The Dilemma of Multiculturalism, British National Identity and Brexit [618159]

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‘The Dilemma of Multiculturalism, British National Identity and Brexit’
Karina Manea (S3306372)
Capita European Integration
MA International Relations
Dr. A.G Harryvan
1. Introduction
Historians may mark the secession on the United Kingdom from the European Union in
2019 as the moment a great project failed. As it is known, in a referendum held on the 23 of June
2016, a majority of British voters supported leaving the EU. The purpose of this paper is to analyze
the circumstances through which this u nfortunate event was made possible , first of all by looking
at the dilemma of multiculturalism which served as a paradigm that undermined the concept by
causing the opposite of integration and tolerance towards diverse cultures. The second part of the
paper represents the pathway of the British in the European Union from the very beginnings to
Brexit from the federalist perspective of Andre w Duff. The purpose of the third part is to use the
arguments of John Curtice which are based on solid statistics and which explain what made the
difference at the final vote between Remain and Leave sides in order to understand this complex
event that hap pened in the British history.
2. The Dilemma of Multiculturalism
In order to understand why Brexit happened we should first take a look at the British
national identity, and the causes of the absence of a civic national identity involved in the British
imperial history1. According to the BBC, the British Minister of Education announced a review
meant for teaching the ‘core of British values’ that should be compulsory for students between the
ages of 11 and 162. The report lasted for six months and ‘ask ed how all children can develop a

1 Eva Maria Asari, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Steven Mock, ‘British National Identity and the Dilemmas of
Multiculturalism’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2008, 14:1, 1 -28, https://doi.org/10.1080/13537110701872444 ,
visited at 10.08.2018
2 Julie Henry, “Britishness and the Class System,” Sunday Telegraph, 22 Jan, 2007,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1540066/Britishness -and-the-class-system.html , visited at 10.08.2018

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strong sense of British identity by learning about Britain’s culture and traditions’3. According to
Sir Keith Ajegbo, a former headmaster and Home Office adviser, the investigation found that
British identity is hardly touched in the school curriculum4.
This aspect leads to one of the main problems that Britain faces today, which is seen as a
failure of a discourse that integrates various ethnic groups under the umbrella of a common British
identity, as the authors Eva Maria Asari, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Steven Mock mention in their
article ‘ British National Identity and the Dilemmas of Multiculturalism ’5. The authors begin their
article by proposing a theory that traces the source of the problem that illustrate firs t the way that
history is taught in the British education and the efforts to revise citizenship law and immigration
procedures6.
To begin with, I would like to mention that when the authors of the article mention ‘national
identity’ they are referring to Anthony’ s Smith definitions such as ‘the maintenance and continuous
reproduction of the pattern of v alues, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the
distinctive heritage of nations and the identification of individua ls with that heritage and those
values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions ’7. This definition can be understood as ‘ the
process whereby a nation is reconstructed over time’8. In order to have a more clear understanding
of this definition, the authors Eva Maria Asari, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Steven Mock explain
that multiculturalism as an ideal is not an absolute because the race and culture themselves are
social constructs, therefore in effect all nations are ‘multicultural’ to some extent9. In this way,

3 Ibidem.
4 Graeme Paton, ‘How British are you really?’, The Telegraph, 26 Jan. 2006,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ expat/expatfeedback/4202740/How -British -are-you-really.html , visited at
10.08.2018
5 Eva Maria Asari, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Steven Mock, ‘British National Identity and the Dilemmas of
Multiculturalism’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2008, 14:1, p.1 , https://doi.org/10.1080/13537110701872444 ,
visited at 10.08.2018
6 Ibidem , p.2 .
7 Anthony D. Smith, “The Sacred Dimension of Nationalism”, Millennium, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2000), p. 796,
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/03058298000290030301?journalCode=mila , visited at 10.08.2018
8 Oliver Zimmer, “Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process -Oriented Approach to
National Identity,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2003), p. 173,
http://www.sneps.net/t/images/Articles/Zimmer_2003.pdf , visited at 11.08.2018
9 Eva Maria Asari, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Steven Mock, ‘British National Identity and the Dilemmas of
Multiculturalism’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2008, 14:1, p.2 , https://doi.org/10.1080/1 3537110701872444 ,
visited at 10.08.2018

