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© 2018 Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd.

Can Russia’s Quest for the New International Order Succeed?

February 20, 2018

By Mamuka Tsereteli

Mamuka Tsereteli is a Senior Research Fellow of th e Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at
American Foreign Policy Institu te in Washington, D.C. His expertise includes international
relations, economic and energy security, and polit ical risk analysis in the Black Sea-Caspian
Region.

Abstract: A genesis and development of the conflict in Ukraine demonstrated fragility of the
international security system and its inability to gu ard sovereignty of the smaller or weaker nations.
By creating and then manipulating conflicts, Russia is gaining levera ge over the decision making on
political and economic development, governance issues , and the external alliances of those countries.
By challenging sovereignty of smaller states, and fo rcibly changing their borders, Russia is challenging
existing international order and the basic principles of Helsinki Final Act on Security and Co-
operation in Europe of 1975, to which the Soviet Union, and its successor state, Russian
Federation, are signatories. For the interests of glo bal stability, it is a priority to bring Russia back
to the framework of the Organi zation for Security and Co-Opera tion in Europe (OSCE) without
any concessions on principles of sovereig nty for all OSCE member states.

t the core of the conflict between the West and Russia is the fundamental
disagreement of the current Russian leadership with the post-Cold War
European order. Russia is changi ng realities on the ground to create
conditions that will lead to negotiatio ns on a new security architecture for
Europe and the entire Northern Hemisphere . The Russian idea of this new system
of security is to limit the sovereignty of the countries in its neighborhood and
prevent the penetration of Western hard an d soft power, as well as its system of
values and governance, in the former Soviet space, an area that Russia considers as its sphere of strategic interest. Russia n leadership has on several occasions
communicated this message to the international community.
1
President Vladimir Putin, in his widely publicized 2007 speech at the Munich
Security Conference, expressed Russia’s dissa tisfaction with the existing “unipolar”
character of the world order. He followed with a harsh criticism of the Organization

1 “The Draft of the European Security Treaty,” Official Internet Resource of the President of
Russia, Kremlin, Nov. 29, 2009, http://en.kremlin.ru/eve nts/president/news/6152. A
doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2018.02.003

Spring 2018 | 205Can Russia’s Quest for the New International Order Succeed? TSERETELI
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (O SCE) and Western countries in general.
He had already criticized the West’s push to fulfill all the conditions of the 1999
revised treaty on Conventional Arm Forces in Europe (CFE), including the removal
of all Russian forces from Georgia and Mo ldova. But most importantly, he stated
that “we have reached that decisive mome nt when we must seriously think about the
architecture of global security.”2
While the speech was publicized widely , world leaders did not take Putin’s
statement seriously enough. The Russian leader had a plan that could lead to new realities, forcing others to pay more attention to Russian statements and actions.
Implementation of that plan continues to this day. The Russian Federation took the first significant step to shake the existing European status quo in 2007 when Russia officially suspended its participation in the CFE treaty. This move was followed by
the events in Georgia in 2008 when the Russian military invaded the territory of the
sovereign country and maintained its militar y presence there af ter active conflict
ended. Russia simultaneously recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two regions
of Georgia, as independent states. All of these actions were publicized as a Russian
response to recognizing Kosovo’s independen ce against the will of Serbia. The same
argument was used in 2014. Russian le adership considered NATO’s commitment to
Georgia and Ukraine at the 2008 Bucharest su mmit as a threat to Russia’s security
interests.
The immediate objective of the Russian Federation was to stop the Eastward
expansion of European security and economic institutions. Its long-term goal was to
push for a new security arrangement with NATO, the EU, and United States which
would recognize Russian supremacy over th e sovereign rights of the countries in
Russia’s neighborhood. Under the premise of protecting its own sovereignty vis-à-
vis supra-national organizations and “universal” values,
3 the Russian Federation has
sought arrangements with Western powers designed to limit the sovereignty of
neighboring states. Russia considers this proc ess a legitimate method of ensuring its
own security.
Sovereignty in this context is underst ood as the supreme authority within a
territory which is exercised in both inter nal development and external relations.4 The
current international relations system is based on the sovereign rights of nation states, both internally and externally sovereign, to ally, trade, conclude agreements, open
borders, etc., as well as on th e Westphalian premise that interfering in other states’
governing prerogatives is illegitimate.
5 The Russian Federation is using military force,
coercion, and economic and energy supply disruptions to limit the sovereignty of

2 Vladimir Putin, Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,
Munich, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp -dyn/content/art icle/2007/02/12/
AR2007021200555.html.
3 Alexander Dugin, Counter-Currents , July 2012, https://www.counter-c urrents.com/2012/07/
interview-with-alexander-dugin/.
4 Dan Philpott, “Sovereignty,” in Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Summer 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archiv es/sum2014/entries/sovereignty/.
5 Alan James, “The Practice of Sovereign Sta tehood in Contemporary International Society,”
Political Studies , vol. 47, no. 3 (1999), pp. 457–473.

