This collection of contemporary international public relations case studies is an invalu- able resource for teachers, researchers and students… [600712]

Public Relations Cases
This collection of contemporary international public relations case studies is an invalu-
able resource for teachers, researchers and students working in public relations,corporate communications and public affairs, as well as offering practitioners an in-depth understanding of the effective use of public relations in a range of organizationalcontexts.
Including cases from the UK, Norway, Sweden, Spain, South Africa, Canada and
the USA, with a focus on such global corporations as Shell, BBC America, Worldcom,PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Marks & Spencer, it offers important insights into thedevelopment of public relations and communications strategies. These include:
• Corporate identity change and management
• Global reputation management• Crisis management in the oil, shipping and tourism industries• Developing strategic alliances between voluntary and private sector organizations• Public relations support for international branding and market entry• The importance of internal communications during international mergers• The integration of public relations and marketing communications• Business-to-business communication
The cases examined in this book demonstrate the breadth of contemporary public rela-
tions practice and the increasing importance of the public relations function in bothpublic and private sector organizations worldwide.
Danny Moss is Co-Director of the Centre for Corporate and Public Affairs at the
Manchester Metropolitan University, and Course Leader for the University’s Master’s
Degree in Public Relations. His previous publications include Perspectives on PublicRelations Research (1999), co-edited with Dejan Vercic and Gary Warnaby, also pub-
lished by Routledge. Barbara DeSanto is Assistant Professor at the School of
Journalism and Broadcasting, Oklahoma State University, where she teaches graduateand undergraduate public relations courses. She has also developed an internationalpublic relations seminar, which she teaches annually in London.

Public Relations Cases
International perspectives
Edited by Danny Moss and
Barbara DeSanto
London and New Y ork

First published 2002
by Routledge11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge29 West 35th Street,New York,NY 10001
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
© 2002 Editorial selection,Danny Moss and Barbara DeSanto;
individual chapters,the contributors
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted orreproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafterinvented, including photocopying and recording, or in anyinformation storage or retrieval system, without permission inwriting from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Public relations cases: international perspectives / edited by Danny
Moss and Barbara DeSanto.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.1. Public relations – Case studies. 2. Public relations – Cross-cultural studies. 3. Corporations – Public relations – Case studies.4. International business enterprises – Case studies. I. Moss,Danny, 1954– II. DeSanto, Barbara, 1950–HM1221.P78 2001659.2–dc21 2001034970
ISBN 0–415–23425–5 (hbk)ISBN 0–415–23426–3 (pbk)This edition published in the Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2005.
“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”
ISBN 0-203-99680-1 Master e-book ISBN

To Berni who put up with little attention during long hours of
editing and to Angus who missed some of his long walks.
To John whose love and support made this book possible, and to
Mr Big who kept me company through the writing and editing.

Contents
List of illustrations x
Acknowledgements xii
Notes on contributors xiii
Introduction 1
DANNY MOSS AND BARBARA DESANTO
Contributions to plenary sessions
Case 1 Shell: managing a corporate reputation globally 10
TOM HENDERSON AND JOHN WILLIAMS
Case 2 Racism – condemn it or condone it: the Commission for
Racial Equality’s ‘personal responsibility’ campaign 27
ADAM ROSCOE
Case 3 BBC America: how Britain won the colonies back 39
BARBARA DESANTO AND JO PETHERBRIDGE
Case 4 Perkins Foods: the place of public relations in the profile
of a European food business 51
DA VID DA VIES AND DANNY MOSS
Case 5 The journey to demutualization: Clarica’s internal
communications challenge 63
CRAIG S. FLEISHER AND PAULA HENDSBEE
Case 6 Barloworld: communicating strategic direction to increase
shareholder value 74
JON WHITE

Case 7 The PriceWaterhouseCoopers merger: using internal
research to ensure a merger’s success 86
ANDREW GLEW AND ANDREW FLINT
Case 8 Tine Norwegian Dairies: rebranding from the inside out 93
PEGGY SIMCIC BRØNN AND STEIN DROGSETH
Case 9 Oklahoma City and Kerr-McGee: managing internal
communication during an external crisis 105
L. DOW DOZIER
Case 10 Does public relations make a difference?: a comparative
analysis of two major Swedish crises 113
LARSÅKE LARSSON AND STIG A. NOHRSTEDT
Case 11 Lobbying for survival: the UK BSE crisis and the role of
the Meat and Livestock Commission in lifting the EC beef
export ban 130
PHIL HARRIS AND PAUL BAINES
Case 12 Creating from crisis: building the Oklahoma City National
Memorial 144
BARBARA DESANTO, R. JOHN DESANTO AND
R. BROOKS GARNER
Case 13 Paradise lost and restored: Florida and the tourist murders 154
DONN TILSON AND DON W . STACKS
Case 14 Raising environmental awareness in Slovenia: a public
communication campaign 167
DEJAN VERCIC AND DARINKA PEK-DRAPAL
Case 15 FASE – fundraising in Spain: generating sponsors for
AIDS awareness 180
DANIÈLE A. LETORÉ
Case 16 The North West Towns’ Consortium: public relations and
the marketing of ‘place’ 194
GAR Y W ARNABY AND DOMINIC MEDW AYviii Contents

Case 17 W . Moorcroft plc: the strategic role of marketing
communications and public relations within an SME 209
RUTH ASHFORD AND NEIL TOWERS
Case 18 The Tourer Marketing Bureau: supporting touring
caravan sales through public relations 226
ANNE GREGOR Y
Case 19 Worldcom Public Relations Group: global access,
local focus 246
BRIAN CUMMINGS AND BARBARA DESANTO
Case 20 Marks & Spencer plc: a crisis of confidence 259
SANDRA OLIVERContents ix

Illustrations
Figures
1.1 The reputation management framework 18
1.2 Shell: Protect endangered species 21
2.1 CRE ‘reveal’ posters, illustrating the original ‘tease’
posters 32
2.2 The Times CRE advertisement 36
3.1 Advertisement for The League of Gentlemen 46
3.2 BBC America promotional material 48
4.1 Perkins Foods Annual Report: Recipes for Success 60
5.1 Clarica logo 63
7.1 PriceWaterhouseCoopers logo 86
8.1 Tine logo 93
8.2 A sample of milk products with the new Tine logo 94
11.1 Stakeholder mapping of key players involved in UK beef
exports 136
12.1 The Oklahoma City National Memorial 148
14.1 Eco-Fund print advertisement 172
14.2 Eco-Fund press release 174
14.3 The Eco-Fund brochure 175
17.1 Christie’s Moorcroft catalogue 222
18.1 Tourer Marketing Bureau logo 233
18.2 Tourer Marketing Bureau advertorials 234
18.3 Cut-away caravan 239
19.1 Worldcom logo 246
19.2 World Y oung Business Achiever Final brochure 254
20.1 Marks & Spencer share price graph, 1991–2000 260
Tables
11.1 UK beef exports (tonnes) for 1990 and 1995 131
11.2 Chronology of the UK BSE crisis 132
11.3 Revenue lost from UK beef exports by country 133

16.1 Push factors in customer patronage 195
16.2 Pull factors in customer patronage 196
16.3 Problems of the traditional high street 197
16.4 Major towns in the North West 198
18.1 SWOT analysis for caravans 228
18.2 Budget allocation figures for the campaign 242
20.1 SWOT analysis for M&S 265Illustrations xi

Acknowledgements
The authors and publishers would like to thank the following for granting
permission to reproduce material in this work:
Shell and Jim Hanson for the use of the ‘Profits and Principles’ advert in
Case 1. Photographer: Maria Krajcirovic, Creative Team: Bruce Rook andBrad Philips, c/o Walter Thompson Detroit. Case 2 figures courtesy of theCommission for Racial Equality and EURO RSCG Wnek Gosper. BBCAmerica for use of various BBC materials in Case 3. All BBC Materials ©BBC/BBC Worldwide Ltd – all rights reserved. Perkins Foods PLC for use ofthe ‘Recipes for Success’ brochure in Case 4. Clarica Life for the use of itslogo in Case 5. TINE Norske Meierier BA for the use of TINE material inCase 8. John R. Catsis for the use of the Oklahoma City Bombing Memorialimage in Case 9. Pristop Communications for the use of materials from thepublic communication campaign for the Environmental Development Fundin Slovenia for Case 14. BRAHM Public Relations for use of materials inCase 18; © BRAHM Public Relations. Worldcom Public Relations Group forthe use of the Worldcom logo in Case 19. The Times, London for the repro-
duction of the graph in Case 20; © Times Newspapers Limited (8 August2000).
Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for their permission
to reprint material in this book. The publishers would be grateful to hearfrom any copyright holder who is not here acknowledged and will undertaketo rectify any errors or omissions in future editions of this book.

Contributors
Ruth Ashford is a Senior Lecturer in Marketing Communications and Public
Relations at Manchester Metropolitan University. Prior to entering academiain 1993, she spent eight years working in the NHS and latterly within a com-puter consumables organisation as the Marketing and CommunicationsManager. Ashford has had many research papers published in the areas ofmarketing communications relating to health services, perceived risk and thedevelopment of enterprise skills within education. She is currently SeniorExaminer for the Chartered Institute of Marketing ‘MarketingFundamentals’ paper. She is also Senior Examiner for the Chartered Instituteof Bankers and the Chartered Institute of Marketing joint award inMarketing Financial Services.
Paul Baines is a Senior Lecturer in Marketing at Middlesex University
Business School. He is a full member of the Chartered Institute of
Marketing, a member of the Market Research Society and a CharteredMarketer. His research interests include the application of marketing to polit-ical campaigning and football clubs, where he has authored more than twentypapers.
Brian Cummings is Chairman and CEO of Cummings McGlone & Associates
Inc., a Dallas agency that was named as one of the five fastest-growing agen-
cies in the United States in 1999 by Inside PR magazine. He has more than
thirty years of public relations experience on both the corporate and agencyside of the business. He is also a partner in The Worldcom Public RelationsGroup, the world’s largest network of public relations firms. He served asChairman of Worldcom from 1997–2000. Before co-founding CummingsMcGlone & Associates, he was Chairman and CEO of Publicis PublicRelations, Inc., a nationally recognized marketing communications agencywith more than thirty staff and $3.6 million in income, and the largest publicrelations agency in the Southwest. Prior to coming to Bloom Public Relationsin 1987, he served for three years as Senior Vice-President and general man-ager of the Pittsburgh office of Burson-Marsteller, a $4.2 million officeprimarily focused on business-to-business marketing and corporate and

financial relations. He joined Burson-Marsteller after a thirteen-year public
relations career with Rockwell International. He is a past chairman andmember of the board of directors of the Dallas Division of the AmericanHeart Association and a member of the Public Relations Society of America.
David Davies, after graduating in History and Politics at London University
in 1981, spent seven years as a journalist and editor specialising in the foodmanufacturing and marketing industries. He entered the public relationsindustry with Moss International in Leeds, before joining Rex StewartGrayling PR in Manchester in 1989, where he became Northern RegionalDirector. In 1995 he set up and ran the PR division of Stowe Bowden Wilson,which is now part of the McCann Erickson UK PR network, and two yearslater established his own independent consultancy. He has been a member ofthe Professional Advisory Committee for the MA degree course in PublicRelations at Manchester Metropolitan University since 1993, and lecturespart-time on this and other relevant courses at the university. As a PR con-sultant he specialises in business-to-business sectors including the foodmanufacturing and retail industries.
Barbara DeSanto APR, Fellow PRSA has a public relations career which
includes time in Florida tourism public relations practice and as a Florida
government public information officer. DeSanto earned her doctorate fromOklahoma State University in 1995. She served as Head of the PublicRelations Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and MassCommunication (AEJMC) in 2000. She is an accredited member of thePublic Relations Society of America (PRSA) where she serves on its Body ofKnowledge Board. She teaches graduate and undergraduate public relationscourses at Oklahoma State University-Tulsa and has developed an interna-tional public relations seminar which she teaches in London each May.
R. John DeSanto APR, Fellow PRSA is an Emeritus Professor of Mass
Communications from the Minnesota State University system where he devel-
oped and directed two mass communications programmes while teachingpublic relations, journalism, advertising and mass media law for twenty-oneyears. As an accredited public relations practitioner, he continues to teachpublic relations, advertising and international media law and has taught at tenuniversities, with his present assignment at Oklahoma State University andOklahoma State University-Tulsa. In addition, he is a former SeniorFulbright Professor to Nigeria and has worked throughout Africa. Mostrecently he has taught public relations at several universities and organiza-tions in Europe and the Pacific Rim as a counsellor/professor.
L. Dow Dozier was, until he recently retired, the Director of Corporate
Communications, Kerr-McGee. A native Oklahoman and graduate of the
University of Oklahoma, Dozier served in the US Marine Corps beforexiv Contributors

beginning his communications career with several Oklahoma newspapers.
He moved from newspaper work to public relations practice when he washired as the editor of the Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company’s corporatemagazine. He was named corporate communication manager for OG&E in1982, becoming Kerr-McGee’s Associate Director for CorporateCommunications in 1990, and then Director in 1994. He retired from Kerr-McGee in 1998 and works as a public relations consultant, adjunct collegeprofessor and volunteer elementary school tutor.
Stein Drogseth was Director of Corporate Communication for Tine
Norwegian Dairies from 1995 to 2000. He is currently Director of Garanti, a
real estate brokerage company for cooperative housing.
Craig S. Fleisher is Professor of Business Strategy and Competition,
University of New Brunswick, St John, Canada. Author of several award-
winning books and over fifty publications on corporate communications andpublic affairs topics, he was President of the Canadian Council for PublicAffairs Advancement between 1995 and 1999.
Andrew Flint is a Director with the Marketing and Communication Agency
Ltd (MCA), an international consulting firm that helps organizations align
their staff with business goals and achieve successful change. HisPriceWaterhouseCoopers case study was awarded a prestigious InternationalGold Quill Award in 1999 by the International Association of BusinessCommunicators (IABC).
R. Brooks Garner is an Associate Professor in the School of Journalism and
Broadcasting at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, where he
has taught public relations courses since 1984. In addition to teaching, he isactively involved in research in the public relations field, and in developingand producing outreach programmes for the School. Prior to joining OSU, hegained public relations experience with Southwestern Bell Telephone, PhillipsPetroleum Company, and Oklahoma Gas & Electric. The scope of his twelveyears of practical experience in the public relations field includes writing andediting, media relations, customer and employee relations, crisis communi-cations, community and educational relations, special events, and financialcommunications. He began his career as a news reporter for the Daily
Oklahoman in Oklahoma City. He is an Accredited member of the Public
Relations Society of America and the Tulsa, Oklahoma Chapter. He alsoholds membership in the Association for Education in Journalism and MassCommunications.
Andrew Glew is Head of Internal Communication, UK, at PriceWaterhouse-
Coopers (PwC) and managed the communication programme for
PriceWaterhouseCoopers during the merger.Contributors xv

Anne Gregory is Head of the School of Business Strategy at Leeds
Metropolitan University. Her main area of interest is in public relations as amanagement function. She headed up the University’s Public RelationsStudies Group until 1994. Before moving into academic life nine years ago,Gregory was a full-time public relations practitioner and held senior appoint-ments both in-house and in consultancy. She continues with consultancywork and is also a non-executive director of Bradford Community HealthTrust with special responsibility for communication issues. She has written abook, Planning and Managing Public Relations Campaigns, is editor of the
Institute of Public Relations/Kogan Page series, ‘Public Relations in Practice’and managing editor of the Journal of Communication Management.
Phil Harris is Chairman of the UK-based Academy of Marketing, a member
of the Senate and Council of the Chartered Institute of Marketing and theboard of the American Marketing Association. With Danny Moss, he is Co-Director of the Centre for Corporate and Public Affairs and joint editor ofthe Journal of Public Affairs. He is a past Vice-Chairman of one of the UK
political parties and has stood as a candidate for both the EU and UKParliaments. His most recent book is Machiavelli, Marketing andManagement with Andrew Lock and Patricia Rees. His main research inter-
ests are in lobbying and political and relationship marketing. He is a Readerin Marketing and Public Affairs at Manchester Metropolitan University andan advisor and consultant to various organizations.
Tom Henderson has a long track record in the communications and corporate
affairs business. He held marketing and communications jobs at Beecham(now SmithKline Beecham) and Grand Metropolitan before joining DowChemical in 1981 where he worked in various capacities both in Europe and inthe USA, ending up as Director of Communications for Dow Europe based inHorgen near Zurich. In 1992 he joined Waste Management International inLondon as Vice-President, Corporate Affairs, where he was responsible for thedevelopment of a communications strategy for the newly founded plc. Hejoined Shell International in 1996 as Project Manager, External Affairs. Hiscurrent portfolio includes reputation management, corporate identity andsociety’s changing expectations of multinational companies.
Paula Hendsbee is Manager, Shareholder Communications at Clarica Life
Insurance Company, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. With an MA inProfessional Writing from the University of Waterloo and ten years in thefield of corporate communications, Hendsbee is a past President of theaward-winning Grand Valley Chapter of the International Association ofBusiness Communicators (IABC).
Larsåke Larsson has a PhD in Journalism and Mass Communication
(Gothenburg University, Sweden) and is a Senior Lecturer in Media andxvi Contributors

Communication, Örebro University, Sweden. Prior to entering the academic
world, he was an Information Manager with several Swedish authorities.Larsåke Larsson has published a number of books including Nyheter i sam-
spel (News Interplay); ‘Det serverkligen illa ut . . .’ (‘It really looks serious… ’:
Communication problems in connection with the ferry Estonia’s disaster) withStig A. Nohrstedt, and Tillämpad kommunikationsvetenskap (Applied com-
munications /PR-textbook).
Danièle A. Letoré , a Cambridge University graduate, has been working in public
relations since 1982. She began her career in the European headquarters of
Burson-Marsteller, where she worked on industrial accounts, then after free-lancing, joined a multinational biotechnology company. After managing itsCorporate Public Relations department, with responsibility for market andproduct public relations, she has now set up her own healthcare communicationsconsultancy, Genevensis Sàrl, based in Switzerland. She has run training courseson public relations, media training, and fund-raising. Clients include blue chippharmaceutical companies, privately owned healthcare companies, internationalorganizations and not for profit healthcare groups.
Dominic Medway has a PhD from Leeds University and is a Lecturer in the
Department of Retailing and Marketing at the Manchester Metropolitan
University. He has led the Department’s research into Town CentreManagement and related themes. Other research interests include rural shop-ping and retailing in Britain’s South Asian Community. Medway haspresented papers at a number of international conferences and publishedarticles in both academic and professional journals.
Danny Moss is Co-Director of the Centre for Corporate and Public Affairs at
the Manchester Metropolitan University and is Course Leader for theUniversity’s Master’s Degrees in Public Relations. Previously, as Director ofPublic Relations programmes at the University of Stirling, he was responsiblefor the introduction of the first dedicated Master’s Degree in Public Relationsin the UK. He is the co-founder and organizer of the annual InternationalPublic Relations Research Symposium which is held Lake Bled, Slovenia.Moss is the author of a number of books including Public Relations inPractice: A Casebook; Global Sources; Public Relations Research: An
International Perspective (co-edited with Toby MacManus and Dejan Vercic);
and Perspectives on Public Relations Research (co-edited with Dejan Vercic
and Gary Warnaby).
Stig A. Nohrstedt has a PhD in Political Science (University of Uppsala,
Sweden) and is currently Professor of Media and Communication at Örebro
University, Sweden. Nohrstedt has published several books and contributedpapers to a number of international journals and conferences, particularly inthe field of risk and crisis communications. Books published include: TredjeContributors xvii

världen i nyheterna (News Coverage of the Third World); En nyhetsdag (A
Newsday); Journalistikens etiska problem ( The Ethical Problem of Journalism )
with Mats Ekström; ‘Det ser verkligen illa ut… ’(It really looks serious… ’ :
Communication problems in connection with the ferry Estonia’s disaster) with
Larsåke Larsson; and Journalism in the New World Order (forthcoming, with
Rune Ottosen); Risker, kommunikation och medier ( Risks, Communication and
Media), with Rolf Lidskg and Lars-Erik Warg.
Sandra Oliver is Founding Editor of Corporate Communication International
Research Journal and Chair of the Committee for Relations with International
Bodies, which includes the United Nations, at the International PublicRelations Association. Based at Thames Valley University, London, Oliver isa Director of Studies and chairs the International Network for CorporateCommunication Studies (INCCS), whose electronic research register went livein January 2001. Her current research activity is in the specialist area of com-munication measurement using eye movement/tracking techniques for webdesign, reading and analysis. She writes and lectures extensively and is theauthor of Corporate Communication: Principles, Techniques and Strategies
(1997) and Strategic Public Relations: A Corporate CommunicationManagement Perspective (2000). Oliver worked at the HQ of three multina-tional corporations and on regional and national newspapers before enteringacademia. She served on the UK’s Institute of Public Relations EducationCommittee, on a British Government Commission, and is a Fellow of theRoyal Society of Arts and an external examiner for numerous university pro-grammes and on advisory panels, both in the UK and the USA.
Darinka Pek-Drapal was a project director. She holds a B.Sc degree in
Biology and works as a public relations consultant for Pristop Com-munications, Slovenia. Her specialization is consultancy in the field ofenvironmental communication.
Jo Petherbridge joined BBC Television as a publicist in 1991 after spending
nine years as a newspaper journalist. Initially working on science pro-
grammes, she was promoted to head publicity for all BBC factualprogramming in the UK. She left the BBC in 1997 to move to the USA andwas quickly approached to work on the launch of the new cable channelBBC America. She was appointed Vice-President, Communications for BBCAmerica in 1998. Petherbridge was born in Birmingham, England, and edu-cated at Hull University where she gained a BA Hons in English Literature.
Adam Roscoe trained on and later edited local papers in North West England
before a period as a freelance journalist. During thirteen years in publicrelations consultancy, he was a director of Shandwick-owned hi-tech con-sultancy, Fowlers; MD of Hill and Knowlton in Manchester, where he wasalso a member of the firm’s European crisis practice; and MD of Euroxviii Contributors

RSCG-owned GTPR. Roscoe joined ICI in 1999 as Head of
Communications at its Chlor-Chemicals business. A member of the IPR, hewas External Examiner at the University of Central Lancashire’s public rela-tions BA joint honours course and is a member of the professional advisorycommittee for Manchester Metropolitan University’s MA in public relations.
Peggy Simcic Brønn is an Assistant Professor at the Norwegian School of
Management in Oslo, Norway, where she teaches corporate and marketingcommunication as well as organizational and management communication.She did her doctoral work at Henley Management College in the UK. Herthesis looked at the strategic orientation of public relations managers.
Don W . Stacks received his PhD in Communication Studies from the
University of Florida. He is currently Professor in the School of
Communication at the University of Miami and directs the undergraduateand graduate programmes in Public Relations and Advertising. Stacks,winner of the 1999 Pathfinder Award for Public Relations research, hasserved as Head of the Association for Education in Journalism and MassCommunication’s PR Division, research Chair and research conference Chairof the Public Relations Society of America’s Educators’ Academy, and aspast editor of the Journal of Applied Communications Research and the jour-
nal World Communication. He has served on more than ten editorial boards.
Stacks was inducted into the Arthur W . Page Society in 1999. His researchand consulting interests include crisis management, corporate communica-tions, research methodologies, and not-for-profit public relations.
Donn Tilson , Associate Professor of Public Relations at the University of
Miami’s School of Communication, holds a PhD in Public Relations from the
University of Stirling, Scotland, the first in Europe to graduate with a doc-torate in the field. A member of the Public Relations Society of America’sCollege of Fellows, Tilson is one of only 304 in the USA who have beeninducted into PRSA ’s ‘hall of fame’. He has published and lectured interna-tionally on corporate public relations, including as a European UniversityPublic Relations Confederation Visiting Scholar at Complutense Universityin Madrid and Autonoma University in Barcelona. Tilson serves on the edi-torial board of Ecquid Novi, the research journal of the Southern African
Communication Association, and is book review co-editor of Journalism
Studies. He is a participating faculty member of UM’s Institute for Cubanand Cuban-American Studies and the Center for Latin American Studies.Prior to joining UM, Tilson served as a public relations manager forBellSouth for sixteen years, directing the company’s charitable contributionsand educational relations programmes in Florida. In 1999 he was inducted asa Knight of the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem, one ofthe oldest Orders of Chivalry in the world.Contributors xix

Neil Towers is a Business Development Manager and Visiting Lecturer at
UMIST. He has worked for fifteen years in different supply chain roles within
large multinational businesses and latterly as Director of a consultancy busi-ness supplying operations management services to SMEs. Towersconcentrates on research relating to the relationship between marketingopportunities and operational controls, which has now developed into PhDresearch. He is also a Visiting Lecturer at Manchester Business School.
Dejan Vercic is a partner in Pristop Communications, was a member of the
project team and acted as its Research Director. He holds a BSc degree inPolitical Science and an MSc degree in Communication Science from theUniversity of Ljubljana and is currently a doctoral student in the Social andOrganizational Psychology programme at the London School of Economicsand Political Science.
Gary Warnaby is a Senior Lecturer at Salford University. He teaches and
researches in the areas of retail strategy, public relations strategy and themarketing of place. He has presented papers at a number of internationalconferences and has published articles in a wide range of academic and pro-fessional journals as well as contributing chapters to several books in both theretailing and public relations fields.
Jon White is a consultant specialising in management and organisation devel-
opment, public affairs and public relations management. He has worked inpublic and private sector organizations in the United Kingdom, the UnitedStates and Canada, for clients such as Shell, Lloyd’s of London, BritishAirways and Motorola. He is a Visiting Professor in Public Affairs at CityUniversity Business School, London, and USI Lugano, Switzerland. Heholds a doctorate in psychology from the London School of Economics andPolitical Science, where he also teaches corporate communications.
John Williams started in communications as a graduate trainee at the J.
Walter Thompson advertising agency in 1975 and worked for more than
eleven years with a wide range of clients and brands including RowntreeMackintosh, Brooke Bond Oxo and Nestlé on accounts ranging from Y orkieto the Guardian. He joined the corporate and financial communications com-
pany Valin Pollen in 1986, becoming Head of Research and Planning andAssistant Managing Director. He was a co-founder of Fishburn Hedges in1991. He is now Chairman. Fishburn Hedges is a corporate PR, public affairsand design company, now part of Omnicom. Williams’s client work hasfocused on strategic planning and reputation management. He leads the Shellteam and has also worked with a range of major companies includingPriceWaterhouseCoopers, J. Sainsbury, Unilever, McDonald’s and Sotheby’s.xx Contributors

Introduction
Danny Moss and Barbara DeSanto
It is perhaps an over-used truism that the ‘world is becoming smaller place’,
at least in terms of international travel and communications. Y et while theworld is becoming more accessible to us all, it is increasingly apparent that theworld remains an extremely diverse place, not only in terms of language andcustoms, but also in terms of work practices, educational systems, tastes,technological infrastructure, and cultures.
Equally, from a business perspective, there is a strong argument for global
convergence – the growing similarity and integration of markets and con-sumption patterns – driven largely by the ease, low cost and frequency ofinternational communications, transport and travel, and, of course, theInternet. Y et here again, there is a counter-school of thought which has arguedthat just because people around the world may wear a Rolex or Swatch, eat BigMacs and drink Coca-Cola, it does not mean that global convergence hasarrived. While there are a number of products and brands that are more or lessstandardised around the world, it is questionable as to whether the manufac-turers of these products are globalising their operations to meet the needs ofincreasingly similar worldwide markets, or simply capitalising on the similar-ities that have always existed between countries. Here it is important todistinguish in what respects countries remain different. For example, peoplemay be drinking the same soft drinks or eating the same type of fast food, butthey may be doing so in different places, at different times of the day, and fordifferent reasons. While the product may be standardised, the cultural normsand values that influence its consumption may be quite diverse.
Hence, to operate successfully on a global scale requires acute sensitivity to
cultural diversity that may exist even in countries which on the surface appearbroadly similar in terms of economic development, consumption patterns, orpolitical systems. Thus within the European Union, countries may be con-verging in terms of many of the fundamental economic indicators, but remainvery different in terms of their cultures and traditional values. For example,there are marked differences among European countries in terms of the foodsthey consume, attitudes towards family and work, conceptions of time, andpatterns of leisure – all of which may have profound implications for anyoneseeking to develop a pan-European marketing or public relations programme.

Similarly, multinational companies, such as Sony, Ford, Glaxo-Wellcome,
Coca-Cola and Unilever, that operate and market their products globally
need to be sensitive to cultural diversity within their own workforces. Whilesuch companies may adhere to a fundamental set of operating principles, howthese are applied in practice may require adaptation to reflect the differingnational values and customs found across the world. Indeed, a failure to doso can result in some embarrassing and potentially damaging cultural faux
pasas Ford found during the 1990s when it was found to have retouched a
photograph featuring five workers from its Dagenham plant in the UK whichwas used in an advertisement in Poland. In the photograph used in the adver-tisement, the coloured faces among the group of workers were replaced withwhite faces. The reason for this action, according to Ford, was that Poles arenot used to seeing people from non-white ethnic groups among the workforceand it wanted to adapt the advertisement to suit local tastes. Unfortunatelyfor Ford, when the photograph was re-used in England, the Polish version ofthe photograph was used by mistake. When the workers at Dagenham recog-nised what had happened, they all walked out in protest. Ford apologised forthe error and sent the workers in question a cheque for £1,500, blaming themistake on its advertising agency. The incident resulted in embarrassing cov-erage for Ford throughout the media provoking headlines such as ‘ Any colouryou want as long as its not black’ which parodied the slogan associated withthe early era of Ford’s mass production of the model ‘T’ motorcar. The inci-dent illustrates what a potential minefield the pursuit of cultural and politicalcorrectness can be for organisations.
The need for sensitivity to cultural diversity applies not only at the country
or regional level; wide variations in culture can also exist between regionswithin individual countries. Thus, for example, there are quite obvious differ-ences in tastes and values among the populations of many of the Southernstates in the United States and those of the Mid-west and Northern states.Similarly, people living in the North West and North East of Britain have dif-ferent tastes and lifestyles to those living predominantly in the South East ofthe country. Equally, population migration and the influx of ethnic groups intomany parts of the USA and Europe have resulted in a multicultural society.This trend has created its own tensions, particularly as many ethnic minoritygroups have tended to congregate in particular areas, creating ethnic enclaveswhich are often isolated in many ways from the mainstream indigenous popu-lation of the country in terms of their cultural norms, values and lifestyles.Such ethnic groups can represent a significant proportion of the populationand, as such, are recognised as increasingly important audiences not only forconsumer goods manufacturers, but also for political parties, government agen-cies and educational institutions. Finding ways to communicate effectivelywith such ethnic and social groups involves more than the correct use of lan-guage and dialect, but also requires a sensitive understanding of culturalmores, patterns of media consumption, and opinion leader influences. It is herepublic relations practitioners are likely to be asked to play an increasingly2Danny Moss and Barbara DeSanto

important role in adapting communications to suit the needs of what is becom-
ing an increasingly diverse population in many parts of the world.
Notwithstanding the continued debate between those advocating the
‘global convergence’ or ‘international diversity’ approach to internationalbusiness, there is little disputing the rapid growth in demand for many typesof products and brands throughout the world. Just think what life would belike in many countries without Japanese electronics, French cuisine, or inter-national tourism and travel! People throughout the world instantly recogniseand demand Coca-Cola, Mercedes, BMW , McDonald’s, Bacardi, BritishAirways and other major brands. Y et the way many of these so-called ‘globalbrands’ are marketed and distributed as well as what they symbolise for con-sumers may vary in different parts of the world. Equally, one must rememberthat for people in many parts of the world, acquiring such brands remains, atbest, merely a ‘pipe dream’.
Undoubtedly one of the key drivers in uniting societies and creating inter-
national markets for products and brands has been the rapid advances incommunications technology, transport and travel. Similarly, the growth ofinternational merger activity has led to the creation of huge multinationalcorporations that often operate on a global scale employing people frommany different countries who may often migrate between offices around theworld. However, it is important to recognise that the world of business doesnot only comprise these massive global corporations. Indeed, even in themost developed economies, the vast majority of enterprises remain relativelysmall, often employing fewer than ten people and, in many cases, operatingon a purely local scale. Y et even here, the growth of internationalism mayreach out and impinge on the operation of these small and medium-sizedenterprises, as companies of all sizes take advantage of the opportunities forinternational trade that technological advances and lower transport costshave created. This growth of international and global trading in many mar-kets has created increasing opportunities and demand for public relations toplay a part in developing and supporting the expansion of international busi-ness operations, whether this be in terms of educating new markets aboutproducts and services, helping to unify culturally diverse workforces, or rais-ing the profile and understanding of corporations as they expand intopreviously unfamiliar territories.
Indeed, the growth of international corporations has been paralleled by the
growth of large international public relations consultancy groups or agenciessuch as Shandwick, Hill & Knowlton, Burson Marstellar and Worldcom,which have grown to service the needs of an increasingly important interna-tional business sector. Here, for example, David Drobis, senior partner andchief executive officer of Ketchum Public Relations, pointed out that the USDepartment of Labor predicts public relations jobs will grow 60 per cent by2004, the third highest growth rate of all us industries. The top twenty-fivepublic relations firms, of which the top ten are international entities, generatemore than $1.7 billion annually.
1While the larger international publicIntroduction 3

relations consultancies tend to dominate the market for international public
relations support, it is important to recognise that the industry worldwideremains one that is populated by numerous relatively small consultancies.Even large client organisations may prefer to use the services of relativelysmall local consultants in the various countries in which they operate becauseof their perceived greater local knowledge and contacts. Equally, some organ-isations may prefer to use their own in-house staff to devise and implementtheir public relations strategies, rather than employing external consultants.In such cases, organisations may choose to rely on local public relationsteams to implement international campaigns, rather than attempting to deviseand control the strategy centrally. This preference for local consultants orlocal in-house staff often reflects the belief that local expertise and knowledgeare often the essential component to ensure the effective development andimplementation of communications strategies, even if the overall goals andbroad thrust of the strategy are determined centrally.
International public relations practice
The practice of public relations has developed significantly, particularly inwestern countries, from its post-World War II technical and media relationsroots into a more sophisticated (although sometimes misunderstood) func-tion that is recognised as an integral part of all organisational efforts tocommunicate with groups of people ranging from the media to employees.However, it would be wrong to suggest that such a view of public relationsexists in all countries and organisations, even within the more developedparts of the world. Within Europe, for example, there are marked differencesin the way public relations is understood and practised. In Greece and Spain,public relations still tends to be seen as a predominantly media relations orpublicity function, and is often treated as part of the marketing function. InFrance there is no direct equivalent term for ‘public relations’, at least in thesense that it is understood in English-speaking countries. Of course, it is notonly organisations in the so-called well-developed economies that employpublic relations. Newly created republics and democracies all have their ownvariations of public relations practice, fashioned by their particular culture,and economic, media and socio-political infrastructures. While perhaps notalways recognised formally as a public relations function, organisations, gov-ernments and corporations in such countries often rely on communications tohelp them develop and achieve their local and international goals. Moreover,as organisations and countries become more intertwined and interdepen-dent, arguably public relations will be accepted as an increasingly essentialelement in making these alliances and partnerships work.
Thus, while public relations can be found in various guises in countries
throughout the world, it is probably true to say that modern-day public rela-tions practice as it is understood in western society is very much Anglo-Saxonconcept that has been taken up, or in some cases, ‘exported’ to other countries4Danny Moss and Barbara DeSanto

by US and UK multinational corporations, consultancy groups and educa-
tors. Moreover, if one examines the increasing number of public relationscourses being taught in both English and non-English-speaking countries inrecent years, it is generally the case that most of the textbooks that are usedare largely of US or UK origin. However, while the ‘model’ of public rela-tions being taught on many of these courses appears to be essentially theAnglo-Saxon model, the practice of public relations in many of these coun-tries often remains relatively unsophisticated, consisting largely of publicityand media relations activities. This emphasis may reflect the still limitedunderstanding and expectations of the function that often exists amongindigenous corporate and public sector organisations
Global principles of public relations
However the practice of public relations is officially defined or perceived, sev-eral major themes underlie successful practice, wherever it occurs in theworld. Research, strategic planning, effective selection of communicationtools and evaluation of programmes carried out are core elements of all suc-cessful programmes, whether it is in South Africa or North America. Whilefew might dispute the importance of such elements of any successful publicrelations/communications programme, they are not in themselves definingcharacteristics of public relations practice.
Researchers such as Sriramesh and White (1992), Grunig et al. (1995),
and Culbertson and Chen (1996) have acknowledged that public relations,as it is understood and practised in many of the more sophisticated anddeveloped countries, is essentially based on the US-model, tempered bylessons drawn from other Anglo-Saxon countries. Y et as Sriramesh et al.(1999) have pointed out, public relations may be influenced strongly by thecultural context in which it is practised and is likely to exhibit indigenouscharacteristics that reflect local or regional social, political, economic andmedia structures and processes as well as business practices. However, asSriramesh et al. emphasise, relatively few international comparative studies
of public relations practice have been conducted, and where such studieshave been conducted, they have often sought to test the applicability of USmodels of public relations in other cultures, rather than adopting a moregrounded, ethnographic approach to uncovering whether any indigenouscharacteristics of public relations exist. Y et despite these methodologicallimitations, studies of international public relations have revealed somesimilarities in terms of the basic components of public relations practice,most notably in terms of a strong emphasis on media relations as a corecomponent of public relations practice in most countries studied. However,even here, significant differences have been found in the way practitionersapproach managing their relationships with the media. For example, inparts of China it is not uncommon for practitioners to pay for press releasesto be printed in the media, and in Japan the ‘press club’ system requires aIntroduction 5

strong emphasis on cultivating and developing strong personal relationships
with key journalists within the relevant press clubs.
What does this albeit limited research tell us about the existence of any
generic or global principles of public relations practice? Perhaps the obviousconclusion that can be drawn is that no universal set of global principles ofpublic relations practice seems to exist. However, there appear to be someobvious areas of commonality, such as a strong recognition that public rela-tions is concerned with the task of building and maintaining relationshipsbetween organisations and their publics. There are undoubtedly a growingnumber of pressures at work that are bringing about a degree of conver-gence in public relations practices, not the least being the growth ofinternational trading, merger activity, international media channels and theemergence of increasingly powerful global corporations. Such pressures,together with the growth internationally of public relations education, arehelping to create an international understanding of what constitutes bestpractice in public relations. Here, it is the large global corporations and theirconsultants that have led the way in adopting such practices. Y et as many ofthe larger global businesses have recognised, to be successful, global strategiesmust always be tempered by a concern to adapt to local trading conditions,societal cultures and economic and political infrastructures. If public rela-tions is to be effective on a global scale, such concerns will undoubtedly be thehallmark of any successful programme.
Moreover, there is little doubt that, internationally, the public relations
profession is on a strong growth path, not the least in the developing coun-tries. This trend is evidenced in the increasing presence and role ofinternational public relations organisations such as IPRA (InternationalPublic Relations Association) and CERP (European Confederation of PublicRelations), and, at the local level, national bodies such as the PRSNZ (PublicRelations Society of New Zealand). There are currently more than 150national and regional public relations societies with more than 137,000 mem-bers. Significantly, the president of the China International Public RelationsAssociation has reported that in China alone there are 100,000 practitionersand more than 450,000 future practitioners studying public relations in vari-ous types of schools.
2
Thus, one of the key challenges for practitioners and students of public rela-
tions as we begin the new millennium will be to become more conversant withhow public relations is understood and practised around the world.Undoubtedly, as we move into a new era of more rapid and far-reaching com-munications, with firms increasingly looking to exploit international tradingopportunities, it is likely that practitioners may be called upon to help developcommunications programmes that span international boundaries, or in somecases, reach out around the globe. Here an understanding of how public rela-tions may need to be adapted to suit local conditions will be essential. Equally,if programmes are to be developed effectively on a global scale, it will be essen-tial to understand what will and will not work in different contexts.6Danny Moss and Barbara DeSanto

This book sets out to contribute to a better understanding of how public
relations is being practised in different countries around the world. The cases
in this book illustrate the rich diversity, yet areas of commonality, in publicrelations practice as we work in the new millennium. Through a careful studyof the cases the reader will gain insights into the breadth and variety ofpublic relations practice in different countries and contexts, while at the sametime observing the similarities of best practice amidst quite diverse scenariosand contexts. As this collection of case studies illustrates, public relations hasbecome a global phenomena, although practices may vary in their emphasisand application around the world. As cases such as the Shell global reputa-tion campaign in Case 1 illustrate, public relations can be deployed effectivelyon a global scale providing practitioners pay careful attention to local differ-ences such as socio-cultural values and media structures. Thus, whenmanaged effectively, public relations can have a genuine global reach, chang-ing the perceptions and influencing the behaviour of what may be quitedisparate populations.
The cases in this book also demonstrate the growing maturity of the prac-
tice. Public relations is much more than just garnering publicity or gettingone’s name in print or on television. Effective public relations practitionersaround the world understand the value and consistent use of research tounderstand situations and assess the perceptions and beliefs of relevantpublics, so that their efforts are consistent with the target public’s knowledgeand perceptions of the organisations and issues. Effective practitioners alsodevelop strategic plans grounded in their research, which leads to targetedobjectives that, in best practice, serve the interests of all publics involved.Communication is then developed and carried out according to a well-thought-out plan, rather than a haphazard, ad hoc reaction to outside events.
The crisis cases in this book demonstrate that even where circumstances neces-sitate a reactive response to unexpected and uncontrolled events, effectivepractitioners are thinking ahead of how to turn reactive, relatively short-termchallenges into proactive, long-term communication opportunities.
Furthermore, these case studies demonstrate the growing maturity of
public relations practice internationally in terms of a clear management focusin the programmes undertaken. Best practice cannot be achieved withoutpublic relations operating as part of the management team, contributing tomanagement decision-making. The cases in this book demonstrate the con-tributions public relations can make to the overall business, social, politicaland economic objectives of the organisations in question. Simply imple-menting the plans of other managers not trained in the importance ofcommunication ignores, often to the detriment of the organisation, the crit-ical role that communication can play in achieving an organisation’sobjectives. While such managerial involvement may not be the case univer-sally as far as public relations is concerned, these cases do point the wayforward to how public relations can be practised more effectively.
Perhaps one of the most important lessons to be learned from the cases inIntroduction 7

this book is the multi-disciplinary and multi-faceted qualities of public rela-
tions practice. From corporate reorganisation to employee communication toproduct and service support, public relations can play a key role in developingthe long-term environments in which relationships between key publics candevelop and flourish. Nowadays organisations of all complexions are recog-nising the value of developing long-term relationships with customers andother stakeholders and have realised the folly and cost of relying on ‘fair-weather friends’ whose support may evaporate when the ‘going gets tough’.Investing in long-term relationship building is, in effect, an essential insurancepolicy that can ‘pay dividends’ when organisations find themselves under fireand have to confront issues that may threaten their long-term survival.
Again, as many of the cases illustrate, one of the key tenets of effective
public relations practice is that practitioners should operate as an organisa-tion’s ‘antenna’, constantly scanning the organisation’s environment andalerting management to new threats and opportunities, and helping frameappropriate responses to emerging issues. Here practitioners can only func-tion effectively if they are taken seriously by management and their advice islistened to by key decision-makers.
While studies of international public relations have failed to find evidence
of the widespread practice of the type of two-way symmetrical public rela-tions advocated by Grunig et al. (1992), there appears to be a strongrecognition in many countries of the importance of negotiation and dia-logue, even though the underlying aim of such activity may often be moreasymmetrical than genuinely symmetrical. As Sriramesh et al. (1999) have
suggested, public relations practice needs to be understood in the context ofthe cultural climate in which practitioners operate, and they call for further
case studies of how organisations in different countries use public relations tosolve organisational problems. In this respect, this book will hopefully add toour understanding of the differences and similarities in public relations prac-tice in the international context, and hence may contribute to improving theeffectiveness of the public relations internationally by highlighting examplesof best practice from around the world.
Notes
1 David Drobis, Still Young at 75, speech delivered to the University of South
Carolina, 7 October 1998.
2 Dennis L. Wilcox, Phillip H. Ault, Warren K. Agree and Glen T. Cameron (2000)
Public Relations Strategies and Tactics, 6th edn, New Y ork: Longman, 2.
References
Culbertson, H.M and Chen, N. (1996 ) International Public Relations: A Comparative
Analysis. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Grunig, J.E. (ed.) (1992) Excellence in Public Relations and Communications
Management. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.8Danny Moss and Barbara DeSanto

Grunig, J.E., Grunig, L.A., Sriramesh, K., Yi-Hui Huang and Lyra, A. (1995) Models
of public relations in an international setting. Journal of Public Relations Research,
7(3), 163–86.
Sriramesh, K. and White, J. (1992) Societal culture and public relations. In J.E. Grunig
(ed.) Excellence in Public Relations and Communications Management. Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. pp. 597–614.
Sriramesh, K., Yungwook Kim and Mioko Takasaki (1999) Public relations in three
Asian cultures: an analysis. Journal of Public Relations Research, 11(4), 271–93.Introduction 9

Case 1 Shell
Managing a corporate
reputation globally
Tom Henderson and John Williams
Introduction
Shell is one of the world’s largest businesses. It is principally involved in the
exploration, production, refining and marketing of oil and gas products, but italso has a substantial chemicals business and a stand-alone division developingrenewable energy sources. Shell is the most recognised and valued fuel brand inthe world. The Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies is the second largest oilcompany and the second largest private gas company in the world. The Groupoperates in 140 countries and had gross sales proceeds in 1999 of $150bn.
The Shell Group is nearly 100 years old and has had a long tradition of
social responsibility and community investment. Nevertheless, like mostmajor companies, it had to move quickly to respond to the rapid changes instakeholders’ expectations of multinationals in the 1980s and early 1990s. Ithad codified its operating principles into a formal ‘Statement of GeneralBusiness Principles’ in 1976 and had invested much in raising standards ofenvironmental compliance, for example, exceeding its own internal target toreduce greenhouse gas emissions by 10 per cent below 1990 levels by 2002, initself double the Kyoto target.
Because of the remote nature of much oil and gas exploration and the
breadth of the Group’s operations, Shell had traditionally operated a verydevolved structure, with much power vested in individual country opera-tions, close to activities, partners and customers. This began to change in theearly 1990s when, after a major strategic review, the Group was reorganisedinto five global businesses: Exploration and Production, Oil Products (refin-ing and marketing), Gas and Power, Chemicals and Renewables.
1995: Brent Spar and Nigeria
Nevertheless, in 1995 the culture of the Group was still very localised and thishad a significant impact on the response to the two corporate crises Shellfaced that year, Brent Spar and Nigeria, which proved a watershed in theGroup’s history. It is not the purpose of this chapter to retell the story ofthese events, but the issues involved are outlined below.

The first was over the disposal of the oil storage platform, ‘Brent Spar’,
located in the North Sea. After exhaustive scientific analysis and wide con-
sultation with experts, Shell proposed to sink the platform in deep water inthe Atlantic, rather than attempt a potentially more environmentally damag-ing salvage operation. The plan spurred one of the most high profileenvironmental protest campaigns ever, led by Greenpeace, who at one stageboarded the oil platform. Protests spread to Europe, where the impact wasgreatest in The Netherlands and Germany. Boycotts were called and retailpetrol sales in some countries fell dramatically in the short term. A petrol sta-tion in Germany was fire bombed. The immediate result was that Shell didnot proceed with its plans for sinking the vessel. Instead, extensive consulta-tion was re-started and the Brent Spar has now been dismantled, and is beingrecycled, in part as elements of a new roll-on, roll-off ship quay in Norway.
In the same year, Shell faced the biggest challenge in its long involvement
with Nigeria. Nigeria is one the world’s largest oil producers and Shell, in ajoint venture with the Nigerian government, is the country’s biggest privateproducer. Oil is vital for the Nigerian economy, providing over 90 per cent offoreign earnings. Most of Nigeria’s oil is produced in the Niger delta, a poorarea traditionally neglected by the changing government regimes and dis-rupted by tribal rivalries. Within one such tribe, the Ogonis, a protestmovement sprang up, led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, a writer and intellectual. Aftera long period of protests and local disturbances, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eightfellow Ogonis were arrested by the Nigerian government, accused of mur-dering fellow Ogoni tribal leaders, and eventually hanged, in November 1995.There was widespread criticism and condemnation of this action around theworld, especially in the West. Nigeria was expelled from the Commonwealth.As part of this protest, Shell was accused of different levels of complicity andcollusion, or simply failing to use its position in the country to prevent theexecutions. Whatever the arguments, it left many observers in the West blam-ing Shell for the executions.
The impact on Shell: creating a recovery strategy
The extent of the worldwide criticism had a traumatic impact on Shell, whichas a Group prided itself on its values, decency and commitment to act respon-sibly. It also had the practical impact of taking up a huge amount ofmanagement time and attention, and distracted the Group from its normaloperations. Shell’s immediate response was to admit, to itself and publicly,that, whatever the merits of how it had handled the situation in each case, ithad not anticipated the impact of the events and the response of many of itsstakeholders. John Jennings, then Chairman of Shell Transport and Trading,wrote in 1996:
The events of the past year demonstrated the degree of complexity in themultinational operations of Group companies and the need to gainShell: managing a corporate reputation 11

broader understanding and acceptance of their activities. This is, in
effect, the Group’s licence to operate.
We learned in 1995 that we need to have greater external focus if we are
to create a better acceptance of the Group’s business among varied audi-ences. Group companies must consult, inform and communicate betterwith the public.
(Shell Annual Report)
Shell recognised that reputation management was something that was now aglobal issue – both the previously mentioned events had impact in parts ofthe world far removed from where they took place.
Thus, the Group, led from the top by its then Chairman, Cor Herkstroter,
embarked on a process to understand better the Group’s stakeholders, theirattitudes and needs, and then use that information to develop a fresh strategyto respond.
Society’s Changing Expectations programme
That process was called Society’s Changing Expectations and it was far morethan a conventional research exercise. The study combined market researchamong general publics, among special publics (Shell’s term for opinion-formers and those with a special stake in Shell’s business) and also amongShell managers; a review of 60 existing research programmes in 21 coun-tries; intensive interviews and analysis with 44 senior Shell executives;consultation with graduate recruiters about the views of young people; abenchmarking survey of practices in 23 peer companies; and ‘round table’meetings in 14 countries where, altogether, 159 Shell executives came face-to-face with 145 representatives of special public groups.
The Society’s Changing Expectations programme was not just research, but
new communication with external audiences, a start of a process of culturechange in the traditionally rather introspective and self-contained Shell‘world’, and in itself a symbol of change to the outside world. The round-tables in particular were an innovation. Many Shell managers for the firsttime found themselves face-to-face with their critics, hearing some toughopinions of Shell and having to defend themselves.
One of the elements of the programme most influential on developing
Shell’s communications strategy going forward was a global reputation surveyconducted by MORI. Its aim was to establish baselines of key expectationstowards Shell; Shell’s position versus other companies; criteria for judgingcompanies’ performance and reputation; and a detailed analysis of Shell’scurrent image. The research covered 7,551 interviews with members of thegeneral public in 10 countries; 1,288 interviews with special publics in 25countries, ranging from academics and investment fund managers to pressuregroups, representatives of non-governmental organisations and journalists;and 583 questionnaires to senior Shell managers from 55 countries.12 Tom Henderson and John Williams

The Society’s Changing Expectations programme ran from late 1996 to the
end of 1997. It reported back to the Shell Group Leadership Meeting in
November 1997, a regular gathering of the Shell Group’s 100 top executives.The study as a whole highlighted some fundamental strengths and weak-nesses. Shell was recognised for its fine, high quality products, its hugetechnological expertise, the calibre of its people and its financial strength.However, the Group was seen as remote and arrogant, operating in a some-what menacing industry faced with a variety of difficult issues; staff moralewas seen to be faltering and the Anglo-Dutch/Euro-centric orientation ofthe Group and its culture prevented it from being seen as a truly global com-pany sensitive to global needs.
In summary, Shell was seen as having lost touch with society’s increased
expectations concerning the behaviour, contribution and accountability ofmultinational corporations, and the progress that Shell had made was notappreciated. The research helped Shell identify what it called a ‘knowledgegap’ – a lack of understanding of Shell’s values and approach, with specificconcern over issues of environmental responsibility and human rights, whichcan be traced directly to the impact of Brent Spar and Nigeria, although theyalso reflect generally increased expectations of environmental performanceand social responsibility. While Brent Spar and Nigeria did not impact to thesame degree in all the countries surveyed, and while Shell’s ratings varied byregion (being generally higher in developing economies), nevertheless theresults provided a clear call to action.
The most potent statistic from the MORI research was the 50/40/10
favourability split, which highlighted the knowledge gap: 50 per cent of theexternal sample were broadly favourable to Shell, 40 per cent neutral and 10per cent hostile. (It is a mark of the impact of these issues on Shell people thatthe Shell managers researched estimated external opposition to be muchmore negative, about 50 per cent positive and 50 per cent hostile.)
A new strategy
Shell recognised that, to meet and keep pace with society’s changing expec-
tations, it was important to strengthen its commitment to its traditionalvalues and improve performance, as well as to communicate both of thembetter. Shell also had to acknowledge that its stakeholders were now a muchwider, more diverse and influential group than before. It had responsibilitiesthat stretched beyond its traditional core of shareholders, customers, businesspartners and employees. It was this wider group that together granted Shell its‘licence to operate’.
In March 1997, the Committee of Managing Directors, Shell’s global man-
agement group, revised the Business Principles to include a specialcommitment to contribute to sustainable development, an approach toresource management that seeks to meet the needs of society today withoutcompromising the scope for future generations to meet their own needs.Shell: managing a corporate reputation 13

Sustainable development requires balancing the financial, environmental and
social cost and benefit in the plans and activities of every business. It alsorequires accommodating the demands of a whole range of stakeholders withdifferent priorities and perspectives. Shell has now instituted a SustainableDevelopment Management Framework which creates a template to assess allprojects and business programmes for their impact on the environment andon local communities as well as for their creation of wealth and return oncapital.
The first step in Shell’s new relationship with stakeholders was to issue its
revised Statement of General Business Principles, first written and publishedin 1976. To topics ranging from business objectives to an unequivocal ban onbribery, new sections were added on human rights and, as explained above,sustainable development. The need to be open and accountable, to consult,communicate and listen, was enshrined as a core business principle. As partof this process, a greater level of consultation with outside groups was insti-gated to feed into the process of understanding stakeholder needs andresponding to them. The Sustainable Development Management Frameworkhas itself been the subject of considerable consultation.
The next change in Shell’s move to greater accountability was the creation
of the first Shell Report, a report to society covering all areas of company
performance: financial, environmental and social. This was the first flagshipcommunication of the Sustainable Development team, and sought throughthe use of external auditors and consultants (including Price Waterhouse(now PriceWaterhouseCoopers), KPMG and SustainAbility, led by environ-mental guru John Elkington) to match the independence and authority offinancial auditing. The first report was published in May 1998 and the reporthas become a benchmark for corporate social reporting as well as an invalu-able tool for stakeholder briefing, engagement and dialogue.
Shell recognised early on the value of the Internet and created a website,
shell.com, in November 1996, offering access to all aspects of the company’sperformance and communications, including the issues raised and assessed inthe Shell Report.
Shell also stepped up its issues management resources including an
increased level of stakeholder engagement, and extensive training and prac-tice development. Senior Shell executives meet with NGOs on a regular basis,including Greenpeace, Shell’s main adversary over the Brent Spar disposal.Shell recognised that the value of stakeholder engagement was not just toclose the ‘knowledge gap’ among special publics but also to learn, from reg-ular engagement, the changing needs and expectations of the world outsideShell and to adapt Shell to meet those needs.
In terms of practice development, the Group added to the Sustainable
Development Management Framework, by creating a series of primers(detailed guides) to address key areas of operation, including Human Rights.
Shell has also developed its environmental policy to meet rising concerns
about pollution, waste and global warming. Shell supported the outcome of14 Tom Henderson and John Williams

the 1997 Kyoto Conference on Climate Change, set its own targets for reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions, withdrew from the Global Climate Coalition (agroup of mainly US corporations, oil majors and car manufacturers opposedto the Kyoto targets) and, in early 2000, launched an internal carbon permitstrading scheme to help meet Group targets.
Developing a communications strategy
Shell recognised that, to help rebuild its reputation, it needed not only to
change some of its policies and practice, but also to be seen to do so. Thisrequired, for the first time in the Group’s history, a global reputation man-agement programme to ‘build, maintain and defend Shell’s capital’. Thegroup identified a series of desired stakeholder responses from seven keyaudiences:
Investors: ‘I’d put my last dollar into Shell.’Customers: ‘I’d go out of my way to buy Shell.’Government: ‘Our desired partner.’Employees and potential employees: ‘I’m proud to work for Shell.’ ‘I’d love
to work for Shell if I could.’
The media: ‘I’ll give Shell the benefit of the doubt.’NGOs/activists: ‘If someone has to do it, better it be Shell.’The general public: ‘Y ou can be sure of Shell.’
Creating an agency brief
The process Shell pursued to turn this strategy into action was unusual.
Originally, a proposal was developed to build the programme around a sub-stantial worldwide corporate advertising programme, but after discussionamong the brand and public affairs community in Shell, this was rejected. Itwas felt important that any new communication from Shell had to be put incontext, and that internal and key external audiences needed a greater degreeof personal communications before any mass media were employed. Shellcalled this a PR-led approach. It recognised that advertising alone was,though powerful, too blunt a medium to achieve Shell’s objectives. What wasneeded was a programme that could take a variety of messages to a range ofaudience groups through a spread of different media. Therefore Shell invitedpairs of advertising and PR agencies to tender for the brief which was, inshort, to help close the knowledge gap around the world about Shell, amongits special public audiences.
The client team was part of Shell International and was based in Shell
Centre in London, and was originally part of the external affairs depart-ment, although later the reporting transferred to the SustainableDevelopment team. This helped bring those responsible for managing Shell’scommitment to sustainable development and reporting it closer to the teamShell: managing a corporate reputation 15

responsible for the separate but overlapping task of managing Shell’s corpo-
rate communications. The programme was managed by a steering grouprepresenting Shell’s five global businesses as well as a range of head officeroles, including international brand marketing and external affairs.
The agency choice was unconventional. The agencies chosen, J. Walter
Thompson, the advertising agency, and the London-based PR agencyFishburn Hedges, had tendered with other partners, but were felt a goodmatch and paired up by Shell. Also, although advertising would be the mostvisible medium (and more than half the budget), Fishburn Hedges was des-ignated the lead agency, to reflect the PR-led approach.
Developing a strategy
In practice, the agencies and client have worked as equal partners and the
strategy and programme developed reflects a unified approach.
In developing the original brief into a full strategy, the following ‘strategy
principles’ were agreed that have guided the whole programme:
1 The key target audience should be special publics : While reputation man-
agement ultimately impacts on the bottom line through consumers and
business audiences, it is opinion-formers that grant the licence to operateand often set the tone for how the general public hears about and assessescompanies. The goodwill of customer audiences could be disproportion-ately affected by an adverse reputation among special publics. Shell wentfurther and recognised that special publics were not a homogeneousgroup, but represented different perspectives and expectations from acorporation. It identified three groups:(a) those with a commercial interest such as investors, business partners
and governments receiving tax revenues;
(b) those who represent a public interest, such as lobby groups, NGOs,
politicians and the media;
(c) those with a personal interest: employees and their families, future
employees, and past employees and pensioners.
This analysis informed the development of targeting and messages.
2The corporate reputation strategy should address all elements of Shell’sreputation, and this requires a PR-led approach : This confirmed Shell’s ini-
tial instincts. It was important that the communications strategydeveloped was an umbrella for all of Shell’s corporate communicationsand did not simply address social issues such as environmental responsi-bility or human rights. It was crucial that messages about sustainabledevelopment were consistent with all other messages coming out of theorganisation from whatever source to whatever audience.
3‘Globalisation’ of special publics needs a global strategy, but adapted tolocal needs and delivery. It must be Centre-led but Operating Unit delivered :
Shell’s experiences in a world of instant global news transmission, what16 Tom Henderson and John Williams

they call the ‘CNN World’, emphasised that it was impractical to have
different strategies and messages in different parts of the world. Thestrategy needed to be devised and delivered from the centre. Y et while itis possible to create and place a worldwide advertising campaign fromone office, PR delivery requires local engagement and the support oflocal Shell country operations (Operating Units). Their support andendorsement were crucial to success.
4Credible engagement requires an adult-to-adult approach: Tone of voicewas considered of critical importance. Traditional corporate advertisingtended to have a rather patronising and self-congratulatory approach,talking down to audiences. This ‘trust me’ stance was no longer valid inwhat Shell identified as a ‘show me’ society. However, the other extreme,of taking a self-critical, apologetic, ‘big corporations have got it allwrong’ approach was considered equally inappropriate. The balance wasto take a mature and even-handed approach with all audiences.
5Strategy is not just about closing the ‘knowledge gap’ but also the ‘valuesgap’ – Shell has to engage both head and heart: It was agreed that factsalone would not win the Shell case. The traditional relationship betweenfamiliarity and favourability, which shows a high correlation between anaudience’s knowledge of a company and its positive opinions towards it,was breaking down. Some audiences are generally critical of global cor-porations, whatever their level of knowledge. What was also importantwas to convey Shell’s values and close the gap in attitudes and approach,not just knowledge.
6The need to balance messages for the short term and long term : Shell was
planning this reputation programme during a period of immense finan-cial pressure on the Group. Oil prices had dropped dramatically and theGroup’s margins and return on capital were well down and below the tar-gets the Group had set for itself. The financial community was lookingfor swift action. Y et at the same time, messages about Shell’s commitmentto social responsibility and environmental protection inevitably took alonger view and promised results over a longer time horizon. Thus itwas clear that Shell’s overall communications needed to balance address-ing the short-term financial needs with tackling the longer-term issues theGroup and the industry faced.
Some crucial thinking – creating a reputation management
framework
The success of the programme was rooted in taking a holistic approach to
planning the communications. While Shell may have five businesses operat-ing in 140 countries, to the outside world, it is just one brand. As Shellpeople put it, ‘Shell is Shell is Shell’. While the project team would not beresponsible for all Shell’s communications with its stakeholders, it had toensure that there was one overarching strategy that provided a framework forShell: managing a corporate reputation 17

all communications activities. Shell also recognised that its reputation was
driven as much by its actions and culture as by its communications, and thatthe impact on reputation needed to be a factor in all corporate activity.
The team developed a reputation management framework (see Figure 1.1)
that identified three campaign strands that addressed different needs andissues:
1The Business Transformation campaign recognised that Shell needed to
continue to communicate, especially to the financial community and toits peers, that it was turning the business around, addressing the short-term cost pressures and was getting back on plan to meet its return oncapital targets. This strand was led, outside the reputation managementteam, by the leadership of the Group and the investor relations team.
2 The second strand was the Profits and Principles campaign, which raised
some of the issues faced by Shell in the way it conducted its business andinvited debate on the dilemmas involved, based on the issues set out inthe first Shell Report, entitled Profits and Principles: Does There Have to
Be a Choice?’, which was launched in May 1998 to audit and evaluateShell’s progress on the road to sustainable development. The choice oftopics was also very much led by the concerns and priorities of outsidestakeholders.
The third strand was called the ‘Living the values’ campaign and was based
on the need to offer proof that that the Group really was living the values ithad embraced through its Business Principles and that the organisation’sactivities and actions were in line with its commitments.18 Tom Henderson and John Williams
Business
TransformationProfits and
PrinciplesLiving
the Values
Group Key
Messages
All Special
Publics
Public Interest Stakeholders Personal Stakeholders Commercial Stakeholders
Figure 1.1 The reputation management framework.