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they believe that mu lticulturalism as a policy means to take a broader definition of national identity
in order to integrate the diversity of cultural differences10.
This being said, the authors belief is that if all societies are to some degree multicultural
leads to the id ea that all nations require a defining and unifying principle needed to be universal
and distinct to the nation in question and that must distinguish the nation and its members by
defining a common ground as a part of their identity11. For example, this can be a cultural
characteristic such as a common language or tradition, a sense of a shared history or a political
mission12. This is why the nation represents a form of social order being in need of a common
reason and a common symbol in order for the indivi duals not to feels excluded from the group13.
In this way, I would like to base my argument of the authors’ assumption that a nation can be seen
as multicultural in the degree to which the unifying principle is inclusive and on how many diverse
individuals and groups within a population can easily incorporate without compromising their
cultural values14.
Furthermore, the authors consider that citizenship, residency or even given territory can be
consider acts of an unifying principle but any attempt to assimilate immigrant groups to any
common principle deemed necessary to national inclusion is rejected as a form of intolerance, even
if the principle is the value of tolerance and diversity in itself15. This paradigm was criticized as
for example an articl e in the New Yorker on multiculturalism in the Netherlands which labeled the
‘Dutch Model’ as being a form of pillarization of origins that are not be found in modern waves
of mass immigration but in the historical separation of Catholic, Protestant and se cular
communities16. The system that begun to unravel the face of modernity which is now recognized
as a perfect recipe of alienation for second and third generation of immigrants as they lose touch
with the values of their parents, and yet they find no loc al culture as an alternative in the land

10 Ibidem, p.2
11 Ibidem, p.3
12 Ibidem, p.3
13 Ibidem ,p.3
14 Ibidem, p.3
15 Ibidem, p.4
16 Jane Kramer, “The Dutch Model,” The New Yorker , 3 April 2006, https://www.questia.com/magazine/1P3 –
1014599331/the -dutch -model -letter -from -europe , visited at 12.08.2018

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where they were raised17. The authors provide us with the example of the Dutch case by the murder
of Theo Van Gogh, or the British case by the attacks of 7th of July 200518.
Our authors believe that this paradigm is the definition that multiculturalism has served to
undermine the concept, as illustrated by righ -wing, anti -immigration parties that have achieved
electoral success over the past decade by means of rhetoric that ironically identifies the mass
immigration of people from foreign cultures as a threat to nations of liberalism and tolerance19.
Moreover, according to the Commission for Racial Equity that published in a report that the British
failed to promote integration to multiculturalism, Head of the Commissi on, Trevor Phillips states
that ‘we are sleep -walking into segregation’ because multiculturalism breeds separatism and the
term needs to be scrapped since it born the idea of a ‘desire to recognize that diversity is a good
thing and to appreciate that many newcomers brought to Britain’, but in the end it has resulted in
alienation, isolation and distancing between the communities20.
Eva Maria Asari, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Steven Mock conclude that Britain, as a
multinational state with a diverse population, it failed to identify a distinct national notion of
belonging because a cohesive notion of multicultural society cannot be base only on the idea that
we should respect other people ’s values but it also requires a positive articulation of a society to
which we should all aspire promoted by institutional and noninstitutional means21.
3. A federalist perspective on the British national identity
Andrew Duff considers that Brexit certai nly means a rude interruption to, if not the end of
the EU’s historic mission to establish ‘and ever closer union among the peo ples of Europe’22.
Without the British involved, Duff believes it is unlikely that the membership of EU will enlarge
again, at lea st for a long time. Nationalists still contest the legitimacy of the Union and in Duff’s
view, there have been times in the story of the European Union where optimism about the

17 Eva Maria Asari, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Steven Mock, ‘British National Identity and the Dilemmas of
Multiculturali sm’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2008, 14:1, p.5 , https://doi.org/10.1080/13537110701872444 ,
visited at 12 .08.2018
18 Ibidem, p.5
19 Ibidem, p.5
20 Ibidem, p.5
21 Ibidem, p.24
22 Andrew Duff, ‘On Governing Europe – A federal experiment’, CreateSpace I ndependent Publishing Platform, 2
Jan. 2018, p.7