206 | OrbisTSERETELICan Russia’s Quest for the New International Order Succeed?
other countries to prevent their integration into Western led institutions. Russia’s
status as the prevailing military power is an essential element of Russian strategy. For
Russia, asymmetry in power is a source of asymmetry in sovereignty.
Experience of Russian policies vis-à- vis its neighbors, as well as military
invasions in Ukraine and Georgia, demons trates that today’s Russia aggressively
pursues power politics to restore control over former Soviet Union space. The West needs a clear strategy to bring Russia back into the system of international norms,
and rules and power politics should be part of it. Matching Russian military power in the Black Sea region will send a message that Moscow w ill understand. Ultimately,
various sides need to come back to the basics of the Helsinki process, and the
sovereignty of the nation states should re main as a fundamenta l principle of the
stability in Europe.

The Anatomy of Conflict in Ukraine
The trigger for the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 was the earlier decision of the
pro-Russian leader of Ukraine Viktor Yanuk ovych to reverse his own policy of being
associated with the European Union th rough a so-called Association Agreement
(AA). The AA is an agreement about introd ucing a rule of law-based political and
economic system to countries willing to impro ve their system of governance and to
trade with the European Union. The AA is neither a membership agreement nor an
agreement on military or security cooperation.
By November 2013, before the pla nned date for signing the Association
Agreement, Ukraine already had committed itself to a nonaligned status and had
accepted a long-term agreement with Russia on the status of naval bases in the Black
Sea port Sebastopol. The agreement allowed Russian control of the base until 2035.
These were significant concessions that Ukraine made under Russian pressure, and
the international system, including international organizations such as the UN,
OSCE, and NATO, did not oppose this pressu re for the sake of “stability” in the
region. Russia, however, did not view those decisions as concessions, but rather as
entitlements.
The sequence of events in Ukraine unfolded in the following manner: a
Russia-oriented leader of Ukraine, former President Yanukovych, wanted to sign the
Association Agreement with Europe while Russia, the Russian Federation, and President Putin personally did not allow this to happen. This lack of agreement led
to internal turmoil which pushed Yanukovych out of power. This action, in turn, led
to more aggressive Russian actions—the military invasion and annexation of Crimea,
and then the Russian supported proxy war in Eastern Ukraine. In addition to
violating the UN charter, Russia’s actions violated the four-party Budapest Agreement of 1994, where Ukraine gave up it s significant nuclear arsenal in exchange
for guarantees of security and territorial integrity affirmed by the United Kingdom,
the United States, and the Russian Federation. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is a
logical continuation of its violation of international obligations in an effort to change
the security status quo in Europe.

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Viktor Yanukovych

Paradoxically, some experts and diploma ts attempted to link the escalating
situation in Ukraine to the Western “attempt to force” Ukraine into the European
institutions, which led to the Maidan mo vement and the forced change of the
government of Ukraine. In reality, the es calation started when Russia forced Ukraine
to reverse its decision to sign the Association Agreement with the EU on the eve of
the Vilnius Summit of the EU’s Eastern Part nership in November 2013. The great
majority of the Ukrainians found this deve lopment surprising, and they resisted it.
In this context, the question is whet her sovereign nations have the right both
to security and for the rule of law based on a political and economic system designed
to raise living standards and grant more political and economic freedoms. Some
experts believe that while th ese innocent desires of nations are legitimate, they still
result in a potentially dang erous confrontation with Russia and therefore need to be
resisted. The European Union was blam ed for its willingness to accommodate the
Ukrainians’ desire to join th e Association Agreement. Henry Kissinger, former U.S.
National Security Adviser, wrote in the Washington Post , “The European Union must
recognize that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the strategic element
to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’ s relationship to Eu rope contributed to
turning a negotiation into a crisis.”6 John Mearsheimer wrote in Foreign Affairs that
liberal delusions provoked Putin to aggressive actions.7
While Kissinger recognized that “Ukrai ne should have the right to choose
freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe,” he also said

6 Henry Kissinger, “To Settle the Uk rainian Crisis, start at the end,” The Washington Post,
March 5, 2014 , https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-
ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-en d/2014/03/05/46dad868 -a496-11e3-8466-
d34c451760b9_story.html.
7 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault,” Foreign Affairs , Aug. 18,
2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.c om/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-
west-s-fault .

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that Ukraine should not join NATO, clearly implying to Russian resistance to that
development scenario, thus recognizing limits to Ukrainian so vereignty. Coming
from deep realist roots, Kissinger also sets Finland as a model for Ukraine’s
international relations: “That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence
and cooperates with the West in most fields, but carefully avoids institutional hostility
toward Russia.”8 He avoids an analysis of the cost that Finland paid to the Soviet
Union after the 1940 invasion of Soviet tr oops: one-third of Finland’s territory and
strict limits to its sovereignty which has lasted to this day. He also ignores multiple
concessions by Ukraine to accommodate Russian interests. In addition, both
Kissinger and Mearsheimer negl ect the legality of the Russian actions in Ukraine.
Russia had no legal ground for its inter vention in Crimea and other regions of
Eastern Ukraine. There was no political separatism or movement for self-
determination in those territories that could create any ground for political, let alone
military, intervention. The conflicts were manipulated by the Russian Federation to
create an artificial post-factum pretext for the intervention.
In this context, it is important to look at the legal context of the conflict in
Ukraine. Analyzing Mearsheime r’s arguments that “liberal delusions” led the West to
adopt “provocative policies” and that these “p recipitated the crisis in the first place,”
Robert Grant from the University of Ca mbridge makes an important observation.
He writes:

