The Ukrainian Crisis An Overview Perspectivedoc

=== The Ukrainian crisis-an overview perspective ===

SCOALA NATIONALA DE STUDII POLITICE SI ADMINISTRATIVE

DEPARTAMENTUL DE RELATII INTERNATIONALE SI INTEGRARE EUROPEANA

LUCRARE DE DISERTATIE

THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS- AN OVERVIEW PERSPECTIVE

Coordonator științific:

Prof.Univ.Dr. Mihail E. Ionescu

Absolvent:

ȘERBAN ANDREI CONSTANTIN

– București 2016 –

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1- GEOPOLITICAL CRISIS IN UKRAINE

Historical determinations that generated the geopolitical crisis in Ukraine

Aggravating factors

The annexation of Crimea

1.3.1. The events

1.3.2. The justification by the Russian Federation for the annexation of Crimea from the perspective of international law

1.3.3. Crimean status after annexation, in terms of international law

The conflict in Donbas

CHAPTER 2 – THE HYBRID DIMENSION OF UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

The Ukrainan crisis in the securitar and doctrinal context

Preconditions of the Russian intervention in Ukraine

The hybrid dimension of Crimea annexation

The hybrid dimension of the conflict in eastern Ukraine

Concepts of "hybrid warfare" used by the Russian Federation in Ukraine

CHAPTER 3 – RUSSIAN METHODS OF PROPAGANDA APROACH IN UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

3.1. Thesis concerning the US power decline

Thesis on Ukraine's status as an artificial state created on the ruins of the former USSR

Ukraine failure thesis in building a functioning state

West's responsibility thesis for for the crisis in Ukraine

Ukraine – the bone of contention between Russia and Europe

CHAPTER 4 – INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TAKEN FOLLOWING THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

EU sanctions against Russia

Wales NATO Summit and the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan

European reassurance measures

Fact Agenda post Wales

The new strategic posture of Central Europe post Wales

CHAPTER 5 – UKRAINIAN CRISIS IMPACT ON THE ENERGY SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

The oil offshore situation activities in the Black Sea and Azov Sea in the context of the new status of Crimea

The implications of the Ukraine crisis on the Black Sea and the Balkans Areas

Implications of the Ukraine crisis on Romania

CHAPTER 6 – POSSIBLE WAY AHEAD

CONCLUSIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION

The current military and political situation in Ukraine highlights the fact that the „geopolitical and geostrategic settlements in Eastern Europe, started in 1990, have still not settled, because the western European world has not offered all its political, social, and military support in the development of democracy of the states in this part of Europe, even if formally some countries are part of NATO and the European Union , but the Russian Federation still doesn’t give up its hegemonic claims in the Independent States Community.”.

Besides that, “the period after the dissolution of the USSR is, for the Russian Federation, in the domain of external policy and security strategies, one of constant redefining in the context of some social transformations, associated to economic, social and political transition, which are extremely costful for the citizens and the society. In this regard, no matter what the transition costs are, or the losses imposed by the breaking of the USSR, The Russian Federation is economically, military and demographically dominating the ex-soviet space. From this point of view, no matter the course of the external policy of the Russian Federation or other ex-USSR states, the first has a wide area of instruments with the power of influencing decisions and external policy affairs, or security, or economics of the former USSR states.”.

On the other hand, starting from the geographic position, territorial dimensions, economical potential and the natural resources, Ukraine wants to be an important country of Europe, and her policy of European integration has been founded on the objective of giving the people western standard of living. Even so, the European integration efforts from Kiev are considerable, but in the internal and external policies carried out until now “elements of territorial, political, social, religious and cultural elements, incapacity of restructuring the economy and dependence from the Russian Federation and I.S.C in economical and nuclear problems are there”, and are part of the historical and geographical determinations that generated the political crisis in Ukraine, in the spring of 2014, “the Ukrainian spring” and the subsequent evolutions.

CHAPTHER 1

GEOPOLITICAL CRISIS IN UKRAINE

Historical determinations of the geopolitical crisis in Ukraine

The different historical evolutions in the east and the west side of Ukraine demonstrate the existence of dividing in the territorial, political, social, religious and cultural departments, which manifests even after the dissolution of the USSR and Ukraine declaring its independence at 24 august 1991. While the eastern part

was under the suzerainty of the Russian Empire ever since 1654, the west of Ukraine belonged the the Habsbug Empire, then to Poland between the wars, until 1939 when it was occupied by the USSR. Religiously, the dividing is obvious in a sense because the western part of Ukraine is catholic, while the eastern is orthodox. In the 1939-1945 period, in the componence of Ukraine came the western regions (1939), Transcapathia (1945), the northern Bucovina, the southern Bessarabia (1940, 1944) and the Crimean Peninsula (1954).

Following Russia, “Ukraine is the vastest country in Europe judging from its territory and population. From its geographical position, it is considered a “buffer state” between the political, cultural, religious and language confrontations in the eastern and western European world”.

According to the censusin 1990, the population of Ukraine was 51.8 million people. Asides ucrainians (74%), other nationalities like russians (21%), jews (1%), bielorussians (1%), romanians live in the country. Historically and geopolitically, the analists appreciate that Ukraine, in its actual borders, is a fragile state, the main problem being given by the lack of national unity elements. The situation in Ukraine presented the danger of disintegration from internal and ethnical causes, alongside the economical crisis, political situation, misunderstandings between the political groups and the conflicts between the main regions. The western part of the country, represented by ucranian nationalists, opt for the full independence towards Russian, orienting towards the west and being part of the euroatlantic structures, while the russophones fron the east and the south (especially the Crimean Peninsula and the Donetk Basin) are in favour of developing tight cooperation relationships with the Russian Federation and integration in the economical, political and security structures of the I.S.C. “Specialized studies bring out the fact that the disagreement of the ethnic ucrainians and the populations from other regions of the country is seriously threatening Ukraine’s independence and integrity. The regional tensions transformed into insistent demands for autonomy, especially from the russophones in the east and Crimea. The political fragmentation has divised Ukraine into two sides, eastern and western, each of them trying, more or less, to choose its own path of economical survival. Also, Kiev is worried about Russia’s try to maintain its influence in the I.S.C. over the ex-socialist states, Ukraine having a special strategic position, because it represents a buffer between the euro-asian and western worlds”.

1.2. Aggravating factors

„After 1991, the ucranian people were unanimously animated by the idea of the national state, but along its evolution, the population confronted with unforseen difficulties that led to the decrease of the standard of living and the shaterring of the national euphoria. Historically and geopolitically, analists think that Ukraine, in its actual borders, is a fragile state laking the elements of national unity” the problems – the absence of reforms in the market economy, the insdustrial production substantially reduced, inflation rose highly, these realities determined Ukraine to be amongst the countries that didn not succeed in applying the privatization programs after the fall of communism. To all these we add not only the lack of a real democracy but even maintaing soviet rules that contributed negatively to the development of Ukraine. The main obstacles in the path of the reforms have concretized in the existence of ex-communist ideologists, in the parliament, that rejected the economic reform program; the dependency of russian imported oil and gasses valued at 1 billion dollars a year; maintaining communist mentalities in administration; organized crime and corruption.

The economic strategy approved by the Ukrainean Parliament in 1992, under the presidency of Leonid Kravciuk, based on the complete tear from Russia, getting out of the rouble area and completing trades with Russia at world prices, proved to be completely wrong. This strategy led to a complete colapse of the ucranian economy, accompanied by hyperinflation (approximately 50% monthly), with catastrophical social side effects. That’s why, in the second half of 1993, this strategy was abbandoned and Ukraine opted for economic integration in the I.S.C., a policy applied by president Leonid Kucima, elected in the summer of the year 1994; financial stabilizing; the tax and monetary reform by sending into circulation a new national coin, grivna; the reduction of expenses in buget and eliminating subsidies; applying a lower tax income on the income and on the export; a greated independency of the Ucranian National Bank; the liberalization of prices on every product; the privatization of en-gros sales for raising the competivity; accumulation of state and private capital with an eye to encouraging investments.

The construction of new political systems in Ukraine represented a complex and controversial process. The rising social tensions and the diversity of strategies and political platforms changed the internal and international image of Ukraine in a negative way, especially in the first 3 years since obtaining independence. The old social relationship system and the communist ideology still persisted, the survival of them being partially sustained by the continuous decline of the standard of living, determining a part of the population to reflect nostalgically over the past.

The formation of political parties began since 1990, but it hasn’t led to a real multiparty system, whereas the simple existence of some political formations and movements in Ukraine didn’t mean the establishment of a democratic political system. In the same time, it is difficult to establish their political objectives, many parties and organizations adapting their electoral tactics depending on the unilateral interests and momentary situations, without the existence of programs or real doctrines. The political organizations in Ukraine can be differentiated depending on the positions adopted toward the most important and actual problems of the country: the status of Independence of Ukraine; considering Ukraine as part of the Russian Empire and not part of the ex USSR; the attitude towards the Russian Federation and the I.S.C.; the form of political regime adopted; the forms, methods and purposes of the economical reform of free market.

“In obtaining its independence, Ukraine was looked at as “the success story of Europe, that is bound to happen”. Ukraine had all the ingredients, political and geographical, to develop exactly the same as central and east-european states. But the obstacles in the path of transition proved to be more significant then the advantages in posesed. It can be aprecieated that the actual situation of Ukraine reprezents the outcome not only of the steps taken by its governments since 1993 until present day, but the consequences of the soviet economical projects”.

1.3. The annexation of Crimea

1.3.1. The events

The Crimean crisis of 2014 was triggered after the departure from power of President Viktor Ianukovici, due to anti-government protests in 2013-2014.

The crimean crisis of 2014 was triggered after the departure from power of president Viktor Ianukovici, due to anti-government protests in 2013-2014.

The crimean situation was very complicated , primarily because of the severe economic problems and the absence of effective economic reforms. The standard of living in Crimea has deteriorated continuously , causing discontent over the government and central government. The Crimean issue was compounded by ethnic composition of the population, especially the exploitation of the demographycal situation by political groups interested in achieving they goals.

At the ukrainian census of 2001 , the crimean population was 2.0337 million inhabitants, of which 58.32 % russian , ukrainian 24.32 % , 12.1 % belarussian and 1.44 % crimean tatars .

However, 77 % of the population declares Russian as their native language, 11.4 % Tatar language and 10.1 % Ukrainian. Tatars are indigenous people; many returning to the former Soviet space, where they were deported by Stalin in 1940 .Pro-Russian secessionist movement have attracted increasingly more followers, due to the economic domination of Moscow. The actors of the tension were, on the first hand, the Russian speaking groups who opposed the new political changes in Kiev and wanted annexation of Crimea to Russia and ,on the other hand, groups of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars who supported the movement "euromaidan " .

In this context, the catalyst factor of the events was the repeal, at 23.02.2014, of the law on regional languages ​​status whereby multiple languages ​​used in Ukraine, including Romanian, were removed from official use.

By repealing the law on foundations of state policy in the field of languages ​​, the status of the Russian language was suspended, regional in 13 of 27 regions of Ukraine, where members of their respective ethnic communities represented more than 10 % of the population .On the February 23rd, Russia has deployed rapid intervention forces to the borders of Ukraine and in Crimea. On February 25, the pro-Russian activists gathered in front of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea Parliament in Simferopol to demand a referendum, rejecting power in Kiev. On 27 February, a group of pro-russian armed people occupied the headquarters of the parliament and government of Crimea and hoisted the Russian flag. On the night of 27 to 28 February the Crimea airports were occupied by Russian-speaking gunmen.

On March 1, the new premier Crimean Sergey Aksionov has urged Russia via Russian president Vladimir Putin, "need assistance in ensuring peace and stability on the territory of Crimea” to take temporary security control” and all of the authorities to obey his orders or resign In response, the United States president Barack Obama warned Russia about the consequences of an armed intervention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

On 1 March, the Russian president Vladimir Putin has sought and obtained unanimous permission of the upper house of Parliament of the Russian Federation to use the armed forces on the territory of Ukraine: "Given the extraordinary situation in Ukraine, that threatens the life of Russian citizens and our armed forces that are conducted in compliance with an international agreement on Ukrainian territory (Autonomous Republic of Crimea), pursuant to Art. 102 par. ( 1) g of the Constitution of the Russian Federation request the Council of the Russian Federation permission to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine”.

Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea voted to hold a referendum on March 6 on the status of the region , and officially to split of Ukraine and joining the Russian Federation . Crimean parliament adopted on 11 March a declaration of independence from Ukraine. Duma ( lower house of russian Parliament ) adopted a declaration to support the people of Crimea , promising to provide security to the peninsula residents regardless of ethnicity , language and religion. Vladimir Putin compared the russian intervention in Crimea with the operation in Kosovo , but without making use of the weapon .

In the context of national and regional security , the crimean issue takes on meanings political, economic , ethnic and military . From the political point of view , the situation in Crimea is reduced to a confrontation between pro-russian groups and proucrainene population . The pro-russian group was supported by the russian armed forces , with headquartered in Sevastopol.

The proucrainian group target was the preservation of territorial integrity , inviolability of borders and maintaining the status of the Crimean part of Ukraine. On the other hand , tatar- ukrainian alliance was fragile because of historical reminiscences , since the nationalists opposed the deportation of tatars and showed no interest in their self-determination.

1.3.2. The justification by the Russian Federation for the annexation of Crimea from the perspective of international law

Immediately after the change of politic regime in Kiev, to the end of February 2014, unidentified military forces supported by the local population, took control of political and administrative centers and of the critical infrastructure elements in Crimea. On February 28, the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea voted for disinvesting the government and organizes a referendum on broad autonomy of the republic. On March 6, the Supreme Council and the Sevastopol City Council announced its intention to declare Crimea’s independence to Ukraine as a unified national entity and its eventual integration in the Russian Federation, respectively to hold a popular referendum on this matter. On March 11, the Supreme Council declares independence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea from Ukraine. On March 15, Russia has vetoed the resolution project of the United Nations Security Council that would have declared the referendum as invalid. In the same day Ukraine voted for the disbandment of the Supreme Council of Crimea (Regional Parliament). On March 16 the referendum was held, on which occasion, officially, 97% voted for independence and joining the Russian Federation. On March 17, the Crimean parliament declared independence and requested its annexation to the Russian Federation. This way Russia was “enriched” with two new entities, namely the Crimean Federal District and the City of Sevastopol. On March 17, President Vladimir

Putin issued a decree recognizing the Republic of Crimea as a sovereign and independent state. The Accession Treaty of Crimea to the Russian Federation was signed on March 18. In March 21, president Putin signed the laws that formally admitted the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol City in the composition of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, the UN General Assembly Resolution number 68/262 issued on March 27 declared the Crimean referendum as illegal. Only 18 states have recognized the secession referendum and only five states (Russia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Syria and Venezuela) have actually recognized the entry of Crimea and Sevastopol city in the composition of the Russian Federation.

From the perspective of public international law, the secession of the Crimea region and its establishment as an integral part of the Russian Federation represents a theme which belongs to a highly compels and disputed domain, namely the recognition and state succession. The argumentation made by Russia in supporting the secession and integration of Crimea was based on the following grounds: historically exercised control over the region; the right of the people to self-determination; Kosovo precedent, as interpreted by the International Court of Justice in its advisory decision of July 2010, in which the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence was received.

The de facto situation is well presented in the press statement of the President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, from 23 March 2014, according whom “Crimea today is part of the Russian Federation. Whether we recognize it or not, the status quo will not change. If Crimea will be recognized as a region of the Russian Federation de jure, does not matter.” Hence, it seems that in the geopolitical space affiliated to Moscow, the report dilemma between international law, illegal acts do not create law and power politics, facts tend to become law was resolved in favor of the latter.