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European project has been displaced by mistrust. Brexit represents though a ma nifestation of old –
age rivalries and confirmation that nationalism has not disappea red from Europe23.
In 1919, President Woodrow Wilson descended on the Paris Peace conference – as Zweig
says, ‘like Moses…to make the world safe for democracy, but Wilson’s liberal baggage of national
self-determination was a simplistic policy that, when entrenched in treaty form, failed to create the
new democratic states to which he looked to replace the old autocratic empires24. The failure of
the League of Nations made t he vision that contrary to the Wilson doctrine, states could not always
be congruent with nations and that the international system would collapse again if it were to be
built only on the basis of the nation state25.
On 16 June 1940, Winston Churchill pro posed the actual union of France and the UK,
albeit it as a desperate move to block the advance of the German t roops on Paris26. He declared
nothing less than the complete and indissoluble political union of the UK and France: ‘The two
governments declare that France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one Franco –
British Union. The constitution of the Union will provide for joint organs of defence, foreign,
financial, and economic policies. Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of
Great Britain; every British subject will become a citizen of France’, therefore, the idea of union
came, naturall y enough from Jean Monnet who was at that stage working in London on war
matters27. Although the Franco -British Union died in vain, federalists were encouraged to intensify
their reflection on what should happen after the war.
Another example is represent ed in the Single European Act. The Single act delivered new
legal bases for EMU, social policy, environment policy and research and technological
development. It extended the use of QMV in seventeen cases. These included the definition of
guidelines for th e internal market, measures required for the functioning of the market, provisions
for mutual recognition standards, measures concerning the free movement of workers, and
directives on regional development, work -place practice, and common tra nsport policy28. The Act

23 Ibidem, p.9
24 Ibidem, p.13
25 Ibidem, p.17
26 Ibidem, p.18
27 Ibidem, p.18
28 Ibidem, p.118

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gave the first acknowledgement in treaty form of the existence of the European Council, which, it
said, should meet twice a year. The ‘Assembly’ of earlier treaties was renamed ‘European
Parliament’. In a revised Article 237 Parliament was given the right to consent to the opening of
enlargement negotiations but not their conclusions. It also won the right of consent to the
Community’s association agreements and a Court of First Instance was established to aid the Cou rt
of Justice29. Naturally, not everyone was satisfied by the outcome of the single European Act.
Thirty years on, the Treaty of Rome had been modernized to reflect the settled jurisprudence of
the Court of Justice, to widen the scope of integration and to reinforce the democratic chara cter of
the Community. According to Duff, a taboo has been busted: Constitutional reform was possible,
after all, to the advance of political integra tion of Europe30.
Furthermore, Andrew Duff explains that the significance of what had happened was not
lost on Margaret Thatcher. Her attitude hardened as the Commission of President Delors, heartened
the Single Act. In September 1988, Thatcher gave a ‘totemic’ speech, as Duff puts it, at the College
of Europe in Bruges which defined her and her countries’ Euro pean policy. She stated that Britain
does not dream of some cosy isolated existence on the fringes of the European Community because
Britain’s destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community but the Community does not represent an
end in itself (Duff 2018, p.120). In Duff’s perspective, Margaret Thatcher’s speech was not an
anti-European speech but it was anti -Community and it could have been made by no other
European leader of the time.
Another example is represented by the referendum in Norway in Novembe r 1994 when the
EU membership was rejected for the second time. The United Kingdom had not set a good example
of European solidarity because of John Major who vetoed the nomination of Belgian Prime
Minister Jean -Luc Dehaene to succeed Delors as President o f the Commission.The less forceful
Luxemburger, Jacques Santer was c hosen instead31.
The EU Act 2011 was passed at Westminster without a glance at what it meant for the EU’s
constitu tional order32. Prime Minister David Cameron gave a long -anticipated speech at
Bloomberg in London on 23 January 2013. He announced a renegotiation of British terms of EU

