Specialization: Navigatie si Transport Maritim Limba Engleza Marine accident or human error. Case study: ships Arctic Ocean, Maritime Lady and Sunny… [302878]

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Specialization: Navigatie si Transport Maritim Limba Engleza Marine accident or human error. Case study: ships Arctic Ocean, Maritime Lady and Sunny… [302878]

Byadmin ianuarie 1, 2024

UNIVERSITATEA MARITIMĂ CONSTANȚA

FACULTATEA DE NAVIGAȚIE ȘI TRANSPORT NAVAL

PROIECT DE DIPLOMĂ

Scientific coordinator

Conf. Dumitrache Cosmin

Absolvent: [anonimizat]: Navigatie si Transport Maritim Limba Engleza

Marine accident or human error. Case study: [anonimizat]. Dumitrache Cosmin

Graduate

Andrei LUCA

Constanța

Year IV

Statement

I, [anonimizat], entitled “Marine accident or human error.case study: [anonimizat]” has been drawn up by myself and so far has not been defended in any other higher education institution in Romania or abroad.

Constanța, data

Graduate Andrei LUCA

Content

Introduction 6

1. General information 8

1.1. Vassel Involved in accident 8

1.1.1. Particulars of Arctic Ocean 8

1.1.2. Particulars of Sunny Blossom 8

1.1.3. Particulars of Maritime Lady 8

1.2. General details of vessel Arctic Ocean and her crew 8

1.2.1. Arctic Ocean 8

1.2.2. General Arrangement 8

1.2.3. Propulsion 8

1.2.4. Cargo 8

1.2.5. Crew 8

1.2.6. Previous Incident 8

1.3. [anonimizat] 8

1.3.1. Sunny Blossom 8

1.3.2. General Arrangement 8

1.3.3. Propulsion 8

1.3.4. Cargo 8

1.3.5. Crew 8

1.3.6. Previous Incident 8

1.4. [anonimizat] 8

1.4.1. Maritime Lady 8

1.4.2. General Arrangement 8

1.4.3. Propulsion 8

1.4.4. Cargo 8

1.4.5. Crew 8

1.4.6. Previous Incident 8

1.5. Naration 8

1.5.1. Events related to Arctic Ocean 8

1.5.2. Events related to Sunny Blossom 8

1.5.3. Events related to Maritime Lady 10

1.6. Emergency response 28

1.7. Tidal and weather conditions 8

1.8. Vessels damaged in accident 8

1.8.1. Arctic Ocean 8

1.8.2. Sunny Blossom 8

1.8.3. Maritime Lady 8

1.9. Elbe River 8

1.9.1. Geography zone 8

1.9.2. Pilotage and helmsmen in this area 8

1.9.3. VTS Service 8

1.9.4. The right of navigating in a fairway 8

1.10. Kiel Canal 8

1.10.1. Geographical area 8

1.10.2. Pilotage and helmsmen 8

1.10.3. VTS canal 8

1.10.4. Brunsbütel Locks 8

1.11. [anonimizat], collisions in the region that happens before 8

2. Analys 10

2.1. Fatigue 10

2.1.1. Arctic Ocean 10

2.1.2. Sunny Blossom 10

2.1.3. Maritime Lady 10

2.2. Aim 10

2.3. The moment of approapch between Maritime Lady and Arctic Ocean 10

2.4. [anonimizat] 10

2.5. Masters’ manning and workloads 10

2.5.1. Arctic Ocean 10

2.5.2. Maritime Lady 10

2.5.3. Lookouts 10

2.6. Vessels entering The Elbe river from Brunsbüttel locks 10

2.6. Collision between Sunny Blossom and Maritime Lady 10

2.6.1. Overview of the collision 10

2.6.2. Opening back theBrunsbüttel Lock 10

2.6.3. Emergency Policy operated by Federal Waterways and Shipping Administration 10

2.6.4. International Marine Safety Management 10

2.6.5. Actions that was taken on board of Sunny Blossom 10

2.6.6. Grounding of Sunny Blossom vessel 10

2.7. Emergency actions related to the colision 10

2.7.1. Shore Units 10

2.7.2. Arctic Ocean 10

2.7.3. Sunny Blossom 10

2.7.4. Maritime Lady 10

2.8. Potential Consequences and the pollution hazards 10

3. [anonimizat] 12

3.1. [anonimizat]’s [anonimizat] Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs and not least from the owners of Martime Lady and Arctic Ocean 12

