo re
the actual deadline (30th of November) shows the extreme importance the Hungarian government was
rendering to its set up. After the total seal of the Hungarian -Serbian border on the 14th of September 2015 ,
plans were put forward for the erection of fences with Romania and Croatia. W hile the fence with
Romania did not materialize , a 41 km long barbed wire barrier was erected along the Hungarian -Croatian
border in September 2015. While the construction of these fences heated up the spirits both within
Hungary and the EU Member States, triggering heavy criticism from the opposite national party leaders,
Euro crats and EU MS decision -makers, in the end it had lived up to the expectation s of its architects, as it
significantly decreased the number of illegal border cro ssings, especially at the Hungarian -Serbian
border.41Furthermore the government established a new law enforcement unit, helping the work of the
border police, called “határvadász,”42 and tightened the laws, labelling both the illegal border -crossing
and the damaging of the fence as criminal offences .43Thus, this migratory situation label led as an
extraordinary event led to the amendment of the country’s Asylum Act , the Criminal Code and the
Criminal Procedure Act.44

39European Commission, European Web Site on Integratio n, „Hungary: Government's National Consultation on
Immigration and Terrorism Creates Widespread Debate” (Posted by: Country Coo rdinator Hungary), 31 May 2015.
40Anna Triandafyllidou, “A “Refugee Crisis” Unfolding: “Real” Events and Their Interpretation in Media and
Political Debates,” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies , Vol. 16, No . 1-2, (2018): 202.
41 Before the fence this portion of the border was crossed by 1500 -3000 people on a daily basis. After the erection of
the fence this number dropped to 150 -250/ day.
Krisztina Juhász, “ Assessing Hungary’s Stance on Migration and Asylum in Light of the European and Hungarian
Migration Strategies ,” Politics in Central Europe , Vol. 13, No. 1 (2016): 41 -42.
42 In unofficial English translation it would be border hunter units .
43 Official Website of the Hungarian Government, „National Consulta tion on Immigration and Terrorism. ”
44Krisztina Juhász, op. cit ., 40.

Following the entry into force of the new legislation concerning the review process of the asylum
claims and the criminalization of the illegal border crossing and fence damaging, a state of emergency
was declared by the Hungarian government in two of its southern counties on the 15th of September 2015.
This decision of the Hungarian government was also propelled by the record number of 9360 third
country nationals45 who crossed the Hungarian -Serbian border in just one day.46 The state of
exception/emergency enables the government that initiated it to deploy the army and the law enforcement
authorities at the borders in order to help with the migratory pressure, also making possible the closure of
roads, of border crossing and the detention of migrants who att empt to illegally cross them. Thanks to the
state of emergency scenario, the court processes for asylum seekers could also be sped up. On the other
hand, as a reaction to the high number of migrants attempting to get to the EU through the Western
Balkans rou te, following the erection of the technical fence by Hungary, other EU Member States as well
took restrictive measures at their external borders. Germany had reintroduced border control within
Schengen at its common border with Austria, while the Austrian army began to build a fence along the
border with Slovenia, and Slovenia built a fence at the border with Croatia, due to the massive flow of
immigrants.47Poland , the Czech Republic and Slovakia had also pledged to close their borders in front of
the migran ts. In August 2016 over fears of an influx of migrants coming from Turkey, the Bulgarian
government also followed the lead of its Hungarian homologue, starting to build a fence along its border
with Greece and Turkey.48After the closure of the Western Balka ns migratory route following the
hammering out of the EU -Turkey deal over refugees in March 2016, more than 14.000 people remained
stuck along the Greek -Macedonian border, what made the Hungarian government to declare a state of
emergency again. The Hungar ian Minister of Interior, Pintér Sándor justified the declaration of state of
emergency over mass migration as a preventive measure to the unpredictable reactions that the "tightened
border restrictions in neighbo uring nations" could generate among refugee s and migrants.49In order to
prevent that the borders of Hungary to be “besieged” as in the summer and autumn of 2015, the Ministry
of Interior preventively ordered the deployment of 1500 members of the Hungarian Defence Force