29 Ibidem, p.119
30 Ibidem, p.120
31 Ibidem, p.155
32 Ibidem, p.242

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Membership. To overcome its problems, he said, the EU needed ‘fundamental, far -reaching
change’33. Duff states that assailing ‘sclerotic, ineffective decision making’, Cameron wanted a
smaller and weaker Commission. Recognizing that the Eurozone needed ‘some big institutional
changes’, he insisted that the UK, and perhaps others, wanted changes too, ‘to safeguard our
interests and strengthen democratic legitimacy’. He attacked the treaty commitment to ever closer
union, which ‘has been consistently interpreted as applying no to the peoples but rather to the states
and institutions compounded by a European Court of Justice that has consistently supported greater
centralization’34.
Cameron hoped that the new EU treaty, when it came, would be able to accommodate the
UK. If not, Britain ‘should be ready to address the changes we need in a negotiation with our
European partners’. By May 2014, however, Cameron took a U -turn from Bloomberg. He
announced that he would insist on an EU referendum taking place in 2017 regardless of whether a
new treaty was ready on the general question of ‘in’ or ‘out’35. Britain’s EU relations continued to
deteriorate. According to Duff, Britain wanted different paths to lead to a different and not ever
closer destination. Cameron’s efforts to restrict welfare benefits to EU citizens resident in the UK
challenged some key principles, notably discrimination on the grounds of nationality, the right to
move and reside freely across the Union, and the free movement of workers. Cameron wanted to
be able to go home having blocked in -work benefits for a period of thirteen years. In this event ,
the blocking period was agreed at seven years, and all states and not just the UK would be enabled
to exploit the same restrictions36.
4. What led to the final outcome of the British referendum
The contribution of John Curtice to the Journal of Common Market Studies attempts to
explain how the outcome of Brexit came about. Curtice approaches this at more than one level and
the explanation is provided by examining the attitudes and orientations of those who voted to
Leave and of those who vote d to Remain37. He poses the important questions of ‘Why did voters

33 Ibidem, p.242
34 Ibidem, p.243
35 Ibidem, p.244
36 Ibidem, p.249
37 John Curtice, ‘Why Leave Won the UK’s EU Referendum’, Journal of Common Market Studies, JCMS 2017
Volume 55. Annual Review p. 19, 2017, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jcms.12613 , visited at
15.08.2018

8
hold the attitudes about the Brexit and the EU and what were the circumstances within which those
attitudes were formed?’38. In these ways, John Curtice looks at the circumstances that gave rise to
the referendum and the circumstances in which voters’ attitudes and evaluations were reflected in
their choice on the pooling day39.
Approaching a theoretical understanding, according to Curtice, the UK’s decision to leave
does not only represent a chal lenge to the EU itself, but also to the theoretical understanding of
how voters’ attitudes towards the EU are shaped40. The author identifies three main theoretical
perspectives on the attitudes towards the EU. Two of them are presented as competitors to ea ch
other, as put by Curtice. The first one argues that the attitudes of voters towards the EU are rooted
in their sense of identity because those having a strong sense of European identity are inclined to
embrace the European Union as a symbolic representa tion of th at identity41. On the other side,
those with a strong identification with their particular nation -state and little sense of European
identity are inclined to regard the EU as representing an illegitimate constraint on the ability of
their ‘nation’ to make its ow n decisions42.
The second school argues that voters’ support for the EU is conditional on whether their
self-interest is served by their country’s membership, including their economic se lf-interest43. This
literature points out that those who are economically and occupationally better positioned to take
advantage of the EU, are more likely to favour membership, while support tends to be higher in
countries benefit from EU membership, either fiscally or in terms of its balance of trade, or when
a country’s economy i s performing well44. This approach focuses on voters’ evaluations of the
instrumental benefits of the EU, their position in the labour market, and how well they might be
doing e conomically45.

38 Ibidem, p.19
39 Ibidem, p.19
40 Ibidem, p.19
41 Ibidem, p.20
42 Ibidem, p.20
43 Ibidem, p.20
44 Ibidem, p.20
45 Ibidem, p.20.