The programme: benchmarking research
The external launch of the programme was scheduled for March 1999. Ahead
of that, a benchmark phase of tracking research was conducted amongglobal special publics covering six key target groups:
• the investment community;
• NGOs and IGOs;• the media;• government and politicians;• corporate peers;• academics and business gurus.
These were recruited worldwide, not through regional or country quotas but
by a set of global criteria created by the research company, BPRI, includingspeaking at conferences or to the media, having papers published or articleswritten, and travelling abroad on business.
The benchmark research confirmed Shell’s existing reputation among this
group. The headline favourability figure of 49 per cent favourable, 37 percent neutral and 14 per cent unfavourable was similar to, if a little more neg-ative than, the 1997 figure of 50/40/10. The research also identified the maincriteria by which each sub-group evaluated and rated major corporations.Selecting from a choice of twenty-six, collectively the sample listed as theirtop five criteria:
• integrity;
• commitment to sustainable development;• well managed;• transparent and accountable;• financial success.
Inevitably, there was some variance in priorities between, for example, NGOs,
who put emphasis on integrity and sustainable development, and investorswho rated management and financial performance highly.
The internal programme
Before the campaign could be made public, an internal system of cascade
briefing had to take place: in order to recruit local support from the externalaffairs and marketing community, to win senior manager endorsement, toexplain to employees the rationale at a time of tough cost pressures, andthrough the campaign, to turn Shell people into ambassadors for the Groupamong their family and friends.
Regional workshops were held on each main continent for external affairs
and brand executives, to brief them on the strategy, receive input andcomment and make any changes necessary before launch.Shell: managing a corporate reputation 19

Ahead of the launch, full briefing packs were sent out, and features
appeared in Shell’s main internal news media, Shell World, its global maga-
zine, and Shell Business Television, its satellite television channel. Template
articles were also written to feature in the internal magazines of countryoperations and each global business.
The external programme
It is perhaps an irony of this PR-led programme that the central component
is, in fact, an advertising campaign, which accounts for over half the budgetand represents the most visible element of the programme. But the advertis-ing was designed very much as a PR tool, to encourage adult-to-adultdialogue, and to position itself as far as possible from traditional self-congratulatory corporate advertising. Its role was to allow Shell to reach outbeyond its existing special public relationships to a far wider group of people,to ensure there was a genuinely global reach for the campaign, and also to usethe medium to challenge and stimulate a response.
The schedule began with eight press advertisements, each of which took an
issue from Shell’s first report to society, Profits and Principles: does there
have to be a choice? ,usually referred to simply as ‘the Shell Report ’. The issues
included responsible exploration and production in environmentally sensitiveregions, investment in renewable sources of energy, climate change and globalwarming, community investment and human rights (see Figure 1.2). Eachsubject set out the dilemmas for Shell in addressing each area, and balancedthis with the approach that Shell was taking. The invitation to dialogue wasreinforced through a special website address leading straight to a micro-siteon shell.com expanding on the issues, as well as an email address and postaladdress to write to Shell.
To reach the target audience of special publics around the world in the
most efficient and cost-effective way, the media schedule was made up ofinternational magazines and newspapers including Time, Newsweek, National
Geographic, The Wall Street Journal and The Economist.
A key objective of the PR-led approach was that Shell’s closest audiences
among special publics – those that it engaged directly or indirectly over thecourse of a year – should have prior knowledge of the advertising element ofthe campaign and not see it cold and without context. This was intended toensure the programme was not characterised solely as a corporate advertisingcampaign and that the rationale behind the programme was understood.
Therefore, a ‘campaign guide’ was produced in the form of two booklets,
called ‘Listening and Responding’. One, subtitled ‘dialogue with our stake-holders’, set out the background and thinking, going back to the Society’sChanging Expectations research. The other carried all eight press advertise-ments and an explanation for each. These were mailed to all Shell’s existingcontacts from its two European headquarters and the booklets were madeavailable for local printing and translation to each country Operating Unit.20 Tom Henderson and John Williams

Figure 1.2 Shell: Protect endangered species.

At the launch, a full press pack was prepared, which was distributed elec-
tronically to the Operating Units for local use, and in London a press
conference was held to allow the maximum opportunity to explain the fullcontext of the campaign face-to-face. The press conference was fronted byboth the communications team from Shell Centre and the author of theShell Report to make an overt link to Shell’s sustainable development pro-
gramme.
The shell.com website was recognised from the start as a crucial tool of
education, engagement and dialogue. All communications used the shell.comaddress to drive people to the website. As explained earlier, a URL addressdirect to the microsite was featured in the press advertising that took thesurfer directly into more detail on the issues raised in the advertising. Themicrosite allowed users to move into the main shell.com site, join a discus-sion forum about the issues or email Shell Centre directly. A team of issuesexperts was set up to help handle any queries arising from the advertising. Inaddition, web advertising was used to increase the traffic to shell.com. Anumber of banner ads were tested on a variety of general and specialistsites from ft.com and cnn.com to enn.com (environmental news network)and motherjones, a website linked to a radical California-based publicationof the same name that was usually critical of big corporations. (Its decisionto accept Shell’s web advertising was the subject of vigorous debate on itsown website.)
To extend the reach of the advertisements further, added value was sought
from the investment made in the press media chosen. This led to theadvertising booklet being inserted in international editions of Newsweek and
Time and striking deals to feature the banner advertising on the websites of
other media carrying the press advertising.
The relationships developed with the press media led to creating a joint
writing prize with The Economist, the first such joint marketing activity TheEconomist had undertaken. Called ‘The World in 2050 Writing Prize’, it has
been aimed at opinion-formers across the world, inviting them to submitessays about how the world might develop in the next fifty years and theimplications for the public policy decisions to be taken today. The prize hasbeen promoted through advertising, a joint website, magazine inserts, postersfor campuses and workplaces, and direct mail. The closing date has not yetbeen reached at time of writing, but already a large number of enquiries andentries have been received.
Some PR ideas could be devised and planned at the centre but could only
be executed by each country operation. These include a series of stakeholderforums where small groups of special publics and members of Shell’s man-agement would get together for twenty-four hours to share ideas and debateissues. After a successful pilot in Melbourne, a template was shared with therest of the Shell country operations, which have set up and run their ownlocal forums.
The Shell Report was already established when the reputation campaign22 Tom Henderson and John Williams

began, but in 2000 a new short form summary report was created with the
aim of extending the reach of the main report, which for reasons of thor-oughness and authority has to be long and detailed. The summary report hashad good take-up including extensive translation, it has been mailed or deliv-ered to all Shell employees in many countries and has been inserted inNewsweek, to extend its reach further. This report also offered a link back toshell.com to allow readers to access the full report and wider informationabout the Group.
The advertising remains a focal point for the campaign. As an extension of
the initial issues-based press advertising, three television commercials weredevised. The main challenge from the early engagement was to demonstratethat the values and principles that Shell had espoused had been embracedwithin the Group and were evident in its operations and people. To demon-strate this, three Shell people, each involved with leading edge work, but inthemselves not untypical of many other Shell people, were chosen to be fea-tured. The three films featured Frances Abbots-Guardiola, working inexploration in sensitive regions, Damian Miller, working in renewable energy,and Michiel Groeneveld, working on fuel cell technology to develop a virtu-ally emission-free fuel from hydrogen. The TV schedule began six monthsafter the press campaign and has run on international cable and satellitechannels, backed by an extension to the shell.com website pages and a localcountry briefing pack.
Results
The programme is only in its second year, but from the start there was acommitment to continuous monitoring and evaluation. The Shell corporateidentity team set four main criteria to judge the success of the programme:
• to achieve general support for the aims and objectives of the pro-
gramme – to achieve a licence to communicate;
• to achieve a high level of take-up of the PR ideas and materials among
Shell’s local country operations;
• to encourage a good level of engagement and response to the campaign –
dialogue is not possible if audiences merely passively receive and note the
communications;
• finally and most crucially, that the key messages were getting through,
that the knowledge and values gap was closing, and that attitudes toShell were starting to change positively.
The initial response to the idea of the campaign was very positive, both inter-nally within Shell and externally. Most evidence was anecdotal, and the besttest was an absence of criticism that the move was simply an expensive adver-tising campaign or ‘just PR’. The UK and European media who attended thelaunch press conference reported the news in a straightforward way andShell: managing a corporate reputation 23

linked the initiative to the Shell Report, which was about to be published for
the second time. Headlines from the UK press included:
‘Y ou can be sure of Shell’s efforts to be ethical’(Independent) ‘Shell in search of profits with principles’(The Times)‘Shell wields the axe to clean up its image’(Daily Telegraph)
The level of take-up by the local Operating Units was also very encouraging.At a time of tough trading conditions in many markets and considerablebudget and resource constraints, a majority of the country operations usedsome of the tools. (Shell Centre did not provide any funding for local opera-tions, only articles, artwork and templates, and copies of material.)
Nearly all Operating Units created some form of internal management brief-
ing and cascade to staff, using in-house publications and team briefings. Somethirty-one countries ran articles in their in-house publications. Over fifty majorcountries sent out the campaign guides to their local stakeholders and to staff.Many issued press releases and seventeen countries adapted the advertisingfor local use in some form, mostly on a tactical basis. A number held stake-holder forums, including the USA, South Africa, Australia and Ireland.
The level of stakeholder engagement can most easily be quantified by
the number of hits and visits to shell.com. As described earlier, all thecommunications material carried the web address and encouraged specialpublics to visit the site to read or debate. Although the impact of the reputa-tion programme cannot be isolated, the launch of the campaign did helpgenerate a huge increase in website traffic, from under 4 million hits a monthbefore the campaign launched, to over 9 million hits in the months immedi-ately following. Site visitors increased to over a million a month and theirlength of stay increased from an average of nine minutes to thirteen. In addi-tion, Shell Centre received hundreds of emails, letters and website postingscommenting on the programme, not all positive, but all part of the dialogue.
The most critical test was the shift in attitude. The Shell team was keen to
see an immediate impact in the first wave of tracking research among globalspecial publics, which went into the field in October–December 1999, eightmonths after the start of the programme. Shell’s external advisers counselledthat there might not be significant shifts in such a short time. Ahead of thetracking, based on the initial benchmark research, the team agreed fourteenkey performance metrics (quantified research measures) and set targets for theprogramme to achieve. These targets covered key messages and attributes,awareness of elements of the programme and general favourability and advo-cacy scores.
The results were good. The research showed that the campaign had already
reached five of the fourteen metric targets. Shell had improved its rating24 Tom Henderson and John Williams

significantly on each of its key programme messages. Where there was a
shortfall was in the reach and awareness of the campaign – in its earlymonths, the level of impact and engagement was not yet high enough.
The core favourability score had, however, leapt from 49 per cent
favourable, 37 per cent neutral and 14 per cent unfavourable, to scores of 67per cent favourable, 26 per cent neutral and only 7 per cent unfavourable. Inaddition, positive advocacy (spontaneous or prompted recommendation)increased by 66 per cent and confidence in Shell as the oil company bestsuited to meet the world’s energy needs in 2050 increased by 40 per cent.While not all of this could be attributable to the programme itself (the shareprice, the price of oil and investor confidence had all improved sharply), nev-ertheless it was significant that the most positive scores came from thoseexposed to one or more elements of the programme and that those groupsmost engaged with the programme – in particular the NGO community – hadshown the largest shifts. Also, on most scores Shell had moved further in apositive direction than its major competitors.
The ‘licence to communicate’ was also firmly established. Over 70 per cent
of respondents agreed with the statement about the press advertising ‘I thinkit is a good idea for Shell to communicate in this way’ and over 80 per centagreed for the ‘Living the values’ television commercials.
Next steps
Reputation management should be a continuous process and indeed this pro-gramme, at the time of writing, has been public only fifteen months. Shell’sstrategy is now to extend the breadth and depth of the programme amongspecial publics. It is negotiating to forge other partnerships with major mediaand global institutions to promote its messages jointly where there arecommon agendas. The ‘Living the values’ television work is being convertedinto press advertising. The use of the Internet is being extended, with new cre-ative material, and widening the advertising schedule.
A key challenge is to increase the level of local country activity. To promote
this, Shell is funding centrally two country tests, to explore if the pump-priming of greater levels of activity, including PR initiatives as well as pressand TV advertising, will have the expected impact of accelerating the positiveshifts in attitudes found to date, on a local basis. But that is for another study.
Lessons learned
The world remains both global and very local. While the Internet allows onemessage to reach 200 countries instantly, local attitudes and perspectives stillvary. Although it is possible to plan and execute a global advertising cam-paign from one location, much stakeholder communication is deliveredpersonally through local relations and small-scale engagement, be it a letteror a meeting. This has to be executed locally. Messages and values need to beShell: managing a corporate reputation 25

applied consistently across the globe; yet each market and region still have
different priorities and will respond in different ways.
It is a challenge for any international organisation. There needs to be
strong strategic thinking and good coordination from the centre; but alsogood links and relations with each business and country operation.
The success of the programme to date has been due to a number of factors:
a commitment to a high level of research and evaluation, to understand audi-ences, test ideas and set measurable targets; giving time to consult businessand country operations, to win local management support; developing asingle strategy and coordinating all activities through one team of client andagencies working closely together; and, crucially, the commitment of theShell Group leadership to the campaign, led from the top by Chairman SirMark Moody-Stuart, who himself initially chaired the steering group thatoversaw the creation of this programme.
Finally, Shell feels that a holistic approach to communications has been
achieved by the PR-led strategy and has delivered a potentially complex pro-gramme of stakeholder engagement and dialogue in a very effective way.
References
Shell Annual Report (various years).
Profits and Principles: does there have to be a choice?, The Shell Report (1998).
‘Listening and Responding – dialogue with our stakeholders’, Shell (1999).
‘Listening and Responding – the advertising’, Shell (1999).26 Tom Henderson and John Williams

Case 2 Racism – condemn it or
condone it
The Commission for Racial
Equality’s ‘personalresponsibility’ campaign
Adam Roscoe
Introduction
In the spring of 1998 the UK’s Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) drew
up controversial plans to challenge racism in the UK in order to demon-strate to the public at large and politicians that ‘all was not well with racerelations in Britain’ and that complacency about racism existed.
The CRE was formed in 1976 under the Race Relations Act, is funded by
the Home Office and is charged with a number of duties, including:
• to work towards the elimination of racial discrimination and promote
equality of opportunity;
• to encourage good relations between people from different racial back-
grounds;
• to monitor the way the Race Relations Act is working and recommend
improvements and take legal action.
The last of these duties has brought both praise and brickbats – praise from
the more liberal members of the public, trade unions and some politiciansand criticism from others, mainly the more right-wing media whose tendencyis to highlight some of the more ‘unusual’ legal actions supported by theCRE. There was a period when the CRE’s support for Irish nationals work-ing in the UK, whose natural intelligence was criticised on the basis of race,became the object of heavy and vitriolic criticism by newspaper leader writ-ers. They took the opportunity presented by industrial tribunals to reinforcenational stereotypes and poke fun at the CRE for being too liberal and ‘right-on’. Considered, well-researched journalism on the subject of racism in allmedia was conspicuous by its absence.
As far as the media was concerned in late 1997 and early 1998 – there was
no evidence of ‘a racial problem’ in the UK – and if there was a problem, itwas in the minds of the CRE. The CRE felt differently and away from themedia spotlight, commissioned research which sought quantitative and qual-itative evidence about the real views and feelings of black, Asian and whitepeople about racism to establish the situation for itself.

28 Adam Roscoe
Research
In late 19971the research, via an independent company, gathered the views of
ordinary people from different racial groups in Britain about the issue of
racism. The findings, in summary, showed that most black and Asian respon-dents stated that from their perspective, racism was still a problem in Britishsociety. They felt, though, that there had been changes. The racism of thelatter part of the 1990s appeared more subtle, although it was sometimesreported as overt and black people felt most strongly discriminated against.
White respondents showed some positive attitudes towards ethnic minori-
ties, but notably, many of the positive statements from this group indicated adegree of ‘qualification’ in respect of black and Asian communities. Quotesfrom the research include statements like:
‘ A lot of my friends are black/Asian, but . . .’‘I’m not a racist, but . . .’, and more overtly: ‘They are taking over thecountry.’
The research indicated that the key areas for discrimination were in employ-ment, law and order, bullying in school and street violence.
Concurrent with this research, but in another forum, racial street violence
was being investigated by Sir William Macpherson in what was then knownas the Lawrence Inquiry. On 22 April 1993 Stephen Lawrence, a blackteenager, was stabbed and killed by a gang of six white youths. The chain ofevents leading from the murder to the final recommendations of theMacpherson Report
2highlight the continued existence of racism in the UK
and ‘institutional racism’ in the police force.
Goals and objectives
Overall, the CRE realised that it had to meet a number of challenges in theyears ahead. An internal report noted:
In the Millennium, the Commission recognises it has to move on fromasserting the needs for racial tolerance to actively championing the valueof diversity.
But first it needs to assert itself and create a platform for challenging
people’s personal attitudes to racism – their personal responsibility.
The CRE’s advertising budget, by comparison with commercial or consumermarketing above-the-line spend, is modest. Traditionally, some of the hottestadvertising ‘shops’ have pitched for CRE work on the basis that they willcharge only for production (print and media space), giving their creative andstrategic input on a pro bono basis. It is not all altruism, though – advertising
agencies also see the opportunity to produce leading edge, and sometimes

‘dangerous’ advertising which can win them awards within their industry
and thus create profile for themselves. This latter objective was stated byEURO RSCG Wnek Gosper, one of London’s top agencies, as one of thereasons why they wanted the CRE’s business. They were awarded the CRE’saccount, ending a long association between the Commission and Saatchi &Saatchi.
Wnek Gosper’s proposals, in response to the brief to help the CRE: ‘assert
itself and create a platform for challenging people’s personal attitudes toracism – their personal responsibility’ were brave. Brave for the agency andbrave for the CRE and its Commissioners.
The agency had devised an outdoor poster campaign using the ‘tease
and reveal’ tactic. Tease and reveal is the technique where an initial poster,designed to challenge the audience is placed on sites for a period, to bereplaced by a ‘reveal’ which comes clean about the purpose of the firstposter.
Tease and reveal became fashionable among advertisers because it pro-
vided a platform for additional media coverage of the advertising itself. The‘genre’ was judged to have become difficult in the eyes of the advertisingindustry watchdog, the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) when one setof teaser posters announced that ‘60 per cent of girls under 15 have had sex’.The reveal, promoting a Millennium Debate, prompted the audience to takepart in the debate to influence the future, or face the prospect of the teaserposters becoming fact in the future.
In its monthly report in June 1998, the ASA ruled the Millennium Debate
campaign to be ‘offensive and irresponsible’. The ASA issued guidelines fortease and reveal posters in general and urged advertisers to be aware that:
• Problems arise when readers do not see all parts of the campaign.
• The message can be inaccurate or seriously misleading if seen in part.• Consideration should be given to the impact of individual elements of
the campaign.
• The distinction between fact and opinion must be made clear.
This guidance helped form the CRE campaign, but all involved knew that
conflict with the ASA was inevitable if the current tactics were pursued.They were.
Target audiences
The target audiences were identified as:
• as many members of the general public as the poster budget would allow;
• politicians and ‘influencers’;• the media.CRE’s ‘personal responsibility’ campaign 29

30 Adam Roscoe
Strategy
The majority of today’s media-targeted public relations undertaken by con-
sultancies comprises 20 per cent research and strategy and 80 per centcampaign delivery. In this case, that ratio was reversed. The advertising cam-paign – in terms of development of creative ideas – was well in hand byApril, when public relations consultancy Greenwood Tighe was appointed toadvise on ‘below-the-line’ strategy to support the campaign.
There is always danger for public relations practitioners in being appointed
once an advertising campaign is crystallising in order to ‘PR the advertising’.Given the timescales, the budget, and the quality of advertising creative andresearch work, which usually prevail under these circumstances, it is advisableto give these projects a wide berth. The need to ‘PR the ad campaign’ usuallyindicates that the advertising agency has lost its nerve, privately admits thattheir campaign won’t shift the target number of chocolate bars, etc. and ascapegoat will no doubt be required in the future. Enter the PR consultantwho comforts him/herself with the view that advertising is ‘the colouring-in’,while PR is the ‘joined-up writing’.
However, in this case, the brave creative work undertaken both by Wnek
Gosper and the CRE, based on robust research, presented the PR consultantwith a strong campaign and one that would benefit from involving the mediaas a ‘booster’ for the above-the-line message.
The aim of the advertising strategy for the Personal Responsibility cam-
paign was:
• to provide a reference point for the public to re-examine their own atti-
tude to racism, specifically relative to the consumer, employment, law and
order;
• to urge action on an individual basis to challenge racism;• to provide a route to complain.
The PR consultancy’s own strategy overlaying this was to multiply the effect
of the above-the-line spend by maximising the message and images via edi-torial media coverage and debate
Three CRE tease and reveal poster treatments had been devised – one for
a consumer product – a training shoe, one for an employment agency andanother focusing on law and order. Importantly, for the tease to succeed, theCRE was not mentioned on any of the initial posters. Key to the tease tacticwas the inclusion of a telephone number that was presented as a ‘call formore details’ phone number. This number was actually linked to a call centrein the CRE, where the Commission was hoping members of the public wouldcall to complain about the images – a direct feedback mechanism for thecampaign – did people complain or condone?
The striking images of a black basketball player juxtaposed with an ape
(which, incidentally, bit the photographer’s assistant during the shoot) – one

showed a white woman looking nervously at a black man on a bus, advertis-
ing a rape alarm with the legend: ‘Because it’s a jungle out there’, and anothera white man treading on an Asian man’s hand while climbing the careerladder – all addressed both overt and implicit racism. All of the reveal postersshowed each tease with the challenge: ‘What was worse, this advert, or yourfailure to condemn it?’ Followed by the tag-line: ‘Racism – Condemn it orcondone it – there’s no in between,’ see Figure 2.1.
The poster campaign was centred on London, but with a presence in
Manchester, Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds and Glasgow utilising sites on travelto work corridors and around public transport interchanges. Budget restric-tions dictated that only 150, 48-sheet poster sites could be covered with apotential audience, based on site data and research, of three million people.A lightweight commercial poster campaign – perhaps for a new CD albumrelease – would normally cover some 2,500 sites.
Given the guidance of the ASA, it was decided that the tease poster
would only remain in place for five days, giving the reveal poster nine daysin place.
Some scenario planning had been undertaken – especially concerning the
potential for posters to be defaced or burnt – or indeed for people to beinjured falling off poster sites in the process of vandalising them.Contingency arrangements for posters to be ‘blanked over’ were agreed withthe poster site owners. During the period May to August the CRE’s chair-man, Sir Herman Ouseley, briefed the Home Office about a generic personalresponsibility campaign due to go live in September, but as the campaigndrew nearer, Home Office civil servants attended meetings and briefings toensure they were fully briefed on content and timing.
Before reviewing the nuts and bolts of the campaign, it is worth noting the
PR consultants’ view of one of the pitfalls of the campaign: In April, withina position paper written for the CRE by Greenwood Tighe, the consultancystated:
It is our view that it will not be possible to maintain the anonymity of theCRE during the tease part of the campaign. Any attempt to ‘ride out’ thepotential furore without reference to the campaign rationale is likely tocreate severe media backlash against the CRE. This will then overshadowthe key messages we are seeking to communicate.
Campaign activation – 16 September 1998
It was agreed that the media would be tipped off on day two/three of the teaseby outraged members of the public who would be reluctant to give theirnames. Teaser posters appeared on 16 September and the analysis of callcentre returns showed that ten members of the public had called, outraged atthe images, some demanding their removal, while one advertising man fromLondon asked: ‘This is a trick isn’t it?’.CRE’s ‘personal responsibility’ campaign 31

32 Adam Roscoe
Figure 2.1 CRE ‘reveal’ posters, illustrating the original ‘tease’ posters.

The ASA contacted the poster company and asked for details of adver-
tiser – responding to a complaint from a member of the public. This call was
managed with the promised to check and call back – a delaying tactic. Andcuriously, a Mr Huggins from Bristol wanted to know where he could buy therape alarm …b u t the media had not picked up the story.
During day two it became clear that the press were reluctant to take anony-
mous tip-offs – an issue not addressed in our contingencies. However, theGuardian newspaper’s media correspondent followed up the story and the
Press Association was also tipped off. Media interest grew during the day, butCRE involvement was not rumbled.
Day two analysis of call centre returns revealed a member of the public in
Battersea, London, who wanted to know where to buy the shoes and 39 callscomplaining about offensive posters, with one caller who told the operator:‘ F…y o u and your racist posters’, and put the phone down.
On day three, the ASA called the poster company again and insisted on being
given information that the campaign was CRE-sponsored. Top-level contact wasmade between the ASA and CRE, culminating in an order by the ASA that allposters should be removed. This move was resisted by the CRE on the basis thatthe reveal, in line with ASA guidelines, would be in place for longer than thetease. The ASA circulated a press release to the media condemning the CRE forits poster campaign and the media started to pick up on the issue.
Outside London, Mr Huggins from Bristol called again…H o w e v e r ,M r
Huggins’ real name was Det. Chief Inspector Huggins of Avon and SomersetPolice who informed the CRE that he would not guarantee the safety of thesites and would arrest the poster contractor unless the posters came down. Apanic-stricken poster contractor (with brush and bucket) avoided a day in thecells and all sites in Bristol were ‘blanked’.
On day four, the media covered the poster row ‘CRE v. ASA ’ story and the
PA story formed the basis of coverage.
As planned, on day five (a Sunday) calls were made by CRE press office
and consultancy staff to all national media about the ‘reveal’ press conferencechaired by Sir Herman Ouseley, scheduled for the following morning. Themedia was mailed once (on Friday), called and faxed on Sunday – some fourtimes – and yet many claimed they weren’t aware of the event on Mondaymorning.
A press release was issued on the day, entitled: ‘Silent majority confirms
complacency through failure to condemn racism’. It summarised the basis ofthe campaign and noted the low number of complainants calling the phonelines on the posters. Within the text of the release, Sir Herman Ouseley wasquoted as saying: ‘The campaign is designed to force people into consideringtheir own personal attitude to racism and is specifically intended to prompta reaction – preferably complaint or condemnation.’
He went on to note the small number of complaints, given the thousands
of people who must have seen them and could not be bothered to complain.He concluded:CRE’s ‘personal responsibility’ campaign 33

This second series of posters is a message for them – there is no walking
the other way or walking on the other side of the street as far as racismis concerned. We all have a responsibility not to tolerate racism at work,in the media and in our day-to-day lives. The posters are just part of awider campaign to challenge passivity in the face of racism. The CRE iscalling for formal public education programmes to tackle racism in thiscountry.
On ‘Reveal Day’ the press tried to steer the story on to the row with the ASAand their condemnation of the campaign, prior to reveal. A number of jour-nalists at the press conference, led by the Daily Telegraph, were broadly
critical of the CRE approach, with some notable exceptions. Privately, afterthe press conference, many journalists praised the CRE’s approach and muchof the coverage carried key campaign messages about condemning racism.Columnists reporting during the immediate period during the reveal cam-paign were broadly critical. However, following the immediate ‘knee-jerk’reaction, some further considered features on the issue of racism and praisedthe CRE for its brave and direct stance. Debate was prompted about both thecampaign tactics and the issue of racism in letters columns.
Towards the end of the year, and following invitations to Sir Herman to
appear on radio debates about racism, BBC TV’s Heart of the Matter pro-gramme, which concentrates on the moral aspects of issues, focused onracism in Britain. The programme was thought-provoking and balanced andincluded extensive use of an interview with Sir Herman which containedmany of the key messages about condemning or condoning racism.
Results
During and after the reveal period, Sir Herman undertook 21 interviews onradio and television – 14 of which were national. The campaign achieved 31media ‘hits’ including 10 nationals and while many contained negative cov-erage – all noted the reason for the CRE’s campaign. Total readership andlistener figures amounted to nearly 50 million with 68 per cent of the adultpopulation of the UK coming into contact with the media coverage of thecampaign. The public relations ‘multiplier’ on the actual advertising mediareach, in this case, was effective – turning a potential three million audienceinto 50 million.
In addition, ‘Racism: Condemn it or Condone it’ support materials, includ-
ing posters, cards and briefings, which encouraged ethnic minority people tobe more aware of their right to complain and which sought to encouragewhite people to be active in condemning racist behaviour, were issued.Schools, commercial organisations, trade unions and Citizens’ AdviceBureaux were among the recipients.
In October the ASA reported that the campaign had broken its rules
and ruled that for the next two years, all CRE advertising would have to be34 Adam Roscoe

pre-vetted by the ASA. The CRE and Wnek Gosper had prepared for this
and immediately submitted a poster to the ASA for clearance. This poster –which appeared on only one location outdoors – opposite the ASA ’s Londonoffices, and as a full-page advertisement in The Times – was in the form of an
apology (see Figure 2.2). It noted in white type on black: The CRE issorry . . . sorry that it had to break the rules to bring the issue of racism to theattention of the public. Sorry that as we approach the new Millennium, thereis still a need for the CRE, sorry that young ethnic minority men are X timesmore likely to be attacked in the street that their white counterparts…etc.
The advertising agency, PR consultants and CRE staff met for a frank de-
brief on the campaign and its implications. The output from this meeting wasin the form of a SWOT analysis as set out below:
Strengths
• More coverage for CRE than any other previous campaign.
• Positioned CRE as high profile, hard-edged, prepared to take serious
issues head-on.
• Broadcast media gave ideal platform for erudite CRE chairman to put
his point.
• Starting point for on-going campaign.• Regional coverage.
Weaknesses
• Anonymous media tip-offs don’t work well.
• Soured relationship between CRE and ASA.• Control of message – media coverage was more about the campaign than
the issues.
Opportunities
• On-going editorial interest – serious feature follow-throughs – Heart of
the Matter spent 40 minutes on racism in Britain in October as a result of
campaign.
• ASA ruling – gave CRE another go – CRE is sorry.
Threats
• Avon and Somerset Police made it impossible to keep the CRE’s involve-
ment out of the media spotlight.
• ASA adjudication came in record time – all future CRE posters will be
vetted for two years.
• Control of messaging – race issues v. advertising issues.CRE’s ‘personal responsibility’ campaign 35

36 Adam Roscoe
Figure 2.2 The Times CRE advertisement.

CRE’s ‘personal responsibility’ campaign 37
Update
In February 1999 there was a late, but powerful confirmation of the CRE’s
premise that racism was still a problem in the UK. The Macpherson Reportinto Stephen Lawrence’s murder contained no less than 70 wide-ranging rec-ommendations for society in general on how it must develop ‘zero tolerancefor racism’.
While the report is remembered for sparking a lengthy debate on whether
or not the police service in general and the Metropolitan Police in particular,suffered from ‘institutional racism’, many other recommendations were made.These other recommendations ranged from urging Ministerial priority actionon racism in law and order, to measures to combat racism in the NHS, civilservice, local government and schools. The report also recommended that, forthe first time, the CRE should have a role in advising and monitoring racismin the police service.
Lessons learned
There are a number of specific tactical lessons to be learned from this cam-paign, but if there is one piece of strategic guidance, it must be that breakingthe rules on very rare occasions, for very good reasons can boost a cam-paign’s reach and impact.
The ASA ’s rule, that advertising in the UK must be ‘legal, decent, honest
and truthful’, probably protects the customers of washing-up liquid andderegulated utility products very well. But challenging deep-rooted and per-sonal attitudes to race and racism (what we really feel and do or say, when
faced with racism) is a tough brief. Positive, smiling images of multi-culturalBritain, according to the CRE, go unnoticed by the public and media alike.They confirm a comfortable preconception. The CRE campaign was notabout comfort – it was about difficult images and uncomfortable messages. Ineffect, the CRE needed to go ‘over the top’ in order even to register an issuewith the media. Had there been no outrage, outcry or righteous indignationfrom the Daily Telegraph and Norman Tebbit, the issue of quiet insidious
racism would not have been addressed.
Sir Herman Ouseley cited Stephen Lawrence’s murder as an aspect of the
problem of racism in late twentieth-century Britain during the ‘reveal’ pressconference – it went unreported – perhaps a piece of the jigsaw the presswanted to ignore, or just facts that spoilt a good story. The CRE’s personalresponsibility campaign was seen as extreme in September 1998, but byFebruary 1999, when the Macpherson report was published, there was littlecondemnation of reactionary, over-zealous, politically correct anti-racismcampaigns. In effect, it put much of the reporting of the findings of theLawrence inquiry into context.
More general lessons from the campaign can be seen as:

• tactically, the tease and reveal poster has had its day – so think of
another hook when handling such issues;
• advertising and PR working to the same brief, but on a different budget
can be a powerful combination providing there is close cooperation
between the two functions;
• it is important not to underestimate just how difficult it can be to over-
come public complacency or ignorance about such sensitive issues aspersonal attitudes towards racism which many may wish to avoid con-fronting. To capture peoples’ attention and stimulate a response mayoften require a radical and perhaps risky communications strategy.
Notes
1The Perpetrators of Racial Harassment and Racial Violence (1997), Home Office
Research and Statistics Directorate Study 176.
2 Macpherson, W . (1999) ‘The Stephen Lawrence inquiry’ (The Macpherson
Report), CM 4262–1, London: The Stationery Office.38 Adam Roscoe

Case 3 BBC America
How Britain won the
colonies back
Barbara DeSanto and Jo Petherbridge
Introduction
When the American colonies sought to free themselves from their mother
country, Great Britain, in the eighteenth century, little did they realize that theformer colonies would pay for a return of the British through television. Themost well-known and respected public broadcaster in the world, the BBC,found itself embracing a major philosophical change in the 1980s – creationof a commercial venture, BBC Worldwide, to provide programming aroundthe world as well as generate revenue to supplement its traditional UK char-ter base. The challenge here was twofold: (1) to preserve the traditional BBCorganizational culture and operational structure as the world’s public broad-caster in its homeland, the British Isles; while (2) developing, marketing andearning revenue from a commercial arm, the newly created BBC Worldwidedivision. Could the BBC be both public and commercial?
This case study explores the introduction of BBC America into the US cable
market by outlining how research and strategic planning and implementation,along with ongoing evaluation, contributed to BBC America’s first two verysuccessful years. At the centre of the BBC America launch was the polishedBBC reputation. BBC America’s success can be measured two ways: (1) inbottom-line numbers: the number of American cable operators who carry BBCAmerica, subscribers who watch BBC America and in growing advertising rev-enues; and (2) in the satisfaction of the BBC America audience.
Research – background and planning
The BBC formally began its operations under terms set out in a RoyalCharter granted in the 1920s. Several major philosophical tenets underlay thispublic broadcasting venture; one was how it was to support itself; Asa Briggs(1985) writing about the philosophy of the BBC commented, ‘Making moneywas not to be the object of broadcasting . . . As we conceive it, our responsi-bility is to carry into the greatest possible number of homes everything thatis best in every department of human knowledge, endeavour, or achievement.’Revenue would come from a household subscription fee which would beused to produce more programming; in 1999 more than 21 million British

households each paid £101 in subscription fees, which provided the BBC
with more than £2 billion (3.5 billion US dollars).
Another major tenet was that because the government-owned broadcaster
did not have to ‘sell’ anything to its viewers, it could plan, produce and dis-tribute programming it considered important, rather than having to satisfyaudiences or deal with pressure or concerns from sponsors or advertisers.Former BBC broadcaster Paul Norris (1999) said, ‘The BBC was then verymuch a producer-driven organization – producers decided what programmesthey wanted to mak e…There was little attempt to research the audience,
and focus groups would have been unheard of, or if known about, rejectedout-of-hand…P r oducers knew what was good for the audience.’
The BBC had a landmark year in 1987. Its major philosophical and cul-
tural tenets were challenged with the naming of the BBC Deputy DirectorGeneral John Birt to oversee the changes necessary to meet the globe’s chang-ing broadcast industry. Birt’s approach was that the BBC needed to be run asa business, and part of that business was to use the BBC’s excellent globalreputation to establish a commercial arm that could generate revenue for theparent public corporation.
The 1990 Broadcasting Act in the UK also affected the BBC as it brought
genuine economic competition into the British system of broadcasting –including provisions for the separate sale of advertising for different channelsand the auction system of commercial franchises. Satellite television’s launchin the UK in the late 1980s was another factor as it changed the UK from anet exporter of television programs to a new importer, a factor which con-tributed to the development of a two-way trading situation and more varietyfor British viewers.
British scholar Colin Sparks who studied the BBC’s changes concluded in
his study that ‘the [UK] Government believes that the BBC’s commercial ini-tiative should aim increasingly at international markets’ (Sparks, 1995). Forthe BBC the playing arena had changed – competition was now a serious con-sideration.
The BBC went to work on the international directive, and in 1994, BBC
Worldwide was established. The underlying concept of Worldwide was that byseparating the various BBC operations, the integrity and branding of theoriginal BBC could be retained while new ventures could build upon theestablished BBC reputation and credibility as a launch point.
The first major business deal was a partnership with Flextech that involved
the BBC’s UK pay channels. The BBC ran programming, Flextech ran mar-keting and the business was operated as a joint venture. But it was the secondpartnership – the BBC’s cooperation with Discovery Communications Inc in1998 – that paved the way for the introduction of, and the resulting success of,BBC America as a US premium cable channel that would generate two typesof revenue: cable fees and advertising dollars. With the business agreement inplace, a carefully planned and executed public relations programme wasimplemented to introduce BBC America into US homes.40 Barbara DeSanto and Jo Petherbridge

In addition to the changing political and governmental environment in
the UK, one technological stumbling block was about to be removed. The
introduction and promised roll-out of digital cable allowed the BBC to posi-tion BBC America as a premium cable channel to be purchased as well asdelivered through the new technology. For cable operators digital technologyallowed many more channels to be delivered using existing bandwidth,thereby maximizing their existing infrastructure.
Using its 15 years of US research and the BBC’s long experience of selling
its programmes to the American market, BBC America now conducted focusgroup research on the potential for American reception of BBC programmingin four American markets: Tampa, Florida; Boston, Massachusetts; Chicago,Illinois; and Nashville, Tennessee. Two themes were evident from previousresearch: (1) Americans like British style, wit and flair; and (2) Americanswelcome a real alternative to cookie-cutter television. The focus groups pro-vided the following additional information:
• Americans see British programmes as a refreshing alternative to US TV .
• A significant number of viewers want to see something different.• Americans tend to think all British programming is BBC-produced.• Americans like British programming. Among titles previously sold to
US channels, BBC comedies have rated high with men, and dramas haverated high with women. BBC titles, in fact, have consistently out-performed other shows on the networks that have bought them.
• The BBC has high brand recognition in the US (48 per cent).• Americans who have been BBC viewers are passionate viewers.
Goals and objectives
BBC America was armed with the mission of delivering profits to BBCWorldwide and targeting the US cable market. Critically, unlike previousBBC commercial ventures, the channel would report editorially to the heartof the BBC public service television. This was to ensure a creative and qual-ity threshold that would sustain the channel through its early growth. Underthese operating parameters, BBC America established the following organi-zational goals:
• American research confirmed that US viewers associated ‘quality’ with
the BBC name, but they also thought of it as somewhat ‘stuffy’. BBC
America was charged with updating that traditional image to somethingmore modern, relevant and cutting-edge.
• To successfully introduce something totally ‘un-American’ into an
American broadcasting and viewing system based on competition andmarket-driven factors.
• To become financially independent ‘as a strong business’; the goal was to
have 25 million American subscribers by 2004.BBC America: winning the colonies back 41

The key element in achieving these goals was to capitalize on the BBC’s well-
developed, respected brand of broadcasting. Terri Houtman (1998), ChryslerCorporation’s manager of corporate image and brand, describes five rules forbuilding brands through public relations that reflect BBC America’s planningefforts:
•Know what the product, and the campaign that surrounds it, stands for: The
BBC knows itself and is aware as well as very protective of the quality
reputation it carries. American research confirmed that US viewers asso-ciated ‘quality’ with the BBC name, but they also thought of it assomewhat ‘stuffy.’ BBC America was charged with updating that tradi-tional image to something more modern, relevant and cutting-edge.
•Target those buyers who have a passion for your product: The BBC sought
out American viewers who had a passion for anything British. Christened‘ Anglophiles’, the BBC planned programming and schedules that wouldsatisfy this passion.
•Understand how the industry to which your product belongs has evolved:The BBC understood its royal charter mission, but also was open andflexible enough to adapt to the new British and global broadcasting scenethat developed in the 1990s.
•Integrate the timeless qualities that have helped make the brand successful:For the BBC this meant focusing on British programming and culture –no dilution, pure British. This is reflected in BBC America’s first pro-motional slogan: ‘Completely British. Completely Different’.
•Reduce cross-considerations by targeting an exclusive market and audience:The exclusive American market revealed itself in the four major marketfocus group studies that identified the lifestyles and interests that were themost important elements. The BBC applied its research, taking the iden-tified Anglophiles and matching them to the subscription tiers in theAmerican cable system.
Communication objectives
• to promote the channel through the trade press, supporting the affiliate
sales drive for distribution and ad sales drive for advertisers;
• to promote the channel to consumers through newspapers, magazines,
television and radio opportunities, creating grass-roots awareness and
demand.
The communication objectives were based on a staple of American market-ing push–pull strategy. The concept involves having the ultimate end-user ofa product, in this case television subscribers, request or ‘pull’ the productthrough the channel by requesting it from their cable operator, while offeringcable system distributors the opportunity to carry and promote or ‘push’ thechannel through to subscribers.42 Barbara DeSanto and Jo Petherbridge

BBC America: winning the colonies back 43
Target audiences
Primary audiences
•Members of the Television Critics Association
These critics were identified as opinion leaders in new US televisionofferings. Twice a year, they view and evaluate all the coming season’snew programming before any other outlets, so the publication of theircomments and perceptions can make or break a new television entry.
•AdvertisersWhile BBC Worldwide had worked with advertising in other commercialventures, this was the first time such advertising would be included in theAmerican version of the BBC.
•US cable operators and satellite providersThis audience provided the actual physical distribution throughout theUS. It was essential to convince these suppliers that BBC America was agood investment for their premium channel-purchasing patrons. Thewidespread availability of digital technology also afforded them the extraspace to carry additional channels.
•Anglophile television viewersIdentifying these audience members and targeting them with BBCAmerica information would lead them directly to contact their cableoperators to request the new channel.
Secondary audience
Next to the trade entertainment press, the entertainment and business pages
of the mainstream US newspapers also provided another avenue to showcasewhat BBC America had to offer, particularly in large urban markets wheredaily papers had entertainment sections with pages to fill.
One way to reach all these groups was by creating ‘buzz’ in the trade and
consumer press. With only a minimal budget for marketing, gaining editorialspace became a key priority.
Public relations/communication strategy and implementation
Strategic implementation focused on a well-developed timetable that carefullyconsidered the target audiences and their role in becoming aware of the chan-nel, forming attitudes about its programming and finding ways to incorporateit into the various cable system offerings.
Timetable
December 1997 : BBC America made its first appearance at the Western Cable
Show, one of the major annual trade events for US cable operators. The BBC

America pub, serving British food and beer, won the best booth award and
created great interest on the show floor. At subsequent appearances at theWestern Cable Show and National Cable Television Association trade shows,live entertainment was added to the pub making it a vibrant British experi-ence for cable operators, show visitors and trade journalists.
19 March 1998: An international deal between the BBC and DCI, including
the launch of BBC America, was announced in a satellite press conferencebetween London and New Y ork aimed at the international and national tradeand consumer press. The press noticed; Newsday reported, ‘Not since the
invention of Masterpiece Theatre in 1970 has there been anything as impor-tant to fans of quality television as the alliance between the BBC and theDiscovery Channe l…including the creation of the BBC’s own cable network
in the United States.’ The Chicago Tribune Daily echoed these sentiments,
‘ Anglophiles across America rejoiced – okay, applauded politely and nearlygrinned at the news of “BBC America.”’
29 March 1998: BBC America went on air in 200,000 US homes receiving
TCI’s (now AT&T) digital HITS package. ‘BBC America is a breath of freshair on a dial filled with the kind of cookie-cutter television shows thatHollywood can’t seem to stop baking,’ the San Francisco Examiner wrote.
On the same day, the first BBC America website, bbcamerica.com, devoted
to programme and schedule information. was launched. This was vital asthe channel was too small for inclusion in standard listings guides.
To add a touch of ‘official’ endorsement, the British ambassador to the US
hosted a BBC America launch party at his Washington residence.
July 1998: BBC America won a coveted slot to present its channel at the
Television Critics Association (200 members) which meets every six months inPasadena, California, to evaluate the coming season’s premiere program-ming. These critics were identified as opinion leaders as their comments andperceptions can make or break a new television channel. BBC America beatcompetition from more than a dozen other channels to present in a 30-minute‘new network’ slot. BBC comic actor Nigel Hawthorne (Yes, Minister) andPaul Whitehouse (writer and star of Brilliant !) appeared in person with Chief
Operating Officer Paul Lee to launch the channel to the critics. The launchincluded clips from key comedy and drama programmes, plus a full-colourpress kit detailing forthcoming premiere programming.
August 1998: The consumer team continued to raise the channel’s profile,
seeking the attention of key critics in the consumer press. David Bianculli ofthe New York Daily News was a known fan of BBC programmes and became
a firm supporter of the channel, writing the first in a series of articles prais-ing BBC America and urging New Y ork cable companies to add it to theirsystems. ‘The best new cable channel in America isn’t available anywhere in44 Barbara DeSanto and Jo Petherbridge

New Y ork. But it’s coming sooner or later, and from what I’ve seen of it, it
can’t be soon enough,’ he wrote.
August was also notable as the month in which BBC America launched its
first program-specific publicity campaign. This was to become a model forsubsequent publicity initiatives. The drama This Life was carefully selected for
the following reasons:
• It is a high quality, contemporary, edgy drama series which exemplifies
the positioning of BBC America.
• It would present US critics, used to a diet of British costume dramas and
traditional sitcoms on PBS, with an example of fresh, vibrant, realistic and
unexpected British drama. BBC America wanted to surprise the critics.
• Its concentration on five young lawyers sharing a house in London would
appeal to a young adult demographic.
• It was close enough to US shows such as Friends and Melrose Place to
attract the US audience who could draw comparisons, yet maintain avoice that was uniquely its own.
• It was long enough (two seasons totalling thirty-two episodes) to be able
to build programming stunts and prolong the press campaign throughseveral phases. (Most British series are only six to twelve episodes long.)
This campaign was rewarded with unprecedented coverage for a small cablechannel. Full page features in The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times
and the Orange County Register plus widespread reviews in other newspapers
put BBC America firmly on the US map.
October 1998: BBC America was added to Echostar’s DISH Network,
putting the channel in a total of 4.5 million US homes.
January 1999: The Television Critics Association invited BBC America back
to its winter meeting to present its newest programming and website in a 15-minute slot. Once again, an enhanced media kit and a promotional tape wereused, and British actress Diana Rigg appeared in person to promote BBCAmerica’s Murder Most English genre.
April 1999: The commercial BBC America website was launched with theintention of it becoming THE online destination for US Anglophiles. The sitewas designed as a portal to all things British, providing e-commerce as well asinformation about the channel and a sophisticated schedule database. Cross-promotion between the channel and website resulted in a steep increase inusers. In addition, a new database attached to the website allowed the com-munications team to deal with e-mails from members of the public moreefficiently. By January 2000, 1,500 e-mails per month were answered.
May 1999: BBC America is number one in USA Today’s top ten highlights ofBBC America: winning the colonies back 45

the 1998–1999 TV season. This article is among those used extensively in
advertising and promotion.
July 1999: Instead of a third formal session at the Television Critics Association,
BBC America took the unusual step of presenting a live evening performance byThe League of Gentlemen, winners of the Golden Rose of Montreaux and oneof the hottest comedy acts premiering on BBC America (see Figure 3.1). Thisnovel approach proved memorable and attention-grabbing.
The summer schedule of premiere programming, positioned against reruns
scheduled by other channels, won widespread coverage and allowed the chan-nel to break into more major New Y ork publications for the first time,including The Wall Street Journal, America’s largest selling newspaper.
August 1999: BBC America launched its television advertising campaign in
New Y ork and Los Angeles featuring Mike Myers as Austin Powers singing‘The BBC Song’. The use of this extract from the first Austin Powers moviecoincided with the release of The Spy Who Shagged Me.46 Barbara DeSanto and Jo Petherbridge
Figure 3.1 Advertisement for The League of Gentlemen.

September 1999: BBC America reached 10 million homes. The 10th million
viewers, a family from Petaluma, California, were sent on a trip to Londonand featured in the UK press. A public relations manager was added to thecommunications team to boost the channel profile among opinion leaders,cable operators, potential advertisers and Anglophile groups.
January 2000: BBC America shows, including The League of Gentlemen and
This Life, are named in several round-ups of the top television highlights of
1999.
BBC America also presented Gormenghast at the Television Critics
Association. This four-part, fantasy epic drama was one of the most ambi-tious projects ever undertaken by the BBC. Christopher Lee, John Sessionsand Jonathan Rhys Meyer were selected from a star-studded cast to appearon a panel facing television critics’ questions. The presentation was accom-panied by a six-minute clip-reel and lavish press kit. Critics were given theproducer’s book on the making of Gormenghast and a CD of the production’s
specially composed music to take with them.
At the same time, the first issue of a quarterly BBC America newsletter was
released to Anglophile and ex-patriot groups throughout the US.
February 2000: BBC America launched a television advertising campaign in
partnership with DirecTV . It featured a comedy claymation queen and thetagline ‘One Wants One’s BBC.’
April 2000: BBC America held its first premiere screenings in New Y ork and
Washington, DC.
May 2000: BBC America received unprecedented trade press coverage sur-
rounding the National Cable Television Show in New Orleans. This coincidedwith successful and diverse consumer media campaigns for shows includingGormenghast, Peacekeepers, Parkinson and Changing Rooms, and UK cover-
age of BBC America’s success in raising the profile of British comedy shows.Overall, in pr ess terms, this was the channel’s most successful month date, includ-
ing two spots on the highly rated CBS network show Entertainment Tonight.
BBC America’s US audience reached 12 million homes.
Evaluation
US subscribers
• 13 million projected by the Fourth Quarter of 2000, and 25 million by
2004.
• The channel is available in 33 of the top 35 DMAs (major markets).
• The channel is well placed on digital systems to roll out with the new
technology.BBC America: winning the colonies back 47

Advertising
• BBC America achieved 25 per cent in upfront advertising received in the
first season (on target).
• There is a gradual shift from direct response ads to a combination of blue
chip traditional ads (Charles Schwab, Ford, American Express, British
Airways, Princess Cruises) and mainstream with younger target audi-ences (dot.coms).
BBCAmerica.com website
• 700,000 page impressions per month.
• 120,000 unique users per month.• First e-commerce venture with Ukgoods.com is 400 per cent higher than
industry standards.
The press
• 100 per cent positive since the launch.
• BBC America articles occupied $2 million worth of space in trade and
consumer publications in 1999.
• Key articles raising the profile of the channel have appeared in almost48 Barbara DeSanto and Jo Petherbridge
Figure 3.2 BBC America promotional material.

BBC America: winning the colonies back 49
every major newspaper and trade magazine including USA Today, the
New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, Multichannel
News, Broadcasting and Cable and Advertising Age.
• Previews of BBC America programmes have been previewed on major
network shows including Entertainment Tonight and Dateline.
Consumers
• Although not yet on ratings, the channel receives around 1,500 e-mails
and phone calls per week from viewers or people who would like to
get the channel. These are overwhelmingly positive (more than 90 percent).
Lessons learned
• BBC’s ability to balance re-inventing itself by capitalizing on its brand
and reputation while staying true to its underlying philosophical princi-
ples demonstrates the flexibility organizations need to have not only tosustain their current positions, but create and/or capitalize on new oppor-tunities available in a global society.
• Both quantitative and qualitative research was the key to discovering
the Anglophile viewer who not only had the means to subscribe to apremium cable channel, but also recognized and valued the BBC as abrand.
Research was also the key to entering a well-established, somewhat
blasé and difficult-to-impress American television market. The prolifer-ation of channels and programming makes creating a presence amongthe clutter difficult. Rather than casting a wide net to all US televisionviewers, the BBC’s investment in research uncovered the niche worthtargeting.
• The BBC reputation and brand were strong enough to carry its own
recognition and quality into an identified, targeted international market.
• A carefully tailored media mix that used opinion leaders in the target
culture and country allowed BBC America to create and distribute mate-rials that reflected the BBC quality while also satisfying the opinionleaders and viewers’ expectations of what BBC America would andshould be.
References
Briggs, A. (1985) The BBC: The First Fifty Years. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Houtman, T. (1998) ‘Building brands through MPR.’ in T.L. Harris, Value-Added
Public Relations: The Secret Weapon of Integrated Marketing. Lincolnwood, IL:
NTC/Contemporary Publishing Group.
Lee, P (1999) How BBC America is Organized. Telephone interview, April.

Norris, P . (1999) Reinventing Public Broadcasting: Is the BBC’s Aggressive
Commercialism A Model to Follow? Paper presented at the 44th Annual
Convention of the Broadcast Education Association, Las Vegas, NV , April.
Petherbridge, J. (1999) Public Relations and BBC America’s Launch. Telephone inter-
view, April.
Sparks, C. (1995) ‘The survival of the state in British broadcasting.’ Journal of
Communication, 45(4), Autumn.50 Barbara DeSanto and Jo Petherbridge

Case 4 Perkins Foods
The place of public
relations in the profile of aEuropean food business
David Davies and Danny Moss
Introduction
This case examines the role which public relations has played in helping a
growing European own-label food company, Perkins Foods, to strengthenits position in both the UK and European frozen and chilled foods markets.The case illustrates how a carefully crafted public relations strategy can helpto build a strong corporate profile within key markets and within the City fora company that does not have the advantages of a prominent consumer brandimage.
Background
Perkins Foods PLC is unusual among stock market listed food industrygroups in the UK. In contrast with those companies that began as manufac-turers or suppliers in a particular product sector, growing and diversifying byacquisition, Perkins was created in 1987 as a listed, customer-led, flexibleand varied European convenience foods group.
On the face of it, that would seem to present a company with a clear iden-
tity profile – the starting point for a cohesive, consistent and effective strategy.However, the first five years or so of Perkins Foods’ existence had somewhatdifferent implications for its public relations function.
Perkins existed first of all, or at least immediately, as a City entity. Its pro-
file as a group existed according to its share value and prospects – itsattractiveness and performance for shareholders and potential shareholders.For some considerable time it did not have any widespread or consistent PRprofile in its business sectors, which were the north European grocery retail,wholesale, food service and food manufacturing environments. The compa-nies which had become members of the Perkins group continued to operateand trade in their own names, and in almost every case, with the same seniormanagement. Perkins’ companies were based in the UK, Holland,Luxembourg, Germany and France, manufacturing and/or selling frozen andchilled meat products, pizzas, pasta and other ready meals, potato specialities,seafoods, processed mushrooms and fresh fruit and vegetables. In each case,

Perkins’ companies had established, but distinctive, reputations in their
respective market sectors.
The frozen and chilled food market
The frozen and chilled food sector has been one of the fastest-growing sectorsof the food market throughout Europe over the past thirty years. The growthof frozen food sales has been driven by a number of factors. First, changes inconsumer lifestyles have seen an increased emphasis on convenience foodpurchases. Second, improvements in refrigeration and packaging technologyhave allowed huge improvements in storage times, and third, the growth ofmajor supermarket chains across Europe has enabled consumers to haveaccess to a vastly increased range of reasonably priced frozen foodstuffs.This desire for greater convenience and the ease of storage of foodstuffs onthe part of consumers, together with the falling real costs of refrigerationequipment, have encouraged consumers to embrace the convenience foodculture that has long been established in the USA.
Chilled foods emerged on the market during the 1980s, again targeted at
the growing convenience sector of the food market, but with a higher qualityimprimatur than frozen foods because of their ‘fresher’ less ‘processed’appearance. Consumers have tended to perceive chilled foods as better qual-ity than their frozen alternatives and hence have been prepared to pay apremium for them. Ironically, many consumers purchased chilled productsand put them in the freezer, unaware that a frozen-at-source version wouldundoubtedly be of better quality than a slowly home-frozen one.
Frozen and chilled foods have become popular even in countries such as
France where traditional cooking and preparation methods, using only freshingredients, have long been seen as a central part of the culture. However,consumption patterns for frozen and chilled foods do vary across Europe,with Denmark having the largest per capita consumption (41.4 kg) followedby the UK (38.5 kg) and Norway (32.9 kg), whereas in countries such as TheNetherlands (19.8kg), Spain (20.6 kg) and Italy (10.1 kg) consumption offrozen foods, in particular is far lower.
1 To some degree, these variations in
consumption patterns reflect the differing climates and agricultural tradi-tions across Europe, but also reflect differing consumer attitudes andtraditions with respect to food preparation and consumption.
Estimates of the size of the frozen and chilled food market in Europe vary
considerably because of the diverse and fast-changing range of productswithin this sector and because of the different measurement methods thathave been employed. One set of estimates of frozen food consumption withinEurope suggest that total consumption reached around 8.8 billion metrictons in 1997 (excluding frozen poultry – 9.96 billion metric tons includingpoultry).
2Here the UK had by far the largest consumption of frozen food
with sales of over 2.6 million metric tons followed by Germany (2.1 million)and France (1.9 million). In contrast, frozen food consumption in Italy52 David Davies and Danny Moss

amounted to only 596,000 metric tons and in Austria 184,000 metric tons. A
recent Key Notes report suggests that frozen food sales in the UK will rise
from £4 billion in 1994 to around £6 billion in 2003 (at retail values), a growthrate of 3–4 per cent per annum.
3However, within this overall figure, the Key
Notes report suggests that more ‘traditional' product sectors such as frozen
vegetables, meat, poultry and fish have experienced more limited growth,with newer ‘value-added’ products such as ready-meals experiencing far fastergrowth in sales. Here, for example, frozen pizza sales have grown by 48 percent in 1994–9 while frozen vegetarian foods have grown by 35 per cent overthe same period.
Figures for the consumption of chilled foods are more difficult to esti-
mate, and vary wildly depending on what products are included in theestimates. Some estimates include such products as yoghurts and cheeses andprepared salads. If estimates are confined only to chilled versions of estab-lished frozen convenience foods (chilled ready-meals, pizza and pasta, etc.),the figure for UK sales has been estimated to be currently in the region of £4billion. However, despite the lack of accurate figures, there is little doubtthat the chilled food sector has expanded remarkably both within the UK aswell as within Europe in recent years.
Given the size and growth of the frozen and chilled food market in Europe,
it is not hard to see why Perkins Foods have enjoyed considerable success inrecent years. However, like all food sectors, the frozen and chilled foods marketis an extremely competitive one, particularly for producers and suppliers. To besuccessful, firms need to ensure rigorous quality standards, constant productinnovation as well as needing to build strong relationships with the majorretailers who increasingly dominate the consumer market place.
Perkins’ growth strategy
Many medium-sized and larger parent groups in the food industry have oftenacquired companies in order to obtain assets, facilities, brands and marketpositions, shaping or absorbing their acquisitions into their existing profileand culture. Perkins set itself up to be an acquisitor not as an end in itself, butin order to construct a group to grow and compete with the most powerful inEurope. It set out to achieve this goal by identifying and acquiring companiesproviding it with:
• a variety of product sector coverage of interest to European multiple
retailers;
• expertise in the production/sale of satisfying products across those
sectors;
• sound respective market knowledge and management skills towards the
profitable manufacture and sale of these products;
• high quality manufacturing and new product development (NPD) facil-
ities with potential for expansion and positive return on investment.Perkins Foods: PR in a European food business 53

Perkins who?
This initial strategy for the construction and success of the group had two
very distinct consequences in public relations and marketing communica-tions terms:
1 Perkins Foods PLC very quickly acquired a strong reputation in the City
– as a skilled acquisitive group with lean and efficient management struc-
ture and good prospects for shareholders but . . . a low level physical
presence coupled with acknowledged City skills did not give it a clearreputation as a food business.
2 Perkins Foods companies retained their existing identities as good com-
panies in their respective product sectors, but. . . they were not clearly
badged as Perkins Foods companies, and their positive reputations as foodmanufacturers and suppliers was not transferred to Perkins Foods PLC.
Perkins’ determination to buy viable food businesses and to construct anexpert, customer-led European food group, had enabled it to become a gen-uinely skilled food business. However, doing the right thing is often notenough. Being seen to be doing the right thing can be an essential manage-
ment tool in maintaining corporate success. For this reason, public relationsneeded to be treated as far more than window dressing or ‘spin’.
A few years into the so far short yet successful history of Perkins Foods, it
was recognised that public relations had an important role to play.
Public relations strategy
Having recognised that Perkins Foods had not established a reputation as a
‘hands-on’ food business, the company recognised the need for a strategi-cally orientated public relations campaign. In other words, Perkinsconsciously avoided the common mistake of pursuing the broad objective of‘raising awareness’, despite the obvious conclusion that a straightforwardlack of awareness in the wider trade environment presented a problem.
From the outset (in 1991) in considering a public relations strategy, it was
accepted that all communications (public relations and marketing communi-cations) should be carefully aligned with, and integral to, the company’scorporate and commercial strategy. Having carefully constructed a group oftrusted, expert food businesses in tune with European retail markets, it wasrecognised that any campaign to raise Perkins’ profile should be based on thecore values that comprised Perkins’ identity.
Tactics: preaching to the converted
The initial public relations campaign for Perkins Foods PLC had a ready-
made audience in the grocery and food trade press that serves its markets, and54 David Davies and Danny Moss

in many cases they were aware of the existence, activities and reputation of
Perkins’ member companies. The task for PR was to place a Perkins ‘brand-ing’ on this awareness – that a success for a Perkins company was a successfor, and because of, Perkins Foods and the way it does business.
This media audience was also largely concentrated in the business-to-
business sector. Perkins was and is primarily interested in the retail own-labelsector, so there is little need to raise a public or consumer profile. Not only isthere no ‘profit’ in this, with very few Perkins’ branded products in the marketplace, but also most major multiple retail customers would prefer their sup-pliers to actively avoid a strong consumer profile. A retailer prefers itscustomers to perceive a product bearing its name to be ‘all its own work’, andto protect relationships with its suppliers with as much anonymity as possible.
As pointed out, Perkins Foods had built up a portfolio of companies across
a wide range of product categories, chosen in simple terms because they didthings the ‘right way’. Creating a stronger corporate profile for the group asa whole meant promoting the activities of of these companies as essentially‘The Perkins Way’. This created a symbiotic relationship demonstratedthrough trade media, in which good products, practices and service byPerkins’ member companies showed Perkins Foods PLC to be a skilled andprofessional food business. At the same time, those individual companies
could greatly enhance their existing reputations in the trade by being seen tohave the gravitas of a progressive, growing and increasingly successful PLC
behind them – with all the investment, development and positive collaborativepotential implied therein.
In practical terms, the public relations campaign for Perkins Foods did not
involve remarkable activities. It comprised: product launch press releases;personnel appointment press releases; factory, production line or QA facilityinvestment stories; inclusion in trade press previews and reviews of majortrade exhibitions; regular articles within trade press scheduled features on rel-evant product sectors, such as meat products, ready meals, pizza and pasta,and so on. These fairly traditional, trade PR mechanisms were used, however,to support corporate PR objectives, in terms of the consistent themes appliedto them.
The coverage received by Perkins Foods has been quite varied in terms of
its extent, subject matter and media involved, but all of the articles in thepress were negotiated and written (some fully prepared for the publications,and some based on information supplied, by the publication), with the con-scious objective of reflecting key strategic messages about Perkins Foods,i.e., the range of specialised convenience food manufacturers within thegroup; the emphasis on continuous development of customer-orientatedquality frozen and chilled convenience foods; a clear strategic focus on thefrozen and chilled convenience sectors; Perkins’ understanding of, and con-certed service provision to, multiple retail and food service customers.
Whatever their specific content, press materials would stress the concept of
‘The Perkins Way’, the principal elements of which comprised: technical andPerkins Foods: PR in a European food business 55

product knowledge; investment in leading edge technology; cross-fertilisation
of skills and ideas across the major European markets; understanding ofretail customer (and consumer) needs; partnership working methods withcustomers. Here key personnel from both the parent group and member com-panies would be quoted at every opportunity, to apply a human face to theseprinciples, and to demonstrate that the parent group and Perkins membercompanies thought and acted as one.
Another consequence of Perkins’ low ‘point of sale’ presence has been
very limited advertising activity. Some trade advertising appears in key tradedirectories and media, but chiefly as a public relations more than purelyadvertising mechanism – demonstrating support by an important player forits market place and media, more than seeking a commercial response.
Perkins’ advertising, as well as exhibition presences and group and divi-
sional brochure materials, have all been devised, written and produced to beconsistent with the PR programme. In this sense, public relations took thelead in setting the tone and emphasis for other market-related communica-tions activities. Examples include an A5 folder-and-insert format brochurelaunched at London’s IFE exhibition, and a set of full colour brochure insertsincluded in a presentation leather Filofax offered to key buyers and Cityanalysts to mark the millennium.
Evolution – focus on convenience
Perkins Foods is still a relatively young food group, but it has changed sub-stantially over the past twelve years. Strategic change, most notably in termsof the disposal of some of its member companies and the acquisition of newones, has taken place as the evolution of its original purpose and ethos – notas a reaction to error or as any kind of U-turn in its mission or philosophy.
Companies have been acquired regularly by Perkins over the last seven
years, again on the original basis of strong existing people, products, facilitiesand practices. The pattern of acquisitions has not signalled any significantchange of direction in the company’s strategy. However, Perkins’ more recentdisposal of its fresh produce division and its move into markets apart fromown-label retail products, most notably the food service sector in 1999, haveraised some eyebrows in the retail and food industries and in the City.
In 1996 it was decided to dispose of the UK-based Speciality Seafoods
business, and of two companies processing mushrooms in various packagedforms. This was not as a result of their performance; the seafood business inparticular was extremely successful, and still is, in supplying exotic fish andseafoods for supermarket fresh fish counters. Neither was compatible with thedynamics of the increasingly successful convenience foods businesses. Morethan a dozen of these businesses, operating in five countries, were workingwell together, sharing expertise and market knowledge and even combiningproducts to meet specific new opportunities. The seafood and mushroombusinesses did not effectively fit into this pattern.56 David Davies and Danny Moss

The evolution of Perkins Foods as a modern frozen and chilled conve-
nience foods business by the end of 1997 suggested the logic of disposing of
its Dutch-based interests in fresh produce (sold for £33.6 million to GreeneryInternational). The Fresh Produce Division was a major importer and sup-plier of high quality fruit and vegetables to European supermarkets, but thisis a very different business from convenience food manufacture and sales. Itsdisposal presented a sizeable PR challenge, as in the first half of 1998 itreduced the turnover of Perkins Foods PLC by almost 30 per cent, to £240.9million. Thus, in handling the news of this disposal, great care had to betaken to communicate to the City that the move was entirely in line with thegroup’s evolving business strategy.
This presented an excellent example of ‘background’ public relations effects
in one area of media supporting the impressions created in another. Coveragein food, retail and grocery trade press explaining the disposal in terms of astrategic business focus on the thriving and rapidly increasing sectors of frozenand chilled foods were viewed in City circles as convincing evidence of clearbusiness thinking on the part of the PLC. Analysts are perhaps more likely totake a cynical view of this focus being explained through direct briefings andcoverage in the financial press (although this is also important) on a ‘theywould say that, wouldn’t they’ basis, than they are of positive coverage of thiskind in core trade press. Analysts do follow the relevant trade press closely forcorroborative evidence of a listed company’s strategic thinking and actions,and this information route was covered by Perkins’ City PR specialist, SquareMile Public Relations, quoting trade press coverage generated by trade PRconsultant David Davies, in dealings with financial audiences.
Positively, the disposal of the fresh produce business enabled Perkins to
post a £33.6 million pre-tax profit on the sale after writing off £46 million ofgoodwill, previously charged against its reserves. This windfall profit resultedin a trebling of Perkins’ earnings per share (29.7p compared with 9.7p in1997), although basic earnings per share, excluding the profits of the disposal,were slightly lower than the previous year. This was due mainly to currencymovements and the effects of adverse weather and poor Christmas trading inthe UK.
Following the sale of the fresh produce division, Perkins made a number of
acquisitions to strengthen its core business including, among others, compa-nies manufacturing international high quality ready meals and premiumchilled sandwich fillings, pickles and relishes.
A feature of Perkins’ growth strategy has been its move into new market
sectors, in particular in the food service sector. Here Perkins has utilised theexpertise, skills and products from within its remaining convenience foodactivities to form a UK-based specialist division serving major food servicecustomers with products (uniquely with frozen and chilled products) from
throughout the Perkins group. At the same time, a French-based initiativecombining the products of four Perkins companies in three countries haslaunched a specialised service for the international in-flight catering sector.Perkins Foods: PR in a European food business 57

These developments have been part of a carefully thought out evolutionary
strategy, rather than simply opportunist tactics. Here public relations has
played a vital role in communicating Perkins’ strategy to these new marketsand the established retail sector, where loyalty must be preserved. The keytask for public relations activity has been to portray Perkins, accurately, as amajor European, customer-led convenience foods group, and a recipe forcontinuing success.
The launch of Perkins Foodservice is a case in point. Having presented
itself consistently as something of a specialist in the multiple retail sector, notleast in own-label foods, this move could have been seen as a ‘U-turn’, or asevidence that perhaps modest success in the retail sector needed to be sup-plemented by a move into food service. The rationale, explained throughtrade publicity and complementary brochure work and trade advertising,was that the food service sector has evolved from a basic ‘manufacturer–wholesaler–caterer’ chain, to professional customer-oriented product andservice provision. The major food service customers therefore serve theirmarkets in a very similar way to the leading retailers, based on consistency,efficiency, quality and value, in turn relying upon sophisticated managementcontrol. Perkins’ pedigree was in fact ideal to command the kind of expertiseand knowledge necessary to meet the needs of these modern food service cus-tomers, indeed as the only truly integrated European group providing a vastrange of (uniquely) frozen and chilled products all manufactured within a
single group. This was the tone of the public relations activity launchingPerkins Foodservice.
Perkins expertise and customer partnerships – ‘Recipes
for Success’
Retailer own-labels may have been born as cheaper alternatives to TV-
advertised proprietary brands, but over the last ten years or so they have beendeveloped more as brands in their own right – competing with the brands onquality, convenience, innovation and interest more than on price. The majormultiples are now major spenders on TV advertising designed to promotetheir brand name, with separate, self-proclaiming economy alternatives estab-lished, such as Tesco’s ‘Value’ and Kwik Save’s ‘No Frills’ brands. Perkins hasfrom the outset been unashamed about its role as an own-label manufacturer,and this has been central to its PR profile throughout the 1990s.
The challenges presented by the modern own-brand environment in terms
of developing products that can compete with established brands for qualityand value for money, as well as satisfying the rigorous demands of dominantmultiple retailers, have been addressed by Perkins Foods by strengthening itsproduct development teams and continuously introducing new ranges of con-venience products. Here for example, Perkins has strengthened its teams offood technologists and chefs in the UK, Holland, Luxembourg, Germanyand France. Indeed, the French team includes a Michelin Star Chef. Recent58 David Davies and Danny Moss

own-label successes include the launch of a range of frozen English Fruit
Crumbles into France and a variety of restaurant-quality chilled completeMeal Solutions, such as Beef Bourguignon and Chicken Chasseur, in UKsupermarkets.
Another popular assumption about the own-label sector is that it conve-
niently avoids brand support costs, but Perkins argues that this enablesinvestment to be channelled into the evolution of convenience food develop-ment and manufacturing. Perkins has continued to invest in manufacturingfacilities and technologies, as well as supporting retail customers’ promo-tional costs. Regular unannounced factory audits are an accepted part ofthe working life of the modern own-label manufacturer, and the highest pos-sible standards have to be maintained at all times.
Nor is the own-label sector governed by a single set of considerations.
Operating across a number of European markets, different consumer atti-tudes come into play. Product quality, convenience and innovation topconsumer ‘wish lists’ in the UK and France, but in Germany, people stillseek out own-label products with price primarily in mind. This is perpetuatedand accentuated by the strength of the hard discounters in Germany.
The move from own-label towards own-brand has also brought the impor-
tance of packaging into focus. This was one area in which earlier ‘cheaperalternative’ own-label products could save on costs, but today the strength ofdesign and quality of photography and materials used are as important inown-label as in proprietary brands. Focus group research is now as commonin Perkins Foods’ own-label product development, including packaging, as itis in branded products.
Discussions about new products are invariably two-way, with both parties
drawing on a wealth of expertise in sourcing, technology, QA, logistics, mar-keting, merchandising and a vital understanding of consumer attitudes andtrends.
The process described above, of own-label evolving into own retailer’s
brand, has provided Perkins Foods with tremendous business opportunitiesover more than a decade. Many food manufacturers claim to work ‘in part-nership’ with their customers, but this is really the only way to succeed in theown-label environment of the late 1990s. For Perkins Foods, by the mid-1990s the single most important factor in its business strategy has been toapply the best possible technology and skills, via detailed understanding ofcustomers and their markets, to partnership working methods alongsideEurope’s biggest retail and food service customers.
This emphasis in Perkins Foods’ strategy is in effect its Recipes for Success,
and it is clearly visible in every strand and element in the company’s PR-dominated (marketing) communications strategy (see Figure 4.1). It is astrategy which has been of vital support to the commercial performance ofPerkins Foods, and the continued success of its City profile. Moreover, it is astrategy which is continuously evolving in order to provide that support as thecompany approached its thirteenth year, and a new millennium.Perkins Foods: PR in a European food business 59

As all of Perkins’ communications activities have been formulated and
executed, from a single cohesive ‘brand essence’ and positioning, a strapline
has emerged to sum up Perkins’ strengths within the convenience foodsenvironment. This strapline is used consistently through all marketing com-munications materials and activities to sum what makes Perkins Foods ‘tick’.
All Perkins products are now chef-developed and recipe-based convenience
foods. Hence, recipes for success. The key elements characterising PerkinsFoods’ professional offer – expert personnel, the latest technology, NPDskills, quality assurance, customer and market understanding, integrationacross companies and countries – also represent a recipe for success. Finally,Perkins Foods’ unrivalled commitment and ability to work in partnershipwith customers to develop and provide products their customers want to buyare its ultimate recipe for success.
Everything the company does, and everything it says through its public
relations and marketing communications strategies, observes and communi-cates the ingredients which combine to make – Perkins Foods – Recipes forSuccess.60 David Davies and Danny Moss
Figure 4.1 Perkins Foods Annual Report: Recipes for Success.

