The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges [614182]

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

11 CHALLENGES FOR THE E ASTERN PARTNERSHIP I N THE CONTEXT OF
SOVEREIGN TENDENCIES OF EU MEMBER STATES FROM CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE

Ioan HORGA
Eduard Ionuț FEIER

Abstract. In the last two years, the trend to recover the competences of sovereignty, totally or partially
assigned towards Brussels, has become obvious in the EU Member States from Central and Eastern
Europe. If in the case of Hungary this happened in the context of EU sanctions against Russia and
against the wave of migrants from 2015, in the case of Poland it happened in the context of establishing
the percentage of migrants which would be received by every EU Member States, and moreo ver of a
permanent ping pong on the justice topic with Brussels. Romania, the second country as size from the
area, seems to have remained in pleased neutrality, but there are signs that even in its case the
sovereign tendencies might emerge. Starting from these data, in this paper we propose to answer to
the following questions: Does the agenda of the Eastern Partnership and EU Member States from
Central and Eastern Europe correspond with Brussels’ agenda? How do the EU Member States from
Central and Eastern Europe relate to the Eastern Partnership?
Keywords: Central and East ern European countries, Eastern Partnership, sovereignism, Visegrad
Group, Intermarium.

he launching of the Eastern Partnership, in 2009, took place in the context of the success
of the European Union enlargement towards East, of the establishment of a new EU
frontier on the former Soviet border, except for the Baltic States, which joined the EU in
2004. The ambition of this project, oriented towards the former Soviet republics from western
ex-USSR (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) and Southwest (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)
was, on the one hand, to secure the eastern border and the wider Black Sea area by creating a
“common market” for goods, services and human resources, and, on the other hand, to create
a buffer zone between the EU and Russia, an area where economic, social and political
alternatives might find their place in relation to the model experienced by these spaces until the
disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Of course, the move that the EU has done through the Eastern Partnership might have had in
Moscow another resonance than the diffuse and incoherent European Neighbo urhood Policy,
launched in 2003, which extended from the Finnish- Russian frontier to the Spanish- Morocc an
frontier. EU -Russia Summits, until the emergence of the Eastern Partnership, did not explicitly
address the issue of future Eastern Partnership countries in Moscow, except for crisis
situations, such as Transnistria in the case of Moldova or South Osset ia and Abkhazia in the
case of Georgia, and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, because Russia believed that the EU
respected its strategic option “Neighbo uring Neighbou rhoods”, formulated in the context of
concluding the enlargement of the EU towards the east. T

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

12 By launching the Eastern Partnership, Moscow believed that the EU wanted to hone and even
impose by force its point of view with regard to the former Soviet republics, for which the
project was intended.1 That statement referred to the fact that the EU had exceeded the
tolerance level of Russia,2 therefore Russia’s position was not a new one, but a constant one,
though obviously more careful. That fact was confirmed especially in the context of the crisis in
Ukraine, as emphasized by the American Profes sor John Mearsheimer, who believes that
“great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory.”3
The EaP prompted Russian officials to launch a tough attack on the European Union. For the
first time since the collapse of the USS R, Moscow accused officially the EU of intrusion into its
spheres of influence, anti -Russian politics and the promotion of US and NATO interests in
Europe. Neither the launch of the European Neighbou rhood Policy (ENP) nor the accession of
the three Baltic States (former Soviet republics) and former Warsaw Treaty members to the EU
disturbed Russia to such an extent.4 The situation referred to above led Russia to reconsider
its relationship with the European Union in terms of changing its perception of the EU , from
strategic ally to competitor for influence.5
The EU’s EaP policy had to cope with three main challenges: a) Russia’s influence on the
overall political architecture of the EaP, whereby Russia seeks to turn the bilateral EU and a
partner country into a tripartite format, thus washing out the fundamental principles of this
policy; b) The traditional inclusion- segregation dilemma, whereby in exchange for political and
economic reforms and adoption of costly EU rules, partner countries are offered only
integration into the EU internal market instead of full -fledged membership in the Community;
this raises doubts as to whether the cost of adapting to EU standards is higher than the
incentives offered by the EU; c) The debate within the EU on the future of the EaP policy,
caused by the emerging number of those claiming that the EaP policy, should not violate the
balance of power in Eastern Europe.6
Looking retrospectively at the Eastern Partnership decade (a decade in which, on the one
hand, the EU sought, until the beginning of 2014, to be very active in pursuing its strategy,

1 Olexij Semenij, “EU -Russia strategy and Eastern Partnership: Less Confrontation, More Cooperation?,” Heinrich
BollStiftung, 16 September 2010, https://www.boell.de/en/navigation/europa- transatlantik -eu-russia -strategy -eas
tern-partnership- 10113.html (accessed 5 February 2018).
2 Tamas Novak, “The future of the Eastern Partnership. Strategic changes or continued drifting,” Osterreichiche
Gesellschaft fur Europapolitik, Policy Brief, 2015, http://oegfe.at/2015/05/the- future- of-the-eastern- partnership
(accessed 29 January 2018).
3 John Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john- jmearsheimer/why -the-ukraine- crisis- is-the-wests- fault
(accessed 29 January 2018).
4 Vasile Rotaru, “Parteneriatul Estic – o nouă etapă în relațiile UE -Rusia?,” (PhD diss., SNSPA, 2013), 3.
5 Ibid., 5.
6 Laurynas Kasčiūnas, Vilius Ivanauskas, Vytautas Keršanskas and Linas Kojala, “Eastern Partnership in a
Changed Security Environment: New Incentives for Reform,” Eastern European Studies Center, Vilnius,
November 2014, 11. See also Laure Delcour and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Spoiler of Facilitator of Democratization?:
Russia’s Role in Georgia and Ukraine,” in Democracy Promotion and the Challenge of Illiberal Regional Power,
eds. Nelli Babayan and Thomas Risse, 459- 478 (London: Routledge, 2016).

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

13 even forcing things, as it happened in the case of the Vilnius Summit in 2013, and, on the other
hand, it entered a blockage in the context of the crisis and the war in the East of Ukr aine
2014- 2015, we find that Brussels position towards the countries in this bloc was initially very
optimistic, confident in attracting these countries in its sphere of influence, but with the
Ukrainian crisis these countries are beginning to be perceived as a buffer needed to secure the
eastern border of the Union.
With the 2015 Riga Summit, the EU seems to be back to the new pragmatic strategy with the
launch of the 20 deliverables of Eastern Partnership cooperation for 2020, adopted by the
Eastern Part nership Summit in Brussels in November 2017 as the agenda to be followed.7
Present at this summit, the President of Romania Klaus Johannis underlined the need for the
European Union to continue to support, in a consistent manner, the modernization and reform
efforts of the six Eastern Partnership countries, underlining that it is not enough for the EU to
ask its partners to implement reforms, without the Union, in turn, to provide all necessary
support for this purpose.8
Looking at the content of the 20 del iverables9 and the overall strategy, based on differentiation
in which the EU would emphasize the responsibility of individual EaP countries and would offer
some vaguely defined support for the countries that decide in favor of the European
perspective, on the one hand, we find that the Eastern Partnership, as a joint bloc of action, is
put in the archive, and, on the other hand, that “it is a cheap and convenient way for the EU to
avoid any major confrontation with Russia.”10
The question that raises is whether this new development of the Eastern Partnership is only
the result of the EU blockage of action, in the context of the crisis in Ukraine and the possibility
of a major confrontation with Russia, or whether it could also be the consequence of regional
developments in the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, respectively. In the last
two years, in the EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, the trend to recover the
competencies of sovereignty, totally or partially assigned to Brussels , emerges more and more