Mearsheimer’s thesis rests on the assump tion that ‘strategic interests’ trump
vested rights. But rights are the main stay of law. To say that one thing
trumps another without considering the force and effect of that other thing
is, at best, sloppy thinking. Russia has no right cognizable under law
against the territorial integrity of its ne ighbors. In truth, Russia does not
even have a claim against its neighbors—none, at least, was articulated
before 2014, and the opposite was articu lated often. Russi a repeatedly, by
treaty and by practice, virtually si nce 1991, and without reservation,
acknowledged the sovereig nty of its neighbors within the borders that they
inherited upon independence. ”9

And then Grant quotes the International Court of Justice judgment:
A prohibited intervention must . . . be one bearing on matters in which
each State is permitted, by the princi ple of State sovereignty, to decide
freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and
cultural system and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is
wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices,
which must remain free one s. State sovereignty ev idently extends to the
area of its foreign policy, and there is no rule of customary international

8 Kissinger, “To Settle the Ukrain ian Crisis, start at the end.”
9 Robert Grant, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: What does International Law Have to Say?”
Lawfare, 2015 , https://www.lawfareblog.com/russi as-invasion-ukraine-what-does-
international-law-have-say.

Spring 2018 | 209Can Russia’s Quest for the New International Order Succeed? TSERETELI
law to prevent a State from choosing and conducting a fo reign policy in co-
ordination with that of another State.10

Thus, debate, initiated by respected scholars and statesmen, intentionally or
unintentionally, leads to recognition of asym metry in the sovereignty of states based on
their size and military might, a reality that w ill have consequences fo r stability, not only
in Europe, but also elsewhere in the world.
Russia clearly saw division in the rank s of Western politicians about their
approach to the sovereignty and independence of the former Russian satellites and has
capitalized on it since 2008, in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war. This divide
created an uncertainty toward the future of Eu rope’s security system in an environment
where the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states are no longer respected.
Russia views current developments as a success of its permanent war strategy,
which implies that war does not stop, but it occurs continuously in the form of
preparation for wars with varying intensity and centers of gravity. This is a war where
exerting political, economic, and cultural influence leads to organized chaos, direct
influence over an opponent, and eventually, internal collapse.11 The primary targets of
this new warfare strategy are Russia’s imme diate neighbors in the Black Sea region,
Ukraine, and Georgia, as well as Moldova. Bu t other Caucasus states, Baltic countries,
and even Belarus and Kazakhstan, the closest al lies of Russia, are also on the target list.
The West’s uncertainty about how to deal with Russia before the Ukraine crisis
was driven by the desire of European allie s, predominantly Germany, to use unilateral
concessions to accommodate Russian interes ts and avoid escalation. Even with
Russia’s annexation of Crim ea, invasion of Ukraine’s D onbass region, and provocative
military patrols over allied territory, NATO’s response remains within the framework
of international obligations, including the commitment to 1997 NATO-Russia
Founding Act, which implies limiting the “permanent stationing” of troops in Eastern
Europe in the “current and fo reseeable security environment.”12 The fact that the
“security environment” has drastically change d is not yet fully reflected in the Western
strategy. And while scale of military presence in NATO’s Eastern flank member states
has increase since 2016, the troops are th ere on a rotational basis, since Western
alliance still considers itself bound with 1997 Founding Act and CFE treaty.
Russia is confident that the West’s un certainty gradually will lead toward the
“necessity” of negotiations on a new Europe an security treaty, or a “new security
architecture,” to use Putin’s terminology. In this new European order, Russia will have
a veto right for EU and NATO expansion. In fact, by gaining territories and creating new conflicts with its leverage, Russia is impro ving its position for the negotiations that
Moscow believes will take pla ce. These Russian actions are a reflection of the West’s

10 Grant, quoting Judgment from ICJ Reports, June 27, 1986, pp. 14 and 108.
11 George Tsereteli, “Russia’s Warfare Strategy an d Borderization in Georgia,” The Central
Asia-Caucasus Analyst , 2015, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publica tions/analytical-articles/item/
13254-russia-warfare-strategy-borderization-georgia.html.
12 Marik String, NATO Unleashed: Stopping Russia in its Track, The National Interest , March 5,
2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-unleashed-stopping-russia-its-tracks-12363

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strategic retreat from the former Soviet space: first Russians stopped NATO and
Western hard power presence through its war in Georgia, and after “punishing”
Ukraine Russia tried to stop Western soft power influence by preventing countries
from having Association Agreements with the EU.
Global reflection on the events in Ukraine is also important. While the West at
least introduced sanctions against Russia for it s actions in Ukraine, countries like China,
India, and Turkey chose essentially to stay silent. The strategic implication of that
silence is that power may be used by other st ates in other parts of the world to limit the
sovereignty of smaller and weaker neighbors.
In considering the global significance , undoubtedly some countries with the
potential for nuclear development will look at Ukraine and make their own strategic
calculations. Treatment of Ukraine by Russia and by other guarantors of the Budapest
Agreement will serve as a stimulus for smalle r nuclear nations to keep their nuclear
arsenal, and for others to develop it.
Russian Gains vs. Russian Losses over Conflict in Ukraine—Snapshot of 2017