3.2. Actions Taken by WSD North 12

Conclusions 14

Anexe 15

Anexa 1 – Graficul implementării 15

Anexa 2 – Structura B 15

Bibliografie 16

Introduction

Most of maritime disasters happen outside of war. All ships, civil and military, are vulnerable to problems from faulty design, weather conditions or human error. The collision witch I am going to relate and describe in the next part of my project is not an exception. To start from beginning, a “naval accident” means an event which result with at least one of the next:

Material loss on a ship

Material loss caused by operations on ship or by ship itself

Grounding or lack of command of a ship, involving a ship in a collision

Pollution

Lost a man overboard, injury or death of a person onboard ship due operations on ship

In my project I want to describe an accident At 1955 on 5 December 2005, when the UK registered vessel with 6326GT a container feeder more exactly, Arctic Ocean, that was leaving Brunsbüttel Lock basin and turn east and cross the westbound fairway of the Elbe River and heading to Hamburg. In the same time, the Gibraltar registered a general cargo ship with 1857GT named Maritime Lady witch was in the westbound, fairway and approaching the exit witch was from the lock basin and then heading to the North Sea.

At 1987 the disaster was hapend, and this two vessels specified a little higher collided, the result was that the Maritime Lady was capsized. All the crew were evacuated fast and safely. Arctic Ocean on the other part suffered minimal damage.

None of vessels was required to carry a pilot. On the Arctic Ocean the master held a Pilotage Exemption certificate and on the Maritime Lady was not a big ship in size to need a pilot. Both masters were attempting to carry out all the duties of pilot and in the same time the watchkeeping officer. This actions of them, caused to eachone to be overloaded when was critical stage in their vessel’s passage.The Maritime Lady witch remains capsized, drifted in a strong ebb stream and rest for about 30 minutes after the collision happened in a position in the westbound fairway, withc was located on 0.75miles on basin of Brunsbüttel Locks south-west the exit.

After the accident, the area of Brunsbüttel Locks were closed until 2100. The first vessel after the closing period expires was Sunny Blossom the chemical tanker Bahamian registered with 11598gt. This ship had a pilot on board and was to to the North Sea, after leaving the lock’s exit basin.

After the leaving of the lock basin, Sunny Blossom attempted to make the turn to the west, and in that moment her stern struck in the wreck of Maritime lady, causing serious damage on propeller and lost the propulsion. The ship continued to drift south, across the Elbe River, until she grounded. On grounding her hull was limited damaged, and from that cause no pollution was caused. Sunny Blossom’s vessel ability to make turn to west and clear the Maritime Lady wreck was not well calculated.

In addition to this error of judgment was a ebb tide, some cropping of Sunny Blossom’s main propeller, affected the rudder area and being at the lower end of its acceptable limits and the effects in shallow waters in the exit of lock basin. There was a failure in the same time to recognise and take the risk posed by the wreck of Maritime Lady witch was in the fairway before the traffic was reopened on Brunsbüttel locks.

Recommendations have been made to the owners of both Maritime Lady vessel and Arctic Ocean, to review advice to their masters and offer training in the management of bridge personnel and resources.The UK Hydrographic Office has been recommended to review its Sailing Directions for the Elbe River to remove any possible confusion over a vessel’s right of way. The Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs was recommended to review:; emergency procedures; requirements for bridge manning levels on both vessels in its pilotage waters procedures covering the briefing of vessels leaving Brunsbüttel Locks to enter the Elbe; prioritisation tasks of VTS operators’; its advice to mariners related to the strength and other characteristics of the tidal stream witch is found in the Elbe River south of Brunsbüttel Locks.

Factual Information

This investigation has made under The International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) ‘Code for the Investigation of Marine Accidents and Incidents’. It’s involving the maritime administration of four nations: Germany, UK, Bahamas and Gibraltar. The exchange of information between the represented investigators from each nation represents that these parties was free and was offering in the spirit of a mutual co-operation. All parties work togheter to accomplish the same objective, that of identifying the lessons in order to improve safety at sea and in the same time the safety of mariners.

It is unfortunate that this cooperations between investigators is not like the cooperation between the masters of the two vessels and investigators. The (NvD) , Nautical supervisor of VTS Brunsbüttel and master of Maritime Lady were important witnesses to events that was happened and were unwilling to share what they know and recollections with the investigators.

There are severe consequences when witnesses decide not to share their informations with the investigators. The results for this non-cooperation are in lost lessons and also material that can bring out important changes to ship design, safety regulations, ship manning snd so on. The commercial arms of this shipping industry are be affected by the policy; failure in reducing accident rates affects in the same time insurance costs, loses shipowners’ revenue and most important damages their image and reputations.