Lessons learned
This case highlights the fundamental principle that there is little point in
attempting to portray a company in ways that do not reflect the reality ofthe business. Indeed, to attempt to do so could be counter-productive. If thedesired profile for the business to be communicated does not reflect the real-ity of the business, then the reality must be changed. Public relationspractice can never make any organisation effective in its field, but it can bea flexible and hard-working support to communicating its effectiveness,and by increasing receptiveness to that message, a positive aid to continuingsuccess.
This case also illustrates the importance, particularly in today’s highly
competitive consumer markets, of effectively integrating all marketing andpublic relations activities so as to achieve a coherent and mutually sup-portive communications strategy that serves the commercial goals of thebusiness. Here debates about the dividing line between public relations andmarketing can be seen as a somewhat futile exercise, particularly when con-sidering the roles that these two functions may play in the commercialmarket context.
This is not to say that marketing and public relations are the same func-
tion, nor should it be assumed that the two functions work in precisely thesame way. Rather, the point here is that public relations can serve as ahighly effective complement to more conventional marketing techniques,extending the reach of marketing, elaborating its message and preparing theground for more overt marketing and sales activity by building the corpo-rate profile and credibility of the organisation in question. Effective andrealistic public relations activity can render a market place more readilyreceptive to a compatible and consistent marketing effort, and therebyimprove the environment in which the company in question then sells itsproducts.
Creatively, the case also highlights the importance of developing a power-
ful and consistent theme that can be carried through all communicationsactivities. In this case, the concept of Perkins ‘Recipes for Success’ summedup and captured the essential driving force behind the company’s successformula.
A further key lesson that the case illustrates is that in a European or inter-
national context, public relations can prove an invaluable tool in promotingdialogue and greater understanding of a business within quite culturally dif-ferent markets. In the case of Perkins Foods, which operates across fiveEuropean countries, it is essential to ensure that there is a clear understand-ing of the core values that account for the corporate success of the business,while at the same time remaining sensitive to cultural differences in the way itpromotes itself and its products. Here, identifying a strong and yet simplecommunications theme that can be applied readily across different countriesand cultures is often the key to success.Perkins Foods: PR in a European food business 61

Notes
1 Estimates taken from European Frozen Food Economy 1997, Quick Frozen Foods
International.
2 Ibid.
3Key Notes (1994), UK Frozen Food Market.62 David Davies and Danny Moss

Case 5 The journey to
demutualization
Clarica’s internal
communications challenge
Craig S. Fleisher and Paula Hendsbee
Introduction
This case describes the internal communication and change management
challenges faced by Clarica Life Insurance Company, the first majorCanadian mutual insurance company to convert from a mutual company toa publicly held company. While the change process is far from complete(Clarica was listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange on 21 July 1999), this casewill outline the challenges of communicating with and engaging a large, dis-persed internal audience during a complex, unprecedented wave of corporatechange.
Although the demutualization process created a two-year communication
challenge and, in fact, continues to present communication challenges andopportunities internally and externally even after implementation, this casewill focus on the internal communication challenges (employees and agents)during the final six months of the process which occurred between Januaryand June 1999.
Background
On 8 December 1997, Mutual Life of Canada1 made history in the Canadian
life insurance industry by announcing its intention to seek policyholder andregulatory approval to go public – known in the industry as the process ofdemutualization. The first large Canadian mutual insurer to chart this course,Figure 5.1 Clarica logo.

Mutual (now Clarica Life Insurance Company) was also the first mutual life
insurance company in Canada, commencing business in 1870, growing froma small provider of life insurance into one of Canada’s major financial ser-vices companies. Today, one in ten Canadians is a Clarica customer. Thesecustomers are served by Clarica’s sales force of 3,000 and staff of 4,000.Clarica also has a US operation.
Why demutualization?
Mutual companies are owned by their participating policyholders, not share-holders. Unlike shareholders, however, those policyholders cannot trade orexchange their ownership rights. Mutual companies can only raise capitalthrough preferred shares, debt or by using internally generated funds.Demutualization presented a singular opportunity for Mutual to add musclein the intensifying competition for customers. It was not an end but a means –a way to transform the company and take it into a higher league.
In Mutual Life’s case, demutualization was a way to unlock the value in the
company and clarify the ownership rights of the participating policyholdersby giving them shares in the company, which they could hold or sell. Thecompany’s mission for 130 years was to maximize value for policyholders,who were also the owners. When demutualization was made possible throughregulatory change, the company determined that changing its structure anddistributing the accumulated value of the company to eligible policyholderswas the best way to deliver on that mission.
The stock company structure would also afford the company greater flex-
ibility in raising capital to increase its ability to participate in industryconsolidation, invest in technology and research, and develop products tomeet changing customer needs.
As for the demutualization process itself, the company had to develop a
demutualization plan and have it approved by its board of directors andindependent actuaries. It also had to receive approval from regulators as wellas the Superintendent of Financial Institutions in the Canadian capital ofOttawa. Next, as part of a larger communication plan, the company had tosend every policyholder a statement and prospectus outlining the processand the proposal. Policyholders then had an opportunity to vote on the planand the company had to receive two-thirds majority of the votes cast. Finally,the Minister of Finance had to approve the plan and then the company couldbe listed on a stock exchange. This whole process took nearly two years tocomplete.
External implications of demutualization
The global trend towards demutualization created broad implications
for Canada, the life insurance industry and the future financial serviceslandscape. Canada experienced a tidal wave of share ownership during64 Craig S. Fleisher and Paula Hendsbee

1999–2000. In addition to Clarica, four other Canadian mutual companies
announced their intentions to demutualize. In 1999 and 2000, Canada expe-rienced a tidal wave of share ownership as a result of demutualization. Inaddition to Clarica, four other Canadian mutual companies demutualized.Estimates in 1999 suggested that demutualization would place some $10 bil-lion dollars into the hands of 2 million Canadian policyholders who wouldbecome shareholders. This would represent the largest distribution of wealthin Canadian history, with billions of dollars of share capital placed in thehands or the control of individuals who would wield considerable purchasingpower and investment clout.
Projections showed that these demutualizations would add 0.3 per cent to
the country’s real economic growth, potentially generating 10,000 to 12,000new jobs in the 18 months following demutualization. Tax revenue wouldincrease by $1 billion – good economic news for Canada.
Internal implications of demutualization
The conversion from a mutual company to a stock company and from
Mutual Life to Clarica created an internal cultural shift with numerous inter-nal implications. The seven organizational implications of demutualizationshown below are considered to be the most important:
1 Change in structure.
2 New owners and stakeholders.3 New name and brand.4 Changing policies/practices.5 Change in several major business processes.6 Increased emphasis on business performance, financial performance and
risk management.
7 Increased emphasis on employee ownership.
These seven shifts and their implications for internal communication are
described more fully below.
Shift 1: Change in ownership structure
Critical implications for internal communication included the following.
Although Mutual Life’s market share was quite large (market share of pre-mium income was at the time close to 16 per cent in individual life insuranceand over 10 per cent in group insurance, earning the company second place inCanadian individual and group insurance combined), there was relativelylittle ‘market presence’. In fact, research confirmed that the name ‘Mutual’caused confusion in the marketplace, with both mutual fund providers andthe scores of other companies with ‘mutual’ in their names. Research alsoconfirmed that consumer awareness of both ‘The Mutual Group’ and‘Mutual Life’ was relatively low.Clarica: internal communications challenge 65

Most of the company’s presence was achieved through sales efforts as
opposed to being accomplished through reputation, advertising and
promotional efforts. Because it became public and opened itself up to thescrutiny of a whole wave of new stakeholders who had different interestsfrom those who were only policyholders in the past, communication effortswent from being primarily internally to externally oriented. It also requiredthe company and its communication effort to move from being reactive toproactive in terms of meeting evolving marketplace demands and trends.
As a public company, the Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO) external pres-
ence needed to increase significantly. Since demutualization, the companynow needs to balance his external and internal roles. The Chief FinancialOfficer (CFO) now plays a significant external role as opposed to the formalrole that used to be primarily internal management of the company’sfinances. Clarica now also has a newly established role of Vice-President ofInvestor Relations, who works closely with Corporate Communications.
Shift 2: New owners and stakeholders
The newly public company needed to build a good relationship with investors
and the investment community in ways that didn’t exist before. This requiredthe company to quickly come ‘up to speed’ with the communication needsand preferences of a stakeholder group that previously was not in the com-munication set.
Becoming a publicly traded company increased the need for business and
financial literacy among employees. The company also needed to communi-cate initially and in an ongoing manner about new stock company policiessuch as insider trading and disclosure. People also had to be more aware ofbusiness performance. This is currently being facilitated through a businessperformance measurement initiative, which assesses financial and non-finan-cial performance measures each quarter. The company’s business plan andgoals must also be crystal clear to people so they know how their actions androles affect the company’s performance.
The company also experienced an unprecedented increase in media atten-
tion. As a mutual company, employees had been mostly insulated from mediaattention. During demutualization, local media in the headquarters city ofWaterloo, Ontario, in particular, was rather critical of some of the company’sactions and even engaged in what some observers perceived to be criticalattacks on the CEO. This change in company–media interaction meant thatemployees needed to become more ‘media literate’. They had to understandthe reasons why the company responded in the fashion they did or didn’t, asthe case might be. One change this created was the new need to share moremedia and external information with employees. One benefit of the increasedmedia attention, which on a national basis was predominantly positive, wasthat it created many internal communication opportunities and helped buildpride in the organization as an industry leader.66 Craig S. Fleisher and Paula Hendsbee

Shift 3: New name and brand
The company introduced a new name and brand at the same time as the
conversion to a public company. This change made sense for several reasons:
• Government regulations suggested the company should consider chang-
ing its name when it demutualized, to ensure it was described accurately
as a stock company.
• A new name would reflect the company’s new reality.• Research confirmed that ‘Mutual’ caused some confusion in the market-
place – with both mutual fund providers and the scores of othercompanies with ‘mutual’ in their names.
• Research indicated that consumer awareness of both ‘The Mutual
Group’ and ‘Mutual Life’ was relatively low.
• A strong brand would help differentiate the company from its competi-
tors and would support continued business growth.
The change of name and introduction of a corporate branding strategy cre-ated a huge communication challenge because it was extremely emotional forstaff and agents and required substantial changes in attitude and behaviour.This included everything from how employees answered the phone to adver-tising and promoting the company in entirely new ways.
As part of its internal branding strategy, Clarica launched a ‘plain lan-
guage’ initiative to ensure that communication supported Clarica’s brandpromise of ‘clarity through dialogue’. The company also had to establish anew advertising presence. For many years, it had no national focus on adver-tising. This created the need for consistency, which meant that agents neededto change the process of how they advertised in their local communities.
Shift 4: Changing policies/practices
Because it had now become a publicly traded company, the company moved
from the lower level of disclosure required in communicating with its policy-holders to active and frequent disclosure regulations and requirements.Former policyholders now owned stock and would need to understand howtheir newly owned stock was performing.
In light of the shareholder disclosure policy, confidentiality was a new
issue that employees had to wrestle with. For example, the company had tocarefully consider the challenges associated with its sharing of business plansand other forms of critical information. This challenge became even trickierdue to the decentralized nature of the company’s communications systemsand structure. The system made for easy information sharing but involvednew risks, as internal information could easily become external just by asingle keystroke if employees chose to forward electronic mail outside thecompany.Clarica: internal communications challenge 67

Shift 5: Changes in business processes
As may be gathered from the discussion to date, demutualization is a sub-
stantial change that affected the company in its entirety. It created the needfor the company to participate in ongoing change management/change com-munication initiatives. Change has become the norm for employees andcommunication has become all the more important in helping employeesunderstand the many implications of change.
The new emphasis on performance also created the need for much more
rigour around communication. There were entirely new and different sets ofstakeholders to consider and, as a public company, it became more criticalthan ever to ensure internal and external messages were both accurate andconsistent.
Shift 6: Increased emphasis on business performance, financial
performance and risk management
The communication team became involved in providing communication
strategies and frameworks for several initiatives that emanated from demutu-alization. These roles and frameworks had not existed in the past andrequired the team to acquire new knowledge and understanding in order tomake a substantive contribution.
The internal communication team also had a new role in providing
communication counsel to business planning coordinators. This new rolewas mainly to ensure that the business plan was accessible and ‘real’ toemployees.
Shift 7: Increased emphasis on employee ownership
The communications team needed to establish a stronger link and partnership
with the change management/human resources management functionsknown in the company as the Strategic Capabilities unit. This new partner-ship was necessary because of the obvious similarity between the units’objectives. This collaboration streamlined and integrated work that otherwisewould have been done independently.
The Corporate communications department was also required to support
the launch of an assisted share purchase plan. This plan went beyond simplepromotion of share ownership; it was, and continues to be, part of a largereffort to encourage shared ownership (literal and figurative) in the company’sfuture.
Research
Little internal communication research existed prior to January 1999 as theCorporate Communications function had not included dedicated internal68 Craig S. Fleisher and Paula Hendsbee

communications resources due to significant downsizing and restructuring in
1995–96. In addition, the decentralized nature of communication in theorganization meant that many related initiatives were separately managedand separately communicated.
Once an internal corporate communications function was established in
early 1999, integration of strategic internal messages became the top priority.
Goals and objectives
Viewing the multiple change initiatives as an integrated whole, the majorgoals and objectives were to:
• create a consistent and integrated communication engine with key mes-
sages, a common theme, and a common look and feel in order to
demonstrate integration and linkages of key activities and changes;
• define the accountabilities and capabilities required to support the trans-
formation of Mutual to Clarica;
• ensure all members of the firm understand how they create shareholder
value, deliver the brand and can participate to achieve the vision ofClarica.
Target audiences
The key internal audiences were identified as:
1 Canadian employees – Approximately 3,200 of Clarica’s 4,000 employees
are based in Waterloo, Ontario, at the company’s corporate head office.
The remaining 800 are based in Ottawa, Montreal, and in branch officesacross Canada.
2 Canadian sales force – Clarica has one of the largest exclusive distribu-
tion channels in the Canadian insurance industry, with 3,000 career salesagents and managers. Unlike many insurance companies, this sales forcesells only Clarica products. In addition, Clarica’s unique commissionstructure rewards agents for developing and maintaining long-term rela-tionships with clients.
3 US employees – The company’s US operations (200 people in two main
locations) did not adopt the Clarica name until December 1999; as aresult, communication needs for this audience were very different. TheUS communications staff advised Corporate Communications on how tomodify messages to ensure that the US staff felt included and customizedmany of the broad corporate messages themselves. US staff were, how-ever, included in company celebrations, major announcements and CEOmessages to ensure they felt included in the process.Clarica: internal communications challenge 69

Key messages
The following key messages directed and guided all communication activities
in 1999:
• To know where you are going, you need to know where you’ve been.
• We know what we stand for, as defined by our values and our service history.• We have provided investment and insurance solutions since 1870. We
have a strong foundation.
• The changes proposed by demutualization will help us to provide greater
value to our customers and owners.
• We know what is required of us, as defined through dialogue with our
customers and owners.
• We’re up to the challenge: we’ve done our homework, our research, and
We have the resources in place to deliver on our promise.
• Our new name/company will deliver value to our customers (and thereby
shareholders): there will be less confusion about who we are, what weoffer, how we work, and where to go for clear solutions.
• As a stock company, we will have greater flexibility for growth (i.e.,
through access to capital).
• We will continue to change to respond to the changing environment
and our customers’/owners’ needs.
• In order to deliver on our brand promise to our customers and owners,
we will focus on making sure that our processes and business decisionsare driven by the needs of the customer and produce returns for the shareholder.
In addition to these key messages, specific messages were developed for eachmajor corporate initiative to ensure message consistency and integration.
All activities were aimed at building awareness, understanding and com-
mitment within the organization, based on the above key messages.
Main elements of the communications strategy including
target media
Although the list of communication activities is far too long to detail here,
among the most essential elements were the following.
Timely, accessible communication
• development of active intranet sites for the staff and sales force intranets;
• an Internet-based stock-market simulation, aimed at increasing stock-
market awareness and creating a rallying point that led up to thepolicyholder vote on demutualization (Waterloo and Ottawa staff only);70 Craig S. Fleisher and Paula Hendsbee

• an electronic feedback box linked to CEO messages that allowed employ-
ees and agents to write back directly to the CEO – received hundreds of
responses;
• development of a customized electronic newsletter for the sales force
specifically for messages relating to demutualization, name and brand;
• development of a News Alert – an electronic news release sent to all
staff and agents simultaneous to an external news release.
Brand and name communication
• a simultaneous, North America-wide official announcement of the
intended name communicated to all staff, sales force and media;
• videos, print materials, information kits and face-to-face communica-
tion through Branch Champions in each area of the business.
Demutualization/initial public offering communication• communication of all major demutualization milestones (see schedule
below; steps 3–7; all staff and sales force) through electronic messaging,
leveraging of external publicity and other creative means;
• a series of change communication publications (called ‘Focus On’) focus-
ing on emerging business issues related to demutualization provided tothe staff and sales force;
• two major employee rallies combining comedy, entertainment and
education;
• face-to-face engagement sessions reaching more than 1,000 staff and
hundreds of agents and branch managers, to allow for learning and dia-logue about the changes facing the company
Schedule
All communication activities in 1999 were geared to Clarica’s initial publicoffering (IPO) date, the same date as the official name change. Due to govern-ment legislation issues, pending policyholder approval and market conditions,this date was not set until literally days before the event; however, communica-tion planning was based on a tentative July 1999 target date along with severalkey milestones, positioned to audiences as the ‘Route to Demute’:
1 Develop the demutualization principles and obtain policyholder input
(achieved in October 1998).
2 Finalize the plan and obtain Board approval (achieved in March 1999).
3 Obtain regulator approval to mail the Special Guide for policyholders
(achieved on 12 April 1999).
4 Print and mail the Special Guide for policyholders (achieved on 26 April
1999).Clarica: internal communications challenge 71

5 Hold the Special Meeting for policyholders (achieved on 10 June 1999).
6 Obtain the approval of the Minister of Finance (achieved on 14 July 1999).7 Conversion, distribution and listing of shares (achieved on 21 July 1999).
Steps 1 and 2 were already complete at the beginning of the phase of com-
munication described in this case study.
Evaluation of results
In September 1999, Corporate Communications conducted an evaluation ofthe effectiveness of these initiatives to date through an employee survey. Anagent survey was also put in progress (results pending).
The employee survey, conducted on a random selection basis with 10 per
cent of staff, was designed to answer four key questions:
1 Do employees perceive that the CEO and management communicate
critical business information to them on a regular basis?
2 Is leadership and manager communication working to the extent that
employees understand key business concepts?
3 Do employees know how to apply that knowledge to do their job?
4 Do employees understand the company’s vision and direction?
Because Corporate Communications mainly supports the communication
needs of the CEO and leadership team, this survey focused predominantly onleadership communication. From the results, Corporate Communicationsmade the following key observations:
• 97 per cent of staff surveyed believed that the CEO and his leadership
team communicated relevant, important business information.
• 96 per cent of staff surveyed believed that the CEO and leadership team
usually explained or provided context for the organization’s direction
and/or business decisions.
• 89 per cent of staff surveyed believed that the CEO and leadership team
communicated a realistic picture of the company and/or industry.
• 94 per cent of staff surveyed indicated they felt comfortable raising issues
and sharing business concerns with their supervisors.
• 87 per cent of staff surveyed were aware of channels for sharing their
thoughts and concerns with management.
• 91 per cent of staff surveyed indicated they had a good understanding of
Clarica’s business goals and vision.
• 88 per cent of staff surveyed indicated they recognized ways in which they
could personally contribute to the company’s business goals and vision.
Additional evaluation has been ongoing in the form of assessing communi-cation over the company’s intranet, garnering feedback from the executive72 Craig S. Fleisher and Paula Hendsbee

management team, and conducting a self-evaluation of the initiatives against
predetermined objectives.
Lessons learned
Based on this communication initiative, Clarica’s Corporate Communicationsteam learned several key lessons that can be applied by other organizationsembarking on large change communication ventures:
1 When communicating major change, messages must be integrated and
consistent. There is significant financial and reputation risk resulting
from lack of internal and external message integration. This risk, and thechallenge, are even greater for organizations with decentralized commu-nication processes and structures.
2 The CEO and management team must speak with one voice from one
message platform. This lesson is critical, as audiences rarely distinguishbetween the source and intended receivers of the message. In addition, tounderstand change, internal audiences must hear repeatedly the intent ofthe change and the expected outcome of the change.
3 The internal audience is a key stakeholder group and must be given
equal, if not more, communication focus during major change. Althoughdemutualization was predominantly an external change (affecting 1 mil-lion policyholders and thousands of new shareholders), it had significantconsequences for employees and agents, who needed to serve as ambas-sadors for the change.
Summary
All long-standing companies eventually go through times of dramatic change.This case described the organizational communication context associatedwith converting from a mutual to a publicly held company. It provided anunderstanding of the range of communication and change managementactions that the company underwent and identified how the employee com-munication context could be managed systematically. Clarica continues toevolve its management of internal communications as it grows comfortablewith its role as a prominent publicly held Canadian company.
Note
1 One major change resulting from demutualization was the change of name from
Mutual Life Insurance Company of Canada to Clarica Life Insurance Company.
Although the company name did not change until after demutualization wascomplete (21 July 1999), we will refer to the company as Clarica for the purposesof this case study.Clarica: internal communications challenge 73

Case 6 Barloworld
Communicating strategic
direction to increaseshareholder value
Jon White
Introduction
The case of Barloworld (also referred to as Barlows), a company head-
quartered in South Africa but operating from its base there around the worldand in a number of business areas, can be looked at in several ways. The caseitself offers some useful insights into issues relating to both strategy devel-opment and the role and management of communication in the setting ofstrategic direction. Second, the case illustrates aspects of consultancy in cor-porate communication and organizational change. It also demonstrates apowerful technique used to help management decision-making groups clarifystrategic directions.
As a management teaching case, the Barloworld case allows readers to put
themselves in the position of the company management group, meeting todiscuss the company’s strategic options and direction.
The company had experienced worldwide change in its operating environ-
ment, as a result of international developments in Asia and Russia, amongothers. In South Africa, it is adapting to changes resulting from social, polit-ical and economic developments. Its performance on the world’s stockmarkets has been disappointing in the past, and its component businesseshave had mixed fortunes in recent years.
Key questions facing Barloworld
At the time the case was written (September 1998) the company was knownas Barlows Ltd and there was a perception among the company’s manage-ment group that the strengths of the company, as a multinational companywith diverse interests, were not being recognized. This was due in part to thefact that the company had not built on its strengths: internally, by communi-cating them to its employees worldwide; and, externally, by communicating aclear sense of the company’s nature and direction to important groups suchas political decision-makers in South Africa, and the investment communityin South Africa and elsewhere.
Examining the situation that Barloworld faced at the time led to a number

of important questions being identified, all having significant implications for
the management of communication by the company:
• What was the company’s strategic focus/intent? What would its brand
stand for?
• What were its strategic options – divestment and concentration on strong
businesses within the company’s portfolio? Organic growth? Acquisition?
Use of resources to build entirely new business interests?
• How could the management team organize and use company resources
to plan for the future, and how could plans be made to work?
• What changes in management style and approaches might be necessary
to lead the company into the future?
• Are there advantages to a South African approach to management of an
international company?
• What steps can companies like Barloworld take to ensure that they have
an adequate pool from which they can draw managers qualified for inter-national management?
• Was the company’s emphasis on globalization and the pursuit of business
interests around the world realistic, and – if it was – how could the com-pany continue this process (for example, by re-siting the companyheadquarters in another business centre, such as London)?
• Were further changes necessary in company structure and interests – for
example, should the company’s eight constituent businesses be rational-ized into a smaller number of businesses? What might the arguments forand against rationalization be?
Further questions arose relating directly to the role of communication:
• What might the role of communication be in developing the company’s
assets of intellectual and emotional capital, with groups inside and out-
side the organization?
• Considering the role of communication, what might some of the key
messages about the company be, and how could these be sustained incommunication with employees and external groups, such as the invest-ment community, customers, the media and the community?
• Would employees understand and support a new brand positioning and
believe in their ability to deliver it?
The consultancy role
The case also illustrates the consultancy process at work. Here consultancypractice can be seen to involve a number of defined phases:
• Entry into the consultant–client relationship.
• A ‘contract’ phase, involving negotiation and agreement on work to be
completed during the relationship. This is an important phase, whichBarloworld: communicating strategic direction 75

allows for definition of problems to be explored, exploration of client
commitment to work on solutions to problems identified, and agreementon the results to be achieved as a result of the consultants’ work.
• A ‘work’ phase, during which the activities agreed upon in the second
phase are carried out.
• An ‘exit’ phase, which allows for a natural break in the relationship
between client and consultant, when the client’s requirements have beenmet, and the client can look to the future without prolonging depen-dency on consultancy advice to deal with the problems around which therelationship began. This phase requires careful planning andmanagement.
This case shows how consultants with The Marketing & CommunicationAgency Ltd (MCA) – a principal from the consultancy and an associate –worked with the management group of the company to help them to clarifythe issues they faced, and to develop approaches to dealing with them. Interms of the consultancy process, the two MCA representatives moved onfrom entry into the client–consultancy relationship, to define a programmeof work with the client that would form the basis for change in the clientorganization.
This approach contrasts with other approaches used in corporate commu-
nication consultancy practice, where the client defines the problems to beworked on, and invites consultancies to propose solutions to these problems,often ‘pitching’ their solutions to the client against solutions offered by com-petitor consultancies.
MCA has pioneered the use of a number of techniques in its practice.
Here, as this case shows, the consultancy made use of the case-writingmethod, developed for management teaching at leading business schools, butturned by the consultancy into a technique for helping management identifyand choose strategic options.
The first step in this approach involved writing up a case history and review
of the company’s situation based on:
• research within the company;
• company histories;• interviews with the company’s management group;• outside commentary.
Here the aim was to tell the Barloworld story so that the management group
could see, and reflect on, ‘the story so far’ and the possibilities it contained.In the consultancy’s experience, this case-based approach has proved a pow-erful aid to management decision-making. The case was used at amanagement retreat as part of a two-day discussion to help set strategicdirection for the company.76 Jon White

Facing an uncertain future
Organisations that will succeed in the new era now dawning in South
Africa will be those that are driven by a vision of the future and which takesteps to realign their operations to be appropriate in a global context.
(Introducing Barlows)
We have always had the ability to scan the globe for ideas and businesssystems and implement what works, irrespective of national roots. Andwe have learnt to manage diverse businesses in complex environments.
(Warren Clewlow, chairman and chief executive officer, Barlow
Limited, global management conference, London, July 1997)
Hermansberg is a property owned by the South African multinational com-pany Barloworld on the Drakensberg Escarpment in South Africa, a shortflight by executive aircraft from Johannesburg, where the company has itscorporate headquarters. The property, a working farm set in beautifulscenery, is an ideal location for management retreats, where the company’ssenior management group can take time out to discuss the management andfuture of the company, as well as to relax, fish, and have more informal con-versations. Routinely, the management group, the company’s chairman,senior officers and heads of the company’s eight businesses use Hermansbergfor these meetings.
Meetings at Hermansberg, such as a meeting held in August 1996, have in
the past focused on corporate strategy, as a function of the performanceprospects for the various business units. The meeting planned for the end ofSeptember 1998 took place as developments inside and outside the companyhad given added urgency to the need to examine the company’s overall direc-tion and the way it could be communicated to groups important to thecompany’s future.
Earlier in September, the company had initiated a study of internal and
external communication with the help of MCA who had been invited into thecompany because it had been recognised that the company was not getting itsmessage across to external groups such as investors, or to its own employees.
At the end of the September meeting, the results of MCA ’s work were to be
discussed, to assist in decision-making about directions for the company’sfuture so that these, in turn, could be communicated to external and internalaudiences as effectively as possible. Here discussion focused on such issues as:
• significant features in the situation facing the company at the time of the
September 1998 management meeting;
• developments inside and outside the company;
• the reaction of managers within the company to the initial research of
the communication consultants;Barloworld: communicating strategic direction 77

• the options that emerged from their research, which involved extended
interviews with senior managers from the company’s central office and
component business units.
A key concern of the meeting was to address the question of the way forwardand, in particular, the question: How could strategic direction set by thecompany’s management group be clearly communicated to its employeesaround the world, and to groups outside the company crucial to the futuresuccess of the company? Success in this task, it was believed, could add toshareholder value and build shareholder and employee enthusiasm for theexcitement and what company staff called the ‘magic’ of Barloworld.
The company and its recent history
At the time, the company’s website described the company as:
a South-African based multinational industrial company, whose activitiesinclude the manufacture and distribution of cement, lime, paint, steeltube, building materials, speciality paper products and scientific equip-ment, as well as major dealerships in Caterpillar and Hyster products,and motor vehicle distribution. From its traditional base in southernAfrica, its operations have grown around the world and can be found inNorth America, Europe, Australia and Asia.
This matter-of-fact description hid a company whose fortunes have beenbound into South Africa’s economic, political and social development. Itsleaders have been larger-than-life characters that have left their mark on thecountry. Principal among these was C. S. ‘Punch’ Barlow (so-called becausehe had a sister called Judy), son of the founder of the company. He led thecompany through its growth years and his influence can still be seen in its cul-ture today. He believed in teamwork and in the value of the people whomake up the company. Once, when criticized for giving too much attention tostaff welfare, he suggested that ‘if the staff is happy, the shareholders willreceive dividends they can be happy about’ (C. S. Barlow, 1905–1979).
The company was founded in 1902, as a small trading company in Durban,
but grew through acquisitions and organic expansion until the early 1990s, bywhich time it was a large conglomerate with interests in almost every part ofthe South African economy. It was, in the words of a book describing SouthAfrica’s best companies, ‘one of the biggest, most horizontally diversifiedconglomerates in South Africa, and typified the unfocused South Africangroup of the 1980s’ (The 49 Best Companies to Work for in South Africa ).
In 1993, the company’s board decided to unbundle the company, then
called Barlow Rand, and to dispose of non-core interests in companies suchas CG Smith, Rand Mines, Reunert and RMP Properties. The purpose ofunbundling was to sharpen the company’s focus on its remaining activities.78 Jon White

The decision to unbundle was met with initial approval by investors in the
company, and the investment community as a whole showed its approval byreturning the share price to its pre-unbundling level within two years of thecompany’s restructuring, despite the absence of 60 per cent of the assets thathad been distributed in the unbundling (The 49 Best Companies to Work forin South Africa).
Business units making up the company were restructured, as was the oper-
ational management of the company, a process that took three years to 1997.The company described itself in its 1997 Annual Report as ‘truly a South-
African based multinational’. At this stage the company comprised eightglobal business units, focused on:
• capital equipment;
• cement and lime;• materials handling;• scientific and paper products;• motor dealerships and leasing activities;• paints and coatings;• steel tube production;• building materials.
The scientific and paper products and materials handling divisions were head-
quartered in the United Kingdom and United States, respectively.
In addition to these business divisions, the company also had a major
shareholding – 17 per cent – in a South African-based information technol-ogy company, Persetel Q Data Holdings Limited, which has been expandingrapidly, especially in Europe, according to the company’s 1997 Annual Report.
The company supports its operating divisions through a number of central
functions, including a treasury operation, and also has a worldwide risk man-agement programme.
In all, at the time of writing, the company had around 30,000 employees
around the world and its divisions operated according to their interests andthe opportunities the company had exploited in a number of countries. Thecapital equipment division, for example, operated in southern Africa, Spain,Portugal, Bulgaria and now Siberia in Russia. Cement and lime are marketleaders in South Africa and export to neighbouring countries. Materials han-dling operated in the southeastern United States and Europe, as well as muchof southern Africa. Other divisions had interests in the United Kingdom,Australia and around the world, while the building materials and motor andleasing divisions concentrated their activities in South Africa. By 1997, thecompany’s shares were listed on stock exchanges in Johannesburg, London,Paris, Brussels, Antwerp, Frankfurt, Zurich and Namibia.
By the first half of 1998, just over 50 per cent of earnings for the group
were generated from outside South Africa – offshore sources – as comparedwith 34 per cent in the first half of 1997. Analysts’ estimates were that 40 perBarloworld: communicating strategic direction 79

cent of these earnings came from continental Europe, 25 per cent from the
United States, 10 per cent from Australia and 25 per cent from the UnitedKingdom.
Despite the success of unbundling, the company had been unable to find a
satisfactory way of describing the new company, so as to be able to commu-nicate a new vision of the company to employees and to important groupsoutside the company, such as the investment community. Most of the seniormanagement group of the company rejected the widely held view that the neworganization was still a conglomerate. For several years, company literaturehad described the restructured company’s activities as ‘closely linked to infra-structural development’ (interview with Warren Clewlow, company chairman,Introducing Barlows ), or ‘focused principally on infrastructural development’
(Annual Report, 1996).
By 1997, the limitations of this description had become apparent. The
company’s annual report for 1997 referred to the company’s activities in moregeneral terms, talking of its global strategic aims to deliver products to cus-tomers at world prices, to create interesting jobs for employees and producesustainable quality returns to shareholders. Thus, one of the questions facingthe management group gathering at the Hermansberg meeting was how tofind a description of the company that could be used to communicate effec-tively with employees and groups outside the company.
Developments inside and outside the company
The September 1998 management meeting followed unfavourable interna-tional and national developments. The meeting was also the first opportunityfor the management group, as a group, to reflect on changes in the com-pany’s management, announced at the end of the previous month.
Outside the company, the international developments which affected the
company included:
• developments in East Asia, which had seen economic expansion in the
region falter and go into reverse;
• an economic crisis in Russia, which had further affected investor confi-
dence in the stability of world markets;
• investor nervousness about emerging markets, such as South Africa.Commentators on the South African economy, such as Dr C. Stals, Governor
of the South African Reserve Bank, pointed out that ‘the South Africaneconomy, which is rapidly being integrated into the evolving interdependentworldwide system of markets could not escape the adverse effects of thedevelopments in East Asia’ (address to shareholders, 25 August 1998). Thecountry, he said, must learn how to share in the benefits, which follow frominvolvement in the world economy, and how to cope with the periodic adver-sities of such involvement.80 Jon White

For South Africa in the middle of 1998, these issues included the with-
drawal of investment in the country. A New York Times article published in
early September suggested that South Africa’s Achilles’ heel was politicalinstability, which prompts foreign capital to move in search of safer lodgingplaces. The flight of capital had several consequences for Barlows, namely,depreciation of the national currency, the rand, against other major curren-cies; and reluctance on the part of investors to invest in the company, whichwas seen as operating primarily in an emerging market
In the year preceding the management meeting at Hermansberg, the com-
pany’s senior managers had seen the value of its shares drop to one-half ofthe previous year’s value (and their own stake in the company, held in optionsor shares, diminish accordingly).
Nationally, the company had to deal with the impact of government legis-
lation relating to rights at work, and with the need to establish a reliablerelationship with the national government, which would allow for the pre-sentation, protection and promotion of the company’s interests.
Inside the company, the chairman, Warren Clewlow, had announced on 31
August 1998, that from 1 October 1998, his other role as Chief ExecutiveOfficer, which he had held jointly with the chairmanship, would pass to TonyPhillips, who was at the time of the announcement the board director respon-sible for the organization’s earthmoving equipment interests around theworld. His explicit task, mentioned in the announcement, would be to leadthe company into the next century. The Chairman’s announcement was aconfident one. Talking of the organization as a ‘strong and vibrant com-pany’, he reminded his internal audience that the company was wellpositioned to ride out ‘the current global storms’.
Another change announced at the same time was the retirement of Russell
Chambers as Chief Operating Officer of the company. He was to retire fromexecutive duties in mid-1999, but to continue on the board as non-executivedirector.
For some years, Warren Clewlow, as Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, Russell Chambers, as Chief Operating Officer, and Des Arnold, asExecutive Director responsible for finance and administration, had formedthe central decision-making group within the company. Of the three, DesArnold would remain in his role for several years to come, but the 31 Augustannouncement heralded changes within the decision-making group.
Management and change at Barloworld had depended on what Warren
Clewlow had called in the past ‘steady evolvement’. This had been particu-larly evident during Mike Rosholt’s chairmanship of Barlow Rand from 1979to 1991. More recently, the company had had to learn to change morequickly. By 1997, the Chairman recognized, in the company’s annual report,that the company’s new approach to globalization demanded a more nimbleapproach.
One of the issues facing the management group gathered in Hermansberg,
and Tony Phillips as the incoming Chief Executive, was how this nimblenessBarloworld: communicating strategic direction 81

of approach was to be incorporated into a company which, until then, had
been recognized by outside observers as strong but ‘fairly conservative’ ( The
49 Best Companies to Work for in South Africa ).
Communication and preparation for decision-making: the
results of the communication consultants’ initial study
The Hermansberg meeting was to focus on the results of an initiative
prompted by discussions within the senior management group of the com-pany. This was to discuss information about the situation facing the company,and management opinions about directions for change that could be com-municated effectively to internal and external audiences.
Two MCA consultants had been invited into the company, to consider
ways in which the company could draw on and communicate its strengths –its ‘magic’ – to important groups. The purpose of improving communicationin this way was to improve staff knowledge of the company and their com-mitment to it. The aim was also to strengthen the flow of accurateinformation to groups such as the investment community and the media inSouth Africa and elsewhere, so that a more accurate picture of the strengthsof Barloworld as a company could be presented.
The two consultants visited the company’s headquarters at Barlow Park in
early September, to question the company’s senior management group, andsenior staff from the company’s business units about the company’s approachto communication. They later followed up the interviews at Barlow Parkwith a telephone interview with the company’s Chief Executive Officer des-ignate, Tony Phillips. In addition to their interviews with individual managers,they also discussed company issues with a group of 7 senior staff drawnfrom central office, the steel tube, paint and cement and lime divisions.
Questions to 22 senior managers, including the company’s Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer Warren Clewlow, Chief Operating Officer RussellChambers, and Finance Director Des Arnold, concentrated on the com-pany’s strategic direction, the groups of people essential to the achievement ofcompany objectives, and the key messages that could be developed concern-ing the company’s objectives and activities.
The answers they heard spoke of a company with a strong culture and tra-
ditions, with values of integrity and concern for the people who make up theorganization. At the most senior levels, they found a clear sense of direction,but at other levels of management there was a frustration that there seemedto be no vision guiding the company. Below a certain level of management,individuals identified more closely with their business units, rather than withthe organization as a whole, and it was recognized that the company did verylittle to communicate with its staff around the world, for example, with staffin Spain and Portugal in their own language.
A number of themes emerged from this research:82 Jon White

• Internationalization should progress, and managers be provided with
more opportunities to develop the skills needed to run international
businesses.
• Among some senior managers, there was a belief that the company
should rationalize further, reducing the number of business interests pur-sued by the company to a smaller number of interests in industries orbusiness activities in which the company had acknowledged internationalstrength. These business interests could then be pursued vigorously todevelop a strong international position.
• Others believed that the company should be looking to develop new
interests – businesses for the twenty-first century, to build and perhapssupersede interests now held in declining industries.
• The company had the resources to acquire new business interests, but did
it have the entrepreneurial drive and innovative capacity to find these?
• The company’s culture had obvious strengths, of integrity and in its
treatment of people in the organization, but it was perceived to be pater-nalistic, controlling and risk-averse.
• Some managers felt that the company’s culture and traditions might set
it at odds with the surrounding national culture, that it might in someways be out of touch with the new South Africa.
Managers judged that the company had not been effective in communication.The communication consultants asked the group to rate the company’s inter-nal and external communication on a 0 to 10-point scale, and found that theaverage rating for the group of managers was 3.9 for internal communicationand 4.8 for external communication.
Internal communication had been limited to a few internal publications,
but managers felt that the situation would get better as the attention of theHead of Corporate communications turned to further improvements in inter-nal communication. External communication had been too cautious. In bothinternal and external communication, managers wanted to see significantimprovements (in the order of 5 points on each scale).
Managers were asked for their opinions regarding some key messages that
might be developed about the company that could be sustained by the com-pany’s record and practices. Of 18 managers expressing an opinion, 4 felt thatit was still true that the company was a conglomerate, one was ambivalentabout this description of the company, and 13 felt that it could not bedescribed as a conglomerate.
The communicators also tested some statements about the business, asking
managers to express their strength of agreement with a number of state-ments about the company as: (1) a manager of diversity; (2) as a companythat sees things differently; and (3) as one that offers a great deal to itsemployees. Managers rated their agreement with these statements on a 0–10point scale, and the average rating given against each of these statementswas 6.3 (range 0–9), 6.4 (range 0–8) and 6.5 (range 4–9) respectively.Barloworld: communicating strategic direction 83

The most pressing challenges facing the company, according to the managers
interviewed, included coping with national developments in South Africa, con-
tinuing the drive towards internationalization, and, above all, finding a clearvision for the future of the company. In this, it was believed that changes set inmotion by the company’s senior management would help to establish this vision.
Communicating corporate direction
The company’s management group were presented with the findings of thecommunication consultants’ work in the form of a case study describing thecompany and the situation it faced. Several elements were in place for imme-diate improvements to the company’s communication with key internal andexternal audiences. Some of these could be implemented immediately, whileothers would take time, management commitment and investment ofresources to realize.
The management had shown its willingness to initiate improvements by
inviting the communication consultants into the company. Their questioningopened up discussion on necessary changes. However, the next steps dependedon the managers at the Hermansberg meeting, guided by the communicationconsultants, on hand to facilitate the management group’s discussion.
Postscript
In the two years following the management summit, the company made themanagement changes that had been outlined in the case and – as a result ofdecisions made at Hermansberg – set in motion internal changes to redefineand fit the company for competition on a world stage.
With the help of MCA, a comprehensive and worldwide study of employ-
ees was carried out to assess the extent to which employees of the companywere involved in, and prepared to champion the company as it changed itsapproach to its business activities. The study involved a quantitative study ofemployees across all the company’s businesses in June 1999 (using MCA ’s pro-prietary research tool – ‘The Buy-in Benchmark’) and qualitative researchthrough a series of ‘Solutions Groups’ held in all businesses in August 1999.The findings from the research, that employees needed greater understandingof the company’s future direction, and that management needed to winemployee confidence in directions set, were acted upon in a thorough pro-gramme of organization development and value-based management that iscontinuing.
In the meantime, senior management now uses quite different language to
describe the company and its business. The 1999 Annual Report points to the
company’s commitment to creating ‘shareholder value by building powerfulindustrial brands and long-term relationships’.
The case study exercise also enabled the company to identify its unique
strengths as an ability to manage diversity; a culture of seeing things84 Jon White

differently; and a willingness to accept business challenges that are difficult.
This culminated in September 2000 with the decision to request share-
holder approval to change the company name, as well as every business unit
name, to Barloworld. This has included the introduction of an integratedvisual identity globally. According to Chief Executive Tony Phillips:
The Barlows strategy is to develop an integrated industrial brand man-agement company and, through the introduction of value basedmanagement, enhance shareholder value.
As part of this strategy, MCA have reviewed the Barlows corporate
identity. This review identified the fact that the ‘Barlows’ name was notunique internationally and a change of name was therefore consideredappropriate to position the company for the future.
The company’s challenges remain, but they are now being faced with a con-fidence that is based on open communication and shared understanding.
Lessons learned
This case suggests a number of valuable lessons for companies and manage-ment facing the challenge of responding to change and wishing to developand drive forward strategic change:
• The first important step is to recognize and understand the forces driving
change and to understand the company’s current position and how it
arrived at it.
• Change can only take place effectively if there is a consensus and com-
mitment among management and this view of the future iscommunicated and understood by all employees.
• A useful way of exploring such issues can be through the use of the type
of case study approach outlined in this case – here it may be necessary tobring in external facilitators to help focus management’s attention on thekey issues.
• Communication often holds the key to effective change management,
particularly in terms of helping both internal and external stakeholdersto understand the company’s vision and in encouraging them to ‘buy in’to this vision.
References
Barlows Annual Report (various years).
C. S. Barlow, 1905–1979, Company history.
Introducing Barlows (1994).
The 49 Best Companies to Work for in South Africa (1998), Zebra Press, Halfway
House.Barloworld: communicating strategic direction 85

Case 7 The
PriceWaterhouseCoopers
merger
Using internal research to
ensure a merger’s success
Andrew Glew and Andrew Flint
In a time of merger mania, a surprising 50–70 per cent fail to achieve the
desired results. When Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand merged toform PriceWaterhouseCoopers, the world’s largest professional servicesorganisation, Price Waterhouse and MCA used effective internal research tohelp make the merger one of the successful exceptions.
Background
PriceWaterhouseCoopers is the largest professional services firm in the world,employing some 20,000 people in the UK alone. The organisation formed on1 July 1998 as a result of the merger between Price Waterhouse and Coopers& Lybrand. Prior to the merger, the leaders in the accountancy and profes-sional services sector were dubbed the ‘Big Six’, with Andersen, Ernst &Y oung and KPMG leading the pack followed by Coopers & Lybrand,Deloitte & Touche and Price Waterhouse.
For the last few years, all of the Big Six firms were rumoured to be talking
to each other about possible mergers. In fact, KPMG and Ernst & Y oungunveiled their merger plans little more than a month after the PriceWaterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand announcement. The KPMG and Ernst& Y oung merger subsequently was dropped.
This flurry of consolidation reflected the industry’s desire for more rapid
growth and the resources to launch new services more quickly. Ian Brindle,then UK senior partner of Price Waterhouse, said the firms needed additionalresources because clients were becoming more demanding in what theyrequired globally and the merger would enabled the combined firm to doeverything required to meet clients’ growing needs.
Figure 7.1 PriceWaterhouseCoopers logo.

Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand’s leaders believed that in a
rapidly changing business environment, their clients were being constantly
challenged by powerful market forces and new global realities that demand adifferent kind of business advisor. The newly formed organisation set out toestablish a unique brand and a new positioning as the breakaway firm – to bethe leading global professional services organisation, solving complex multi-dimensional business problems, and the No. 1 provider of business solutionsin every market in which PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) chooses tocompete.
PwC’s leaders quickly recognised the importance of securing its people’s
understanding and commitment to the new brand in order to realise the ben-efits of a new organisation. Effective communication, informed and directedby research into staff awareness and attitudes, has proven to be a key tool forthe firm in building this understanding and commitment.
Opening Pandora’s box
Prior to the merger, Price Waterhouse asked the Marketing CommunicationsAgency (MCA) to help develop an internal communication strategy andframework for the UK operation by identifying business and communicationneeds. During 1998, MCA was asked to develop a programme of researchthat would support the ongoing effectiveness of communication in the crucialperiod during and immediately after the merger. Our pre-merger work gave usa clear road map for the merger communication and enabled thePriceWaterhouseCoopers/MCA team to concentrate on a programme ofresearch in the crucial period during and immediately after the merger.
There were two target audiences for this programme, both in the UK:
• partners, about 1,100 in total;
1
• staff, about 15,000 in total.
Early in its work, MCA used a series of one-to-one interviews and focus
groups to understand the needs of the two key audiences and tailor the com-munication and future plans to meet and manage their expectations. Fromthis, MCA learned that partners wanted communication to do the following:
• help maintain strong client relationships and seamless service over the
period of the merger;
• reduce their use of anecdotal information about staff views in decision-
making;
• facilitate changes in behaviours and attitudes among staff by assisting in
the integration process.
Staff said their communication needs were:The PriceWaterhouseCoopers merger 87

• quality more than quantity of message;
• the details of the business case for a merger;• a simple, factual and informative communication style rather than
‘propaganda’;
• spelling out the merger timetable, including key milestones and hurdles;• insight into impact on both service lines as well as local and individual
levels;
• more interactive exchange and face-to-face communication opportunities;• ensuring everyone is informed.
To meet these needs and expectations MCA decided to make research akey part of developing and implementing a communication plan, and thisapproach made a significant contribution to the merger’s success. Forexample, many people in the UK agreed with a statement in the researchthat ‘My present prospects are good, but after the merger it’s difficult tosee how they won’t be affected.’ Addressing this issue was vital to movingforward.
Setting business-driven objectives
After a series of discussions with the leadership in the UK, two broad goalsfor the overall communication strategy were identified:
• Helping partners and staff work towards shared goals. This meant work-
ing with the key merger taskforces and giving partners and managers the
tools to communicate effectively within their teams. Any merger createsa degree of uncertainty. Our aim was to help partners and managersdeliver consistent messages.
• Ensuring a smooth transition. Maintaining strong client relationships
and seamless service during the period of the merger was vital. Goodcommunication was therefore essential for staff to respond effectively toclient queries or concerns.
To support these goals, the research programme that was conducted aimed toachieve the following objectives:
• identify communication needs to help PwC realise the merger’s benefits
as soon as possible;
• address staff issues and concerns arising in the transition before they
damaged staff motivation or retention – a crucial issue for a profes-
sional services firm that depends on its people to deliver its services toclients;
• create an open dialogue to track people’s views and build a shared sense
of purpose.88 Andrew Glew and Andrew Flint

Applying lessons from the pollsters
A research plan was developed that would provide the information needed to
meet these objectives without overwhelming the merger team with too muchdata. The first phase of research consisted of interviews and focus groups.The findings enabled the best communication structures to assist the mergerto be determined, which were later implemented. These communication struc-tures were:
• a network of local communicators to facilitate merger messages;
• communication guides for line managers to help them communicate
merger messages that required face-to-face communication, and also tohelp them judge when to communicate and via which medium;
• a Merger News Database that acted as a basic intranet site on merger
information so people could be kept informed of merger developments.
For the second phase of research, an ongoing telephone survey panel was setup. Panel surveys are a common technique in political polling, especially inthe run up to national elections, to track views and emerging issues. By apply-ing this external methodology to internal research, it was possible to deepenthe understanding of staff views more quickly than by traditional employeeresearch methods.
Every time a focus group discussion was held, additional participants to
join the continuously expanding telephone panel were recruited. This methodof recruitment meant that all the participants were met at one time oranother, which made it easy to call them up ‘on spec’ and get their views toevents almost as they occurred.
As the merger negotiations, progressed, MCA sought to align the research
programme with that being used in Coopers & Lybrand. The regulatoryprocess would not allow MCA to work directly with Coopers & Lybrand orto share detailed information. Instead, informal cooperation took placeasking questions about similar topics and later, when allowed, the same ques-tions were used. Since the merger, the PW and C&L research programmeshave come together.
Building support and overcoming challenges
For the research programme to succeed, it needed the support of partnersand staff. The initial research was used to find the ‘hooks’ for each group anddevelop an appropriate course of action. To meet partners’ needs it was essen-tial to show that the programme would do the following:
• Provide more reliable information for decision-making. Here the goal
was to give partners current information about their people’s issues
through a combination of a research programme and feedback from atwo-way communication structure.The PriceWaterhouseCoopers merger 89

• Help change behaviours and attitudes. Research enabled people’s under-
standing of and commitment to the merger to be assessed and the
communications could then be tailored accordingly.
Focus groups revealed what staff wanted from merger communications:
• Feedback and responsiveness. This meant more than just feeding back
the results of focus groups. It meant a continuous process so the business
could respond to people’s needs.
• Two-way dialogue. A communication structure was set up to meet these
needs, which comprised regional communicators, local coordinators andkey people in the lines of service who were all responsible for deliveringmessages and facilitating feedback.
• A clear media strategy. There had been a tendency to adopt the scattergun
theory of communication. Staff wanted better-targeted communication,which was also incorporated into the communication plans.
The communications programme
The research programme aimed to capture representative, reliable and action-able information that would enable the firm to manage its people effectivelythrough the merger to ensure its success. Researchers confirmed that thefindings were representative and reliable, and in order to measure the successin providing actionable information, evaluation focused on the decisionsmade that were based on the research.
Giving staff access to more authoritative sources of information
The initial research showed that 60 per cent of staff were receiving their infor-
mation about the merger from the ‘grapevine’. Although this figure is low inrelation to other organisations that MCA had encountered, it was recognisedthat this reliance on the grapevine needed to be reduced to ensure peoplethroughout the organisation received consistent and reliable merger messages.As a result of this research, a Merger News Database (MND) was launched,an electronic source for up-to-the-minute merger news and commentary.
The MND opened with a front page ‘Stop Press’ box with key headlines
and PWC’s response. It also contained:
•‘What the papers say ’ with a weekly round-up of news in the national press.
•‘Latest News from the Centre’ with bulletins summarising key merger
developments.
•‘Latest from Coopers & Lybrand’ including a who’s who.
•‘We’re listening to you’ with responses to internal merger queries and a
round-up of key Q&As.
•‘Keeping close to our clients’ with quotes and comments from key clients
about quality of service, project performance and new business wins.90 Andrew Glew and Andrew Flint

•‘Competitor moves’ with the latest news about the other Big Five, includ-
ing focus on the proposed merger between KPMG and Ernst & Y oung.
•‘What’s happening in your area’ featuring key developments within each
Service Line/Territory/Region.
Crafting top-down messages in response to external developments
When KPMG and Ernst & Y oung announced their plans to merge, research
showed that this development exacerbated staff concerns about regulatoryapproval for the Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand merger. These con-cerns were addressed through a feature-length interview with a PriceWaterhouse management board member explaining the process and timetable.
When the KPMG/E&Y merger was later called off, one of the reasons
cited was regulatory concerns. Some Price Waterhouse partners wanted tocraft messages to reassure people, but before doing so, the research waschecked first. Feedback showed staff felt cancellation of the rival mergerwould actually increase the chances of their merger being approved. Theresearch helped avoid communicating an inappropriate message.
Changing the tactics in response to feedback
After the Merger News Database (MND) had been set up, a panel survey
revealed that only 9 per cent were using it, and that nine out of ten staff were notreceiving regular information about the merger at all. Focus groups revealed thereason: the MND was seen to be boring, out of date and hard to access.
Action was quickly taken to make it more user-friendly and relevant. These
improvements were promoted internally via an internal postcard drop,posters in elevators, and the network of local communicators. A follow-upsurvey showed that 68 per cent were now using the MND at least once aweek, and a further 23 per cent were using it daily.
Responding to people’s concerns
The research was used to address the staff’s ongoing concerns such as pay and
benefits in the new organisation, the perception of two different cultures andco-location. Further research revealed that the proportion of those expectingto leave following the merger was below historic departure levels and 90 percent felt positive about their career opportunities. In a professional servicesfirm, where staff retention is an investment in intellectual capital, this is a crit-ical measure and a vital contributor to the merger’s success.
Lessons learned
Much has changed in the professional services sector since the PwC mergertook place. Last year, America’s main professional body for accountantsThe PriceWaterhouseCoopers merger 91

ordered the Big Five accountancy firms to introduce new measures to ensure
their independence. In keeping with this, KPMG spun off its consulting armearly in 2000, and PwC is exploring similar options.
The research programme that was introduced to facilitate the merger will
continue to be an invaluable asset as PwC embarks on whatever changes lieahead. The experience gained from this programme provided MCA withuseful lessons about overcoming common communication hurdles during amerger and ensuring a smooth transition for staff and clients. The lessonslearned are:
1Make communication a priority from the start, and then take the long
view: PwC’s top team recognised the vital importance of having theirpeople on board, which was half the battle. The other half was focusingon life after the merger rather than thinking of it as crisis communica-
tion. The strategic communication programme took PwC through thetransition period and put in place a communication infrastructure thatwould work once the merger was in place.
2Don’t make assumptions . . . do the research, and then act on the finding s:
In the heat of a merger, organisations often overlook internal researchbecause of a perceived lack of time or a fear of opening Pandora’s box.MCA/PwC saw research as a way to identify issues before they becameproblems, and a tool to assess where to place our communication efforts.
3Consistent messages from the top : Another common challenge in a merger
is that senior managers are engrossed in the merger details at a timewhen clear leadership and consistent messages are critical. Anotheradvantage of the research programme is that it helped ensure that part-ners delivered targeted, relevant messages.
4Go for quality and for ‘pull’ instead of quantity and ‘push’ : Research
showed that people wanted to know the details about the merger withoutbeing bombarded with information. As with many mergers, the regula-tory process meant long periods with nothing to communicate. It’simportant to keep communicating in a time of uncertainty, but it’s nogood just pushing out information for the sake of it. The solution was torely on a pull for information with the on-line Merger News Database,which allowed people to check for updates themselves. It also made infor-mation accessible to staff who often work off-site.
5Localise communication for greater relevance : Like most high-concern mes-
sages, a merger creates a need for communication that addresses personal,localised issues as well as the big picture. MCA/PwC relied on a network of‘champions’ including regional communicators, local coordinators andkey people in the lines of service to give local relevance to messages.
Note
1 Like most professional service firms, PwC is a partnership owned by its members
rather than by external shareholders.92 Andrew Glew and Andrew Flint

