Titlu: Liberul Arbitru [608846]

Universitatea „Lucian Blaga” din Sibiu
Facultatea de Științe Socio-umane
Departamentul de Jurnalism, Relații Publice, Sociologie și Psihologie
Specializarea PSIHOLOGIE
REFERAT
FUNDAMENTELE PSIHOLOGICE ALE DECIZIEI
UMANE
Anul III
Titlu: Liberul Arbitru
Student: [anonimizat]: 1
Data: 04.11.2016
Coordonatori: Profesor universitar doctor Iordanescu Eugen

Universitatea „Lucian Blaga” din Sibiu
Facultatea de Științe Socio-umane
Departamentul de Jurnalism, Relații Publice, Sociologie și Psihologie
Specializarea PSIHOLOGIE
People generally act as if they possess free will, and they certainly act as thought they believe
in their own free will. People don't feel like automatons, and they don't treat one another as
they might treat robots.
For psychology to make any sense, the universe must be, to some degree al least, predictable.
A psychology that doesn't accept causes of behavior or the possibility of prediction is no
psychology at all.
The idea that people have the capacity to make free, autonomous, and responsible choices is
one fundamental assumption of most, if not all, modern civilizations. Although most cultures
operate based on some degree of belief in freedom of choice, people vary in how much they
regard human beings, including themselves, as capable of making free choices
(e.g.,Baumeister, 2008; Paulhus & Carey, 2011).
Over two millennia, philosophers have been debating what the concept of free will means,
how it should be defined, and what purpose it serves. Despite the long-standing debate there
has so far been very little convergence with several schools of thought and countless views
conceptualizing free will in different—sometimes conflicting—ways.
A growing body of literature examining free will beliefs and attributions has
converged on the idea that in laypersons’ minds the concept of free will is associated with
moral responsibility.
However, studies on free will beliefs and cognition are not limited to morality and moral
situations but have extended to broader behavior in everyday life to reflect a wider view of the
self as an active agent who is free to choose actions and pursue goals.
To exemplify that free will attributions are about more than just morality, it has been shown
that free will attributions are affected by self-serving biases differentiating between
perceptions of the self and of others. Pronin and Kugler (2010) showed that people tend to
perceive themselves as having more free will than others, perceiving their own behaviors as
less predictable, and their own futures as less determined and more driven by intent.
If free will were mainly about holding people responsible and punishing them for immoral
actions, it would make little sense for people to attribute high free will to themselves, because
that simply increases their own vulnerability to punishment.
Coordonatori: Profesor universitar doctor Iordanescu Eugen

Universitatea „Lucian Blaga” din Sibiu
Facultatea de Științe Socio-umane
Departamentul de Jurnalism, Relații Publice, Sociologie și Psihologie
Specializarea PSIHOLOGIE
We expected that attributions of free will would be triggered in a wide array of negative
circumstances, including those that are morally neutral or devoid of intent. From moral
situations to everyday life learning, the perception of having free will (the capacity to have
chosen otherwise) is an essential component of accepting responsibility for one’s past,
present, and future behavior so that negative outcomes can be corrected. In this view, the
attribution of higher free will to agents would not be limited to the judgments of others, but
will also extend to those of the self, and would not be limited to specific actions, but would
also extend to outcomes regardless of action.
Coordonatori: Profesor universitar doctor Iordanescu Eugen