7 European Commission, “ 2017 Eastern Partnership Summit: Stronger together,” Press Release, 24 November
2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press -release_IP -17-4845_en.htm (accessed 5 February 2018).
8 Klaus Iohannis, At the Summit of the Eastern Partnership: “EU must continue to support the modernization
efforts of the Eastern Partnership states,” Bursa , 26 November 2017, http://www.bursa.ro/ klaus -iohannis -la-
summitul -parteneriatului -estic- ue-trebuie- sa-continue- sa-sprijine -eforturile- de…&s=banci_asigurari&articol=33603
3.html (accessed 5 February 2018).
9 Broadened outreach and targeted support in particular to grass roots civil society organisations; supporting
businesses and providing loans in local currencies , in partnership with key international financial institutions;
improving the capacity of partner countries to take advantage of the trade opportunities with the EU and with each
other; reform commitments and specific investments in the area of energy efficiency; developing better and safer
transport links by 2030 with a long- term investment contributing to connecting the partner countries with the EU
and amongst themselves; a digital package, including concrete steps towards harmonised roaming pricing and
reduced roaming tariffs among the partner countries, easier and cheaper access to internet through the roll out of
national broadband strategies, and support for job creation in digital industries ; a substantial new support package
to youth and education; a comprehensive new communication approach on assistance for the Eastern
Partnership, and a stepping- up of strategic communication.
10 Novak, “The future of the Eastern Partnership. Strategic changes or continued drifting.”

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

14 obviously. If we cannot yet give the answer to a natural question, i.e. whether these countries
managed to support a change of the Eastern Partnership paradigm, we are able, however, to
perceive some future implications that developments in the EU Member States from Central
and Eastern Europe will have on the EU’s relations with the Eastern Partnership countries.
Therefore, in the first part of the paper we shall try to look at the evolutions of the EU Member
States from Central and Eastern Europe between illiberalism and sovereignty. Then we shall
try to answer the following questions: Does the agenda of EU Member States from Central and
Eastern Europe correspond to Brussels agenda in the case of the Eastern Partnership? How
do EU Me mber States from Central and Eastern Europe relate to the Eastern Partnership?

1. Central and Eastern European Countries between illiberalism and sovereignty
Over the past few years, Western Europe has looked on with mounting bewilderment and
exasperation at the political trajectory of Hungary, Poland and several other former communist
states, which started to demonstrate more and more obvious tendencies to avoid the model
they adopted in the first two decades after 1989, when they were committed to common
European values, including liberal democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law;
currently they seem to be implementing an altogether different political model.11
This development is due, on the one hand, to a shift of the EU towards itself, in the context of
the economic crisis, of cooling relations with Russia, in the context of launching the partnership
with Eastern states and with Turkey, though the accession negotiations with the latter started
to slow down. On the other hand, these developm ents are due to the strengthening of the
leaders’ positions in the two neighbou ring powers , i.e. Vladimir Putin in Russia and
RecepTayyip Erdoğan in Turkey.

1.1. EU Members States from Central and Eastern Europe and Illiberalism
According to Cas Mudde12 on the European continent there are (at least) three powerful
illiberal democrats. The most powerful is the President Vladimir Putin, who has dominated
Russian politics for the past decades. Putin used this EU support to establish an iron grip on
Russian politics and society and, when he finally lost most of his friends and protection within
the EU, he started supporting anti -EU parties such as the National Front (FN) in France and
the Jobbik in Hungary.13

11 Stephan Pogany, “ Europe’s illiberal states: why Hungary and Poland are turning away from constitutional
democracy,” The Conversation, 4 January 2018, http://theconversation.com/europes -illiberal- states -why-hungary –
and-poland- are-turning- away -from-constitutional -democracy -89622 (accessed 28 January 2018).
12 Cas Mudde, “ It Is High Time for EU to Stand Up to Creeping Illiberal Democracy in Europe,” Huffpos t, 3 April
2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/cas -mudde/it -is-high- time-for-eu-to_b_9384564.html (accessed 28 January
2018).
13 Ibid.

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

15 The Second center is Turkey, where RecepTayyip Erdoğan came to power more than a
decade ago, and quickly became a darling of EU politicians because of his claimed support for
neoliberal economics and moderate Islamic politics. However, it didn’t take long to see that
Erdoğan might not be an Islamist, but he isn’t a liberal democrat either.14
The third major illiberal democrat in Europe is Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary,
who has been turning his country into an illiberal democracy since regaining power in 2010. In
the first years Orbán focused al most exclusively on transforming his own country: rewriting the
constitution, weakening institutional checks and balances, harassing opposition, and using
economic and legal pressure to domesticate the media. While there was some push- back from
the EU with regard to banking and media reform, crafty politicking and political protection by
the powerful European People’s Party (EPP) ensured that Hungary’s transformation into an
illiberal democracy was hardly affected.15
But as the EU was too occupied with fight ing the economic crisis and saving the big banks,
Orbán was not just transforming Hungary, he was inspiring illiberal democrats in other
countries – including governments in Croatia, Poland , and Slovakia – and plotting a challenge
to “multicultural” Europe. The refugee crisis and terrorist attacks of 2015 gave him the
opportunity to mount that challenge, which has been very successful so far and is still
growing.16 For Orbán, the refugee crisis is simply the latest and most visible symptom of what
he sees as the failure of Europe’s liberal politics and the weakness or naivety of some of the
continent’s most prominent politicians, including the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel.
Beginning with a speech in July 2014, Orbán extolled the virtues of ‘illiberal democracy, ’
singling out Putin’s Russia and Erdogan’s Turkey as allegedly successful states that avoided
the liberalism.17 For Orbán all these data were favou rable in order to unify the Visegrad
countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic) so as to oppose the EU
redistribution of the refugees.
In Poland, the ruling Law and Justice Party has assumed political control over state- funded
radio and television. By July 2016, 164 journalists and news anchors had either resigned or
been dismissed. In D ecember 2017, the government’s continuing efforts to curb the
independence of the judiciary prompted the EU Commission to formally declare that there is
“a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law in Poland.”18 In our opinion, there are more
sove reign tendencies in Poland, which we shall present in the following sub- chapter.
In the same month, the EU launched infringement proceedings against the Czech Republic,
Poland and Hungary for failing to take appropriate steps to resettle limited numbers of asylum
seekers, in accordance with decisions previously taken by the Member States.19 Some months

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Stephan Pogany, “Viktor Orbán, Refugees and the Threat to Europe,” Social Europe, 2 November 2015,
https://www.socialeurope.eu/viktor -orban- refugees -and-the-threat -to-europe (accessed 28 January 2018).
18 Pogany, “ Europe’s illiberal states: why Hungary and Poland are turning away from constitutional democracy.”
19 Ibid.