Under UK law, the obligation Maritime Lady master was to be interviewed by MAIB Inspectors remains. He and his advisers must know that a visit in the UK, or servicing on a UK ship, will offer that opportunity to inspectors. In that case he provides important new evidence, and made possible that investigation to be reopened.

To a degree, this report appear to indicate that Arctic Ocean could, or must do more to avoid the collision with Maritime Lady. But this was be an unfair interpretation and see the result of the investigation to have inadequate or reliable information about what actions or what intentions has the master of Maritime Lady.

Under German law, a witness is able to refuse to answer questions, the answers something that might incriminate him. Even though it is not the aim of marine accident investigations to determine faulty liability, behaviour, or claims, and individual statements that are protected from make them accessible to other entities, as these interviews was conducted under German jurisdiction, and the right to remain silent has been respected by the accident of investigation bodies.

Vassel Involved in accident

1.1.1. Particulars of Arctic Ocean

1.1.2. Particulars of Sunny Blossom

1.1.3. Particulars of Maritime Lady

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Reproduced from Admiralty Chart 3262 by permission of the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Office (CHART AREA) Figure 1

General details of vessel Arctic Ocean and her crew

1.2.1. Arctic Ocean

1.2.2. General Arrangement

Arctic Ocean was built by J.J.Sietas KG Schiffswerft GmbH & Co, Hamburg in 1995. Accommodation and wheelhouse are right aft, she is a is a fully cellular containership, and she can carry 660 twenty foot equivalent unit (TEU) containers in the four cargo holds and also on deck. The cargo holds are well surrounded by double bottoms, and wing tanks, and the vessel carries 150t of gas oil for her auxiliary engines and approximately 680t of heavy fuel oil for her main engine and.

She is a typical ‘feeder’ vessel witch operating in European waters, although her hull is ice strengthened. Many of his service was in the Baltic Sea.

About lifesaving appliances, this include one enclosed free-fall lifeboat witch can be launched from the stern, and a rigid hulled rescue boat on her starboard quarter for six persons, launched from a crane. Three inflatable life rafts which are carried; 2 x 20 persons units aft and also 1 for 6 persons forward.

1.2.3. Propulsion

The propulsion is made by a single controllable pitch propeller witch is driven by a six cylinder diesel engine, this running at 425rpm, burning heavy fuel oil. Propeller control is a normally one, by a single control lever and that is located on the bridge console.

A generator can be driven by the main engine. Two other generators are driven by independent of the diesel engine.

1.2.4. Cargo

Ten units goods were loaded in Tallinn and Helsinki to be unloaded in Hamburg or Bremerhaven. These were cataloged by containing dangerous:

6 units of Class 5.1, UN Number 1463, stowed in the hold 1 unit of Class 3, UN Number 1263, stowed on deck

1 unit of Class 2.2, UN Number 3337, stowed on deck 1 unit of Class 9, UN Number 3077, stowed in the hold 1 unit of Class 2.2, UN Number 3159, stowed on deck

Of these substances, UN1263 and UN3077 were classified as Severe Marine Pollutants or Marine Pollutants

1.2.5. Crew

In the moment of collision on the Arctic Ocean vessel was members of crew, and one passenger. The crew which included the chief and the second officer, the chief and the second engineer and the master. The vessel’s SMD, (Safe Manning Document) specified 14 minimum crew to be carried. These numbers included a master, a chief mate, two engineers and two deck officers. However, when operating the ship in specified geographical limits, which included the Baltic Sea, the Safe Manning Document allowed the complement of crew to be reduced by one deck officer and one engineer.

The master and the passenger were Germans, the chief engineer and chief officer were originally from Ukraine and the remaining crew were Filipino.

None of deck officers or engineers had a UK Certificate of Competency, each had a CEC (Certificate of Equivalent Competency) issued by the vessel’s Flag State, the United Kingdom’s MCA (Maritime and Coastguard Agency). These Certificates of Equivalent Competency make the holders able to sail on UK ships on capacity specified by the (CEC), and were issued to follow MCA’s acceptance of certificates of competency that was issued by the national administration.

The master held a PEC (Pilotage Exemption Certificate) which him able to dispense with the services of a pilot in Arctic Ocean or in the Elbe River. The PEC was been resulted from an examination on 15 December 2004, and this act was valid until 14 December 2005.

1.2.6. Previous Incident

On 17 November 2005, on night the Arctic Ocean was off the Swedish coast, and bound for Kotka, Finland. The master witch was standing the 2000 to 2400 watch and, at approximate at 2330, allowed the AB lookout to leave the bridge and also to call the next watch and to undertake fire rounds.