The Russian annexation of Crimea and its enhanced military presence on
Georgian soil, predominately in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, has improved Russia’s strategic position and its negotiation power with the West.
After annexing Crimea in 2014, Russia exponentially increased its military
presence in the area and established a platform for power projection there.
13 This
power projection was aimed not only at the Bl ack Sea, but also at the Mediterranean.
Since 2014, Russia has moved a significant nu mber of anti-air and anti-surface missile
systems onto the peninsula, systems that co uld hit targets in most of the Black Sea
region. Russia already has de ployed advanced Bastion miss ile systems on the peninsula,
systems that would allow Russia to destroy practically any target in the Black Sea. Russia seeks military dominance, limiting spac e for NATO’s naval pr esence, as well as
individual members of the alliance. This aggressive posture impacts the NATO
member states of the Black Sea—Turkey , Romania, and Bulgaria—as well as non-
NATO members—Georgia and Ukraine. Any country on the Black Sea is a potential target, and any moving object or infrastruc ture installation can be targeted. This
aggression poses a serious risk and creates cost implications for Black Sea trade and transit. Increased Russian military presence in the Black Sea potentially threatens the
functioning of the trade corridor between As ia and Europe, which has significance not
only for the littoral states, but also for greater global trade.
Increased Russian military presence in Georgia also gives Russia strategic
advantages. Prior to the c onflict in 2008, the only military base that Russia had in the
South Caucasus was in Gumri, Armenia. In times of potential crisis, providing

13 Department of Defense Press Br iefing by Gen. Breed love in the Pentagon Briefing Room,
February 25, 2015, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-
View/Article/607020/department-of-defense- press-briefing-by-gen-breedlove-in-the-
pentagon-briefing/

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logistical support for the base from the nearest Russian bases in North Caucasus was
challenging. With a total of 7,000 troops and several military bases in both Abkhazia
and the Tskhinvali region, Gumri is now much easier to reach. In addition, a military
presence standing in close proximity to the ma in East-West highway in Georgia, as well
as the railroad line which connects the Caspian Sea to the main ports on the Black Sea,
also gives Russia strategic advantage.
But Russian actions also have had negati ve consequences for Russian interests
in the region. With his action in Ukraine, Putin ended the Western perception that Russia was an actor that respected the pos t-Cold War order. He also shattered the
perception in Western Europe and the United States that Russia no longer represents a
strategic threat to the West.
In his July 2015 confirmation hearing to become the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Joseph Dunford to ld the Senate Armed Services committee that
“Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security.”
14 This concern
represented a dramatic shift in strategic thin king in the United States and Europe since
the late 1990s. If the Russian invasion of Georgia was perceived as an episode, the
Russian annexation of Crimea and manipulati on of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine have
transformed strategic thinking.
By raising the temperature in relations with the West, Russia has forced
military planners to consider containment pl ans. The paradox is that instead of
pushing NATO away from its borders, Russia , in fact, has invited more NATO troops
closer to its border, and for more pro-ac tive actions on the West’s part. Russian
aggression in Ukraine already has caused Ukraine’s decision to abandon its nonaligned
status and may lead to greater NATO-Ukrainian cooperation. Another interesting development is an opening of the joint NATO-Georgia training center in Tbilisi that brings Georgia one step closer in the long process of NATO integration. The
cooperation and multiple joint exercises ca n further promote institutional integration
and comparability of the Ukrainian and Georgian military forces with the Euro-Atlantic
security arrangements. Although this development does not guarantee future
membership, it certainly leads to greater co llaboration. Today, due to NATO member
states’ fear of Russian threat, there are more U.S. and NATO troops in the Baltic states,
Poland, and Romania than ever before. And in the context of Ukraine and Georgia, by
the end of 2017 the U.S. Department of St ate had approved sales of anti-tank Javelin
missiles to Georgia and Ukraine, the decisi on that Georgia was asking for since 2008,
and Ukraine – since 2014.
15

14 Jamie Crawford, “2015 Join t Chiefs nominee: Russia greatest threat to U.S.,” CNN , July 10,
2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/09/politics/jo seph-dunford-russia-greatest-threat/.
15 US Says it will Enhance Ukraine’s Defensive Capabilit ies; Russia Derides Move, RFE/RL ,
December 23, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/ a/us-ukraine-enhanced-w eapons-javelin-missiles-
russia-separatists/28934551.html , and US Department of State Approves Possible Sale of
Javelin Missiles to Georgia, Defense Blog , November 21, 2017, http://defence-blog.com/
army/us-department-of-state-approves-possibl e-sale-of-javelin-missiles-to-georgia.html .