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

16 earlier, the European Court of Justice dismissed cases brought by Slovakia and Hungary in
which the latter had sought to argue that the EU’s scheme for the mandatory relocation of
asylum seekers was unlawful.20
This model of authoritarian political culture, particularly in Hungary and Poland, has rejected an
ideology founded on individualism, human rights, economic transparency and multiculturalism.
They are tur ning instead towards an alternative social, political and economic model in which
the cultivation of “traditional values” and distinct national identities is of paramount ideological
importance.
Even though we cannot argue that the illiberal model is present ingenue in other ex -communist
countries in the region (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania), following the political life of these
countries, especially after the economic crisis, we see tendencies bordering on illiberalism21
even if, at least, at the declarative level and not very substantially the political system and the
society are open to liberalism. In relation to this ambiguous evolution in all the states in the
region, immediately after the joining of these countries t o the European Union, Professor
Andrei Marga drew attention that Central and Eastern Europe broadly adopted procedural
democracy (i.e. liberalism), but democracy as a style of life22 is still a desideratum.

1.2. EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, and Sovereignty
If, at least prior to the 2015 refugee crisis, the old founding states in particular and the EU
space in general perceived the group of Visegrad states, formed by Hungary, Poland, the
Czech Republic and Slovakia, with admiration and c onsideration for their desire to better
promote their interests at the European level, with their firm decision not the accept the groups
of refugees Brussels began to wonder what are the real objectives of these states. Some
deviations could be seen as early as 2014, when the EU introduced the economic retaliation
against Russia in the context of events in Ukraine, but they were tolerated because different
opinions came only from the two states, Hungary and Slovakia. If Victor Orbá n’s sympathy and
closenes s to Russia were tacitly accepted, the voice of Slovakia emerged as somewhat
surprising, as it is the only country in the Eurozone group and therefore strongly linked, from an
economic point of view, to the European core.
Starting in 2016, the voice of the Visegrad group in the EU, as an inconvenient group, has
emerged more prominently, receiving on the one hand unity in political vision with the
accession of all governments with anti -European stance, and a common stance with reference

20 Ibid.
21 Protectionist laws (percentage of Romanian products on the shelves of shops and limitations imposed on the
possibility to buy agricultural land), a discourse against the large multinational companies: supporting the
referendum initiated by the Coalition for the Family, attac ks against the independence of the legal system, the
description of the European Union as an enemy of Romania. See Ovidiu Nanhoi, “EU și UE. Liberali și Iliberali – o
comparație,” Dilema Veche, 668 (December 2016): 6- 13, http://dilemaveche.ro/sectiune/pe- ce-lume -traim/articol/li
berali -si-iliberali- o-comparatie (accessed 28 January 2018).
22 Andrei Marga, “Democracy as Form of Life,” Eurolimes 8 (Autumn 2009): 141- 154.

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

17 to the freedom of jus tice, freedom of expression, and the beginning of a campaign against
multinational companies, especially those in the sphere of commerce, selling, in their view,
low-quality products to citizens living in these countries compared to the products sold in
Western Europe. More and more obvious sovereign attitudes can be observed, along with a
more and more open reconsideration of relations with Russia, in the case of Slovakia and the
Czech Republic, and in the case of Hungary, where Victor Orbá n declared himself not only a
sympathizer but also a friend of Vladimir Putin. Poland followed in 2016 all the evolutions of
other Visegrad countries, except the aspects regarding the relationship with Russia, which
remained unchanged, as Poland continued to mistrust Mosc ow and consider it as the most
sensitive point of preoccupation for its sovereignty.
For the Visegrad Group countries the vote for Brexit came as a confirmation that the sovereign
line they followed within the EU was a correct one, being adopted by a major Member State in
the EU bloc, the United Kingdom. In particular, the Brexit has had a major impact on Poland
and the Czech Republic as regards the strengthening of their position as sovereign states
within the Visegrad Group and their relationship with Brussels.
Ever since they joined the EU, the two countries mentioned above followed the model of the
United Kingdom. Poland supported the UK in gaining a special status in some decision- making
issues adopted by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.23 The Czech Republi c and the UK were the
only EU Member States that did not join the European financial stabilization mechanism in
December 2010. In December 2015, the countries of the Visegrad group rejected, along with
the United Kingdom, the refugees’ allowances allocated by the European Council.
Poland’s special relationship with the post -Brexit UK had, besides these connotations, linked to
the European agenda, bilateral connotations as well, some of them related to the historical
tradition of relations between the two st ates, but especially to recent common interests. The
massive Polish economic downturn in the last 25 years has been heavily weighing in the
relationship between the two countries, in the UK’s exit of the EU and the closing of the British
labou r market for the millions of Poles working in the UK. From the point of view of the security
of the two states, threatened by Moscow, there are many interferences in both directions.
Therefore, we can say that sovereign Poland – supported by the UK – is making an
incre asingly vocal tandem with the illiberal Hungary, supported by Russia.
The election of Danald Trump as the president of the US was explicitly supported by Victor
Orbán and by the Czech President Milos Zeman, two of the leaders of the Visegrad group
countries, who became the group’s critical voices in relation to Brussels. The policy change in
Washington has strengthened notably the sovereign positions not only of the Visegrad group
towards Brussels but also of other Central and Eastern European countries where political
changes took place in the autumn 2016 and the spring of 2017, materialized in the coming to
power of conservative forces, with illiberal sympathies (Romania, December 2016; Bulgaria,
the spring of 2017).

23 Iordan Gh. Bărbulescu, Noua Europă. Identitate și Model European (Iași: Polirom, 2015), 421.

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

18 As a consequence of these political dev elopments, especially in 2017 and at the beginning of
2018, looking closely at the meetings of the Visegrad group, one can notice a tendency
towards association among several observers, and even among some representatives of
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia. Thus at the meeting of the heads of state and
government of the Visegrad group in Budapest, on 24- 25 January 2018, the Secretary of State
for Agriculture Affairs of the Government of Romania was among the participants.
The question that emerges i s whether one can expect that, in 2018, Visegrad is going to
extend at a V5 … V8? The evolutions of the past two years seem to indicate an increasing
evolution towards sovereignty.