The argument relied on historical control of the Russian Federation has a secondary relevance in the international law and therefore this issue is mainly of historical research. In terms of self-determination, both doctrine and normative part of public international law considers secession as transfer of a territory from one state to another, be it a previously existing state or a newly formed state. In general, international law has maintained neutral on the right of unilateral declaration of the independence of a territory. In other words, international law does not prohibit a population to hold a referendum, but does not recognize any unilateral right to secede and merge or annexation to another state. What international law clearly prohibits is promoting secession in contravention in relation to "jus cogens”, such as changing territorial sovereignty by "illegal use of force”. Modern international law and practice converge in not accepting the removing of the international law principle of self-determination of the historical context of colonialism in which it was recognized and its transposition into arguments justifying a right to unilateral secession in the case of independent national states.

The casuistry international policy and the relevant jurisprudence (for instance, the seccession case of the Quebec region – The Supreme Justice Court of Canada) confirms the geopolitical reality of the declarations of independence and unilateral secession acts exercised in the autodetermination principle, in contradiction with internal and international law, but doesn’t affect the de facto situation in the last instanc, namely the secession produced. In these kind of situations, the statehood theme becomes relevant. In this sense, it is imposed to establish which of the 2 major conceptions prevails in the international community approach, respectively the constituitive theory, which sustaines that the recognition by the international community represents an essential criterium of statehood, or the declarative theory, which claims that statehood represents a legal status that is independent of recognition.

Regarding the argument about the „previous Kosovo” invoked by Russia, the contradictory position of it is to be remarked, given that the Russian Federation was between the states which did not recognize the independence of Kosovo. Besides that, the International Law Comitee in the UN has established that if a declaration of independence is emitted with the breach of the „jus cogens” norms, the independence declared this way is considered illegal, and the international community has the obligation to abstain from recognising the political act of independence. In the same sense, The Vienna Convention concerning the law of treaties (art.52), declares the treaties therefore concluded using force, or by threat of force, null, in contradiction with the international law principles in the UN Carta. Even in the situation of a high degree international reconnaisance of a secession act, it will not confirm its legality from the perspective of the international law. Furthemore, when secession takes place in contradiction with „jus cogens” and by violating territorial sovereignity by using force or threat of force, or by breaching international traties, the constitutional law is ferm in imposing the states’ obligation of not recognising the state formed this way.

So, the invoking made by Moscow of similarities between Crimea secession and Kosovo's independence case in order to justify secession from the perspective of international law, is not substantiated. First of all, by its advisory opinion in the case of Kosovo, the International Court of Justice didn’t confirmed the legality of Kosovo’s statehood, but only advocated that the declaration of independence isn’t contrary to the international law. Then the premises of the declaration of independence of Kosovo were totally different, that region being under international administration at that time, the motivation being that it was subjected to ethnic pressure made on the Kosovar population, which seems to not be the of the Russian-speaking population in Crimea. Also Kosovo has not been recognized as a state by the international community, particularly relevant due to the absence of recognition at the UN level. In addition, in the Crimean case there is data that the secession took place in the context of the presence of military forces other than those of the Ukrainian state, so under threat of force. And, not least, Russian acts of political power issued in the purpose of the annexation of the region Crimea had a goal and produced effects contrary to international law, in particular in relation to the Bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and Russia from 1997 and the Treaty between the two countries on the status of the Russian Black Sea fleet. Towards this last aspect, the position of Kremlin seems to be clarified in the declarations of President Putin from 4th March 2014, at a press conference in Novo Ogariovo: if a revolution were to take place in Ukraine, a new state would result with whom Russia does not consider having any treaty. Of course, the change of regime in Kiev would not affect, in the opinion of the russian president, the situation of the debts that ukraine has towards Russia. In fact, the Crimea situation seems more similar to the case of Cyprus. After the turkish population in the north of the Cyprus island declared its independence in 1983, supported by the turkish military presence on the island, proceded in creating the state known as The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Until present day, the only state that has recognised the stability of this entitiy is Turkey. A major role in directing the attitude of the international community towards the situation in Cyprus was the role of the ONU Council of Security’s resolutions, through which the declaration of cypro-turkish independence was declared illegal, and the international community was asked not to recognise this state unit. Regarding the southern region of the island, populated by greek ethnics, it has been recognised internationally in full, excepting the recognition from Turkey, being a member of NATO and the UN. In spite of this rightful status, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus continued to act de facto like a fully sovereign state, contributing to maintaining a tense situation in the south-eastern Mediterranean area, especially regarding the relationships between Turkey, Cyprus and Greece. The matter in which these tensions have reflected in the exploitation of the hidrocarb resources in the Mediterranean Basin has a great interest in aticipating the evolution of energy costs in the Black Sea Basin.

1.3.3. Crimean status after annexation, in terms of international law

The politico-military activists anticipate that “in the near future we will witness the attempts of Russia to legally legitimate the exercise of its sovereignty over the Crimean territory, especially by imposing the de facto state in Ukraine’s international links, which concerned the sovereignty exercised by the Ukrainian state over the peninsula”. Aspects that are taken into account are about the continental plateau and the economical area from the Black sea. In anticipation of the positioning of Russia in the problem of taking over by it of some rights and international obligations of Ukraine regarding the Crimean territory, including the adiacent areas from the Black Sea, it is appreciated that it is necessary to analyze the application of the Public International Law in the matter of succeeding states at the given case.

In the theory, practice and the regulatory framework of the Public International Law there are two main currents regarding the succession of states for international treaties. One supports the thesis of universal succession of the succeeding state at the international treaties concluded by the forerunner state. The other has the “tabula rasa” thesis at its base, according this the succeeding state can select the treaties which it wants to become a part of, from the forerunner state.

The aspects that relate to the succession of states in rights and international obligations have their basis in the Convention of Vienna from 1978 regarding the succession of states at treaties as well as international custom. Article 6 from the Convention establishes that this will apply only to the effects of a statal succession that takes place in conformity with International Law and, in particular, with the international law principles presented in the ONU Carta. As we previously shown above, the legality of secession and integration of Crimea in the Russian Federation cannot be sustained unequivocally, regarding the factual elements that are referring to the existence or non-existence of a foreign military occupation and using force or not, or threatening with armed conflict. On the other hand, the Russian Federation is not part of the Convention, while Ukraine has signed that Convention. This situation may mean that respective Convention is not applicable to the Crimean issue, instead following the custom or general principle from the Public International Law. Also, it should be mentioned that the respective Convention doesn’t trace a clear distinction between different cases of suzerainty transfer over a territory (secession or cession, absorption or unification, separation or statal dismemberment etc.), which only amplifies the complexity of the interpretations. The applicability of the Vienna Convention in the case of Crimea would mean that in case of secession, the succeeding state, in this case the Russian Federation, would automatically takeover the treaties of the predecessor, respectively Ukraine, regarding the territory over which the sovereign transfer take place, excepting the case in which the states involved agree otherwise, or in the case

In which it results from the succession treaty or in other way, that applying it in the matter of the succeeding state would be incomparable with the means and the object of the treaty, or it would radically change the operating conditions of the respective treaty. Under these circumstances, it is possible that the Russian Federation makes an appeal to the provisions of article 16 from the Convention, which consecrates the “tabula rasa” rule in the case of “newly formed independent states”, argumenting that before becoming part of the Russian Federation, Crimea transformed into an independent state, not having to assume the relevant obligations in the international treaties signed by Ukraine. International theory and practice are however almost unanimous in linking the applicability of both this article 16 and the international custom that reflects the same principle, to the decolonizing process, namely the “state dependence and identity” criteria and not the secession cases. Also extremely important is the provision in the Convention that establishes that a succession of states won’t have effects over the treaties that establish the frontier regime or those that refer to using certain territories. In the given Crimea situation the problem stands with either they can apply the Vienna Convention or not. If not the custom in the Public International Law should become applicable. This imposes clarification on whether The Vienna Convention reflects international customs or not.

Doctrine in these matters is accepting , mostly , the thesis that the arbitration agreement , even if it is something innovative in matters of succession, does not entirely reflect international custom. International custom and state practice regarding the succession countries have traditionally applied the theory of " tabula rasa " in case of new independent states, while in the case of States that were not " dependent territories " customary law establishes the rule of universal succession or continuity , based on which the successor state to take over treaties predecessor . Kosovo, however, imprinted trends in this regard , meaning preference applicability of the theory of universal succession , through the mechanism of so-called devolution transfer agreements between international instruments predecessor and the successor State, Most likely, Russia will advocate for the inapplicability of the Vienna Convention, which will place the dispute in the generally accepted principles of international law. In this hypothesis, the struggle arguments aside, of course, the question of the legality of the act itself secession and annexation, wear around the criterion of "addiction and identity" Crimean respectively if its separation from Ukraine was an act of self-determination to justify Rule "tabula rasa", or if Crimea not seen as a dependent territory to secession, which would justify application of the continuity. Performing these elements of international law of particular relevance in terms of the obligations and rights of states bordering the Black Sea Basin, more specifically, if Russia and Ukraine will continue to comply with international commitments on the delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones assumed to date with other riparian states. In economic terms, these issues of law will be circulated extensively in the near future when, inevitably, will be debated potential exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in the Black Sea.

1.4. The Donbas conflict

The separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine started from a dispute over a trade agreement , but has become one of the most violent in Europe after the wars in former Yugoslavia in the early '90s.

After delaying for one year the signing of a political agreement and trade with the European Union on 11.21.2013 , the ukrainian president ,at that time,Viktor Yanukovych, has suspended talks amid opposition from Russia , who does not want Ukraine to get closer to EU. Tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets following days, to highlighting the deep divisions between Ukraine's pro-western and east pro-Russian. The violence that lasted several weeks has escalated at 20.02.2014, at the onset of a shootout between protesters and police in Independence Square in Kiev that left 100 dead. Protesters claimed that army snipers opened fire against them, but Yanukovich's government accused opposition leaders that have provoked violence. Following the increase in scale protests at 02.22.2014 President Yanukovych left Kiev in secret after security forces abandoned their presidential complex. Thousands of people stormed the luxury building left behind by the president. Former prime minister and opponent of Yanukovych, Yulia Tymoshenko, was released from prison and addressed the protesters on Independence Square. She was imprisoned in 2011 for " abuse of office”, following a trial considered by many as having a political motivation.

Soon , the 01.03.2014 , the parliament approved the request russian President Vladimir Putin to send military forces in Crimea. Thousands of russian-speaking soldiers with uniforms without official insignia , entered the peninsula . Two weeks later Russia completed the annexation of Crimea through a referendum denounced as illegitimate by Ukraine and the world . The government in Kiev launched 4.15.2014 , the first formal military action against pro-russian rebels who occupied government buildings in cities in eastern Ukraine . Putin warned that Ukraine is " on the verge of civil war " . Less than a month separatists in eastern Donetsk and Lugansk regions have proclaimed independence following a unrecognized referendum.

On 25.05.2014 , Petro Poroshenko , one of the richest men in the country , claimed victory in the presidential elections in Ukraine . Pro-russian separatists have been accused of blocking voters to vote in the East . The following month , on 27.06.2014 , the new president signed the Association Agreement with the EU and warned Russia that Ukraine's determination to approach the EU can not be ignored. A new escalation of tensions occurred at 17.07.2014 by shooting down a Malaysia Airlines aircraft ground-to-air missiles in the breakaway region of eastern Ukraine , an action that killed the 298 people on board. International observers were initially prevented from going in the collapse zone by armed persons and lasted several days before rebels have allowed investigators to examine the bodies.

On 09.07.2014 , Minsk signed a protocol by the OSCE Heidi Tagliavini , former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma , russian ambassador in Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov and separatist leaders Aleksandr Zaharcenko and Igor Plotnițki .

The protocol provided: bilateral ceasefire immediately; control and verify of the ceasefire regime by the OSCE; decentralization of power, allowing a local provisional autonomous government in the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk in eastern Ukraine, by virtue of a law on a "special rule"; constantly and actively control the OSCE border between Ukraine and Russia and the creation of a security zone along the border; immediate release of all prisoners of war and detainees illegally; adoption of a law against chasing and bringing to justice persons involved in some events in the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk ; continuation of the national dialogue including taking measures to improve the humanitarian situation in Donbas (Donetsk and Lugansk regions); early local elections in Donetsk and Lugansk; withdrawal of illegal armed groups, the heavy weapons of combatants and mercenaries and all of Ukrainian territory; adopting a program for economic recovery of the Donbas basin and to resume the activity in the region; ensuring the safety of people participating in the consultations. This plan was signed by the OSCE Representative Heidi Tagliavini, former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Zaharcenko and separatist leaders and Igor Plotnițki.

On 20.09.2014 , Ukraine and pro-russian separatists signed a ceasefire agreement including a demilitarized zone urging all parties to withdraw their heavy weapons beyond the front line . Meanwhile , a convoy of Russian humanitarian aid trucks crossed the border without the permission of the Ukrainian Government. Moreover , according to NATO sources , on 12.11.2014 , Russian tanks , weaponry and troops crossed the border into Ukraine , in an obvious breach of the truce in September , but Russia denied the fact . On 22.01.2015 , the international airport of Donetsk , which was rebuilt before the 2012 European Football Championship , was captured by rebels after months of battles with Ukrainian forces . A few days later, President Poroshenko announced that he would ask the International Criminal Court in The Hague to investigate possible "crimes against humanity " committed during the conflict . Following the escalation of the conflict at 06.02.2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande discussed a new proposal for peace with Vladimir Putin , while the United States were considering the possibility of providing arms Ukraine. European leaders opposed arming Ukrainian forces fearing that it could lead to intensified the conflict, which to date were with more than 5,000 dead since the beginning of the conflict.

Less than one week to 02.12.2015 , President Putin announced that an agreement was signed in Minsk , following marathon negotiations between the leaders of Russia , Ukraine, Germany and France , for the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine , from 15 February . The Normandy Format negotiations held in Minsk on 12.02.2015 ended with a new peace agreement involving the leaders of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk , and a representative of the OSCE , former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma and Russian ambassador in Ukraine representing the " contact group ".

Agreement including 13 points provided: a complete ceasefire in eastern Ukraine , starting at 00:00 hours on February 15; withdrawal of heavy weapons; use by the fleet of drones OSCE , observers on the ground, as well as satellite images and research data through radar , to ensure that both parties respect the agreement; negotiation by the warring parties of terms concerning the upcoming local elections in rebel-held areas, which will bring them back into the Ukrainian legal framework and adoption by Ukraine of legislation for self-proclaimed republics acceptable; Ukraine's declaration of a general amnesty for the rebels; an exchange of prisoners within five days after complete withdrawal; convoys of humanitarian access to areas affected by confrontations, based on an international mechanism of operation; restoration of Ukraine's economic, social payments and banking services in separatist areas that were previously discontinued token response elections organized by self-proclaimed republics; Ukraine restoring control over their borders with Russia after local elections in Donetsk and Lugansk regions; withdrawal of foreign troops, heavy weapons and mercenaries from Ukraine and demobilization of illegal armed groups; implementing a comprehensive constitutional reform by the end of 2015, the Ukrainian political decentralization, empowerment linguistic discretion to appoint prosecutors and judges and to establish economic ties with Russia; supervision by the OSCE observers to local elections in the unrecognized republics; more discussion within the "contact group".

Provisions of the document were to be achieved by 31 December 2015 but they were not fully met up so far. So the prolongation of agreements becomes inevitable. In addition , separatist leaders from Lugansk and Donetsk have agreed to postpone in the year 2016,the local elections that they wanted to organize in Donetsk on 18 October and 1 November in Lugansk, which would be another reason to extend the agreements.

CHAPTER 2

HYBRID DIMENSION OF UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

Running conflict in Ukraine revealed that, in recent years, Russian military strategists analyzed the types of conflicts in terms of command structure, management operations and take steps accordingly to maintain territorial control and transferring responsibility for security to use unconventional forces and operation of paramilitary forces or local militias.