45 Accord ing to the Eurostat, in 2015 altogether Hungary received 174.400 first time asylum applications, which
represented 14% of all asylum application, being the second largest number in the EU, after Germany (with 35%,
441.800 first time applications). In 2015 in Hungary there were only 545 positive decisions concerning the asylum
claims, while on Germany there were 148.215.
Source: Eurostat, “Asylum in the EU Member States Record number of over 1.2 million first time asylum seekers
registered in 2015 Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis: top citizenships,“ 4 March 2016, 1.
46 Prior that day 5809 migrants entered in Hungary.
Deutsche Welle , “Hungary in 'state of emergency,' locks do wn border ,” 15 September 2015.
Aljazeera, “Hungary declares state of emergency over refu gee crisis,“ 15 September 2015.
47 Deutsche Welle, “ Austria begins erecting fence on border with Slovenia ,” 7 December 2015.
48 Vicki Oliphant, “B ulgaria builds 30km fence on Turkish border to keep migrants out,” Express , 11 August 2016.
49Cassandra Vinograd, “ Europe's Refugee Crisis: Hungary Declares State of Emergency Over Migrants ,” NBCnews,
9 March 2016.

together with large number of police forces at the countries’ southern border. The oversaturation of the
centres in which asylum applicants could be accommodated was also listed amongst the reasons for
declaring a state of emergency over a mass migratory situation.50The Hungarian laws permit the
declaration of state of emergency or national emergency for a period of 6 months, after which there’s a
possibility for extension for other 6 months as many times as it is considered necessary by the central
governing apparatu s. Following the termination of the six months period, in September 2016 the state of
emergency was extended by governmental decree until the 8th of March 2017, despite the fact that the
number of migrants trying to pass through Hungary had de creased signi ficantly since the 2015 flow.51
According to Eurostat, in 2016 Hungary registered a minus 84% decrease in first time asylum
application s (28.215) compared to 2015, while this nu mber increas ed in Germany, 60% with 722.300 first
time asylum claims , and in Italy with 10% representing 121.100 first time asylum applications.52Out of
the 28.215 first time asylum application s in Hungary there were onl y 440 positive decisions, in Germany
445.210, while Italy decided favourably in 35.450 cases. 53Despite the obvious decrease in the intensity of
the migratory movements at the border, the Hungarian government motivated the extension of the state of
emergency based on the reports elaborated by the state security agency, which was forecasting the
intensification of the m igration fl ows as a direct consequence of T urkey ’s refusal to honour its long-term
commitments set in the agr eement signed with the EU.54 The state of emergency was extended once more
in February 2018 until the 7th of September 2018, the decision being justified in an interview given to M1
public news channel by the PM’s private security adviser, Bakondi György as a preventive feedback
given to the recent developments in Europe, as contrary to its official closure, there has been a boost in
the number of migrants coming through the Balkans Route , the migrants also testing other routes such as
the one linking Albania with Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria. Furthe rmore, he added
that despite of the seemingly peaceful situational picture at the southern borders of Hungary, the
intensified vigilan ce is still crucial, as only in the first two months of 2018, more than 1800 third country
nationals were stopped and escor ted to the other part of the border.55If we look at the numbers, the
statistic s provided by the Hungarian Immigration and Asylum Office reveal that in 2017 Hungary
received 3397 asylum claims, the vast majority of the asylum seekers, 1432 being Afghan citizens,

50Ibid.
51The Budapest Beacon, “ Hungary extends “mass migration” state of emergency another six months ,” 6 Septemb er
2016.
52Eurostat, „Asylum in the EU Member States 1.2 million first time asylum seekers registered in 2016 Syrians,
Afghans and Iraqis continued to be the top c itizenships,” 16 March 2017, 2.
53 Idem, “Asylum decisions in the EU Member States granted protection to more than 700 000 asylum seekers in
2016 over half of the beneficiaries were Syrians Asylum in the EU Member States 1.2 million first time a sylum
seekers registered in 2016 Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis continued to be the top c itizenships,” 26 April 2017, 3.
54 The Budapest Beacon .
55Dailynews, “Orban’s Cabinet again extends state of emergency dur to migration cris is, Hungary, 17 February
2018 .