2. Does the agenda of EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe correspond
to Brussels agenda in the Eastern Partnership?
For Brussels, the Eastern Partnership is a new source of opportunity. Even if they see the
same thing, the EaP and some EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe find that
the price is too hi gh so as to counterbalance with Russia’s reaction and the energy -related
dependence on it, in the case of the Visegrad countries group or in the case of Bulgaria.
For Brussels, promoting a free society is an essential condition for the success of the Eastern
Partnership and the adoption by these countries of the European values. Even if their views
converge with those of Brussels, EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe
consider that the liberal society will not be able to bring stability to the countries that belong to
the EaP, since there was peace in this space in the close past.
For Brussels, the presence of problems in relation to the EaP can be explained by the action of
diverse factors, though it always believes strongly in the existence of a solution. For some EU
Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, EU issues in its relation to the EaP are
explained only by the fault of Brussels, without any prejudice to Russia’s involvement.
For Brussels, the diversity represented by the EaP countries is not a problem, it is a challenge.
For the EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, this diversity is transformed into
uniqueness, each being interested in a specific country on national and historical grounds, and
not about the whole bloc of the EaP (Poland and Hungary in Ukraine, Romania in Moldova
especially, and to a certain degree in Ukraine).
Brussels, in the relationship with the EaP countries, seeks to speak not in relation to states but
uses instead as levers various regions, c ross-border cooperation, civil society, business
environment, while for the EU Member States from Central and Eastern, the state is the main
actor in the relationship with the states and other actors in the EaP.
Brussels considers that minorities should be listened to and protected. For EU Member States
from Central and Eastern Europe, the majority dictates while the minority is used as an
instrument just outside their borders, and in our case when talking about some EaP countries
(the Hungarian, Romanian and Polish minority in Ukraine and the Bulgarian minority in
Moldova).

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

19 Brussels considers the force of the institutions as an essential factor; if the institutions do not
exist, they must be created, while for many EU Member States from Central and Eastern
Europe, the force of the leader is enough for the dialogue with the EaP countries, where a
similar mentality is largely present.
For Brussels, corruption is the result of dysfunctional institutions, of legal limitations,
trespassing of the state- of-the-law norms, while for the countries from EU Member States form
Central and Eastern Europe these norms have been included only in the check -list of the
joining process and after joining they have been left aside while institutions have become
instruments for corruption. This reality is largely accepted in the EaP space and encouraged by
Moscow.
For Brussels, patriotism means the promotion of national values in a successful country,
together with partners and allies. For the EU Member States from Central and East ern Europe
patriotism is a means of historical reversal, both towards a West that treated them as
second- hand members through the difference in the quality of supermarket products, the
transitory conditions on the labor market or an ‘arrogant’ instituti onal attitude, which does not
accept them as they are, and the EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, among
them (Hungary vis -à-vis Romania and Slovakia). Of course, this historic revenge is also a
chimera that feeds the prejudices against the E U Member States from Central and Eastern
Europe towards the EaP (Poland towards Belarus and Ukraine, Hungary to Ukraine, Romania
to Ukraine and Moldova), to which the anguish of the EaP countries coming closer to the EU is
a response, as they are exposed t o possible historic revenge from neighbo urs in the EU.
Judging from the perspective of this, Brussels (i.e. the old EU Member States), EU Member
States from Central and Eastern Europe dichotomy, as a dichotomy between liberalism and
illiberalism, referring to the whole EU space agenda for the Eastern Partnership Area, we find
that, on the one hand, Brussels seeks to bring the countries of the Eastern Partnership Area in
the space where it has only procedurally succeeded in imposing a change in the EU Member
States from Central and Eastern Europe, where an unexpected distance, at more than a
decade after accession, can be observed. On the other hand, the Eastern Partnership Area
countries would like to have procedural changes under the influence of Brussels because they
are bringing financial benefits, but they feel much closer to the realities of the EU Member
States from Central and Eastern Europe.
This means whereby the two trends and the two realities that exist within the EU can be
brought together, since they can either facilitate or affect the role that the EU has assumed in
the world in general, and in our case in the EaP space, are presented by the German Foreign
Minister Sigmar Gabriel who, on the occasion of the conference The Marshall Plan at 70: What
We Should Remember and What We Must Do for the Future of May 18, 2017, said that “now,
when we are witnessing the ascension of states that claim to be either illiberal or anti -liberal,
the EU and the US need to assert not only the standards for the 21st century in economic

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

20 issues, but also the issue of Western ideas about human rights, democracy, freedom of
speech, and others – against those antiliberal and authoritarian ideas in these countries.”24

3. How do the EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe relate to the Eastern
Partnership?
The affirmation of a tangible agenda, not to say ‘alternatives’ of the most25 EU Member States
from Central and Eastern Europe to the multiple problems of European governance,
sometimes going to follow different directions, without negotiation, cannot be exempt from
exceptions when talking about the Eastern Partnership. How can we explain the existence of a
nuanced or alternative agenda of the EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe in
relation to the EaP26 beyond the individuality of the general positions that have been
mentioned especially in the subchapter EU Member State s from Central and Eastern Europe
and Sovereignty ?
First of all, it can no longer surprise anyone that a political decoupling of some Central and
Eastern European countries from Brussels is caused, on the one hand, by the underlying
energy dependence of most of these states from Russia, except Romania; on the other hand,
they all seem to have embraced illiberal model of government. Russia is doing all it can to
make these former communist countries rediscover either a common historical past or a
common spir itual tradition, as it is the case with Romania.
Second, it is worth mentioning here some encouragements from German officials, especially
for Central and Eastern European leaders, who want to assert greater autonomy towards
Brussels, including the Eastern Partnership agenda. Thus, in a declaration from 2017, the
Bavarian Conservative leader Horst Seehofer, in order to justify the invitation he made to Victor
Orbán to visit Bavaria, said, “We should quit huffishness when we evaluate other countries and
other politicians.”27
Finally, a “commercial war” has recently been perceived between Polish, Czech and Hungarian
companies and major European, German, French, and Dutch companies, which have been
determined to join an Alliance of Eastern European Employers , in order to become stronger.
Interestingly, this initiative belongs to the National Union of Employers in Romania, to which
have joined, in early February 2018, the employers’ associations in Hungary, Poland and

24 Gabriel Sigmar, “The Marshall Plan at 70: What We Must Remember and What We Must Do for the Future,”
Conference Speech, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 18 May 2017, 4, https://csis –
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs -public/event/170525_marshall_plan.pdf?AAM1ufR3h.YCFwH3sl30Hb8RGpF_xUo2
(last accessed 28 January 2018).
25 Referring to the case of states such as Romania, the President Klaus Johannis stated clearly his support for
community policies, includi ng the Eastern Partnership, while the governing coalition PSD -ALDE does not deny
such a support, though the way it exercises power indicates a different agenda.
26 Andreas Pache, “The Visegrad Group and the Eastern Partnership,” 3 October 2016, http://www.nouvelle –
europe.eu/node/1956 (accessed 4 February 2018).
27 Horațiu Pepine, “Ce va face președintele Johannis în cazul Poloniei,” Ziare, 9 January 2018, http://www.ziare.
com/europa/polonia/ce- va-face-presedintele- iohannis -in-cazul -poloniei -1496643 (last accessed 10 January 2018).