The operations of the Russian forces in Ukraine that resulted in the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the conflict in the east of the country were often analyzed from the perspective of 'Hybrid War "to describe the overall strategy of the Russian Federation and the manner of action of the military and paramilitary. Most politico-military analysts tend to believe that the involvement of Russia in the conflict in Ukraine is part of the political strategy of Moscow, which involves coordination and interconnection means used to fulfill the strategic objectives set perhaps by President Vladimir Putin and his inner circle. The general evolution of the conflict highlighted the concentration of Russian Armed Forces priority on propaganda actions, deployment of troops without identification marks, covert actions of troops and paramilitary and training separatist leaders .

2.1. The Ukrainan crisis in the securitar and doctrinal context

As could be seen, 2014 marked a new fundamental change in the history of conflict. Both events conducted in Ukraine and how they were conducted have shaken the fabric of European security and deeply surprised the international. As shown above, in a few days, the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula, de facto and in the opinion of the Russian de jure, and the result of later clashes in eastern Ukraine between government forces and pro-Russian separatist is the Ukraine loss of over half the military potential, given that, in fact, there has been no open war between the two countries. In this way, it was a situation where, after two conventional world wars, Europe faces new modern challenges and a possiblemajor impact in the political, military and economically field as a result of shaping and amplifying the hybrid threat propagated by the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, the Russian intervention in Ukraine introduced doctrinaire confusions, arising especially because of the predominant unconventional character of actions. The absence of a declaration of war and actions on the limited geographical targets, respectively Crimea and eastern Ukraine, events seemed to favor the inclusion of Ukraine in "limited war" in which "belligerents choose not to fight with full strength".

But, the means used and the conduct of hostilities, by executing various and simultaneous asymmetric attacks on military, social, economic and political systems of Ukraine, brought into question the concept of "war without limits" different from the "total", characteristic of the last century, by blurring the military dimension.

As a result, behavior and actions of Russia against Ukraine are seen as the result of a strategy of "hybrid warfare" that combines efficient and sneak, conventional and irregular components, military and non-military, as well as a wide range of instrument categories. Although none of the components is not new, orchestrating their combined effect can generate surprise and ambiguity, making it difficult to identify appropriate response, especially for multinational organizations that operate on the basis of consensus.

2.2. Preconditions of the Russian intervention in Ukraine

Russia charged Ukraine political crisis in the period December 2013 – February 2014 either as a threat or as an opportunity, there are arguments for each of the two approaches. Under Vladimir Putin's mandates, Russian State abandoned democrat-liberal trends and travesing a process of consolidation of autocractic democracy. Internal stability and income from energy exports had created neoimperial prerequisites, Moscow had begun recovering international prestige by challenging the global unipolarity, and by political steps and military actions for sabotage Euro-Atlantic projects. It can be said that under the Putin regime, Contemporary Russian power reached its zenith.

Russian authorities are, however, aware that currently, greatness can come from being a leader of political and economic integration projects of large scale such as the EU.

Thus, The materialization of the Eurasian Union would have secured the Russia's role of regional hegemon, the membership of Ukraine in this project not only would have given the substance needed, but on the other hand, would have stopped forever the EU and NATO extension eastward.

The oscillation of the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, between East and West was not new to Moscow, but Russia hopes that autumn 2013 is crucial for Ukraine's orientation towards political and regional economic projects, and the political crisis triggered in Ukraine after the summit in Vilnius during 28-29.12.2013 could be an opportunity in this case.

The overthrow of Yanukovych by pro-European forces was a shock to Putin, who perceived the event as key to a critical strategic changes in Russia's near abroad, with existential security implications for Moscow. Thus, Yanukovych overthrow constituted a casus belli for the Russian Federation, triggering subsequent events in Ukraine.

2.3. The hybrid dimension of Crimea annexation

Leaving leadership by Ukrainian President Yanukovych, on February 22, 2014, It was followed by a series of Russian actions, military and non-military, which led to the de facto and the jure annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. The speed at which the events occurred has left the impression of applying a contingency plan, prepared in time. On February 26, Russian troops have begun to focus on the eastern border of Ukraine under the guise execution of military exercises. According to official statements made by subsequent supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe, General Philip Breedlove, 30000-40000 Russian troops were in close proximity to the Russian-Ukrainian border, fueling concerns about a classical military intervention. This course of action has not been materialized, merging of Russian troops on the border with Ukraine, in fact, designed to create additional pressure on Ukraine. From 28 February, however, local armed groups in Crimea, the so-called "self-defense forces", aided by the famous "little green men" seized control of government buildings and strategic objectives of the peninsula, radio and TV stations and blocked the Ukrainian military units and ships at dislocation bases.

In parallel, Russia triggered a war of information (treated in Chapter 3 of this paper) meant to legitimize the separation of Crimea from Ukraine and to dilute international perception of an "aggressor" that outline the Russian Federation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, on 01.03.2014, President Putin receives authorization from Parliament to use the Russian armed forces stationed in Crimea to protect local military installations and ethnic Russians in the peninsula. According to Moscow's arguments, overly publicized by the Russian authorities in Kiev fascist forces gave a coup and Yanukovych remains the legitimate president of Ukraine.

More, the actions in Kiev is not only causing a major humanitarian crisis, forcing ethnic Russians to leave Ukraine, but jeopardize the rights and freedoms of ethnic Russians in Crimea and threaten the physical security of Russian troops deployed in the peninsula.

By this, the Kremlin used the exact set of arguments designed to justify Western intervention in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2012), additionally the constitutional right to defend its citizens abroad and requests for military assistance to restore order coming from President Yanukovych and Ukrainian authorities newly formed in Crimea. On March 12, new significant deployments of Russian armed forces are seen at the Ukrainian border, and on March 16, in a referendum held in Crimea and supervised by local militia, Cossack troops and "little green men", 96,7% of the 81,3% peninsula citizens who have exercised their right to vote chose separation of Ukraine and reunion with Russia . Consequently, on March 18, President Putin signed the incorporation law of Crimea into federation, and on March 21 signed a constitutional amendment that enshrines de jure annexation of the peninsula.

Throughout issue and support such legalistic arguments at the same time with de facto annexation of Crimea, Russian authorities have officially denied the Russian military presence in the peninsula and thus Moscow's military intervention against a sovereign state. Nearly a month after this fait accompli, respectively 04.17.2014, President Putin admits the presence of Russian troops in the Crimea, being there to provide the necessary assistance to local self-defense forces to restore order.

Looking back at how they performed the annexation of Crimea, there are few Russian tactics that transcend borders of classic military intervention. The most obvious tactic was to use covered military special operations forces, so-called "little green men". Without a declaration of war and troops without identification signs, led the main actions of military occupation of Crimea, with the pretext of supporting local popular militias. According to Russian military thinking, covered tactics and subversion are subsumed under the concept of maskirovka, ie misleading the enemy about the presence and layout of their troops. So, in the Crimea, "little green men" were used to occupy the peninsula under the umbrella of denying military intervention.

Another tactic derived from use of "little green men" is the noncontact military actions, designed to avoid escalating the conflict. Ukrainian soldiers deployed in the peninsula were stuck in barracks, disarmed and largely evacuated without violence, by forces specialized in escalating control, effective tactic if an opponent is not prone to risk. It contributed to this situation that the interim government in Kiev has avoided engagingarmed forces in conflicts with the occupants of peninsula, having regard to previous Russian intervention in Georgia unwilling to provide Moscow any justification to act in the mainland, north of Crimea. In addition, these tactics of carrying special operations actions were permanently coupled with non-military actions (political, diplomatic, media, etc.), perfecting perception of Russian hybrid character of military intervention in Crimea.

Analysis of hybrid intervention in the peninsula would be incomplete without a review of the particular conditions under which he worked. First, it is necessary to mention the fact that the Russian armed forces have legal stationed in Crimea, which was not only a major tactical advantage, but it used to argue hands-off obstinately supported by Moscow officials. Secondly, pro-Russian orientation of a significant segment of the local population and attractiveness to Russian statist socioeconomic model were increasing which facilitated the infiltration of Russian forces and carrying out actions aimed at the annexation of the peninsula. Related to this situation, in particular, Ukrainian troops deployed in Crimea, especially the lower ranks and soldiers, were mostly locals and mainly pro-Russian. Moreover, many of them were attracted by the prospect of continuing military service in the Russian armed forces, receiving material benefits .

2.4. Hybrid dimension of the conflict in eastern Ukraine

With the creation of the Crimean separatist precedent, premises and archetype continuation of this hybrid intervention of Russian Federation in pro-Russian eastern Ukraine were established. Crimean occupation radicalized, irreversibly, Ukraine's pro-Western west and the Kremlin loomed federalization option for the neighbor state. Pro-Russian eastern Ukraine's secession in the model applied in the Crimea by "popular will" adequately supported by Russian military, but hidden, seemed viable options.

On 04/06/2014, pro-Russian separatists occupy government buildings in the regions of Donetsk, Lugansk and Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine, which leads the government in Kiev to react. Decided to avoid the occupation scenario of Crimea, Ukrainian authorities launched in eastern Ukraine an "anti-terrorist operation" against them, without touching results. Moscow decided to exploit the situation in the field and for legitimizing separatist actions, Putin invoked the concept of New Russia (Novorossiia), union territories pro-Russian east and south of Ukraine to the Danube.

As the similar scenario in Crimea, referendums are held on May 11 in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, after wich the pro-Russian separatists in these regions declared independence from Ukraine. On May 24, a day before the presidential elections in Ukraine, the self-proclaimed separatist republics of Donetsk and Lugansk declare their association in the Federal Novorossiiei.

In late May, the actions of the Ukrainian authorities, after the election of President Poroshenko, leads to the beginning of eastern Ukraine occupation. On May 26, the Ukrainian government troops, backed by aircraft, regained the airport in Donetsk. Following this episode, the Russian Federation has decided to provide sophisticated military equipment to separatists, including anti-aircraft missile systems, which caused significant losses in Ukrainian aviation.

Political and military situation in eastern Ukraine proved, however, to be materially different from Crimea, as pro-Russian sympathies were mostly concentrated around the cities of Donetsk and Lugansk, Ukrainian authorities were determined to fight, and separatist formations seemed affected by internal disputes.

All these factors has decisively influenced military developments on the ground. On July 5, 2,000 separatist fighters led by Commander Igor Ghirkin abandoned town of Slavyansk the seat of the insurgents' military command and retreated to Donetsk in order to target military action to crowded urban area. There, Ukrainian army could not carry out large-scale offensive action without causing collateral damage . In addition, shooting down the Malaysian aircraft MH-17 in the airspace conflict zone affected the military actions in eastern Ukraine and thus the mode of action of Russia. In late July, Ukraine triggers a series of military operations aimed at defeating the separatist insurgency.

Aware of the potential military defeat of the separatists, Russian Federation initiated a set of actions to adjust the balance of forces in the field. Thus, on August 16, the international press report that, according to OSCE, in recent weeks was observed a continuous transit of the Russian-Ukrainian border by persons in military uniforms.

August 22, Moscow sent the first "humanitarian convoy" in eastern Ukraine, an action that distracts international attention from separatists tactical movements of encirclingUkrainian forces at Ilovais'k. Simultaneously, the separatists opened a second front in the Sea of Azov and occupies the city of Novoazovsk, motion aimed at reducing military pressure on Donetsk. Starting August 24, the international press reported widespread raids of Russian units in eastern Ukraine, directions Donetsk and Novoazovsk – Mariupol, and between 28 August and 1 September separatists backed by Russian military units decimates the Ukrainian government forces from Ilovais'k, registering over 300 deaths among Ukrainian military.

The military disaster at Ilovais'k was a turning point in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Kiev's forces abandoned the city Lugansk, and armistice in Minsk (September 5th) found separatist forces near the port city of Mariupol, earth gate to Crimea and southern Ukraine. Defeat at Ilovais'k recorded and direct involvement, although limited to Russian forces in eastern Ukraine.

August 28, NATO released satellite images of a Russian military convoy within Ukrainian borders. Since then, the hybrid war in eastern Ukraine became a "proxy war" consecrated form of armed conflict during the Cold War, by wich a state it held its unofficial non state allies from opponent state, to avoid a conflic between states.

Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine is a combination between the separatist groups and "Russian volunteers" actions, on one hand and actions of Russian military detachments in short incursions into the territory of Ukraine, on the other hand.

In the early stages of the conflict in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, Russian special forces acted as experts and instructors in the use of sophisticated military equipment to the separatists. However, when the Ukrainian army began to regain ground , Moscow sent troops concealed in order to provide direct military support to the separatists. Russian troops, whose superiority was evident, acted in tactical subunits of batalion level deployed in four airborne divisions, totaling 3-4,000 troops. Although Russian authorities wanted to create the illusion of non-participation in war, escalation of the conflict has reached a level at which the denial of Russia's participation had no effect. However, neither the recognition of the state of things was not an option. Although officially unacknowledged, but obviously, direct military involvement of Russia was dictated by political and military conditions in eastern Ukraine, significantly different from those in the Crimea. War has kept the hybrid nature, many Russian actions forms in Crimea can be found also in eastern Ukraine, namely denying military presence, information warfare and the use of paramilitary forces. Direct involvement dictated by military considerations in the ground distinctly places Russia's actions in the paradigm of "proxy war", subsumed under the concept of hybrid war .

The crisis in Ukraine has demonstrated Russians ability to mobilize and to deploy rapidly to neighboring states borders considerable military capabilities ranging all forces categories and all military regions. Thus, unconventional forces were represented by the elements of composition of Russian security services, volunteers specially trained for this purpose and groups within special operations forces. These effectives were used both in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine, whose role is to organize, train and coordinate the actions of irregular forces, to perform research, sabotage and direct action against military and political targets. Irregular forces were made up of fighters recruited from among the local Russian minority, dissident political groups, ethnic groups and other criminal elements in Ukraine. They provided Russian Federation the ability to act effectively in a disguised manner, in terms of reduced costs of services provided by such elements. Another advantage of the irregular forces is based in a thorough understanding of the operational environment. In addition, irregular forces are hard to detect and proven when operations do not lead openly. Although the main motivation is to obtain financial benefits, irregular forces are effective as elements of subversion and the possibility of a state denial of any involvement.

2.5. Concepts of "hybrid warfare" used in Russian intervention in Ukraine

Underlying Russian intervention in Ukraine, as in the case of Georgia and Czechoslovakia, is the concept of "Po zakonu" ie "in accordance with law". Russian diplomatic and informational campaign presented Moscow's actions in Ukraine as apparently legal, or in a gray area of generally accepted norms of international law, area where previous interpretation makes the difference, and the Kosovo case has been used extensively in order to promote an image acceptable to the Russian Federation stand. In strictly military plan, two concepts have been used in tandem: deterrence by punishment, ie deterrence through the threat of retaliation and denial of the Special Forces covert intervention. Another concept used in Russian intervention in Ukraine was exploiting the local advantages, in this case the presence of ethnic Russians and pro-Russian elements. The presence of ethnic Russians in the conflict zone not only offered arguments to legitimize intervention, but also ensured the "popular will" necessary to institute pro-Russian local authorities. The relevance of these benefits has been reflected in the speed with which he pursued the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. On the other hand, tensions between pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine and the local population has created bottlenecks affecting the conduct of events.

Not least, the concept of "extended informational war" emerges as a central and indispensable element of hybrid russian action. Used both in the Crimea and in eastern Ukraine, information warfare practiced by Moscow was conducted on several main areas, namely "systematic disinformation," "plausible denial" and "humanitarian connotation".

All these measures and actions of the Russian Federation were possible and proved effective by the complementary character given by the hybrid frame. Thus, what initially seemed a novel mode of action, It proved in retrospect an ingenious application of ideas ‒ both Russian, and taken from the mode of action of Western armed forces ‒ the conventional and unconventional warfare, old and new .