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The Case of Kosovo—An Important Element of the Russian Narrative

The West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence is at the core of the Russian
narrative for justifying the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, as
well as the annexing Crimea in 2014. The st rategic, political, and security implication of
recognizing Kosovo’s independence in Februar y 2008 against the will of Serbia is an
important subject for analysis. This action became the alleged trig ger for Russia’s very
aggressive actions toward its neighbors, a imed at limiting sovereignty and preventing
integration of former Soviet Union states into the European and Transatlantic economic and military-security institutions. Against the backdrop of the West’s emphasis on the “uniqueness” of the Ko sovo case, Putin and members of his
government threatened to use the “precedent ” of Kosovo and apply it to conflict areas
of the former Soviet Union.
In January 2006, while speaking at an annual press conference in the Kremlin,
Putin declared that a “univers al principle” should be applied when dealing with “frozen
conflicts,” and Kosovo could serve as a mo del for resolving conflicts in post-Soviet
space. “If someone thinks that Kosovo can be granted full independence, then why
should we refuse this to Abkhazians or Sout h Ossetians? We know, for example, that
Turkey has recognized the Republic of North Cyprus.”
16
In March 2006, the Spea ker of the Federation Council Sergey Mironov
mirrored Putin’s words: “We are closely watching what is happening in Kosovo. The
situation there is very similar to South Ossetia, and they are heading toward the
establishment of an independent state.”17
Russia then qualified the recognition of the independence of Kosovo as a
violation of international law. Minister of Foreign Affairs Se rgey Lavrov, in a
November 2006 interview with the news magazine Itogi, indicated that “When we’re
saying that unilateral actions regarding Kosovo would create a precedent, we act just so
as to prevent a violation of international la w and the creation of such precedent. We
are perfectly aware what consequences this may have for other unrecognized
territories.”18 Putin continued this theme in harsh terms days before the declaration of
Kosovo’s independence by the regional gove rnment there. On February 15, 2008, the
press reported Putin’s position that any declaration of statehood by Pristina would be “illegal, ill-conceived and immoral. Other co untries look after their interests. We
consider it appropriate to look after our interests. We have done some homework and

16 “Tbilisi Fears Russia’s Policy of ‘Uni versality,’” CIVIL.GE, Feb. 2, 2006,
http://www.civil.ge/eng /_print.php?id=11688.
17 “Russia Sees Kosovo as the Answer,” The Moscow Times, March 29, 2006,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/ 2006/3/article/russia-sees-kosovo-as-the-
answer/205957.html.
18 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Interview with Weekly News Magazine Itogi,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of th e Russian Federation, Nov. 26, 2006,
http://archive.mid.ru//b domp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a 7b43256999005bcbb3/ac2f66757
c3a2c25c32573a20038456d!OpenDocument.

Spring 2018 | 213Can Russia’s Quest for the New International Order Succeed? TSERETELI
we know what we will do.”19 At the time, these threats clearly were aimed at Georgia
and its sovereign rights in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region.
A few days later, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement: “Kosovo’s
Provisional Institutions of Self-Governmen t declared a unilateral proclamation of
independence of the province, thus violating the sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia,
the Charter of the United Nations, UNSCR 1244, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework, an d the high-level Contact Group accords.”
The statement further indicated that Russia fully supports Serbia’s territorial integrity
and that they expect that both the UN and NATO would “take immediate action to fulfill their mandates as authorized by th e Security Council, including voiding the
decisions of Pristina’s self-governing inst itutions and adopting severe administrative
measures against them.”
20
The West’s, and predominantly the Uni ted States’, decision to recognize
Kosovo’s independence was made without adequate understanding of the potential
consequences for the areas of “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet space. It appears
now that Western calculations of the Ru ssian response did not include the radical
actions of Russia in Abkhazia or other c onflict areas. If there were any mitigation
strategy for that potential outcome, then it clearly did not work. The reality is that
while Russia used “frozen conflicts” in Mo ldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan for its own
benefit, Moscow used them as a justificat ion for maintaining its presence and control
over these countries for almost two decades. Russia never recognized any separatist
territories’ independence before the West’s recognition of Kosovo. It was naïve to
expect that Russia would accept the uniquene ss of the Kosovo case and continue to
stay in the legal framework in its own neighborhood after Kosovo’s independence.
Another important factor impacting Russia’s decisions on recognizing
Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independen ce is the legal aspect of Kosovo’s
recognition. There is a per ception gap on the legality of that decision outside of the
UN Security Council framework: while the West focuses on the legality of the
protection of human lives in the context of all the atrocities conducted by the Slobodan
Milosevich regime in the former Yugoslavia, Russia is focusing on the UN role in the
decision-making process. And with a lack of Security Council support for Kosovo’s
independence, it seems that not enough was done to reduce that gap.
Ambassador John Bolton, former U.S. envoy to the UN, in a February 2008
presentation, indicated one aspect of the process: by setting up the deadline for
negotiations on Kosovo’s status and by indicating that failed negotiations would mean the independence of Kosovo, no incentives we re set for Kosovar Albanians to agree on
anything other than full independence from Serbia in their negotiations with the
Serbian government. There are different opi nions for what really drove the rushed
decision on Kosovo’s independence. Among others, those are: President George W.
Bush’s promise to Albanians; the context of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a
desire in the U.S. administration at the time to take a positive step towards the Muslim

19 Luke Harding, “Kosovo br eakaway illegal, says Putin,” The Guardian , Feb. 15, 2008,
http://www.theguardian.com/wor ld/2008/feb/15/russia.kosovo.
20 Statement by Russia’s Ministry Of Foreign Affairs On Kosovo , The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of The Russ ian Federation, 2008.