Case 8 Tine Norwegian Dairies
Rebranding from the
inside out
Peggy Simcic Brønn and Stein Drogseth
Introduction
In 1994, Norway went to the polls a second time to vote on membership in
the EU. By a slim majority of 51.5 per cent the country voted once again tostay outside of the European Union. In 1999, even though the country electednot to take part along with her Nordic sisters, Sweden, Denmark and Finlandin the EU, it is still bound by the rules of the European Economic Area(EEA), in which the country has elected to participate. The rules of the EEAare very similar in some ways to EU regulations, particularly those governingthe free movement of goods and services, human resources and financialresources. One effect of these rules has meant that to compete, some businesssectors in the country must be deregulated.
Norwegian authorities started partial deregulation of certain business sec-
tors such as public housing, banking and finance, and agriculture as early as1982. In spite of these efforts, the Norwegian state still remains a large pres-ence in many business sectors in the country. However, some sectors inNorway that had previously operated as total monopolies were finding theircommand of the market threatened by increasing competition. No longerwere these monopolists certain of maintaining their position in the market-place. They suddenly had to deal with a future that was much more uncertain.The question these companies faced was to what extent carrying over monop-oly mentalities helped or hindered their ability to adapt to a more
Figure 8.1 Tine logo.

market-oriented situation. Much of their success was dependent on helping
their workforce adapt to a competitive environment. In this situation, com-munication becomes a powerful tool in ensuring that the company can attractthe best candidates, that current employees stay motivated, and are increas-ingly innovative and feel secure in their jobs and with the company.
In 1995, the dairy industry became the last agricultural sector to be dereg-
ulated by the Norwegian authorities. This case discusses the challenges ofTine Norwegian Dairies’ internal communications efforts in building a brandname and ensuring employee support for the changes the company had tomake as it prepared to meet increasing competition.
The company
The Norwegian Dairies is a cooperative owned by ten cooperative dairy com-panies, which are in turned owned by approximately 25,000 Norwegian dairyfarmers. Established in 1928 under the name Norske Meieriers Eksportslag,it has a long and tradition-rich history in Norway. Its products include milk,mostly sold to consumers by the litre, yogurt, a wide variety of cheeses,including the well-known ‘brown cheese’, a goat cheese favoured byNorwegians, and Jarlsberg, perhaps the company’s most well-known inter-national product, and butter (see Figure 8.2).
Tine’s operations are divided into a number of areas. First is the adminis-
trative part of the company consisting of the head office, which houses thetop management team and basic functions such as finance and accounting,logistics and organization, international department, research and develop-ment, and marketing. Here is carried out product development, productplanning and marketing sales for the entire organization. Not located at94 Peggy Simcic Brønn and Stein Drogseth
Figure 8.2 A sample of milk products with the new Tine logo. Prior to adding the
logo, the cartons were merely labelled ‘milk’.

headquarters are at least three R&D departments and the subsidiary com-
panies, Norseland in the USA, Norske Meierier GmbH in Germany, andFjordland in Oslo.
The dairy cooperatives produce about 200 different products at facilities
spread over the entire length of Norway with raw material supplied by 26,400local milk farmers. The ten dairy cooperatives are divided into five regions.The smallest of these is Vikedal Meieri on the southwest coast with fourteenemployees and 30 million Norwegian crowns (NOK) in turnover, and thelargest is Tine Mid Norway with 812 employees and NOK 2.4 billion inturnover. In total, the company employs more than 5,000 people and has atotal yearly turnover of NOK 10.5 billion (ca. £800m.).
The dairy products market
Tine has until recently operated as a pure monopoly in the dairy sector inNorway, being the sole supplier of liquid milk (including goat milk) to theNorwegian market up until the late 1990s, and with limited competition fromsmall cheese manufacturers such as Synnove Finden. Because of its monop-olistic situation it was not even necessary to use the Tine name in marketingproducts.
For many years, the company sold its products under the name Norske
Meierier together with the symbolic icon of a ‘Tine’. A ‘tine’ is an old-fashioned Norwegian butter holder. However, with the increasing threat ofcompetition and the upcoming EU referendum, the company realized itneeded to build a strong brand name in the marketplace. Selling genericproducts by a dairy association would no longer be effective. In 1992, aftermuch research, the name Tine, based on the icon of the butter holder, wasintroduced along with a campaign to create a visual identity to the newbrand.
Within two months, TINE milk as a brand name had achieved a 76 per
cent recognition level in the marketplace without any mass communication.This is an extraordinary achievement considering that previously neither thename Norske Meierier nor the ‘tine’ icon had achieved great recognitionamong consumers. In its annual ranking of the images of Norwegian com-panies, the marketing research company MMI regularly lists Tine in the topfive most respected companies in the country. They were ranked number oneas late as 1999, having been ranked number one for the previous two years. Itis believed that part of the success of Tine’s brand building was due to thefact that the 1994 Olympics was being promoted at the same time as thebranding activities were going on, and both the Norwegian Olympic effortsand Tine were promoting the same values. Tine was able to incorporate itsvalues of nature, purity, tradition, Norwegian good taste and quality intandem with the same values being promoted as part of the Olympics.Tine Norwegian Dairies: rebranding 95

The competition
In recent years Tine has experienced foreign competition from Arla, a
Swedish dairy cooperative, and national competition from three minor ‘pri-vate’ Norwegian dairy companies. Both the Swedish company and theNorwegian companies have a difficult time in this market. International com-panies suffer most from Norway’s high tariffs and taxes while nationalfarmers find it difficult to obtain any economies of scale because of the smallsize of the market and the strong position of the Tine brand name.
In the late 1990s many of the organization’s resources were concentrated on
developing and marketing new products, particularly for young people andwomen. They have been successful with most of their new product launches,increasing their overall turnover, but the company has also experienced prob-lems with a number of issues. Some of the issues have to do with unsuccessfulproduct launches and poor marketing communication decisions. In the lasttwo years, questions relating to the possible harmful effects of drinking milklater in life have also received more attention. Norway appears to have ahigher than normal percentage of elderly with osteoporosis and the discus-sion is if milk actually harms or helps people in this situation. Part of thediscussion also deals with the fat content of milk and its possible contributionto heart disease; in fact, skimmed milk is Tine’s highest selling milk product.
Tine 2000
In 1996 Tine Norwegian Dairies began working on a document that wouldcome to be known as Tine 2000. This document was to serve as the basis formapping and developing a strategy for the organization’s competitive advan-tage in the new millennium. Several challenges and possibilities wereidentified, among them: increased competition, changing consumer attitudes,strengthened power of supermarket chains, market changes that challengeprofitability, uncertainty of access to raw materials, and more attention to thedairy cooperatives by politicians. Two additional challenges were competitionfor highly competent employees and changing demands on leadership andbusiness.
The vision for Tine, as outlined in Tine 2000, is to create value in close
cooperation with nature, agriculture and the market. Tine should producegood and healthy food from clean and natural raw materials that are pre-ferred by consumers. It should also be the country’s leading deliverer ofnutritious food.
To realize this vision, the company developed several plans. Those dealing
specifically with the human resources side include: strengthening and devel-oping employee competencies, creating an attractive place to work for itsemployees, and ensuring that employees and their managers have a commonunderstanding of the need for and importance of employees’ contributions tomarket- and business-related initiatives.96 Peggy Simcic Brønn and Stein Drogseth

A large part of the Tine 2000 strategy involved getting employees to buy
into the plan and to get them involved in ensuring its success. A great deal of
attention was given to communicating the plan to the employees; however,later research revealed that less than 50 per cent of the employees were awareof the plan. Furthermore, while 65 per cent of managers were aware of theplan, only 31 per cent of non-managers knew about it. This was a cause ofgreat concern to the organization.
Communications research at Tine
The Norwegian School of Management and Tine entered an agreement in1998 to analyse Tine’s current communications vehicles or channels, the mes-sages being sent by the organization and by whom, and managerialcommunications. In further conversation with the team put together to workon the project, it became clear that some of the above analysis had alreadybeen done by Tine, including the following:
• A needs survey in 1998 analysing employees’ opinions on their working
environment in relation to the organization’s benefits and attitudes
towards health, the internal working environment, security and companyhealth services. This report was carried out internally under the supervi-sion of the HMS Committee, a group appointed to deal with and makerecommendations to management regarding how the company deals withissues of health, working environment and security. The report does notmention how many people participated in the survey and it appears thatonly employees at the headquarters office in Grønland took part.
• An ‘Information Survey’ conducted in 1997, which analysed Tine’s inter-
nal communication that looked at routines, preferences, needs andattitudes towards internal information and communication within theorganization. This study was done by an external consultant at the behestof Tine’s Information Department and was a follow-up from a previousstudy done in 1995. The survey was carried out among different sectionsof Tine and delineated the number of participants both with and withoutmanagerial responsibility.
• An internal environmental survey done in 1996 covering the following:
• information;• career possibilities;• educational possibilities;• willingness to relocate;• top management;• ‘ties’ to company (identification with company);• relationships with superiors;• quality;• conflicts;• work environment and psycho-social relationships.Tine Norwegian Dairies: rebranding 97

It is not possible to tell from this study how many employees participated,
their profile or who within the Tine system participated. The study isinteresting and somewhat useful as it not only gave average results butalso showed the ‘spread’ on a number of important issues and also givesextensive employee feedback in the form of comments.
Managerial communications
It became apparent that something was missing from the surveys and that wasmanagerial communications, or, more specifically, an instrument that couldmeasure managers’ ability to communicate in a ‘proper’ and effective mannerwith employees. In addition, even though at least two of the above instru-ments asked questions regarding employees’ attitude towards managerialcommunications, there were no specific questions addressing their attitudestowards their own leaders’ communication competencies. Previous researchuncovered the fact that employees wanted information first and foremost fromtheir immediate superior, but they usually got it from several other sourcesfirst. This dissatisfaction with sources of information had increased in thetwo-year period between surveys mentioned above. This was particularly truefor the type of information they were receiving. More employees than everwanted information from their superiors on the company’s future, such asinformation of a strategic nature. It appeared that many top managers werenot very good at conveying this type of information to their employees. Eitherthey were not aware of their desire for it, they just did not think about it, orthey were not good communicators. Therefore the Norwegian School ofManagement researchers concentrated their efforts in this area.
A first step in carrying out the project was assembling a team within the com-
pany based on a model of integrated communications with cross-functionalteams working to make sure the organization’s communications were consis-tent. This team consisted of the head of personnel, the head of corporatecommunications, the marketing director, and a person from administration.The purpose of the team was to work with the researchers in identifying mainconcerns, to assist in interviews, to approve all plans, and to make recommen-dations to upper management. After preliminary meetings, the overall thrust ofthe project was approved and a presentation of the project was made to the reg-ular Monday morning meeting of the top management team.
It was agreed that the researchers would develop and administer a survey
to measure the ‘gap’ between the employees’ perception of their managers’communication skills and the managers’ perception of their own communi-cation skills. The objective was to try to ascertain if there were issuesregarding personal communication abilities that had not been uncovered inprevious surveys but which might have an effect on the relatively unsatisfac-tory results of the previous surveys.
The target group for the research consisted of employees at Tine’s head-
quarters in Oslo. Working with the team, the ten primary administrative98 Peggy Simcic Brønn and Stein Drogseth

departments responsible for Tine’s overall operations were selected to partic-
ipate in the study. From this group, twenty-two managers were chosen asrespondents for the study. This group included senior vice presidents as wellas managers one level down from them. They were to evaluate their own per-sonal communications competencies on the survey instrument.
Employees one level down from each of the managers were chosen as
respondents in the employee group. Their task was to rate their immediatesuperior’s communication competencies. Both groups were to rate the topmanagement team’s communication competencies. It was necessary to limitthe number of employees due to the complications of defining the level ofmanagerial roles. The task of identifying respondents proved to be quitecomplicated as respondents often fitted both the roles of employee andsupervisor. Close cooperation with the head of human resources was key insuccessfully defining respondents for the study.
To assist in the development of the questionnaire, it was decided to hold a
focus group with representatives on the same hierarchical level from the tendepartments. Working closely with the head of human resources, ten peoplewere chosen at random from each department to participate. The purpose ofthe focus group was to identify key areas that were important to employeesregarding the type of communication skills they would like their superiors tohave. A letter from the human resources director of Tine was sent to eachfocus group respondent outlining the purpose of the research and invitinghim or her to participate in the focus group. A total of nine employees even-tually participated in the focus group, which was scheduled for two hours inthe morning followed by lunch.
During the focus group, important subjects to be covered in the question-
naire were identified and agreement was achieved on terminology and theemployees’ interpretation of that terminology. The results of the focus groupswere combined with theory from a literature review of internal and manage-rial communications as the basis for creating two questionnaires; onedesigned to elicit employees’ attitudes towards their direct superiors’ com-munication competencies, and a second designed to elicit managers’ attitudesregarding their own communication competencies. The main areas covered inthe questionnaire were:
• communication with top management;
• communication in the work environment, including communication with
employees (for managers) or managers (for employees);
• formal communication;• informal communication;• communication climate;• feedback;• communication between departments;• total impression of communication from top management.Tine Norwegian Dairies: rebranding 99

More than 100 questionnaires were prepared for employees and twenty-two
for managers, with the wording changed to reflect whether or not the respon-dent was assessing their own or other’s competencies. The questionnaireconsisted of eight pages with fifty-seven questions designed to capture infor-mation in each of the above categories. All of the questionnaires werecarefully coded to ensure that the correct individuals received the appropriatequestionnaire. Each was placed in an envelope with a self-addressed and pre-stamped return envelope along with a specially prepared letter from EinarEnger, the administrative director of Tine, asking respondents for their coop-eration in this important survey. It was agreed that the questionnaires were tobe delivered to Tine on a specific date to be handed out to the employees.
The research team worked feverishly to prepare the questionnaires, have
them copied, coded and put in envelopes to have them ready for the agreeddelivery date. They were working right up to the deadline on the morning thequestionnaires were to be delivered when they received a phone call from thecommunications director at Tine calling off the entire project.
The team at Tine working with the researchers presented the final ques-
tionnaires to the top management team with confidence in the project and theneed for it. In fact, they had given the NSM researchers the ‘green light’ to goahead based on their belief that the top management team would approve thequestionnaire. It was a surprise to everyone when the upper managementvoted to put a stop to the project at its regular Monday morning meeting. Thefirst reaction from the managers was that measuring their communicationcompetencies was too personal. The second reaction was that communicationcompetencies were not part of managers’ performance review, nor were theya basis of evaluation for recruitment. That Tine should suddenly demand acertain level of competencies in this area without first informing them ormaking it part of an overall recruitment process was seen by the managers asprecipitate. They felt that if the organization were to demand these types ofcompetencies from their managers, Tine must first develop human resourcespolicies on a strategic level. The new policies could then be incorporated intorecruitment and evaluation practices.
The Tine team indicated that perhaps it was necessary to slow down and
look at the work being done in conjunction with the project. In addition tothe response of the managers it was also felt that the employees had beenoverloaded with questionnaires of a relatively similar nature and also that theresearchers had somewhat veered away from the original intention of theproject. Another very important concern raised in the course of the meetingswas Tine’s plans regarding use of the results of the various surveys. Work wasthus stopped on the project and the researchers were asked to write a reportthat would analyse the process to date on the current project, compare itwith results from previous surveys and make recommendations for follow-upby the company.100 Peggy Simcic Brønn and Stein Drogseth

Analysis from previous studies
Analysis of the 1996 and 1998 research indicated that the Tine workforce had
neither very strong positive nor very strong negative feelings regarding mostaspects of the organization. In fact, employees at Tine seemed satisfied butthey were in no way excited about working for Tine. In addition, the com-pany, or at least those analysing the results of the surveys, seemed contentwith what can only be described as very average results.
Most of the studies used a Likert scale with ratings from 1 to 7, with 1 the
worst case and 7 the best. When analysing research results, it is up to thoseanalysing the results to decide acceptable levels. In the majority of the analy-ses of the Tine studies, 5 was rated as ‘extremely good’. One might questionwhether it is acceptable to rationalize 5 as ‘extremely good’ when it is between4, the average, and 7, the best. This leads to the next concern, which is that atno time did anyone from Tine ask the question: What kind of results do wewant? On a scale from 1 to 7, is 5 satisfactory? Not asking this questionmeans that Tine appeared to have no goals regarding the type of climate itwanted its employees to work in. By stating a goal, perhaps in conjunctionwith Tine 2000, such as ‘We want our employees to rate us a 7 in all areas’, thecompany could design efforts to achieve that 7. By merely taking polls andbeing satisfied with seemingly marginal/average results the company hadaccepted mediocrity.
There was also no attempt to do any kind of cluster analysis with the
results of the surveys. For example, it would be very interesting and useful toknow the characteristics of the groups who were very satisfied. Were theymore highly educated? Were they older employees with longer length of ser-vice at the firm? Were younger employees more dissatisfied because they sawthemselves working in a company unable to adapt to modern times? Or viceversa: were the long-term employees more dissatisfied because they saw theold way of doing things disappearing and they has a difficult time adapting?What were the turnover rates among different groups of employees? Whatchanges had there been in productivity rates? Tine cannot hope to meetmarket challenges with a marginally satisfied workforce.
Another problem with the surveys was that they looked at issues sur-
rounding employees and their relationship to the company in a piecemealfashion. There was no integrated approach. Different departments over-lapped work already done by other departments. Constantly bombarded withquestionnaires of similar types and with seemingly no plans to implement theresults, employees were quickly developing cynical attitudes towards thoseadministering the surveys and towards the company as well for allowing suchpractices.
In analysing results from the previous surveys it became clear that employ-
ees’ relationship to management was critical. In rating the importance ofissues, this category received more ‘high’ ratings than any other. However, theconclusion of Tine was that the overall results of the surveys were, in general,Tine Norwegian Dairies: rebranding 101

‘good’, but the conclusion of the NSM researchers was that the results were
poor. This was based on the assumption that Tine, as an organization, wouldnaturally want its employees to have a much higher opinion of top manage-ment and the organization, again in the 7 or best range.
Discussion
It is clear that a lot of time and effort had been invested by Tine in trying togain a complete profile of its employees’ attitudes, communication needs,and so on. These efforts should be applauded, as recognizing employees as acritical and primary stakeholder group is a first step in working towardsbuilding a two-way and mutually beneficial relationship between the organi-zation and its employees. However, it is also obvious that the number ofsurveys, the lack of follow-up from the surveys, the lack of interactionbetween departments carrying out the surveys, and the lack of goal-setting onthe use of the surveys had led to many inefficiencies and not the least agrowth in scepticism on the part of the employees regarding the motives ofTine. This in fact appeared to be the primary reasoning behind putting a holdon the NSM–Tine survey. Putting a hold on the survey, stepping back andreviewing past practices regarding these surveys was a reasonable decision.
A first step in any process is assessing the organization’s strategy, its mis-
sion and its goals. All plans must be anchored here. This begins the strategicprocess of developing plans on how to maintain a viable fit between the orga-nization’s resources, its objectives, and the changing market opportunitiesthrough the use of communication. Communication objectives and strategiesare normally the responsibility of the communication manager and are basedon the corporate objectives and strategies. The communication manager thendecides on the ‘mix’, i.e. various tools to use to obtain results.
For this procedure to function optimally there must be a system in place.
There must be direct and open contact between the communication managerand upper management, and there must be clear goals and objectives. Goalsand objectives are what drive the decision process. And this is seeminglymissing from the Tine surveys. Additionally, by not defining goals and objec-tives, it is impossible to develop a plan to achieve those goals and objectives.
The interpretation of the surveys was left to Tine. It is a well-known phe-
nomenon that when faced with bad news, people can find ways to turn it totheir favour. It would not be unusual for those inside Tine analysing thesurvey results to interpret an average rating of slightly over average to be ‘verygood’. Furthermore, by accepting the results of employee surveys withouthaving a clear picture of a desirable situation, Tine had problems developinga plan to achieve the desired goal.
The first recommendation was that Tine should formalize the team work-
ing on the various surveys. This team should be entrusted with, and givenauthority to develop, a systematic way to deal with communication issues.Because of the make-up of the current team at Tine, this team could also102 Peggy Simcic Brønn and Stein Drogseth

function as an Integrated Communications team. The team should also
receive instruction on how to work in an integrated manner, including how toset common objectives, how to communicate within the team, how to ensurethat they all have a common understanding of the organization’s image, strat-egy and identity, and how to understand how each of their positions workingtogether can better help the organization achieve its goals and objectives.
Epilogue
One of the most important results of the internal communication situationwithin Tine was management’s realization of the need to develop a clearunderstanding of the company’s image among its employees. Most of theirimage-building activities previously had been directed outside of the com-pany. A document produced in 1997 outlines Tine’s strategy for buildingbrand awareness primarily with external audiences. The internal communi-cation surveys, while full of problems, did have the effect of demonstratingthat employees were not very satisfied with communications directed at them,they were not strongly enthusiastic about the organization, nor were they suf-ficiently aware of the Tine 2000 project, one of the company’s most importantstrategic documents. Stopping the managerial communication survey actuallyprovided the catalyst to help Tine understand the value of employee com-mitment.
Perhaps the most important outcome was that Tine management began to
look more closely at the nature of its communications efforts. Today, employ-ees are getting more information more often and of a more strategic nature,i.e. more is being done to make them feel as though they are, to some degree,participating in guiding the future of the company. The company have con-tinued with their internal newsletters and magazines, as well as theirdeveloped Intranet page, Intern Nytt, but they are now considering mecha-nisms for ensuring that employees can provide feedback to management. Forexample, more employee meetings with top managers have been instigatedwith opportunities for dialogue with the administrative director and other topleaders.
The most important outcome, however, was that managerial functions
other than corporate communications began to take the concept of inte-grated communications more seriously. It was obviously becoming criticalthat different functions needed to start working closer together on issues andcommunications. The original cross-functional team put together to overseethe NSM research was institutionalized and meets twice monthly. A top-level strategic communications team has also been put together with Tinemanagers from all over the country. One result of this is that the marketingfunction has placed more weight on internal marketing and information. Ata previous meeting, the head of marketing remarked that she did not seewhy her department should consider employees in their communicationsplanning. This attitude no longer prevails. Tine has also instructed itsTine Norwegian Dairies: rebranding 103

advertising agency to work together with their public relations agency. It
must be noted, however, that most of the work here is more product-relatedas opposed to concentrating on internal communications. Although as aresult of this cooperation, the marketing department, for the first time, dis-seminated material on a newly launched advertising campaign to employeesbefore the public launch.
Tine has reworked its Tine 2000 strategy and replaced it with Tine 2005
where employees are recognized as the primary stakeholder group. The mostimportant part of the new plan is reputation/image building, and Tine hopesthat by highlighting the need for top leaders to build better relationshipsbetween themselves and their employees they will improve the image of theTine brand internally.
But Tine has still not specifically addressed the issues of managerial com-
munication competencies or, even further, organizational characteristics thatpromote good communications. The focus remains on non-personal corpo-rate communications such as company newsletters and magazines, Inter- andintranet, and so forth. No training has been provided for managers, nor havepersonnel policies or hiring strategies been changed to reflect that the abilityto communicate effectively on a personal level is an important competencyfor being recruited to the Tine system.
Lessons learned
• Organizations and public relations scholars should remember that prac-
titioners and educators can learn from one another. Public relationseducators can contribute their expertise from the study of public relationsas a discipline and practice while practitioners can contribute the real-lifeexamples and scenarios that make learning beneficial for both in specificsituations as well as a valuable contribution to the body of knowledge inthe profession.
• The support of top management cannot be taken for granted. Such coop-
eration and support must be clearly understood before the project isundertaken. Best practice would indicate that top management shouldparticipate fully in developing the employee communication plan at alllevels, including their own. As egos are involved, the need to fully under-stand all perceptions is crucial.
• Research must be carefully planned around solid aims and methodolo-
gies to ensure than information gathered is useful and credible. While noresearch study is perfect, specifying exactly what the study hopes toaccomplish before it is conducted may prevent errors that invalidateinformation.
• Employees will tell employers and superiors valuable and truthful infor-
mation if they feel they will not be penalized or compromised forproviding that information. It is management’s responsibility to create anenvironment where that information sharing can take place.104 Peggy Simcic Brønn and Stein Drogseth

Case 9 Oklahoma City and
Kerr-McGee
Managing internal
communication during anexternal crisis
L. Dow Dozier
Introduction
One of the State of Oklahoma’s oldest and largest oil companies, Kerr-
McGee Corporation, has its worldwide headquarters in downtownOklahoma City, Oklahoma, a small Midwestern city that became the focus ofworldwide attention on Wednesday, 19 April 1995. That day, the Alfred P .Murrah Federal Building, located two city blocks from Kerr-McGee’s head-quarters, was bombed.
The company had extensive crisis communication plans for all its domestic
and international facilities, primarily focused on disasters and events per-taining to the oil industry. Nothing like the bombing had ever beenanticipated. Consequently, the crisis plans were virtually useless at 9:02 a.m.on that infamous day.
Less than two hours after the bombing, orders were given by local police
and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation to immediately evacuate theKerr-McGee complex. By then, it had been determined that the MurrahBuilding explosion was caused by a bomb, and it was thought that a secondbomb was about to explode. The Kerr-McGee buildings, housing more than900 employees, were designated as part of the ‘crime scene’. The 29-storymain building and two other nearby structures were soon cordoned off withthe familiar yellow warning tape.
The crime scene designation caused several associated problems for
employees, such as: Were any of our people hurt or killed? With the buildingsevacuated, how can we know what’s going on? When can we move our cars?How do we get home? When can we go back to work? How can we help? Allof these questions were basically communication issues. After extensive trial-and-error and ‘seat-of-the-pants’ efforts, most of the questions were answeredeffectively, if not always as quickly as might be expected.
This case study examines the methods used by the management of Kerr-
McGee to solve these critical communication problems. In an instant, profitsand day-to-day operations were set aside. Employee communication became

the number one priority, not just for the professional communicators, but for
the entire management team.
Research
Nothing of the magnitude of the Oklahoma City bombing had been antici-pated by Kerr-McGee’s management. Consequently, little or no research forthis specific type of crisis had been done. The company was sailing inuncharted waters, and found that the crisis created a need for communicationat its most basic and human levels.
As a major player in the oil industry, Kerr-McGee had industry-specific
crisis plans in place, such as how to deal with off-shore oil fires and storms inthe North Sea. One room in the Oklahoma City headquarters was desig-nated as the ‘Midlife Crisis Room’, and contained the written and testedcrisis plans for those scenarios. Part of the crisis training including havingeveryone in the company who might be involved in each scenario run throughthe crisis process for these specific incidents. What the company did not havewas a general all-purpose crisis plan for this unexpected event. What com-pany employees did have, however, was education and experience in dealingwith the process of a crisis.
Goals and objectives
The fundamental short-term goal was to meet the needs of Kerr-McGee’sdowntown Oklahoma City employees during one of the most stressful periodsin their entire lives. The long-term goal was to help employees and their fam-ilies cope with the mental and physical anguish caused by the bombing.
In the short term the objectives were quite basic: determine and
communicate:
• How many employees were killed or seriously injured? How about their
families?
• How badly was the headquarters complex damaged?
• When will employees be expected to return to work?• When can employees get their automobiles out of the company parking
lots that had been closed because of the ‘crime scene’ designation?
• How can employees get their paychecks that were due in two days? This
was a problem not only for Oklahoma City employees, but for those in allother locations as well. All payroll matters are handled out of theOklahoma City office, and although many workers have their checks elec-tronically transferred, a significant number still collect regular paperpaychecks.
• What kind of atmosphere can employees expect when they come back to
work?106 L. Dow Dozier

The overall goal was to answer all of these questions so that once the personal
concerns of the employees were addressed, the company could return to ‘busi-ness as usual’ as quickly and humanely as possible. Employees, customers,vendors and the financial community needed assurance that, despite thebombing, Kerr-McGee would survive.
Target audiences
The primary target was the Oklahoma City workforce of more than 900people. Secondary targets were the more than 4,000 employees in other loca-tions, customers, vendors, news media, government agencies, and a criticalaudience, the worldwide financial market.
Communication strategy
Within minutes after the bombing, Kerr-McGee’s executive managementgroup was transformed into a corporate communication team. The regularcommunication team consisted of five people, the Vice President ofCorporate Communication and Investor Relations, the Director of CorporateCommunication, the Coordinator of External Communication, the newslet-ter editor, and the associate newsletter editor. This team met once a week withcompany executives, creating a close working bond between the executivesand the communication staff.
Kerr-McGee’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, who had himself
narrowly escaped serious injury in the bomb blast, quickly mobilized thecompany’s officers and department heads. About a dozen of these top exec-utives, including the company CEO, the Vice-chairman, the Head of HumanResources, the legal staff, and top operations people, including the VicePresident of the chemical division and the Vice President of exploration andproduction, combined with three members of the corporate communicationstaff to work out and implement strategic plans for one basic goal: Letemployees know what is going on. A fundamental logistical question formanagement was: with Kerr-McGee’s headquarters and all of its communi-cation systems unavailable, how can the company talk to its people? Theexecutives and operations heads realized the importance of communicationduring this time because they had been trained in media relations, and in thehours and days following the blast relied on the communication staff fordirection.
Needless to say, all work stopped at 9:02 a.m. that day. For the first few
minutes after the blast, no one knew what had happened. There was specu-lation that there had been a huge natural gas explosion nearby. Othersthought an airplane had crashed in the vicinity. Some people crawled undertheir desks, fearing another blast. Others just looked at their colleagues, wide-eyed, asking, ‘What was it?’ Many employees left the building and startedlooking around. Looking north they could see enormous clouds of blackKerr-McGee: internal communication during crisis 107

smoke rising. Walking toward the smoke, many people saw only the south
side of the Murrah Building, which did not appear to be seriously damaged,because the gaping hole in the Murrah Building was on the north side.
Kerr-McGee workers then started returning to their work location and
were told as they re-entered the buildings to stay away from windows andbroken glass. More than 100 large windows were shattered by the blast,mostly on the upper floors on the building’s north and west sides.
Fortunately, there were no major injuries to Kerr-McGee employees,
although ten people sought and received first-aid treatment for minor glasscuts in the on-site medical clinic. Later, information confirmed, however,that the 6
1⁄2-month-old son of two Kerr-McGee employees, Kevin and Sheryl
Gottshall, was killed in the Murrah Building’s daycare center, anotheremployee’s 27-year-old daughter was killed and several other employees lostclose relatives and friends.
First communication efforts
Those employees who had access to radio or television sets soon became awareof the enormity of the situation, and many of them started trying to callhome to check in with their families. Telephone lines quickly became jammed,and it was virtually impossible to make a telephone call outside the building.
At 10:19 a.m., one hour and 17 minutes after the bomb exploded, Kerr-
McGee management made its first formal effort to communicate withdowntown headquarters employees. It was a brief employee bulletin distributedby e-mail and posted in various headquarters locations. The bulletin read:
To all employees: Some minor injuries were reported in McGee Tower by9:30 this morning as a result of an explosion in or near the FederalBuilding in downtown Oklahoma City. The explosion caused windowdamage to the north side of McGee Tower as well as some office damage.Dr. Gibbs is standing by in the clinic on the 17th floor. Other employeesare returning to their work stations.
It was almost at that same moment that an announcement was made that asecond bomb had been found and that the area within a two-block radius ofthe Murrah Building would be evacuated. That area included the Kerr-McGee complex and employee parking spaces in and near the complex.Owners of the automobiles parked in those spaces were not allowed to movetheir automobiles for several days. It was later determined that there was nosecond bomb.
A public address system announcement was then made, asking all remain-
ing employees to leave the building in an orderly manner and gather at theMyriad Convention Center, about three blocks to the south, so that furtherinstructions could be given. That same message was given to employees whowere just then returning to the building.108 L. Dow Dozier

The majority of the company’s employees had already scattered, so man-
agement’s message to the 200 remaining employees who had walked to the
Myriad was, in effect, ‘Get home any way you can, and we’ll try to contactyou as soon as possible to let you know what is going on and when you cancome back to work.’ Now the task of communicating with employees beganin earnest.
At the same time that employee communication was being planned, com-
munication people reached out to the other critical audience, the financialcommunity. Especially crucial to financial analysts in markets such as NewY ork and Boston was the message that Kerr-McGee was not affected directlyby the bombing. The immediate personal phone calls from Oklahoma City tothose markets and analysts helped the company get back to normal when itre-opened the following Monday, when another round of personal calls wasmade to key financial markets and analysts.
Tactics
With the main headquarters building declared off limits, the command postwould obviously have to be at some other location. A quick call to the PetroleumClub, located on the top two floors of a downtown bank building, rev ealed that
a large room on the 35th floor could be made available to Kerr-McGee. Mostof the company’s top executives and corporate communication principalsgathered in that room on Wednesday afternoon, the day of the bombing.
Management decided immediately to make no efforts to resume business
activities until some normalcy returned to the area. The number one prioritywas to talk personally to as many employees as possible, answer their ques-tions, and let them know what was expected of them.
Only two telephone lines were available in the temporary command post at
the Petroleum Club. The decision was made to form a telephone calling tree,whereby top executives would contact the people who reported directly tothem, and these people would then contact the people who reported directlyto them, and on down the line until every possible employee was contacted.The early message was: ‘We don’t know when we can get back in the building,but we’ll try to keep you posted.’
Because the local phone company’s lines were jammed, and because the
company had all of its people and facilities involved in bombing rescueefforts, the local toll-free 800-number service was not available. The thinkingwas that if a toll-free number could be established, Kerr-McGee employeescould call in from time to time and receive a recorded, frequently updatedmessage. Contact was then made with a company in Atlanta, Georgia, thathad the capability of setting up remote service from its headquarters. Whilethe idea was good, the execution proved problematic. The people in Atlantadid not seem to understand the seriousness of the situation, and employeeswho called the number received confusing and incomplete information.Another plan was needed.Kerr-McGee: internal communication during crisis 109

Later that afternoon a communication team member remembered that
Kerr-McGee had another facility that would be ideal for a command post.
Known as the ‘tech center’, the company’s research and development buildingin far northwest Oklahoma City about ten miles away proved to be the perfectlocation for a communication center. A large room was already equipped withtables, chairs and most importantly, 15 telephone lines. The executive com-munication team immediately began moving to the tech center where it wascompletely set up by Thursday afternoon, just one day after the bombing.
The early efforts of the telephone calling tree worked well to begin with,
because most of the top executives had home telephone numbers for man-agers who reported directly to them. Problems arose when the team begantrying to call the homes of non-supervisory or non-management people.Most of the team was amazed to find that the company’s personnel recordsdid not contain home telephone numbers! This meant that published tele-phone directories, which were almost a year old, had to be used to find homenumbers, a time-consuming and sometimes futile effort.
Several of Kerr-McGee’s key payroll people were able to enter the com-
pany’s downtown headquarters and get the employee records to issue thepaychecks and to access personnel records for phone numbers. Employeeswere paid for all of the work days, even though they were not at work duringthe four days following the bombing.
By rotating shifts of people, the executive communication team was able to
man the phones around the clock from Thursday to Sunday. With the lack ofsuccess of the previous toll-free number in mind, the team devised a methodwhereby an internally recorded message was made available to employeesseeking information. The toll-free number was posted to the regular companynumbers so when employees called those numbers they were re-directed to thetoll-free number. The lines were answered personally by company employees,so employees calling in heard a real voice, and the operators told callers thatif all the lines were busy, the automated line with updated messages wouldanswer their calls. The message was updated any time new informationbecame available, sometimes three or four times an hour in the early days.Employees later praised these efforts and expressed appreciation for man-agement’s dedication to keeping everyone informed.
The main questions employees asked were: ‘When can I get my car?’ and
‘When do we go back to work?’ The answers were: ‘Y ou can get your carsSaturday’ and ‘We’ll re-open for business Monday.’
So many volunteers showed up at the tech center it was difficult for some
of them to find something meaningful to do. Someone had the idea ofmaking memorial ribbons commemorating the bombing victims and theirfamilies. Volunteers not needed on the telephones put together enough ofthose ribbons so that each employee could receive one upon returning towork Monday morning. Within days of the bombing, hundreds of people inthe State of Oklahoma were wearing the memorial ribbons on their lapels.The ribbons proved to be such a powerful symbol of the strength of the110 L. Dow Dozier

Oklahoma people during this time that the US Post Office later commis-
sioned a metal lapel pin version of the ribbon to be sold at post officesthroughout the state. The ribbon was also memorialized as an option to addto resident’s automobile license plates.
Meanwhile, back at the main downtown headquarters, Kerr-McGee’s build-
ing services people were able to get into the building almost immediately andassess the damage. It was bad, but it could have been much worse. Damagewas minimized by the fact that the Southwestern Bell building was almostdirectly between the Murrah Building and the Kerr-McGee complex. Foot-long, dagger-shaped shards of glass littered the desks of several top executives.It bordered on miraculous that there were no fatalities or serious injuries.
Another piece of good luck was that the building services people had the
exact measurements of all of the 100 or so damaged windows. They were ableto get all of the windows replaced with glass or plywood by Sunday, only fourdays after the explosion. A careful survey by outside engineers showed nostructural damage to the tornado-proof main building. With a Herculeaneffort, the building was ready for occupancy on Monday morning.
In a genuine show of concern, Kerr-McGee’s top executives stationed
themselves at all entrances to the building on Monday morning. They handedout the memorial ribbons and gave every returning employee a sincere, sym-pathetic hug. Employees were surprised, but they were also very pleased andsaid so many times in succeeding months.
To some extent, all Kerr-McGee employees were affected by the bombing,
not just those who had lost family members or friends. Knowing that manyemployees could be profoundly affected by the bombing and its aftermath,Kerr-McGee’s management retained a well-known firm to help employeescope. The firm, Crisis Management, Inc. (CMI), is composed primarily ofpsychologists and psychiatrists who specialize in personal counseling follow-ing tragic events of all types.
CMI’s first order of business was to have mass meetings with all employees
in the company’s auditorium. The employee workforce was then divided intogroups of 20 for ‘let’s-talk-about-it’ sessions with CMI counselors. Allemployees were urged to attend these sessions, even if they did not feel like it,and all but a very few complied.
The results were generally excellent, with Kerr-McGee employees being
allowed to express their feelings without fear of criticism or recrimination.The CMI people were available after the initial sessions to talk to employeesand their family members on a one-to-one basis for several weeks after thebombing. Many employees took advantage of CMI’s services, all paid for byKerr-McGee.
Evaluation
Getting back to normal took some time. The communication, the hugs, theribbons and the expert counseling did not stop the pain. Kerr-McGee’sKerr-McGee: internal communication during crisis 111

112 L. Dow Dozier
management knew that the healing process would take a long time – longer
for some employees than others. Supervisors and managers did the best theycould to return to the business of running the company, but it was done in aslow, sincere, humanitarian manner. ‘Productivity’ was hardly even men-tioned for many months. Kerr-McGee also paid for all damages not coveredby insurance to employees’ cars that resulted from the fallout from windowsand other debris.
The traditional employee media of bulletin board notices, e-mail and
employee publications were relied upon more than usual following the returnto work after the bombing.
Although the bombing and its aftermath will forever be engraved on the
minds of Kerr-McGee employees, the company’s management and commu-nication team will always know they did their best to communicate with theiremployees under some of the worst circumstances possible. Members of man-agement showed with their funds and, most importantly, their hearts, thatthey really do care about their employees.
Lessons learned
• Being prepared. The immediate reactions in any crisis tend to follow a
pattern and the crisis operations plans in place and field-tested by Kerr-McGee employees demonstrated that the basic operating procedures andprocess during a crisis apply whatever the crisis.
Also important is the necessity of having a plan that is written out and
familiar to all involved. In this case, the shock of the crisis may haveimpeded managers from thinking logically and coolly about options forgetting in touch with their employees, such as the Tech Center phonelines. Having these options written down and thought through can avoidcostly delays.
• The importance of management understanding and using the expertise
of the trained communicators on staff. This resulted in the communica-tion staff being allowed to communicate and take appropriate actionwith internal and external publics without fear of reprisal from othermanagers.
• The critical need to fully educate outside components that may be part of
an organization’s crisis plan, such as the Atlanta telecommunication orga-nization Kerr-McGee contracted with to provide emergency access foremployees. Without having a real understanding of Kerr-McGee’s busi-ness and what had happened to its entire organization during the daysimmediately following the bombing, the agency provided poor service.
• Showing the human side of an organization – hugs, repair to cars, and
available counseling demonstrated to Kerr-McGee employees that theywere and are an important part of the organization. It also demonstratesthat little things mean a great deal to employees, and the rewards in termsof employee loyalty far outweigh the monetary cost Kerr-McGee incurred.

Case 10 Does public relations
make a difference?
A comparative analysis of
two major Swedish crises
Larsåke Larsson and Stig A. Nohrstedt
Introduction
What makes a major accident or disaster develop into a social crisis? This, in
a nutshell, is the question we address in this chapter, with particular empha-sis on the public relations/information aspects of this dynamic. Our argumentis related to, but not solely based on, two major disasters involving heavylosses of life during the last decade in Sweden. In 1994, the ferry Estonia sank
in the Baltic Sea, with 859 passengers remaining on board. In the late autumnof 1998, a fire broke out at a discotheque in Gothenburg, where 63 youngpeople perished and over 200 were injured.
Theoretical perspective
Our analysis stems from the view that public relations activities are importantfactors in explaining why a major accident does or does not escalate into asocial crisis. Public relations are critically important in disaster and emer-gency situations. In such moments, the authorities or organisationsresponsible experience whether or not their communication policies and oper-ations are both effective and relevant to the needs of the situation at hand.Both our own research and that of others clearly show that the status of PRincreases in a crisis, that the PR/information function becomes part of theleading managerial function, if this was not already the case before the crisis.Furthermore, in a crisis, PR officers face a broader responsibility than innormal circumstances – they are engaged in crisis management.
In some ways, however, disaster situations also turn accepted PR models on
their heads. In such situations, communication tends to be more asymmetri-cal than what is normal for the organisation, both internally and externally.Even if the organisation aspires to maintain more ideal communicationrelationships such as symmetrical (e.g. Grunig, 1992; Spicer, 1997) or evendialogical communication patterns (Banks, 1995; Deetz, 1998), in a crisissuch communication is often set aside. There is often no time for symmetry ordialogue in a disaster situation. On the other hand, there is rarely a greaterneed for open and symmetrical communications than in these cases. This

paradox may provide the theoretical underpinnings as to why disasters evolve
into crises in some instances and not in others.
The fact that the PR function is often a part of managerial work as a
whole also implies that research on disasters must adopt a broader organisa-tional view and not focus exclusively on aspects of communication. In otherwords, we believe that PR factors alone do not provide a sufficient explana-tion for crisis tendencies in different major accident situations.
From disasters to high politics
International crisis research has identified a number of indicators for a society’s
handling of accidents and disasters. These include the tendency to centralisecrisis work, the tendency for bureaucratic rivalry, difficulties in adaptingresponses to the situation and a strong reliance on experts. Within the realm ofcommunications, important indicators include high levels of media pressurealong with a highly rapid but also highly uneven flow of information.
As Dutch researchers Paul ’t Hart and Uriel Rosenthal (1996) argue, crisis
research has tended to adopt an organisational/administrative leadership per-spective in which the primary focus is the effect of planning and decisions.This ‘containment tradition’ is aimed at outlining how public authorities andprivate companies deal with different types of disasters. It stems from the per-spective that such occurrences disrupt the social system and that the measuresadopted in a crisis situation should result in a return to normalcy. They pro-pose a more critical and political perspective in which disasters and accidentsare defined as ‘moments of high politics’ and ‘periods of breakdown of famil-iar symbolic frameworks’. These events, they argue, should be viewed as partof an ongoing process in which ‘different crises may be the outcome of dif-ferent critical paths’. This new perspective thus requires a new conceptualframework which implies that crises:
• are perpetual phenomena resulting from changes in the environment
which actors must be aware of;
• contain multiple levels of conflict that occur from an intra-individual to
a societal level;
• are an affective category with collective stress, insecurity and vulnerabil-
ity as a result;
• play a delegitimation role in a process of legitimation–delegitimation–
relegitimation (before–during–after the crisis);
• provide opportunities for mass mobilisation and institutional self-drama-
tisation (’t Hart and Rosenthal, 1996: 12ff).
The political dimension is often likely to be the most important component in
the context of a disaster or accident. Rosenthal cautions about viewing dis-asters only as temporary interruptions in the system, arguing that it isimportant to place much greater emphasis on the political and social factors114 Larsåke Larsson and Stig A. Nohrstedt

which, so to speak, lay the groundwork for the reaction to the occurrence
(Rosenthal, 1998; see also Bovens and ’t Hart, 1998).
Based on the observations of these researchers as well as our own studies
of major societal disruptions and disasters, we believe that such situationsresult in ‘high politics’ precisely because they constitute a potential crisis.There is a risk that the developments following the event will lead to a situa-tion in which basic values, one’s faith in society’s capacity to protect citizensand one’s faith in the existing system of power and responsibility will becalled into question. On the other hand, these situations also provide anopportunity for skilful political leaders to display their leadership and drive.Such initiatives can be decisive in terms of whether disturbances and disastersdevelop into crises or not.
Central components of this ‘high politics’ are the handling of public rela-
tions and the satisfaction of the need for information (Nohrstedt, 1991).While the responses of political leaders to such situations can be decisive indetermining their own political fates, we argue that high politics pertains tomore than the success or failure of individual political figures. It also encom-passes deeper underlying social relations, where fears of societaldevelopments and fears of new and complex threats to one’s existence areincluded as important aspects of what has been referred to as ‘national soci-ety’ (Beck, 1986; see also Dahlgren and Höijer, 1995). Seen in this way, adisaster or crisis becomes a decisive moment in the historical processes sur-rounding the construction or re-construction of society. Similar to ’t Hart andRosenthal, we argue that it is not always appropriate to view a return to aprior ‘normalcy’ as the most desirable outcome. Philosophically speakingthis is not possible, and in any case it would seem both more interesting andmore important to consider instead the implications of these events for futuresocial relations.
The handling or mishandling of public relations cannot, as mentioned ear-
lier, provide the entire explanation as to why certain disasters develop intosocial crises. However, the following analysis will attempt to illustrate that thisdoes constitute an important part of the explanation for the different out-comes of the two Swedish disasters examined here. The two aspects of publicrelations management by government authorities vis-à-vis the media and
other organisations which we will concentrate on here are:
1 flexibility and the capacity to mobilise resources, primarily in terms of
contacts with the media and various stakeholders (e.g. relatives), and;
2 the continuity and consequence of information in satisfying both public
and stakeholder demand.
With these analytical dimensions as our point of departure, we hope in the
concluding section to contribute, on the one hand, to an explanation whythere was a social crisis in one case but not in the other, as well as to the the-oretical development surrounding the role of public relations in theComparison of two major Swedish crises 115

emergence and management of social crises more generally. Hopefully, this
analysis will also be able to contribute to our understanding of organisationallearning within government authorities and other organisations responsiblefor handling catastrophes and social disturbances, including rescue services,the police, environmental and health care bodies, etc. Thus, an important partof our analysis is to examine the capacity for organisational learning in con-nection with this type of occurrence.
Organisational learning
Within organisational research, the concept of organisational learning has
long held a strong position, while in the more applied organisational litera-
ture, the term learning organisation is generally used. In short, the concept
refers to an organisation’s ability or capacity to discover and correct errorsand insufficiencies, with an emphasis on learning as a continuous, ongoingprocess. Among the factors associated with this process are the involvementof employees, a high degree of responsibility and initiative taking and a lead-ership that stimulates these behaviours.
Knowledge in this field is based on the research of Chris Argyris and his
colleague Donald Schön. They distinguish between two now well-knowntypes of learning: ‘single-loop-’ and ‘double-loop-learning’ (Argyris andSchön, 1978; Argyris, 1999). Single-loop-learning occurs ‘whenever an erroris detected and corrected without questioning or altering the underlyingvalues of the system’ (Argyris, 1999: 68). This is routine and repetitive changewhere the norms remain the same. Double-loop-learning occurs when thegoverning variables are changed. This often applies to complex problems,whose solution is necessary for the long-term survival of the organisation.
But Argyris and Schön do not limit themselves to the first two types of
learning. They add a third form: ‘deutero-learning’ – in which people learnhow to learn, when learning itself becomes a part of the organisationalculture.
In some of their writings, however, these scholars are quite pessimistic
about the learning capacity of organisations, meaning that it is more normalto try to hinder advanced learning. People tend to follow a ‘theory-in-use’approach, where they pursue their own goals and seek unilateral control.Deficiencies that tend not to be corrected are those that threaten ‘theory-in-use’ and prevailing values and which, if corrected, would reveal either thatone had concealed mistakes or that one did not have the capacity to correctthem. Such deficiencies are disguised by defensive routines, often carried outwith great skill. Corrected deficiencies are only those which are highly visible,which do not constitute a threat to affected actors, or which constitute athreat that is nonetheless outweighed by the threat of concealment or neglect.Another instance of correction exists, namely, when an organisation is con-fronted by a major failure or crisis situation (Argyris, 1999).
In the more applied organisational management literature, organisational116 Larsåke Larsson and Stig A. Nohrstedt

learning tends to be treated very broadly. The fundamental advice is to
analyse and change the organisational culture, to encourage the individual tohandle him/herself on his/her own, to view mistakes as important learningexperiences, to reward risk-taking, to encourage ideas and create security for‘thinking activity’ (see, for example, Kline and Saunders, 1993). French crisisresearcher Patrick Lagadec (1993) argues that above all, organisational learn-ing implies the creation of new views about openness, ethical behaviour andbetter ‘citizenship’ in order for the organisation to be granted high credibilityand legitimacy in disaster and crisis situations. Also relevant here is theimportance of inter-organisational transparency regarding crisis manage-ment plans and exercises, as well as the creation of informal networks and‘cross-fertilisation’ between different organisations. Looking at internal mea-sures, Lagadec notes the importance of executive involvement, not only interms of decision-making but also regarding practical participation in exer-cises. Other important factors include more broadly delegated responsibility,less centralised steering of information and the instilling of a stronger crisisand security awareness among the workforce.
The insights that have been obtained from this research can be applied to
studies of organisations in both the public and private sector. The followingsections will present the results of two studies in which we have paid attentionto the public relations responses of government authorities in connectionwith large-scale disasters – the sinking of the Estonia ferry and the
discotheque fire in Gothenburg.
The sinking of the Estonia ferry
The sinking of the Estonia ferry on 28 September 1994 in the Baltic Sea is the
largest disaster to have affected Sweden in modern times. A total of 859people lost their lives in the wreckage – 501 of them were Swedish.
The Estonia is calculated to have gone under just after midnight, at 12:48
a.m. Swedish time. At 1:31 a.m., the first news flash appeared on the wire ser-vice ‘TT’. At 2:00 a.m., the first radio report went out over Swedish radio.The next news report contained approximate information of the scale of theaccident.
During the initial operational rescue phases, the primary arenas of involve-
ment were of course the maritime rescue teams at sea as well as the hospitalsin the Stockholm area, which received a large number of rescued and injuredpersons. However, the consequences of the accident affected large parts of thecountry, since passengers came from different towns throughout Sweden andtherefore left behind friends and relatives. A number of towns were hit veryhard – one in particular lost a noticeable percentage of its population. Ineffect, everyone in this town was a relative or acquaintance of someone whohad been lost, and the accident created not only human and social problems,but also problems for different local authorities.
Our analysis will focus on two issues associated with the authorities’Comparison of two major Swedish crises 117

handling of the crisis, namely contact/communication with bereaved groups
and the mass media, on the one hand, and the salvage of both the wreckageand the bodies of the victims, on the other. Together, these issues provide afairly comprehensive picture of the public relations difficulties confronted bythe relevant authorities.
Contact and communication responses
National level
The Swedish government quickly established information channels with the
media and other affected governments. At the same time, however, a greatdeal of pressure was being exerted from relatives for information about theaccident. The responsible authority, the Transport Ministry, was unpreparedfor this assault and ended up answering the latter’s phone calls in an ad hoc
fashion. In addition to this, many people had trouble locating the properauthorities.
When the list of victims was confirmed, there was a need on the part of the
nation’s leadership to establish direct communication with the relatives. Instead,however, relatives were referred to the media as a means of spreading informa-tion, and they initially encountered substantial problems establishing directcontact.
As is usually the case in Sweden when interests are to be articulated, some
of the bereaved groups soon organised themselves. While this may have beenhelpful to the authorities in the sense that they would now have a more cen-tralised or organised negotiation or dialogue counterpart, this also createdproblems because several of the bereaved groups held contradictory interests.Some of the contacts that were arranged – in the form of meetings at the cen-tral and local level – were conducted under strained and sometimes chaoticcircumstances, all of which received extensive media coverage.
Regional and local level
The Swedish rescue organisation – SOS Alarm, with a station in every
region/county – did not receive its first alarm until about six hours after theaccident. However, this was not an official or authoritative alarm network,but that of security firms and scattered individuals. Stockholm’s SOS station,which already knew about the accident at 2:00 a.m., did not alert the rest ofthe country immediately, which was a mistake.
During the night of the accident, none of the three county administrations
studied here had activated their crisis management systems, which include,among other things, coordination of local rescue services and fire stations.None of the county councils opened information or disaster relief centres, asis stipulated in their emergency plans. However, certain contacts were made ina few places, including contacts with municipal actors.118 Larsåke Larsson and Stig A. Nohrstedt

By contrast, the health care system appears to have responded profession-
ally both at the county and local levels. The larger hospitals organised crisis
and information services relatively quickly. The district police in the threeregions examined received word about the accident between 2–4 hours afterit occurred, through radio news or through relatives and friends. Those onduty during the night did not take any specific measures themselves, butwaited for the arrival of their superiors the following morning. Even if thesuperiors were aware of the accident during the night, they did not, with fewexceptions, take any action. They concluded that a direct crisis situation didnot exist in the county itself and, therefore, no preparational measures werenecessary. The fastest alarm and information channel appears to have beenthe dissemination of news through the broadcast media.
The local police took little action during the night. There was no prepara-
tion to handle events such as the Estonia shipwreck, either organisationally or
culturally. Several of the police officers interviewed for this study said thatthey found themselves quite lost in this situation, since there was no physicalaccident site in the county and since the situation did not require a traditionalpolice response. Instead, they were expected to move into a crisis mode ofoperation, comprising several units (social services, health care and churches,etc.). Furthermore, for several days the police were operating in a turbulentinformation environment in which they were not receiving sufficient infor-mation about victims from central sources. At the same time, however, thedemand for this information was enormous. There was a long period of con-fusion surrounding the identity of who had been on board the ferry in thefirst place, who had drowned and who had been saved.
Crisis reception centres were set up in the individual municipalities in the
morning. Ad hoc crisis management groups were also established throughout
the period. Even if formal crisis management plans were not activated, suchplans nonetheless served as the basis of the ad hoc activities. The communi-
cation between the parties involved was characterised by temporary solutions.Certain authorities had severe difficulty in responding effectively to the enor-mous volume of telephone enquiries.
Even at the county and local levels, loved ones had difficulty contacting the
appropriate authorities, i.e. those that could deal with the consequences ofthe accident. With the exception of the police, loved ones had the most con-tact with regional radio stations. Apparently these ‘non-official’ institutions,such as radio stations, were perceived as a natural point of contact by many.
Once initiated, the municipal crisis management system functioned well,
despite certain instances of ad hoc organisation. The operation received much
praise in our interviews. Individual government and organisational personnelmade great contributions, and inter-organisational cooperation appears tohave functioned relatively friction-free despite the intersection of a number ofdifferent organisational cultures, for example, social services, psychologyteams, the church, the police, local associations and voluntary organisations.
Some of the crisis groups had to confront a particular problem from mediaComparison of two major Swedish crises 119

coverage. The problems were particularly pronounced in a town that attracted
a massive media presence including international TV companies. Under-standably, the crisis management plan of this fairly small town did notinclude measures for dealing with a large media presence at the same time asdealing with affected and grieving relatives. Furthermore, the personnelinvolved were unaccustomed to this type of contact.
The salvage issue
At the time of the Estonia sinking, a shift in government was taking place in
Sweden. The outgoing conservative government was being succeeded by a
social democratic regime. Contacts between the incoming and outgoingPrime Ministers appear to have functioned extremely well as far as theEstonia disaster is concerned. They spoke with the same voice in the initial
phase, promising that the ferry would be salvaged in order to retrieve thebodies for burial.
For the incoming government, the issue became increasingly more difficult
to handle, not least because it affected three different countries – Sweden,Estonia and Finland. The vessel was registered in Estonia and it sank inFinnish waters. For reasons that cannot be specifically ascertained, theSwedish government altered its position on the salvage issue, claiming thatthe sea was a worthy burial site and that the wreckage should be covered withconcrete to protect it from trespassing and plundering. This view was vehe-mently opposed by some of the bereaved. They protested against thegovernment breaking its promise and wanted to retrieve the bodies for finalidentification so that they would not have to live with the uncertainty ofwhat had happened to the victims.
In addition to this, a Royal Commission set up to study the cause of the
shipwreck dragged on and remains essentially unresolved to this day. A judi-cial process is being prepared to settle the matter of responsibility between theshipping company, the maritime authorities and the shipyard that carriedout renovation work on the Estonia a few years prior to the accident.
These circumstances fostered an emotional debate about the misleading
nature of the information reported in the media. Representatives of thebereaved accused the government and relevant authorities of not listening totheir demands and hiding facts about the shipwreck. Among the groups ofbereaved, however, different views about the salvage issue emerged, renderingcontact even more difficult. At the national level, a lack of preparedness fordealing with the wishes of the bereaved for contact and advice made relationsworse, and this created the impression in the media that the authorities werebehaving in an arrogant fashion and that they were avoiding the demands ofthe bereaved. Frequent articles about dissatisfied and disappointed loved onesreinforced this image, and due to the extent of the disaster and the media cov-erage surrounding it, this meant in effect that the entire Swedish populationwas engaged in the fate of the victims and the feelings of the survivors.120 Larsåke Larsson and Stig A. Nohrstedt

In sum, considerable public relations problems arose in connection with the
Estonia shipwreck, the most important of which were difficulties associated
with warning regional and local authorities, quickly conveying information to
loved ones, organising ongoing contacts with the bereaved and handling thesalvage issue.
Media coverage
The mass media naturally displayed a great interest in and devoted consider-
able coverage to the shipwreck. During the subsequent three weeks, the fournational papers wrote nearly 1,000 articles – frequently entire pages – aboutthe accident, and the three main television channels broadcast a total of 9hours of news stories. Not surprisingly, the focus of coverage during the firstfew days was the accident itself. Later, however, the focus shifted to the vic-tims and the handling of the bereaved, particularly in local newspapers, aswell as safety and technical issues in the national media. One of the ethicalissues raised was whether the passenger list should be publicised. Here, cer-tain media chose to publish the list while others did not. Research on mediacoverage of the disaster has so far only studied the first three weeks after theaccident. During that period, the coverage contained relatively little criticalmonitoring (Hedman, 1996). But later there is a much more critical coveragedue to the adverse relations between the authorities and the relatives.
The Gothenburg fire
Warning systems and mobilisation issues, as well as the handling of contactswith relatives, were also decisive factors in the case of the Gothenburg fire. Interms of the continuity and consequence of information, the main issue cre-ating problems for the responsible authorities was the cause of the fire.
In Gothenburg, a uniform crisis management plan has been in effect for
several years. It applies to all county and municipal authorities – the firedepartment, the police, health care, the office of City Hall and city sectionadministrative authorities (also, where necessary, the military). In the event ofa crisis, a joint leadership group is mobilised in special locations in the centralfire station, together with an information staff consisting of the informationmanagers of the various authorities.
Communication responses
Just before midnight on the night before All Hallows Eve 1998 (29 October
11:42 p.m.), a fire burst out in a meeting place belonging to the Macedonianassociation in Gothenburg. A party was taking place with nearly 400 youngpeople crowded into the facility. Most of the partygoers came from familieswith foreign origins – a total of 19 nationalities. The venue, which hadpermission for a far lower occupant capacity, quickly burst into flames. AnComparison of two major Swedish crises 121

intensive rescue operation was initiated, though it was delayed a few minutes
by the problem of localising the fire at the time of the alarm – the first signalwas sent via cell phone from the disc jockey inside the venue and was quitediffuse. Some 63 young people died in the fire and 213 were injured (Larssonand Nohrstedt, 2000).
The local media were quickly on the scene, recording rescue work, young
people jumping out of windows, those who had just died, and traumaticscenes of relatives arriving at the scene and discovering their children dead.Several television media interviewed rescued youths who criticised the policeand fire department for preventing them from returning to the site to try tohelp friends still inside – implying that in doing so the rescue personnelcaused unnecessary deaths.
Just over an hour after the fire alarm (1:00 a.m.), all of the members of the
crisis leadership group, including the chairman of the city council and thecity’s general manager, were on the scene and shoulder-to-shoulder with theleadership of the rescue team. The organisation operated smoothly – thesystem had been tested in recent years, particularly by a large tram accidentand a difficult snowstorm. The police, the fire brigade and hospitals alsohad valuable experience from a fire on board the Norwegian ferryScandinavian Star in 1990 just off the Swedish west coast which claimed 160
lives. What was needed in the current case, however, was the summoning ofsocial as well as technical competence. Getting information to the media wasone of three priority measures (apart from debriefing returning fire andambulance personnel and organising sufficient operational resources to con-trol the fire). A press centre was set up. The general extent of the damage andthe number of dead and injured were already known at this time.
In addition, the crisis team quickly decided to mobilise the crisis reception
centres in the parts of the city designated by the crisis plan to receive and sup-port loved ones. Approximately 30 centres were established.
At the main hospital, major problems arose as scores of relatives
descended to find out whether their young people were alive or dead and tolocate the injured. Largely as a result of the wide use of cell phones, they hadarrived at the same time as the injured, which was of course a problem initself. There were also a number of generally curious people contributing tothe crowd at the hospital – altogether between 4,000–5,000 persons are esti-mated to have been in the hospital area during the night. The situation wasparticularly chaotic at the morgue, where the identification of bodies tookplace. Certain coordination problems between health care and the policearose, as the police found themselves having to identify the deceased notaccording to their standard procedures, but in large numbers and in the pres-ence of loved ones.
PR personnel played leading roles in crisis management activities, both in
many of the city reception centres and at the hospitals. At the main hospital,the Vice-Information Manager was one of the three people who led the entireorganisational effort. A particular problem that occurred here was that the122 Larsåke Larsson and Stig A. Nohrstedt

regular ‘psychosocial unit’ could not handle the situation and had to be
quickly replaced.
The first press conference was held at 2:30 a.m. in one of the hospitals
where many of the injured had been taken. By this time, the national radioand one of the national television stations (TV4) had broadcast the news, andthe large local morning paper had stopped its presses. Even the BBC sent outa story. At 3:30 a.m., the first press conference was held in the press centre,where all official information continued to be brought together. At the pressconference, the fire commander on duty stated that the fire ‘could have beencaused by arson’. Press conferences were held about every other hour duringthe night and into the morning.
At 2 a.m. the alarm went out on the national level. The Prime Minister and
the Defence Minister (who is also responsible for civil defence) were wokenand met in the morning before taking a plane to Gothenburg. During the daythey visited the site of the fire as well as a local church that had become agathering place. They also participated in one of the press conferences and ina memorial service in the cathedral in the evening. There was tumult in thelocal church not only because of the throngs of people storming in but alsobecause the media wedged itself between the Prime Minister and the grievingpeople he was trying to address.
The next morning, a number of television crews arrived from various
European countries. At the press conference held at noon, 120–130 journal-ists from 50 or so media were present. A large staff of interpreters was neededfor the foreign journalists. Press meetings, between journalists and officialsfunctioned very well – with summary reports, question periods and inter-views – despite the large influx.
The joint leadership team and the information staff worked from Friday
night to Sunday evening. From Monday onward, responsibility was trans-ferred to the respective authorities. On Monday, memorial services were heldin schools. This seemed to be a helpful step towards psychological healing .In
addition, a special information team toured the schools, where firemen andpolice talked about the fire and what had been done. During the next week,the victims were buried, and particularly in the case of the Muslim funerals,there was a great deal of mass media coverage. The crisis reception centres inthe various parts of the city were maintained for about ten days, at first for 24hours a day.
Police investigation work continued for one and a half years. The investi-
gators became more and more convinced that the fire was startedintentionally, especially after comprehensive technical testing using small-scale models of the venue. In New Y ear 1999, four boys with foreignbackgrounds suspected of starting the fire to seek revenge for being deniedentrance to the party were charged with arson (Larsson and Nohrstedt,2000).Comparison of two major Swedish crises 123