Information domination and manipulation of segments by the Russian ethnic, homogeneous as language, culture or ethnicity, were the key elements of the hybrid approach for achieving the strategic interests of the Kremlin in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The success of this approach, conducted through the Russian media, facilitated the transmission of the strategic message in the national environment, precum și prezentarea trunchiată a situației, tailored to their interests on the international environment. This approach has allowed achieving surprise, taking the strategic initiative, disorganization force structures and administrative provisions of the Ukrainian state, through deception and ambiguity both in terms of establishing with certainty the aggressor and in terms of presenting the legitimate actions of any kind, of Kiev, as a riposte which affect the interests of the Russian Federation and contribute to the conflict escalation. Subsequently, the implementation of actions to protect the interests of ethnic Russians and the Kremlin's support for legitimizing their coverage was presented as a natural and logical action, without any connection with events held previously.

In essence, the primary attribute of hybrid war, namely the concepts it articulates, is to provide the appropriate framework of a military intervention, such as the Russian Federation in Ukraine. The basic principles of action in Moscow was carrying a short time fait accompli, its legitimation and avoidance aggressor posture by applying concepts synergistic and adaptive hybrid war .

Differences between the mode of action of the Russian Federation in Crimea and eastern Ukraine highlights other essential attributes of hybrid war, namely, adaptability and flexibility derived from the general application of its concepts. But these concepts have not been discovered by the Russian Federation, they have been applied in various shapes and shades throughout the history of warfare. It can be said that Moscow has ingenoius adapted the main frame to particular situations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. But if the annexation speed of the peninsula highlights the advantages of a hybrid model of war, sliding to a "proxy war" in eastern Ukraine reveals the pitfalls of excessive theorising in the concept of hybrid warfare. What remains undisputed in Russian intervention in Ukraine is strategic ingenuity in using synergistic concepts hybrid war. This might occur in the future without having to leave the hybrid field. The mode of action of Russia in Crimea and implementation of such a strategy is directly linked to accuracy action, but above all, by the correct assessment of the local situation and opponent's vulnerabilities .

CHAPTER 3

RUSSIAN METHODS OF PROPAGANDA APROACH

IN UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

During the crisis in Ukraine, Russia widely used media to create the appearance of legitimacy to its actions, “demonizing" At the same time, the Ukrainian government and the military. Within the Russian Federation propaganda actions was pursued accreditation of myths including acts of barbarism in the conflict zone by Ukrainian "fascists", involvement of US special services in the "Euromaidanului" organization, committing genocide against ethnic Russians in Lugansk and Donetsk, etc. The main ideas submitted by both Russian media and political environment, revolved around the idea that "The culprit of the crisis is the West," "The Ukrainian government commits crimes," "Russia wants to bring peace in Ukraine". "The value and logic of these ideas do not justify Russian actions in Ukraine but highlights a conflict of views on the international system: the West looks at it in terms of neoliberalism and Russia in terms of neorealism, theories based on opposing views on the subject”.

3.1. Thesis concerning the US power decline

According to one of the themes of Russian propaganda, US power is declining, and the war in Ukraine was started to keep American influence in Europe. Russian analysts have framed the idea that the old problem of the role it plays Russia in European security remained unsolved, and now the crisis in Ukraine is a "revenge of history" on a hegemonic order which was imposed after the Cold War. International system move from one order to another, and collision between those who want to conserve those who want a new system is otherwise a normal process. The economic crisis and the increase of new players have changed the balance of power in the world and started the process of moving from "the American world” to "post-American" order as Fareed Zakaria suggested it in his book "Post American world”. New major players such as China, Russia, and Iran want their special place in the international system and the United States cannot act unilaterally but are forced to share influence. Dealing with the problem of Germany that was a defeated state in 1945, now becomes a hegemon in the EU. New order barely structures and, certainly, the time comes when actors decide to settle in a new "Congress of Vienna". The Moscow Higher School of Economics Dean, Sergei Karganov believes that the end of unipolarity and the transition from "Pax Americana" to a different model of world order processes are imminent and the US are trying to keep their positions by feeding conflicts on the periphery of the world system: Libya, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and now Ukraine. In fact, the professor asserts that the US is the main beneficiary of these conflicts, allowing Washington to reaffirm their military superiority offering deployment of military forces opportunities in regions where Americans have economic and military interests. The instability created by these conflicts makes the old US allies to keep the pro-American policies, although they have the desire and see a cooperation perspective with other emerging actors. Thus, the Ukrainian crisis is a consequence of changing powers balance and transition from a unipolar international system model to a multipolar system”.

In the past 14 years, Russia has recovered from the economic crisis and has become a regional power, that many countries in Europe, Middle East and Asia, seeking to cooperate with. Moscow has increased its influence in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine which, with the coming of Yanukovych, resumed the policy oscillating between the West and Russia. Economically, Russia has created a block: Customs Union, which aspires to evolve into a supranational entity representing an alternative to the EU economic area. Clearly, the growth of Russian power, its economic attractiveness and political benefits that can be achieved only through stronger cooperation with it, convinced Yanukovych to abandon the association agreement with the EU. An additional argument was the $ 10 billion loan to strengthen the Ukrainian budget and reducing the price of supplied natural gas. EU could not simply grant such financial support. Brussels' proposal only contained to a free trade regime whose results became tangible only in the long term without addressing current budgetary problems.

The Ukrainian government has preferred partnership with Russia to a partnership with the EU, which has hit hard the American interests in the region. In front of the pro-Russian Ukraine threat, with the chance of approaching the Customs Union, the EU and US supported pro-European opposition in Kiev, protesters from the "Euromaidanului" which, after months of clashes with police, they managed to take power by force. Agreements of February 2014, mediated by the EU and Russia were not respected, and President Yanukovych was forced to fly away from Ukraine. US and EU recognized the new government in Kiev, although its legitimacy and participation of some extremist parties, eg "Svoboda" his development raised up many concerns about the real intentions of the new leadership of Ukraine. However, the West did not have another discussions partner; therefore, some extremist movements’ abuses have been overlooked. In the press release of 02/24/2014, the Russian foreign ministry stressed that the West supported the actions of the opposition, which did not respect the agreements of February 21, on resolving the crisis peacefully. Also, in the same statement, the Russian state that: "failure of 21 February discredit its initiators and guarantees and pose a threat to peace, the stability of the society and security of citizens." The legitimacy list of the new government and the actions of the right radical movements, for example Pravii Sector, generated in Eastern Ukraine federalist political movements, movements that tried to be stopped by the use of armed force. Thus, the press release of 02/05/2014, Foreign Ministry directly accused the US and EU support military actions of the government in Kiev, which, in their view, violated the Geneva Agreements on resolving the Donetsk conflict peacefully. So, according to Russian officials, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is the result of the coup in Kiev and the West, which supported it, is totally responsible for conflict”.

According to Russian propaganda, the essay about the decline of America and the wars on the periphery, fueled by US offers a good explanatory model of crisis in Ukraine. According to this model, the US supported the new Ukrainian government, which took a dubious legitimacy and an anti-Russian agenda, to maintain its influence in an area where Russia's ongoing offensive. In fact, this theme is the idea that the US was concerned about their influence in the area, than the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Russia, perceived the change of government in Kiev as an attempt to change the balance of power in the region, and in the face of this danger, undertook measures that it necessary deemed to restore balance. Adding Crimea and participation in the conflict in eastern Ukraine constituted an attempt to restore the quo status up to euromaidan. Mostly, Russia succeeds because Ukraine's accession to NATO and the EU are blocked because of frozen conflicts and appeared new leverages in the bilateral negotiations. Ukraine is antagonized; Russia has avoided its worst option. At the same time, US has strengthened military presence in the area, and reaffirmed their political leadership in the West in the face of Russian danger, and managed to "benefit" of strife and mutual suspicions between the EU and Russia to revitalize NATO and to return to old allies. "Thus, accidentally or not, the crisis in Ukraine has helped strengthen US influence in Europe. Military conflicts at the borders of its former allies, revives the US importance, becoming a security provider for entire regions. Thus, the only beneficiary of the crisis in Ukraine was the US, that in front of the Russian military danger, managed to strengthen the NATO alliance and reaffirmed its leadership in the Alliance and the Western world”.

3.2. Thesis on Ukraine's status as an artificial state created on the ruins of the former USSR

The theme about Ukraine as an artificial state laid at the decision of Russian President Putin to Crimea and Sevastopol recognition input in the composition of the Russian Federation. According to him, "The Bolsheviks ceded to southern SSR Ukrainian numerous Russian and Crimean territories”. But what the Russian president does not mention is that the in Ukrainian SSR also were also included other territories conquered by Russian from the Central Europe neighbors, and Ukraine, in fact, is tailored in many "pieces" of territory, which was annexed by the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union, joined to Ukraine to ensure their management easier.

In fact, this situation has older historical roots. Russian medieval state has its roots in spiritual Kievan Russia, which was half a millennium intellectual and religious center of the Russian territory. This territory has lost its political independence and its functions were taken over by Moscow, which later expanded its territorial and cultural space in the East and West. Thus, the Russian advance towards Central Europe, through numerous wars with Poland, Lithuania and Sweden has enabled the recovery of previously lost territory. The medieval Ukrainian state, during his time as he was independent, was territorial reduced to central regions, steppe. Other territories joined to Ukraine before or after 1918 are the result of "gifts" of the countries during tsarist or Soviet Russia: Crimea, South Bessarabia, Cernauti and Hertza region, Transcarpathia and Galicia. As long as Ukraine was in the structure of the Russian Empire or Soviet Russia, its existence answers of the mandatory administrative of the center. Ukraine itself, in the Slavic language means "at the edge" to which were joined later conquered territories by Russia. Ukraine in its borders until 16 March 2014 was considered the fruit of extending Russian Empire and the Soviet Union and the breakup of the Soviet Union denied the historical and political realities in the region. In fact, Ukraine is presented as a state "artificially" created in "pieces" of territories conquered by the Russians and "incorporated" to the Ukrainian state by administrative reasons, being politically linked to Moscow.

Crimea is a very relevant example of this theme. In the view of President Putin, the peninsula is historically linked to Russia and its return by virtue of historical right, restores the situation until 1954, when Khrushchev, violating the procedures, assigned the RSS Ukraine peninsula. However, Putin stated that the decision was taken purely administrative reasons given that Ukraine and Russia accounted for one state. As long as the central authorities in Moscow maintained political and military control over them, which does not count in the composition of union republics would find their respective territories. For the same reason, the composition of the Ukrainian SSR were introduced also Northern Bukovina, Transcarpathia, Eastern Galicia and Southern Bessarabia – territories annexed by the USSR 1940-1945.

So, the logic of this issue is very clear. The central authorities in Moscow have entered the composition of Ukrainian SSR some historical territories of Russia when it apply its political and military control over Ukraine. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia can legitimately claim to return the territories since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, without taking into account the realities of history, political separate historical Russian territories. Crisis and instability in Ukraine have created concerns among ethnic groups, and once was the opportunity, they decided to change the status of the regions in which they live. In Crimea held a referendum where the population expressed willingness to withdraw from Ukraine and joining the Russian Federation. In Donetsk and Lugansk held a referendum on independence, which also expressed the population desire to withdraw from Ukraine. In the same speech Putin, invokes international foregoing, such as Kosovo. The International Court of Justice held that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law, so in Putin's opinion, at least in Crimea, this precedent can be applied.

Invalid character of this theme is related to the "historical right"concept, a category that actually does not exist in international law. Borders, especially in Central and Eastern Europe were stable after centuries of wars and hundreds of bilateral and multilateral agreements, and any discussion of "historical right" for redrawing the map of Europe would open "Pandora's box". In addition, the theme does not consider the legal principle of "uti possidetis juris", meaning that reconstituted State should have the same boundaries as before decolonization or its breakup. Thus, Ukraine's post-Soviet borders, recognized and guaranteed by Russia and other partners, could not be changed. Also, no concept of right to self through the Kosovo precedent can not be applied. International Court of Justice decision to recognize the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence was based on legal arguments and factual realities of the area. Crimea's declaration of independence did not occur in similar conditions to those in Kosovo, so it can not be made a paralelelei between the two cases. In reality, Russian troops have guaranteed secession of the Crimea and the referendum was a formal process, because its outcome was known in advance.

3.3. Ukraine failure thesis in building a functioning state

Expressing sympathy for "that Ukrainians that came out to the Maidan to demand a change", Russian Federation President stated: "In 20 years, politicians have ravaged Ukraine, fought among themselves for power, finance and wealth and they did not keep a lookout for people's interests”.

It was the echo of a tougher idea, which was not stated by Putin, but was widely circulated in the Russian media, according to which Ukraine is a failed state that, within two decades, did not build a viable political system. According to Russian media, the war in eastern Ukraine is actually the result of the opposition of the people to live in an oligarchic state in which the financial-industrial groups in Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk and Kiev, sharing budget and spheres of economic influence, political power was based on supporting regional oligarchic groups, which led to the intensification of political "tourism" and the disappearance of opposition. Practically no Ukrainian president does not have the support of entire Ukraine, so he had to maneuver between regional economic groupings to consolidate his power and sharing administrative and economic resources of the state. So in the end, Ukraine was a state with a vertically political structure, its regions and interests being left on the second plan. As a result, once the balance of power between oligarchic groups was changed, the state began to crumble.

The theme essence is that Ukraine was too divided to be governed in a political system based on loyalty oligarchy and functional mechanisms were needed to represent the population, regions and interests. Great oligarchs as Rinat Akhmetov, Viktor Pinchuk, Dmitry Firtaș, Clan of Yanukovych and current President Petro Poroshenko, supported and enabled political parties to ensure their interests in addition to state bodies. Corruption and bad governance have aroused dissatisfaction with the leadership in Kiev, which was manifested by euromaidan, but also by movements in Eastern Ukraine. According to a Transparency International index in 2013, Ukraine was the most corrupt country in Europe, ranking 144 out of 177 countries. In addition, Ukraine has not escaped any of the economic crisis and governments ineffective policies. Thus, according to IMF data, from 2008 to 2013, government debt was increased from 20% to 40% of GDP and in 2014 it reached 67% of GDP. 27% increase in public debt is explained by the war in Donbass and the Crimea loss of tax revenue, but in 2013 the economy had considerable problems. We have taken into account the economic consequences of signing the Association Agreement. Russia has manifested its concern that with the signing of the agreement, Ukraine will be used for re-export of European goods on the Russian territory, so in summer 2013 it imposed restrictions on trade with the Ukrainian state. Firstly suffered regions of Eastern Ukraine, linked to markets in Russia. Faceing new economic challenges and new Ukrainian government's decision to sign the FTA with the EU, some regions of Eastern thought it may lose traditional markets outlets. Kharkiv, Donetsk and Lugansk regions, balance in Ukraine exports was 29%, have submitted requirements for greater political and financial autonomy. Basically, in the first weeks of clashes in the Donbass, the population requirements were federalization and financial autonomy.

On February 23, with the repeal of the law operating regional languages, in which Russian language was removed from the public administration, the regions of Eastern Europe began to demand the autonomy to choose the language of administration. Language problems, economic relations and political representation were the factors that led to the first separatist movements. Initially, on the background of discontent in Eastern Ukraine, the Regions Party wanted to increase their own power by creating federal units in the regions where they maintained administrative control. Later, with the start of mass disorder, and after that the start of the war, the federal units maps draft of the future Ukraine varied: from a Ukraine composed of East, South, Centre and West, to a Ukraine consisting of South, East, Central and West. In the early days of the armed secession of the Donetsk and Lugansk even Russian media called federalists the rebels in the East. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said that federalization is the only solution for the unity of Ukraine and, surprisingly or not, this view has been widely debated in Europe. The government in Kiev, legitimately saw a danger of separatism in this proposal and proposed the formula "decentralization". Again, Russian analytical and political environment of the Russian government repeatedly accused Kiev of unwillingness to discuss the "federalization" which is the real cause of the secession of East regions.