214 | OrbisTSERETELICan Russia’s Quest for the New International Order Succeed?
communities outside the war zones. Kosovo was seen as an opportunity for creating a
new Muslim state in Europe. This action wa s supposed to demonstrate to the world
the nonbiased and just nature of decision making in Washington and major European capitals.
After Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Ko sovo card re-emerged in the Russian
narrative in the Ukraine context. On Ma rch 18, 2014, President Putin called for the
Russian Duma to support the annexation of Crimea and said that Crimea’s secession
from Ukraine was just like Kosovo’s secession from Serbia. Any arguments otherwise
were viewed as just attempts to bend the We st-advocated rules that were applied to the
Kosovo case. “Our Western partners cr eated the Kosovo precedent with their own
hands. In a situation absolutely the same as the one in Crimea they recognized
Kosovo’s secession from Serbia legitimate while arguing that no permission from a
country’s central author ity for a unilateral declaration of independence is necessary.”
Putin also mentioned in that speech that the UN International Court of Justice agreed
to those arguments. He dismissed the contention that Kosovo was unique due to the
many victims during the Balkan wars. He also dismissed the allega tions that Russia was
violating international law with its actions in Uk raine. “Well it’s good that they at least
recalled that there is international law. Thank you very much. Better late than
never.”21
Obviously, there are serious inconsisten cies in Russia’s position. As some
experts indicate, what Putin did in Ukraine “i s in part retaliation for what the United
States did in Kosovo over Russian objections. But that is quite different from claiming
Kosovo constitutes a precedent.”22 Russia always has argu ed about the importance of
UN approval for any decision on Kosovo. But Russia ignored the UN’s position on
Georgia and Ukraine. While there was ma jor international involvement in Kosovo,
Russia prohibits any involvement by international organizations, including the UN, on
issues related to Crimea or Eastern Ukraine. In fact, in the Kosovo case, Russia played
an active role in urging Milosevic to yield control of Kosovo to NATO.
The key argument for why NATO interve ned against Serbia was to protect
Albanians from ethnic cleansing, war crime s, and crimes against humanity. There were
no atrocities committed against Russian speaki ng populations of Crimea or in Eastern
Ukraine. This reality make s the Kosovo comparison inadequate. And in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, ethnic cleans ing was conducted against the Georgian population of both
regions.
Another important argument against using the Kosovo precedent is that
neither the United States nor any other major power had any intention of annexing
Kosovo. Meanwhile, Russia has annexed Crimea and has initiated a campaign of
revival for the term “Novorossiya,” the ei ghteenth century Imperial Russian term for
the territory north of the Black Sea that includes the East and South of Ukraine and

21 “Putin: Crimea similar to Kosovo, West is rewriting its own rule book,” RT, March 18,
2014, http://www.rt.com/news/putin-address-parliament-crimea-562/.
22 Daniel Sewer, “Putin’s Petard,” Peacefare, Jan. 28, 2015, http://www.peacefare.net/
2015/01/28/putins-petard/.

Spring 2018 | 215Can Russia’s Quest for the New International Order Succeed? TSERETELI
parts of Moldova. The parallel exists though between the policies of Yugoslav
President Milosevich and Pr esident Putin’s policies in the Russian neighborhood.
Russia is engaged in the same pattern of creating problems in order to control
territory—starting with “protecting of minorities” and ending with military presence,
occupation, or, as the Crime a case shows, annexation. T h i s i s a s t r a t e g y o f
destabilization and control which starts with ethno-political manipulation that evolves
into using military and paramilitary means. “The pattern is a familiar one: exaggerated
reports of mistreatment, organization of militias to protect against largely fictional
mistreatment, provocation by those militias against legitimate state forces, then
intervention to protect co-nationals from any efforts to restore law and order.”23 This
was a scenario in Abkhazia, Transnistria, an d South Ossetia in the 1990s, and again in
2008, prior to the Russian military intervention into Georgia. This was the scenario in
Ukraine as well.
Bottom line: there was not a new reality on the ground, with the potential of
Moscow recognizing the independence of se veral newly created illegal state entities,
again using the “precedent” of Kosovo. The Russian narrative in Ukraine is similar to
the Russian narrative in Georgia since the ea rly 1990s: Ukrainian “nationalists” target
the “peaceful” Russian minority in Eastern Ukraine and thus Russia is forced to take
action. One may expect similar developmen ts in Kazakhstan, Baltic states, or
elsewhere, where Russia finds it suitable for its own interests to apply the “Kosovo”
model.
Russian Interests and Changing Strategic Dynamics in the Black Sea Region

The Black Sea today represents the interests of multiple global and regional
actors; these interests are transforming the geopolitical environment of the Black Sea region.