Media coverage
A Royal Commission under the leadership of Professor Kent Asp (SOU
1999, no. 68) studied media coverage of the fire. The study concluded that themedia performed well throughout the period: ‘The commission’s general con-clusion is that the mass media provided the public with nuanced andinformative coverage in light of the circumstances’ (ibid: 12). The studystated, for example, that it was reasonable to pay attention to the ethnicangle, i.e. the fact that most victims and the bereaved had immigrant back-grounds. Criticism of the rescue efforts received fairly wide coverage in thebroadcast media and in the evening (tabloid) papers the first day after the fire,but in general this was not sweeping. On the other hand, the police receivedoverwhelmingly negative criticism for their input, even if the spokesperson forthe police corps was given the opportunity to address this criticism. TheCommission report refuted the claim that the immigrant-targeted media pre-sented a more critical picture of rescue efforts than the Swedish languagemedia.
The speculation during the first days that the fire was caused by arson was
reported in both the Swedish and foreign media. However, the study statedthat this was not an explanation that journalists themselves constructed, butrather one that had first been formulated by the rescue leader’s statement thatthe cause ‘could have been arson’. In the media, responsibility for the disas-ter tended to be placed on those who arranged the party or on racist/Nazigroups. According to the Commission’s study, however, the media coverage
rarely pointed out the latter as being responsible (SOU, 1999: 68, 63).
Interviews with journalists and editors showed that they consciously
adopted a cautious approach in reporting whether the fire might have beencaused by arson. The editorial chief of the leading local paper inGothenburg, for example, said that they were swamped by phone calls fromforeign colleagues, all of whom assumed that the deed was motivated byracism. Personally, he explained, he chose to ‘weigh every word on a goldenscale’ and not convey unconfirmed rumours about the causes of the fire. Healso tried to avoid over-use of the term ‘immigrant’ in order to make sure thatcertain readers wouldn’t get the impression that the paper favoured‘Gothenburgers and Swedes’. At the same time, several journalists said thatthey received many positive reactions from immigrants who, amidst all theconfusion, felt that the coverage was good because it was the first time theyfelt they were treated as part of Swedish society (Englund, 2000).
This picture of the media coverage is supported by two other studies, one
based on interviews with young people from the same schools and social cir-cles as the victims (Olausson, 2000), and the other based on surveys of,among other things, immigrants’ faith in various societal institutions(Wadbring and Weibull, 2000). The first study shows that young people havean overwhelmingly positive view of the fact that the media devoted so muchattention to the grief of friends and relatives. Similarly, the confidence study124 Larsåke Larsson and Stig A. Nohrstedt

revealed improved perceptions of the daily press among immigrants in the
western region after the fire.
The confidence study also suggested ways in which trust in the responsible
authorities was affected by the fire. Immigrants in the region judged politi-cians both at the national and local levels more positively after the fire thanbefore. This upswing can be explained by the relatively rapid reaction to thefire by the national and municipal political leaders, as well as by theirparticipation in managing the crisis and grief counselling. The visit of cabi-net officials to Gothenburg received tremendous coverage in the media, andthe same applies to the involvement of local politicians and authorities.
Comparative analysis
In analysing crisis situations, the research frequently points to deficiencies ininternal and external contacts and communications among relevant author-ities or organisations. ‘Research studies have consistently documented seriousorganisational problems in mobilisation of relevant resources, in intra- andinter-organisational communication and co-ordination.’ Another commonobservation is that the authorities’ handling of external contacts have oftenexacerbated the problems that arose for affected groups in connection with aserious accident (Quarantelli, 1989).
The question, then, is whether this pattern is repeated in the two accidents
studied here. Did the public relations behaviour of the responsible bodiescontribute to the development of a crisis? The answer, it would seem quiteclearly, is that while this appears to be the case in the Estonia ferry disaster,
the Gothenburg fire provides an example in which the authorities’ publicrelations behaviour helped to reverse crisis tendencies.
Examining the public relations activities of these two cases in greater detail,
it can be stated that the Estonia ferry disaster differs from the Gothenburg fire
according to the two factors we have concentrated on in this comparison:flexibility and mobilisation of resources; and the continuity and consequencesof information.
Flexibility and mobilisation of resources
While the responsible authorities and even the affected shipping company in
the Estonia case had difficulty grasping the extent of the disaster and the
need for informational inputs, the local authorities in Gothenburg displayedboth considerable speed and flexibility in adjusting to the demands of the sit-uation. A contributing factor in this regard is of course the fact that theEstonia case necessitated information initiatives at the national level as well as
mobilising authorities at the regional and local levels. This of course is morecomplicated than reaching out to different parts of a city in a municipaladministration. In the case of the fire, however, the national level response isalso striking in that the national government quickly perceived the importanceComparison of two major Swedish crises 125

of clearly signalling their participation and engagement. The visit of the
Prime Minister the following day was an important symbolic manifestation ofthe nation’s feelings for the suffering caused by the accident. Local authoritiesin Gothenburg were also more aware of the need for information and werebetter prepared to handle the situation than appears to have been the case inthe Estonia accident. The town quickly established crisis reception centres to
handle the contact and information needs of affected groups. Cooperationbetween the various immigrant associations contributed much to this effort aswell. In the Estonia case, there was a long period in which there was no com-
parable representative for the bereaved, nor was there a functioningorganisation to facilitate contacts with them. This contributed to the mediaimage of the authorities – particularly those at the central level – as merelytrying to shield themselves from the consequences of the disaster.
The continuity and consequences of information
One of the greatest public relations problems associated with the Estonia
disaster was the lack of continuity regarding the decision to salvage the
wreckage. The shipwreck occurred at the time of a governmental shift, andboth the outgoing and incoming Prime Ministers immediately declared thatthe wreckage and the bodies would be salvaged. This statement, whichreceived a great deal of coverage in the media, later came to be reversed, andtoday the ship lies at the bottom of the Baltic Sea. In the intervening years,the media has repeatedly given considerable voice to the demands of bereavedgroups to recover the bodies for land burial and to salvage the ferry in orderto obtain a definite answer about the cause of the accident, etc. Media report-ing has also focused largely on dissatisfaction with the government’s handlingof the situation, not only in terms of the salvage issue but also in terms of theseeming disinterest of the authorities in listening to the views of the bereaved.It also took a long time before forms of contact with bereaved groups wereorganised and transferred from the government chancellery to a centralauthority within the civil defence administration.
Although the response to crisis was far more effective in the case of the
Gothenburg fire, information about the fire did not satisfy the needs of thepublic and the bereaved. The fact that the cause of the fire could not bedetermined for more than a year certainly made things more difficult. Thefirst response from the authorities came from the rescue leader, who saidthat the pattern of spread of the fire suggested that it was arson. Later com-munication from officials said that the cause was not determined. For a longperiod, the media was filled with information about a variety of possiblecauses. This period of uncertainty about the cause of the fire contributedboth to lasting psychological burdens for the bereaved and to speculation andthe spread of rumours. At the same time, spokespersons for the police and thecourts emphasised that everything possible was being done to identify thecause of the fire and to bring the perpetrators to justice. Just as important126 Larsåke Larsson and Stig A. Nohrstedt

was the fact that the authorities, together with religious and immigrant asso-
ciations, quickly responded with crisis reception centres that later carried outlong-term activity to assist affected persons. At the same time, public atten-tion was focused on the efforts of societal institutions to support the mostdirectly affected, and even if this did not directly reduce their suffering, griefand worry, it nonetheless effectively dispelled the notion that the responsibleauthorities did not take the problem seriously.
Conclusion
Weighing the experiences of these two Swedish disasters, it would appearthat an important partial explanation as to why the Gothenburg fire did notdevelop into a social crisis – relative to the Estonia ferry disaster – was the
greater degree to which the public relations activity was handled profession-ally (in accordance with Grunig’s (1992) ‘excellence’ principles), i.e. a moreopen, receptive and proactive engagement. Most importantly, the authoritiesin Gothenburg avoided the fatal mistake of appearing arrogant and insensi-tive to the needs of the bereaved. Particularly interesting is the fact that theresponsible authorities in the case of the fire seem to have been more aware ofand prepared for handling a conflict and crisis dynamic in a multiculturalsociety. Due in part to the statements made by the rescue leadership that thefire could have been caused by arson, and further coupled with the subse-quent suspicion that it could have been a racist attack, the threatening imageof potential ethnic instability appeared quite realistic. Here it is possible thatthe speculation and rumours generated a more powerful and apparentlyempathetic engagement on the part of the authorities than would have oth-erwise been the case. Given these conditions, this can be seen as a rational andreasonable response aimed at preventing the escalation of the accident into asocial crisis.
To what extent can the more professional behaviour exhibited in the case of
the Gothenburg fire be explained by learning from earlier disasters such as theEstonia? It is of course impossible, if not somewhat meaningless, to isolatelearning effects from a single case. On the other hand, it does seem reasonablyclear that the more serious accidents and disasters that have occurred over thepast 20 years have resulted in an increased knowledge and awareness of the needto develop competence in different areas of crisis management, including thehandling of public relations. A number of studies, both academic and official,have addressed the issue of communication problems. The interest in crisis man-agement literature and professional training appears to have increased rapidlyboth in Sweden and internationally. There is reason to believe that these trendshave contributed to better-planned and more successful responses on the part ofthe responsible authorities. This, in turn, helps explain why there may have beena greater capacity for crisis management in connection with the discotheque firethan was the case at the time of the Estonia ferry disaster four years earlier.
In our view, the comparison of the Estonia disaster and the GothenburgComparison of two major Swedish crises 127

fire illustrates that the responsible authorities have not only drawn lessons
from prior experiences in a way that has resulted from more competent publicrelations in association with larger accidents, they have also increased theircapacity to learn. Today there is a greater effort to develop competence in thearea of disaster and crisis management than there was five or six years ago.This is a significant conclusion that underlies the importance of judging thehandling of larger accidents and social disruptions not according to thedegree or speed of a return to ‘normalcy’, but rather according to how theseexperiences are harnessed into the development of competence and learning.
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Case 11 Lobbying for survival
The UK BSE crisis and
the role of the Meat andLivestock Commission in lifting the EC beefexport ban
Phil Harris and Paul Baines
Introduction: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
This case examines the still ongoing crisis which has hit the British beef
industry as a result of the discovery of BSE in cattle during the 1980s. Thecase examines how the farming industry and the British government havesought to address the problem and have attempted to restore confidence inthe safety of British beef both in the UK and overseas markets.
BSE was first reported as being found in a UK beef herd in April 1985 in
Ashford, Kent (Ford, 1996) and scientifically confirmed in September 1986. Itsorigins are uncertain, but it has been strongly argued by such experts as JohnBourne, Institute for Animal Health (Bourne, 1996), that it developed as aresult of the use of meat-and-bone meal (especially sheep scrapie-infectedcarcasses and offal) being used as a protein supplement in animal feed in theearly 1980s. In response to the confirmed outbreak, a ban on the feeding ofruminant protein to ruminants was introduced in the UK in mid-1988 whencases of BSE had risen to 200 a month. In late 1989, a total ban on using spec-ified bovine offal in human food was introduced. Irrespective of this action,BSE cases continued to increase, peaking in 1992 at 3,000 cases a month, theequivalent on an annual basis to one in 300 of all UK cattle becoming infected(Cocks and Bentley, 1996).
The level of reported infections and the growing instances of BSE cases
after the feed ban date triggered more numerous inspections and tighter mea-sures such as offal staining to reduce instances of contamination inslaughterhouses. The government continued to deny any human health risk,and the European Union (EU) continued to allow the export of young UKbred cattle. But in March 1996 (with new cases being reported at around1,000 a month) the potential link between BSE and Creutzfeldt-JakobDisease (CJD), the human equivalent of BSE, was officially announced, anda worldwide export ban on British beef followed. The impact of this decisionwas immediate and devastated the UK beef export trade. The scale of thebusiness and the increasing importance of the EU as the prime market prior

The UK BSE crisis: lifting the beef ban 131
to the height of the BSE crisis can be seen in Table 11.1 which outlines the
volume of exports of UK beef for 1990 and 1995, while Table 11.2 shows thechronology of the UK BSE crisis.
The British beef export industry’s sales value plummeted overnight from
approximately £520 million (recorded sales in 1995) to £0 (see Table 11.3 formore details). John Major’s Conservative government appealed and referredthe ban to the European Court of Justice on the grounds that it was intro-duced on political rather than health grounds. This appeal was subsequentlyunsuccessful. After initiating a number of financial aid schemes, principallyto rescue stricken farmers and imposing a number of restrictions on theproduction and distribution of British beef, the worldwide ban was eventu-ally lifted more than three years later in August 1999. The total cost of thegovernment’s aid packages in support of the beef industry during the periodwas estimated to have cost the UK taxpayer between £3–£3.5 billion, withlosses to UK exporters of between £1–£2 billion (Baines and Harris, 2000).
The consumer role of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and
Fisheries (MAFF)
Many commentators have argued consistently during the past ten years that,
in this government area of policy-making, there needed to be a departmentthat represents more effectively the consumer – not just on customer rights inretailing, but championing standards in food production, processing, pack-aging and protecting the natural environment from over-exploitation(McCormick, 1991). Some signs of consumer interest groups exerting pres-sure on the quality and standard of food have been seen in additivecampaigns (Grant, 1995), anti-genetically modified (GM) foods, and increas-ingly, through the power of retail food supermarket chains exerting marketingpressure on producers via buying preferences.Table 11.1 UK beef exports (tonnes) for 1990 and 1995
Destination 1990 1995
France 67,000 80,000
Italy 4,000 42,000
Netherlands 9,000 17,000
Spain 1,000 7,000
South Africa 3,000 27,000
Other EU countries 16,000 45,000
Other non-EU countries 14,000 28,000
Total 114,000 246,000
Source: Meat and Livestock Commission.

MAFF policy-making has come under growing influence and scrutiny
from pressure groups as concern for animal welfare has increased dramati-
cally in society (an area of activity where Britain still leads the world). Thistrend can be seen in the vigorous protest movement against live animal ship-ment with picketing seen at such places as Brightlingsea, Coventry andShoreham in 1995 and 1996. Interestingly, the campaigners represented allpolitical persuasions, not least of all country and suburban-basedConservative government supporters. There are a growing number of animalrights pressure groups and special interests which have continued to attemptto influence policy-making; however, until relatively recently, most of theirviews were largely ignored by MAFF . Key among the animal rights and132 Phil Harris and Paul Baines
Table 11.2 Chronology of the UK BSE crisis
Date Events
1985 Clinical signs of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) are
found in UK cattle.
June 1986 UK government scientists agree first official diagnosis of BSE.
August 1988 The government orders the slaughtering of BSE-infected cattle
and compensates farmers.
November 1989 Specified bovine offal (material most likely to contain BSE-
infected tissue) from cattle more than six months of age banned
for human consumption.
April 1990 British Government chief veterinary officer criticises Russian ban
on British beef.
March 1993 First known human death from CJD: Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease.
March 1996 UK Health Secretary admits possible link between BSE-infected
cattle and CJD.
March 1996 EU imposes worldwide ban on British beef.April 1996 EU Agriculture Minister Franz Fischler and EC President Jacques
Santer both state that they would personally eat British beef.British Prime Minister refers the ban to the European Court of
Justice insisting that the ban is based on political rather thanpublic health grounds.
May 1996 UK government initiates its Over Thirty Months Scheme (OTMS)
where cattle above the set age (those most likely to havecontracted BSE) are destroyed.
August 1999 Worldwide ban on British beef lifted.
October 1999 France continues to operate ban on British beef despite EC ruling
provoking UK consumer boycott of French products, led by
leading UK supermarket groups including Budgens; this, in turn,stimulates port protests by French farmers.EC scientific committee considers new French evidence, rulingthat removal of the trade ban on British Beef is still justified,paving the way for the re-establishment of its export markets.

welfare lobbies have been the twelve major pressure groups listed below,
which range from established, more conservative bodies, to more radical sci-entific specialist groups:
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA)
The largest animal welfare organisation in Europe has a measured approach
of looking after all animal welfare interests. This has resulted in recent devel-opments like a highly targeted and effective lobbying campaign ofgovernment on the movement of live animals, dangerous dogs, etc.
Compassion In World Farming (CIWF)
Instrumental in having veal crates, sow tethering and narrow stall systems
banned. Developing offices and organisations in Eire and France to foster amore consistent European approach on issues.The UK BSE crisis: lifting the beef ban 133
Table 11.3 Revenue lost from UK beef exports by country
Importer 1995 value 1999 value
(£m) (£m)
France 179.0 0
Italy 126.0 0
Ireland 52.0 0
Netherlands 49.4 0
South Africa 23.8 0
Spain 17.4 0
Denmark 12.0 0
Belgium 10.0 0
Portugal 7.0 0
Mauritius 4.0 0
Sweden 3.0 0
Ghana 2.5 0
Malta 2.2 0
Hungary 1.8 0
Hong Kong 1.8 0
Saudi Arabia 1.7 0
Gabon 1.7 0
Angola 1.5 0
Philippines 1.5 0
Greece 0.6 0
Germany 0.6 0
Other non-EU 20.5 0
Total 520.0 0
Source: Meat and Livestock Commission.

Animal Aid
Advocates an end to livestock farming altogether.
Advocates for Animals
Active in campaigning against the movement of live animals to the Continent.
The Political Animal Lobby (PAL)
Wants sentient animals to be under another category of the EU Treaty other
than the one that lumps animals in with any items of trade. This would leadautomatically to better conditions and standards for animals.
Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC)
A government advisory body, its members are appointed by the Minister of
Agriculture.
Farm Animal Welfare Network (FAWN)
Concerned primarily with chicken and poultry animal welfare. Recently
began campaigning on game fare standards.
Farm Animal Care Trust (FACT)
Pioneering trust to campaign for good standards of farm welfare.
The World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA)
Organisation works behind the scenes worldwide to improve standards in trans-
port, slaughter and markets. Opposes indoor intensive production systems.
The Universities Federation of Animal Welfare (UFAW)
Federation of concerned academics, experts and others who produce technical
reports and bulletins on the core issues and best practice in animal welfare.
The Humane Slaughter Association (HSA)
Started by two women in 1911 who wanted to see the captive bolt pistol
replace the earlier poleaxe method of stunning animals.
Interestingly, most of the leading edge pressure group bodies in this area
have maintained a low profile in the media on the BSE issue; it can be arguedthat they felt that the issues were already well established in the public domainand had raised issues which underpinned their own specialist agendas.134 Phil Harris and Paul Baines

However, they have certainly played a vocal part in raising animal welfare
issues, which have become an integral part of modern consumer preferences.
The role of the Meat and Livestock Commission
The Meat and Livestock Commission (MLC) was used in these difficult cir-cumstances to provide help and leadership for a beleaguered industry.Established under the 1967 Agriculture Act, the MLC’s original aim hadbeen to promote increased efficiency in the livestock and associated productindustries of Great Britain. The MLC is currently funded through a statutorylevy placed on animals slaughtered in the UK or exported, although theMLC increasingly raises commercial income from within the livestock indus-try. A major focus for the MLC has been to restore consumer confidence inbeef products within the UK and other EU countries after the BSE crisis.Thus, the MLC has effectively acted as a champion for the UK beef industry,researching consumer attitudes and coordinating industry-wide initiatives.One of the key performance indicators used by the MLC has been the adop-tion of its ‘blueprint techniques’ for production and distribution by the beefindustry to ensure high quality meat produce.
The introduction of a quality ‘kite mark’ for minced beef produced using
MLC blueprint techniques and a ‘traceability scheme’ detailing the stages ofthe supply chain through which the product has passed, in addition to heavyadvertising support – both on television and through magazines and news-papers communicating the quality of traditional British cuts of steak – hadensured a strong domestic recovery in consumer confidence by the time of thelifting of the worldwide ban in August 1999. Total Great Britain householdbeef consumption for the 4-week period ending 31 July 1999 was only 6 percent down on the same period in 1998 and 2 per cent down on the sameperiod in 1995 (MAFF, 1999).
The British beef export market
The export market for British beef inside and outside Europe rests on cooper-ation, collaboration and competition between member organisations of thesupply chain within the domestic market, and the development of relationshipswith organisations within the EU beef supply chain. In addition, besides theproducers and distributors within the domestic industry, the export market forBritish beef is also influenced by organisations within the political sector. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), for example, the Meat Hygiene Service,the Meat and Livestock Commission and politicians associated with the com-petitiveness of what is a key British industry such as the Secretary of State forthe Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, and the President of theBoard of Trade, have all had an impact upon the export process. Figure 11.1illustrates those stakeholders within the domestic market that have a bearing onthe export of British beef. An attempt is made to demonstrate which organisa-The UK BSE crisis: lifting the beef ban 135

tions have the greatest influence upon the export process by dividing the vari-
ous organisations and politicians into those that are:
• key stakeholders;
• stakeholders that need to be kept satisfied;• stakeholders that need to be informed;• stakeholders that have little influence and, therefore, should receive only
minimal effort in terms of lobbying and communication activity.
The different organisations within the supply chain that contribute to exportprocesses include beef processors who prepare packaged products for export,multiple retail grocers who supply European subsidiaries with pre-packagedbeef products, selected farmers who raise and develop herds (e.g. AberdeenAngus), the MLC which exists to raise British export revenues (in addition toits domestic targets), and EU-approved abattoirs that prepare beef carcassesfor export.
The political nature of the European beef industry was highlighted by the
following statement made in the House of Commons in December 1997 by136 Phil Harris and Paul Baines
KEY PLAYERS
UK Prime Minister
EU President
Secretary of State for Ministry
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
MLC
EU beef producers
Multiple retailers UK and EU
KEEP SATISFIED
UK Meat and Hygiene Service
The EU Commission
EU Domestic Governments
German Länder (state)
governmentsMINIMAL EFFORT
REQUIRED
Cattle auctioneers (UK)
Abattoirs (non-EU approved)KEEP INFORMED
Abattoirs (EU approved)
Farmers in UK
Agro-businesses
Veterinary professionals
Animal pressure groupsHigh
Interest
LowHigh Power Low
Figure 11.1 Stakeholder mapping of key players involved in UK beef exports.

the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, Dr
Jack Cunningham, who took over the agriculture portfolio after the electionof the Labour government in the 1997 British General Election:
there is an over-supply of beef throughout Europe, and a long-termdecline in beef consumption . . . the [UK] government’s aim for agricul-tural policy is to change fundamentally the narrow producer focus of thepresent common agricultural policy, to decouple support from produc-tion, to work for sustainable farming and to give customers, taxpayersand the environment greater priority.
The BSE crisis ensured that British beef exports effectively became a globaltrade issue. Japan ceased importation of British beef for pet food produc-tion, supplementing its ban on imports of UK beef for human consumption(a ban that has operated since 1951 out of fear of foot-and-mouth diseasealthough it excludes selected cuts of Aberdeen Angus for Sushi prepara-tion). Taiwan also announced a ban on canned beef, sausage and ham,supplementing its original ban placed on British and Irish beef in 1990(USMEF, 1999). The United States banned British beef in 1991 as a reac-tion to BSE and in retaliation for the European ban on American meattreated with hormones.
The EU-imposed worldwide ban on British beef and the erosion of con-
sumer confidence in its safety ensured a heavy fall in export sales. Table 11.3demonstrates the relative loss of income from a variety of EU and non-EUcountries. Potentially significant non-EU markets include South Africa,Australia, the United States and Japan, while France, Italy, Ireland and theNetherlands represent the most significant EU export markets for the Britishbeef product.
MLC public relations and public affairs campaign
To re-establish British beef export markets and remove existing and, arguablyunlawful, domestic bans still operating in some EU countries (e.g. someregional state governments in Germany and the national government inFrance), the MLC has aimed to influence opinion formers through the use ofpublic affairs and marketing staff at its European offices in Brussels andParis, and through its agents operating in EU countries.
Because of the complexity of the BSE issue and the psychological and
political issues associated with the beef market, a focused public affairs cam-paign had to be mounted. This included the following elements: an issuesmanagement analysis, a focused, scientific information campaign and a highquality standards-led export drive.The UK BSE crisis: lifting the beef ban 137

Issues management analysis
The development of an issues management approach to assess over time the
prime impediments to the easing of the ban on the export of UK beef by theEuropean Commission was adopted. This was carried out by MLC in con-junction with specialist advisors on EC agricultural policy and MAFF . TheEC Directorate General Six (DG6) has prime responsibility for agriculturewithin the EU and was the key target for focused lobbying activity that wasbuilt around providing quality information flow and scientific research tosupport a review of existing policy.
Focused scientific information campaign
The campaign of lobbying, media, political and press activity was focused on
achieving a sequential lifting of the ban on beef exports and associated leg-islation. This element of the campaign included a press campaign both withinBrussels and member states emphasising the remedial steps that had beentaken in the UK beef industry, such as tracing the beef herd from birth to endproduct, introduction of animal passports, rigorous scrutiny of slaughter-house and meat processing standards, and the large-scale destruction ofsuspect or infected herds. This included presenting evidence of the gradualelimination of the disease and the high quality standards now prevalent in themeat and associated processing industries. Press activity was initially partic-ularly focused on scientific and trade journals and specialist media. As thecampaign developed, so activity was increased in EU member states, such asFrance and Germany, where there was a reluctance to accept the lifting of theban. Media activity and lobbying were then focused around the followingcore events:
• March 1996. The EC bans the import of British beef.
• June 1996. The EC meeting in Florence agrees on a framework for the
gradual removal of the export ban. Further Commission and CouncilDecisions have since amended the ban, notably Decisions 98/256 and98/692.
• June 1996. The ban on export of bovine semen from the UK is lifted by
the EU.
• September 1998. The lifting of the ban on commercial exports of beef
cattle from Northern Ireland.
• July 1999. The Commission set 1 August 1999 as the date from which UK
beef exports could start under the Date-based Export Scheme (DBES).By the end of December there were two plants – St Merryn Meats atProbus, near Truro, and Scotbeef at Strathaven in Lanarkshire –approved to export beef under the DBES. St Merryn commenced slaugh-tering cattle for export on 2 August, its first export taking place on 24August. Since then regular consignments have been sent to several138 Phil Harris and Paul Baines

European countries. Throughout this period a full media campaign was
mounted to support the relaunch of British beef and the high qualitynow obtainable. A number of politicians from agricultural constituen-cies and opposition parties supported the initiative by hosting beefeating events in Brussels and London to laud the quality of British beef.On the more popular front, leading UK and continental chefs did aseries of promotions on the high quality of British beef for selectedmedia.
• By the end of August 1999, 12 of the 14 other EU member states had
confirmed that they had no barriers in place to prevent the import ofUK DBES beef, France and Germany had kept their import bans inplace contrary to EU law. France provided evidence in support of itsban which was considered by the European Commission’s ScientificSteering Committee (SSC). The SSC agreed unanimously on 29 Octoberthat: ‘There are currently no grounds for revising the overall conclusionsof the SSC Opinions directly related to the rationale of the DBES andthe measures taken by the UK make any risk to human health from theUK DBES at least comparable to that in other European MemberStates.’
• On 16 November 1999, the Commission launched legal proceedings
against France for failure to lift the ban while parallel discussions tookplace between the UK, France and the Commission with the aim ofsecuring the lifting of the French import ban. On 23 November theEuropean Commission produced a document summarising the outcomeof these discussions. However, following consultation with the FrenchFood Standards Agency, on 9 December, the French governmentannounced that it would be maintaining its ban. On 14 December theEuropean Commission issued a Reasoned Opinion on France’s failure tolift its import ban. The French government responded to the ReasonedOpinion on 30 December maintaining its refusal to lift the ban followingwhich the Commission will be pursuing the case through the EuropeanCourt of Justice during the course of 2000. The German FederalGovernment said it would take the necessary legal steps to lift its ban, butbecause of the constitutional position in Germany, it would take sometime. As a result the German Bundesrat were not able to vote on the leg-
islation to lift the import ban during the course of 1999 and the banwould stay in place until a vote is taken during 2000.
• August 2000. The Commission recommends the adoption of full trace-
ability scheme modelled on the UK system for general adoption on allmeat products sold throughout the EU.
Only a sensitive, long-term and scientifically based public affairs campaignusing an issues management approach to target media and politicians hasbeen able to achieve this ‘about turn’.The UK BSE crisis: lifting the beef ban 139

High quality standards-led export drive
In the past, MLC has sought to influence non-EU overseas export sales by
taking part in overseas trade missions in South Africa, China, the Philippinesand Japan. The British Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for theMinistry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food have both also been active intrying to ensure that the ban on British beef still operating in some Germanstates and in France is lifted as soon as possible (in line with the EC Directivereleased in August 1999). British politicians have also been actively seekingthe removal of trade bans operating in non-EU countries. All this activity hasbeen supported by regular EU and UK press briefings on the scale of mea-sures taken by UK government and beef producers to ensure meat fromBritain is of the highest standards.
The beef export scheme for the UK (excluding Northern Ireland which has
a computer tracking system and has been able to demonstrate that its herdhas been BSE-free for more than a year) imposes restrictions on the prepa-ration of the meat. The meat has to be de-boned (effective from the 1 August1996 when the meat and bone meal feed restrictions that were argued to bethe source of the infected meat came into place) and aged from 6 to 30months. UK politicians have argued that, as a result of these safeguards andrestrictions, British beef is the safest in the world.
Postscript
As the European Commission exists to implement laws and regulationsmade by a combination of the European Parliament and Council, it wasessential that the early thrust of the campaign was aimed at these twobodies to lift the beef ban. To achieve this, lobbying and briefing activitywas directed towards EC officials and national government politicians andstaff to gain support and overturn the ban. Once this was agreed, theDirectorate Générale (EC government department) for agriculture imple-mented the policy. This resulted in a gradual acceptance in the Germanmarket with some regional variations in the speed of lifting the ban and acontinuing ban in France, which is being challenged in the ECJ by theCommission. To repeal the ban has taken time, planning and the consistentnon-belligerent approach adopted by the UK government, MLC and farm-ing interests to overturn the EU ban.
The BSE crisis in the British beef industry has been a major factor in lead-
ing to the deepest slump in UK agriculture for more than 70 years. Thesteady public affairs and scientific work by government, its agencies and thefarming industry is only now beginning to restore confidence. Consumerconfidence in the UK has taken considerable time to restore; it will takelonger for the same to be achieved in the EU and worldwide.140 Phil Harris and Paul Baines

Evaluation
It is very difficult to evaluate the success of the MLC campaign to regain lost
markets in the EU for British beef. In the UK, consumption of British-pro-duced beef has returned to levels just below pre-BSE crisis levels. Product isbeing differentiated and increasingly labelled as from Northern Ireland,Wales, Scotland, particular English regions, organic farms or quality breedsand herds. However, only in 2000 were there signs that some traditional EUmarkets were beginning to take quality British beef again, most notably theBenelux countries in small amounts, particularly of Aberdeen Angus, whileother markets have turned to local producers for native products, for instance,South Africa, and are unlikely to return to British beef. However, the fact thatthe EU ban has been lifted means that the objectives of the campaign in theshort term have been achieved. It is too early to evaluate the long-term suc-cess of the campaign.
Lessons learned
This case illustrates a number of important lessons both about the power ofpublic opinion, particularly on matters concerning public health, and equallyabout the difficult process of exerting influence within the political arena.Key lessons include:
• Handling any crisis in public confidence requires swift and decisive action
to be taken. Rhetoric alone will not work and only effective action to
address the source of concern will have a chance of turning public opin-ion around.
• The key to any effective lobbying campaign is to marshal the appropriate
evidence and present it in ways that can be easily understood by thepublic and politicians alike.
• In handling such a sensitive and complex issue as BSE, it is essential to
have the support of all interested parties and to ensure that a concertedand consistent message is being communicated.
• When dealing with lobbying on an EU-wide basis, it is necessary to take
account of the differing vested interests that will inevitably colour thereaction of individual governments. This requires a detailed understand-ing of the working of the EU political scene and knowledge of thevarious agendas that will affect the response of member governments andtheir advisors.The UK BSE crisis: lifting the beef ban 141

Appendix: the working of the EU political system
The European beef market
The World Trade Organisation, EU and domestic competition policy largely
regulate European beef production. Fluctuating exchange rates have aconsiderable impact upon the nature of sales and when the pound is strong,UK beef exports become expensive to European partners, making domesticsupply more profitable. The EU provides support to the beef industrythrough import levies, import quotas and export refunds on products tradedoutside the EU to ensure that European beef production stays at prices aboveworld market prices. The Common Agricultural Policy effectively governs thissupport regime and was designed to protect the EU farming sector fromexternal competition. The Common Agricultural Policy has been criticised inBritain because of its apparent bias towards the French and German farmingindustries (Harris and McDonald, 1994).
Perceived discrepancies in competitive advantage arising for different EU
member states as a result of the application of rules and regulations flowingfrom the Common Agricultural Policy ensure that lobbying activity remainsan important consideration for member state governments and their associ-ated firms. Increasingly, public affairs activity is seen to be effective inbringing about positive changes in the regulatory environment for the firmsinvolved in the public affairs activity.
The EU government structure
The EU is based on a series of treaties, which determine the agreed objectives
of the member states. It also has institutions that have powers to make andenforce EU laws and policies.
There are five institutions, specified in the treaties, which are involved in the
task of governing the activities of the EU:
1 European Parliament (EP).
The EP is the only directly elected institution within the EU, with repre-
sentatives from all the states. It holds the EC to account and has powersof co-decision with Council. It is an increasingly important body withinwhich to mobilise opinion to amend or change policy.
2 Council.
The Council is composed of the national government ministers respon-sible for the area which the Council is discussing. It is a body withinwhich to build-up coalitions of support to amend or bring forwardlegislation.
3 Commission.
The Commission is composed of a number of commissioners: two fromeach of the larger states and one from each of the smaller ones. It142 Phil Harris and Paul Baines

proposes new laws, based on articles in the treaties or on instructions
from the Council and EP .
4 Court of Justice (ECJ).
The ECJ is the final court of appeal for all matters relating to EU lawand the interpretation of the treaties.
5 Court of Auditors.
This audits the accounts of the EU to ensure that funds have been prop-erly and lawfully used.
In addition, the Council and the Commission are assisted by an Economicand Social Committee (ESC) and by a Committee of the Regions. A bank,the European Investment Bank (EIB), exists to fund development projects.
References
Baines, P . and Harris, P . (2000) ‘Kite flying: the role of marketing in the post-BSE
British beef export industry’. British Journal of Food, 102, 5/6.
Bourne, J. (1996) Institute for Animal Health. in The Guardian, Friday, 22 March 1996.
Cocks, R. and Bentley, R. (1996) £300 Billion, Government Spending: The Facts .
Reading: Databooks.
Ford, B. J. (1996) BSE. The Facts: Mad Cow Disease and the Risk to Mankind ,
London: Corgi.
Grant, W . (1995) Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain. Hemel
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Harris, P . and McDonald, F . (1994) European Business and Marketing: Strategic
Issues. London: Paul Chapman Publishing.
Harris, P . and O’Shaughnessy, N. (1997) ‘BSE and marketing communication myopia:
Daisy and the death of the sacred cow’, Risk, Decision and Policy, 2, 1, April.
MAFF (1999) ‘MAFF BSE information: support to the beef industry’, Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, accessed 26 October 1999.
McCormick, J. (1991) British Politics and the Environment. London: Earthscan.Meat and Livestock Commission (1998) Annual Report. London: MLC.Meat and Livestock Commission (1999a) http://www. Maff.gov.uk/animalh/
bse/market-support/market-support-index.html, accessed 26 October 1999.
Meat and Livestock Commission (1999b) Corporate Plan 1999/2002. London: MLC.USMEF (1999) ‘BSE scare becomes global beef issue’, United States Meat Export
Federation Export Newsline, http://ifse.tamu.edu/cknowledge/usmefexport.html,accessed 28 October 1999.The UK BSE crisis: lifting the beef ban 143

Case 12 Creating from crisis
Building the Oklahoma
City National Memorial
Barbara DeSanto, R. John
DeSanto and R. Brooks Garner
Introduction
Unlike much of the world, terrorist attacks have been rare in the United
States. That changed in 1993 when foreign individuals ignited a car bomb atthe World Trade Center in New Y ork City. Oklahoma, situated in the heart-land of America where one-half of the state’s three million people live inrural areas and small towns, was one of the last places in the country peopleexpected a terrorist bombing. Y et two years after the World Trade Centerincident, a bomb hidden in a truck destroyed the Alfred P . Murrah FederalBuilding in Oklahoma City. This event at 9:02 a.m. on April 19, 1995, was themost deadly terrorist attack in US history killing 168 people, including 19small children, injuring more than 600 people, and destroying or damagingmore than 300 buildings. This case examines how Oklahomans moved fromthe horrors of the bombing to create an internationally recognized memorialwith the mission of educating people worldwide about the senselessness ofterrorism.
The blast heard around the world
The nine-story federal building contained nearly 500 people the morning ofApril 19, 1995. At 9:02 a.m. 168 people were killed in and around the build-ing, while more than 800 survived. Thirty children became orphans, whileanother 219 children lost at least one parent. Some 462 people were lefthomeless, and 7,000 people in the area were left without a workplace. An esti-mated 387,000 Oklahoma City residents knew someone killed or injured inthe bombing, about one-third of the city’s population. In the days and weeksfollowing the bombing, more than 12,380 volunteers and rescue workers par-ticipated in the rescue operations. Estimates on rescue and recoveryoperations, funerals, medical expenses, counseling, trials and rebuilding putthe costs around $1 billion.
Oklahoma federal, state and local officials, especially firefighters, police
and medical personnel, are well trained in emergency procedures, in great partdue to Oklahoma’s physical location which is often the victim of violent

weather, in what is known as ‘Tornado Alley’. For example, as part of their
regular on-going emergency training, Oklahoma City Police Departmentmembers had just attended a Federal Emergency Management Association(FEMA) national seminar at its Washington, DC, headquarters. As a resultof this training, the various different emergency and official government enti-ties were ready to work together; what one volunteer described as ‘The key isflexibility, and to include all agencies. One key concept was “we,” not “I” any-more. Y ou don’t want to have antagonism between groups.’
Another key was to designate a lead agency to secure credible, verified
information and then communicate that information to families and victimsas well as the media, which mushroomed from the three local television sta-tions, a dozen local radio stations, the Oklahoma City and Tulsa dailynewspapers and a variety of community papers into an international mediacamp with nearly 600 on-the-scene reporters in a day. Within 20 minutes ofthe bomb blast, the worldwide press was calling and 15 people in theGovernor’s Office were answering media calls. A little more than an hourlater, the Oklahoma Governor’s Office had more than 200 requests for inter-views with the governor.
The City of Oklahoma City and the Oklahoma City Chamber of
Commerce coordinated the media efforts in the immediate aftermath of theApril 19 bombing, The media were credentialed through the Oklahoma CityPolice Department, while the Chamber of Commerce helped with the massivenumber of stories national and international media covered while they werein Oklahoma City. The media was briefed daily by the Oklahoma City PoliceDepartment, the Oklahoma City Fire Department and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI).
The media policy established that information would be verified and
released in a timely manner, with 24-hour availability as long as necessary.Because all the agencies involved were prepared for a variety of disaster sit-uations, a plan was swiftly agreed upon and implemented with no problems.The head of the rescue and research operations for the Oklahoma City FireDepartment, who spent 16 days on site searching for bodies, Chief JonHansen, said, ‘The local media was the priority – they got the informationfirst. They’ll be there when the others leave. Other media observed theOklahoma media’s professionalism and followed their lead, not the case inmany other disasters.’ As part of his rescue operations, one of the first thingsHansen did was set up a media command post in a parking lot several blocksaway. A pool system was also used to bring a limited number of reporters tothe site, with pool reporters sharing their stories and footage with other newsoutlets.
International media began to arrive on the scene within hours of the explo-
sion. They often turned to the local media for assistance in seeking sources,including two German writers from Stern Magazine who asked for assis-
tance in finding the mother of a dead child whose picture was in a photo inUSA Today. A reporter from ECO International News, serving a Spanish-Oklahoma City National Memorial: creating from crisis 145

speaking audience of 300 million, jumped on the first flight to Oklahoma
City to get first-hand reports. Media members from Australia, Sweden,Denmark, Japan and dozens of other nations soon followed. The storybecame an extended story as the search for survivors captured the attentionof the world. However, this would not be a major media story with a shorttime frame. The efforts to rescue people and recover bodies would last untilMay 23. In addition, the legal trials of the two Americans ultimately con-victed of the bombing, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, extendedthrough several years.
1And, on April 19, 2000, major international media
attention was again focused on Oklahoma City as a memorial honoring itsvictims was dedicated.
The Memorial – five years from idea to reality
In July 1995, three months after the bombing, Oklahoma City mayor RonNorick formed the Oklahoma City Memorial Task Force. Robert M.Johnson, a local Oklahoma City attorney and community volunteer, and aBoard of Directors consisting of family members of those killed in the bomb-ing, bombing survivors, rescue workers and community volunteers, quicklyformed 13 separate committees to look at everything from communications todeveloping a mission statement for the Memorial project to getting the fam-ilies and survivors to meet together for the first time. This system allowed allinterested parties to be a part of planning the Memorial, and became thebasis of the communication structure used during the next five years in devel-oping the Memorial.
The Board recognized early on that communications and public relations
were the key to its success. In November 1995, it hired its first employee, KariWatkins, as its communication director, with the mission of coordinating theefforts to build and manage a memorial to the disaster and its victims. AmongWatkins’ major tasks were: to keep the media as involved in telling the storyof building the memorial as they were in telling the story of the bombing;working on generating the funds to build the $29 million memorial; andcoordinating the work of the 13 committees. In September 1996 the taskforce became the Oklahoma City National Memorial Foundation, a private,non-profit entity dedicated to fulfilling the mission of building a Memorial,and in 1999 Watkins became the executive director.
Target audiences
The Memorial process was challenging because of the wide range of audi-ences the project has to reach. Primary audiences included:
• Families, survivors and rescue workers. These were people who had
direct, emotional ties to the Murrah Building site; the objective here was
to always inform and/or consult with these people on plans and events146 Barbara DeSanto et al.

before any media or other outside entity was considered. This has been
observed from the first days after the bombing through the dedication ofthe symbolic part of the Memorial.
• The Board of Directors. Many of these, 25 out of 45 directors, were
directly involved in the bombing and were also responsible for the cre-ation of the Memorial.
• The public, especially Oklahoma residents. This also included people who
were touched by the tragedy and would eventually visit the site.
• The media, with special ‘first rights’ for the Oklahoma media. These
were journalists who were involved moments after the bombing hap-pened and would function as opinion leaders in garnering support for theMemorial project.
Secondary audiences were identified as the Oklahoma City City Council, theOklahoma legislature and the United States Congress. All of these groupshad an interest because of the attack on the US government and because theywould become funding partners in helping to build the Memorial.
Planning for a memorial
The Memorial design competition
This was a consensus-building, community-based project that began with an
international competition to develop the design for the construction of theMemorial. A significant factor in opening the design competition worldwidewas because of the international impact of the bombing, particularly in theinitial accusations that international terrorists might be responsible.Designers from all 50 US states and 23 countries submitted 624 designs; anAmerican husband and wife team living in Germany and operating as ButzerDesign Partnership was selected as the Memorial designers. The Butzers nowlive in Oklahoma City where Hans teaches architecture and Torrey is close toher birthplace of Nowata, Oklahoma.
In October 1998, construction on the first phase of the Memorial began,
with then Vice President Al Gore and Attorney General Janet Reno in atten-dance. In addition to the design selected, elements of the design came fromfour different countries, including bronze for the Gates of Time from Japan,the black granite of the reflecting pool from Canada, the stone fromArkansas and other US states, and the reinforced turf from London.
The Memorial design is a simple design of a black granite reflecting pool
between two tall bronze gates inscribed with 9:01 a.m. on the east gate and9:03 a.m. on the west gate, signifying the 9:02 time of the blast. One hundredand sixty-eight chairs face the reflecting pool, each chair etched with thename of a victim. At night the glass chair bases are illuminated. Pieces ofgranite from the Murrah Building were salvaged and used to construct thewalkway around the pool (see Figure 12.1).Oklahoma City National Memorial: creating from crisis 147

148 Barbara DeSanto et al.
Figure 12.1 The Oklahoma City National Memorial. Photo by John R. Catsis.

The fence
The day after the Memorial public ground-breaking ceremony, family members,
survivors and rescue workers came together to move large sections of the chain-link fence that was erected around the bomb site after the building wasimploded. The fence had become a living tribute to the victims and their fami-lies as visitors from around the world left mementos from baby toys to T-shirtsand prayer cards tucked into the fence. The fence had become so much a part ofthe tragedy that many members of the Board of Directors asked that it becomea more identifiable part of the permanent Memorial. Although only familymembers, survivors and rescue workers actually moved the fence, the event wascarried live on network news and was featured in newspapers around the world.The fence-moving ceremony closed with a candlelight vigil as participants stoodon the now-open Murrah site. The fence is a featured part of the MemorialCenter Museum located next to the Memorial outdoor site, allowing visitors toleave tributes to the victims. All mementos are archived, with plans for many ofthem to be included in the museum and others saved for research.
Paying for a memorial
The $29.1 million needed to pay for the Memorial came from a variety of
sources, and ranged from donations of $1 million to $10, including $5 millionfrom the US government, $7.3 million from Oklahoma sources, $1 millionfrom Kerr-McGee and other private donations from corporations, founda-tions and individuals. Several special campaigns, however, raised money inways that especially highlight the memories and emotions of the disaster:
• The 168 Pennies Campaign: The 19 children killed in the bombing
brought an outpouring of sympathy from school children around the
nation. Elementary school principal Nancy Krodel from Putnam City, asuburb of Oklahoma City, asked each of her students to contribute 19pennies to the Memorial – one for each child who died in the bombing.This single effort raised more than $50,000. The penny collection ideawas then developed by the Memorial committee, with former MissAmerica Shawntel Smith, an Oklahoman, as the national spokesperson.
Contributions from children will be used to support areas of the
Memorial designed for children and learning, including an outdoorChildren’s Area and an interactive learning area in the Center where chil-dren can learn about the bombing, the consequences of violence, andnon-violent methods of conflict resolution.
A 168 Pennies Honor Roll was created to list all US schools that donated
168 pennies to the Memorial effort for the 168 victims; the names are alsolisted in a place of honor in the Memorial Learning Center.
• Sales of a print of the Fence by Oklahoma City-based artist Greg Burns
was raised more than $50,000 for the Memorial thus far.Oklahoma City National Memorial: creating from crisis 149

Communication
•Under Construction Newsletter: Memorial construction project director
Harley Watkins came up with the idea of keeping people up-to-date on
the Memorial’s construction progress. More than 1,500 individuals,including family, survivors, rescue workers, community volunteers, mediaand government officials receive the monthly publication.
•The Progress Reports: These annual reports were also directed to those
directly involved in the Memorial, with special attention given to donorswho could see where their money was going.
•The Anniversary Celebrations: Every year on April 19 a private ceremony
marking the occasion is planned for the family, survivors, and rescueworkers. The central feature of the ceremony is reading the 168 victims’names and allowing the families and loved ones of each victim to paytribute at the site in private with flowers and other remembrances. Apublic ceremony that involves the media is also conducted on eachanniversary.
•The Trials: At the same time the Memorial was being planned and con-
structed, the very high-profile trials of Timothy McVeigh and TerryNichols were being carried out in Denver, Colorado. The trials had beenmoved from Oklahoma to Colorado to ensure fairness and an impartialjury. The trial coverage offered the Memorial communication staff oppor-tunities to promote sidebar stories about the Memorial plans and progresswithout getting into the trial proceedings or legalities of the cases.
Media relations
Throughout all these projects, Memorial officials believed it was important to
make all media, from local to international, feel a part of the process, espe-cially so that the media could educate the public about the three componentsof the Memorial. Throughout the five years of planning and construction, 20to 30 media requests from around the world came in each week.
Courting and taking care of the media ranged from everyday requests for
feature stories about the Memorial construction to special coverage duringthe trials of McVeigh and Nichols. Media coverage included:
• The nationally broadcast morning show, The Today Show, which did a
documentary on the Memorial construction, making one trip a month to
report the progress.
• Requests from national magazines, such as People magazine, who came
into town for a one-day feature and then disappeared until the next specialoccasion.
• International media who were very intrigued by the bombing and report-
ing on the new phenomenon for Americans – terrorism on their own soilversus international terrorism. Language barriers had to be overcome;150 Barbara DeSanto et al.

especially important was making sure that reporters understood the US
process of doing things and the project details.
In 1995 the local media set the precedent as to how the national and interna-tional media would tell the Oklahoma City story. The world watched as the‘Oklahoma Standard’ was displayed on the front pages of every major news-paper, heard on the airwaves and broadcast across television with graphic,heart-wrenching images. The Oklahoma Standard became a worldwide themethat exemplified the image of people helping their neighbors. The term wascoined by the media as they reported not only on the horrors of the blast, buthow Oklahomans responded to each other – donating great amounts ofclothing, food, money, and time. This was such a phenomenon because ofOklahoma’s history; it did not become a US state until 1907 and is generallyconsidered to be one of the nation’s poorer and less progressive states. Thenews stories about Oklahomans sharing whatever they had painted a new pic-ture of the state’s residents.
April 19, 2000 – the Memorial dedication
The Memorial staff knew that the world’s attention would be focused onOklahoma City where the Memorial stood ready to be publicly dedicated onthe fifth anniversary of the bombing. But before the world could enter, thefamilies, survivors and rescue workers continued the tradition of a privateanniversary with an 8:30 a.m. ceremony that included the traditional 168minutes of silence and an opportunity for victims’ families to leave mementoson each of their loved ones’ Memorial chairs.
In January 2000, Executive Director Kari Watkins assembled a 100-person
task force that began daily work on planning for the Memorial’s dedicationon the fifth anniversary of the bombing, April 19, 2000. The task forceincluded members of the local Public Relations Society of America (PRSA)chapter, the Women in Communication (WIC) chapter, and other public rela-tions practitioners; seven sub-groups were each assigned specific duties,including:
• Issuing 5,000 invitations to the dedication, including inserts, return post-
cards and envelopes to all donors, anyone who had volunteered, family
members, survivors and rescue workers.
• Creating and printing 5,000 programs – each program was 30 pages long
and includes all events and the dedication activities.
• Developing press materials, including press packets with programs, news
releases of the day’s events, explanations of the symbolic elements, avail-able photos list, fundraising update and Memorial Center news releases.
• Developing the tri-fold, four-color dedication brochure explaining the
meaning of the sections of the Memorial. This brochure is now availableto visitors to the Memorial to guide them through the story.Oklahoma City National Memorial: creating from crisis 151

• Developing an initial news release about the dedication ceremonies which
was made public in February 2000, and subsequent releases on a regular
schedule.
• Hosting daily news conferences during Dedication Week. More than 20
to 30 media outlets daily attended these conferences, with more than1,200 media credentials issued for the dedication ceremonies. Media fromaround the world covered the dedication, including German andJapanese television, BBC, and American media outlets USA Today,CNN and the three major television networks, ABC, CBS and NBC.
The public dedication ceremony, scheduled for 5 p.m., included a number oflocal state and national speakers with the keynote address by President BillClinton. More than 10,000 stories were written and broadcast around theworld April 19, 2000.
Evaluation
Executive Director Kari Watkins reported that the members of the mediawere very complimentary about the Memorial, especially the accessibility formedia to cover the event, the credentialing process, and the availability ofmaterials for publication.
Lessons learned
According to Watkins, planning is the key. Understanding the needs andwants of the primary and secondary audiences and keeping that informationup-to-date allows efficient and relevant plans to be made and carried out.
In this Oklahoma Memorial case, Watkins highlighted the importance of
the media as a force in getting the Memorial funded, constructed and dedi-cated. She stressed giving the media every bit of information possible so thereporting is as accurate and timely as possible. Also, structuring the infor-mation into talking points so media get the main points and report what theorganization thinks is important and spending time with reporters to makesure they have all the facts correct is essential to telling the story and achiev-ing the organization’s objectives. Watkins also said organizations must makecomments and provide media outlets with stories – failure to do this willresult in media finding some sort of story of their own.
Watkins also reported that conducting a successful public relations cam-
paign includes being proud of the work. In this case, the organization usedthe emotion and horror of the bomb blast from 9:02 a.m., April 19, 1995, tocreate a worldwide tribute to what is good in people around the globe.152 Barbara DeSanto et al.

Acknowledgements
The authors thank Executive Director Kari Watkins for her assistance in
providing materials, time and interviews for this case study.
Note
1 Timothy McVeigh, who was convicted of planting the bomb which devastated the
Alfred P . Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people on April
19, 1995, was finally executed at the Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, onJune 12, 2001.Oklahoma City National Memorial: creating from crisis 153

Case 13 Paradise lost and restored
Florida and the tourist
murders
Donn Tilson and Don W. Stacks
Background
A community’s reputation, like that of any institution, is a consequence of
public perceptions based upon a synergy of communication images, eventsand corporate performance. Communities that seek to establish and maintaina favorable reputation with key publics must do so proactively in a compre-hensive strategic manner. In times of crisis, the community often finds itselfboth reacting to the immediate events while beginning to think long-termproactively to the ongoing consequences – all with the goal of restoring a pos-itive reputation.
Florida and the Greater Miami and the Beaches area – often referred to as
South Florida – are a good case in point. Florida officially calls itself ‘TheSunshine State’, and wintertime television weathercasts regularly confirm agreen southern US oasis in a sea of ice and snow. Florida’s state parks,beaches and wildlife, in fact, are promoted as tourist attractions in statebrochures touting the ‘Real Florida’. Miami’s Convention and Visitor Bureau(C&VB), similarly, markets the area as the ‘world’s favorite playground’ offer-ing ‘the vanguard of pop culture, global commerce, fashion andentertainment…with the beauty and splendor of a tropical paradise’.
Tourism generates 20 percent of the state’s sales income tax, $37 billion in
sales, and accounts for more than 781,000 jobs statewide. The Miami Heraldnewspaper and the Miami Convention Bureau reported that in 1998, 9.7 mil-lion people visited Greater Miami and the Beaches, spent $12 billion,generated 35 percent of the area’s state sales tax, and supported nearly317,000 jobs in Miami-Dade County.
In contrast to this positive image, throughout its history, Florida and espe-
cially Miami also have been in the ‘vanguard’ of a colorful parade offlim-flam artists, bootleggers and drug dealers – an outlaw image that thecommunity has at once chaffed at and embraced. From the land booms of the1920s to the modern-day Miami Vice television images and real-life criminals
ranging from drug dealers to illegal aliens, Miami was an area of contrasts. A1987 Behavorial Science Research Survey conducted research in six Americantourism markets whose respondents noted Miami’s appeal included its

weather, nightlife, cleanliness and exciting location, but also noted its negative
characteristics including drugs, expenses, shabby and run-down places, toomany foreigners and old people, and general danger.
In addition, since 1979 Miami had the highest crime rate in the USA, and
Florida specifically, the top crime rate nationally, with an 82 percent increasein violent crime statewide from 1982 to 1990, an average of more than 10 per-cent a year. Social unrest in 1989 and 1990 continued to put Miami intonational and international headlines, including accounts of racial distur-bances and the refusal of city leaders to officially greet Nelson Mandelabecause he thanked Fidel Castro for his support of the African NationalCongress. That refusal manifested itself through a Miami boycott of African-American community leaders who organized a boycott against the area’sconvention business, with an impact of $28 million in cancelled bookings.
In response to these and other incidents, the Greater Miami Chamber of
Commerce organized an image committee to restore the city’s reputation.Chamber President Sherrill Hudson noted, ‘Perceptions become reality. It’s afact of life.’ African-American community leaders cautioned, however, thatMiami’s image could not be repaired by addressing the city’s massive socio-logical and economic problems.
Such problems, however, were only a prologue to the nightmarish events
that rocked Miami and the rest of Florida in 1992 and 1993. On August 24,1992, Hurricane Andrew devastated South Florida, leaving 15 dead and morethan $20 billion in damages – the worst natural disaster in US history. Then,less than two months later, British tourist Keith Thompson was murdered inOrlando during a robbery – the first of 9 international tourists to be mur-dered statewide (5 in Miami alone) in an 11-month period from October1992 to September 1993, including two Canadians, one Venezuelan, twoBritish and three German visitors.
The murders put both the City of Miami and the State of Florida’s resolve
and public relations skills supremely to the test. At that time, 13 percent ofvisitors statewide and 61 percent of Miami visitors were internationaltourists; German tourism in Miami alone represented $750 million inbusiness.
All of the murders prompted police investigations and were reported by the
local media, but the last three murders, given the brutal nature of the crimesand the cumulative effect of the tourist attacks upon public opinion andmedia coverage, ‘unleashed a fury of media attention, public protest andgovernmental-law enforcement-business/tourism industry response,’ reportedthe Miami Herald. Just three days after the murder of German visitor
Barbara Jensen, the national morning talk shows – CBS this Morning, ABC’s
Good Morning America, and the NBC Today Show dedicated extensive air-time to the crisis.
Other coverage included former Miami Herald crime reporter Edna
Buchanan characterizing Miami as a very dangerous, Third-World type city;the Italian newspaper L’Expresso warning its readers ‘Visit Miami and Die’;Florida: paradise lost and restored 155

graffiti artists adding ‘and die’ to a ‘Visit Florida’ billboard near London’s
Gatwick airport; and the German Foreign Ministry threatening to warn itscitizens against visiting South Florida. The result was by October 1993 SouthFlorida tour operators, hotels, airlines and rental care agencies were report-ing decreased advanced bookings by as much as 50 percent, particularly fromEurope.
Immediate reaction
The Greater Miami C&VB, Miami’s mayor, the Dade County manager,Florida’s governor and police met to plan a coordinated response to preventfurther attacks. A task force of local, state and federal law enforcement agentsbegan patrolling tourist ‘hot spots’ in Miami even as a 20-member Miami-Dade Tourist Police Brigade guarded rental car companies and hotelsadjacent to Miami international airport. Other measures included:
• setting up a special police radio frequency linked directly to hotels;
• establishing tourist information booths with visitor and safety informa-
tion stationed near the airport;
• positing new road signs to direct tourists to popular destinations;• having Metro-Dade police dispatchers give callers directions in English
and Spanish, while AT&T translators provided help in German andother languages;
• increasing security along interstate highways and Florida’s turnpike;
including armed guards sent by then-Governor Lawton Chiles to high-way rest areas;
• requiring rental car agencies to quit issuing rental car stickers and license
tags with tell-tale ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ letters customarily used to designate rentalcars;
• having the US Attorney’s Office begin discussions to enact tougher sen-
tences for carjackings and repeat felonies.
Target audiences
As law enforcement addressed the immediate security problems, SouthFlorida and state government and tourism industry officials approached thecrisis with a strategic communication plan that was a mix of public relations,marketing and advertising tactics that targeted the following primary groupsof people:
• international travelers;
• domestic and international travel industry personnel, including travel
agents, tour operators and travel writers;
• domestic and international government officials, from city and county
officials to leaders of other countries;156 Donn Tilson and Don W. Stacks

• state tourism workers;
• residents of the Miami-area as well as all state residents.
Goals and objectives
• Reassure European travel leaders and travelers that Florida was taking
swift and aggressive action to protect visitors.
• Educate and re-emphasize the importance of the industry to Miami-
area and state residents.
• Gain more positive media coverage using travel writers.• Train travel agents and tour operators to anticipate and allay customer
fears.
Communication strategies and tactics
The Florida Department of Tourism began by launching a $6.5 millionEuropean print advertising campaign. The campaign, featuring a collage ofsmiling Floridians, including Mickey Mouse, E.T. and a dolphin, had beenput on hold following the most recent European murder. The Departmentalso requested $2 million from state rental car taxes to finance the televisioncommercials. The tourism industry pledged $3 million more. Meanwhile,Miami hotel owners, Greater Miami C&VB representatives and other localtourism leaders traveled to Europe to brief the European media on areaplans to increase tourist safety and to sell Miami as a vacation spot. InOctober the Miami Convention Bureau unveiled an advertising campaignaddressing tourist safety, and the Greater Fort Lauderdale Convention andVisitors Bureau launched advertisements showing the city as a safe place.
To further bolster its efforts, the Greater Miami C&VB hired the New
Y ork public relations firm of Howard J. Rubenstein and Associates. Theagency’s strategy and tactics included holding a tourism summit on MiamiBeach for international media, tour operators and local officials; traininglocal travel agents and tour operators to deal with customer fears; openingsales offices in Europe and South America staffed with public relations per-sonnel to sell Miami to international media and tourism representatives; andsetting up a crisis team of government officials and community leaders torespond to media coverage.
The tourism summit was held in January 1994 to discuss the future of
tourism; it was followed in May by Pow Wow, an annual international con-ference of tour operators and travel agents who book 90 percent of theinternational visitors to the US city. Private interests spent $2.2 million tohost the event, which attracted 5,000 delegates and 300 members of the con-sumer and travel-trade press.
The Bureau also hired a consultant to inspect and issue report cards on
hotel quality and cleanliness; this revealed an issue even larger than the mur-dered tourist incidents – tourism experts noted that impoliteness, poor serviceFlorida: paradise lost and restored 157

and questionable quality were the biggest problems facing South Florida
tourism. Follow-up research showed that when these problems wereaddressed, most domestic and international tourism leaders ‘agreed [it]marked the beginning of a road to recovery for South Florida’s batteredimage,’ according to an academic research study conducted by Professor DonStacks of the University of Miami.
On the domestic front, a number of new security and customer service mea-
sures were introduced, including:
• doubling the number of tourist information booths;
• having airline flights feature on-board broadcasts of a Metro-Dade Police
videotape on safety tips on major domestic and international flights intoMiami;
• the launch of a visitor information radio station, W AEM-FM, operated
by the Greater Miami C&VB, broadcasting pre-recorded spots in English,Spanish, German and French.
In October Barry University’s ‘Miami Nice’ program and the Greater MiamiC&VB teamed up to focus on calming tourists’ nerves and improve service byeducating one of the tourists’ first contacts – cab drivers. This included:
• Arming cab drivers with a ‘safe tips’ brochure for passengers and a
prompt card with frequently asked questions such as ‘Is this city safe?’ and
answers in English, Spanish, German and French. Passengers could call aspecial telephone number to recommend courteous drivers for a $50award given by American Express.
• Cabbies applying for licenses were required to attend ‘Miami Nice’ cus-
tomer-service classes at Barry University. By November, the program hadreduced complaints about taxi drivers by 80 percent.
Travel writers were another important target public. Other Dade Countytourism monies went into direct advertising campaigns in Britain, Germany,Canada and Argentina to fly international travel writers to Miami and reprint3.5 million copies of a special advertising section to use as promotionalmaterial.
The Greater Fort Lauderdale C&VB targeted advertising and public rela-
tions materials to the Latin American and Bahamiam markets in Octoberwith television commercials that featured local residents touting the city’s newbeach, attractions and shopping, all conveying ‘an image of safety’. The FortLauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, meanwhile, previewed a seriesof promotional videos on the facility to German tour operators visiting thearea on the first of many familiarization tours organized by the VisitorsBureau. Narrated in German, the video suggested German tourists use FortLauderdale as the gateway to South Florida and inferred that they avoidMiami.158 Donn Tilson and Don W. Stacks

In late November the Florida Commerce Department’s new $4.2 million
tourism campaign debuted on network talk shows, cable programs and in
print in Northeast, Midwestern and Canadian markets. To promote the stateto travel agents and tour operators, a delegation of 60 Florida tourist associ-ations, attractions and government agencies attended the annual ‘FloridaBeach Bash’ convention in Toronto and Montreal in early December, furtheremphasizing the safety message.
At the same time that the tourism officials were working to rebuild tourism
numbers, government and law enforcement officials were getting tough oncrime. In April 1993 the Florida Senate formed the Committee on Tourist-Related Crime which found through testimony that crime was deterring newbusinesses from coming to Miami, and 20 percent of present companies wereconsidering moving out of Miami. The Council’s recommendation was thatthe state build more prison spaces to keep criminals in jail. During the 1993legislative session, lawmakers voted just that – 6,951 more prison beds werefunded. During the 1994 legislative session laws were changed to send convictsto prison at a younger age, end automatic sentence reduction, which involvedreleasing criminals before they had served their assigned sentences, andincrease the goal of time served to 75 percent of sentences. Funding was alsoprovided to build boot camps for young offenders and for a 5-year prisonbuilding program to add almost 27,000 new beds at a cost of $543 million.Such efforts helped lower the crime rate in South Florida and statewide in 1993and 1994 even though crime elsewhere generally remained high.
Since early 1996 state and South Florida tourism officials have built upon
the area’s restored image with battle-tested tactics and innovative, newapproaches. For example, promotional campaigns have used new methods toreach key publics. In the 1995–96 winter season the Greater Miami C&VB ranits first-ever commercials on cable television in Chicago and Atlanta. TheGreater Fort Lauderdale C&VB sent a representative to London for the firsttime in January 1996 and added a Latin American sales director. The Bureaualso opened an office in Chicago in November 1997 to attract business asso-ciations and corporations, and expanded advertising to cable television andbroad national appeal magazines.
Niche tourism markets were also targeted. The Greater Miami C&VB
launched an African-American/Caribbean guide and a multicultural tourismguide in October 1997. Similarly, Florida published its new vacation guide inGerman, Portuguese and Spanish in January 1998 while the Greater FortLauderdale C&VB began offering a tourism planner in five languages in 1999.Both Miami and Fort Lauderdale bureaus have websites, as does the state.
The Greater Miami C&VB partnered with American Airlines in July 1996
to co-host 8 television and 7 print journalists from Latin America to seeMiami’s Centennial celebrations and also cover the Olympic soccer elimina-tion matches at the Orange Bowl.
In August 1998 the Greater Miami C&VB and United Airlines ran a
cooperative television commercial campaign in Brazil and 5 other LatinFlorida: paradise lost and restored 159