The debate launched by the Russian political sphere can be continued by analyzing the democratic legitimacy of power in Kiev and its ability to represent the interests of entire Ukraine. Euromaidan essentially was a revolution that led to the change of government in Kiev. Putin took a more radical assessment, calling it a coup d’état, executed by political powers, nationalist, neo-Nazi, Russophobe and anti-Semitic".

And indeed, Pravîi Sektor and Samooborona Maidana nationalist organizations, as early as the bloody clashes in Kiev, began replacing law enforcement and public administration with their own representatives. Government bodies were paralyzed in the face of anger of the masses and have not served their duty. Almost the entire western and much of central Ukraine were left without democratically elected local leadership, which was taken down by the protesting masses. The apogee of the confrontation was President Yanukovych escape, who left the country to avoid being prosecuted for corruption and crimes against protesters. The State organs no longer functioned, no police, no army or intelligence services no longer supported the president. The pro-Europeans victory was perceived as "legitimate" in almost all regions, however, even as I said, Ukraine was too diverse in terms of economic and political point o view, to override the periphery reactions to Center events. Yanukovych's escape, collapse of the government and "political tourism" in parliament have deprived these regions of credible representatives in state institutions. Previously, interests of these regions were provided by Yanukovych and the Regions Party, but in early March, they either escaped or were persecuted. As a result, regions whose interests have not been represented in Kiev, decided secession as the only solution to ensure the interests of the population. Of course, separatism is outlawed and Donbass leaders have not exhausted the peaceful means of resolving the crisis. However, even their actions fall within the atmosphere of that period where state institutions lacked democratic legitimacy and could not effectively control the country. Poroshenko's election and the upcoming parliamentary elections will contribute to strengthening the legitimacy of the government and stabilize the country, but they were too late to return East, which has decided to separate.

The cornerstone of the theme is the center-periphery cleavage model application to the Ukrainian politics. According to Ukrainians analysts in Ukraine before-euromaidan there are no periphery, there are only the center and financial bank groups, and their interests were negotiated with the president. So the absence of a functional policy for Ukraine regional diversity representation in state institutions, facilitated the transition from internalized conflict to the outsourced. The break out conflict,partially can be compared to other civil war, particularly those in the former Yugoslavia. East Ukraine's interests were not represented at the Center, East interests were different from the Centre ones, so civil war is a logical continuation of the events. However, it would not be conceivable the rebellion success in Donetsk and Lugansk without the support of military and financial support from the Russian territory, which control the 260 km border with Ukraine.

3.4. West's responsibility thesis for for the crisis in Ukraine

Many analysts consider that the danger of a civil war in Ukraine could become a reality if the European Union and the United States had not adopted the firm positions.

On the other hand, Russian propaganda directly accuse the West and especially the US to set off the crisis in Ukraine through the challenges to the Russian Federation, mostly related to the expansion of its institutions. This view is supported by one of the foremost American contemporary international relations ideologist, Professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and author of books that became quickly famous, such as The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (published in Romanian in 2003 under the title the Great power politics) and the Israel Lobby and US Foreign policy. It made clear that "contradict the current version ventilated propaganda in the West, most of the responsibility for the crisis in Ukraine lies with the US and its European allies”.

According to him, which would have triggered the crisis is not Putin "imperial greed", but US and NATO attempt to turn Ukraine into an anti-Russian strategic beachhead. It is obvious that Russia could not calmly assist in transforming Crimea into an anti-Russian naval military base, as would have happened if the virulent anti-Russian regime in Kiev, that became NATO ally, could completely control the situation in Crimea. This development is not just an imaginary scenario, but a clear likelihood, since power in Kiev was not only virulent anti-Russian, but also significantly oriented towards the far right, neo-fascist elements. (The new government in Kiev was pro-Western and anti-Russian to the core, and it contained four high-ranking members Who Could legitimately labeled BE neofascists).

John Mearsheimer also draws attention that the transformation of Crimean into an anti-Russian military beachhead could be compared with the transformation of Mexico or Canada in anti-American beachhead. (Imagine the American outrage year if China built impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico). Obviously, the US would never accept this and would react violently as they reacted in 1962 as the Soviet attempt to transform Cuba into a missile base aimed at US.

In particular, the US has acted in three directions in relation to the post-Soviet space: NATO and EU enlargement and democratization of Eastern space, perceived by Russia as threats. In fact, Mearsheimer states once again that relations between states are guided by the distribution of power, not the principles of international law. The three-way expansion of the West provoked Russia, who felt besieged. So her reaction could be easily calculated because no state would stand passive when its security interests are jeopardized. The West, however, considered that the extension of its institutions is not directed against Russia and had no intention of a threat. So there is a conflict of visions. Russia perceives the international relations as neorealist theory, and the West treated the same processes through the liberalism.

The frustrations of both Russia and the West can be considered legitimate, given the fact that there is a difference of perceptions and values. Russia felt that the West's relations with Ukraine are against its interests. West stand for the Orange Revolution and euromaidan who removed Yanukovych from governing, President pro-Russian vizion in the foreign policy. Also, Ukraine was promised the admission to NATO after the Bucharest Summit in 2008. Of course, the promise had little chance of being fufilled, however, the discussion about Ukraine's participation in a military alliance that excluded Russia, generating concerns about the status of the Russian fleet in Crimea. Finally, Western pressures for signing the Association Agreement with the EU, were perceived as an attempt to bring the West borders in the near future closer to Russian border. In addition, the agreement with the EU prevent other regional integration project promoted by Russia Eurasian Union. Thus, the actions of the West were considered by Russians a way to change the status quo in the region. Mostly, if we apply logic realistic theory, we can agree with Mearsheimer, who said that Russia was provoked by Western actions.

Russia's actions are not surprising, and the nature of its behavior in the international arena can be perfectly explained by realist theory of international relations. Thus, NATO expansion to Russian borders in 2004 and talks about Ukraine's accession to the Alliance in 2008, have created concern in Russian military circles. As a result, Russian military doctrine, published in 2010, mentions that the biggest threat to Russia's security is NATO's expansion eastwards. However, the federation's foreign policy strategy, published in 2013, called Ukraine's main partner of Russia in the CIS, including in terms of economic integration projects in the region. Thus, on these two documents through the realistic view, we can not conclude that Russia has identified the main enemy as NATO and politically relevant area consisting of the Commonwealth of Independent States, of wich Ukraine was the main target. Signing the association agreement with EU carry out Ukraine from the Eurasian Union project promoted by the Russian president, so Western pressure on Ukrainian President at the time was considered actions directly against Russian interests. A Ukraine left off the Eurasian Union and associated with the EU, considerably reduced the area of ​​Russian influence in Europe. More so, a pro-European Ukraine arise the issue of Russian military fleet in Crimea and in particular on the participation of Ukraine to NATO. So adding on Crimea by Russia ensured that the Russian influence at the Black Sea and inflameing the separatism in East has created mechanisms that Ukraine will be stopped from the pro-European and pro-NATO course. This is a logical realistic theory, pragmatic and devoid of any legal or moral constraints.

Of course, the neorealist ideologists views is based on the idea that states are by nature selfish, living in an anarchic international system, the rule of law is absent, and the only constraint is its structure. The conflict of views on the international system, which occurs between major players is obvious. US at different times tried to promote to its agenda the issue of supporting countries' efforts to build democratic states. US national security conceptions during lu G. W. Bush and B. Obama stresses that the US interest in expanding the number of democratic countries because it enhances the American and world security. Of course, the idea is inspired by liberal internationalism and democratic peace thesis, submitted by Fukuyama. Unlike the Americans, the concept of Russian foreign policy component is not ideological but contained the phrase "a democratic international society," which suggests rather a desire to have a system of states with equal rights, without specifying the substance of their political systems. This is another indication that Russia views the world through the realist theory of international relations, where the distribution of powers between states matter more than their political system. Although Mersheimer accuses West of the crisis in Ukraine, he shares this responsibility with Russia, because mutual distrust and misunderstanding of intentions from both actors, have led to conflicts of interest that was expressed by civil conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

3.5 Ukraine – the bone of contention between Russia and Europe

Thesis that Ukraine is a major source of discord between Europe and Russia has been developed by Alexandr Dugin geopolitician .

If Putin said that the collapse of the USSR is the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century, A. Dugin believes that the Ukraine itself its a geopolitical catastrophe, a state that does not allow establishing friendly relations between Europe and Russia. He proposes a model of disintegration of Ukraine, such as Europe and Russia to solve all the problems and old misunderstandings. It is suggested formula "Russia what it is Russian, Europe what it is European."

Ukraine problematic in relations between Europe and Russia take the concept of "cordon sanitaire", "Buffer zone" created artificially by denying geopolitical realities, to prevent the formation of an axis of Russia-Germany strategic partnership. At different times, buffer states between Germany and Russia were Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, states with foreign policy always oriented on the strategic military partnership with England, France, USA. In his view, the problem of these countries is that they were formed from territories belonging to two cultural areas, namely Central Europe, Catholic, whose limits correspond to the borders of the former empire of the Habsburgs and German, and Russian space, orthodox. Their independence and maintaining them in the Euro-Atlantic alliance is favorable only the US, France and Britain, which in this way, do not allow the creation of a "German Europe" and not allow Germany allying with Russia. In this regard,the independent Western Ukraine and it is a true geopolitical catastrophe, because separates Russia from the Balkans and Central Europe. Thus, the division of Ukraine as a top way to redistribution of spheres of influence between German Central Europe and Russia, which ultimately lead to common alliance against the US. Dugin proposes to split Ukraine on geopolitical criteria. Thus, the West, consisting of Northern Bukovina, Transcarpathia, Galicia, are historically, culturally and religiously related to Central Europe. The region was annexed by the USSR and added to RSS Ukraine after World War II. Historically, it has been the basis of numerous political nationalist movements and anti-Russian respectively Ukrainian Insurgency Army, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists Stepan Bandera, more recently Our Ukraine, with its leader Iușenko and extremist Svoboda party. In his view, the region would be strategically placed under the control of Europe. Central Ukraine, would be an associated state of Russia, while Southeastern Ukraine to be annexed to Russia, as happened with Crimea. Once solved the problem of Ukraine, Russia and Germany are to restructure the entire area to create two geopolitical entities that have a sense: Russian Empire and European Empire.

Of course, A. Dugin presents an imaginary scenario in which Germany and Russia reach agreement to banish the US from Europe and a redivide in areas of strategic interest. However, scientific research is required to delimit the geopolitical regions of Ukraine, more exactly, Western, Central and Southeastern Crimea. The , multiethnic, multireligious West annexed from Poland, Romania and Slovakia, really gravitates toward the West, vote right-wing parties and extreme right is deeply anti-Russian and pro-European. Southeastern Ukraine, or so-called Novorossia is Orthodox, ethnic Russians constitute an important minority, and Russian main idiom. From Historically point of view, the region has strong economic contacts, cultural and human with Russia. Crimea is dominated by ethnic Russians, who are not identified with the Ukraine State. In the center, the region's ethnic homogeneity is larger in north and decreases in south, the main ethnic groups being Ukrainians and Russians. From linguistically point of view the Center is divided on the East-West axis, the landmark being Kiev meridian. As Dugin stated, Ukraine's regional diversity is caused by the fact that previously, its territory was divided between the two empires, Habsburg and Russian. This determine the establishment for Western Ukrainian of cultural and economic links with Central Europe, where previously was the Habsburg Empire and gravitate towards the rest of Ukraine to Russia.

This thesis of Dugin is a very unlikely scenario, given the distribution of powers between states in the international system and liberal values promoted by the European political elite. However, reducing the US role in the world and punctual successes of the new European right, anti-EU and anti-US perspective, can return to the discussion table the need for a pan-European security arrangement, which excludes the Americans. In the UK, Denmark and France, far-right parties have support of over 25%, Austria 19% and in Hungary, Finland and the Netherlands over 13%. Dugin predicts a "conservative revolution" which, in his opinion, will bring anti-American forces and pro-Eurasian in the European States. For now, however, Dugin introduced the unique functional concept that entered the political discourse of the leaders in the Kremlin is Novorossia in Southeast Ukraine.

On the presented facts shows that Russian policymakers and analysts operates neorealist terms of vocabulary. In the West, these terms are considered decrepit and are frequently resorted to those of neoliberal origin, or institutionalist. Because of this difference is that the West has managed to build functioning international institutions and military alliance that would ensure peace and joint stability. Created institutions, EU and NATO have put the countries in a system that favored cooperation and establish trust between actors, both at the economic and politico-military level.

These institutions have created an "island of stability" space where international law and human rights are the core values ​​and consequences of the anarchy of the international system have come down significantly. In contrast, Russia failed to create an economic bloc or its complex politico-military security, so it remains a space where anarchic structure of the international system manifests to the fullest. Without being part of NATO or EU, Russia see expansion as an attempt to their security. On the other hand, the West regards extending its institutions through the neoliberalism, that is, the belief that international institutions will help strengthen cooperation and trust between actors even in the field of military security. Different perceptions creates mistrust between the major players and key to overcoming it, paradoxically or not, one can only give a view of the problem of Ukraine through the realistic, by establishing its place in European security and establishing zones of influence between the West and Russia in Eastern Europe.

The scenario "finlandizării" proposed by Kissinger and supported by Brzezinski, two of the most important representatives of realism in international relations, based on the idea that Ukraine should be a bridge, not a wall between the West and Russia. The scenario involves preserving the neutrality of Ukraine, its political independence to choose partners for cooperation, the return of Crimea in its as part of it, provideing a special status for the region and the launch of political reconciliation regions. In the future, advanced cooperation between Ukraine and the EU would stabilize the Ukrainian state should create a functional political system and rule of law. The cooperation also reduces the risk of disintegration of Ukraine, even if the Kiev European integration will depend both Brussels and Moscow. This would create an area of ​​stability on the borders of the EU, and Ukraine will become a credible and predictable partner for the West. Exclusion of Ukraine's accession to NATO, maintaining the buffer zone between NATO and Russia, would keep the status quo in the region, and this is what Russian would like. If we look at historical examples, Finland, which was neutral in the Cold War and worked equally with the USSR and the EU, could join the EU only in 1995, after the Cold War ended, NATO membership is not on the agenda. This country experience, which is neutral, maintained its integrity and political independence, managed to gain EU membership and to establish stable relations with Russia, demonstrates that for Ukraine this option should be analyzed.

CHAPTER 4

INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TAKEN

FOLLOWING THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

4.1. EU sanctions against Russia

Since March 2014 the EU imposed restrictive measures gradually in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and deliberate destabilization of Ukraine. In this context diplomatic steps have been taken; individual restrictive measures; restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol; total ban on investment and also with a prohibition on providing tourist services in Crimea; economic sanctions – measures for trade with Russia in certain economic sectors; measures on economic cooperation.

Under diplomatic measures was canceled the EU-Russia Summit and the EU Member States decided not to carry out the usual bilateral summits with Russia. Bilateral talks with Russia on visas and talks on the new agreement between the EU and Russia have been suspended. Instead the G8 summit in Sochi June 4-5 2014 held in Brussels G7 meeting. Since then, meetings have continued in the G7 process. EU countries have also supported the adjourned of negotiations on Russia's accession to the OECD and the International Energy Agency.

Concerning Individual restrictive measures, it proceeded to an asset freeze and travel restrictions. As a result, 146 people and 37 entities subject to an assets freeze and travel ban because of their responsibility for actions that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. On 10 March 2016, the Council extended these measures until 15 September 2016. In March 2014, the Council also decided to freeze the assets of individuals identified as responsible for misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds. These measures were extended last time in March 2016.

As a result of the EU's non-recognition of illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia, imposed significant restrictions on economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol. These measures include a ban on the import of goods originating in Crimea and Sevastopol, imposed in June 2014 and in July introduced restrictions on trade and investment related to specific economic sectors and infrastructure projects. In addition, in December 2014 it is in force a ban on investment coupled with a prohibition on providing tourist services in Crimea. It is also prohibited exports of other essential goods for certain sectors, including equipment for prospecting, exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral resources. On 19 June 2015, the Council extended these measures until June 23, 2016.