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

21 Slovakia.28 The goal of this alliance is to promote better the interests of the business
environment in the region vis -à-vis Brussels, creating a communication platform for the
business of the four countries activating on third markets. The same goal of strengthening the
business environment in the region might also be associated with the announcement made by
the Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and the Prime Minister of Hungary, Victor Orb án
at the beginning of 2018, on the launching of the project of a regional bank to stimulate
investment in the infrastructure in the region, to which Slovakia and the Czech Republic, as
well as other countries in the region, have been invited to join.29
The affirmation of a different agenda, especially from the part of the Visegrad countries, can be
perceived in the form of two converging/divergent actions, on the one hand, the shaping of an
extended Visegrad to the Eastern Partnership, wanted by Poland, and on the other hand, a
Visegrad with weak neighbou rs, dominated by domestic crises, wanted by Hungary.
Polan d, by its demographic, economic and territorial weight, seeks to take on the role of a
leader and of coagulant factor in the region whose orientation goes beyond the enlarged
Visegrad group towards a Visegrad that includes the neighbou ring countries of the Eastern
Partnership. Among these a central role is played by Ukraine, where Poland has very large
historical, geopolitical and economic interests. Secondly, Belarus, which is also a neighbou r, in
which Poland is interested based on the same conscientious as in the case of Ukraine.
Poland’s interest in Moldova is a geopolitical one, but also one that aims at Romania’s
association with Poland’s strategic vision of bringing the Intermarium30 interwar project into
discussion.
The Three Seas Initiative is a relatively new idea in the European diplomatic landscape that
aims to stimulate closer cooperation especially on energy issues between the twelve EU
Member States bordered by the Adriatic Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. More
specifically, Austria, Bulga ria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary, mainly the countries of the former communist
Eastern bloc. The first meeting took place last year in Dubrovnik, Croatia. The idea belonged to
the President of Poland, who resumed the model of the Intermarium Federation that Marshal
Józef Piłsudski designed in the third decade of the last century, aiming at an alliance between
the “countries included among the seas ” in order to ensure the security of the member states
both in relation to Soviet Russia and Germany.31
Even if Poland’s and the UK’s post -Brexit common interests are not openly shown, it is
understandable that London seeks to weaken Brussels negotiation capacity in this matter,
using the P olish lever and its weight in the Eastern Border Security Architecture of the EU and

28 On 9.2.2018 the articles of incorporation of the Alliance of Eastern European Employers were signed in
Cluj-Napoca, www.unpr.ro (last accessed 10 February 2018).
29 See www.infoziare.ro (last accessed 2 February 2018).
30 See about Intermarium interwar project: Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, Intermarium. The Land between Black and
Baltic Seas (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2012), 568.
31 Horațiu Pepine, “Mai există astăzi Noua Europă?,” Deutsche Welle, 4 July 2017, http://www.dw.com/ro/mai -exis
ta-noua- europa -39539092?maca=rum -rss-rom-all-1493- rdf (last accessed 3 January 2018).

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

22 obviously in BUM space.32 The theme of the Intermarium project is one not only with a retro
character, but also with current strategic valences for both Warsaw and London. This theme
was reopened especially in the context of the fact that the Weimar triangle (France, Germany,
Poland) could be remarked in the first part of the Ukrainian crisis, in the negotiations that took
place as part of the Minsk 1 and 2 agreements, when Poland was put aside by the
Franco- German couple, which generated frustration at the level of the Polish diplomacy. In this
context, Poland received indirect support from the UK and especially from the United States33
in order to become the integrat ing actor and at the same time the head of a bloc of states,
including the ones bounded by the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Seas. This bloc, centered
around the Visegrad Group, aims to include all EU Member States, but also the Western
Balkan states and the Eastern Partnership BUM group in an economic and security structure.
The project’s axis is the Via Carpatica road and rail link,34 which would link the Baltic States,
Poland -Slovakia -Hungary -Romania- Bulgaria -Greece and towards which the eastern- west axes
crossing the Eastern Partnership and EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe would
converge.
As pointed out by Joel Harding, the Intermarium group will become a de facto voting bloc in the
EU and NATO that will be implacably opposed to any weak dealings with Russia. It will unite
and divide both the EU and NATO in the sense that it forms a fault line between the isolationist
Germans and the dithering Romance nations when it comes to dealing with Russia. This
seems to be a good thing for both NA TO and the EU, by balancing politically the naive and
dithering Western European nations on Russia issues.35
As far as Hungary is concerned, through its strategic position in Central and Eastern Europe, it
seeks to assume, through the voice of Victor Orbá n, both an integrating role vis -à-vis the other
EU Member States in the region and with the Eastern Partnership states, especially on the
Hungarian- Polish axis, as well as a disintegrating role, as an independent player close to
Russia.
Hungary seeks to act as an economic hub especially for Ukraine, given the access, provided
by its territory, to Ukraine’s most important transport route to the West and South- Western

32 Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova.
33 In Varsaw, the American president Donald Trump emphatically spoke so as to give satisfaction to the
conser vative Europe, including Poland and Hungary, placing himself in an implicit opposition with the
liberal -progressist line of Germany and France. Donald Trump’s discourse validated the politics of the Rightness
and Justice Party, which are consider ed abominable in Berlin and Paris. See Horațiu Pepine, “Klaus Johannis
după Varșovia,” Deutsche Welle, 7 July 2017, http://www.dw.com/ro/klaus -iohannis -dupa- varsovia/a -39598859
(last accessed 3 February 2018).
34 “Via Carpatia: Pe unde va traversa România noua autostradă dintre Mediterană șu Marea Baltică,” Economica,
6 March 2017, http://www.economica.net/via- carpatia- pe-unde -va-traversa -romania- noua- autostrada- dintre- medi
terana- si-marea -baltica_115733.html (last accessed 5 February 2018).
35 Joel Harding, “ Intermarium or Russia Getting What It Deserves,” To Inform Is to Influence, 22 May 2016,
https://toinformistoinfluence.com/2016/05/22/intermarium -or-russia -getting- what -it-deserves/ (last accessed 3
February 2018).