American countries during a popular television variety show that broadcast
for one week on location in Miami. The 30-second commercials encouragedtourists to visit Miami during the Fall shoulder-season and promoted the air-line. United Airlines, which was trying to garner a larger share of the LatinAmerican market, contributed $10,000 to the $420,000 campaign, distributedtourist brochures to Latin sales offices and flew the television crew at nocharge to Miami.
One month later the Greater Miami C&VB unveiled a new ‘Shop Miami’
brochure in English, Spanish and Portuguese at a Latin American travel andtrade show in Orlando; the brochure was developed in cooperation withAmerican Express and local retailers. About 32 percent of Miami’s tourists,which is 60 percent of the area’s international visitors, come from LatinAmerica. Surveys reported in the Miami Herald indicated that about 73 per-
cent of Latin American’s rank shopping as their number one activity inMiami.
Florida area tourism bureaus have also partnered with one another in co-
promoting their areas. In April 1996 the Great Miami C&VB and Orlando’sC&VB shared marketing costs by organizing a first-ever joint trade mission totravel agents and tour operators in Brazil. In 1997 the Greater Miami C&VBand the Greater Fort Lauderdale C&VB hired a cultural tourism director topromote tourism through cultural attractions and special events.
Evaluation
To everyone’s relief, crime against tourists in Miami in 1993 dropped 53 per-cent from April to October. That trend continued through 1994 as touristcrime fell 70 percent compared to 1993.
Tourism, however, also fell during the 1993–94 Florida winter season in a
delayed reaction. While the number of Florida tourists had risen for 7 con-secutive months since the fall of 1992 (the beginning of the tourist murders),4.2 percent fewer visitors came to the Sunshine State from January to April1994 compared with 1993; auto travel, in particular, declined 12.5 percent, orabout 1 million visitors. As feared, the number of German tourists fell 36.6percent. A February survey of international tourists and tour operators by theOrlando/Orlando County Convention and Visitors Bureau predicted thedecline, with many Germans (35 percent), Canadians (41 percent) and domes-tic travelers (26 percent) saying Florida was ‘unsafe,’ and 89 percent of Britishcitizens and 93 percent of German citizens planning to avoid the state in 1994.In Miami alone, German and British tourism fell 20.6 percent and 23.5 per-cent respectively since the September 1993 murders.
By the end of 1994, Florida tourism had dropped 2.8 percent; the number
of international visitors fell 2 percent, and domestic tourism 12 percent com-pared to 1993. Miami reported a 1.1 drop percent in tourism compared to1993 despite an 8 percent increase in domestic tourism and a 4.5 percentincrease in Latin American tourism. More importantly, however, Miami’s160 Donn Tilson and Don W. Stacks

number of Canadian and European tourists remained down – Canadian, 32
percent; British, 23.1 percent; and German, 57.3 percent.
But things in both the fight against crime and the move to restore tourism
were improving. The targeted, tough measures against crime, together withcommunity support and continued economic growth, began to help reducecrime statewide as well as in South Florida. In 1995 Florida, which had thehighest crime rate in the USA the previous year, reported the largest statewidedecrease in violent and property crime in 13 years. In 1998 total crime inFlorida hit a 20-year low as the state recorded a 9.2 percent annual drop in vio-lent crime and the fewest homicides since 1979. By mid-1999, crime statewidefell an additional 8 percent.
In Miami, from 1995 to 1996, the number of tourist robberies fell 33 per-
cent, and by the end of 1997, the total number of felonies had dropped 18percent since 1994. Miami, which had the highest crime rate in the USA in1994, fell to sixth. Countywide, the number of violent crimes in 1998 was thelowest since 1990, with total crime falling for the fifth consecutive year to itslowest point in 8 years. More dramatically, tourist robberies had decreased by92.5 percent since 1992.
South Florida tourism officials continued their efforts during 1995 to
reverse the downward trend in tourism as the Greater Miami C&VB feted adozen British and Scottish journalists on a 5-day tour of the area in March,while the Miami-Dade Office of Film, Television and Print hosted the filmingof a 70-minute, prime-time television special by ZDF, one of Germany’s twomajor networks. The program, shot on Key Biscayne, South Beach, downtownMiami and Key West, featured German band leader James Last and airedthroughout Europe in June.
Dade County tourism leaders also began reaching out to new audiences
both locally and externally after unveiling a new Visitor Industry Plan inMarch, a 10-year program calling for increased promotion and tourism edu-cation for the community. Before every film the Cobb chain of theatres beganrunning a 30-second public service announcement about the importance oftourism countywide even as Miami began a countywide multilingual tourismhospitality training program for hotel service employees in May. ThatSeptember Miami launched its first-ever television advertising campaign in theNew Y ork market while Broward did the same in Canada in December.
As actual changes were made on the social, political and economic fronts,
the image of South Florida as a vacation mecca were also improving.According to the Tilson and Stacks report:
Miami rose from number 80 to 67 in Money magazine’s list of the best 100
places to live in the US, and Michelin announced that it would issue itsfirst-ever Michelin Tourist Guide to Florida in English, French andSpanish in August 1996, in recognition of the state’s growing popularitywith Europeans and Latin Americans; Florida would be only the fourtharea outside of Europe to have a ‘green guide’.Florida: paradise lost and restored 161

As crime continued to decrease, tourism began to flourish. From 1994 to 1998
the number of visitors to Miami-Dade increased by more than 11 percent(8.76 to 9.74 million visitors), and to Broward County by 23 percent (5.2 to 6.4million visitors). More important, the number of international tourists toMiami-Dade has grown from its low of 5.02 million in 1994 to 5.2 million in1998, or about 54 percent of all visitors. Moreover, the share of Europeantourists in Miami-Dade has rebounded from 10.7 percent of all visitors in1994 to almost 14 percent in 1998. Through the first quarter of 1999, Miami-Dade registered a slight increase (0.3 percent) in visitors while Browardtourism grew 9.3 percent during the same period in 1998.
Statewide, Florida tourism has recovered from a low of 3.9 million in 1994
to 48.7 million visitors in 1998, a 22 percent increase; each year since 1994 thenumber of tourists coming to the state has grown.
As tourism rebounded, crime continued to drop. Statewide the crime rate
dropped in 1995 in every category; the decline was the largest in Florida in 13years. Crime also dropped in Miami by more than 9 percent and by 11 percentin Broward County. Law enforcement officials credited several crime fightingmeasures – the reintroduction of chain gangs in state prisons, mandatoryprison terms on criminals convicted of a fourth offense, more prison beds dou-bling the average time served to 60 percent of the original sentence, and a newstate law raising time served to 85 percent, and more Dade County judges andprosecutors to handle cases.
Things had improved so much that the state reduced patrols at highway rest
stops in July 1995 from a 24-hour to a dusk-to-dawn surveillance, and the Cityof Miami closed its tourist information booths. The downward trend infelonies continued in Miami through 1996 as violent crime fell an additional12 percent. Stacks and Tilson noted: ‘Of more symbolic importance forFlorida, however, were the convictions in 1995 of those charged with the 1993murders in Miami of German tourists Barbara Jensen and of Uwe-WilhelmRakebrand and of British tourist Gary College in North Florida.’ Long prisonterms for some and life sentences for others seemed to finally close the chap-ter on foreign tourist crime in Florida.
In 1996 surveys showed that 41.9 percent of visitors to Miami-Dade were
concerned about safety and crime; such concerns dropped to 27.8 percent in1997 and to 14.2 percent in 1998. Conversely, in the first quarter of 1997, 95percent of visitors said they were ‘extremely’ or ‘very’ satisfied with their stay –the highest rating since 1989 – a level that further increased to 98 percent in1999; moreover, 88 percent said they are likely to visit again.
Other polls show improved public perceptions for Florida. A December
1996 AAA/Travel Industry Association of America nationwide survey rankedFlorida as the preferred choice (47 percent) worldwide for a winter vacation(up from 40 percent in 1995). A May 1997 AAA poll rated Florida as the topspot, 34 percent, for a summer vacation. In a Harris poll the following month,respondents nationwide said they would prefer to live in Florida than any-where else in the USA.162 Donn Tilson and Don W. Stacks

In 1998 the Miami C&VB responded to more than 8,000 websites inquiries,
while visitors and travel agents began booking discount vacation packages
through Fort Lauderdale’s website in October 1999.
The expanded promotional efforts have been made possible by larger bud-
gets and cooperative ventures with government and corporate partners. Forexample, from 1996 to 1998, the Greater Miami C&VB reported that its adver-tising budget more than doubled from $1.5 to $3.8 million and attracted anadditional $3 million in cooperative advertising and promotion from airlines,car rental and credit card companies and other industry affiliates. The MiamiHerald reported that ‘Fort Lauderdale’s bureau estimates that state and busi-
ness joint advertising programs will double the impact of the bureau’s $2.5million advertising budget.’
According to the Miami bureau figures, its media relations program in fiscal
year 1997–98 ‘brought in 17 media tours, which included more than 120 traveltrade and consumer media’, and also ‘included 13 special media projects, suchas radio and television promotions and nearly 135 journalists visiting…f o rresearch’.
Perhaps the greatest step forward for the tourism industry statewide has
been the creation of ‘Visit Florida, Inc.’, a joint public–private group thatreplaced the Department of Commerce and Division of Tourism, abolished inJuly 1996 by the state legislature and the governor. Initially named the FloridaTourism Industry Marketing Corporation, the partnership of tourism attrac-tions and industry-related businesses took control of marketing the state. Theindustry was asked to contribute one-half of the organization’s operatingexpenses with the state matching that from car rental surcharges. By 1998 thegroup had raised $12 million in direct and cooperative advertising among itsmembership, which had tripled to more than 1,260 partners. That year VisitFlorida added sales representatives in Dallas and Montreal and a public rela-tions representative in Latin America. The organisation also premiered a newstate tourism logo and contracted vendors to sell an array of tourist sou-venirs sporting the logo at airports and retail outlets statewide – a toll-freetourist information number and a first-ever-in-state advertising campaign.
In the final analysis, the public relations campaign in Florida following the
1992–93 tourist murders was effective in countering negative perceptions ofkey national and international publics and restoring tourism largely becausetourism, government and law enforcement officials:
• worked collectively and forthrightly to resolve the immediate crisis both
communicatively and operationally;
• engaged primary publics, particularly intervening publics, in dialogue to
identify perceptions and attitudes, fact-find on issues, communicate inter-
personally Florida’s response to the crisis; and involve a broad communityconstituency in participatory, decision-making;
• formulated mid-range and long-term solutions that addressed fundamen-
tal industry and community social needs.Florida: paradise lost and restored 163

164 Donn Tilson and Don W. Stacks
Lessons learned
• A comprehensive communication strategy integrating public relations,
advertising and marketing on equal terms in a dynamic mix that alter-
nately relied on one particular component or a combination of threedisciplines can effectively use the strengths of each of the three disciplines.
• All communication does not have to be two-way in nature – which model
to use may depend on the situation. Engaging one-way models were usedwhen ‘propagandistic’ approaches seemed most appropriate to dissemi-nate and reinforce certain messages. Then strategy shifted to two-waymodels when information gathering and relationship-building were ofparamount importance. And, in some cases, more than one-communica-tion model was simultaneously used.
• Ultimately, communication must serve to manage conflict and improve
understanding with strategic publics as public relations scholars JamesGrunig and Todd Hunt write, if credibility – and in this case – tourismare to be restored. Florida officials quickly realized it was not enoughsimply to defend Miami in the press; strategic interpersonal efforts wereessential to restore relationships strained by the crisis. Given that per-sonal contact is often overlooked, but very effective, as a public relationschannel, initiatives to meet face-to-face with travel agents, tour operators,foreign government officials, citizens and other key publics for the pur-pose of dialogue and consensus building on corrective actions wereperhaps the campaign’s saving grace. To the degree that such key publicsfelt confident their concerns were being seriously considered andaddressed in a decisive manner, their trust and support were regained.
• While communication alone cannot change all of society’s problems; in
this case, with public relations professionals leading the way in manyrespects, industry and government officials have begun to tackle the vari-ous social, political and economic problems that have promptedcommunity crises over the years, particularly in South Florida. Improvingthe quality of life for those who live in the community ultimately will servethe best interests of residents and tourists alike. A community cannot be asafe or attractive tourist destination if it is not a healthy or safe ‘home’ forits citizens. Indeed, good public relations must begin at home.
• Hiring an outside agency can provide much needed assistance in both
external and internal relations during a crisis period, from research toevaluation. The ability of an outside agency to view the problems andchallenges from an impartial perspective, along with the increasedresources the agency can bring, helps the local public relations practi-tioners concentrate on their important objectives without spreadingthemselves too thinly trying to work with all important publics, in thiscase, publics around the globe.

References
Center, A.H. and Jackson P . (1990) Public Relations Practices: Managerial Case
Studies and Problems, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Grunig J.E. and Hunt, T. (1994) Public Relations Techniques, New Y ork: Harcourt
Brace.
Parks, A.M. (1981) Miami: The Magic City, Tulsa, OK: Continental Heritage Press.
Stacks, D.W . (1991) ‘Miami Image: to know us is to like us – a survey of surveys
(1984–1991)’, research report presented to the Greater Miami Chamber ofCommerce, Miami, FL: April.
Tebeau, C. (1980) A History of Florida, Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press.Tilson, D.J. and Stacks, D.W . (1997) ‘To Know Us Is To Love Us: the public relations
campaign to sell a ‘Business-Tourist-Friendly’ Miami, Public Relations Review,
23, 99–100.
The following Miami Herald articles provided information for this case:
Acle, Ana. 13 May 1999. ‘Dade crime declines for fifth year’Arrarte, Anne Moncreiff. 8 February 1995. ‘Fear of crime fuels decline in tourism’Bousequet, Steve. 1 October 1999. ‘Significant crime drop reported’Bridges, Tyler. 4 January 2000. ‘Murders lowest in three decades’Chardy, Alfonso. 6 November 1999. ‘Sunburst symbols removed’Clark, Lesley. 13 May 1999. ‘State’s crime rate falls to a 20-year low in ’98’—— 3 March 2000. ‘Florida crimes fall in record numbers’Clarke, Jay. 15 May 1994. ‘Pristine Grayton Beach: why it’s the best in the U.S.’Corzo, Cynthia. 17 September 1998. ‘Miami reaches out to shoppers’—— 2 September 1999. ‘Wanted: More Latin tourists’Dupont, Dale K. 15 February 1996. ‘Dade tourism bounces back’—— 7 May 1997. Dade and Broward set records for tourism’—— 14 May 1997. ‘Florida is top vacation spot’—— 13 August 1997. ‘South Florida tourism on road to record year’—— 18 February 1998. ‘ Art Deco draw lifts Dade tourism to ’97 record’—— 19 July 1998. ‘Stierheim’s legacy: Crisis management led to real tourism
progress’
Dupont, Dale K. and Arrarte, Anne Moncreiff. 12 December 1996. ‘ A tourist attrac-
tion for Florida’
Fields, Gregg. 24 September 1998. ‘Effort leads to 5,800 jobs, council says’Fields, Gregg and Whitefield, Mimi. 25 January 1999. ‘One community, one goal’‘Florida tourism: Visitors up 3.7 percent in 1998’ 18 February 1999. Garcia, Manny.
28 December 1998. ‘S. Florida crimes goes way down’
Keating, Dan and Epstein, Gail. 3 December 1995. ‘In crime, Dade leads the nation’Keating, Dan and Robles, Frances. 10 April 1996. ‘Dade takes a sharp bite out of
crime’
Kleinberg, Howard. 21 September 1999. ‘Crime, it’s nothing new to South Florida’Leen, Jeff and Getter, Lisa. 22 February 1996. ‘Criminals no longer getting off easy’Markowitz, Arnold. 5 January 2000. ‘Continuing trends, Dade crime rate falls again’The Miami Herald. 25 February 1995. ‘Visitors to Florida drop 2.8% in 1994’—— 9 June 1997. ‘Where to live? Florida ranks as the favorite’—— 18 February 1999. ‘Florida tourism’Florida: paradise lost and restored 165

—— 25 May 1999. ‘Fort Lauderdale tourism’
—— 26 May 1999. ‘Greater Miami tourism’Morales, Maria A. and Reisner, Neil. 17 May 1999. ‘Miami, Lauderdale show drop in
crime’
Morgan, Curtis. 26 January 1999. ‘Miami-Dade takes a big bite out of crime’—— 1 January 2000. ‘Florida rides wave of visitors’Morgan, Curtis and Gail Epstein. 15 January 1998. ‘Miami crime declined by 5 per-
cent in 1997’
Nieves, Gail Epstein. 2 May 1999. ‘New crime laws could bog down courts’Rejtman, Jack. 8 October 1999. ‘Broward emphasizes service in focused tourism cam-
paign’
‘Summit: Tourism, aerospace called key to state’s economic future’ 20 September
1997.
Whitefield, Mimi and Fields, Gregg. 12 August 1997. ‘Chamber project aims to create
jobs’
Wooldridge, Jane. 5 August 1998. ‘Visit Florida expands’—— 20 August 1998. ‘Tourism ads reach Latin media’Y eomans, Adam. 25 May 1995. ‘State removing day guards from interstate rest areas’166 Donn Tilson and Don W. Stacks

Case 14 Raising environmental
awareness in Slovenia
A public communication
campaign
Dejan Vercic and Darinka Pek-Drapal
Introduction
Air pollution caused by the use of dirty fossil fuels (coal, wood, heavy oil) for
power generation and heating is one of the biggest environmental problemsin countries in transition. In Slovenia, a newly independent country inCentral Europe with a population of 2 million living on 20.296 km
2, the
heating of buildings, flats and individual houses uses about one-third of thetotal energy consumption and is therefore responsible for the same amount ofair pollution as sulphur dioxide and smoke. Although efforts have been madein Slovenia to reduce air pollution from burning dirty fuels, the problem stillpersists. Previous efforts have been directed primarily at reducing air emis-sions from big power stations because of their concentrations of air emissionson one site.
Despite the introduction of a scheme to provide low-interest loan finance
to encourage households to convert to more environmentally friendly heatingsystems, up to 1996 only limited progress had been made.
This case study describes how Pristop Communications was responsible for
the design and implementation of a public communication campaign whichsucceeded in increasing the take up of these loans by individual householdsmore than tenfold. The public communication campaign started in May 1996and by its end, 1,896 Slovenian households had converted from dirty fossilfuel heating systems to more environmentally friendly heating systems.
Aim of the case study
The aim of this case study is to show how good use of research and straight-forward execution can be effective even within externally imposed time andfinancial constraints and in economically difficult times – in this instance forthe intended loan provisions. Time and financial constraints are common inpublic communication campaigns particularly if providers of communicationservices are selected through a public tender which usually pre-defines whathas to be done, in what time and with what resources.
The economic environment also plays an important role in the execution of

any public communication campaign. The usual goals of public communica-
tion campaigns are to achieve improvements in public well-being (education,health, etc.) and, in this case, cleaner air. Although, in general, most peoplewill agree that improvement in the public’s well-being is beneficial, the ques-tion of who should pay for such improvements is often contentious.
In the case of environmental issues, the principle of the ‘polluter pays’ is
generally accepted, but the situation can be complicated if the polluter comesfrom a financially weak strata of society. In this case, the major group of loantakers have been retirees, who are financially a very vulnerable group in post-socialist countries. However, through research it was found that some(grown-up) children in Slovenia are prepared to pay for more convenient andefficient heating systems for their elderly parents. The campaign theme wasthus broadened from environmental to financial questions and the greaterconvenience of newer heating systems.
Background
In an attempt to tackle the problem of air pollution, in Spring 1995 theGovernment of Slovenia established the Environmental Development Fund(Eco-Fund) within the Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning toprovide attractive low-interest loans to households to convert their dirty heat-ing systems to more environmentally friendly systems. The Eco-Fund servedas the overall loan managing institution, while the administration of the loanscheme was conducted by a group of banks, led by Nova Kreditna BankaMaribor. However, from June 1995 to May 1996, only 117 loans were takenby individual households.
In 1996, the European Commission, through its Phare programme, issued
a public tender for the ‘Pilot Testing Phase of the World Bank Air PollutionAbatement Programme’. The intention of this programme was to evaluateand improve the Eco-Fund project management capabilities, to design andlaunch an extensive public communication campaign, and to design and pro-vide computer courses for the Eco-Fund staff including purchase ofcomputer and communication hardware and software. A Slovenian consor-tium of four consultancies (ITEO, Pristop Communications, Sistemi Shift,and E-Net) won the tender.
The consortium collaborated through a Steering Committee that held 13
meetings and the project assurance team that held 32 meetings during the lifeof the project. The whole contract value of the project was ECU 400,000, ofwhich ECU 154,800 were designated for the public communication cam-paign. The campaign started in May 1996. One month was designated as aninception phase, 11 months as the implementation phase, and 1 month for thefinalisation and evaluation phase.168 Dejan Vercic and Darinka Pek-Drapal

The public communication campaign
Formative research
The initial formative research to assist the design of the public communica-
tion campaign was prepared and executed in May and June 1996. It consistedof both quantitative and qualitative research. The latter consisted of in-depthinterviews with the management and staff of Eco-Fund and interviews withsome of their target audiences. The quantitative phase of the research con-sisted of a poll of a representative, quota sample of 1,163 households drawnfrom the population of 645,000 households in Slovenia. Face-to-face inter-viewing was carried out between 20 and 28 June 1996. Analysis of publics,which was used to discover the willingness of the population to enter into adialogue on the key topics, showed that half of the population could beviewed as a potential target.
From the poll it was concluded that the model target audience had the fol-
lowing characteristics:
• is older;
• lives in an urban environment;• is employed by the state/a public company;• lives in a family with one provider;• the family has middle or lower income;• the possibility (willingness) for communication activity grows with
target’s education.
From in-depth interviews it was found that one important group that wasinterested in the conversion of their heating systems were retirees. It wasfound that children were prepared to help their elderly parents financially toafford the cost of conversion to more convenient gas heating systems.
Goals
Following the research, five broad goals were identified:
1 to train and increase the communicative capability of the Eco-Fund
management and staff and to establish Eco-Fund as a credible institution
that funds environmental projects through favourable loans;
2 to increase awareness about the loan programme in the target population;3 to change attitudes and behaviours so as to establish a consciousness that
it is necessary to convert to environmentally friendly systems for heating;
4 to establish a mutual understanding and strategic partnership between
Eco-Fund and those target groups that actively participate in the pro-gramme for the conversion of heating systems (banks, Energy AdvisoryOffices, etc.);Raising environmental awareness in Slovenia 169

5 to influence the target population and other enabling groups to do the
necessary preparatory work, apply for loans, take the loans and convert
the heating systems.
Planning and implementation
Five major groups were identified for the public communication programme:
1 those within the general population most likely to benefit from the heat-
ing conversion loans (those with old and environmentally unfriendly
heating systems needing conversion);
2 enabling publics (those institutions directly involved in the loan pro-
gramme that have an influence on the success of the programme – banks,labour contractors, natural gas and district heating distributors);
3 media (journalists and editors of both press and electronic media on
local and national level);
4 energy consultants and professional associations (professional energy
associations, municipal energy consultants);
5 political publics (Parliament, government, Ministry of Environment and
Physical Planning, environmental pressure groups).
The key messages were formulated according to the specific needs of each ofthe publics. These can be summarised as falling into the following categories:
• financial arguments – those promoting the availability of favourable
loans for the modification of environmentally harmful heating systems;
• environmental arguments – those encouraging the need to change the
system of heating to one which is environmentally friendly;
• convenience arguments – those promoting new energy supplies (natural
gas) as reliable, cost efficient and comfortable;
• enabling arguments – those promoting the need for a partnership and
joint action among all institutions/organisations that are directly or
indirectly incorporated into the Eco-Fund loan programme.
Tactical plan
The tactical plan consisted of the following key elements:
• a launch ‘open day’;
• training and seminars for Eco-Fund management and staff;• advertising;• live radio talk-shows;• media relations;• a brochure;170 Dejan Vercic and Darinka Pek-Drapal

• a toll-free telephone line;
• a national round table on air pollution abatement.
Before its completion, the project was re-evaluated with a programme poll.
Feedback of results and further recommendations were provided to the man-agement and staff of the Eco-Fund.
Launch: ‘Open Day’
The public communication campaign was launched with an ‘open day’ recep-
tion at the premises of the Eco-Fund on May 1996. Representatives of localcommunities, managers of leading energy supply companies, bank execu-tives and journalists met with the management of the Eco-Fund and theirstaff. To ensure the presence of all key representatives at the ‘open day’ theinvitation included the basic description of the communication campaignproject. The strategic role of each group invited to the ‘open day’ was pointedout, explaining that only with their active participation would the objectivesof the campaign be attainable.
Training and seminars
After competing the initial research, the initial planning phase of the com-
munication campaign started with briefing of the Eco-Fund management andits staff to prepare them to play the role of communicators for the loan pro-gramme. This consisted of training to enable them to deliver statements to themedia and also included television training to help them to prepare for par-ticipation on a TV round table (September 1996). A ‘Question and Answer’manual on relevant topics was prepared for those personnel likely to beinvolved in dealing with the media. Seminars were organised to help improvethe management’s basic understanding of communication management,public relations and public affairs (October 1996). A series of supplementarybriefing documents were also prepared for internal use covering topics as:
• a definition of the communication problems in the Air Pollution
Abatement Programme;
• situational analysis of the Eco-Fund’s publics;
• a definition of communication goals.
These briefing documents also outlined the main components of the public
relations plans and activities.
Advertising
An advertising account team (comprising the campaign art director, copy
writer, designer, TV spot director and media planning expert) prepared aRaising environmental awareness in Slovenia 171

comprehensive plan for the media campaign. The creative work was finished
in July 1996 and the materials were presented to Eco-Fund executives fortheir approval. The proposal included suggestions for the main slogan, copytext, layout of print advertisement, scenario for TV spot and radio adver-tisement. The creative work was approved by the Eco-Fund management. A16-second TV advertisement was run on both major national TV stations, apublic (TV Slovenija) and a private station (POP TV) in September 1996(the first wave) and in March 1997 (second wave). Its first peak (September1996) reached 70 per cent of the whole Slovenian population (achieving 443GRP – gross rating points, and 6+ OTS – opportunity to see). Its text wasshort and simple. After naming the sponsor of the advertisement (TheEnvironmental Development Fund of the Republic of Slovenia) it started inblack and white, showing a young girl running towards a rocking-chair. Asthe background steadily changed to ‘green’, the following message appeared:Don’t you think that you spend too much money polluting the environment? /172 Dejan Vercic and Darinka Pek-Drapal
Figure 14.1 Eco-Fund print advertisement (see page 178 for English translation).

Change your source of Energy!/ Take advantage of favourable loans for cheap
and environmentally friendly heating.
Radio spots were placed on nine national and regional radio stations in
March 1997: Radio Brezice, Radio Celje, Radio Dur, Radio Glas Ljubljane,
Radio Maribor MM1, Radio Ognjisce, Radio Trbovlje, Radio Triglav, andVal 202.
Full-page advertisements ran in ten national, regional and local dailies,
weeklies and bi-weeklies: Delo, Dnevnik, Dolenjski list, Gorenjski glas,
Ljubljana, Novi tednik, Ptujski tednik, Slovenske novice, Vecer, Zasavc in
September 1996 and March 1997. The advertisements included details onthe sponsoring organisation – the Eco-Fund and banks that were facilitatingthe loan (see Figure 14.1).
Live radio talk-shows
Twenty-one live radio discussions were organised from September 1996 to June
1997 to help spread more information about the loan scheme and to get thetarget audience to join discussions on the loan programme and on ‘environ-mental issues’. These radio programmes took place on the following nationaland regional radio stations (in the order they were broadcast): Radio Studio D,Radio Triglav, Radio Ptuj, Radio Brezice, Radio Trbovlje, TV Impulz, RadioKranj, Radio Glas Ljubljane, Radio Celje, Radio Dur, Koroski radio, RadioMaxi, Radio Sora, Radio Univox, Radio Trbovlje, Radio Cerkno, Koroskiradio, Notranski radio, Radio Morje, Radio Koper, Radio Izola.
Media relations
The consultancy produced special background materials, progress reports,
press releases, fact-sheets, and feature stories for the media. The intensivemedia relations campaign resulted in the publication of 27 articles on the sub-ject in the national and 35 in the regional press. A total of 660 minutes oftime were aired on broadcast media.
Brochure
An easy to understand booklet entitled Loans for environmentally friendly
heating systems was prepared, printed and disseminated through the offices ofthe banks which provided Eco-Fund’s loans, community environmentaloffices and through the existing energy advisory offices on the regional andlocal level. Here the aim was to provide the target audiences with usefulinformation in a friendly ‘take-home’ form, available in appropriate loca-tions. The booklet contained information about how to apply for loanstogether with the necessary application forms and a list of useful addresses ofEnergy Advisory Offices and banks. Approximately 14,000 copies of thebooklet were distributed.Raising environmental awareness in Slovenia 173

Toll-free telephone line
A toll-free telephone enquiry line was set up and there were some 975 phone
calls to the line from October 1996 to May 1997 as well as numerous calls toother Eco-Fund phone numbers (telephone calls received through the liveradio talk-shows are not included).
National round table
A national round table was organised on the priorities and the necessary
measures to encourage air pollution abatement activities in Slovenia afterthe formal conclusion of the communication campaign. More than twomonths’ preparations for the national round table included the following:a list of all organisations that should take an active role in the air pollutionabatement programme; preparing a scenario for the round table with174 Dejan Vercic and Darinka Pek-Drapal
Figure 14.2 Eco-Fund press release.

concrete action plans which should be accepted as a result of the round
table; a series of meetings with organisational representatives and coordi-nation among them; rewriting papers with the aim of preparing a commonnational round table document. Supporting publicity and media relationswere carried out before and during the round table. The national roundtable was held on 22 April 1997, coinciding with International Earth Day.It was addressed by the Minister of Environment and Physical Planning, DrPavle Gantar. As a consequence, a coordinating body was established withrepresentatives of the Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning, theMinistry for Economic Affairs, the Environmental Development Fund, theAgency of the Republic of Slovenia for Efficient Energy Use, the Chamberof Commerce, and representatives of energy distributors. The coordinatingbody was responsible for suggesting, adjusting and supervising the loanprogramme.Raising environmental awareness in Slovenia 175
Figure 14.3 The Eco-Fund brochure (see pages 178–9 for content of the brochure).

Outcomes and feedback
The implementation of the public communication campaign started in May
1996. During the 10 months of the campaign, the number of loans increaseddramatically from the earlier low take-up level of only 117 to 1,896 and anequal number of household converted to environmentally friendly heatingsystems.
The Environmental Development Fund (Eco-Fund) had published its first
public tender for favourable loans intended for conversion to environmentallyfriendly heating systems in June 1995. In December 1996, PristopCommunications conducted evaluative research to review the progress of thecommunication campaign and to discover any major problems and obstaclesthat borrowers had been faced with in the process of the application forloans. Six in-depth interviews, two focus groups and a telephone poll of 140loan recipients were conducted.
Research results confirmed prior assumptions about the feasibility of the
loan programme:
• the population of those taking up loans was older than the general pop-
ulation of Slovenia, with retired people forming 40 per cent of borrowers;
• the availability of financial resources in the form of an Eco-loan was
named as a reason to take the loan in only 15 cases;
• the major reasons cited for applying for the loan and the conversion of
the heating system were identified by the respondents as: easier use of the
new systems (57 per cent), environmental reasons (55 per cent), and ageof the previous system (30 per cent) (multiple answers were possible);
• 56 per cent of respondents identified print advertisements as the pri-
mary source of information on the loans, 25 per cent cited friends andrelatives, and 16 per cent television advertisements;
• the brochure was identified as an important source of information about
the loans by 40 per cent of respondents – however, only two of themidentified it as the primary source of the news on the loan.
A third of interviewees indicated that it took more than a month to completeall the required technical and financial documentation involved in applying fora loan and indicated that the complicated procedure in completing the appli-cation provided a major obstacle that needed addressing in the future. Thesefindings were presented to the management and staff of the EnvironmentalDevelopment Fund (socio-economic and other useful data could not beobtained directly from loan applications due to legislation protecting personalinformation that is provided to an institution for a limited purpose – in thiscase, banks). Further insights were gained not only into the effectiveness of thecommunication campaign, but also about household decision-making on thequestions of the conversion of heating systems, work of enabling institutions,etc. Another workshop was organised with the participation of researchers176 Dejan Vercic and Darinka Pek-Drapal

from Pristop Communications, the staff of the Eco-Fund and the manage-
ment of the loan programme at the Nova Kreditna banka Maribor, the mainbank that was coordinating the work of all other banks involved. At the endof the project written recommendations for further work relating to the over-all project – including public communication – were provided to themanagement and staff of the Eco-Fund.
Although the project that is the focus of this case study was successfully
completed in July 1997, the Eco-Fund has continued its communicationactivities using its own resources. Also due to the successful outcome of theproject, the European Commission issued a new tender through its Phare pro-gramme to support the activities of Eco-Fund in 1998 (for information onresearch for this case study and on more materials, see Appendix 3).
Key lessons for the development of public communication
campaigns and the role of public relations
This case study demonstrates a number of key lessons for the development of
public communication campaigns and the role of public relations:
•The interests of campaign sponsors and targets need not be identical; but they
need to be congruent: As the research demonstrated, more people took
loans and converted their heating systems because the newer heating sys-tems are easier to handle than for ‘environmental’ reasons, which wereguiding the sponsor to provide loans. But although the interests thatguided the behaviour of sponsors and targets were not identical, they werecongruent enough to produce the desired effects and satisfy both sides.
•Only research can tell you with whom to communicate: Every communi-
cation campaign needs to start with good research which is the onlymeans to find with whom you can communicate. Since every communi-cation campaign faces constraints (time, money, personnel, etc.), it isextremely important to concentrate resources at hand in the most pro-ductive direction – to people who are interested in what you have to say.The indiscriminate distribution of messages is both highly inefficient anda waste of money and other resources.
•Your target audiences are those with whom you can communicate: There
are many ways in which you can define your target audiences, but in acommunication campaign you have to concentrate on those you canreach with your communication means and messages. A communicationcampaign can succeed only if you can find partners for the dialogue for
your sponsor.
•Messages need to be simple, but broad enough to integrate the interests ofboth sponsors and targets: Any public communication needs, by defini-
tion, to be simple. But since the interests of the sponsors and the targetsare rarely (if ever) the same, you must create such messages that, whileremaining simple, still embrace the interests of both sponsors and targets.Raising environmental awareness in Slovenia 177

•For the media selection, narrowcasting (targeting) is more important that
broadcasting: The success of this campaign was dependent on the behav-
iour of 1,000 people out of two million. In a public communicationcampaign, you use mass media, but you are using them to narrowcast(target) – it is more important who you reach than how many.
•Success of public campaigns depends not only on sponsors and targets;‘others’ involved may hold the leverage: For a target to behave in the
desired way – to convert their heating system – many people and institu-tions needed to do their jobs, the Eco-Fund, banks, EnvironmentAdvisory Offices, etc. As the summative research at the end of the projectshowed, the concerted action of all these enables involved was still aproblem. The cooperation of all these parties was good enough duringthe project to achieve the given target, but further success of the pro-gramme was critically dependent on further improvements in their work.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Translation of the text from the advertisement in Figure 14.1
DON’T YOU THINK YOU’RE SPENDING TOO MUCH MONEY ON
POLLUTING THE ENVIRONMENT?’ / The blackness surrounding us is
becoming greater each day. Also because many Slovene home-owners are stillheating their dwellings with environmentally hazardous solid fuels. / But coal- or
wood-fired furnaces can soon become your black past. / Use favourable loans for
environmentally friendly and comfortable heating!/ The Environmental
Development Fund of the Republic of Slovenia offers favourable loans to every-one living in areas with more polluted air and who would like to change to usingcleaner fuels. In order to limit environmental pollution and at the same time pro-vide comfortable heating, we recommend the introduction of a heating systemfor remote heating, gas, heating oil, heat pump or solar energy. Favourableloans are available for installing the aforementioned types of heating systems. /
Choose pure comfort. / Loans for environmentally friendly heating are available
from the following banks: Nova kreditna banka Maribor; LB Domzale,Dolenjska banka, Celjska banka, LB Zasavje, LB Koroska banka andGorenjska banka. / Information may be obtained from: / The Environmental
Fund of the Republic of Slovenia/ Telephone: (061) 176 33 44/ MOTTO:
Change the source of energy! / LOGO: Environmental Development Fund of the
Republic of Slovenia d.d.
Appendix 2: Description of the contents of the brochure presented in
Figure 14.3
Basic information concerning loans for environmentally friendly heating,
Technical data on environmentally friendly heating systems, Remote heating,178 Dejan Vercic and Darinka Pek-Drapal

Natural gas, Liquefied petroleum gas, Light heating oil, Heat pumps, Solar-
powered heating systems, Choose pure comfort, What can the loans be usedfor?, Who is eligible for the loans?, Applying for a loan, The procedure forobtaining a loan, Obtaining advice on energy consumption, Energy consult-ing service, Information and application documentation.
Appendix 3: Research for this case study and further materials
This case study is based on two 4-page case summaries that were prepared by
Darinka Pek Drapal – the project director of the campaign at PristopCommunication Group. One was awarded the United Nations Award, givenout by the International Public Relations Association (IPRA) in cooperationwith the UN for a single project in a year that best meets the working guide-lines of the United Nations in the domain of environmental concern. Theother one received the Award of Excellence from the InternationalAssociation of Business Communicators (IABC) – Europe. The originalresearch, interim and final reports of the project were reviewed, as well asother project documentation that is archived at Pristop Communications.
After receiving the UN award, Pristop Communications prepared a video
case study of the communication campaign. The (VHS) video tape with thecase study is available from Pristop Communications, Selanova 20, PO Box3249, 1001 Ljubljana, Slovenia.Raising environmental awareness in Slovenia 179

Case 15 FASE – fundraising in
Spain
Generating sponsors for
AIDS awareness
Danièle A. Letoré
Introduction
The not-for-profit sector in Europe, known as the Third Sector or as Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) has experienced market growth inrecent decades. However, while more and more associations and foundationsare being created to respond to specific social needs, the money available forsupport has not grown at the same rate. Not-for-profit organisations, there-fore, have to be creative and seek long-term partnerships that will guaranteeincome to plan programmes over several years and ensure the continuity ofthe organisation.
Partnerships can involve two or more parties, with the NGO or not-for-
profit agency generally furnishing the knowledge about and needs of itscause, and the corporate sponsor providing the funding and often its specialindustry and business connections and influence. These partnerships offer analternative to the traditional forms of thinking where money was consideredthe key element to any successful NGO activity. Today, cash donations toNGOs in Spain account for only 50 per cent of corporate or business fund-ing in the Third Sector. The other 50 per cent is generated from a wide rangeof different activities. Planning activities in the long term requires the NGOto have a clear mission and vision, strong objectives, good planning, and theresources to implement each level of activity as well as carefully matched for-profit partners. This case study of FASE – Fundación Anti-Sida España, aMadrid-based HIV/AIDS charity, demonstrates that despite the lack of along-standing tradition in philanthropy and social action in Spain, creativepartnerships can be developed which provide both the donor and the organ-isation with advantages as well as preserving and enhancing each party’sindependent objectives and activities.
Research
When the HIV/AIDS virus reached Spain in the early 1980s, neither the gov-ernment, the private or public sectors or the Third Sector realised its epidemicproportions. As elsewhere in Europe, it was first considered a rare disease and

then as a condition that affected only specific populations. Spanish society
was slow to react. By the early 1990s Spain had the highest incidence ofHIV/AIDS infection in Europe, an estimated 125,000 to 250,000 people, withabout 7,000 new cases detected each year. AIDS has become a more signifi-cant cause of death than car accidents among adult men.
Although several local organisations and a national government plan for
AIDS education had been launched, the national plan could not be imposedat the regional level because of community autonomy restrictions. Theserestrictions placed even more emphasis on the need for not-for-profit orThird Sector organisations to lead the way and meet the critical social needsof special groups.
Goals and objectives
Within this context, a small group of businessmen and journalists decided toset up an organisation to combat the biological and social ignorance aboutthe virus, from the spread of HIV to the stigma of AIDS, and the resultingexclusion of and discrimination against HIV positive people.
The founder and president of FASE, a chemist by training, developed a
quality control method to test the safety of condoms. This method waspatented and the income from the royalties was used with one objective: thepromotion and creation, through direct or concerted efforts, activities andprogrammes to win the fight against AIDS.
Unlike many of the 150 not-for-profit organisations that mushroomed in
the HIV/AIDS sector, FASE chose to tread the path of pluralism and neu-trality, catering to all the HIV-infected population, with no politicalcommitment other than to fight AIDS. FASE maintains a slim organisa-tional structure with a governing board and honorary patrons that have linksto all sectors of the Spanish economy and society.
FASE is organised into six areas with specific missions:
1 management that develops and implements yearly planning of events as
well as conducting the day-to-day administration of all activities;
2 a toll-free telephone information line that provides counselling, advice
and information on HIV , AIDS, treatments and services throughout thecountry;
3 communications, media and special actions specialists who coordinate
media relations and plan and implement special events;
4 training programme personnel who conducted HIV/AIDS educational
sessions throughout Spain for youth, counsellors, medical and paramed-ical staff, and HIV positive persons and families;
5 counselling and personal support staff available to help solve personal
HIV/AIDS-related problems;
6 a legal advisory staff with a network of lawyers who can either offer
counsel or suggest or take appropriate action.FASE: generating sponsors for AIDS awareness 181

In addition, FASE has a reservoir of more than 400 regular volunteers who
collaborate on different programmes that FASE organises.
It became clear that there was a need to broach the lack of knowledge, sup-
port and treatment for HIV positive persons. Prevention and awarenesscampaigns aimed at the general population, media campaigns and govern-ment mobilisation were urgently needed:
• to prevent the uncontrolled spread of the virus;
• to provide medical and social support of those already infected;• to remove the social stigma attached to HIV/AIDS;• to achieve an understanding that human rights were being violated on a
daily basis.
Another goal was to become a nationally recognised, sanctioned NGO, whichrequired that the not-for-profit organisation acquire substantial funding orcorporate in-kind support. It is through meaningful partnerships that FASEwas able to become a nationally recognised NGO. This case study illustratesfive specific partnerships that FASE established, each for a specifically tar-geted objective.
Partnership 1 Telefonica and FASE’s toll-free telephone line
900 111 000
Telefonica is the largest private telecommunications company in Spain with
an annual income of more than 2 billion pesetas. As a service provider in thetelecommunications industry, Telefonica targets all its marketing actions andcommunications activities towards the whole population in Spain. With65,000 employees, Telefonica sought to institutionalise its corporate citizen-ship programmes by creating, in 1997, a department devoted exclusively tosponsorship and philanthropy. The annual budget for the first year of thisdepartment was 750 million pesetas.
The partnership
Recognising the necessity for corporate citizenship in a country with no such
tradition, Telefonica selected a number of NGOs working in the five areas thecompany elected to support. As awareness of HIV/AIDS grew, with the real-isation that anyone and everyone could become infected, Telefonica chose aninstitution that was publicly recognised and that had nationwide impactworking through a means that fitted its own marketing objectives and exper-tise: the telephone, including telephone support services, remotetelecommunications services for handicapped persons and senior citizens,education and culture related to telecommunications, cooperation and devel-opment work in Third World countries, and sports.
While historically Telefonica had supported FASE’s toll-free HIV/AIDS182 Danièle A. Letoré

information line since its initiation in 1992, when Telefonica’s Sponsorship
and Philanthropy Department was created in 1997, the relationship withFASE was formalised within established criteria that the company had laiddown for its programmes. Telefonica determined five main sectors for supportof not-for-profit organisations having as its objectives:
• to improve education;
• to develop communication;• to ameliorate quality of life.
In 1998, under its new guidelines Telefonica agreed to cover 70 per cent of the
expenses related to the toll-free line. However, the NGO had to pay the bills,manage the line, and ensure transparency of accounting so that Telefonicacould reimburse the monetary value of 70 per cent of costs at the end of theyear. In 1998, Telefonica actually covered up to 35 per cent of the toll-free linecosts. The reduced contribution was due to the increasing amount of othersponsorships to which Telefonica has committed.
Success factors and problems from FASE’s point of view
Success factors
• FASE is a high-visibility organisation working in a field with patrons
consisting of top personalities from all sectors of the Spanish society.
• FASE is a credible organisation.
• FASE operates nationwide.• FASE has contacts in some of the Latin American markets where
Telefonica is present.
• FASE gains the support of one of the most important corporations in
Spain; other companies will not hesitate to support the cause, thus reduc-ing dependence on each sponsor.
Problems
• One problem is that the terms of the agreement stipulate tight control of
expenditures; should FASE not manage to control the management of its
expenses, the contract might not be renewed.
• Another consideration is today there are many more NGOs applying for
funding than there used to be and budgets are shrinking, so FASE isfacing increased competition for a finite amount of money.
Success factors from Telefonica’s point of view
• Systematic mention of Telefonica as a sponsor in all publications and
public speeches by FASE.FASE: generating sponsors for AIDS awareness 183

• Goodwill generated within the employee base of the Telefonica through
its internal publications.
• All donations are tax-deductible.
Results to date
The collaboration between FASE and Telefonica has lasted five years to date.
The toll-free line receives more than 35,000 calls a year. Telefonica has hadmany media mentions thanks to the honouring of the contract by both sides.
Partnership 2 Casa DÈcor – reaching out to all levels of
society
Casa DÈcor is a small private company that originated in Argentina and
began its activities in Spain in the early 1990s, using run-down, empty town-houses refurbished by top designers and exhibited to the public for onemonth. In Spain, Casa DÈcor has run ten such exhibitions to date, with ever-growing success in Madrid and Barcelona. It is the most importantdecoration exhibition in Spain. In Latin America, Casa DÈcor has refur-bished houses in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Peru and Colombia, andintends to extend activities throughout Latin America. Some three millionpeople have visited Casa DÈcor projects worldwide.
Casa DÈcor houses became a showcase for the most up-to-date interior
design because of the diversity of decoration proposals and interior designinnovation. Each designer is free to choose whichever style, decoration, fab-rics, furniture and accessories he or she wishes. The designer also selectswhich companies will work for his or her design and determines his or herbudget. The entire supply chain of the decoration industry is involved in thisproject. The whole project must be completed in one month.
The resulting work of interior design is then put on show to the public for
one month. In addition, a small conference room is installed for the durationof the exhibition, in which conferences on all aspects of design are held. Acatalogue is developed so that suppliers can be contacted by visitors. Arestaurant, cafeteria, store and free-of-charge nursery are also at the disposalof visitors. The media is invited to the opening and television frequentlybroadcasts programmes directly from Casa DÈcor.
The partnership
In 1992, Casa DÈcor in Madrid decided that some of the profit generated by
Casa DÈcor should be donated to FASE. Casa DÈcor is a unique platformfor any NGO to reach sections of society. The decision to espouse the causeof HIV/AIDS prevention was based on the recognition that messages couldbe delivered to a wide segment of the population who under normal circum-stances might not consider AIDS-related issues and the dimension of the184 Danièle A. Letoré

epidemic. There was a need in Spain to make the population realise what
HIV/AIDS means in terms of healthcare provision, human rights and socialissues.
The agreement was that FASE would receive 10 to 20 per cent of all income
generated by entrance fees and sales of the catalogue. In addition, the inau-gural gala cocktail party is put entirely at the disposal of FASE and allincome generated from the event is donated to FASE.
At the entrance of Casa DÈcor, there is a stand with volunteers from
FASE. As people enter, they receive the catalogue and also a red ribbon.This allows the curious to ask questions and the volunteers to talk aboutAIDS prevention and information. Within the exhibition area, there are dis-creet reminders that the cause being supported is HIV/AIDS – here a hatcovered in condoms or there a bag with a clasp in the form of a red ribbon,emblematic of the fight against HIV/AIDS is displayed.
Casa DÈcor also provides an excellent setting for media interviews where
journalists and actors like to be interviewed. In 1998, several talk shows werefilmed at Casa DÈcor, ensuring wide media coverage of both the exhibitionand of HIV/AIDS prevention.
Success factors and problems from FASE’s point of view
Success factors
• Exposure of the HIV/AIDS issue to all the supply chain involved in
building and interior design.
• Exposure to circles of Spanish society which are otherwise unreachable in
a neutral environment.
• Financial access to people with money.
• The patronage of the Infanta Elena and her visit to Casa DÈcor ensured
maximum media coverage nationwide.
Problems
• One problem is the need to adapt language, style and dress to an envi-
ronment to which some NGOs are unfamiliar.
• Another problem is the lack of commitment to ensure a full-time pres-
ence of several volunteers to promote discussion.
Success factors and problems from Casa DÈcor’s point of view
Success factors
• Espousal of a cause that affects all levels of society where there is little
history of philanthropy.
• Exposure through media and social circles.FASE: generating sponsors for AIDS awareness 185

• Goodwill generated.
• Appeal to increasingly wider audiences.• The cost is tax deductible.
Problems
• Use of different language and dress codes.
• Lack of innovation on the part of the NGO to fully use the exhibition for
creative prevention and fundraising campaigns.
Results to date
When Casa DÈcor began its activities five years ago in Spain, a small number
of people visited the exhibition. In 1998 more than 30,000 visitors attendedthe exhibition within one month. There has been extensive media coveragenationwide. Tens of thousands of red ribbons have been distributed; fiveyears ago people did not want to wear them, today nobody rejects the redribbon. Casa DÈcor has thus served as a very effective social barometer togauge knowledge and acceptance levels.
Five years ago when Casa DÈcor began to collaborate with FASE,
HIV/AIDS was a taboo subject within certain social circles. A very importantresult of the Casa DÈcor/FASE partnership has been to introduce the subjectof HIV/AIDS information and prevention into all levels of society.
Finally, FASE has benefited from direct and indirect contacts with differ-
ent decision-makers in Madrid and Barcelona. In addition, Casa DÈcor hasassured an annual income that can be used for FASE’s different activitiesthroughout the year.
Partnership 3 Denci – the art of social marketing in a
sceptical market
With one of the highest unemployment rates in Europe, at some 21 per cent
of the population, Spain did not traditionally have a mobile temporaryemployment market. Until 1994 there was no law governing the sector, anduntil 1997 there was no particular consensus on wages or on the obligationsof different agencies and employers. It was a free market but it was not wellrespected by employers or by trade unions, on the basis that:
• wages were different from company to company;
• temporary work is not a guarantee of labour security;• agencies were perceived not to supply qualified staff;• no one agency can supply all the temporary staff required.
Today the temporary employment market in Spain is regulated and becoming
ever more competitive, with the larger multinational companies gaining the186 Danièle A. Letoré

highest turnover. At the time of writing, the market was valued at 190 million
pesetas; by the year 2000 this will have increased by 150 per cent.
Among the 427 agencies specialising in providing temporary employees,
Denci is the thirteenth largest. Privately owned, Denci has twenty officesthroughout Spain and opened offices in Portugal in 1998. With a small com-munications budget and a strong belief that temporary work can be thesolution for many people, both unemployed and in transition, Denci haschosen to carry out a form of social marketing that enhances its corporateimage, serves a social function and allows other companies to add to thesupport that Denci is giving FASE.
In a highly dense and competitive market, it is important to differentiate
one company from another. Denci thus began to search for alternative meansto market its services, especially seeking a cause that affects everyone and wasrepresented by an NGO that had nationwide presence.
In Spain, corporate social marketing is in a development phase but repre-
sents a fertile ground for companies to position their products. According toa leading business magazine, 90 per cent of Spaniards would rather buygoods or services that contribute to a social cause than one that does not.According to a survey carried out by the Fundación Empresa y Sociedad, thefavourite category to support in terms of social action is employment, withAIDS coming lowest on the list. It was therefore a challenge, a risk and anadvantage for Denci to blend both current concerns, especially as AIDScomes at the bottom of the list of current concerns.
The partnership
Through the public relations agency that Denci uses, the suggestion was
made to support FASE for the World AIDS Day in 1997. A mailing wassent out to 5,000 of Denci’s existing clients and potential clients stating that0.7 per cent of all income Denci received during the month of December fol-lowing World AIDS Day would be donated to FASE. The success of theoperation, which brought in 1 million pesetas, was extended to the whole of1998: Denci donated 0.7 per cent of all the yearly income from companiesusing Denci’s services through FASE’s public relations.
Success factors from FASE’s point of view
• The name of FASE was exposed to some 5,000 companies as well as to
all the employees of Denci.
• Direct income was generated from the action.
• Both employment and HIV/AIDS are social causes that need to be kept
in the public eye.FASE: generating sponsors for AIDS awareness 187

Success factors and problems from Denci’s point of view
Success factors
• Association of the company with a social cause positions the company as
a caring company and thus enhances the company image.
• Positions Denci as a forward-thinking, innovative company.
• Strongly differentiates Denci from its competitors.• Recognition of Denci in all of FASE’s newsletters.• Through FASE’s other partnerships Denci also reached new audiences.• Income is tax deductible.
Problems
Problems may include: that AIDS is not necessarily well considered by all
potential employers.
Results to date
Denci has recruited more companies into its client base as a direct result of
the mailing stating that the company was supporting FASE. The companyand FASE have both benefited from the public relations campaign that gen-erated good media coverage for both entities. Denci has thus used itscommunications budget in a cost-effective manner, maximising on every com-munications opportunity. Both organisations have thus had better exposure inthe media and valuable corporate positioning.
Partnership 4 Bristol-Myers Squibb – absorbing costs
The Spanish subsidiary of Bristol-Myers Squibb is one of the many sub-sidiary companies of the US-based pharmaceutical group. With annual salesof more than 30,000 million pesetas and a high investment in research anddevelopment, the Spanish company has a large pharmaceutical division spe-cialising in the areas of oncology, cardiovascular disease, antivirals,antibiotics and the central nervous system. Through this division, specificallythrough the antivirals area, Bristol-Myers Squibb has been actively involvedin the fight against AIDS. The company markets two active ingredients usedto treat HIV: DDI (didanosine in chewable and soluble tablets) and D4T(stavudine in capsules and oral solution), as well as an active ingredient indi-cated for the treatment of AIDS-related cachexia and anorexia, megestrolacetate (tablets and oral suspension). In addition to its pharmaceutical divi-sion, the company also has a nutrition division and, parenteral nutritionprogrammes for patients suffering from cachexia (excessive loss of lean bodymass).
Since the first cases of HIV/AIDS were declared in Spain at the beginning188 Danièle A. Letoré

of the 1980s, Bristol-Myers Squibb has consistently sought out and collabo-
rated with the not-for-profit organisations working in the field of HIV/AIDS.NGOs, public institutions and patient self-help groups have been offered helpand collaboration by Bristol-Myers Squibb, whose people involved withHIV/AIDS have mobilised attention and energy and encouraged the provi-sion of comprehensive and transparent information, which is not the case inother healthcare fields.
Bristol-Myers Squibb has a direct business interest in the field of
HIV/AIDS as it markets treatments for the virus as well as nutritional prod-ucts for AIDS-related cachexia. However, the main reason for such activity isto enhance its corporate image and prove its commitment to the field ofHIV/AIDS treatment.
The partnership
People infected with HIV are frequently as well, if not better, informed than
their physicians are about their condition. Those who are newly diagnosedtend to seek out a maximum amount of information about what treatmentoptions exist and how to choose which one is most suited to their particularcase. Bristol-Myers Squibb, therefore, became interested in FASE as a nationalNGO with a toll-free line, extensive contacts throughout Spain in clinics andhospitals, and training courses. The original proposal was to develop jointly aninformation brochure providing facts about HIV – infection, treatment, pre-vention and counselling. Co-scripted by FASE, the company and two otherNGOs (FIT and Movimiento Ciudadano Anti-Sida), 40,000 copies of thebrochure were printed. FASE and Bristol-Myers Squibb distributed it to hos-pitals, clinics, ambulatory healthcare practices, pharmacies, drug rehabilitationcentres, universities, regional administrations and public libraries.
The success of this particular venture has led the company to expand its
support to financing training programmes that FASE organises, with theobjective of ‘training the trainers’. In addition, the company has organisedlectures on different themes around the country and supported the presenceof FASE staff at relevant international conferences.
Success factors and problems from FASE’s point of view
Success factors
• Editorial input in the brochure.
• Control of the content of material distributed under the aegis of the
Foundation.
• Financial means to print a brochure that will last and is attractive.• Access to quality designers and printers.• Entry point into the company to develop further programmes together.• Good network of contacts throughout the country.FASE: generating sponsors for AIDS awareness 189

Problems
• The need to maintain interests of patients and so to present neutral
information.
• Some reticence about the motives of a pharmaceutical company.
Success factors and problems from Bristol-Myers Squibb’s point of
view
Success factors
• The experience of NGO in responding to enquiries.
• Established, effective distribution and communications networks.• Recognition in all of FASE’s newsletters.
Problem
• A potential problem is the lack of understanding of the NGO’s position
and policies as a social service agency which must remain neutral in its
dealings
Results to date
The brochure has been distributed nationwide. FASE gets weekly requests for
more brochures from all over the country. The brochure is referred to over thetoll-free line and is available from FASE’s offices. The success of the brochureis such that the two organisations will develop a second brochure devoted totreatments, nutrition, counselling and human rights.
For the company the results do not translate into direct sales, but the
brochure has signalled to the market that the company is a serious partnerand will be in the market for many years to come with both existing productsand those in the pipeline.
Partnership 5 BDF Nivea SA (Harmony) – raising awareness
together
BDF Nivea SA is one of the Spanish subsidiaries of the German group
Beiersdorf. In Spain, the activities are divided into two main groups – para-pharmaceutical products and cosmetics. Within the pharmaceutical division,various products are sold among which are condoms marketed under theHarmony brand name. Condoms represent less than 2 per cent of the totalproduct portfolio of BDF Nivea sold in Spain.
The condom market in Spain is supplied through two main channels:
through pharmacies and through supermarkets. While 90 per cent of com-peting brands are sold through the former channel, Harmony is one of the190 Danièle A. Letoré

few brands of condoms to be sold in Spain through supermarkets. BDF
Nivea does not do any advertising for Harmony; the brand has 25 per cent ofthe mass market share.
Given that condoms have a recognised use in the prevention of transmis-
sion of HIV/AIDS, it was logical for BDF Nivea to seek partnership with anNGO working within the HIV/AIDS sector. Not only was FASE well knownat national level, but FASE’s founder had developed a quality control test forcondoms. From the company’s point of view, distributing free condomsthrough FASE could easily provide the sampling that Nivea was seekingwhile fulfilling an essential role in the coordination of prevention campaigns.Both organisations thus achieved their own objectives. Condoms and trainingare an integral part of prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS.
The partnership
A five-year agreement was drawn up with FASE, whereby the foundation
received $33,000 per year in exchange for the endorsement of the condomsthat BDF Nivea markets. The toll-free telephone information number andFASE’s logo is printed on every packet of Harmony distributed in the massmarket. In addition, 100,000 condoms are donated to FASE each year for dis-tribution to FASE’s members, at training courses, at events, to the media, atuniversities and wherever else appropriate.
As part of the partnership, BDF Nivea also covers the printing costs of dif-
ferent publications that FASE develops, including training manuals forcourses and the foundation’s newsletter, which appears six times yearly. FASEretains editorial control.
Success factors and problems from FASE’s point of view
Success factors
• Free sampling of condoms for all events.
• A direct link to the work that FASE is doing.• Decreases in direct expenses.• The number of the toll-free line is distributed nationwide without cost to
FASE.
Problem
• A potential problem is that this partnership might exclude support from
other condom manufacturers.FASE: generating sponsors for AIDS awareness 191

Success factors and problems from BDF Nivea SA’s point of view
Success factors• Endorsement by a well-recognised NGO.
• Wide-scale distribution throughout the country to target audiences.• Good sampling opportunity.• Identification with a social cause.
Problem
• A potential problem might be difficulty in relating the direct impact of
activities to sales.
Results to dateWhile it is difficult to make a direct relation between the company’s action
with FASE and the impact on sales, Harmony sales are increasing 10 per centeach year. This is probably due to ever-increasing awareness of the necessityto protect oneself during sexual intercourse.
The distribution of Harmony condoms has been made throughout Spain
to the widest possible audiences. In 1997 a distribution campaign waslaunched outside the Prado museum in the summer months, targeting touristsand Madrid citizens alike. The telephone toll-free line also revealed that somepeople call FASE because they have seen the number on the condom packet.
The company has managed to differentiate itself from the competition by
obtaining endorsement from FASE. The success of this venture has led thecompany to carry out similar programmes with other NGOs, notably withAbrazo in Portugal.
Lessons learned
It can be suggested that successful partnerships between any NGO and part-ners can be measured by the income generated for the NGO; by the length oftime that the company donates income/goods; by the yearly renewal of thepartnership contract over a minimum of three years; by the target audiencesthat have been reached; and by the satisfaction level of both partners.
In general terms, and extrapolating from these partnership scenarios, suc-
cessful partnership would appear to depend on a number of different factorsfrom each partner’s point of view. From the NGO’s point of view:
• the clarity of objectives and programmes within the NGO;
• the cohesion of NGO staff and volunteers;• successful image-building in the marketplace;• the NGO’s openness to original projects;• commitment to creative and non-sectarian thinking;192 Danièle A. Letoré

• the search for and creation of a ‘win-win’ situation for both partners;
• a willingness to adapt ideas to the relevant audiences;• adaptation of ideas from other places to the specific marketplace;• the NGO’s retention of independence of decision and action;• good social networking skills by all NGO personnel.
From the private sector’s point of view:• the NGO’s clearly defined expected outcomes;
• a relevant, mutually beneficial business, image or philanthropic interest;• a potential return on investment, such as an improved corporate image,
increased sales,and access to potential contacts;
• clear definition of roles and responsibilities between NGO and private
sector.
FASE has been singularly successful in eliciting partnerships from the pri-vate sector due to a careful selection of its patrons and governing board,through media campaigns, carefully planned programmes and excellent net-working. The Foundation’s policies of addressing the widest possibleaudience, maintaining a wide and up-to-date donor base, keeping itsindependence and seeking innovative partnerships will ensure its continuingsuccess. The factors that contributed to FASE’s success in building mutuallybeneficial alliances with private sector companies may provide usefullessons for other charities and NGOs working in either the HIV/AIDS fieldor other fields.FASE: generating sponsors for AIDS awareness 193

Case 16 The North West Towns’
Consortium
Public relations and the
marketing of ‘place’
Gary Warnaby and Dominic Medway
Introduction
Since the 1970s the geography of British retailing has been characterised by
increasing decentralisation from traditional urban centres to edge-of-townand out-of-town sites. Schiller
1has used the metaphor of three waves to
describe this decentralising process: the first wave comprised the developmentof food superstores; the second involved non-food specialist stores selling do-it-yourself goods, carpets, garden products etc.; and the third wascharacterised by the more integrated retail provision of regional shoppingcentres. The success of this third wave of decentralisation, which createdmore direct competition to the town/city centre retail offering, has, amongother things, raised a number of significant implications for the role of tra-ditional urban centres as shopping destinations.
A number of what have been described as ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors have
combined to discourage consumer patronage of town and city centres,
2and
these are summarised in Tables 16.1 and 16.2.
While urban centres perform a variety of functions (e.g. commercial, res-
idential and social/cultural), retailing has been regarded as underpinningthe vitality and viability of most town centres, yet it is the urban functionmost at risk. Recent surveys of town centre visitors
3have identified a per-
ceived deterioration of town centres in terms of their cleanliness, the qualityof their non-food shops, and their safety and attractiveness. Moreover,competition for the best sites within town centres by the leading multipleretailers has led to a compaction of the core shopping area and the con-traction of the ‘effective action space’ where most money is spent.
4The
negative consequences of this process of town centre concentration for thesecondary and tertiary shopping areas of town centres have been signifi-cant. The problems of the traditional ‘High Street’ can be summarised asshown in Table 16.3.
In response to this concern regarding the vitality and viability of town
and city centres, action has taken place at a number of levels. At the nationallevel, government response has been manifested by various initiatives relatingto central guidance of local planning policy in favour of town centres. Two

such recent initiatives (Planning Policy Guidance Notes 6 and 13) relate to
retail development and transport infrastructure respectively, and favour retaildevelopment in town centres. Revisions to the first of these guidance notes inJune 1996 were even more overt in their preference for the town centre, pri-marily through the introduction of a sequential approach to selecting sites fornew retail development. This gives first preference to town centre sites (wheresuitable sites are available), followed by edge-of-centre sites, and only then toout-of-centre sites in locations that are (or can be made) accessible by achoice of means of public transport.
In addition, representatives of central government have been vocal in their
support of a range of local-level initiatives to protect the vitality and viabil-ity of town centres. Perhaps the most important of these has been thedevelopment of the concept of town centre management (TCM) and thesubsequent proliferation of town centre management schemes across theUK.
5The first scheme was initiated in 1987 and there are now around 300
across the UK.6The late 1980s saw steady growth in the numbers of TCM
schemes, but the most rapid growth came in the early 1990s, catalysed by theThe North West Towns’ Consortium 195
Table 16.1 Push factors in customer patronage
Factor Implications
Decline in the urban Out-migration, reduction in the spending power of
economy urban catchment population and consequent fall in
the customer base and sales of town-centre retailoutlets
Dispersal of population Growing demand for off-centre retail facilities on the and jobs urban periphery and in smaller towns in semi-rural
areas
Environmental problems Quality of town-centre retail environment in town centres undermined by perceptions of crime, anti-social
behaviour, and eyesores such as litter, graffiti etc.
Transport problems Issues such as under-investment in public transport,
poor car parking facilities, traffic congestion, anduninviting access points to make town centres lessattractive to shoppers
Increasingly mobile Ability to access a wider variety of regional facilities urban population and attractions, reducing the pull of town centres
Failure to move with Standards of customer provision in town centres have
the times failed to meet modern expectations. Facilities such as
toilets and rest areas, which are increasingly indemand, are often found neglected or vandalised.
Source: Adapted from Evans (1997).

establishment of the Association of Town Centre Management (ATCM) in
1991, the objectives of which were:
• to encourage cooperation among those with a common vision for their
town centre;
• to act as a national forum for the identification and exchange of best
practice;
• to consider national and local government practice and seek priority for
the funding of town centres;
• to liaise with other relevant organisations having similar aims.7196 Gary Warnaby and Dominic Medway
Table 16.2 Pull factors in customer patronage
Factor Implications
Attractiveness of out-of- Increasingly wide range of food and
town centres durable goods sold off-centre, through
physical expansion in the number of shops
and tendency to diversify product ranges.
Shopping centre design Reproduction of positive aspects of town
centres without the environmental drawbacksprovides a cleaner, safer, more accessible andmore convenient shopping environment.
Exploitation of tourism and Promotes retail dispersal as most tourism leisure by providing on-site venues are located outside traditional retail retailing at tourist attractions centres.or developing ‘leisure retailing’attractions
Growth in home-based as More time is spent in the home and less in
opposed to social or community pursuits. The perception of society
community-based leisure as increasingly dangerous has reinforced the
pursuits inclination to remain at home or use
neighbouring facilities rather than avoidjourneying into town centres, especially atnight.
Shifting customer values Shopping has become a more individualistic
experience and less of a social or communityactivity. This has weakened the traditionalappeal of town centre markets and personalservice, while value for money, speed ofservice, ease of access and convenience, whichare particular strengths of out-of-townretailing, are seen as increasingly important.
Source: Adapted from Evans (1997).