Economic sanctions include measures for trade with Russia in certain economic sectors. In July and September 2014, the EU imposed economic sanctions regarding trade with Russia in certain economic sectors. In March 2015, EU leaders decided to align the existing sanctions regime to fully implement the agreements from Minsk, which was scheduled for late December 2015. Following this decision, on June 22, 2015 Council extended economic sanctions for a period 6 months until January 31, 2016.

Since the Minsk agreements were not fully used until 31 December 2015, the Council extended economic sanctions until July 31, 2016.

These restrictive measures: limit access to capital markets, primary and secondary EU for 5 large Russian financial institutions owned by state and subsidiaries owned mostly by them and established outside the EU, as well as 3 big energy Russian companies and 3 of defense; imposing export bans and import regarding arms trade; establish a ban on exports of dual use for military purposes or for military end-users in Russia; Russia restricts access to certain sensitive technologies and services that can be used for production and oil exploration.

Restrictions on economic cooperation have been introduced by EU leaders in July 2014, as follows: requested the European Investment Bank to suspend signing new financing operations in the Russian Federation, EU Member States have agreed to coordinate their positions in the Council of Governors of the Reconstruction and Development European Bank to also suspend new finance operations, implementation of EU regional cooperation programs with Russia has been reassessed, and some programs were suspended.

EU High Representative for Foreign Policy, Federica Mogherini, said to the German newspaper Die Welt ,05.19.2016 , that expects financial penalties, energy and defense against Russia to be extended by the Union in July 2016. Catherine Ashton Statement It occurs in the context of several European countries advocating the rasing of sanctions and the Regional Council of Veneto, Italy, adopted a resolution that demands that the annexation of Crimea by Moscow and Russo Italian resuming trade ties. In an interview with the German publication, Mogherini said "The EU Heads of State or Government have linked the lifting of sanctions with the full implementation of the Agreements in Minsk. So far, this condition was not fulfilled." Referring to the pressures to remove sanctions from some governments such as Spain or other institutions such as the Regional Council of Veneto, the European high official said that "There have always been different views on several elements of our common policy of sanctions. Probably this will not change… What is important is to preserve the unity and decide all together”.

Part of sanctions adopted against Russia after Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014 will expire in July 2016. The European Council will then decide whether sanctions will be renewed for an additional period of 6 months.

4.2. Wales NATO Summit and the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan

Widening of international issues and challenges of a Hybrid war, characterized by using a wide range of military measures, paramilitary and civilian, open and undercover, in an architecture with a high degree of integration, represents for NATO states members a real security problem. In this context, the NATO Summit in Wales, 4 to 5 September 2014, took into accounta a number of globally security issues, emphasizing the instability in the Middle East and North Africa, transnational and multidimensional threats, and in particular, the Ukrainian crisis and the relationship of the Alliance with Russia.

Based on need and at the same time, responsibility for the Noth Altalntic Alliance to protect themselves against military aggression, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO member states adopted a Rapid Plan Reaction, focused on East Europe. Despite these allies concerns legitimacy, to adopt this Plan aroused, however, the Russian Federation perceived the Alliance actions as a direct threat to its security. So if Russia is considered by NATO an aggressive actor with expansionist and destabilizing behavior constituting a threat to Euro-Atlantic security, it is found that in reverse there is the same vision, Russian official considering as a threat to increase NATO presence in eastern Europe to the security of the Russian Federation. In fact, the measures set out in Summit, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to fulfill the three basic tasks of his strategic concept , the collective defense, crisis management and security through cooperative, by adopting a plan for increasing the reaction level, providing both an insurance package and an adaptation one.

Ptotection measures that include presence and air, land and sea activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, rotational basis, aim to provide the basic requirements for insurance and discouragement and to be flexible and measurable as a response to the evolving security situation. Adaptation measures, which include the components needed to ensure that NATO can fully respond to possible security challenges, aimed at increasing the responsiveness of the NATO Response Force (NRF) by developing task forces to act quickly. As a result of the challenges arising from the periphery of Alliance territory, as part of their set was the establishment of a multinational force groups with a very high level of response. This group includes a land component, air one and sea, and the reaction level will be tested through military exercises. It also decided to be some command and control units and forces troups in the territories of Eastern allies by contributions from Member States based on rotational forces. NATO has proposed, also to take measure to rapidly and effectively strengthen the allies, including infrastructure preparation, pre-positioning of equipment and means of supply and designate specific bases. By adopted measures at the Summit, the Alliance pursues its forces maintain an adequate response level to carry out its entire range of missions, from deterrence of aggression against the Allies. Lastly, it also decided to strengthen the Permanent Naval Forces in order to better inform maritime and conduct the full spectrum of conventional maritime operations. The contributors Allies will increase for this purpose, the level of response and capabilities of the Northeast Multinational Corps Headquarters and develop its role as a hub for regional cooperation. In order to enhance the training and response, it was established an intensified program of exercises, paying greater attention to collective defense exercise. An example of this is the practice of answers to complex scenarios of civil-military type, as in the case of a hybrid war.

On the other hand, NATO states its dissatisfaction on the absence of conditions for a strategic partnership between the Alliance and the Russian Federation based on respect for international law and the idea of an independent Ukraine, sovereign, stable, firmly committed to democracy. For this reason, NATO decided to suspend all civilian and military cooperation, exception of political one which remains, however, open.

NATO stressed that does not want a confrontation with Russia is not a threat to it, nor accept compromises regarding principles that underpin the Alliance and security in Europe and North America. The nature of relations with Russia and aspirations of this partnership will depend on a clear and constructive change in Russian actions, and compliance with international law and international obligations and responsibilities.

4.3. European reassurance measures

The whole configuration of the summit decision in Wales, the issue of relations with Russia was the big challenge in efforts to redefine conceptual-strategic Alliance. The dilemma of finding an adequate response to the Russia aggression dominated the debates in the run up and during the course of the Summit.

The key challenge became NATO-Russia Founding Act, a document that drew European security architecture in the last two decades. As is known, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed in May 1997 with the main objective to establish a general framework for the functioning of relations between the two geopolitical actors in the new era post-Cold War. In essence, they were approved two major coordinated action. At the political level, it was recognized that Russia and NATO no longer considers opponent and express shared commitment to buil a partnership for the mutual benefit of security. At the strategic level, the key of the Joint Declaration consists of providing Alliance assumed provision and it has no intention, plans and motivation to undertake significant military infrastructure, including tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Eastern Europe. Declaration "three no", as has been called, has become axiomatic in building relations with Russia and founding the strategic design of NATO's eastern border. The document preceded the first wave of NATO enlargement establishing new Strategic architecture terms in the Alliance in conditions of extension to Eastern Europe, but also the configuration parameters of systemic post-Cold War. Despite episodes of tension, including the war in Kosovo, further extension to the East, the war in Georgia, the two sides have been careful to respect the arrangements established in 1997. In the ongoing process of enlargement to the east, the Founding Act was strengthened by the forming in 2002 the NATO-Russia Council in which the two sides pledged to discuss and analyze together all the important decisions regarding their security and the European as a whole. In connection with this statement that this was not supposed to give Russia a veto in matters of Alliance policy. Due to the status quo agreed with Russia, NATO member states located in the vicinity of Russia were "excluded" from NATO as the primary defense. An analysis of data provided by CEPA, published in March 2014 shows the state of strategic exposure of the states in Central Europe: 1.5 out of NATO troops in Europe, less than 10% are located in Central and Eastern Europe; out of 28 major military installations, 23 are located in Western Europe and only 5 in the East; of the 66 217 US troops in Europe, 66 081 were deployed in the western part of the Alliance and only 136 in the East; not finally, within Central Europe is not any of the 200 existing tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

This vulnerability has not been felt so strongly in an environment of security relatively predictable, but it has become chronic with the return of Russia to an revisionist agenda and thus its transformation into a direct source of threat to the security of the East. The debates at the summit in Wales have generated two contradictory approaches on the future relations with Russia. The first is represented by the states of Central Europe that have pledged to close the Founding Act and the reconfiguration of relations with Russia in light of the new revisionist and aggressor state status, excluding any possible partnership as it was thought the document in 1997. The second approach with support in the Western European, insisted on keeping the legal framework defined by the Founding Act and avoid a confrontational policy with Moscow. The stake was how to conceptualize the Strategic

european status quo and defining a new post-Cold War system configuration. The final declaration of the summit chose the path of reconciliation of the two approaches. On the one hand Russia was warned that by his actions violated existing legal commitments and, on the other hand, express readiness to continue dialogue and cooperation with it. According to the text of the final declaration, NATO continues to believe that the partnership with Russia has "strategic value" and continues to want a "relationship of cooperation, constructive, mutual trust and transparency", expressing the regret that, at that time, there were no conditions for such a relationship. The Wales Summit failed therefore to provide a definite answer the question of whether Russia is NATO: geopolitical adversary or strategic partner. This ambivalence was accentuated by the lack of clear perspective on finding a consensus among Alliance members about the validity of the Founding Act.

At the level of Central Europe, there is concern that maintaining a blockage decision on this extremely complicated case will affect the geography of eastern flank of defense preventing any decision on the establishment of permanent military bases in this area particularly vulnerable.. Both divergences on the legitimacy of the Founding Act in the new security environment induced impact of the Ukrainian crisis can be a major test of solidarity and internal cohesion of the Alliance with direct effects on the credibility of defense allied commitments.

4.4. Fact Agenda post Wales

Therefore the package of measures adopted in Wales, it has initiated a comprehensive action plan on the implementation and operationalization of the new decision agenda of the Alliance. In January 2015, as part of the NATO Action Plan was announced the plan to implement the measures on activating NATO Forces Integration Units in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries. It been also announced the consolidation NATO's Northeast Multinational Corps Headquarters in Szczecin, in Poland, responsible for coordinating the integration of NATO Forces Units in Poland and the Baltics. Units to coordinate similar in Romania and Bulgaria was established multinational South Eastern division Command, Headquarter in Bucharest.

NATO defense ministers Summit held on February 2, 2015, confirmed the new operational architecture of the Alliance military devices and how to turn them into Eastern European space. The main actions were: increasing the size of the Rapid Reaction Force (NRRF) of 13,000 to 30,000 troops; ultra rapid reaction force establishment, a spearhead with a capacity of 5,000 troops ready to be deployed within 48 hours; network commands in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries); establishment of two headquarters for Northeast (Poland) and southeast (Romania). According to the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, the new spearhead of NRRF is that of a multinational unit, elite, the size of a brigade. Land force will be supported by air, sea and special forces. In the event of a major crisis, spearhead will be doubled through the deployment of two additional brigades to act as a reinforcement. Level of coordination and leadership was established formula nation – framework to ensure by rotation action continued ability of the new force. By the end of 2015, and expressed their intention to act as the nation – frame, six NATO countries, namely France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK.

In this context, US Defense Secretary, Chuck Hagel announced the decision of the US Congress to approve the sum of one billion dollars for implementing the European Reinsurance announced by President Obama in June 2014 thereby increasing the US contribution to the NATO Action Plan Emergency. A priority of the security situation targeted eastern flank whose posture was considerably more vulnerable due to the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the consolidation of Russia's nuclear and conventional device in the peninsula. The militarization of Crimea peninsula is part of a much wider plan made by Moscow which aims to strengthen the military posture representatives and ensure dominance over power equation in the Black Sea, threatening the very Alliance southeastern hand side capacity. The risk that Russia will gain a military preemineță to the Black Sea area generated concerted action from the Alliance to address potential imbalances and maintaining a strategic balance in the Black Sea. In this perspective, since March 2015 the US extended their deployments based on rotation of troops in Romania and Bulgaria. In June 2015, the US announced the extension of the Black Sea Rotational Force by establishing a Joint Arms Companies in Bulgaria.

In June 2015, US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter during his visit to Estonia, announced Washington's decision to temporarily prepositional in some Central European states, tanks, artillery and other military equipment. On this occasion, Ashton Carter announced that six countries in the region have agreed to host elements of this equipment, the Baltic countries, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. Prepositioning will include about 250 armored vehicles (tanks Abraham, Bradley fighting vehicles and M109 mortar) with related materials. The equipment will be enough to serve the company and 150 soldiers or a battalion, about 750 soldiers. Formal activation of these new units was announced by the Secretary General of NATO, 1 September 2015.

On October 8, NATO General Secretary, Jens Stoltenberg announced the decision to supplement NATO Rapid Reaction Force to 40,000 troops to respond appropriately defense imperatives on both vulnerable east and south sides.

The full range of actions and deployments of forces in eastern Europe wanted to be, in fact, both a "show of force" against Russia and confirmation of Alliance solidarity action and the credibility of commitments for defense against States Members. These measures were complemented by increasing the number of military exercises and training to strengthen the capacity of joint action, interoperability between different national forces and increase the trust between the allied armies. New geography operational adopted at NATO aims to discourage any attempt by Russia to change the status quo strategic counterbalance Eastern European states as part of the competition hegemonic employed by Moscow to prevent possible "unintentional incident " between NATO forces and Russian under unprecedented Russian airactions in or near NATO space.

4.5. The new strategic posture of Central Europe post Wales

The states on the Baltic-Black Sea strategic belt through history formed a strategic stake and a permanent confrontation ground in the struggle for regional hegemony between the systemic great actors. Consequently, integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures has been a truly historic achievement allowing spiral out of geopolitical dilemmas and intrusion in an area where the security and defense of this space became a collective responsibility on the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic community. Beyond idealist-constructivist approaches, we can say that the strategic thinking in the capitals of Central Europe was a priority, as defined in geopolitical key, namely fear of Russia and the need to obtain an umbrella of security to deter any action of force by Eastern hegemon.

Consequently, the relationship with Russia dominated the overall strategic and psychological position of the Central European space and defined their political calculations equation within NATO. Despite the "Accident Ahead”, NATO membership has softened security dilemmas of Central European states. 2014 has generated, however, a radical change of paradigm for the European Central states and prompted the sudden return of military threat and the logic of geopolitical calculations. From the perspective of Central European states, Russia's aggressive policy has profoundly changed the strategic equation at the continental level, the Russian threat is assumed as major strategic imperative. Some arguments are particularly important to explain the overall positioning of Central Europe and safety

concerns caused by the new revisionist agenda of Moscow. At the strategic level, Russia's annexation of Crimea has proven the ability to alter by force the existing territorial arrangements and questioned the legitimacy of European borders. Secondly, at the military level, the instrumentalization of new techniques of warfare, hybrid type, Russia has expanded and diversified instruments of aggression by vulnerabilities from within the targeted states by substantially reducing responsiveness using classical-conventional means. In such a scenario, NATO's collective defense strategies might prove insufficient for a prompt reaction and difficult to apply in the context of a hybrid. Thirdly, at the political level, conceptualizing the right of intervention to defend Russian citizens everywhere, as Putin Doctrine afirms, hotbeds of instability, vulnerabilitare, especially the Baltic States, countries with significant Russian-speaking communities. Based on these arguments, the Central European states have proposed operationalization immediate measures to correct the deficiencies eastern flank defenses and neutralize the possible attempts by Russia to amend the regional status quo.