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

23 Europe (Adriatic and Mediterranean).36 On the other hand, by its transformation into the most
important Russian gas deposit, to which, under the conditions of East Ukraine crisis, this
country will have access to with the completion of Paks’ atomic power plant.37 Hungary may
become the largest electricity supplier for Western Ukraine and Western Balk ans.
Speaking from Hungary’s political perspective as an integrating factor, it is interesting that
Hungary is almost at the same level of acceptability for the Republic of Moldova as Romania. If
Romania is considered the strategic partner for the Romanian- speaking population of the
Republic of Moldova, Hungary plays this role for the Russian- speaking population. This
integrative status for the Republic of Moldova was achieved in the period when Hungary
played the role of a Schengen consulate for the Republ ic of Moldova and then in the conditions
when the representatives of the left cent re parties from the Republic of Moldova were looking
for the gate to Brussels through Budapest and not through Bucharest.
Looking more closely at the actions of Hungary, it seems that although it has an agenda close
to that of Poland regarding the integration of the Eastern Partnership states, one can notice
that due to its proximity to Russia, it seeks to integrate the Eastern Partnership space into a
space where the influence of Russia must become again important, especially in the case of
Moldova and Ukraine.
Unlike Poland, Hungary also has a particular tool to integrate through the disintegration the
Eastern Partnership countries, namely the issue of the minorities in Ukraine and the Republic
of Moldova. Hungary’s position on the issue of the Hungarian minority in the Carpathian
Basin,38 including in relation with EU Member States, Romania and Slovakia, is well known.
Taking advantage of the adoption of the new education law in Ukraine, in 2017, which limits
the right to education in the minority languages, Hungary has brought together al l states that
have minorities in Ukraine to join their efforts against the Education Act. In fact, Hungary has
exploited the victory of that part of the Ukrainian society39 and has pushed the pedal of the
protection of minority rights threatened by Ukrainia n nationalism in order to strengthen its
position in western Ukraine, where, in the context of the crisis in the East of Ukraine, Hungary

36 At least partially, this starts to be competed by Slovakia, whose infrastructure works on its eastern territory and
would create an alternative for the transport in Ukraine, especially towards the West.
37 A Russian investment of more than 10 billion euro; Constantin Balaban, “ UE aprobă proiectul ruso- ungar
destinat extinderii centralei nucleare de la Paks ,” Agerpres, 6 March 2017, https://www.agerpres.ro/economie/20
17/03/06/ue- aproba- proiectul -ruso-ungar -destinat- extinderii -centralei -nucleare- de-la-paks -13-29-08 (accessed 5
February 2018).
38 Inga Chelyadina, “Between East and West: The Hungarian Minority in Ukraine,” Nouvelle Europe, 2 October
2016, http://www.nouvelle- europe.eu/en/between- east- and-west-hungarian- minority -ukraine (last accessed 4
February 2018).
39 Andrew Wilson, “Partner for Life: Europe’s Unanswered ‘Eastern Question’,” European Council of Foreign
Relations, 12 October 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/partners_for_life_europes_unanswered_
eastern_question_7232 (accessed 5 Febr uary 2018).

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

24 was a supporter, with Moscow’s benevolence, and along with Slovakia, of bringing into
discussion the Ruthenian problem in the Transcarpathian province.40
The same tool, related to minorities, was used during the period 2014- 2016 on the internal
affairs that worried the Republic of Moldova in the wake of the crisis in Ukraine, of the
pressures of Russia so as that country s hould not get out of its influence, by signing of the
Association Agreement with the EU, attracting the Republic of Moldova into the economic orbit
of Romania, with the support of the EU. The separatist movements in the south of the Republic
of Moldova, the Gagauzes have found a favou rable echo in Hungary’s policy of protecting
minorities and of conjugating their actions to those for the autonomy of the Szeklers in eastern
Transylvania.
Romania is the second largest country on the eastern border of the EU and obviously its
geopolitics forces it to position itself in a particular way vis -a-vis the affirmation of a regional
pole of countries, with an impact on the Eastern Partnership. Unlike the other two countries,
Romania is not a supporter of a special relationship between the EU Member States group
from Central and Eastern Europe and the Eastern Partnership countries but of a general
community relationship with these countries. On the occasion of the second meeting of the
countries of the Intermarium group, on 7 July 2017, in Warsaw, Romania expressed its point of
view that it did not want “to develop initiatives to separate these countries from the rest of the
EU, encouraging rather the help of the EU for these countries, an attitude that integrates
perfect ly into the EU’s grand goals.”41 This is due, on the one hand, to the fact that Romania
still has a high degree of confidence in the EU, that there are no political forces with
anti-European discourse, even if in practice such a discourse is impl ied. On the other hand,
there is a certain lack of confidence in the Central and Eastern European projects, which hide
the dangers of some political constructs that it tries to avoid.
Another set of issues relates to the relations Romania has with the main actors of a distinct
regional construct within the EU – Hungary and Poland.
As far as Poland is concerned, the Polish side has always made offers for a Polish- Romanian
partnership, thanks to the excellent historical relations that have existed between these two
countries, especially during the interwar period, but also during the communist era. The
educational, scientific and trade exchanges, especially from the Polish side to Romania, have
laid the foundations for a strategic partner. But these relations have never come out of the
political framework, although the Polish side has made proposals for a Polish- Romanian
tandem in the European institutions. If we can talk about a strategic partnership this is visible in
NATO and in the new developments of this alliance over the past 2- 3 years, in the context of
the crisis in the East of Ukraine. At the same time, Romania has announced that it supports the
Intermarium project as a structure of cooperation, in the Romanian vision, especially for the

40 Nikolas Kozloff, “Ukraine Crisis: Hands Off Transcarpathia!,” Huffpost , 20 April 2014, https://www.huffington
post.com/nikolas -kozloff/ukraine- crisis- hands -off_b_5358893.html (accessed 5 February 2018) ; Paul Robert
Magocsi, “The heritage of autonomy in Carpathian Rus’ and Ukraine’s Transcarpathian region,” Nationalities
Papers 43, 4 (2015): 577- 594.
41 Pepine, “Klaus Johannis după Varșovia.”

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

25 security part at the EU and NATO borders and by the possibility of extension to immediate
neighbou rs if necessary.
For Romania, the relationship with Hungary has a degree of political mistrust, although from
the point of view of economic relations, that of scientific an d cultural exchanges, each part is
for the other among the first ten partners. Beyond its aspect of historic dispute, the problem of
the Hungarian minority in Romania is Hungary’s most sensitive resort, although the Hungarian
minority was part of almost al l governmental structures in Romania in the past two decades.
The Romanian side, especially in the unofficial zone, but sometimes with public disclosure, is
dominated by distrust in the relationship with Hungary, and a speech with nationalist accents
can be perceived in certain environments. It is precisely these aspects that have so far made
the Romanian part to be reserved in accepting certain proposals from Budapest to limit the
ranks of the EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe, except for taki ng a position on
the refugees issue in 2015, rapidly corrected by the President of Romania, Klaus Johannis.
However, in the last two years, it became obvious that there are talks in relation to associating
Romania with certain actions of the Visegrad Group, especially in the autumn of 2017 and the
first months of 2018.
As far as Romania’s relations with the Eastern Partnership countries are concerned, beyond
certain historical nuances regarding Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, they do not leave
the Brus sels-specific line and the NATO strategy.
For instance, as regards the relation with Ukraine, although in this country there has been a
Romanian- speaking community of almost half a million people, Romania is very discreet
regarding the issue of its minorit y in this country, although the law of national education,
adopted in Ukraine in 2017, and which threatens education in minority languages, has brought
Romania to join the countries that have criticized this law, going as far as cancelling the visit of
the Romanian President to Kiev in the summer of 2017.42 Romania is the follower of the
negotiation, as shown by its position in the autumn of 2017, when in the Cernauti region the
Ukrainian authorities allowed the opening of two new schools with teaching in Romanian.
Unfortunately, although Romania has the longest frontier with Ukraine, in terms of economic,
educational and scientific exchanges, its relations with Ukraine, as compared to those Ukraine
has with its other neighbou rs, are far from the potential of the two countries, persisting some
presumption of distrust to the events in Eastern Ukraine, when the perception of those two
states from each other began to change.
With regard to the Republic of Moldova, Romania has an interest that may be defined as
national, but which is not dominated by the interest of the union of the two Romanian- speaking
states, although beyond the Prut there are important voices, but not dominant in this direction,
as well as many other voices, that support the integration with Ro mania, on the path provided
by Brussels, i.e. the existence of two Romanian states but within an EU -managed framework.