Retailing in North West England
The retail geography of the north west of England is focused around the
Greater Manchester conurbation, which comprises ten local governmentjurisdictional areas including the City of Manchester, whose retail provisionhas recently been ranked third in the UK.
8 Based on a classification of the
attractiveness of towns as shopping destinations (assessed on the basis of thepresence of major stores in each town), the major towns in the North Westare summarised in Table 16.4.
9
The concept of town centre management has developed rapidly in the
North West in recent years with a proliferation of schemes. The Associationof Town Centre Management is organised on a regional structure and thenorthern region was formed in 1994 with around nine members. By the timethe northern region was split into separate North West and North Eastregions, there were around 35 member schemes.
The northern region of the ATCM has been very active. While it began
very much as an experience sharing exercise, meeting once a quarter, it wasthe building of the new Trafford Centre shopping complex north ofManchester that galvanised it into action.The North West Towns’ Consortium 197
Table 16.3 Problems of the traditional high street
Problem Manifestation
Deficiencies in physical • Barren, concrete multi-storey car parks
environment • Decaying upper storeys of many buildings
• Stark, windswept precincts and open malls• Congested pavements and roads (including access
roads)
• Pedestrianisation schemes which lack aesthetic appeal• Poor service facilities for delivery vehicles
Social problems • Litter, graffiti and casual vandalism
• Nuisance of teenage gangs and vagrants• Lack of amenity areas• Some enclosed malls are claustrophobic• Crowd congestion in some confined streets and malls
Economic problems • Limited amount of car parking close to the core
shopping area typified by poor quality and highcharges
• High rents and rates imposed on the better shopping
streets which inhibit small independent businessdevelopment and lead to ‘sameness’ in the characterand functional structure of the principal shoppingstreets
Source: Adapted from Davies (1987).

The Trafford Centre
The Trafford Centre is a purpose-built regional shopping centre located on
Manchester’s orbital motorway. It comprises over 1 million square feet ofretail space on two levels. The centre has approximately 250 outlets and hasa number major stores as key attractions, including Selfridges, Debenhams,BHS and Boots.
The Trafford Centre is both a retail and a leisure development, with
280,000 square feet provided for catering and leisure facilities including amultiplex cinema and a wide variety of themed restaurants, fast food outletsand cafés.
The history of the development of the Trafford Centre is a controversial
one. The original planning application for the Centre was made in 1986 at198 Gary Warnaby and Dominic Medway
Table 16.4 Major towns in the North West
Shopping destination classification Indicative North West towns and cities
Major city Manchester
Major regional Liverpool
Chester
Regional Preston
Bolton
StockportBlackpoolBirkenheadHuddersfieldWarrington
Sub-regional St Helens
AltrinchamWiganBlackburnOldhamRochdaleBuryLancasterCreweBurnley
Major district Kendal
AccringtonAshton-under-LyneBuxtonSalfordWidnes
Source: Adapted from Management Horizons Europe (1998).

the height of a retail ‘boom’ in the UK. The application was the subject of
a public inquiry during 1987–88 when the development was opposed by aconsortium of eight of the ten local authorities within the GreaterManchester conurbation. The public inquiry resulted in the then Secretary ofState for the Environment, Chris Patten, accepting the development in prin-ciple, subject to the Department of Transport’s satisfaction with measures toameliorate the impact of the centre on the motorway network aroundManchester.
The subject of the implications of the Centre on the transport infrastruc-
ture led to a second inquiry in July 1992. Here, the consortium of GreaterManchester towns opposing the development sought permission to widen theinquiry to reconsider the question of whether the development was needed inprinciple, particularly in the light of changed economic forecasts and gov-ernment policies (to protect the vitality and viability of town centres). Thispermission was refused. The inquiry resulted in the Trafford Centre beinggiven full planning permission in March 1993.
In the summer of 1993 this decision was challenged in the High Court by
the local authorities’ consortium. When this challenge was dismissed the con-sortium took the case to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the appeal inJuly 1993, thereby quashing the planning permission given previously. Thisdecision was challenged by the then Secretary of State for the Environment,John Gummer, in the House of Lords, which overturned the appeal inFebruary 1995 and finally granted full planning permission. Construction ofthe Trafford Centre began in spring 1996 and the Centre was opened inSeptember 1998.
Project Sunrise
The decision to finally approve the development of the Trafford Centre wasthe catalyst for a concerted campaign of action by members of the NorthWest region of the ATCM. It encouraged TCMs to put aside their preoccu-pation with issues such as competition from each other and competitionfrom the edge of their own towns in order to focus on the new threat posed toall by the Trafford Centre.
A decision was taken to set up a small working group to consider what
could be done on a regional basis to counter the effects of the TraffordCentre. This group commissioned a report to evaluate the impact of theTrafford Centre on the retail activities of those town centres within the NorthWest ATCM region and identify strategies to enable these centres to respondeffectively to the Trafford Centre. This initiative became known as ‘ProjectSunrise’ and its aims can be summarised as follows:
• to establish the percentage deflection of retail trade and the total loss of
retail revenue to the Trafford Centre from each of the town centres in the
North West region;The North West Towns’ Consortium 199

• to develop a checklist of initiatives for revitalising town centres in
general;
• to consider in more detail how three of the towns in the North West
could respond to the threat of the Trafford Centre;
• to identify sources of funding for revitalising town centres.
The consultants who produced the report developed an ‘impact model’ to
estimate the amount of retail expenditure that would be deflected from eachof the town centres in the North West region of the ATCM. The suggestedinitial deflection figures (if the town centres did nothing to respond to thethreat posed by the Trafford Centre) were as follows:
Over 20 per cent for Altrincham, Stockport, Warrington and Wigan;10 to 19 per cent for Ashton-under-Lyne, Oldham, Rochdale,
Macclesfield, Blackburn, Bolton, Salford, Eccles,Leigh and Chester;
Under 10 per cent for Blackpool, Birkenhead, Preston, Lancaster,
Liverpool, Crewe, Manchester and Southport.
The ability of individual towns to respond effectively to the threat posed bythe Trafford Centre was identified as being a function of four factors:
• the size of the town itself;
• its proximity to the Trafford Centre;• its strength and vitality;• the presence of intervening towns of a similar size and retail mix.
However, rather than addressing how individual towns should respond to the
Trafford Centre, the Project Sunrise report identified a range of strategies andprojects that could be implemented in different types of town or collectivelyat a regional level.
The results of the impact model study undertaken as part of the Project
Sunrise initiative gained a significant amount of media coverage. This cover-age focused, somewhat sensationally, on the headline deflection rates (andparticularly on those centres which were estimated to be in danger of losingover a fifth to one-quarter of their retail trade if they did nothing to counterthe threat of the Trafford Centre), with little recognition of the basis uponwhich these deflection forecasts were made. However, the publication of theProject Sunrise report certainly raised awareness of the issues and showedthat the regional media were interested in, and would respond to, what rep-resentatives of town centres had to say on the issue. Thus, a momentum wascreated that the working group did not wish to lose.200 Gary Warnaby and Dominic Medway

A public relations-led awareness campaign
At this point, the working group of the North West region of the ATCM
were very much at a crossroads, and major decisions as to how the initiativewas to be carried forward had to be made. One of the consultant’s recom-mendations in the Project Sunrise report was for the development of acollaborative and cooperative approach between all the towns in the region,particularly in terms of marketing/public relations activity. Thus, the decisionwas made to develop a PR-led awareness campaign to maintain the momen-tum created by the publication of the Project Sunrise report.
However, major decisions needed to be made regarding the message and
tone of the campaign. Paul Rice, one of the members of the working group,argued against running a negative campaign directed against the TraffordCentre and attempting to persuade people not to shop there; rather, he arguedstrongly for a positive campaign extolling the virtues of the North Westtowns’ facilities.
The actual implementation of any resulting campaign also had to be con-
sidered. Here, it was recognised that with a budget of only £15,000–£20,000,the campaign could not hope to compete with the advertising spend of keystores such as Selfridges, let alone the resources which the owners of theTrafford Centre, Peel Holdings, were going to spend to promote their newdevelopment. This view was reiterated by Mark Perry from Meredith Thomas,the public relations consultancy retained by the working group to develop theinitiative further, who argued that it was pointless embarking on a campaignattacking Trafford Centre head-on. Rather, he suggested that the ATCMshould recognise that many people would be likely to visit the Trafford Centre,at least once or twice a year, but the aim should be to persuade shoppers tomake town centres their regular shopping destination throughout the yearand thus minimise the loss of trade to the Trafford Centre.
Thus, the opening of the Trafford Centre became the focus for the cam-
paign because it was something that could unify the town centres andhighlight the problems that they had. However, the broad thrust of the cam-paign was to raise awareness of the issues faced by town centres generally, andin the process, to make sure that town centres in the North West had a col-lective voice on the issue. Thus, by early 1998, six months before the openingof the Trafford Centre, the tone and approach of the campaign were set. Theoverall mission of the campaign articulated by Meredith Thomas was: To
help raise the profile of the towns of North West England to renew shoppingloyalty in competition with out-of-town centres such as the Trafford Centre.
Town centres: the real shopping experience
One of the first actions of the campaign was the establishment of the ‘NorthWest Towns’ Consortium’. Up to now the initiative had been developed by asmall working group of the Association of Town Centre Management in theThe North West Towns’ Consortium 201

North West, and 28 towns in the region had contributed to the initiative thus
far. However, according to the public relations consultancy, ‘calling them theAssociation of Town Centre Management in the North West was a bit of amouthful, so we termed them the North West Towns’ Consortium, which wasthe umbrella under which we went out’.
The North West Towns’ Consortium was formally launched in Manchester
at an event during May 1998. This involved a press conference at which the 27town centre managers were present, each wearing a T-shirt displaying theirown town’s name. This provided a great photo opportunity which wasexploited by moving the T-shirt-clad town centre managers around so thateach individual town centre manager appeared in the front of the group of27, thus generating a series of targeted photos which would be disseminatedto localised media in each town centre. As Mark Perry stated, ‘by bringing allthose people together on one da y…w h a t w e e f fectively did was get 27 dif-
ferent possible news stories’. Press releases were tailored to each of themember towns of the Consortium, and these emphasised that each town waspart of a greater force across the North West.
In July the campaign itself was officially launched under the banner of
‘Town Centres – The Real Shopping Experience’ at Manchester Town Hall,with presentations by Paul Rice (the former Warrington town centre managerwho had just taken up the position of Town Centre Development Managerfor ADSHEL, and who remained a Director of the National Association ofTown Centre Management), Alan Tallentire (Chairman of the Association ofTown Centre Management), Maria Appleton (then the town centre managerof Bolton and Chair of the North West region of the ATCM), and HelenThomas (Managing Director of Meredith Thomas). This launch generated alot of media coverage including slots on Granada TV News and GMR(Greater Manchester Radio), and copy in a wide range of regional and localnewspapers. Press releases were tailored to exploit the specific local mediainterest around the region.
Between the July launch and the next natural key peak of the campaign,
the opening of the Trafford Centre in September 1998, the public relationsconsultants Meredith Thomas acted as a central point through which news-worthy items from the individual town centre managers were developed anddisseminated. This policy proved to be effective in maintaining the momen-tum of the campaign over the summer of 1998, not only in the local andregional media, but also in trade papers such as Estates Gazette ,Urban
Environment Today, Shopping Centre magazine and Retail Week. As Paul
Rice commented: ‘ All of a sudden our friend up the road [the Trafford Centre]was seeing these…and very quickly he began to flap, much, I have to say, toour surprise.’
On Saturday, 5 September, five days before the opening of the Trafford
Centre, many of the partner towns in the consortium had a ‘Shop Local’ day.Publicity was generated in individual town centres through the use of balloonreleases, T-shirts, etc. Eccles also had a ‘Family Fun’ day in the town centre,202 Gary Warnaby and Dominic Medway

as did the towns of Blackburn, Burnley and Bolton. As well as creating many
photo opportunities, these activities helped create a buzz about town centresthe weekend before the Trafford Centre opened.
The obvious peak of the campaign was the opening of the Trafford Centre
itself, which inevitably generated much media coverage. For three evenings upto the opening, the Granada regional news programme did special reportsfrom town centres under the theme ‘Shopping Centred’, in which members ofthe consortium were featured. Indeed on the opening day itself, BBC regionalnews programmes were broadcast from the Trafford Centre. A frenetic day interms of media relations activity ensued, involving:
•North West Tonight (BBC regional news programme);
•BBC Breakfast News;
• the Five Live Breakfast Show;
• interviews on BBC 24;• a lunchtime interview with Granada TV News in Liverpool;• an interview on the BBC’s Working Lunch;
• interviews with the Financial Times ,The Economist and the Investors
Chronicle.
Liaison was also maintained with most of the regional press including theManchester Evening News and other local papers around the region, whoseawareness of the Trafford Centre had been raised by the campaign during thepreceding months.
An indication of the news agenda of some of the media, which ran counter
to the aims of the campaign, was given by Mark Perry. He suggested thatsome elements of the media almost wanted people waving placards as itmade good TV . In his opinion, their attitude was: ‘Y ou’re out there and you’regoing to be devastated by the shopping centre and we want you to showsome commitment…a r e y o u going to get anyone out there with placards?’Here Mark argued that his typical reply to this was: ‘No, because that’s notw h a t w e a r e a b o u t…W e ’ r e running an awareness building campaign.’ The
aim had been to build a professional campaign to give credence to town cen-tres, to show that town centre management had a role to play, and that towncentre managers and town centres were serious places. In short, waving plac-ards would not help to achieve this.
Given the amount of media activity undertaken by various individuals
involved in the campaign, the importance of having a coherent messagewhich was consistent with the aims of the campaign was vital. Here the roleof Paul Rice, who did many of the TV and radio interviews, was crucial. Asalready noted, Paul was, until earlier that year, the town centre manager ofWarrington and had long played a significant role in the ATCM on both aregional and national basis. However, by September 1998 he was working fora private sector company ADSHEL, while still retaining involvement in theATCM at a national level as a member of the Board of Directors. Paul’sThe North West Towns’ Consortium 203

situation worked to the advantage of the campaign as he was no longer
involved in the operational side of town centre management per se, hence, he
could become the voice of the Association of Town Centre Management,under which lay the umbrella organisation of the North West Towns’Consortium. As a result, he could be appear to be independent of the day-to-day affairs of local town centres.
Paul Rice’s role differed from that of the individual town centre managers
in that rather than pushing the case for individual towns, he was able to rep-resent the ATCM’s view and, by virtue of his position, to put the campaignin its wider national and policy context. Throughout the interviews he gave,Paul Rice maintained a consistent line and emphasised that the issues con-fronting North West towns were also of relevance to the rest of the UK.
Results
While not a measure of the true impact of the campaign, the potential value
of the media coverage generated was calculated to have been worth almost£693,000 in terms of advertising equivalent value. This overall figure breaksdown as follows: print media, £71,000; radio coverage, £53,000; and TVcoverage around the opening of the Trafford Centre, £569,000. When themedia coverage of the establishment of the consortium and the officiallaunch of the campaign is added, the total media coverage achieved was cal-culated to be worth in the region of £850,000. Clearly, while such figures mayappear impressive on the surface, the true measure of the campaign’s effec-tiveness needs to be judged in terms of its impact on shopping flows at thevarious towns within the region. Here, anecdotal evidence suggests that theprojected trade deflections which were forecast in the original ‘ProjectSunrise’ report have not materialised. Of course, these deflection figureswere based on the premise that the towns concerned would not respond tothe threat posed by the Trafford Centre. This was certainly not the case. As‘The Real Shopping Experience’ campaign has demonstrated, the NorthWest Towns’ Consortium has been very proactive in its attempts to raise theprofile of the region’s town centres, thereby countering the threat from theTrafford Centre.
In the aftermath of the opening of the Trafford Centre, interest in the
campaign inevitably dipped. However, the Christmas trading season pro-vided another peak for the campaign in that it generated a natural focus formedia coverage on the impact of the Trafford Centre on retail activity withinthe region’s towns. Granada TV regional news approached Mark Perry witha view to putting forward the Consortium’s perspective for an item focusingon one of the towns affected by the Trafford Centre. BBC North West alsobroadcast a Close-Up North programme featuring a live debate on town
centre issues in the region just before the Christmas of 1998. In addition,Meredith Thomas continued to put out news stories for individual town cen-tres throughout the autumn and winter of 1998. These enabled individual204 Gary Warnaby and Dominic Medway

town centre managers to develop their own profiles and the profiles of their
schemes in their localised media.
A changing focus
Throughout 1998 the campaign was focused on the retail activity of towncentres within the region. This was perhaps inevitable given the opening ofthe Trafford Centre and the impetus it provided in terms of galvanising themembers of the North West region of the ATCM into activity. The cam-paign had been aimed at four audiences: (1) shoppers and consumers; (2)local opinion formers (to get them on board in terms of supporting theirlocal town centres); (3) investors, pension funds and property agents; and(4) retail and leisure operators and the local business community. However,the relative importance of these target audiences within the campaign strat-egy has changed as the campaign has progressed. As Mark Perry stated:
I think if you look at what we did [in 1998] it was very much aimed at thefront-end consumer market. In terms of the coverage that we got itachieved its aim, and worked as part of the whole marketing concept interms of what town centres are doing – sort of stemming the flow to theTrafford Centr e…This year has taken a slightly differently tack, we
wanted very much to aim at the investor in town centres, the business endof the market. And we have gone out and done a campaign this year thathas been aimed very much at the property industry, the influencers.
On 25 June 1999, a seminar was held specifically for the business market,institutions and pension funds, i.e. organisations which invested in town cen-tres. This seminar was chaired by Graham Brady (MP for Altrincham andSale West who is active in parliamentary committees on town centre issues),and included influential speakers on a wide range of urban issues. This sem-inar attracted an audience representing a complete cross-section of retailleisure and residential developers, opinion formers from around the region,institutions and property agents, all there in one room listening to the subjectof building a competitive location – town centres.
There were also positive spin-offs from the seminar for the member towns
of the Consortium. The towns were able to put up exhibition material dis-playing the attractions of their respective localities for the investors anddevelopers. This offered an opportunity for face-to-face meetings betweentown centre managers and potential investors in their town centres. As MarkPerry stated:
It gave them [developers and investors] an opportunity to talk to towncentre managers, and out of that I know that some residential developershave seen town centre managers of various towns that were supportingthe event that they wouldn’t necessarily have gone to in the first place.The North West Towns’ Consortium 205

For the member towns, the value of this event was that it gave the opportunity
to talk directly to property agents and investors; institutions who would notnecessarily regard such towns as potential venues for investment. MeredithThomas and the North West Towns’ Consortium have continued to developpositive news items about towns in the region. The campaign is therefore ongoing. A recent milestone was in September 1999. This period marked theanniversary of the Trafford Centre’s opening, and consequently there wasrenewed media interest in its impact on towns in the North West.
The theme of the on-going campaign in 2000 is ‘Building on Success’ with
two complementary strands. The first of these is to maintain the momentumin relation to the property/investor market in order to facilitate developmentopportunities in the region’s town centres. However, it was felt that the recentsuccess of the campaign in helping to encourage development and regenera-tion in town centres should be communicated to a wider public in order tomaintain the profiles of the individual town centres within their localities, andalso regionally. This ‘popularist’ approach represents the second strand andin many ways can be regarded as something of a return to the original aimsof the campaign.
Lessons learned
This case study raises a number of interesting issues and key learning points.These can be broadly categorised as being related to: first, the operation andmechanics of the public relations campaign itself; and second, the role ofpublic relations in forwarding the wider debate regarding the role of towncentres in the North West.
In terms of the planning and implementation of the campaign, decisions
made at an early stage set its tone and, arguably, assured its success. Primaryamong these was the choice of a positive rather than a negative campaigntone, in which the strengths of the retail offers within town centres in theNorth West were emphasised, rather than a negative message telling peoplenot to shop at the Trafford Centre. This tone was emphasised throughout thecampaign by representatives of the North West Towns’ Consortium in theirdealings with local and national media, demonstrating the importance of aconsistent approach in public relations activities.
The communication of the campaign’s message was facilitated by the
effectiveness of representatives of the Consortium in dealing with the media.In particular, the case emphasises the crucial role of key individuals, such asPaul Rice, who acted as a credible and effective spokesperson for the cam-paign and consequently was more likely to be perceived as an ‘honest broker’by the target audiences.
This campaign, like most, has witnessed natural peaks and troughs. The
high point was the opening of the Trafford Centre in September 1998, withsubsequent smaller peaks in Christmas 1998 and on the first anniversary ofthe Trafford Centre’s opening. The intervening troughs were counteracted206 Gary Warnaby and Dominic Medway

through a constant ‘drip feed’ of news items from members of the
Consortium via the public relations agency to their localised media. Thisillustrates the value of developing a campaign through a ‘grass-roots up’approach, capitalising on the local and regional media rather than targetingthe more competitive national media scene. This approach enabled themomentum of the campaign to be maintained, while at the same time allow-ing national media opportunities to be exploited where appropriate.
Over time, the focus of the campaign has developed to incorporate what
might be regarded as a more strategic dimension. The narrow focus on retail-ing in town centres which characterised the early stages was perhapsinevitable. However, after the opening of the Trafford Centre, the scope of thecampaign was broadened to perhaps better reflect some of the initial inten-tions of the members of the Consortium by the inclusion of some discussionof town centre issues aimed at a broader range of audiences, including: prop-erty agents; pension funds and other investors in town centres; retail andleisure operators; and the business communities of town centres.
It could be said that the campaign has acted as a catalyst for the develop-
ment of town centre management in the North West. Many town centremanagement schemes now take a much more overtly strategic orientation(characterised, for example, by an increased emphasis on marketing and pro-motion), as opposed to the previous focus on what have been termed‘janitorial’ issues (relating to the maintenance of the fabric of the town centreenvironment). The campaign has also served to raise the profiles of individ-ual town centre managers, further developing articulate spokespeople todefend the interests of town centres in the future. Town centre managers inthe North West have also been given a collective voice and an opportunity toengage in debates regarding wider policies and issues relating to town centres.
The case further illustrates the potentially powerful role that a well-
orchestrated public relations campaign can play in helping to mobilise thecollective efforts of what might otherwise have been relatively weak and inef-fective individual town responses to the threat posed by the development ofthe Trafford Centre.
The case also shows that public relations is not simply a tool for use by
businesses seeking to promote their products or services or build their cor-porate profiles, but can play a valuable role in supporting the achievement ofthe goals of public sector bodies campaigning on a variety of issues.
Notes
1 R. Schiller (1986) ‘Retail decentralisation: the coming of the third wave’, The
Planner July: 13–15.
2 R. Evans (1997) Regenerating Town Centres. Manchester: Manchester University
Press.
3 Association of Town Centre Management (1994) The Effectiveness of Town Centre
Management: Research Study. London: Association of Town Centre
Management.The North West Towns’ Consortium 207

4 R. Davies (1987) Help for the High Street: Some New Approaches to Revitalisation.
Cheshunt: Tesco plc.
5 Town centre management has been defined as ‘the search for competitive advan-
tage through the maintenance and/or strategic development of both public and
private areas and interest within town centres, initiated and undertaken by stake-holders drawn from a combination of the public, private and voluntary sectors.’G. Warnaby, A. Alexander and D. Medway (1998) ‘Town centre management inthe UK: a review, synthesis and research agenda’. International Review of Retail,
Distribution and Consumer Research 8(1): 15–31.
6 Association of Town Centre Management (1999) Directory of Managed Towns.
London: Association of Town Centre Management.
7 Association of Town Centre Management (no date) An Introduction to Town
Centre Management. London: Association of Town Centre Management.
8 Management Horizons Europe (1998) UK Shopping Index 1998–1999. London:
Management Horizons Europe.
9 Management Horizons Europe (1998) UK Shopping Index: Classification of
Shopping Destinations. London: Management Horizons Europe.208 Gary Warnaby and Dominic Medway

Case 17 W . Moorcroft plc
The strategic role of
marketing communicationsand public relations withinan SME
1
Ruth Ashford and Neil Towers
Introduction
The much-publicised on-going debate among academics concerning the role
and relationship between marketing and public relations is replicated withinmany organisations. However, many companies are moving towards a greaterintegration between the two functions and this is even more apparent inSMEs (small and medium enterprises), where the ‘marketing’ function isoften very constrained due to the small budgets and resources available.
From a marketing perspective, there is a sound argument which holds that
the traditional ‘marketing communications’ elements such as advertising,sales promotion, personal selling, sponsorship and publicity need to be fullyintegrated to ensure the adoption of a synergistic communications strategy.Especially within SMEs, the pressure on marketing budgets has seen firmsembracing sound ‘relationship marketing’ concepts more, to build customerloyalty and retention. Here, many organisations have turned to the use ofpublic relations techniques to help build these relationships and to supportbelow-the-line activities such as direct marketing.
The basis of relationship marketing and the reliance on public relations in
certain industries is appropriate as an essential part of their business strategy.The development of long-term, interactive relationships with customers andother stakeholders such as special interest groups has been widely accepted ascrucial to business success. The concept of building and maintaining two-waycommunications for any organisation is paramount if relationship marketingis to succeed, and this will be considered within this case.
This case concentrates on an established pottery company, W . Moorcroft
plc, which is classed as an SME, albeit now a large one, located within theUK. To provide the context for this case it maybe useful to consider the keyissues of concern to business and management within the small to mediumenterprise sector as a whole. Generally, SMEs are characterised by a differentset of attributes compared to their larger corporate entities. Usually, becauseof their smaller size, SMEs do not have access to the same array of manage-ment resources and skills that are inherent in the larger organisation. This can

lead to a lack of knowledge and understanding of the demands required of
them within the marketplace. Although usually noted for their creativity,innovative ability and selling skills, SMEs often have an inability to convertthat expertise into a competitive advantage for the enterprise. This can be par-ticularly relevant in reconciling the perceived longer-term partnership needsof customers with the myopic short-term view and business world inexperi-ence that is usually prevalent in an SME. However, as this case willdemonstrate, W . Moorcroft plc has managed to overcome such problems.
W . Moorcroft plc is an internationally renowned art pottery organisation,
located in Burslem, Stoke on Trent, UK, which produces hand-crafted indi-vidual pieces of art. In 1986, the organisation was suffering serious financialdifficulties and faced possible closure. However, in stark contrast to the restof the ceramics sector, W . Moorcroft plc has managed to overcome its earlierfinancial problems and has increased its order book considerably andexpanded its operation to meet customer demand resulting in the building oftwo new factories and creating 220 new jobs in recent years.
This case will examine how W . Moorcroft has combined public relations
and marketing activities to help the company achieve success in what is a verycompetitive and cyclical market. It will investigate how the company built andmaintained key relationships with the fickle and notoriously difficult collec-tor market as its main customer base, as well as with the media, influencerssuch as the main international auction houses, employees and suppliers.
Background
History
William Moorcroft designed the first pieces of Moorcroft Art Pottery in
1897 at the age of 24 in Burslem, Stoke-on-Trent, which was and still is thecentre for pottery in the UK. The hand-crafted nature of the art potteryprocess, known as ‘tubelining’, requires fine design work and considerableskill. Such was the quality of the company’s products, that it had won GoldAwards at international exhibitions in 1904, 1910 and 1925. In 1928 QueenMary appointed W . Moorcroft Ltd Potters to HM the Queen, which was, ofcourse, a very prestigious accolade. The company has continued to winawards for the quality of its products, culminating in 1996 with Moorcroftwinning the Gold Award for Excellence at the International Light Show.Indeed, Moorcroft’s art pottery from the 1890s through to today’s designs canbe found in museums throughout the world including the Victoria and AlbertMuseum in London.
Issues, need and opportunity
By 1986, however, the Moorcroft organisation was facing dire financial and
commercial problems that resulted in major reductions of staff numbers and210 Ruth Ashford and Neil Towers

products (many of which were severely out of date). Indeed, there had not
been any product development, in terms of new designs, during the previousten years (only 18 new designs had been developed in the previous 47 years).
The issues facing the organisation were generally related to a range of key
management and economic concerns:
• no new product development for many years;
• a lack of understanding of the market needs and trends;• declining sales due to a lack of consumer and trade interest in the lines
produced;
• declining enthusiasm for the Moorcroft name within the collector market;• management reliance on the Moorcroft reputation in existing markets
rather than proactive development of new markets;
• a range of poor working practices and poor pay for the much reduced
workforce;
• skill slippage due to enforced redundancies;• the loss of one of their oldest and best key trade accounts – Liberty of
London.
Clearly, many of the problems facing the company were due to poor man-agement, which had resulted in the company becoming complacent, andconsequently its business had stagnated. The once highly acclaimed andsought after Moorcroft brand had lost its cache and became almost forgottenby the market.
The communications issues were simpler to understand:
• New collectors did not enthusiastically embrace the perception of the
Moorcroft corporate brand. Indeed, it was seen as a very tired and oldbrand.
• The trade was not interested in the brand as consumers had been lost and
therefore, they were no longer interested in stocking the products.
• The key skilled staff were demoralised and there was a danger of losing
an extraordinarily important workforce.
New management intervention
In September 1986, only 24 hours before the Moorcroft company was aboutto be wound up, John Moorcroft contacted an old friend, Hugh Edwards, ina final bid to save the business. Edwards, a well-known commercial lawyer inthe City of London and lifelong Moorcroft collector, was appointed as thenew Chairman. He saw an opportunity to rejuvenate the brand. Along withfurther new directors, Richard Dennis and his wife Sally, a designer, Edwardsand his wife Maureen mounted a last-minute rescue for the company, anddeveloped a five-year plan for the company’s revival.
A new corporate mission was evolved which aimed:Moorcroft: PR in the SME sector 211

• to revive the quality and unique brand name;
• to bring in new products and designs;• to attract and re-attract skilled personnel;• most importantly, to use the design skills of Sally Dennis.
As an important first step the company undertook market research with its col-
lector market and sales staff in the trade. This identified the need for investmentin the re-establishment of the brand and innovative designs in decoration,along with a new management structure in order to revive the business.
Goals and objectives
A corporate business plan was devised to maximise what was left of the inter-national reputation of Moorcroft and secure growth for the enterprise by thecreating and marketing of new designs. The corporate objectives were:
• to re-establish sales to the levels achieved in the heydays of the company
(1926) with an aim to achieve a minimum of £1 million sales per year in
the short-term (sales were only at £242,000 in 1986);
• to ensure sales growth year on year ultimately to reach the long-term goal
of £8 million turnover from Moorcroft pottery;
• to build the product base to minimise risk for fluctuation in demand and
taste.
To realise these ambitious goals, the company recognised the need to developa more effective marketing strategy. Here the key marketing objectives were:
• to redevelop the UK domestic market;
• to develop more demand in international markets such as Australia,
Japan, the USA and Canada;
• to regain the historic Liberty of London account, as this was seen as a
key goal for maximum prestige and distribution;
• to consider the expansion of the product line – to acquire or build new
products which would enhance the current designs and appeal to newtarget audiences.
To achieve the marketing objectives and ultimately the corporate objectives, thenew management recognised the need to (re)position the corporate brand. Thiswas recognised as a key task for the public relations function and led to thedevelopment of the following public relations or communications objectives.
Customer objectives
• to focus the perception of the brand on the uniqueness of quality crafts-
manship and innovative new young designs;212 Ruth Ashford and Neil Towers

• to reposition the brand to appeal to the core customer base of collectors
who were more broadly segmented by age and disposable income (espe-
cially towards the younger market);
• to raise awareness and build new brands which would complement the
product portfolio (i.e. enamels);
• to develop interest in a range of sub-brands by a secondary emphasis on
the ‘Moorcroft Design Studio’. This involved the development of aStudio of Designers, where the designers’ names and design names wouldbecome sub-brands under the Moorcroft corporate brand.
Media objectives
• to ensure maximum coverage for Moorcroft in local, national and inter-
national press, radio and television;
• to ensure that the Moorcroft name became synonymous with unique
quality and new highly developed designs;
• to ensure that the new brands acquired (such as Enamels from Kingsley
Enamels) were seen to be part of the Moorcroft corporate brand.
Other stakeholder objectives• to attract new world-class design talent for the manufacturing process;
• to support Christie’s of South Kensington, London (international auc-
tion house) in the promotion of Moorcroft art pottery sales.
Target audiences
The new management team realised that understanding the attitudes, beliefs,values and perceptions of the target consumer audiences was of paramountimportance if any public relations and communications strategy was to besuccessful. Therefore, it was crucial that the organisation was able to developa clear understanding of its differing customer needs and segment the marketaccordingly. Here Moorcroft identified the following target audiences: cus-tomers, employees and the media.
Customer base
It was important to ensure that both the trade and end customer were
included within the planned campaigns. In marketing terms this involvedwhat is known as ‘push and pull’ based communications strategy. The ‘pushstrategy’ to the trade aimed to push the product down through the tradechannels towards the end customer, whereas the ‘pull strategy’ sought totarget the consumer market directly and build demand from the retailer or, inthis case, directly from the company.Moorcroft: PR in the SME sector 213

The key trade targets were:
• major trade buyers and decision makers, such as major department
stores – e.g. Liberty of London and the John Lewis Partnership;
• international distributorships in locations such as Japan, the USA,
Australia, New Zealand and Canada.
Customer target audiences included:
• Moorcroft Collectors segmented by age and disposable income;
• Moorcroft Collectors segmented by country;• general pottery collectors;• antique pottery collectors;• customers looking for giftware or special occasion purchases.
Employees
One of the key issues which Moorcroft faced was the fact that its employees
were even more important than the product. It was the skills and creativity ofthe team which enabled a piece of pottery to be transformed into a uniqueobject of desire. Because of Moorcroft’s financial difficulties which hadresulted in many redundancies and layoffs, it was very important to buildback the trust and confidence of the employees. They needed to feel valuedand important parts of the whole Moorcroft brand. Indeed, positive word-of-mouth recommendations from the employees at open days and factory visitswas seen to be a crucial communication’s objective – from all levels ofemployees, even the catering staff.
The media
To reach the targets effectively and reposition the brand, especially within the
UK, it was seen as essential to generate media awareness and coverage forMoorcroft. The long-term repositioning campaign included the followingmedia targets, which were considered to be the key media for reaching thetarget consumer groups:
• international press, such as the Financial Times;
• the British national press, including the Guardian, Independent Business,
Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, especially business and features editors;
• the regional dailies/evening papers such as Manchester Evening News,
and the Sentinel;
• local paid for and free press.
Whilst recognising the limitations of achieving extensive television coverage,
the campaign nevertheless sought to target regional television newsprogrammes (particularly on the Moorcroft name) such as Granada and214 Ruth Ashford and Neil Towers

Central, as well as national television news, including the BBC and Channel
4, where major and unusual story items are reported.
Targets also included national talk-based radio stations (e.g. Radio 4 and
Radio 2) as well as regional local radio and commercial radio stations (suchas Signal Radio, BBC Radio Stoke).
Corporate strategy
Moorcroft’s new chairman and directors devised a quite radical corporateplan in an effort to achieve the objectives set. There was a major drive todevelop new designs in the traditional Moorcroft lines. This meant that theskills of new designers needed to be captured and developed. This startedwith the search and recruitment of Rachel Bishop, a recent ceramics gradu-ate who had attracted the attention of domestic and international customers,because of her innovative and stimulating designs. This led to the establish-ment of the Moorcroft Design Studio which was formed in 1997, comprisingno less than ten designers with Bishop as their head. This new design teamhas produced more than 131 dynamic and successful new designs since thestudio was conceived. The development of new product lines was an essentialfeature of the strategy to build a solid product portfolio base; this resulted inthe successful launch of Moorcroft table-lamps, limited editions and specialeditions of art pottery.
The company also expanded its product base by acquiring Okra Glass
Studios Limited in 1997 and Kingsley Enamels Ltd in 1998, which allowed anew range of enamelled products to be launched. Also in 1997, the CobridgeStoneware range was developed and launched at the British Museum. Thisproduct range was made from stoneware which has been decorated in atotally unique way, using the Moorcroft designers to build ranges of newstoneware lines.
The product range
The implementation of the business plan ensured that there was now a fullrange of hand-crafted products available: Moorcroft pottery giftware andtable lamps, Moorcroft enamels (decorated enamel boxes or other shapeditems), Cobridge Stoneware (decorated stoneware) and Okra art glass.Attention to detail and ultimate quality is paramount, as each piece is hand-turned and decorated using a mixture of traditional and technologicallyadvanced methods. A range of limited and numbered editions is processed aswell as the standard lines. Design is of paramount importance and thereforethe company uses its new, young and very talented designers well by produc-ing new ranges on a regular basis. The prices per piece range fromconsiderably more than £2,000 to £25, with many pieces within the £200–£400range. Each piece of pottery is still turned on the lathe and after turning, thebackstamps ‘Moorcroft’ and ‘Made in England’ are impressed into the clayMoorcroft: PR in the SME sector 215

together with symbols, which denotes the year of manufacture and decorator.
These markings provide an almost unique opportunity for the collectormarket to enable people to collect a particular decorator’s and designer’swork, and which adds to the uniqueness of each piece.
The public relations and marketing communications strategy
Moorcroft took the step of appointing a London-based PR agency –Hobsbawm, Macaulay Communications Ltd, to help to address its imageproblem in 1992. This move signalled a recognition that the company neededto shift its focus from that of relying purely on marketing or sales andresulted in integrating public relations into a campaign which sought to buildon the synergy with existing marketing communications.
PR, marketing programme for the international and domestic
collector audience
The management realised that a sound understanding of the target customer
was imperative, and it used its sales staff’s understanding of the core cus-tomer in an informal way to research the market. It was identified that thecollector target audience was renowned for demonstrating a high level ofinvolvement when purchasing collectable items. Hence, it was important thatcustomers’ perceptions were fully understood as collectors initially needed tobe attracted by the product, but also to perceive a sense of value (whether interms of potential financial investment) or an opportunity of owning apotential piece of history or social comment. The public relations pro-gramme/strategy was designed to take account of the customer’s need to feelownership of a unique piece of art, which could be perceived as a part of an‘exclusive collection’.
Here the strategy was to develop and maintain a dynamic collectors club.
However, as many of Moorcroft’s competitors (such as Wedgwood) had alsoused this strategy, it was important to use public relations activities to the fullto ensure a differentiated approach.
The key benefits and messages communicated to the Collectors Club mem-
bers were:
• to build perceptions that the members are ‘special’ and valued collectors;
• to develop the perceptions of members accessing ‘inside information’
before the rest of the collector market;
• that as customers, members would be receiving ‘added value’ by being
given special opportunities to buy limited additions and discontinuedlines – which are the lines which are most likely to become the mostsought after in the future antique market;
• to create a perception of ‘celebrity’ status for the Moorcroft designers to
build credibility for their designs.216 Ruth Ashford and Neil Towers

It was recognised very early in the club’s history that advertising would not be
effective for this fickle market. Collectors did not want to feel that they werebeing the target of a ‘marketing campaign’, but that they were special and apart of the Moorcroft business, supporting the brand and the company byinvesting in Moorcroft products. The key elements of the programme aredetailed below:
Collectors Club newsletter
The production of a Collectors Club newsletter, which is sent out to members
three times per year, has been a key element in the public relations-led strat-egy. The newsletter written and edited by the public relations team containshigh quality photographs and features covering such issues as: collectors’views; launches of new designs; forthcoming Moorcroft events; art commen-tary; The William Moorcroft Story (which is an ongoing serialisation of thelife and times of the founder’s family); editorial about the designers andworkforce; international news and auction reports from the major auctionhouses throughout the world. These newsletters serve to build the reputationof the brand and provide the collector with an inside view of the business ona regular basis. Obviously, there is some emphasis on the forthcoming prod-ucts but these are written as editorial features rather than adopting amarketing stance. This, therefore, raises the awareness of the launch of newproducts and serves to stimulate the desire to own a particular piece.
Events management
Stimulating the level of interest in the brand is fuelled by the continuous
planning of special events which are designed to build a level of excitementand interest for the collector. A series of special ‘Collectors’ events, which areattended by key Moorcroft personnel and members of the Design Studio,have been organised at Moorcroft factories. One of these events is the OpenWeekend in May or June each year at the factory, which boasts limited avail-ability, and invitation is strictly exclusive to Collectors Club members. Atthis weekend, there are lectures by guest speakers, an actual live auction ofrare and unusual pieces of Moorcroft pottery, and, of course, the opportunityto see behind-the-scenes at the factory. At these events, a unique vase is usu-ally commissioned which can be purchased for that event only, making theproduct truly limited.
During 1999 the following events were staged:
• First view of the Moorcroft Enamels new designs via a pre-launch party
at the House of Lords, with VIPs Lord Clarke CBE, KGB, deputising forBaroness Goudie of Roundwood, David Batty of Sotheby’s auctionhouse and Paul Atterbury, ceramics experts often seen on the BBC pro-gramme, The Antiques Roadshow.Moorcroft: PR in the SME sector 217

• Launch of Moorcroft Enamels in Liberty of London in May 1999.
(Much was played on the fact that the very late ‘marriage’ of the 102-
year-old Moorcroft and the 95-year-old Kingsley Enamels was ratherunique for today’s society and thus gained more media coverage).
• A Moorcroft Open Weekend with VIPs such as Henry Sandon, antique
ceramics expert; Kathy Niblett – City Museum and Art Gallery; Stoke-on-Trent experts and Moorcroft Design Studio celebrities such as RachelBishop.
• The sponsorship of the New Statesman Eve of the Labour Party
Conference, which resulted in an exhibition display at the conferencewith the British Council and listings in the conference issue of the New
Statesman for the ‘Britishness’ week.
• Exhibition of current Moorcroft pottery at Christie’s Auction House in
London was held prior to the last Moorcroft pottery sale in October1999. The exhibition was held during the viewing days before the auction,where all current designs were exhibited and a demonstration of the pro-duction techniques was also included.
• The centenary celebration 1897–1997 was also a major event in the public
relations scheduled in 1997 and was used to promote the core message ofquality and longevity.
Developing the concept of factory tours and shop atmosphere
Moorcroft has capitalised on the Stoke-on-Trent Council tourism campaign,
and joined in with its competitors in the concept of the ‘Heritage Trail’ forpottery factories. This has meant that substantial, themed signage has beenerected throughout the town of Stoke-on-Trent, raising awareness about thefactory tours and shop facilities.
A historical Moorcroft museum was built alongside the factory shop,
where visitors can view a range of the original pottery designs and access his-torical commentary, again offering a uniqueness to the visiting experience.
Factory tours are made available for members, free of charge, and operate
at the Burslem factories on Mondays, Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays.During these tours, members are able to walk through the factory museum toview some of the finest Moorcroft products from the beginning of manufac-ture. Also, there is the all important ‘seconds’ factory shop where productswith slight imperfections can be purchased at a slightly reduced price. Withinthe factory shops there is occasionally (usually on a Saturday), a live demon-stration by a tubeliner (part of the process) and a decorator or painter, whoare both trained to talk to the customers.
There is also the opportunity to buy both an exclusive piece of Moorcroft
pottery and Moorcroft enamel designed each year especially for members ofthe Moorcroft Collectors’ Club. This once again confirms the message ofuniqueness and building the concept of having a special relationship betweenthe customer and the organisation.218 Ruth Ashford and Neil Towers

Catalogues and point of sale promotional material
The newly updated glossy Moorcroft Pottery and Moorcroft Enamels pro-
motional catalogues detailing new limited editions and discontinued designsare sent to the collectors as well as retailers on a regular basis. These aredesigned to be classically simple in landscape (each ‘theme’ in A5 size), con-veying the traditions and quality of the business and illustrating the fullrange of items, with key information about the designers and informationrequired by the disconcerting, serious collector.
A number of recently published specialist books have been written in the
field, which has also helped to raise awareness and the repositioning of thebrand. Ceramics expert Paul Atterbury’s published work entitled A Guide toMoorcroft Pottery 1897–1993 and a videotape on the subject, coupled withFraser Street’s very popular book The Phoenix Years, have been instrumental
in providing credible commentary on the Moorcroft brand. Indeed, the mer-chandising within the factory shop and trade has used these works to supportpoint of sale material, which has proved very successful by adding to the con-cept of the importance of each piece of art pottery.
Moorcroft website – www.moorcroft.com
A website was created to cater for the domestic collector and, more impor-
tantly, also for the international market. The site was devised by expertdesigners and this is evident in its appearance and structure. It section-alises the areas which would be of interest to most collectors, including:Collectors’ Club; Design Studio; Giftware; Table Lamps; Limited Editions;Special Editions; Moorcroft marks; How to find us and References. The siteserves to endorse the communications messages as the only officialMoorcroft site.
The membership campaign has been designed to capitalise on the attitudes
and beliefs of the collector, in that its most important aim is to build a strongand loyal long-standing and mutually beneficial relationship. The word-of-mouth gained from such a campaign via the club members is also very muchpart of the networking approach to communications.
The trade public relations programme
The trade programme has mainly been confined to the sales force, where theSales Director has been instrumental in communicating directly with keytrade accounts. Moorcroft has tended to concentrate on the end consumerusing traditional ‘pull’ communications techniques, and as this has been sosuccessful there is less emphasis on the trade communications. However, keytrade buyers and dealers are invited to the Moorcroft factories and are givenan exclusive experience and retail training about Moorcroft’s work.Moorcroft: PR in the SME sector 219

Moorcroft has recently participated in DTI (Department of Trade and
Industry) supported trade fairs in Tokyo and New Y ork. It is acknowledged
by the management that more work needs to be undertaken in this area ifMoorcroft are to develop its international markets.
The internal employees PR programme
The corporate plan acknowledged that new blood had to be brought into thecompany to build and develop new products. To ensure that the best design-ers were attracted to the company, a strong relationship has been forged withthe key UK universities awarding ceramics degrees. This has been under-taken by the management regularly contacting and building a personalrelationship with academics (Course Leaders) from universities who offerceramic/design degrees and higher programmes. Indeed, this is a two-wayrelationship, where Moorcroft offers practitioner advice in relation to thecontent of courses to the academics and university graduates are consideredfor potential recruitment. This has proved fruitful as academic staff regularlycontact Moorcroft’s management team directly when a new talent is ‘discov-ered’.
There is a flat organisational structure within the company, which has
helped to build the message to the workforce that each individual is valued.Internally, the staff are all now benefiting from excellent working conditions,good pay and a top-of-the-market pension scheme. This care for the work-force has been extended to an employee profit-sharing scheme, which hasenabled the workforce to feel truly valued as an integral part of the organi-sation. Indeed, employees as shareholders at all levels has almost beenachieved.
Although there is no formal internal public relations programme, the man-
agement has used subtle techniques to reinforce the value of the talents of allemployees and acknowledge the esteem in which they are held at all levels,including the shop-floor operatives. Staff members are asked to be present atthe ‘Open Weekends’ and in the factory shop, where they are encouraged totalk to the customers honestly about the brand and their part in the creationof the product.
One of the key methods used to communicate that the company values its
workforce is to include feature articles on individual members of the DesignStudio and other staff (such as decorators) in the Club Newsletter. This tech-nique serves, once again, to build an internal atmosphere of trust and feelingof value within the workforce while also allowing collectors to feel that they‘know’ the artists.
The media relations programme
The relationship with the public relations agency, Hobsbawm MacaulayCommunications Ltd, has proven to be very rewarding for W . Moorcroft220 Ruth Ashford and Neil Towers

Plc. The London-based agency already had many links with editors, journal-
ists and newscasters in the consumer media. However, it was determined tobuild further relationships for the Moorcroft account. As part of the mediaprogramme, the agency hold regular distinguished ‘Moorcroft Lunches’ withmedia guests, which have always had an impressive attendance at these events,including, for example, the features editors from the Daily Mail, You
Magazine, the Express, Sunday Business, The Victoria and Albert Museum,
the British Council and the Crafts Council to name but a few. As a directresult of contacts made at these luncheons, Moorcroft are launching itsMillennium ranges across all four companies from the internationallyrenowned Victoria and Albert Museum in London and are suppliers to theBritish Council for gifts for embassies world-wide. These events have provento be very successful and have served to build further contacts and editorialcoverage for Moorcroft. The results are highlighted in the next section.
Results and evaluation
Financial success
The Moorcroft public relations programme has been stunningly successful.
This is substantiated by the achievement of the corporate financial objectivesby increasing turnover from £242,000 in 1986 to £6 million in 1998. The sus-tained success of this long-term campaign resulted in Hugh Edwards beingawarded the prestigious title ‘Business Man of the Y ear 1998’ awarded by theregional Sentinel newspaper. The company also won the runner-up position
for Business Innovation at the same awards ceremony. This once again gen-erated valuable publicity and coverage for the company.
Media coverage
The communications success has served to achieve the financial results pre-
viously detailed. An assessment of the media coverage achieved by the publicrelations consultancy during 1999 revealed that more than twenty-seven edi-torial pieces have been achieved, ranging from features in glossy-stylemagazines to the Financial Times. A Channel 4 documentary series based on
the Moorcroft organisation has been broadcast and this was subsequentlyrepeated.
International catalogue exposure
Such is the enthusiasm for the collection of Moorcroft pieces now that
Christie’s International auction house holds one specialist Moorcroft potterysale per year at the South Kensington, London, sale house. For each auction,in excess of 4,000 auction catalogues are sold and distributed throughout theworld (see Figure 17.1). There are also three other separate ceramics salesMoorcroft: PR in the SME sector 221

held by Christie’s in London, which also often feature Moorcroft pieces. The
October 1999 sale featured 557 lots of Moorcroft pieces. Many pieces at thesale were from recent Moorcroft collections of the same year, with a highnumber of these recent pieces realising higher prices at auction than the retailprice, thus serving to illustrate the enhanced value of the brand in thismarket.
The British Council has recently contacted the company with a view to
considering the Moorcroft designs to be included on the official gifts list forinternational and official designates. This is once again a great honour andwould also serve to reinforce the brand values and afford good internationalcoverage for the products.
Customers Collectors’ Club
The Moorcroft Collectors’ Club was founded in 1987 and now has more
than 15,000 fee-paying members. Although there is usually an annual 20 percent turnover in club members, this is more than compensated by an increase222 Ruth Ashford and Neil Towers
Figure 17.1 Christie’s Moorcroft catalogue.

of 30 per cent new members per year. The company is currently researching
the reasons for this level of turnover so that methods to stem the outflow ofmembers can be planned.
Although formal market research is not undertaken within the Collectors’
Club membership, the company does seek informal feedback at events andthrough the sales team. It is clear that the sustained campaign to repositionthe brand and build positive perceptions has been very effective, with themarket now being very enthusiastic about the new designs and clamouring tofind out more information on the next era products.
The concept of the Design Studio and the sub-branding of this have also
been effective, with many collectors and dealers eager to gain more informa-tion which simultaneously increases the sales of new designers products.
Trade success
Moorcroft was able to regain the Liberty account which has been a major
success, further illustrating the rebirth of the brand. Moorcroft Enamels isabout to start an export drive in the USA where there has been a more thankeen interest in the brand.
Lessons learned
This case study demonstrates the important role which public relations canplay in complementing a company’s marketing communications strategy andthereby contributing to the achievement of business objectives. Although artpottery is a specialist market, this case has highlighted many of the genericbusiness and marketing problems which SMEs often face in today’s climate.It also demonstrates that understanding stakeholders’ perceptions is crucial indetermining the objectives and building the long-term relationships usingsubsequent strategy and tactics.
The synergy and dynamism derived from the integration between public
relations and marketing activities are quite apparent from this case. However,this case illustrates an organisation who did not initially recognise the valu-able role which public relations can play, especially within a consumer market.Prior to the appointment of the new Chairman in 1986, there seemed to be aclear misunderstanding about the market place. Indeed, there seemed to besome complacency in relation to the marketing communications and publicrelations activities until 1992, when the public relations agency was appointedto address the developing image problem which plagued Moorcroft. This isnot untypical within SMEs, where the business functions can become con-fused and there are certain skills which are not fully understood within theorganisation.
By considering the customers’ needs more specifically, Moorcroft adapted
the traditional marketing activities in relation to the product portfolio andoffered more products which the market place required. The traditionalMoorcroft: PR in the SME sector 223

224 Ruth Ashford and Neil Towers
distribution via the trade was developed further towards an increase in the
direct trade, with the public relations campaign developing the concept ofthe Collectors’ Club which stimulated the demand for new products to bepurchased directly by consumers. The trade audience was serviced by theSales Director as part of the traditional marketing communications func-tion; however, the conventional use of advertising was not continued butinstead, stakeholder relationships were cultivated with the special events(for the media, trade and customers) and newsletters which were ingeniouslydevised. The drive for creativity and understanding the needs of the stake-holders is of paramount importance and this has been understood clearly bythis organisation. Indeed, W . Moorcroft plc have seen clear benefits of inte-grating its marketing and public relations activities, where the organisationhas moved towards a stronger customer orientation. It has focused upontheir promotional activities and has brought together their communicationsto provide a consistent and harmonised message in relation to the reputationand perceptions of the Moorcroft brand for all internal and external stake-holder groups.
Although the success of this programme is clearly evident in many ways,
the management at Moorcroft realises that it cannot afford to become com-placent. Classically, managers understand that there are other issues whichneed to be considered if they are to keep ahead of the market and not fallback into the position which they faced in the mid-1980s.
Because of the resource constraints that often exist within the SME
sector, it is important to ensure that the potential synergies that can resultfrom effective cooperation between marketing and public relations func-tions are fully exploited. In the case of Moorcroft, such synergies haveclearly been well exploited and have resulted in a dramatic turnaround ofthe organisation.
Within SMEs the international aspect is often beyond their reach and all
too often public relations activities are haphazard. The role of public rela-tions is not considered as strategic and the targeting of international marketsis left to agents in specific countries, where control of communicationsbecomes difficult to manage. Indeed, many small to medium enterprises makethe mistake of ‘tinkering’ with advertising and concentrate more on salesissues rather than considering the whole strategic communications planningprocess.
This case also illustrates that within traditional SMEs where in-house
public relations expertise may not be available, an external agency can play anessential and valued role in the determining and execution of the communi-cations plan. An agency can provide a valuable fresh perspective on thebusiness together with the necessary creative skills and knowledge to capi-talise on the business’s inherent strengths.
This case also indicates the fact that integrated communications in relation
to marketing and public relations activities are more likely to be effectiveand therefore to occur when organisations attempt to enter into a coordinated

dialogue with their various internal and external audiences. As with the
Moorcroft case, the communication activities used in dialogue and the mes-sages conveyed should be internally consistent with the organisation’sobjectives and strategies. This will result in the target audiences receivingcommunications and associated activities which are coordinated, consistentand effective at building the desired perception about the organisation and/orits brand.
Note
1 This case has been written in conjunction with Hugh Edwards, Chairman of
Moorcroft plc.Moorcroft: PR in the SME sector 225

Case 18 The Tourer Marketing
Bureau
Supporting touring
caravan sales throughpublic relations
Anne Gregory
Background
Touring caravans, that is mobile homes that can be towed using a family car,
are the butt of many a joke in the UK. Caravan owners are perceived asbeing ‘worthy’, but dull ‘types’ and caravans themselves are seen in a negativelight; causing traffic hold-ups, being old-fashioned in design and representingan outmoded holiday experience which was left behind in the 1960s and1970s.
The perception of campers and touring caravans in other part of the world
is quite different. There they are seen to reflect an energetic and largely younglife-style. Campers piled high with wind-surfing gear and bicycles are acommon sight in places as far apart as the USA and Australia. This caselooks at a public relations-led marketing campaign which took place between1996 and 2000 and sought to address the dramatic fall in caravan sales in theUK.
Introduction
Caravan production in the UK is undertaken by a small number of domesticmanufacturers; competition from importers is minimal. In 1996, there werejust nine manufacturers who accounted for all UK production. All of themsell through a network of dealers who also provide warranty and an after-sales service.
In May 1996, all the manufacturers joined together to form a company
called Tourer Promotional Association (TPA) Limited, which had the soleaim of promoting the touring caravan to the widest possible audience. TheBoard of the Company consisted of representatives of the manufacturersand it was funded by members contributing £25 for every caravan manufac-tured, plus an allocation of unspent funds from the National CaravanCouncil (NCC). This gave the TPA an annual promotional fund of some£500,000.
The TPA was set up as a direct response to a dramatic decline in sales for

new touring caravans. In 1989, sales had stood at 36,500, but by 1996 sales
had dropped to 20,400. Alarmingly, the twelve months period April 1995 toMarch 1996 saw a massive 17 per cent fall in sales.
No simple reason could be identified to account for this marked decrease
in sales, but a number of factors were thought to have contributed to the dra-matic decline in sales: the economic recession of the 1990s, the growth in thepopularity of other types of holidays and the poor image of the touring car-avan experience.
To help them in their efforts to reverse the decline in sales, the TPA
appointed a public relations consultancy – BRAHM Public Relations. Thebrief given to BRAHM was:
• to promote caravanning to caravanners and convince the core audience
to review their purchase;
• to identify and target potential new customers.
Research
The TPA were also able to supply BRAHM with vital background research
on caravanning. This research, based on information provided by theNational Caravan Council (a body made up of caravan manufacturers, deal-ers and associated bodies which reports to government on the state of thecaravan industry), established that negative perceptions tended to be highlyvisible, while positive realities tended to be invisible.
Negative perceptions included:
• the idea of being stuck behind a slow-moving caravan;• over-crowded urban sites;• countryside spoilt by caravans;• caravans seem to be cramped boxes with no comfort;• there was a fear of the unknown, especially of towing and what to do at
a caravan site.
Positive perceptions included:
• big advances in design and comfort including grills, hobs, refrigerators,
flushing toilets, fitted hot showers and air-conditioning;
• ease of towing;
• improvements in sites;• freedom to take holidays when and where the owner pleases.
The TPA had also undertaken a comprehensive strategic analysis, including
a detailed SWOT analysis looking at looking at Strengths and W eakness
from a customer perspective and O pportunities and T hreats from a manu-
facturer’s point of view, see Table 18.1.Tourer Marketing Bureau: supporting sales through PR 227

Table 18.1 SWOT analysis for caravans
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Expensive
Large to store, keep and maintainSecurity/theft vandalism concernsImage of caravanningDifficult to try easily/poor hire
facilities
Environmental concernsDifficult to buyBritish weather/poor sitesLack of variety in design/colourHarder to get to europe and more
expensiveFreedom, mobility, choice,
independence
Home from homeLifestyle choiceCan take petsSuitable for children (can take
toys, bikes, etc.)
Fresh air, outdoors, healthyCaravanners trustworthy and
social
Safe for children, traditional
family values reinforced
Educational and funCaravans used in ‘sexy’ sports;
motor racing, athleticsAllow image to catch up with
reality
Can pursue hobbies, golf,
walking, bird watching easilyat low cost
Advantageous demographically
(increase in 2 to 8 year olds)
Repositioned as touring ‘not
caravanning’
Good value for moneyResurgence in family valuesHelping dealers moreMore practical information and
advice givingEntry of competitor manufacturersLow cost and greater choice of
holidays
Better marketing of uk holidays
(short breaks, farmhouseholidays, etc.)
Effect on environmentUnder-capacity on sites at peak
periods
Lack of finance optionsCompetition from other large
purchases, e.g. conservatories
Difficulty in identifying new
customers

BRAHM also undertook its own research which included analysis of
socio-economic and demographic factors which influence leisure activities.
The consultancy examined potential correlations between, for example, houseprices and employment and caravan sales. They found no positive links, butdid establish that the decline in sales was worse than these indicators. Existingcaravanners were not repurchasing and new customers were not materialising.
BRAHM also held three sets of focus group discussions, with existing car-
avanners, those with anti-caravan attitudes and those who were neutral. Theyfound out that existing caravanners were typically 45 to 64 years old, camefrom social categories B, C1 and C2 (largely middle-class professionals orskilled working class) and were empty nesters or had older children. Some 63per cent were in full-time employment with 21 per cent retired. These cus-tomers were very loyal, enjoyed the freedom to get away on their own terms;eat when and what they wanted, were reassured by knowing what the stan-dard of accommodation was, had a good network of sites, clubs and friendsbuilt up over many years and enjoyed the flexibility that caravanning offered.They sold their caravans when they themselves became less able to manoeu-vre the equipment on site.
The anti-caravanners expressed all the negative images and preconceptions
that the TPA had identified. They viewed caravanning as old-fashioned anda thing of the past. They believed there was a stigma attached to caravanningand that caravanners were slightly eccentric. Many had had a negative expe-rience when young – being cramped together in a poorly equipped box withno running water, chemical toilets, few luxuries, on a poor crowded site; allcompounded by bad weather.
The neutrals tended to have had no experience of caravanning, or to have
been to a European destination in a fixed caravan such as on a Eurocamp site.They were surprised by the quality of the interior fittings and open to the ideaof caravan purchase. For young couples with children it was seen to be anideal solution.
BRAHM had initially thought there may be a progression from camping to
caravanning, but found there to be no overlap. Camping was seen to representindividuality, flexibility, being beholden to no-one. It gave a sense of adven-ture and belonging to the wild without any stigma. An element in the lack ofcross-over (apart from the negatives examples above) was that caravanningcan be more expensive: the cost of the caravan, depreciation, parking, main-tenance, site charges, etc. To get value, use has to be very regular, in fact tobecome a part of the owner’s lifestyle.
The consultancy also undertook random telephone research of 420 people
who were selling a caravan; 100 of them (21 per cent) were not replacing fora variety of reasons: financial pressure, limited use or not enough time, familychanges or too old (65+).
To complete the picture BRAHM attended caravanning shows, visited and
spoke to dealerships and spoke to other interested parties such as the CaravanClub, Camping and Caravanning Clubs and the trade media.Tourer Marketing Bureau: supporting sales through PR 229

In summary the conclusions drawn from the research were:
• there was a definite perception issue: caravanning was seen to be for
slightly eccentric older people from a previous age;
• existing caravanners were loyal;
• the promotional effort should be targeted at potential customers rather
than existing customers: essential if the market was not to die out;
• the new markets were among younger age groups and any campaign
should have a leisure and lifestyle focus;
• the most attractive proposition put to non-owners was that ‘freedom’ was
an important feature of a good holiday.
Goals and objectives
There were two distinct, but linked, objectives for the campaign:
1 to attack the negative perceptions of caravans and caravanning;
2 to generate sales leads for the dealerships.
These objectives allied closely to the organisational objectives of the TPA, to
arrest and reverse the decline in sales of caravans because this threatened theviability of the manufacturers.
Target audiences
The primary target audience for the campaign was potential customers. Thisaudience fell into distinct categories:
• older, empty nesters or those with older children;
• young families (thirty-something);• those of all ages with outdoor leisure interests, (e.g. water-sports, enthu-
siasts, walkers, birdwatchers, country sports, etc.).
The first category were the traditional buyers of caravans who needed re-introducing to a familiar, but updated concept. The second category weretargeted in the expectation of communicating that caravanning is a safe,cheaper, more flexible option for the average family.
The third category would be those who were especially receptive to the
‘freedom’ message. Their preferred leisure and lifestyle pursuits meant thatthey needed to have accessible, flexible accommodation that would provide allthe convenience of home (ability to eat, sleep when you want, hot showers,good storage) at the point where the chosen activity is to take place.
The second primary audience were the dealerships. They needed to take
ownership of the campaign because they would be the point of personalcontact for potential customers, and needed to be able to capitalise on the230 Anne Gregory

opportunities presented in order for themselves and the manufacturers to
benefit from the promotional campaign.
A major secondary audience was the media:
• the regional press;• outdoor leisure/lifestyle publications;• women and consumer magazines;• radio and TV .
The campaign was heavily weighted towards using the media as a channel to
contact potential customers. The media were also an audience in their ownright in that key journalists were regarded as important opinion formers andinfluencers critical to tackling some of the image problems associated withcaravans and caravanners.
The final secondary audience were other industrial bodies such as:
• the Caravan Club;• the Camping and Caravanning Club;• the English Tourist Board.
Their cooperation was seen as vital in spreading a positive message about car-
avanning and members of the various caravan clubs were a point ofinformation for potential customers, journalists and dealers.
Communication strategy
BRAHM wanted to create a communication platform that would underpinand create coherence for the whole programme. That platform was encap-sulated in the core message: ‘Enjoy the Freedom’. The notion of ‘freedom’ togo when and where the caravan owner wanted had tested very well in theoriginal research with focus groups. It also meant freedom to take chil-dren, friends, pets and all the accessories that make a good break such asbicycles, water sports equipment, skiing gear, without the space limitationsof a car or public transport. ‘Enjoy’ signified not only the pleasure of get-ting away, but the luxury of the experience with a well-equippedhome-away-from-home featuring all the modern conveniences of a well-equipped apartment.
‘Enjoy the freedom’ also allowed BRAHM to concentrate on the benefits
of caravanning, rather than the utility and functionality of caravans (a focusof many of the dealers). It would enable them to attack the image problem byappealing to modern as well as traditional values and allow them to broadenout the audience base for the campaign.
Given the type of purchase and costs involved, the strategy was not
intended to sell directly to the public, but to generate traffic which would bedirected to the dealers. It was the dealers’ job to sell an appropriate caravanTourer Marketing Bureau: supporting sales through PR 231

to the customer. Interestingly, research had also shown that it was women
who were the influencers behind the decision to buy (hence the choice ofmedia), but it was men who made the purchase. Therefore the dealers werekeen to satisfy the requirements of both women and men in the sales trans-action and that needed to be done face-to-face with the products available forinspection and trial.
Campaign
The campaign which it had been agreed would require a combination ofmarketing communications and public relations techniques ran over a periodof five years starting from 1996. The main elements of the campaign were:
• introducing a new corporate identity;
• media relations;• dealer support;• exhibitions;• project work.
New corporate identity
The first recommendation that BRAHM made was that the TPA should re-
brand itself as the Tourer Marketing Bureau and introduce a new corporateidentity. The Tourer Promotional Association had one element in the namethat was valuable and that was Tourer. Research used showed that the word‘caravan’ immediately conjured up the negative images explained earlier.‘Tourer’ fits very well with the ‘Enjoy the Freedom’ core message and has thecorrect associations of flexibility, movement and accessibility. The words‘Promotional Association’ had notions of hard-sell, and cartels and datednessattached to them. ‘Marketing Bureau’ was seen to be more modern and hadlinks to other helping organisations such as Tourist Information Bureau andCitizens Advice Bureau.
BRAHM believed it would be more acceptable to consumers and the press
and would give the organisations a fresh start. A new visual identity wasdesigned to go with the name and featured a modern representation of aTourer on the move. Manufacturers were also encouraged to use the brand-ing on their delivery vehicles.
The new identity was introduced as part of the launch of the whole project.
A press pack was mailed to all consumer trade and travel journalists (300 intotal) in which the new initiative was explained under the new branding.Responses to the pack helped BRAHM gauge the level of interest in the pro-ject (which was high) and confirmed that the prejudices identified through theresearch were indeed firmly in place.232 Anne Gregory

Advertorial support
A key part of the campaign was the placement of advertorials (paid-for
double-page advertising spreads that look like features). Advertorials are notregarded by readers as blatant advertising since they take on the tone andlook of a feature. The idea is that they have the ‘feel’ of an independent edi-torial and sometimes are mistaken for that. Usually, they are clearly labelled‘advertising feature’ or something similar so that readers are not misled.They can be regarded as being half-way between an editorial feature and anadvert.
The advertorial campaign was initiated and run by the public relations
consultancy BRAHM recognised that they faced a difficult task in gettingtheir key message over in a controlled way to a largely cynical or at bestagnostic consumer press. Buying space meant they could ensure that thedelivery of the desired message, in words and pictures, could be guaranteed.
Starting in February 1997, a series of full-colour double-page spreads
appeared in consumer, rural interest and outdoor leisure magazines, eachone specifically tailored to the audience of the publication. Thus, for Gallop
Magazine, the focus was on the benefits of having a touring caravan so thatthe principal outdoor event venues can be visited throughout the summer. ForBBC Wildlife magazine, the theme was touring Scotland looking for nature
flora and fauna.
None of the advertorials featured external photographs of a tourer; all had
internal shots emphasising comfort and high quality, modern facilities. Eachadvertorial contained a coupon response and a free-phone telephone number(also promoted in all the media activity). The coupon encouraged people torequest a free 20-page TMB brochure ‘Enjoy the Freedom’. The coupon alsoasked respondents if they owned a touring caravan. The brochure coveredeverything a potential purchaser would want to know about owning a tourer.A dealer list, based on the respondent’s geographic location was alsoincluded.
The returned coupon formed the basis for constructing a customer data
base. The full list of respondents was passed on to manufacturers who wereable to mail both owners and non-owners with appropriate information andwork with dealers in converting the response to a sale.Tourer Marketing Bureau: supporting sales through PR 233
Figure 18.1 Tourer Marketing Bureau logo.