The Novorossiysk Commercia l Sea Port (Wikimedia)

23 Sewer, “Putin’s Petard.”

216 | OrbisTSERETELICan Russia’s Quest for the New International Order Succeed?
The Black Sea is an important import and export gateway for the Russian
Federation. The Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port is one of the largest
transportation hubs in Russia. It has the largest cargo turnover among Russian ports
and the fifth largest in Europe. Novoross iysk port handles appr oximately 20 percent
of all export and import cargoes shipped via Russian Sea ports. The port cities of
Novorossiysk and Tuapse are also major oil export outlets, with Novorossiysk
playing an increasing role in the export of Ural and Siberian light crude oil.
Russia already exports about 13 billion cubic meters (BCM) of gas to Turkey
via Blue Stream pipeline and is building another pipeline, Turkstream, with an initial capacity of 16 BCM. Th e construction of the pipeli ne was commenced on May 7,
2017 in the Black Sea near the Russian coas t. On June 23, 2017, the docking of the
shallow and deep-water parts of the TurkStream gas pipeline took place, and the
laying of the deep-water section began. While increasing Turkish dependence on
Russian gas, this pipeline is clearly harming Ukrainian, Moldovan, and other downstream and transit market interests. Turkstream will also compete with the
South Caucasus Pipeline-TANAP (Trans-A natolian Pipeline)-TAP (Trans-Adriatic
Pipeline) pipeline system, connecting Azerb aijani Shah-Deniz field, via Georgia,
Turkey, Greece, and Albania to Italy, with a link from Greece to Bulgaria. The South
Caucasus pipeline and TANAP are mostly completed and will be able to transship
Azeri gas already in 2018, thus improving energy security for Turkey, Bulgaria, and
others. But Turkstream will give Russia n Gazprom an opportunity for price wars
and other manipulations vis-à-vis Azerbaijani gas.
Overall, Russia has strong current and future commercial interests in the
Black Sea and undoubtedly is not interested in a radical escalation of conflict with the
West in the area. This situation gives NATO and the United States an opportunity to lead towards strategic co-existence in the region, working with other actors who are
also interested in the stability of the area.
Sanctions were the West’s major policy answer to the Russian annexation of
Crimea. Only after Russia began to move military equipment into Crimea did
NATO and the United States start to enhance their deterrence capabilities in the
Black Sea, while at the same time avoiding escalation and confrontation with Russia.
In line with these strategies, NATO and it s allies held several military exercises in
2016-2017 in the Black Sea region, sendin g cautionary signals to Moscow that
Russian actions are on notice.

Turkey and Russia

Turkey is an actor with traditional inter ests in the Black Sea region. It is a
major NATO member and a Black Sea state. In fact, Turkey was the frontline
country during the Cold War and served as a major balancing power in the Black Sea
region vis-à-vis Russia after the Soviet Union’s collapse. But due to increased tensions with its Western allies, as well as its economic priority of deepening
profitable trade and economic ties with Ru ssia, Turkey has retreated gradually from
its position as the vanguard of the Western strategic interests in the Black Sea.

Spring 2018 | 217Can Russia’s Quest for the New International Order Succeed? TSERETELI
Turkey had a cautious reaction to Russia ’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, as
well as the escalation of conf lict in Ukraine in 2013-201 4. While Turkey did not
recognize Russian rights over Crimea and condemned the annexation, it passed on
joining international sanctions against Russ ia. The later escalation of the Russian-
Turkish tensions over the downed Russian military plane at the Syrian border, and
the follow-up Russian pressure on Turkey created different dynamics in the bilateral
Turkish-Russian relationships. Russia clearly came out as the winner in this confrontation. Turkey was forced to apologize for the downed plane and has signed on to the Russian plan to build the new Tu rkstream pipeline, which competes with
the strategically important TANAP pipeline which Turkey strongly supports.
In addition to energy cooperation, Tu rkey recently conducted several naval
military exercises with Russia, which may be another reflection of Turkey’s desire to
keep economic ties with Russia. But all these compromises have geopolitical costs
which may not be understood fully today. Turkey cannot be blamed solely for the
concessions it was forced to make in the Black Sea region. The uncertainty of U.S.
policies over Syria and the conflict’s esca lation in the past exposed Turkey’s
vulnerabilities. Russia exploited those vuln erabilities due to a lack of coordinated
strategy between Turkey and its Western allies.
Despite all these issues, Turkey unde rstands the threat of an increased
Russian domination in the Black Sea an d is willing to accommodate increased
Western naval presence there. That is wh y Turkey is an active part of the naval
exercises in the region, including the larges t Sea Breeze exercise in history in 2017.
The exercises included the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania,
as well as ten other countries. Yet, it will be difficult to expect pro-active
independent moves from Turkey in the process of balancing Russia.