42 Angela Sârbu, “Ucraina se declară “decepționată” de anularea vizitei președintelui Klaus Johannis,” Agerpres,
22 September 2017, https://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2017/09/22/ucraina- se-declara- deceptionata- de-anularea -vi
zitei-presedintelui -klaus -iohannis -19-06-55 (accessed 5 February 2018).

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

26 There is also about a similar amount of voices that are against the union with Romania,
arguing instead for a closer connection of the Re public of Moldova with Russia and the
Eurasian Economic Community.
As a result of the majority of the Moldovan population approaching the EU and Romania, this
country has undertaken to integrate the Republic of Moldova into Romania’s economic space
through trade,43 investments, infrastructure, alternative energy sources (gas, electricity),
through the formation of the human resource. Romania’s option for a differentiated integration
of the Republic of Moldova into the European economic space is a practice that has become a
community decision regarding the relations between the EU and the Eastern Partnership
countries, especially after the Riga Summit of 2015.
In our presentation in this subchapter, we have insisted very much on possible divergence
from the EU ’s objectives and policies in relation to the Eastern Partnership states. As pointed
out, in February 2018, by Geza Jeszenszky,44 the former Foreign Minister of Hungary and
founder of the Visegrad group in the 1990s, whether the actions of the Visegrad group in the
EU relationship are meant to express gloomy points of view or alternatives, but which are part
of the whole of European policies, then the group’s actions must be appreciated.
These accents, with nuances that indicate confidence, formulated by one of the most
appreciated Hungarian supporters of Europe, that the actions of the Visegrad group are in fact
part of the EU strategy towards the Eastern Partnership tracts can also be observed in the
official actions of this group in relation to their neigh bours from the East. Thus, it has become a
practice that there should be an annual meeting of the foreign ministers of the countries in this
group with their counterparts in the Eastern Partnership countries or the representatives of the
governments of the two groups when discussing specific issues.45 Thus, on August 31, 2017, a
meeting took place in Budapest, which prepared the positions of the two parties for the Eastern
Partnership Summit in Brussels, in November 2017.46

43 Starting with 2014, it has become the first commercial partner of the Republic of Moldova both as regards
exports and imports.
44 Geza Jeszenszky: “I am one of the founders of the Visegrad Group as Foreign Minister in the 1990s. I have
always believed, and I believe that many leaders in the Visegrad countries have, if not a political mission, the goal
of having more impact in the European Union. But I think the big question is: what impact? If the goal is to have
more weight, more influence to weaken the EU, to become a group that diminishes common actions then it is
doomed to failure more, it will not live long. It will ruin the gro up’s solidarity. We can already see on certain
occasions over the last two years that the group has been united in issues such as migration, but there has been
a limit, a confrontation with the rest of Europe. So the Visegrad group must follow your goals w isely. Opposition to
Europe would surely be a tragedy and I think the citizens of the Visegrad countries are not so stupid as to allow a
break. There will not be a Vrexit.” Balasz Barabas, “Pașaport Diplomatic,” DIGI 24, 3 March 2018, https://www.digi
24.ro/stiri/externe/mapamond/fost -ministru -de-externe- al-ungariei -niciun -maghiar -nu-ar-fi-gata- sa-moara- pentru –
transilvania- 872113#ziarecom (last accessed 3 February 2018).
45 Visegrad Group , www.visegradgroup.eu (accessed 5 February 2018).
46 Visegrad Group, Joint Statement of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Visegrad Group on the Occasion of the
Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of W4 and the Eastern Partnership Countries “Strategic challenges of the
Eastern Partnership before the Brussels Summit,” http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/selected -events -in-2017-
170203/joint -statement -of-the-170904 (last accessed 4 February 2018).

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

27 Conclusion
In conclusion, although there are many actions to integrate the Eastern Partnership countries
into the regional constructions designed by the EU Member States in Central and Eastern
Europe – Visegrad or Intermarium – one can witness differentiated integrating actions, some
Brusse ls-based actions, some started by these regional constructions, especially the Visegrad
group, but some of them also carrying national interests of the EU Member States in Central
and Eastern Europe. The fact that most of the countries from the Belarus -Ukraine- Moldova
group are targeted by the EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe is symptomatic of
the dominance of the national interes t in relation to that of the EU as the AGA countries
(Armenia -Georgia- Azerbaijan) are not a priority for the EU Mem ber States in Central and
Eastern Europe agenda, since they are not in the area of national interest.47
Important for success in integrating the Eastern Partnership countries into the whole of the
European space, without the EaP countries being members of t he EU, is that the three levers
of action – community policy, regional group policy and political / national preference – have
the highest degree of convergence, with the common agenda assumed. The action of regional
and national levers should not be seen as a destructive competition for community action, but
as a complementary action of a convergent nature.

Bibliography
Balaban, Constantin. “ UE aprobă proiectul ruso- ungar destinat extinderii centralei nucleare de
la Paks. ” Agerpres, 6 March 2017. https:// www.agerpres.ro/economie/2017/03/06/ue- aproba-
proiectul -ruso-ungar -destinat -extinderii -centralei -nucleare- de-la-paks -13-29-08 (accessed 5
February 2018).
Barabas, Balasz. “Pașaport Diplomatic.” DIGI 24, 3 March 2018. https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/exte
rne/mapamond/fost -ministru -de-externe- al-ungariei -niciun- maghiar -nu-ar-fi-gata- sa-moara- pen
tru-transilvania- 872113#ziarecom (last accessed 3 February 2018).
Bărbulescu, Iordan Gh. Noua Europă. Identitate și Model European. Iași: Polirom, 2014.
Chelyadina, Inga. “Between Eastand West: The Hungarian Minority in Ukraine.” Nouvelle
Europe, 2 October 2016. http://www.nouvelle- europe.eu/en/between- east-and-west-hungarian –
minority -ukraine (last accessed 4 February 2018).
Chodakiewicz, Marek Jan. Intermarium. The Land between Black and Baltic Seas . New
Brunswick: Transaction, 2012.

47 This thing also becomes obvious from the level of help coming from the Visegrad group in these three
countries, in relation to the help they receive from the BUM group. Balázs Gyimesi, “The Visegrad Group’s
development assistance to Eastern Partnership countries,” 2 October 2016, http://www.nouvelle- europe.eu/en/
visegrad- group- s-development- assistance -eastern- partnership- countries (last accessed 4 February 2018).