In this regard, they were especially targeted two directions: strategic direction or expansion devices the Alliance's military on the eastern flank, including stationing of bases and troops standing and policy direction with respect to the need to reassess the framework of organizing relations with Russia, mainly NATO-Russia Founding Act. Under the new dynamic security imperatives, the Alliance has undertaken a series of actions to correct the existing imbalance strategic eastern border and to respond to requests for support from eastern allies. The first measures were announced immediate as response to the occupation of Crimea, the US decision to supplement its military presence in the north-central area. In this regard, in Poland were transferred 12 F-16 aircraft and 300 troops, to which was added additional 6 devices F-15 air police mission to ensure the protection of the Baltic air. Simultaneously, the south-eastern flank was reinforced by the destroyer USS Truxtun deployment in the Black Sea area. On April 16, NATO agreed on strengthening the military presence throughout Europe and the US have decided to conduct small land units, with 150 troops each effective in Poland and the Baltics. This initial deployment of troops marked the beginning of Operation Atlantic Resolve that includes most activities on land, air and naval instruments intended to provide reassurance and deterrence Eastern allies against Russia.

The decision of US President Barack Obama announced on 03/06/2014, concerning a contribution worth one billion dollars to strengthen the defense potential of the Central European states, known as the European Reinsurance Initiative, acting to the same register . From the perspective of States situated on the eastern border actions of the Alliance were meant to help reduce the vulnerability of the defense potential of the East, but not solve the bigger picture, namely the integration of this space for defensive ally by establishing permanent bases and readjusting allied defense plans. At this level of analysis, we can discern two important dynamics, which are in a close interrelationship in the positioning of the whole region. The first relates to the lack of a regional consensus and allied forces on permanent location in central Europe. The second relates to the difficulty of formulating a common approach towards Russia, obvious reality both within the region and the Alliance.

The states Typology behavioral from Central Europe complex indicate a certain break of perception and security posture between two groups of states. On one side is the group consisting of Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries, states bordering the zone of conflict and vulnerable strategic military maneuvers of Russia either on Kaliningrad direction (Poland, the Baltic States) or in the Crimean Black Sea direction ( Romania).

Their vulnerable posture dictated overall behavioral typology materialized in the agenda of actions required within the Alliance as its main lines: the adaptation of conceptual and strategic NATO to the new realities of security generated by Russia, conduct credible forces and the establishment of permanent bases on the eastern flank suspension Founding Act and redefining the parameters relating with Russia identified as the main threat to euro-Atlantic security. The second group consists of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary opted for a moderate approach towards Russia. The reasons are so strategic in nature (none of the three states is not in proximity Russia), economic (the existence of close economic and business relations, a high level of energy dependence) and the existence of cultural and historical affinities. Consequently, this group of states has adopted a rather ambivalent attitude claiming the need to strengthen and support for Ukraine's eastern border, but opposing measures that would have caused the deterioration of relations with Russia.

In this regard it is relevant the Czech and Slovak reaction to the proposal on the location of military bases, both firmly rejecting such an eventuality because "especially after 1968 remained certain sensitivities regarding the presence of foreign troops on their territory.

Positions of the two groups have affected the level of solidarity and cohesion act at the regional level and weakened the capacity of concerned Member to design a unified and coherent agenda within the Alliance. Despite these differences, Central Europe acted jointly in the implementation of measures adopted at NATO. Decisions of the Wales Summit and their practical implementation through actions of the allied states contributed to relatively lower regional dilemmas and generated a mobilization efforts by states in this area. Several dynamics are particularly significant. First, all Central European states have pledged to increase their defense budgets to achieve the 2% threshold as required by NATO. Secondly, Slovakia and Hungary have agreed to house units Integration of NATO Forces and thus participate in the new operational configuration developed on the eastern flank of NATO. Third, they increased their efforts to enhance regional cooperation in defense and increasing its contribution to securing the common reference. It is obvious that for countries such as Poland and the Baltic countries, the extent of actions taken by NATO does not resolve the issue of existential security and defense nor substantially reduce vulnerabilities strategic eastern border. In this regard are invoked a number of reasons, including the complexity of the process of political decision-making if an action as article 5, the lack of a common approach on Russia, the reluctance of some Allies to alter the alignment of defense of NATO refusal to accept permanent bases eastward expansion. From the perspective of Poland and the Baltic Action Plan approved in Wales provides a higher potential for defense, but not strong enough and credible to deter Russia. 2014 Summit was interpreted in Central Europe rather as a compromise likely to avoid escalating tensions with Russia, to spare agendas of security of some of the Western states (mainly concerned with the dynamic security on the southern flank) and identify a substitute for permanent bases as a form of Balts and Poles fears improvement. Moreover, Poland and the Baltic countries have resumed requests on whether amendments to NATO's strategic posture, file which will be a central point of discussion at the NATO Summit in

Warsaw 2016.

CHAPTER 5

UKRAINE CRISIS IMPACT ON

THE ENERGY SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

5.1. The oil offshore situation activities in the Black Sea and Azov Sea in the context of the new status of Crimea

By the Crimea secession, Ukraine bounded offshore oil blocks off the coast of the Crimean Peninsula, of which the most important are Skifska, Forosa, Prikercinskaya and Tavriya. Shortly before the fall of Yanukovych, the Ukrainian government was located very close to signing an agreement production-sharing perimeter Skifska with Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell, with partners OMV-Petrom and Ukrainian state company Nadra Ukrainy. The auction in this matter has been challenged by the Russian company Lukoil. Prikercinskaya perimeter, a production-sharing agreement was signed in 2013 with a consortium led by Italy's Eni for the south and for the rest, with another Ukrainian-Russian consortium led by Vanco, together with Lukoil.

Developments in the oil sector in Ukraine have led former Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykola Azarov to declare in the summer of 2013 is expected Ukraine to acquire sufficiency in the domestic production of natural gas over the next 10 years, this will probably afford exports in 2020. Currently, 2/3 of the gas consumed in Ukraine is imported from Russia, Ukraine is the second most important customer for Russian gas after Germany. Tensions grind today but Exxon Mobil led the region to declare in March 2014 that it would suspend any activity in the Skifska area to resolve the situation in Ukraine. Shell announced the end of any discussions on the project.

From a legal perspective, these oil companies are in the situation of oil agreements signed with a partner, respectively the Ukrainian government that with the loss of jurisdiction over the exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea for Russian, no longer holds de facto control rights granted to companies, sovereign rights remains pointless. In addition, immediately after the declaration of independence of Crimea, local parliament decided to nationalize assets Ukrainian Naftogaz national companies, Ciornomornaftogaz, including the rights held by it on the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of the Black Sea. The local government then announced that it will prepare the company for privatization, Gazprom is the only company that had expressed interest. Ciornomornaftogaz provide 7.9% of national production of natural gas to Ukraine and 2.4% of oil production. It holds licenses for 17 blocks, of which 15 natural gas and 2 oil both onshore and offshore as well, and gas storage facilities or warehouse Glebovskoye the Crimea. Once calmed military and ethnic tensions in Ukraine, nationalization Ciornomornaftogaz reaction will certainly attract Ukraine to lift the legal claims against Moscow, the Crimean authorities and against any company that will take over the Ciornomornaftogaz assets.

Ukraine's reaction will be but worse under the pressure of supply off the country with natural gas from Russia and pay overdue gas supplies. Although Gazprom has been indicated as the favorite in the event of a privatization of the Ciornomornaftogaz company, such acquisition will not be an easy decision for Gazprom, given the unclear legal situation and the potential of such transactions affecting Gazprom already damaged relations to the European market. In addition, Gazprom has not shown interest in the Black Sea offshore projects. Only Russian companies Rosneft (in joint venture with Lukoil, Eni and Exxon) and Lukoil expressed interest and presence in the Black Sea so far. Yet, Russia will have to find a solution to ensure gas supplies of Crimea, given that that region can not cover consumption by available resources within its territory and, while imports would require a Ukrainian transit hardly conceivable to be feasible under the circumstances.

Except perhaps Russian companies it is not expected to resume offshore activities in the area recently, because of the uncertain legal status of Crimea region. Even in terms of Russian companies potentially interested in the area, it remains to be seen how they will be dealt with issues related to Russian domestic legislation, as the amendments of the 2008 Act basement, which states that offshore projects will be carried out only by companies owned at least 50% of the Russian federal State and who have greater experience of 5 years in the industry. In addition, in the event that Russia would proceed with oil activities perimeters offshore Crimea side, would be faced with another challenge of technical and logistics, namely transport possible production of oil and natural gas to oil terminals or networks. In this respect, Russia will seek to develop energy transportation infrastructure over the Kerch Strait. Therefore, control of the Crimea is also a cost factor for Moscow.

For the countries of the region, the most important evolution is the reconsideration of a possible delimitation of the territorial waters, continental shelves and exclusive economic zones, after taking control of Crimea by the Russian Federation. From this perspective, Ukraine's situation is dramatic in all aspects, economic, military and energy. According to the principles of international law of the sea and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea – UNCLOS to which they are parties both Russia and Ukraine, a redefinition of territorial delimitation in the Black Sea and Azov Sea between Ukraine and Russia will virtually strangle any Ukraine's access way to the Black Sea. Ukraine would remain a small portion of south-eastern coast from the northern point of Crimea to the mouth of the Danube and a small part in the Sea of ​​Azov, without access to the Kerch Strait. Obviously, the territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone are elements whose boundary should be subject to negotiation and agreement of coastal states, as required by the UNCLOS under international law. In this case, Ukraine will however be forced to negotiate under the present of Russian Black Sea fleet (perhaps more striking in the next period) and an increasing pressure on the Russian speaking population and relationship addiction in ensuring supply Russian gas. In addition to access to the high seas, Ukraine will not be able to do it than through the waters under the jurisdiction of Romania or Russia. Regarding access to the Sea of Azov seas, total control belongs to Russia, the Kerch Strait.

In the context of Moscow efforts to strengthen a bond on land between Crimea and the Russian Federation mainland – a belt about 10 km wide along the Azov Sea coast – is remarkable the involvement , in mid-May, of Siderurgiști workers in Mariupol in taking control of pro-Russian separatist forces in the name of civil order and economic stability. In fact, it is obvious that Ukrainian oligarchs continue to play an active role, showing a striking sense of opportunity. Irrespective of legality Crimea belonging to the Russian Federation, which should invalidate any claims of Russian international law perspective, a redefinition of territorial boundaries in the Black Sea can not affect directly and theoretical than Ukraine, amplifying its security risks.

For Romania it is essential to know whether the exercise of Russian sovereignty over Crimea could justify, under the treaties, principles of international law and UNCLOS, a reopen discussion of the maritime delimitation between Russia and Romania as adjacent coastal state.

5.2. The implications of the Ukraine crisis on the Black Sea and the Balkans Areas

The crisis in Ukraine brings into atention the need to review regional security complex in the context in which we know that the security of the Black Sea and the Balkans can not be separated due to states interconnections in this area. In "Security – a new framework for analysis," Barry Buzan and Ole Waever develop "Regional Security Complex Theory" which he defined as "a lasting structure of the international system with an important geographical component of security established in time”.

Basically, the countries of the regional system are geographically close, and their security is interdependent to such an extent that they can easily tell the security of their neighborhood regions. This theory is similar to the situation in the Black Sea and the Balkans that explains, to a certain extent. In Ukraine the danger of civil war could become reality if the European Union and the United States had not adopted the tougher positions.

The link between the situation in Ukraine and the Balkans in the fact that the Black Sea region and the Balkans are characteristic traits of the security environment, which causes mutations in the event of conflicts with serious consequences. Perspectives on geopolitical shifts, geoeconomic and geostrategic Black Sea and the Balkans were reviewed by prestigious analysts as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alvin Toffler, Samuel P. Huntington, and the transatlantic draft strategy conclusion for stabilization and integration Black Sea and the Balkans reveals that any disruption of two spaces involves a resizing canceling policies and security strategies developed so far.

Black Sea and the Balkans go through a stage characterized by efforts to separation from communism and a society dominated by a closed economy, to the values ​​of democracy and market economy. These developments take place in a context where Russia is trying to restore economically and militarily former political space, Ukraine is considered an important piece in the scenario. Developments and effects of the current crisis in Ukraine call into question current security environment in the Balkans, considered the "powder keg of Europe". Balkans and the Black Sea is an area of ​​strategic importance both on the management of future oil and gas routes from the Caucasus and Near and Middle East and terrorism and other threats. The events in Ukraine and Bosnia have shown that economic assistance to the West is the only chance to overcome the crisis and stimulate recovery processes of social and economic situation. At present, Russia sees his dream threatened to create a Eurasian Union, because the changes in Ukraine open another perspective. Russian foreign policy is faced with redrawing the lines of action of which Ukraine is not excluded, but it requires a different way to approach the next developments. In the Balkans, the situation is slightly different because the Russian Federation, after finding that the US and NATO have strategicaly good position, economic launched an offensive by energy companies who "bought everything you can buy." The best example of this matter is Montenegro. Currently, the Russians control a series of modern processing complex, stations and transport oil and gas that make Balkan economies in this area depend on the relationship with Russia. But the most important aspect is that the Balkans became an important strategic element for NATO and the US. Security Complex in Southeast Europe, the traditional arena of confrontation between the great powers is going through a profound political and military restructuring. If we consider the Russian military presence in Crimea and Moscow's intentions to transform the strategic base in Sevastopol in an important oversight and control of the region, it is understandable why the Black Sea and the Balkans can not be separated and any conflict in one side or another may generate hard calculable consequences. This space is the main target of control to the Orient and for this reason the assessment of vulnerabilities, risks, dangers and threats to regional security becomes a necessity in formulating regional policies.

Black Sea region and the Balkans have an important feature, namely that in addition to the variety of cultural and political component the countries are at different stages of development. Regional developments showed that these differences were highlighted the potency inability of states to cooperate in European integration and NATO. This could be seen in the case of Ukraine and the candidate countries in the Balkans, when significant events have become the source of disorders with profound social impact.

The vulnerability, an important element in characterizing the Black Sea region and the Balkans was revealed in Ukraine. Ukrainian company failed the best combination of existing risks with her ability "to comply and survive and internal and external emergency situations". All this led to a confusing situation that Russia benefited,who sees another semantic in separation term than usual. "Movements" both in Ukraine and at that time in Bosnia, although they were generated by different causes, but with common elements, such as poverty, affecting mainly the Euro-Atlantic security complex and default scenarios built after the wars in Yugoslavia. There are opinions that supported the impossibility of establishing a common strategy for the Black Sea region and the Balkans. Reality denied them because "laboratory in the Balkans" built after conflict a strategy, first for the region, and then for the close space from the eternal rival Russia.

In this context can explain the process that the European Union began to develop it by creating a new concept of "neighborhood" which is another manifestation within the enlarged Europe with countries such as Ukraine and Moldova. The Vilnius failure slightly altered perceptions in Brussels who were expecting a " lenient -eyed" from Russia to the EU's desire to speed up the implementation of EU legislation in these new spaces. Therefore it can be said that "European neighborhood policy does not yet provide a coherent conception of integration of Russia". What happened in Ukraine was convenient, however, that Russia could implement some old intentions or conditions of employment without Crimea. EU reluctance at first was used by Russia, which has "advanced" more than enough to have where to assign in future negotiations.

In a simple analysis,in the beginning, European diplomacy lost Vilnius time, which created the situation that followed in Ukraine and called into question the security system of the Black Sea and the Balkans.

5.3. Implications of the Ukraine crisis on Romania

Romania signed the Treaty with Ukraine on the basis of good neighborly relations and cooperation, which entered into force on 22.10.1997. Treaty circumscribed bilateral relations principles established by the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and other OSCE documents. Consecrating the principle of inviolability of borders, the bilateral treaty states that the parties will agree later through negotiations, border regime and delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. The Treaty makes no reference to the exploitation of subsoil resources in the Black Sea Basin.