After a few minutes later, at about 2335, the master was reporting some severe stomach cramps. He checked the radar and saw a fishing vessel watch was about 4 miles on the starboard bow. He take the closest point of approach (CPA) with fishing vessel at 1.5 miles, but the trace on that was lost after a few seconds later. After that he entered the bridge toilet, leaving the bridge with nobody in it.

The fishing vessel stopped on about 2340, and the skipper made a check of traffic in the area. After decided that all vessels are passing clear, he left the wheelhouse and go to serv meal in the mess room.

Arctic Ocean at 2350 collided with the fishing vessel. The master came quickly from the toilet and saw the fishing vessel drifting about to 100m off his starboard beam. This master was also on board when the collision with Maritime Lady on 5 December 2005 was happend.

General details of vessel Sunny Blossom, and her crew

1.2.1. Sunny Blossom

1.2.2. General Arrangement

Sunny Blossom is a Type 2 chemical tanker with 19,995 tonnes deadweight, with her bridge, machinery and accommodation spaces aft of her cargo tanks. A continuous double bottom extends to the full length of vessel aft and for the fore peak

1.2.3. Propulsion

A slow speed diesel reversing engine has connected a single fixed pitch propeller. Maneuvering speeds ahead, given on the Pilot Information Card, were:

Loaded Ballast

Full Ahead: 90rpm 10.9knots 10.2knots

Half Ahead: 62rpm 7.0knots 7.8knots

Slow Ahead: 55rpm 6.2knots 6.9knots

Dead Slow Ahead: 45rpm 5.1knots 5.6knots

During survey made by classification society, DNV (Det Norske Veritas) between 7 and 17 June 2005, the tip of one propeller blade was notify and recorded also as being damaged over a length of 600mm, approximately.

Following the survey, a classification society condition imposing permanent repairs to be made on the propeller by 31 March 2006. Ship’s staff were advised to adjust engine speed to avoid possible or excessive vibration. Any abnormality in service was needed to report to Det Norske Veritas.

The ram-type hydraulic steering gear is coupled to the single spade rudder. Two pumps supplied the Hydraulic power, each one driven by an electric motor.

The steering gear was tested at 0830 on 5 December 2005 by ship’s staff, before starting the transit of the Kiel Canal. The report from test notes that all was in good working order. After the collision was happened with Maritime Lady, the steering gear was again being tested by the local Water Police and found again in good order to function.

1.2.4. Cargo

Sunny Blossom was carrying Urea Ammonium Nitrate Solution a cargo of 18,120t at the time when contact with Maritime Lady. This material UANS (Urea Ammonium Nitrate Solution) is not classified in the IMDG Code.

The IBC Code (International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk) covers the cargo because of its pollution hazards and safety. The IBC Code grant this cargo a pollution category of ‘C’. A substance of Category ‘C’ is specified in Annex II of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 73/78 as:

“Noxious liquid substances which if discharged into the sea from tank cleaning or DE ballasting operations would present a minor hazard to either marine resources or human health or cause minor harm to amenities or other legitimate uses of the sea and therefore require special operational considerations.”

MARPOL 73/78 limits the discharge of Category ‘C’ substances into the sea. Various conditions and limitations apply, such as total quantity discharged, depth of water, minimum speed of vessel, distance from discharge and land to be below waterline, concentration of substance in the wake astern.

UAN (Urea Ammonium Nitrate) is needed to be carried by a vessel witch has a standard not less than Type 3, as classified in the IBC Code. This classification requires that the vessel to have cargo tanks which offer at least the minimum level of protection. This substance is commonly used in the agricultural industry as a fertilizer and it is not considered to be a substantial hazard for the environment.

1.2.5. Crew

All crew was from 24 members were all was Filipino nationals. Those officers that required certificates of competency had all the necessary certificates and endorsements from the vessel’s flag state.

On 10 August 2005 the master joined the vessel. He had sailed previously on Sunny Blossom, also as master, between March 28 and May 17 of 2005. His first transit of the Kiel Canal, as a master, was on 1 December 2005.

1.2.6. Previous incident

A previous incident was reporting that The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) and BMA described two groundings of Sunny Blossom, on 16 July 1999 and 18 May 2000, on the St Lawrence Seaway. Although none of the groundings was directly attributable to the vessel’s handling characteristics, a major finding of all the reports was that the vessel was not able to steer and did not respond properly to helm changes at slower speeds in shallow water. Full details about this are contained in TSB Canada’s Marine Investigation Reports M99C0027 and M00C0019

omă va conține între 3 și 5 capitole numerotate crescător, fiecare putând să aibă, în partea finală, o secțiune de concluzii, care să sintetizeze informațiile și/sau rezultatele prezentate în cadrul acelui capitol;