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

28 Delcour, Laure, and Kataryna Wolczuk. “Spoiler of Facilitator of Democratization?: Russia’s
Role in Georgia andUkraine.” In Democracy Promotion and the Chall enge of Illiberal Regional
Power, edited by Nelli Babayan and Thomas Risse, 459- 478. London: Routledge, 2016.
European Commission. “ 2017 Eastern Partnership Summit: Stronger together.” Press Release,
24 November 2017. http://europa.eu/rapid/press -release_IP -17-4845_en.htm (accessed 5
February 2018).
Gyimesi, Balázs. “The Visegrad Group’s development assistance to Eastern Partnership
countries.” Nouvelle Europe, 2 October 2016. http://www.nouvelle- europe.eu/en/visegrad –
group- s-development -assistance -eastern- partnership- countries (last accessed 4 February
2018).
Harding, Joel. “ Intermarium or Russia Getting What It Deserves.” To Inform Is to Influence, 22
May 2016. https://toinfor mistoinfluence.com/2016/05/22/intermarium -or-russia -getting- what -it-
deserves/ (last accessed 3 February 2018).
Kasčiūnas, Laurynas, Vilius Ivanauskas, Vytautas Keršanskas, and Linas Kojala. “Eastern
Partnership in a Changed Security Environment: New Incent ives for Reform.” Eastern
Europea n Studies Center, Vilnius, November 2014.
Kozloff, Nikolas. “ Ukraine Crisis: Hands Off Transcarpathia!” Huffpost , 20 April 2014.
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/nikolas -kozloff/ukraine -crisis -hands -off_b_5358893.html
(accessed 5 February 2018).
Magocsi, Paul Robert. “The heritage of autonomy in Carpathian Rus’ and Ukraine’s
Transcarpathian region.” Nationalities Papers vol. 43, no. 4 (2015): 577- 594.
Marga, Andrei. “Democracy as Form of Life.” Eurolimes vol. 8 (Autumn 2009): 141- 154.
Mearsheimer, John. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West‘s Fault.” Foreign Affairs ,
September/October 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john- jmearsheimer/
why-the-ukraine- crisis -is-the-wests -fault (accessed 29 January 2018).
Mudde, Cas. “ It Is High Time for EU to Stand Up to Creeping Illiberal Democracy in Europe.”
Huffpost , 3 April 2016. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/cas -mudde/it -is-high- time-for-eu-
to_b_9384564.html (acce ssed 28 January 2018).
Nanhoi, Ovidiu. “EU și UE. Liberali și Iliberali – o comparație.” Dilema Veche, no. 668
(December 2016): 6- 13. http://dilemaveche.ro/sectiune/pe- ce-lume -traim/articol/liberali -si-ilibe
rali-o-comparatie (accessed 28 January 2018).
Novak, Tamas. “The future of the Eastern Partnership. Strategic changes or continued drifting.”
Osterreichiche Gesellschaft fur Europapolitik, Policy Brief, 2015. http://oegfe.at/2015/05/the- fu
ture-of-the-eastern- partnership (accessed 29 January 2018).
Pache, Andreas. “The Visegrad Group and the Eastern Partnership.” Nouvelle Europe, 3
October 2016. http://www.nouvelle- europe.eu/node/1956 (accessed 4 February 2018).

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

29 Pepine, Horațiu. “ Ce va face președintele Johannis în cazul Poloniei.” Ziare, 9 January 2018.
http://www.ziare.com/europa/polonia/ce- va-face- presedintele- iohannis -in-cazul -poloniei -14966
43 (accessed 10 January 2018).
Pepine, Horațiu. “Klaus Johannis după Varșovia.” Deutsche Welle, 7 July 2017. http://www.dw.
com/ro/klaus -iohannis -dupa -varsovia/a- 39598859 (last accessed 3 February 2018).
Pepine, Horațiu. “Mai există astăzi Noua Europă?” Deutsche Welle, 4 July 2017.
http://www.dw.com/ro/mai -exista -noua- europa- 39539092?maca=rum -rss-rom-all-1493- rdf (last
accessed 3 February 2018).
Pogany, Stephan. “ Europe’s illiberal states: why Hungary and Poland are turning away from
constitutional democracy.” The Conversation, 4 January 2018. http://theconversation.com/
europes -illiberal- states -why-hungary -and-poland- are-turning- away -from- constitutional -democra
cy-89622 (accessed 28 January 2018).
Pogany, Stephan. “Viktor Orbán, Refugees and the Threat to Europe.” Social Europe, 2
November 2015. https://www.socialeurope.eu/viktor -orban- refugees -and-the-threat -to-europe
(accessed 28 January 2018).
Rotaru, Vasile. “Parteneriatul Estic – o nouă etapă în relațiile UE -Rusia?” PhD diss., SNSPA,
2013.
Sârbu, Angela. “Ucraina se declară “decepționată” de anularea vizitei președintelui Klaus
Johannis.” Agerpres, 22 September 2017. https://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2017/09/22/ucraina
-se-declara- deceptionata- de-anularea- vizitei -presedintelui -klaus -iohannis -19-06-55 (accessed
5 February 2018).
Semenij, Olexij. “EU- Russia strategy and Eastern Partnership: Less Confrontation, More
Cooperation?” Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 16 September 2010. https://www.boell.de/en/navigation/
europa- transatlantik -eu-russia -strategy -eastern- partnership- 10113.html (accessed 5 February
2018).
Sigmar, Gab riel. “The Marshall Plan at 70: What We Must Remember and What We Must Do
for the Future. ” Conference Speech, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington DC, 18 May 2017. https://csis -prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs -public/event/1705
25_marshall_ plan.pdf?AAM1ufR3h.YCFwH3sl30Hb8RGpF_xUo2 (last accessed 28 January
2018).
“Via Carpatia: Pe unde va traversa România noua autostradă dintre Mediterană șu Marea
Baltică.” Economica, 6 March 2017. http://www.economica.net/via- carpatia- pe-unde- va-traver
sa-romania- noua- autostrada- dintre- mediterana- si-marea- baltica_115733.html (last accessed 5
February 2018).
Visegrad Group. www.visegradgroup.eu (accessed 5 February 2018).
Visegrad Group. Joint Statement of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Visegrad Group on the
Occasion of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of W4 and the Eastern Partnership
Countries “Strategic challenges of the Eastern Partnership before the Brussels Summit.”

The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Securi ty Challenges

30 http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/selected- events -in-2017- 170203/joint -statement -of-the-
170904 (last accessed 4 February 2018).
Wilson, Andrew. “Partner for Life: Europe’s Unanswered ‘Eastern Question’.” European
Council on Foreign Relations, 12 October 2017. http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/part
ners_for_life_europes_unanswered_eastern_question_7232 (accessed 5 February 2018).