For the purposes of the agreed Treaty, Romania and Ukraine have concluded subsequently the Ukrainian Romanian Treaty on state border regime, the cooperation and mutual assistance in border issues. It entered into force on 27 May 2004. Article 1 of this Treaty sets out several principles to be applied by the parties in delimiting the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. The only text referring to the exploitation of the subsoil is Article 18, which states that prospecting work and exploitation of subsoil may be done up to a maximum of 20 meters from the state border, unless the parties agree otherwise. Blocking negotiations between the two countries on the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea (including the status of Snake Island) to Romania for the opening of a trial with Ukraine under the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. On 3 February 2009, the International Court of Justice pronunced, setting boundary lines. Subsequent to the International Court of Justice, Romania has signed several oil concession agreements for exploration and exploitation activities until the limit of its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. Activities in this oil perimeters are underway. Following the secession and annexation of Crimea to Russia, Romania sees herself in the position of having common border with Russia in the Black Sea. Compared to this reality, the main problem is to know if the exploitation of subsoil resources by Romania in the Black Sea is somehow endangered by jure or de facto.

In the geopolitical Black Sea play and probably in geopolitical perspective, Russia could argue that international acts signed by the Ukrainian authorities in the past, and especially those that were held in Ukraine and Crimea affiliation, such as those on Boundary border or territorial sea, are not opposable forcing to reopen the discussions, not necessarily the desire to obtain a favorable solution, but especially to induce a state of geopolitical uncertainty in the area. Russia could afirm, for example, that does not recognize and does not consider itself the successor of the bilateral treaty of friendship, namely the Treaty of delimitation of the border between Romania and Ukraine or not appreciate as her opposable decision of the International Court of Justice in this case Romania-Ukraine, on items that are related to the Crimean territory. In such a situation, it raises the question of State succession to treaties, namely the legal nature and effects of the International Court of Justice decision in this case Ukraine-Romania. This case is, however, unlikely, in relation to Russia's practice in its international relations to avail themselves of treaties, not to denounce them. Indeed, as mentioned in the treaty to incorporate Crimea Peninsula in the Russian Federation, March 18, 2014 Moscow undertakes to apply international law concerning maritime borders in the Black Sea and the Azov Sea.

On the other hand, neither Romania nor Russia are party to the Vienna Convention of 1978 on the succession of states to treaties, which means that about succession rights and obligations of Ukraine in relations with Romania, on matters relating to law of the sea, will become applicable international customary law. In these circumstances, the confrontation could be between applying the "tabula rasa" in succession, which could be supported by the Russian Federation and the continuity that could be invoked by Romania. As is known, the principles of international law do not, however, extend the effects of succession in respect of treaties or using borders that separate territories. In fact, this would mean that the regime established by the Treaties of Romania's border with Ukraine could be affected. In addition, the scenario of a Russian-Romanian relations problem divergent territorial delimitation in the Black Sea and obligations arise from the bilateral treaty concluded between Romania and the Russian Federation on 04.07.2003 and entered into force on 27 August 2004, referring to the UN Charter, Helsinki Final act, the Charter of Paris for a new Europe and other documents of the OSCE, reaffirming the inadmissibility of use of force or threat of force against the territorial integrity. Yet both base bilateral treaty which, due to conjuncture historical concluding it does not contain provisions that relate to issues of integrity and territorial delimitation, and the mechanism exclusively to ensure its observance, valid with any other treaty through the United Nations Security Council, where Russia holds veto, lead us to estimate that, taking into account the preference of Russia, particularly in extreme situations, to the political and geopolitical coverage legalistic detrimental to the spirit of the law, that Treaty will not matter in a possible Russian- Romanian dispute. Also, the Russian Federation could be argued that the World Court decision of 2009, in which was done the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone of the Black Sea between Romania and Ukraine he is not opposable. Indeed, international court decisions are not opposable only to parties that have agreed to submit the dispute under the jurisdiction of the Court. The discussion can be extremely complex in this regard, international law does not benefit from a clear coding. The solution should be reached and accepted by Romania and Ukraine following a decision by the Court to be accepted as part of international customary and thus constitute part of international law. Otherwise said, the Court's decision should be considered as a source of international law. As mentioned above, the 1978 Vienna Convention on State Succession to the Treaties establishes that a succession of states will have no effect on treaties that establish border regime or those that refer to the use of certain territories (NOTE Articles 11 and 12 of the Convention). In Conception Convention, the term "treaty" means an 'international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, be incorporated into a single instrument or two or more instruments linked, regardless of how it is described". Obviously, in general, a decision of the International Court of Justice can not come within the definition of "treaty" above. In the particular case but the decision of the International Court of Justice namely Ukraine, Romania, one can appreciate that it followed and issued in virtue of bilateral agreements between the two countries, in particular under the provisions of the basic bilateral treaty. From such a perspective, the decision of the International Court of Justice, it is challenged by the parties and is applied as such can be considered part of the set "several instruments linked" forming a treaty within the meaning of the 1978 Convention of Vienna and 1969Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties. In this interpretation, Russia and Romania must respect the territorial delimitation in the Black Sea agreed between Ukraine and Romania, by virtue of "jus cogens" and spirit of the Vienna Convention, delimitation entering the family "treaties that establish border regime or those that refer to the use of certain territories ". Therefore, if Russia chooses not to respect the decision of the International Court of Justice in this case Ukraine and Russia, will put the issue of ensuring compliance / decision enforcement, which, in this situation, requires enforceable Security Council of the United Nations, where but Russia has veto power.

Another plan of possible challenges Russian to the exercise of sovereignty and any economic activities by Romania in its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, starting from the premise that integration of Crimea to Russia is a fait accompli, leaving suspended legal status of this political act, Russia can appeal to claims of promoting economic and environmental nature of possible production activities of natural gas and mineral oil in Romanian perimeters. The Treaty regarding friendly relations and cooperation between Romania and the Russian Federation of 04.07.2003, came into force on 27 August 2004, Article 8 establishes that the parties will cooperate in the field of nature protection in the Black Sea and the purpose of rational use of Black Sea economic resources. In virtue of such provisions and a framework for discussions with potential litigious content, Russia could argue that the Romanian oil activities are affecting the marine environment. To the extent that such a theme worsens, the military presence in the Black Sea, Russia might "impose" de facto even a suspension of petroleum activities, which would seriously affect Romania's energy security plans.

Another element likely to allow an "intervention" of the Russian Federation in Romania petroleum activities in its exclusive economic zone, starting from the hypothetical premise that they should be taken by Russia in compliance with the principles of law relating to the succession of States, It is the absence of any intergovernmental agreements of exploitation between Romania and Ukraine. Basically, in case the companies holding concessions offshore granted by the Romanian state would make findings and would start exploiting oil reservoirs that extend beyond the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone on the Crimea maritime zone it is expected that Russia determine the start of negotiations on joint operating agreements (pooling and joint petroleum development and operating agreements), with support in multilateral international agreements (UNCLOS, the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and States Obligations). In geopolitical context, these negotiations can be lengthy and complex, since international law does not impose an obligation to conclude an agreement for joint development of natural resources, but to cooperate in this regard. This would impact directly on the Romanian energy security aspirations. Of course, it is significant that, unlike in Ukraine, where Black Sea offshore represents a crucial element for improving energy security, Russia is not at all pressed by such considerations. On the contrary, would rather delay the initiation of interest in commercial projects of other costal states in order to maintain regional monopoly status. The best example of this is the treaty between the UK and Norway, which regulates an intergovernmental framework to promote institutional cooperation in the joint development of the North Sea perimeters.

In such conditions, in the case that Russia would choose the path of power politics gross space border of the EU and NATO and challenging the effects of the decision of the International Court of Justice, in this case Romania versus Ukraine, Russia would have two options namely, addressing geopolitical engaging Romania in complex situations, under the power play (soft or hard, depending on the relevance and strength of Romania as a NATO member and, secondarily, the EU) and to address legal and judicial approach, in the comfort of United Nations Security Council. Of course, the most likely is a combination of both options. In terms of geopolitical approach, such a "game" would take place in volatile conditions. The situation in Ukraine will maintain the arc of crisis a long time. In an attempt to distance Ukraine as a transit state, Russia will focus on any alternative, such as, for example, South Stream and strengthening of bilateral relations with European countries that are deeply involved in energetic space in the Black Sea basin – along with coastal states, such as Bulgaria and Turkey, countries like Austria, Italy, with energy companies present in the area. The main factor "disturbing" in this process could only be US at the moment. Romania as a peripheral state yet a member of the EU and NATO, will benefit from political and territorial security guarantees, but in terms of energy, so long as no Community will be outlined a serious common policy, it will have to be rely primarily on their own capacities for knowledge, analysis, implementation and strategic alloying.

I compared above, the annexation of Crimea and the effects it can produce in the Black Sea with the situation in Cyprus. For about five decades, the situation in Cyprus can not be solved neither the EU nor NATO. Greek-Turkish confrontation substantially affect to promote offshore projects in the Mediterranean. Turkey refuses to recognize the territorial delineation made by Cyprus and oil concessions awarded by Cyprus and thus offshore activities oil area, overlapping their exploration activities both in Cypriot and Greek waters, accompanied by Turkish warships and threatening with army intervention. Tensions between the two countries are far from being exhausted.

CHAPTER 6

POSSIBLE WAY AHEAD

The problems facing the Ukrainian authorities on the adoption of constitutional amendments, provided for by agreements in Minsk in order to resolve the crisis in Dombas are likely to provoke new doubts on the chances of achieving a lasting peace in the east of the country. “Russia beyond the headlines” magazine appealed to specialists to outline possible scenarios for the evolution of the situation in Ukraine ranging from the resumption of hostilities to maintain the current status quo.

A first scenario refers to the possibility of a lightning war. Despite agreements and the OSCE observers’ presence on the midline, shootouts continued in Dombas, making numerous victims. Since early September 2015, however, the intensity of the shootouts experienced some decline. Mikhail Remizov, the chairman of Independent National Strategy Institute, states that there are concerns about the resumption of hostilities in Dombas. According to him, "The temptation of cuting the gordian knot remains strong especially in Kiev. Military balance in the area of conflict has moved strongly in favor of the Ukrainian army, which would be able to make a lightning war”.

This scenario is possible as far as the government of Kiev is aware that it is unlikely to adopt constitutional amendments on decentralization in Ukraine and the special status of insurgent regions of Donbas. Otherwise, President Petro Poroshenko who signed the agreements in Minsk considered “roadmap" for peace in Dombas dosne’t have a parliamentary majority for the adoption of amendments to the Basic Law. Many MEPs consider that the proposed amendment, otherwise considered insufficient in terms of self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk, represents an exagerated concession from the Ukrainian authorities. If this situation of stalemate in parliament and the increaseed pressure on the president will increase the regime in Kiev and will seek a solution and could resort to force, for example staging a challenge in Donbas. Thus, the Ukrainian army "will be required to respond” and in terms of escalation of military actions, the Minsk agreements will pass on the second plan. However, this case presents a low probability and a more realistic scenario would seem a peaceful one.

Previous experience of military regulation on the crisis in Donbas does not inspire much hope, and the risk of using force could appear too important. Such considerations might compel the Ukrainian lawmakers to abandon pressures and vote amendments to the Constitution. Political analyst Igor Bunin, the President of the Independent Foundation Center for Political Technologies, believes that the Ukrainian authorities do not want to be accused of failure agreements in Minsk. According to him, "if the constitutional amendments will not be adopted, the US and Europe will consider that this failure lies with Ukraine. In this situation, due to the common pressure of Western states, under the Rada, will be met two-thirds vote required for the adoption of amendments”.

However, most of the observers doubt the adoption of amendments by the Parliament of Ukraine. It is therefore considered most likely the scenario of maintaining the current status quo.

In this respect, Vladimir Jarikin, an analyst at the Countries Institute of the Community of Independent States considers that "unable for the moment to determine the parliament to vote on the amendments, but also worried about the perspective of assuming failure agreements from Minsk, the administration of Kiev could try to modify their interpretation, so as to cause Russia to act first, but without much chance".

On the other hand, Andrei Iermolaiev, director of the Institute for Strategic Studies “New Ukraine", located in Kiev, said that “all he does President Poroshenko is an attempt to maintain its power thanks to some pseudo-reforms. Otherwise, it will continue “mimicking" the implementation of the agreements from Minsk, until it will be found a new political formula for regulating situation in Donbas, the central issue in the political life of Ukraine. Without further dialogue with the insurgents, such a formula is impossible. However, Kiev authorities don’t agree dialogue with opponents in Donbas and qualifies them as "terrorists" and "bandits”. In this political impasse, the power will seek ways to maintain itself at least another two years until the next presidential elections”.

CONCLUSIONS

General determinations of geopolitical crisis in Ukraine are so internal order, some historical, some topical, and external order too.

Since its independence after the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine has proved to be a fragile state due to lack of proof of national unity and division of ethnic, political, social, cultural and religious, amid of the incapacity manifested in restructuring of the economy and the establishment of a democratic political system.

Along with the economic crisis, political instability and disagreement between political groups, ethnic structure has contributed to the increasing complexity of the situation in Ukraine. The western part of the country, represented by Ukrainian nationalists, opt for full independence from Russia, orientation towards the West and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, while russophones from the east and the south, especially in Crimea and Donetk Basin are in favor of developing close cooperative relations with the Russian Federation and Ukraine's integration into the economic, political and security of the Community of Independent States.

The catalyst factor of events was the repeal by the Ukrainian authorities of the law on regional languages ​​status whereby multiple languages ​​used in Ukraine, including Romanian, were removed from official use. By repealing the law on foundations of the state policy in the field of languages, it was suspended the status of the Russian language as regional language in 13 of 27 administrative regions of Ukraine.

The period after the dissolution of the USSR and the Russian Federation, in the policy fields of foreign and security strategy, one characterized by searches and redefinings in the context of societal transformation, being associated with economic transition, social and political, extremely expensive and difficult from the point of view of the cost for citizens and society as a whole. In this regard, it is clear that, regardless of the transition costs or losses that have resulted from the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation dominates economic, military and demographic former Soviet space. From this point of view, whatever could be the course of action for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation or of other member succession states, the Russian Federation has a wide range of policy tools with the power to influence decisions and actions of foreign policy, security or economic of the other member succession states.

It can be appreciated that Russian involvement in the conflict in Ukraine, is part of Moscow's political strategy, which involves coordination and interconnection means used to fulfill the strategic objectives, set perhaps by President Vladimir Putin himself and his close circle. Under the mandates of Vladimir Putin, Russia began recovering it’s international prestige by strong and steady challenging the actual global unipolarity, as well as political and then military action steps for sabotaging the Euro-Atlantic eastward projects. In this context, Russia has perceived the Ukrainian political crisis in the period December 2013 – February 2014, at the same time, both as a threat and as an opportunity. After the swinging between West and East of the Ukrainian authorities, Russia hoped that the autumn of 2013 is crucial for Ukraine's orientation towards political and regional economic projects initiated by Russia and that the political crisis in Ukraine triggered after the 28-29.12.2013 summit in Vilnius could be an opportunity in this respect.

Russian Federation’s attitude and actions against Ukraine are seen as the result of a strategy of “hybrid warfare" that combines efficient and sneak conventional and irregular components, military and non-military, as well as a wide range of instrument categories.

Widening of international issues and specific challenges of a Hybrid war, characterized by using a wide range of measures military, paramilitary and civilian, open and undercover, in architecture with a high degree of integration represents for NATO a real problem of security.

The new security environment induced by the impact of the Ukrainian crisis can be a major test of solidarity and internal cohesion of the Alliance with direct effects on the credibility of the allied defense commitments and the confirmation of NATO solidarity action. The crisis in Ukraine rediscovers the need to review regional security complex in the context in which it is known that the security of the Black Sea and the Balkans can not be separated due to interconnections of states in this space.

After taking control of Crimea by the Russian Federation, for the countries of the region the most important development is the possible reconsideration of the delimitation of the territorial waters, continental shelves and exclusive economic zones.

For Romania, it is essential to know whether the exercise of sovereignty of Russia on Crimea could justify, according to the treaties, principles of International Law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a re-discussion of the maritime delimitation between Russia and Romania, as a coastal adjacent state, meaning that Russia could resort to invoking claims bonuses of economic and environmental activities related to the possible production of natural gas and crude oil in Romanian perimeters.

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