followed by 812 Iraqi and 577 Syrian.56According to the latest data, between January and April 2018, in
Hungary there were registered only 342 asylum seekers , 139 Afghan, 127 Iraqi and 26 Syrian citizens.57

Conclu ding remarks
Without the state of emergency, the presence of the fence, the involvement of the army and of
various law enforcement agencies, the closure of the borders, the amendments of the existent legislations
concerning asylum, migration and criminal code etc. cann ot be justified any more in front o f the reference
object. Thus, the governments declaring state of emergencies (the securitizing actors) will strive to uphold
the existent status quo , by wittingly nurturing the anxiety and threat perception of the public by
weaponizing the problem of migra tion. In this equation they become agent provocateurs , namely actors
that exploit a given migratory situation, accommodate to it and after its successful engineering as a threat
on every existent media platform they intro duce measures and policies which under normal conditions
would never be possible. Without disregarding the magnitude of the current refugee/migration stalemate
that Europe is facing, Italy and Hungary are good examples of those countries which deliberately
exaggerate and manipulate the public opinion and use the state of emergency over mass migration
scenario in order to empower their leaders or to secure their continuity on the polit ical scenery of Europe.
Recently, both the Hungarian and the Italian governments constructed their electoral campaign s around
the issue of migration, in the end managing to defeat the opposition parties which had lobbied for a
common EU approach based on b urden -sharing and solidarity.
Figure no. 1 validates that the measures undertaken by the Hungarian government during the
migration stalemate subscribe within a successful act of securitization as elaborated by the representatives
of the Copenhagen School of Thoughts. This means that that the Hungarian government posing as the
securitization actor launched an appeal for securitization via different channels of the media (TV,
billboard, radio, internet, mail, social media, written and online media) targeting the public opinion (the
Hungarian people) identified as reference object, defining the migrants and immigration as a security
threat to the country, asking for the consent of the people for the initiation of extraordinary policy
measures to halt the real/ perceived peril. The reference object believed the securitization rhetoric
authorizing the government to take measures which in a normal situation wouldn’t be allowed. Here we
would like to emphasize the limitations of the well -known securitization theory of the Copenhagen
scholars, what explains how security issues emerge, as the political elite using speech acts (discourse)
uplifts various areas of normal politics into the realm of emergencies, invoking fears of threats to national
security, but completel y excludes other potential forms of securitization, nonverbal forms, such as images

56Hungarian Immigration and A sylum Office, “ Annual statistic s 2017.
57Idem, “Statistics April 2018. ”

or material practices, knowledge and professional skills.58As we could notice, in case of Hungary the
securitizing actor besides speech acts used other forms of non -verbal c ommunication and practices in
order to persuade the reference object, enabling control over the issue. The representatives of the Paris
School, Thierry Balzaq59, Didier Bigo revolutionized the securitization theory by moving from the narrow
discursive focus of the Copenhagen School to including practices and processes of securitization. By this
we mean that the scholars of the Paris School of Thoughts offer us a more thorough picture of the
securitization process undertaken by the Hungarian governmental appa ratus than their Danish
homologues. According to Thierry Balzacq , the securitization strategy cannot be limited only to speech
acts, as it could have other practical elements too (such as mobilisation of the army, legislative
amendments, erection of fences etc) . Thus, in order to understand the securitization process it’s not
enough to analyze the discourses of various decision -makers, but one must take into account the non –
discur sive elements of the process , which support the classification of various situations as security
risks.60

58Dimitrios Skleparis, „Studying the Migration -Security Nexus in Europe: Towards which End of the Nexus?”
(Paper presented at the UACES Student Forum 12th Annual Conference, University of Surrey, Guil dford, 30 June -1
July 2011), 6.
59 Szalai and Gőbl, op.cit ., 3.
60Bernáth Gábor, Messing Vera, “ Biztonsági fenyegetés vagy humanitárius katasztrófa? A politikai jelentésképzés
és beszivárgása médiába, [Security threat or humanitarian catastrophe? Political reporting and its infiltration into the
media],” Médiakutató , 18 évfolyam, 1 -2 szárm, (2017): 34.

Figure no. 1 . The securitization of migration in Hungary and the measures taken following
the declaration of state of emergency

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