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The author believes that despite focusing on very different aspects of EU membership, one
thing that these two perspectives have in common is that they presume that attitudes towards the
EU are shaped primarily by people’s feelings towards the institu tion itself46.
By giving the theoretical consid erations, Curtices identifies three sets of circumstances that
could well have undetermined support for the EU in Britain in 2016. These were a low level of
European identity, high level of immigration and the EU’s recent econom ic travails47. Also,
Curtice argues that in 40 years of membership, few in Britain have taken the European project to
heart, as acknowledged by their low level of willingness to acknowledge a Europe an identity48.
Since 1992, the EU’s own Eurobarometer survey has periodically asked its respondents the
following variant which is widely known as the Moreno question and which was or iginally
conceived by Juan Linz49: ‘In the near future, do you see yourself as British only; British and
European; European and British, or European only?’50.
As the table from the Eurobarometer shows, almost every time the question has been asked
in the UK, well over half have said that they were British and denied that the y were European51.
The second table based on the proportion acknowledging a European Ident ity taken between the
years 1996 -2015 shows that the proportion given at a free choice picked European as at least one
of their identities52.
The third table based on long -term International Migration in the UK, 1991 -2015, shows
that the UK has experience d much higher levels of net inward migration in recent years from the
1990’s onwards but of course not all of this migration came from the EU53. According to Curtice,
in recent years, migration from the EU has usually been responsible for less than half of the net
total54. In 1975 EU Referendum, one of the key arguments used by advocated of the EU

46 Ibidem, p.20
47 Ibidem, p.21
48 Ibidem, p.21
49 Guinjoan, M. and Rodon, T, ‘A Scrutiny of the Linz -Moreno Question’. Publius, 2006, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 128 –42,
https://academic.oup.com/publius /article/46/1/128/2494053 , visited at 14.08.2018
50 John Curtice, ‘Why Leave Won the UK’s EU Referendum’, Journal of Common Market Studies, JCMS 2017
Volume 55. Annual Review p. 21, 2017, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jcms.12613 , visited at
15.08.2018
51 Ibidem, p.21
52 Ibidem, p.22
53 Ibidem, p.23
54 Ibidem, p.23

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memberships was that it would be economically beneficial but ever since, Britain had experienced
a stagnant economy in which as soon as unemployment fell, inflation rose and as a result, the
unemployment started to rise again55. The 2016 referendum, in contrast occurred against the
shadow of the financial crisis of 2018, as the Table 4 emphasizes the GDP at Current Prices,
Eurozone, UK and Spain, 2005 -2015, Britain su ffered a much bigger initial shock from the crash
than did the countries in the Eurozone56. Curtice explains that this very different economic history
might be regarded as an example of the troubles brought by a globalized financial system that
given the ex perience of the financial crash of 2008, seemed to be out of control57.
To address the question ‘Which were the considerations that mattered more in people’s
minds as they decided which way to vote?’ Curtice looks at the results in Table 6 of a logistic
regression analysis that models the relationship between how people voted in the EU referendum
and the evaluations of the perceived consequences of leaving or being in the EU58. Therefore, those
who thought the economy would suffer as a result of leaving the EU were much less likely to vote
to leave the EU than were those who thought it would be strengthen but at the same time both of
the perceptions undermines Britain’s distinctive sense of identity and how European someone feels
were also strongly related t o how people voted59. Those who felt that membership of the EU
undermined Britain’s distinctive identity were more likely to vote for leave, as were those with a
weak sense of European identity60. According to Curtice, the outcome of the EU Referendum is
best understood as the product of the interplay between the peoples’ belief of what instrumental
consequences of leaving would be and their sense of identity61. But the answer to the question
‘Why did this produce a final outcome in which the electorate was almost evenly divided between
Remain and Leave?’ stand In Curtice’s view in the Table 7 which both illustrates the relationship
between vote choice and some key variables, and shows the implications of these relationships for
the overall outcome given the marginal distribution of the evaluation in question62. The table shows
that the link between the vote choice and evaluations of the economic consequences of leaving the

55 Ibidem, p.23
56 Ibidem, p.23
57 Ibidem, p.24
58 Ibidem, p.29
59 Ibidem, p.31
60 Ibidem, p.31
61 Ibidem, p.31
62 Ibidem, p.32