234 Anne Gregory
Figure 18.2 Tourer Marketing Bureau advertorials. © BRAHM Public Relations.

Y ear on year, an advertorial response analysis undertaken at the end of the
previous year informed decisions on where to place advertorials in subse-
quent years. In 1999 the advertorial campaign was notably successful when itinvolved an advertorial feature with a free competition entry, where compe-tition entrants could win a Range Rover Freelander. To encourage footfall todealers entries had to be stamped by a dealer prior to entry.
In 2000, despite the success of the advertorial campaign especially in 1999
with the competition link, response tracking showed that double-page adver-torials were beginning to be less effective (response degradation). Theconsultancy experimented with some small adverts, but discovered they werenot attracting the response required. Further research showed that tourersneed a story to explain them to encourage a response. As the project drew toa close in August 2000 the consultancy were using single-page or part-pageadvertorials to arrest the degradation trend. This proved successful.
Media relations
BRAHM established a press office within the consultancy under the Tourer
Marketing Bureau (TMB) banner. Its role was to generate as much positivemedia coverage as possible conveying the ‘Enjoy the Freedom’ message andthe luxurious interiors of modern touring caravans. It was also to use themedia to challenge negative consumer perceptions and respond to negativemedia coverage.
Feature articles
To complement the advertorial campaign, feature articles were written for
placement in the regional press, outdoor leisure/lifestyle publications andwomen’s magazines highlighting the benefits of ownership. To identify oppor-tunities for suitable features, BRAHM used the ‘advanced feature listings’ forthe national and regional press. They also targeted regional press with a highcirculation and ‘sold in’ the stories to them. These features often piggybackedseasonal or news items, for example, when there were delays in airport travelin the summer of 1999, the freedom of the tourer owner to chose whateverdestination they wanted was emphasised. During February 2000, a featurewas placed on the benefits of using a caravan for skiing holidays, emphasis-ing the benefits of: flexibility to visit several resorts, no queues for food, goodaccommodation, hot showers and at reasonable costs. The features had alifestyle and destination-led bias, emphasising the ‘go where you want to’message.
This tactic proved successful with regional press contacting the TMB for
stories in advance of being approached. An additional benefit was thatBRAHM were able to build up a database of freelance journalists interestedin their material. Freelancers are notoriously difficult to track because theywork independently, but once contact is established, they are a very usefulTourer Marketing Bureau: supporting sales through PR 235

group to work with since they have material accepted in a variety of
publications.
News releases
The consultancy produced selective news releases to the target media on a
range of subjects, from research findings to exhibition media briefings,market commentaries and advertorial competition winners.
Syndicated radio tapes
A series of radio tapes for regional radio was produced. These featured a vari-
ety of topics including an interview with the Chairman of the TMB on‘Caravanning in the 90s’ and a ‘Freedom to Roam’ piece which captured thethoughts of two journalists on a touring journey from Land’s End to JohnO’Groats (at the extremes of Great Britain) packaged as a topical news piece.
Celebrity bird-watcher Bill Oddy (a well known comedian in the UK) also
featured, promoting the synergy between outdoor activities and touring. Thetapes were commissioned by BRAHM who made editorial decisions on thecontent. Appropriate radio journalists were contracted to professionally‘voice’ the pieces. BRAHM used a specialist media distribution agency toedit, market and distribute the tapes.
Media facility visits
A vital element of the media programme was to ensure that key journalists
were able to sample the experience of a touring break. Over the course of thecampaign, media facility visits were undertaken. Journalists who took partwere not touring caravan specialists and included journalists from publica-tions such as the Observer, BBC Radio 4, Holiday and Leisure World, and the
regional press. BRAHM project managed the press facility visits whichincluded:
• selecting high calibre touring sites in the UK and overseas which matched
the journalists’ interests and had relevance to their publication;
• liaising with Tourism Boards to provide touring itineraries and maps;
• obtaining the use of cars, with towbars fitted, from the press fleets of
Volvo, Mitsubishi and Jeep;
• organising the storage, maintenance and valeting of a three-model tourer
press fleet;
• furnishing the tourer;• arranging towing training for journalists;• arranging transport of tourer to site;• collating comprehensive press packs;• briefing journalists on setting up and using a touring caravan.236 Anne Gregory

For every facility visit, each journalist’s party was welcomed by a member of
the TMB press office, given a full briefing on the objectives of the campaign,shown how to use the caravan, introduced to site personnel and provided withfull information of activities in the region.
Take-up of the offered facility visits was good, with positive feature articles
and broadcasts. National Radio 5 Live broadcast a three-hour show from atourer based on a site in Leek in Derbyshire as part of the summer scheduleBreakfast Programme. A series of caravanning pieces were broadcast through-out the mornings, interspersing Radio 5 Live news and sports items.
Dealer support
Training initiative
During their initial research, BRAHM discovered that dealers had a very
varied approach to customers. Some were proactive and professional, otherswere less so. BRAHM believed this to be a possible inhibitor to sales andgiven that their brief was to generate footfall to dealers, they felt the salesopportunity must be capitalised on. They commissioned a Mystery Shopperresearch programme at 50 (23 per cent) of the dealers to discover what thecustomer experience was like. The researchers found that on the whole it wasnot as an enticing experience as it should be. Unlike car show rooms wherethere are attractive indoor and outdoor displays that are well lit and customerfriendly, caravan dealerships were less sophisticated and the selling tech-niques were rather dated, although the dealers themselves were friendly andenthusiastic. Customers were left to browse without any proactivity on thesalesperson’s behalf. Sales staff focused on product features rather than sell-ing the benefits of the touring caravan experience to the individual with theirparticular set of requirements. As a result, an article on how to handle newcustomers and enhance customer service was written for the dealer newslet-ter and the issue of selling was raised with the Board of TMB.
The Mystery Shopper research provided the basis for a successful application
for a Government Department of Trade and Industry funded training awardof approximately £100,000 to the Caravan Industrial Training Organisation(CITO). The resulting profit-line training programme to improve dealer train-ing was aimed at supporting a British-based industry in order to resist marketinvasion by overseas manufacturers. In total, 94 people went through thetraining programme. The training led to improved salesroom layout, moreimaginative financing deals for purchasers and an improvement in the sellingtechniques of the dealers.
Footfall generation
The purpose of the whole campaign was to increase consumer footfall (or
traffic) at the dealerships. In this, it was successful (see ‘Evaluation’ below). AsTourer Marketing Bureau: supporting sales through PR 237

the programme rolled out the media campaign was linked into dealers’ own
advertising activity. Feature packages were designed for local and regionalpress and dealers were able to support them with their own advertising. Theycould then track traffic generation through their own coupon responses andthrough the TMB at BRAHM who informed them of freephone enquiriesand additional generated contacts. To support their own traffic generationinitiatives, dealers were also able to purchase the ‘Enjoy the Freedom’brochure from the TMB at cost price.
Newsletter
The consultancy researched, designed, wrote and produced a TMB News
Update, a quarterly newsletter aimed at the dealerships. News Update kept
dealers informed of campaign activities and progress as well as inviting com-
ments and suggestions to the TMB from dealers themselves. The publicationwas also used as a media communications tool.
Exhibition support
The press
The TMB undertook a series of press events at the four major UK caravanning
shows. The target media were travel and motoring correspondents from theregional media, Guild of Caravan and travel writers, national TV , radio andpress travel and motoring correspondents along with important freelance jour-nalists. Press activity included computer-based presentations, media packs withphotographs, and the ‘Enjoy the Freedom’ brochure and press interviews.
Consumers
Consumers who visited the TMB stand at these shows were presented with a
specially adapted exhibition caravan whose side had been cut away todemonstrate the quality of the interior (see Figure 18.3). Many were surprisedat the luxury of the modern tourer. Staff on the stand collected names andaddresses to add to the customer database. In the later years of the campaignBRAHM worked with exhibition organisers on pre-event promotion, com-petitions, ticket deals and access to the attendee database. The cut-awaycaravan was also made available to dealers for their own promotionalactivities.
Dealers and suppliers
Presentations and literature were also given to the dealers and suppliers who
attended the exhibition in an attempt to communicate the TMB message andto enlist their support for the campaign.238 Anne Gregory

Following success at the specialist caravanning exhibitions, the formula
was repeated at major non-specialist exhibitions such as the Motor Show, the
Ideal Homes Exhibition and rural county shows. This was to contact poten-tial customers who would not have attended caravanning events.
Project work
During the course of the campaign, there were three major projects that pro-
vided major public relations opportunities, the first two adding a major boostto the media programme.
The Tourer 2000 Millennium Survey
This research project began in 1997 shortly after the General Election. The
research fell into three phases. Phase One involved extensive research exam-ining the current and future market forces influencing the Touring Caravanexperience. These included environmental and road traffic issues; social,family and population trends; leisure, travel and accommodation preferences;political influences and technological influences.
Phase Two, called Millennium Day, was an event held on 19 September
which was a day of exploration and provided a platform for discussion of theissues raised in Phase One. The Day was chaired by Martin Sandbach, Headof Research at the English Tourist Board and involved caravan industrybodies, travel and camping clubs, the media, a design company andTourer Marketing Bureau: supporting sales through PR 239
Figure 18.3 Cut-away caravan. © BRAHM Public Relations.

representatives from the dealer and supplier networks. A range of topics was
covered including marketing promotions, product and service strategies, dis-tribution, sales, after-sales and communication issues.
Phase Three was a series of consumer focus group sessions held in October
and November in which existing and potential customers were asked to eval-uate and comment on all the issues raised in Phase One and Two and torecommend the best options for success.
Three clear conclusions came out of the survey:
• the British touring caravan industry had not radically changed for years;• the freedom and flexibility offered by touring caravans are attractive to
the fast-developing leisure market;
• to grasp the opportunities, the industry needed to create new public rela-
tions and marketing, product development and customer servicestrategies.
In summary, to survive and prosper, younger people, new to the market,needed to be attracted to buying tourers and design was the key to bringingthem in.
The survey results were used to inform the campaign at several levels. The
freedom and flexibility elements were exemplified in the ‘Enjoy the Freedom’campaign theme. The public relations programme and the direction it tookwere guided by the leisure and lifestyle conclusions and aimed to attractactive, younger people to the market. Dealer training helped to introduce newcustomer service insights and the product development aspects were coveredin the Tourer for the Millennium project (see below).
Tourer for the Millennium
One of the issues arising from the Millennium Survey was the design of car-
avans. Although interior design had been massively improved, and was thesource of pleasant surprise by some potential users, BRAHM felt that therewas room for improvement. Having talked to boat manufacturers and otherdesigners, they recommended a Tourer for the Millennium design project.During the Academic Y ear 1997–98, students from the industrial designcourse at the University of Northumbria were invited to enter a competitionto design a ‘concept’ caravan which would embrace the use of contemporarymaterials and state of the art design. The resultant designs were shown at theLondon Earls Court Show at the end of 1998 and provided further mediaopportunities.
The research from the Millennium Survey indicated that it was the external
appearance of tourers that was off-putting to many potential buyers, espe-cially those in the younger age groups. The consultancy recommended thatradical redesign of the shape and exterior be undertaken and provided pre-liminary suggestions. These recommendations are yet to be acted on, but240 Anne Gregory

there are clear indications that more attractive exteriors in, for example, the
USA, Canada and Australasia could contribute to sales success.
Breakout Magazine
The TMB launched a new magazine called Breakout, which was designed to
attract a new and younger audience to touring caravans. Produced withPractical Caravan, it focused on the freedom of touring caravanning andlinked it to outdoor sports.
The magazine was mailed to 2 million households nationwide using a com-
bination of lifestyle profiling with postcode classification. In follow-uptelephone calls with 1,000 targeted houses, 582 recalled receiving the maga-zine and 0.36 per cent claimed they had visited a dealer in response.
Opportunistic activities
Advertising
BRAHM also took opportunities to get across the ‘Enjoy the Freedom’ mes-
sage where possible. For example, when the Hull Daily Mail made a highlycritical report of hotel conditions in some Spanish resorts, BRAHM placedan advert in the same paper just days later headed ‘Instead of a holiday fromHell, have one hell of a holiday’, which trumpeted the benefits and risk-freenature of holidays in a tourer.
Challenging negative coverage
The TMB press office challenged journalists and publications who made crit-
ical attacks on caravans. Having made the challenge, journalists were thenoffered information and potential content for stories that they may want towrite in the future. This tactic proved particularly successful with local radio,who began to request a TMB presence, especially on phone-in-programmes.
Website
In the spring of 2000 BRAHM introduced the TMB website offering infor-
mation on dealer locations, sites, news and links to dealers. The idea was tobring the ‘Enjoy the Freedom’ brochure to life, give the TMB a presence onthe web and to provide another information service for enquirers.
Educational links
GCSE.com runs a website called GCSE Answers, one of the most academi-
cally respected and popular educational websites in the UK. It forms part ofthe Department for Education’s National Grid for learning.Tourer Marketing Bureau: supporting sales through PR 241

In May 2000 the company requested and was given permission to use the
‘Discovering the Dordogne’ advertorial (see Figure 18.2), which featured
touring in the Dordogne, as part of a section on media and non-literarytexts, a component of the GCSE English paper. The advertorial was identi-fied as being a good example of use of messages and imagery in acommercial context.
Budget
The cost of the programme averaged at about £500,000 per annum. Resourceswere allocated as shown in Table 18.2.
Table 18.2 Budget allocation figures for the campaign
Resource %
Advertorials 50
Response pack 2
Media facility visits 4
Exhibitions 12
Research 4
Special projects (e.g. Tourer for the Millennium) 4
Dealer relations 2
Fee and operational costs 22
Evaluation of results
The campaign was subject to formal annual review and evaluation each year.
Media campaign
The combined media relations and advertorial campaign reached an annual
average readership of about 146 million each year, calculated by circulation ofpublications multiplied by number of i nserts. Consumer research undertaken
with respondents demonstrated that 35 per cent had visited a dealership as aresult, thereby fulfilling a campaign objective – to generate sales leads for d ealers.
Some of the broadcast media coverage was worth special note. BBC TV
North’s Industrial Correspondent went on a facility visit which producedcoverage on regional and national TV and radio and won the Caravan Club’sAward for Best Broadcast.
Carlton TV’s national cookery programme Chef on a Shoestring featured a
caravanning family being provided with a meal for four on a budget of £10 bycelebrity chef Brian Turner. The programme highlighted the modern cookingfacilities found in today’s tourers.
Facility visits also generated significant coverage with an average of 12
features and articles produced per year with a total readership of almost 20242 Anne Gregory

million. Journalists, especially the non-specialists, were universally positive in
their reports on their experience recommending it to their readers. Hencethe opportunity of changing the views of key opinion formers from negativeto positive was achieved.
Response pack
In total, 30,000 responses were recorded for 1997 to 1999 and copies of the
‘Enjoy the Freedom,’ response pack were distributed to those requesting themvia the coupon return. Research among recipient audiences (press, potentialcustomers, dealers) was positive both about the content and the insight it gaveinto modern touring; and on the quality of the pack itself. Potential cus-tomers reported it had been the most influential information in promptingthem to visit dealers. A significant element of the response pattern was thatfrom a position where 49 per cent of enquirers were from non-owners in1997, in 1999 this had gone up to 81 per cent, demonstrating that the cam-paign was successful in attracting this new market.
Dealer support
The DTI training scheme was in many ways a ‘result’ of the Mystery Shopper
research and won the £100,000 grant application described earlier. The train-ing itself made the selling process more effective with dealers reporting anincrease in the conversion rate of customers visiting their dealership. Dealersbecame enthusiastic advocates of the TMB campaign and actively lobbied foran opportunity to participate in the promotional programme, taking outadvertising support for the editorial input for the Bureau.
Exhibition support
The exhibition work included names and addresses being added to the cus-
tomer database, all of whom were followed up by the manufacturers anddealers. Furthermore, research demonstrated that potential customers whovisited the shows and exhibition left with quite a different perception ofmodern touring. Thus, both objectives, attitudinal change and sales lead,were met through the exhibition programme.
Projects
The three major special projects were aimed at informing marketing decision,
changing potential customer opinion, and generating leads. The Tourer 2000Millennium Survey ensured the promotional campaign remained on track,involved key opinion formers to enlist their continued interest in the projectand provided material for the media campaign.
The Tourer for the Millennium project again emphasised the quality of theTourer Marketing Bureau: supporting sales through PR 243

interiors of tourers and provided opportunities for manufacturers to take on
new design materials and production methods. It also provided a ready mediaplatform.
Breakout Magazine increased traffic to dealers significantly. If the results of
the telephone survey were replicated across the total circulation of 2 million,6,800 people would have visited dealerships as a result of receiving Breakout.
Remaining copies of the magazine were distributed to dealers to use as pointof sales material.
However, the most significant result was the overall impact of the cam-
paign. From an industry low point of 20,400 sales in 1996, there was a 12 percent increase by the end of 1997 with a total of 22,500 tourers sold, withindustry spokespeople claiming that the industry had turned the corner. Bythe end of the campaign in 2000, sales projections were well in excess of30,000, with some manufacturers reporting sales increases of up to 40 percent – a remarkable turn round.
Furthermore, Tony Hartley, Chair of the TMB and Managing Director of
the largest manufacturer, reported a new ‘feel good factor’ in the industry.That was as a result of staff involved seeing the positive coverage, a percep-tible change in attitude from consumers and increased interest from peoplenew to touring altogether. This, combined with a better trained, successfuldealership network, had turned an industry in spiralling decline to one withrenewed confidence, increasing sales and a better reputation. The publicrelations-led promotional campaign had met the objectives set in everydimension.
Lessons learned
This case provides some useful insights into how a well-thought-out andstrategically managed public relations campaign can be used to help addressand turn around entrenched consumer attitudes and negative perceptionsabout products such as caravans. However, as the case shows, changing well-established consumer attitudes requires a sustained campaign over timewhich, by inference, requires a longer-term commitment of resources on thepart of client organisations.
The case illustrates how public relations can work alongside marketing
programmes, complementing them and, in some cases, achieving results thatmight not be possible using mainstream marketing techniques alone.
The case also shows that for public relations to deliver effective business
solutions, it is often necessary for practitioners to extend the scope of theirwork beyond what might be seen by many as the traditional domain of publicrelations. As this case illustrates, the work undertaken by consultants to TMBembraced elements of advertising, design, consumer research, and even salestraining advice. In effect, their role was essentially that of ‘business consul-tant’ to the TMB.
Thus, this case suggests that in the modern, increasingly complex world of244 Anne Gregory

business, public relations consultants may need to adopt a ‘total solutions
approach’ to handling client problems rather than confining themselves toproviding solutions comprising only activities from the traditional publicrelations domain. Here, for example, public relations practitioners mightneed to draw upon a range of complementary fields such as marketing,design, human resource management, and the broad field of managementpractice in order to offer a comprehensive solution to client problems.Tourer Marketing Bureau: supporting sales through PR 245

Case 19 Worldcom Public
Relations Group
Global access, local focus
Brian Cummings and Barbara DeSanto
Introduction
Worldcom’s roots go back to 1954 in Canada with the creation of the Inside
Canada Public Relations Group (ICPRG) when public relations firms inMontreal, Toronto and Vancouver linked up to serve local and nationalclients. In 1960 the International Public Relations Group of Companies(IPRGOC) was formed primarily to provide Japanese companies with publicrelations services globally. The new organization’s structure was roughlybased on the Canadian model and encompassed independent public rela-tions firms from around the world including the entire ICPRG Group nowexpanded to seven cities.
In the late 1980s, the Americas Group of IPRGOC was seeking significant
changes in how the organization was managed. They were unhappy with thefact that majority ownership rested with one Japanese firm which exerted aveto power over any group initiative that was not Japan-centric.
Concurrently, the public relations industry was growing as corporate
America, griped in a wave of downsizing in an effort to fight its way back to
Figure 19.1 Worldcom logo.

profitability, was outsourcing services like public relations. This growth in
what was essentially a cottage industry, coupled with the industry’s superiorprofitability vis-à-vis advertising, made public relations firms attractive acqui-
sition candidates.
One of the companies on the prowl for acquisitions at that time was
Shandwick International. Shandwick, which was founded in London in 1974by Peter Gummer, became listed on the London Stock Exchange in 1985and, using its high-performing stock as currency, began expanding worldwide,mostly by acquiring other geographically dispersed public relations firms.
Early in 1988, when Shandwick acquired the Japanese firm at the centre of
the dispute within the IPRGOC network, the concerns of the IPRGOC mem-bers, particularly the American members, intensified. IPRGOC membersfeared that with Shandwick now controlling the network, business would bereferred to Shandwick-owned agencies rather than IPRGOC members. Inseveral cities, IPRGOC members competed with Shandwick-owned agencies.
At a meeting of IPRGOC 1988, Peter Gummer attempted to allay the fears,
but was unsuccessful, and a group of members decided to leave IPRGOC andform a new organization. A few months later, at the offices of Padilla SpearBeardsley in Minneapolis, Minnesota, the Worldcom Group was formed.
Key players in the formation of the original Group included:
• John Adams, John Adams & Associates (Washington);• Eric Cunningham, OEB International (Toronto);• Michel Dumas, BDDS (Montreal);• Andy Edson and John Beardsley of Padilla Spear Beardsley (New Y ork
and Minneapolis);
• Joe Epley, Epley Associates (Charlotte);• John Francis, FWJ Communications (Calgary);• Peter Morrissey, Clarke & Company (Boston);• Jay Rockey, The Rockey Company (Seattle);• Jim Strenski, Public Communications Inc. (Tampa);• Davis Y oung, Liggett Stashower (Cleveland);• Roger Haywood, Kestrel (London);• Borge Mannov, Mannov Consults (Copenhagen).
Each of these agencies were leaders in their respective markets and ranged in
size from $1 million to $5 million in fee income and employed from 10 to 50employees. They were all keenly aware of the importance of an internationalnetwork and how necessary it was to enable them to compete against themultinational agencies.
Worldcom is unique because members refer to themselves, and treat each
other, as ‘partners’. While not a true ‘partnership’ in the legal sense, the spiritof Worldcom rests in the close personal and working relationships amongpartner firms. In Worldcom all partners are equals at the table regardless ofthe location, billings, size and types of clients a partner firm may have. WhileWorldcom: global access, local focus 247

partner firms may share the same country, and sometimes the same city and
marketplace, they do not compete against each other. The main competitionis seen as the large international public relations consultancy groups in theworld such as Burson Marsteller, Hill & Knowlton, Shandwick, Edelman, orFleishman Hillard.
Despite strong competition from these international consultancy groups,
Worldcom has grown steadily to become the third largest public relationsorganization in the world with more than 90 firms generating some $160(US) million in billings from more than 100 offices.
Worldcom’s structure
Through this network of offices, Worldcom partners provide their localclients with global public relations services. Thus, for example, if a clientneeds help in launching a product in New Y ork or wants to stage a news con-ference in Tokyo, or needs market intelligence in Australia, a suitable provenWorldcom partner can be identified.
Worldcom’s world is divided into three regions:
• The Americas;• Asia/Pacific;• Europe/Middle East/Africa.
The Americas Region includes Canada, the United States, Latin America and
the Caribbean. The Asia/Pacific Region includes the entire region. TheEurope/Middle East/Africa Region covers all of Europe including the NIS(New Independent States) and the Middle East. Africa, with one partner inSouth Africa, is a region in development. Each region is governed by its ownBoard of Directors elected by partners in each respective region.
Overseeing the entire organization is a Group Board of Directors elected
by all partners. The chair of each Regional Board has a seat on the GroupBoard to ensure all parts of the globe are reflected in the make-up of theGroup Board. Day-to-day operations of Worldcom are managed by a ChiefOperating Officer whose job is to staff critical functions and coordinate part-ner activities.
What Worldcom is not
While Worldcom is many things, there are some things Worldcom is not.Worldcom is not simply a ‘network’ conveniently assembled to meet short-term goals or respond to regional client opportunities. Rather, it is a strongpartnership-based organization dedicated to the long-term delivery of per-sonalized global public relations services. Moreover, it is not a monolithwhere one corporate headquarters makes all the decisions. It is a mosaic ofresourceful, locally owned firms making decisions that meet the best needs ofits clients in the global marketplace.248 Brian Cummings and Barbara DeSanto

In terms of its operatives, it is not owned and operated by corporate exec-
utives who are posted on a rotational basis. Partner firms are operated by
local owners and executives with a long-term commitment to and intimateknowledge of their marketplace and with a track record of performance thatin many cases spans several decades.
Worldcom is also not an organization that prices its services based on the
profit requirements of corporate headquarters. Rather, pricing is established bythe dynamics of the local marketplace where partners practice. As a conse-quence, each partner’s revenue depends upon the partner office’s location andmarketplace. More often, Worldcom serves as a powerful marketing toolenabling partners to offer clients public relations services anywhere in the world.
Making the network concept work
Turning the idea of a network into reality was simple and complex – simplein concept, but somewhat complex in execution. Each of the founding part-ners had seen first hand the value of belonging to a worldwide network.Each had been asked by clients to provide on-the-ground assistance in remotemarkets. And each had called on other network members for advice andguidance in areas where their own agencies were weak.
The value of forming a network was never in question. What shape the net-
work should take was a more complex decision. Based on the experienceswith IPRGOC, it was decided that each member agency would have one vote,regardless of size, so that no one agency could dominate. Each agency wouldalso pay the same dues, again, to reinforce the egalitarian nature of the group.
The Group would be organized into geographic regions with each region
having its own board, dues and budgets to reinforce the local aspect of thisglobal network. The Group would hold an annual meeting in the Spring witheach region taking turns hosting the event, with regional meetings being heldin the Fall. Partner attendance would be required at one meeting annually,however, attendance at both the annual meeting and the partner’s regionalmeeting would be strongly encouraged.
It was decided that the organization would be structured as a profit-making
corporation to help keep its focus on making money for the members. It wasagreed that the common language for Worldcom business would be English,and partner firms would need to have at least two staff members who couldcommunicate fluently in English.
In retrospect, more research should have been done on organizational
alternatives. Being registered as a corporation in the United States inhibits thegroup’s effort to build up a cash reserve since any money left at the end of theyear is subject to taxation. Thus the goal each year is to spend all of the feeincome in the year it is received. Additionally, more effort could have beenfocused on organizing for the handling of day-to-day administrative andfinancial affairs. The Group’s growth and internal management efficiencyduring the early years were hampered by the lack of a central, paid staff.Worldcom: global access, local focus 249

Initially, the Worldcom secretary/treasurer Andy Edson of Padilla Spear
Beardsley’s New Y ork office handled all of the group’s administrative affairs at
minimal cost to the Group. Although this arrangement sufficed for the earlydays, as the Group expanded, it became evident that the complexity of admin-istering a worldwide group required more extensive administrative support.
Ultimately, as part of the strategic planning process, the position of Chief
Operating Officer (COO) was created and made a contracted position ratherthan a paid staff position. This action streamlined the organization’s admin-istrative effort and helped focus its marketing efforts. Since the COO’s duty isto attend all regional meetings, the COO serves as a valuable link between allof the regions, cross-pollinating good ideas and serving as an early warningsystem for problems.
Goals and objectives
Worldcom’s goals and objectives, enshrined in the Group’s by-laws, weredefined as:
• operating a worldwide network with geographic regional subgroups of
independently owned public relations firms working cooperatively in
support of each other’s activities, and enabling firms to better serve theirclients on a global basis;
• promoting the value of a network of affiliated public relations firms to
clients and potential clients;
• making available on an hourly basis, without a minimum, professional
staff and expertise to serve each other’s clients, at prevailing hourly ratesfor individuals involved;
• promoting the interchange of business among member firms;• promoting cooperation and sharing of knowledge among its members.
The goals were developed by the founding members of Worldcom and were
based on their experience with the IPRGOC. If Worldcom was to survive, itneeded to be a collegial group, organized geographically and focused on help-ing each other win and service client business.
Expanding Worldcom’s capabilities
To service clients on a global basis, the initial priority was to identify andrecruit small to medium-sized public relations companies in markets whereWorldcom was not represented. The founding partners knew it would benecessary to quickly deliver on the promise of worldwide client support, sorecruiting of new partners became the paramount goal. The expansion wasremarkably swift. By the end of 1988, membership had grown to about 37partners. Five years later, in 1993, there were nearly 70 partners.
By 2000, Worldcom had 104 partner firms working out of more than 121250 Brian Cummings and Barbara DeSanto

offices in 38 countries on six continents, and employing more than 1,500
employees. Consolidated net fee income for 1999 was nearly $170 million.
However, the Group was not so successful in reaching other key audi-
ences – potential clients and the public relations industry as a whole.Although there were some attempts at raising the organization’s visibilityand credibility among those audiences, little progress was made until theGroup developed and began executing a strategic plan in 1995.
Worldcom’s strategy
In 1994, Eric Cunningham, then the worldwide chairman, convened a plan-ning meeting in New Y ork City of the three regional chairs and the chairs ofthe Group’s marketing and recruitment committees. That meeting galvanizedthe Group to begin the development of a strategic plan, and the followingyear, under the leadership of newly elected chair Michel Dumas, a strategicplanning process was set in motion.
Jim Strenski of Public Communications Inc. in Tampa, Florida, took on
the job of chairing the Strategic Planning Committee to develop and executethe plan. At the 1996 Annual General Meeting in Northern Ireland, the part-ners accepted a plan embracing the vision that by the year 2000, theWorldcom Group would be:
• recognized as a pre-eminent global communications resource;
• providing partners and the clients they serve with information and
problem-solving expertise;
• using informed local insights and implementation skills of the highest
quality and ethical standards.
To realize this vision, Strenski and his committee divided the tasks into sixoverarching goals:
1 Structure and Finance: to develop a support structure sufficient to serve
the group into the twenty-first century.
2 Recruitment: to recruit and maintain professionally competent partners
with adequate resources to serve broad client needs.
3 Protection: to develop respect and protection for Worldcom and its
partners.
4 Quality and Performance: to establish a methodology for quality mem-
bership performance that is uniform, timely and professional.
5 Resources: to develop resources and systems which give partners timely
access to critical information, analysis of that information and strategic
counsel.
6 Business Development: to provide a framework for securing clients
worldwide.Worldcom: global access, local focus 251

Moreover, as a subset to the Business Development goal, the document laid
out a multi-year marketing plan with several key objectives:
• to establish and maintain a three-tier structure that integrates marketing
activities at global, regional and local levels;
• to establish Worldcom as a pre-eminent global communications resource
(Vision 2000);
• to develop, maintain and administer an inventory of basic marketing
tools and materials;
• to provide marketing support to practice groups.Over the next four years, as the strategic planning process unfolded, the
Group began making progress in achieving its visions.
The Worldcom name was officially changed to the Worldcom Public
Relations Group Inc. to better reflect what the organization did and to pro-vide some differentiation from a US-based, international telecommunicationscompany with the same name. New logos were developed and made availableto each region, and partners were encouraged to use the mark in local signageand on business cards and stationery.
A new corporate brochure was developed in an effort spearheaded by the
European Region and adopted by the Group and the Americas Region. Theeight-page color brochure contained a pocket on the inside back cover so thateach partner could customize it.
Circuit, the Worldcom monthly newsletter, was converted to an e-mail
format for ease of distribution. A Worldcom Internet site was developed andpublicized to increase the Group’s visibility in the industry. The site wasdesigned to be searchable by partner, expertise and geography. Links to part-ners’ pages were included. Later, an Intranet was added for the posting of casestudies, presentations, by-laws and other documents for Worldcom partners.
Practice Groups were organized focused on technology, consumer prod-
ucts, crisis, environmental communications and Latin American affairs. TheTechnology Group developed a brochure and a separate website and levied atariff on members to support its own marketing efforts.
The ‘World Y oung Business Achiever Programme’, an international awards
programme recognizing entrepreneurs, was formally adopted on a trial basisas a Worldcom brand-building effort. The competition, which was developedby Worldcom partner Robin Dunseath, had operated independently ofWorldcom, albeit with the participation of many European and Asia-PacificRegion partners (see Figure 19.2).
Each region moved marketing to the top of its agenda and appointed a
marketing committee to ensure that the particular marketing needs of eachregion were being met. In the European Region, where joint presentations toserve clients across national boundaries are common, the group developedcommon business cards, stationery and presentation templates that could beused by partners when pursuing business under the Worldcom banner.252 Brian Cummings and Barbara DeSanto

In the Americas Region, a detailed public relations and advertising plan
was undertaken using tactics that included interviews with region and Group
officers, joint research efforts undertaken by the partners, and releases on newmembers. Additionally, the region began to sponsor social events at majorindustry events such as the meeting of the Public Relations Society ofAmerica (PRSA) Counselors Academy and awards such as CIPRA awardsfrom Inside PR Magazine.
In the Asia-Pacific Region where distances between partners are daunting,
regional partners began the development of a region-specific brochure thatcould be used by each member to tell the Worldcom story.
Greater emphasis was placed on the requirement that partners attend the
regional and group meetings held each year. Not only is attendance at least atone meeting per year a requirement of the Group’s by-laws, it is vital to theoverall health of the organization. Without the face-to-face interaction, thetrust and confidence necessary for the interchange of business cannot occur.Several partners were expelled for non-attendance and new partners recruitedin their place.
Quality standards were written into the Group’s by-laws and, at the 2000
Annual General Meeting, the partners agreed to pilot a certification processthat would ultimately lead to each partner meeting quality and managementstandards that would provide credibility for the claim of worldwideexcellence. The recruitment process was also formalized during this periodwith prospective partners screened more thoroughly and carefully than everbefore.
Partnerships: from idea to practice
A number of partnership ventures illustrate how the agencies have pairedtogether and what the partners learned from each other.
Growth Plus – Europe’s 500
Partners involved: Wisse Kommunikatie, The Netherlands; Kestral Worldcom
UK, United Kingdom; International News Service, Sweden; Sanchis &
Asociados, SA, Spain; Agentur für Kommunikation, Germany; WorldcomEurope Brussels, Belgium; CBO Srl, Italy; Kendo, France; Institut fürKommunikations, Austria.
Campaign overview: the partners ran national press events in each of their
countries in support of an annual publication of the fastest growing entre-preneurs called ‘Europe’s 500’. The campaign generated maximum press andmedia attention on the job-creating qualities of entrepreneurship and posi-tioned Growth Plus as the leading trade association representativeorganization in Europe. The campaign was run in each of the partners’respective countries, through successful national, regional, local, and profes-sional/trade media.Worldcom: global access, local focus 253

254 Brian Cummings and Barbara DeSanto
I am delighted that the World Y oung
Business Achiever Final is [text cut] this
year. I am sure this will be a magnificentfinal not only be [text cut] this year but
also being hosted in such superb sur-roundings.
Our finalists are:-Argentina Trini Vergana
In less than four years has created andconsolidated a new [text cut] specialising
in producing Gift Books.
China Luo Zhaoming
Mr Luo Zhaoming is an entrepreneur hismain business is real estate development.With special interest in developingZhongguancun, the Chinese Silicon Valley.
England Ajit Patel
Mr Patel is Chairman and Chief Executiveof Goldshield Group. Ajit co-foundedGoldshield in 1989 and oversaw its flota-tion on the London Stock Exchange.
Finland Vesa Keskinen
Vesa has developed Finland’s biggest vil-lage shop. However, it is more like ashopping mall and is now a tourist attrac-tion.
Germany Andre Floeter
Dr Floeter along with Dr Peter Gluchefounded their company GFD in March1999. The company specialises in makingdiamond products using new technologies.The first products developed werediamond scalpels for eye and neuro-surgery.Hong Kong Thomas CheungFounder and Executive Director ofInnomed Group Limited. The InnomedGroup specialises in the formation, devel-opment and financing of early stagebiotechnology and biomedical companiesin Hong Kong and Asia.
India Manoj Tirodkar
Founder and CEO of Global Enterprise.Global is among the top twenty companiesin India with E-commerce playing a largepart by providing amongst others anInternet Payment Gateway, which permitscorporates, banks and consumers to tradesafely over the Internet.
Mexico Ignacio Vizcaino
Director General and founder member ofBusinessware International. He is author ofthe administrative software Crescendo whichis used not only within Mexico but within sev-eral other Latin American countries.
Netherlands Geesje Duursma-Dijkstra
Geesje is CEO for De Pleats, a restaurantand conference centre in Burguum,Netherlands and ECN, a catering com-pany. De Pleats also has a unique outdoortheatre, which can host a variety of eventsover the summer months includingShakespeare and Folk events.
Ireland Pat Doyle
Pat Doyle founded Glass and CladdingTechnology Limited in 1996 along withMark Caffrey and Noel Cunningham. Thecompany designs, manufacturers andinstalls the glass and aluminium façades tolarge commercial developments such asoffice blocks and shopping centres.
To Worldcom Partners

Lessons learned
• Strategically tailored and positioned messages for each country generate
greater interest from each country’s press. Practitioners must speak the
language and culture of each individual country.
• Joint projects involving several partners require extra time for coordina-
tion. Different cultures operate on different social, cultural and physicaltime clocks – getting a great number of people together takes time.
• One key interface between partners and client during the planning stages
to advise on strategy and positioning smooths the process ofWorldcom: global access, local focus 255
Philippines Alistair Israel
Alistair Israel is the President of WS FiestaOnline Corp. and Co-creator of Y ehey! –which is the premier Philippine searchengine. Y ehey! is a search engine whichfocuses on the Philippines and Filipinosworldwide. WS Fiesta Online also operatesan online advertising network.
South Africa Sandile Zungu
Sandile is Executive Deputy Chairman ofSARHWU Investment Holdings Limitedwhich is a trade union investment com-pany.
New Zealand Oscar Nathan
Chief executive of Tourism Rotorua, anorganisation which promotes Rotorua as atourist destination.
Poland Andrzej Grzegorzewski
Andrzej is director of the KolastynaLaboratory, their business is productionand development of cosmetics and skincare products.
Scotland Michelle Mone
Founder of MJM International, whichdeveloped and produced the revolutionaryUltimo Bra.
I would please ask everyone to make our
finalists most welcome and when you meeta finalist I would be indeed grateful if youcould spend a moment or two to take thetime to have a chat with them.As this is my first year as Chief Executive,a role I only assumed responsibility for atthe end of January, I wish to thank all theWorldcom partners and friends for all theirhelp and support in assisting with thepreparation of the Final.
It is always difficult to single out one or two
people as I have been Assessor for WorldY oung Business Achiever since its incep-tion and therefore know most of theWorldcom partners. However, I would liketo thank Brian Cummings, currentPresident, Roger Haywood, President,Kestrel Worldcom UK and Chairman, PublicRelations Standard Council. RobinDunseath, Founder, Daisy Guthin, GaryBitner, Cynthia Connolly and a special men-tion to the excellent team too numerous tomention who have assisted World Y oungBusiness Achiever since its formation with-out whom we would not be here today.
I look forward to meeting you all personally
and conclude by thanking you all most sin-cerely for all your help and assistance.
Kind regardsY ours sincerely,
J B Hunter
Chief Executive
12 April 2000
Figure 19.2 World Y oung Business Achiever Final brochure.

cooperation. One partner had to take the lead with the client and then
communicate and coordinate the strategy with the other partners.
Station 12, KPN the Netherlands
Partners involved: Kestral Worldcom UK, United Kingdom; Cummings
McGlone & Associates, United States; Binn & Co., Public Relations, Ltd,
United Kingdom; John Adams Associates, District of Columbia; BlissGouverneur & Associates, New Y ork; Gillian Gamsey International, SouthAfrica; The Phillips Group, Australia.
Campaign overview: Station 12’s parent company, KPN, merged Station 12
with the satellite communications division of Telstra, the Australian telecomcompany. The project was to create a new global market identity for themerged company, which was now the world leader in satellite communica-tions. The objectives included building media recognition in key markets inEurope, Africa, Australia and the US, achieving strong positive media cov-erage; generating new business enquiries, and building company credibility inhighly competitive markets.
Lessons learned
• Partners must work to an agreed-upon strategy that all partners can
support.
• Each partner must trust all other partners as market experts in their own
domains and follow their advice.
• All partners must agree to use copy generated by all partners and then
adapt it to local needs.
• The lead partner must act as an advisory coordinator rather than an
authoritarian bottleneck.
Trans World Airlines (TW A)Partners involved: The Standing Partnership, United States; and Bitner. com,
United States.
Campaign overview: TW A had recently expanded its Puerto Rican service
routes to strengthen its presence in the Caribbean. The two partners collab-
orated to produce the initial new service announcement, translate alldocuments, and conduct a successful media relations campaign.
Lesson learned
The ability to communicate in Spanish to the local media through news releases,
press conferences and interviews was vital to the success of the cam paign.256 Brian Cummings and Barbara DeSanto

Eastman Kodak Company Document Imaging Division
Partners involved: Buck & Pulleyn, United States; Kestral Worldcom UK,
United Kingdom; HBI Helga Bailey GmbH, Germany; The Phillips Group,
Australia; Hallmark Public Relations, United Kingdom; N.S. Asia-PacificPublic Relations Corporation, China.
Campaign overview: The client, Eastman Kodak, was seeking a new business-
to-business technology public relations firm with international capabilities formore than $1 million in annual billings. This was one of Worldcom’s firstclient pitches where partner consultancies banded together to present relevantagencies as the Worldcom Group rather than having just one agency pitch theaccount. This banding together allowed Worldcom to position itself as anexpert, flexible entity with a variety of specialists to work on the account.Worldcom was placed second in the pitch, defeated by less than 20 points ona 1,000-point ranking scale. Kodak stated that it was extremely impressedwith the knowledge level and commitment of all the partners demonstrated ina worldwide conference call during the pitch presentation.
While Worldcom was not selected as the overall consultancy, one of the
partner consultancies did earn part of the business – Buck & Pulleyn wasawarded the division’s customer case study program and online placementduties. Kodak has also encouraged two other consultancies, The PhillipsGroup and Kestrel, to pitch to Kodak’s regional offices.
Lessons learned
• Visibility can come in numbers. The awarding of pieces of Kodak’s
worldwide business gives Worldcom partners an opportunity to become
known in global markets.
• Flexibility to combine and reinvent oneself to meet client needs is an
asset. Worldcom’s structure allows consultancies to pick and choose indi-vidual consultancy strengths to meet client needs.
Evaluation of Worldcom’s success
If one of the reasons Worldcom was established was to help partners win andserve clients, then it seems to be achieving some success. In 1999 Worldcompartners reported sharing more than $1.4 million of business. Given thenature of the partners and their aversion to centralized reporting, the actualfigure is almost certainly higher. The shared income involved some topbrands – companies like Phillip Morris, Procter and Gamble, BurlingtonIndustries, Blockbusters and the California Raisin Board. So not only was thelevel of turnover impressive, but the quality of the clients was also veryimpressive.
If another goal was to promote sharing and knowledge among partners,
then the Worldcom organization is succeeding there as well. The partners thatWorldcom: global access, local focus 257

attended the 2000 Annual General Meeting were represented by an average of
1.7 people per firm, showing that the involved partners are incorporatingWorldcom into the heart of their organization.
Also, if being recognized as a pre-eminent resource for public relations ser-
vices was the vision in 1996, then it’s time to develop a new vision. Worldcomas Worldcom (and not as one of the partner firms) is increasingly beinginvited to present for major, multinational businesses.
During the past decade, Worldcom has grown to become recognized as a
viable alternative to the major multinational public relations firms. Because oftheir local market strength, Worldcom partners are being approached by cor-porations and organizations that need public relations assistance nationwideand worldwide and want senior, proven practitioners to handle their work.
Formerly, these companies would almost exclusively seek out the local
office of one of the major agencies, assuming (often incorrectly) that theoffice could serve as a window on the major agency’s worldwide capabilities.Increasingly clients are turning to Worldcom, rejecting the multinationalagency business model where senior agency staff may serve as new businessgenerators, but then leave servicing the account to a group of more juniorpractitioners. In contrast, Worldcom ensures that senior entrepreneurial prac-titioners serve both to generate new business and service the account’s needs.258 Brian Cummings and Barbara DeSanto

Case 20 Marks & Spencer plc
A crisis of confidence
Sandra Oliver
Introduction
This case examines the crisis and ongoing problems that Marks & Spencer,
one of Britain’s best known retail brands, has experienced after many years ofunbroken success. The case examines the factors that contributed to perhapsthe most serious threat that the company has faced in its over 100-year his-tory and identifies the implications for the company’s future public relationsstrategy.
The company
Marks & Spencer (M&S) is one of the UK’s largest, best-known retailers andtheir brand has been synonymous with reliability, value and quality for gen-erations. Marks & Spencer has been viewed as setting the standards thatother retailers have striven to match over the years and, until recently, wasrecognised as one of Britain’s best-managed companies with an enviable trackrecord of successful growth and profits. The company has consistently beenrated as Britain’s ‘most favoured company’ in surveys among business leaders.The name Marks & Spencer, like Harrods, had become a national icon forBritish business in terms of honourable trading and, in complex ways, hadbecome a cultural icon representing all that was fairness and just about theBritish character. However, Marks & Spencer’s position as the UK’s mostsuccessful retailer suffered a serious dent as a result of a media-led crisis thatwas to shake customers, shareholders and general public confidence in thecompany which would have seemed impossible a few years ago. This declinein M&S’s position was reflected in the market fall of its share price (seeFigure 20.1).
Marks & Spencer plc considered that its core values were quality, value
and service worldwide. Since forming in 1884, Marks & Spencer had pro-gressed from a market stall to being one of the world’s most successful retailersand the UK’s largest exporter of clothes since 1977. The St Michael brandremained at the heart of its quality reputation throughout this period, main-tained by close relationships with suppliers. Its 1998 Annual Report stated,

‘Our obsession with quality is the essential appeal of our brand’. Value and
variety held a prominent position. The value proposition was based on sellingexcellent products at competitive prices with a high level of service and, untilthe 1950s, other brand names of food and textiles were sold alongside the StMichael brand. Marks & Spencer has always been innovative. Even in 1884when it was just Michael Marks’s stall in the market, his sign: ‘Don’t ask theprice, it’s a penny’, was an ingenious and innovative response to his inability tospeak English. It was simple and it worked. Later, in the product area, he wasto ask what made the customer’s life easier and more convenient, so that, by1940, he had introduced a merchandise development department to considerthe introduction of man-made fibres for textile manufacture and specialistfoods. A refund policy was equally innovative in its day, as was buying directfrom suppliers instead of wholesalers. More recent ideas include the intro-duction of the chargecard in 1985, colour management procedures,machine-washable silk and non-iron cotton and the new designer range ofwomen’s clothing and Salon Rose women’s underwear to appeal to a differentor wider variety of buying publics. The M&S Chief Executive, Peter Salsbury,said that the designer range was an initiative designed to win back customerswith the idea that shopping at Marks & Spencer would ‘provide an experiencethat moves you into a slightly different world’.
Mission and core values
M&S’s core values are described in the 1999 Annual Report as being its cor-
porate principles. It states that ‘all M&S goods are made to our specificationand sold under our exclusive brand name. We differentiate ourselves by serv-ing the mass market with innovative high quality goods at competitive prices.260 Sandra Oliver
Figure 20.1 Marks & Spencer share price graph, 1991–2000.

We remain committed to values which have always set us apart, namely
innovation, quality, value for money and service.’ M&S aims to put the cus-tomer first at all times and states that:
[it is] determined to sell only merchandise of the highest quality at out-standing value. It is determined to offer the high standard of customercare in an attractive shopping environment and aims to improve stan-dards continually throughout its operations using the latest technology. Itestablishes mutually rewarding, long-term partnerships with its suppliers,developing overseas sources to serve its expanding international busi-ness, at the same time maintaining support for its British supply base. Itaims to minimise the environmental impact of its activities. The groupnurtures good human relations with staff, customers and the communityand ensures staff and shareholders share in its success.
M&S, like most world-class companies, separated its mission statements fromits values statements. A mission statement indicates the company philosophyto interested parties in terms of vision and how the company plans to achieveits goals. A values statement embodies a philosophical approach to corporateethics and conduct based on a belief system to which employees and otherstakeholders will be expected to adhere. At Marks & Spencer, the impor-tance of keeping corporate mission and corporate values statements asseparate operations entities but integrated for a corporate communicationstrategy became paramount. As profits fell and in no uncertain terms, acad-emic and industrial journalists started to criticise the company’s internalmanagement such as its relations with suppliers and store operational policiesand its external management in terms of customer and media relations. M&Srealised that external perceptions of the organisations had to be broughtcloser to those perceptions held internally by the organisation itself andcloser to the way management wished itself to be perceived by others.
Public perception
Marks & Spencer, like its major competitors, operates in a dynamic retailenvironment. The rapidly changing consumer trends and marketplace reflectthis, particularly in the non-food retail sector which has always tended to beviewed as cyclical, even though Marks & Spencer have not followed thistrend. Marks & Spencer had relied for too long on the belief that its reputa-tion for quality and value for money would insulate it from the fluctuationsin consumer tastes and demand within the fashion sector and its managementappeared to have overlooked the fact that many of its competitors had caughtup and even overtaken Marks & Spencer in terms of the quality and value formoney. More significantly, Marks & Spencer had failed to ‘move with thetimes’ and cater for a new generation of more affluent and fashion-consciousconsumers who no longer saw the M&S brand as appropriate to theirM&S plc: a crisis of confidence 261

lifestyles and image. An example of Marks & Spencer’s arrogance about its
position was its continued refusal to accept payment by credit card (otherthan its own store card). This resulted in the alienation of, and loss of tradefrom, many tourists, particularly in its London stores, who after queuing topay for goods often found that they were unable to pay by credit card andsimply abandoned their purchases at the cash desk. It was only when facedwith the evidence of sharply falling sales that Marks & Spencer’s manage-ment belatedly began to introduce new designer merchandise ranges andeventually accepted payment in its stores by credit card. Such changes wereintroduced cautiously as management were concerned not to alienate the tra-ditional Marks & Spencer shopper.
Media pressure
As Marks & Spencer’s performance began to falter, criticisms of its man-agement’s failure to move with the times and adapt to a changing retailenvironment began to gather pace. The company suddenly found itself underattack by the British media on a scale never previously experienced by thecompany. Some examples of headlines and media comment which capturedthe public imagination were as follows:
‘Marks & Spencer sees profit collapse’ (Daily Telegraph, May 1999)
‘Stalling sales threaten M&S final dividend’ (Daily Express, November 1999)
‘M&S gambles on foreign suppliers’ (Guardian, November 1999)
‘Marks & Spencer axe looms over Baker Street HQ’ (The Times,
October 1999)
‘The company has lost touch . . . failing to listen to communication from
the bottom up’ (The Times, October 1999)
‘Improving responsiveness to shifting trends will be an important part of
raising sales per square foot’ (The Times, October 1999)
‘Unions accuse the company of abandoning loyal British workers andwarned of a customer backlash’ (The Times, October 1999)
‘M&S propose savings of about £850m by changing suppliers and launch-
ing a securitisation programme, the consensus was that it would be at least12 months before any real signs of recovery and few believed M&S wasa credible takeover bid’ (The Times, October 1999)
‘The decision to accept ordinary credit cards looks like a useful step butsales may need to rise 3–4 per cent to cover that cost’ (The Times,October 1999)
‘There is a perceived lack of confidence in the management team’ ( The
Times, October 1999)262 Sandra Oliver

‘Most market share has been lost to rivals such as Next and Gap, sug-
gesting that it is mainly women who have chosen to shop elsewhere’ ( The
Times, October 1999)
‘Y ears of a commander control management culture have led to an over-
staffed bureaucratic organisation that huddles too much decision-makingat the centre and leaves the company ill equipped to respond to thechanging demands of modern retailing’ (Independent, May 1999)
‘The supply chain is more than 100 years old on the clothing side, withlittle change having taken place during that time’ (Scotland on Sunday,February 1999)
Here perhaps the most telling comment was found in the Independent on
Sunday:
‘The key word for M&S is plain – plain as in decent honest-to-goodnessand plain as in Jane’ (Independent on Sunday, July 1999)
While M&S felt such a vociferous attack was unjustified and even feltbetrayed by a fickle UK media, some felt the attacks were motivated by lovenot hate, in a perverse attempt to save their beloved national icon. Given thelevel of brand loyalty felt by customers and the complex links which emergedbetween corporate and national identity highlighted by press, television andradio journalists, any corporate communication strategy had to address ques-tions relating not only to reputation, but also to self-image which conflictedwith images held by other publics, their reactions and responses. The obviousimmediate reaction was for management to go on the defensive, but it wasclear that M&S management had been stung into action and had recognisedthat something drastic needed to be done.
Analysis
The company, like all firms which had gone through a process of ‘re-engineering’ in the 1980s and 1990s, had to address the reconfiguration of allits messages, including its mission and values statements. It had developed acomplacent attitude to its internal and external behaviours, including itsapproach to marketing communication strategy via the long-held positionand differentiation it enjoyed throughout that period. If public relations is theeye and ears of the organisation, M&S was neither seeing nor hearing.
Like many British retailers, M&S had to retain key elements of its tradi-
tions and culture which investors, employees and customers related to andidentified with, while redefining corporate strategy to meet the expectationsof critics and devotees alike. A public relations priority was identified inwhich the mission needed to be re-emphasised to clarify the kind of businessM&S was now in, reflecting the modern nature of its traditional products andM&S plc: a crisis of confidence 263

services, while articulating and correcting where necessary conflicting per-
ceptions and misconceptions.
Public relations strategy had to be linked coherently to an evolving corpo-
rate strategy in such a way as to ensure that communication policy andpractice could address the internal and external forces that were limitinggrowth, arresting change and turning into a ‘media circus’. The significanceof the changes that had occurred in what has been termed the ‘post-technological era’ and the impact of competitive forces cannot beunderestimated in terms of their impact on corporate public relations.
Four basic public relations issues emerged from M&S’s realisation of the
impact of the negative press coverage:
1 The company had an identity crisis which had led to a lack of image
credibility.
2 As a result of this identity crisis, the PR strategy it had was undermined.
The organisation appeared not to be prioritising the communication
channels in any coherent way and messages were not structured carefullyeither directly or indirectly.
3 With the convergence of corporate communication impacting on its public
relations activities M&S could no longer identify its key constituents.
4 Subsequently, constituents were not responding in the way each of its tra-
ditional, loyal groups had done in the past.
The SWOT analysis shown in Table 20.1 suggests some of the underlying rea-sons for Marks & Spencer’s crisis which it had created by failing to respondto the changing environment in which it operated. Such analysis is essential inorder to understand the company’s strategic position and the options it facesin terms of the key opportunities and threats as well as the competitive andenvironmental forces affecting its future direction.
Marks & Spencer’s falling profits had a detrimental impact on the share
price (see Figure 20.1) and in the 1999 Annual Report the company suggested
four priorities for restoring the value of shares:
1 M&S had to create profit centres with simpler management structures,
faster decision-making and distinct targets for shareholder value.
2 It had to change the way it bought goods both in the UK and overseas by
giving its selling and marketing functions more say in what they had to
offer.
3 It had to restore profitability overseas by reorganising its local business
to serve local customers.
4 Finally, M&S had to build on the success of its financial services
business.264 Sandra Oliver

Table 20.1 SWOT analysis for M&S
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Reputation for quality
Presentation of food itemsSmart imageCustomer refund policyWide rangeLoyal customer baseBad publicityShare price vulnerableOutdatedLong supply chainExpensive suppliersNo e-commerceNo EPOSExpensive in relation to competitorsE-commerceTechnologyCommitted workforceMarketing policySportswearMobile phonesBrooks BrothersDesigners popular with consumerMail orderEuropean UnionCompetitorsConsolidationWalMart/price warLow inflation rateSterling value makes UK
expensive
Share value: loss of city
confidence
Xmas sales vital (40%)

Public relations strategy
It was almost impossible to define timescales by which changes should take
place. To regain competitive advantage and raise the value of the share price,M&S needed to focus more on their customers and less on the organisa-tional facets of the business. It needed to focus on both internal and externalenvironments to constantly evaluate its publics and the influences affectingthe perceptions of those publics. The introduction of ‘ Autograph’ and ‘SalonRose’ – its new designer clothing ranges – as value-added ranges andenhanced personal service began to make Marks & Spencer more attractive tothe consumer, and currently the introduction of a customer loyalty scheme isbeing considered as it is a popular strategy in the European retail industry.
Public relations practitioners have been arguing the value-added compo-
nent of effective public relations and communication for half a century, andit is interesting that the issues which may well lead to the survival of thismajor British retailer will rely on sound symmetrical communication policiesand practice. Marks & Spencer are now devoting additional energy andresources to marketing the M&S brand by allocating more appropriate levelsof resource towards this area of activity. The company is beginning to use itsexisting customer database to target customers with a specific type of brandoffer and predicting peak selling periods to maximise their staffing levels.Whether or not internal communications and public relations techniques willbe applied to individual stores by allowing store managers to be empoweredremains to be seen. Although staffing levels have improved to ensure cus-tomers are served quickly and effectively, the attitude and behaviour of manyretail store staff still require modification in terms of improving customercourtesy and responsiveness. Many image consultants have called for achange of logo to modernise the brand image and make Marks & Spencermore fashionable and attractive.
Public relations advice must concern itself with all facets of both the inter-
nal and external environment, including the organisation itself, but not at theexpense of the customer, service delivery in relation to production and cus-tomer orientation in relation to sales. The heart of any communicationsstrategy must lie with an improved reputation based on shifting perceptionfrom poor image to confident and competent identity. This will involvesubstantially and substantively shifting high pricing with low perceived addedvalue, which was a strategy destined for ultimate failure, to one of high per-ceived added value and low pricing.
Marks & Spencer learned the hard way that public relations is no marginal
matter in the pursuit of corporate goals. It is a major function and core ele-ment of management. The failure to recognise that image, identity andreputation had an important strategic role to play in the organisation was areflection of lack of understanding about the relationship between the com-pany and the society which was vital to its existence. With clearer corporategoals being put into place, it should now be possible to create a realistic pro-266 Sandra Oliver

gramme to communicate the mission and to project the desired image to all
stakeholders. Clearly, delivering different messages to different stakeholdersrequires expert corporate communication skills in delivering a consistentmessage while dealing with individual group concerns. The challenge is tocontinue to develop strategic and tactical public relations responses to meetstrategic business imperatives and expectations. Marks & Spencer has toretrieve its worldwide reputation and to reaffirm that its core values are abelief in the customer and the good of society. In today’s era of communica-tion convergence the company can only do this when it learns thatcommunications are as important as product and service.
Postscript
This case study was not intended to be a final ‘campaign evaluation’ as the cor-porate situation and restructuring are ongoing and the ultimate outcome isunclear. Thus, this case has not attempted to follow the basic public relationsprocess of ‘campaign’ research, strategic planning, implementation and eval-uation. The case is written from a managerial competency perspective,regardless of whether the public relations activities were handled in-house oroutsourced, because the changes necessary to improve M&S’s public relationsdepended largely on substantive changes within. It demonstrates the criticalimportance of the role of public relations management in ensuring that PRstrategy is clearly defined and linked at all times to corporate mission and busi-ness objectives through main board corporate governance.
Lessons learned
In reviewing this case a number of lessons can be identified:
• Large well-established corporations, no matter how secure their position
appears, cannot afford to be complacent about the security of their
future, especially in today’s increasingly dynamic environments.
• To contribute fully to the successful strategic management of an organi-
sation, public relations should be treated as an integral part of the overallmanagement function, serving, in particular, as the internal and externalantennae and keeping management alert and sensitive to environmentalchange.
• Public relations can only be effective if it has a credible story to tell.
Where there are deep-seated problems with the organisation’s strategy, itsproducts or relationships with customers, these need to be sorted out firstbefore public relations can begin to do an effective job.
• Media are important external barometers, creating and reflecting an
organisation’s image in the eyes of many publics from consumers tostockholders. Failure to monitor this important source of external infor-mation can lead to major image and perception problems that havefar-reaching impacts.M&S plc: a crisis of confidence 267