Asian Countries and the Black Sea

There is a growing interest in the Bl ack Sea from Asian countries. Trade
between Europe and Asia is growing, an d Asian producers and European importers
are looking for faster ways to deliver bu siness orders to European consumers at
competitive prices. The Black Sea is destin ed to play a larger role in the Asia-
Caucasus-Europe trade and transit corridor. One potentially attractive option is the
multimodal transportation network from Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan via the
Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan, then to Georgia’s Black Sea ports or Turkey’s
transportation system to Europe and the Mediterranean. The countries of Central
Asia and the South Caucasus are making significant investments in developing their
infrastructure. Afghanistan and Iran al so are looking at different options for
transportation investment in an effort to improve trade with European countries.
The new railway line between China an d Aktau, a port on the Caspian Sea,
reduced the time of transshipment via Kazakhstan. Developing port infrastructure in Aktau, Turkmenbashi, and Alat near Ba ku should improve connectivity in the
Caspian Sea. The expansion project in the port of Poti and the development of the
new deep water port Anaklia in Georgia will make it easy to se rvice the increased
flow of cargo. By connec ting Georgian ports to ports in Ukraine, Romania, and

218 | OrbisTSERETELICan Russia’s Quest for the New International Order Succeed?
Bulgaria and by creating preferable comme rcial terms, Black Sea countries will attract
significant volumes of cargos.
China: New Actor in the Neighborhood

Discussion about the new strategic en vironment in the Black Sea region
cannot be completed without considering the impact of the new actor in this region:
the People’s Republic of China. China is looking at the Black Sea as a natural
extension of the One Belt One Road Initiati ve. China already has $60 billion in trade
with Central and East European (CEE) countr ies and has initiated the so-called 16+1
group with 16 Central and East European Countries, which includes two Black Sea
littoral states, Bulgaria and Romania.
24 This group already has a secretariat,
organizational structure, and a fairly active life.
At the most recent Riga Summit of the group in 2016, China’s Prime
Minister Li Keqiang and CEE leaders agre ed to enhance pragmatic cooperation and
increase people-to-people exchanges to unle ash each other’s advantages. The leaders
reaffirmed their support for the cooperation initiative involving the ports on the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas, and along the inland waterways. Beijing views the
Black Sea as an important channel for cooperation with Central and Eastern
European countries.
China’s European and global ambitions were well demonstrated in the joint
Chinese-Russian naval military exercises in th e Baltic Sea, called Joint Sea 2017. And
while Beijing has no immediate plans for a s ecurity presence in the Black Sea region,
China’s economic presence will have strategic implications.

Strategic Option: Symmetry in Power Politics
Despite some signs of strength, Russia is a declining power, with poor
demographics and a stagnating economy. More importantly, however, Russia is a
country with a weak and corrupt government that can offer little to other nations
regarding innovation and progress. Even countries that are heavily dependent on
trade and remittances from Russia are trying to escape from Mo scow’s influence.
While the European Union under the NATO security umbrella offers stability and
prosperity to the citizens of the countrie s who voluntarily want to join, the Russian
Federation is forcing countries into the Eura sian Union, offering as an alternative
confrontation, dismemberment, instability, and corrupt governance.
Developments in the conflict areas of the Black Sea-Casp ian region indicate
that there is a clear attempt by the Russi an Federation to limit the sovereignty of
Ukraine, as well as Georgi a, Moldova, and other states. By creating and then

24 The 16 countries include 11 EU Member Sta tes and 5 Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croati a, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia , Slovakia, Slovenia, Macedonia),
http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/poli cy/multilateral-relations/cooperation-between-central-and-
eastern-european-countries-and-china.

Spring 2018 | 219Can Russia’s Quest for the New International Order Succeed? TSERETELI
manipulating conflicts, Russia is gaining leverage over the decision making on
political and economic development, governan ce issues, and the external alliances of
those countries. Russian policy is directed at institutionalizing the asymmetry of
sovereignty between the Russian Federat ion and its neighbors. This policy limits
small nations’ ability to exercise their sovere ign rights on integration in international
organizations. Simultaneously, it gives Ru ssia the right to decide the level of
sovereignty possessed by each of its neighbors.
The international implication of this proces s, if allowed to prevail, establishes
a twenty-first century “Monroe Doctrine” pr ecedent in the Russian neighborhood. It
also tempts other global or regional powers to copy the “doctrine” in their own
regions, leading to othe r small or larger conflicts. The capacity of small countries is
not enough to resist this process. The international community needs to mobilize to
resist these attempts to destroy the internati onal system based on the sovereignty of
nation states and to prevent deeper destabilization around the globe.

Looking Ahead
It is in the interest of global stability to bring Russia back into the system of
international norms and rules. This goal ca n only be achieved by understanding what
President Putin and current Russian leaders are thinking and operating based on Cold
War paradigms. Russia understands the language of great power politics. One
scenario that may lead to Russia’s retu rn to the OSCE framework (the framework
that was created with participation of the Soviet Union and then Russia) is for United States and NATO declaring a temporar y hold on the CFE treaty and the 1997
NATO-Russia Founding Act limitations on the size of troop deployments and equipment in Central and Eastern Europe, an d deploying military forces in the Black
Sea to match the Russian military power in the area in terms of the size of forces and
type of equipment. These forces should remain in the area until Russia removes its
military equipment and personnel from the co nflict areas in Georgia, Moldova, and
Ukraine, including Crimea.
This scenario is not risk free. Th ere is always a possibility of tensions
escalating which may lead to conflict, but it is not in Russia’s military-security, or
political and economic interest to esca late relationships with the West in
the Black Sea area.