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EU was indeed, very strong because around nine in ten of those who thought the economy would
be better if they left the EU voted to Remain, while conversely, around nine in then of those who
thought that the economy would be worse voted to Leave63. Given that two -fifths of those who
voted were of the former view and only a quarter the latter, this pattern gave the Remain side an
advantage, but not a decisive one64. The outcome of the referendum was in fact determined by the
votes of those who reckoned that leaving the EU would not make much difference either way and
as a result, while voter’s e valuations of the economic consequences of leaving the EU did play an
important role in shaping how voters voted, this issue did not play sufficiently to the advantage of
the Remain side to deliver the victory65.
On the other hand, as Curtice mentions, th ere was also a clear social evidence as Table 8
shows that university graduates voted by around three to one in favour of Remain, while nearly
four in five without any educational qualifications voted to Leave66. Partly, as a result, younger
voters were als o more likely than older voters to vote Remain67. In this way, university graduates
at 48% expressing the view of being more likely than those without any educational qualifications
of 18% to think that Britain’s economy would be worse if the country left t he EU68. Both groups
of graduates and older voters disagreed almost as much on the question of whether being in the
EU undermines Britain’s distinctive identity, as in only 35% of the graduates agreed with that
proposition, whereas 63% of those without any qualifications agreed, but the concerns about
identity were particularly marked amongst older voters ages 65 years and over, where as much as
32 points more likely than those aged 18 -34 to agree that EU membership undermined Britain’s
identity69.
In short , Curtice emphasizes that both economic considerations and debate about identity
helped forge a sharp social division which left the country divided between its young well –
educated professionals who felt comfortable with EU membership and the older, less e ducated

63 Ibidem, p.32
64 Ibidem, p.32
65 Ibidem, p.32
66 Ibidem, p.33
67 Ibidem, p.33
68 Ibidem, p.33
69 Ibidem, p.34

12
voters who have been characterized as ‘left behind’ by some of the economic and social changes
that have occurred around them70
The UK public have never been amongst the most enthusiastic supporters of the EU and in
40 years of membership, few took the institution to heart and developed a strong sense of identity71.
Only a minority felt that leaving the EU would be bad for Britain’s economy and around a half
expressed concern about the impact of the EU membership on the country’s distinctive sense of
identity while other half reckoned that immigration would fall if Britain left72.
5. Conclusion
As a multinational state with an increasingly diverse population, but without having a
strong tradition of substantive citizenship discourse, Britain has failed to identify the unifying
principle of belonging, therefore a cohesive notion of multicultural society cannot be based on the
idea that we should respect other people’s values but it also requires a positive articulation of the
values underpinning su ch a society promoted by institutional and non -institutional means73.
We have seen in Duff’s book what a profound influence Britain has had on the
constitutional development of the European Union. The first twenty years of the European
Community were shap ed in large measure by the UK’s equivocation about its ties to the mainland.
The next twenty years saw the UK engaged in the European process but from Maastricht onwards,
slow withdrawal of Britain from Europe was underway74.
Last but not least, on their own, perhaps neither Britain’s recent experience of immigration,
nor the financial crash would have produced such an outcome, but in combination the two provokes

70 Ibidem, p.34
71 Ibidem, p.34
72 Ibidem, p.34
73 Eva Maria Asari, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Steven Mock, ‘British National Identity and the Dilemmas of
Multiculturalism’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2008, 14:1, p.24, https://doi.org/10.1080/13537110701872444 ,
visited at 17.08.201 8
74 Andrew Duff, ‘On Governing Europe – A federal experiment’, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2
Jan. 2018, p.264

13
to be toxic for a public that had always been inclined to be skeptical about the manifestation s of
globalization75.
Bibliography
Aricles
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Dilemmas of Multiculturalism’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2008, 14:1, p.p 1 -28
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JCMS 2017 Volume 55. Annual Review, 2017
Guinjoan, M. and Rodon, T, ‘A Scrutiny of the Linz -Moreno Question’. Publius, 2006, Vol. 46,
No. 1
Henry, Julie, “Britishness and the Class System,” Sunday Tel egraph, 22 Jan, 2007
Kramer, Jane, “The Dutch Model,” The New Yorker , 3 April 2006
Paton, Graeme, ‘How British are you really?’, The Telegraph, 26 Jan. 2006
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p. 79 6
Zimmer, Oliver, “Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process -Oriented
Approach to National Identity,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2003), p. 173

Books
Duff, Andrew, ‘On Governing Europe – A federal experiment’, CreateSpace Independent
Publishing Platform, 2 Jan. 2018

75 John Curtice, ‘Why Leave Won the UK’s EU Referendum’, Journal of Common Market Studies, JCMS 2017
Volume 55. Annual Review p. 2 1, 2017, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jcms.12613 , visited at
15.08.2018