RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ACADEMY OF NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PUBLIC A DMINISTRATION [627165]

RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ACADEMY OF NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PUBLIC A DMINISTRATION
NORTH -WEST INSTITUTE OF MA NAGEMENT

Faculty of international relations
Department of international relations
Educational program 41.04.05 International relations

Geopolitical aspects of cooperation between th e countries
of the Black Sea in the energy sector

Prepared by:
Сигартеу Йонел -Симион

Scientific supervisor:
К.п.н. Абалян Анна Игоревна

Saint Petersburg, 2018

Introduction
The Black Sea, as a geopolitical space, is positioned between three important
geographical region Europe, Asia , and Middle East . This position has quite astonishingly led to
years of neglect. After the end of the Cold War , the Black Sea space has entered in an
international geo -economic and geopo litical transformation. The hydrocarbon resources of the
Caspian states, not only influenced enormously the formation of new international relations in
the Caspian region, but caused the radical change of the energy flows and their direction from
north -south to east -west. The ro le of the Black Sea also changed radically. After significant
potential hydrocarbon reserves were found in the Caspian Sea shelf, this region became the
focus of attention of Western countries and oil and gas companies. The transit potential of this
region has grown enormously. This region became the „bridge” for hydrocarbon transit from
the Caspian region to the European countries. The energy reserves was the main reason why
this region found itself in the focus of the world politics and was turned into the object of the
geopolitical struggle between the regional and non -regional states1.
At the beginner, small steps were made in the realization of common institutions,
especially economic ones. The concept of the wider Black Sea region emerged as a result of the
development of self -awareness, and then the region entered into a political and economic
international competition, due to the richness of energy raw materials and the expansion of the
Euro -Atlantic and the European Union area. The geopolitics of t he region remains strongly
influenced by the domestic and fo reign policy of the major powers, such as SUA, EU , and
Russia. Today we can observe that important developments are taking place in the Black Sea
region wider coastal states of Bulgaria , Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia , and the Black Sea
regional states as Moldavia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia .
In the current context of globalization and the need for energy resources, Black Sea is
important not only as an energy transport route but also as a potenti al supplier of oil and natural
gas. More than 50% of the EU's energy is currently being supplied from the wider Black Sea
area, and the prospect is that over the next few years 70% of the EU's energy needs will be
supplied from this area.
In this study, I ana lyzed reference books, articles, legal documents, reports, policy
papers and news regarding the energy cooperation and competition between states in Black Sea

1 Sergey S. Zhiltsov,Igor S, Oil and Gas Pipelines in the Black -Caspian Seas Region , Springer, 2016, p. 3

area. This paper focuses on cooperation and dispute of the politics of energy in the Black Sea
region. It will generalize discussions of the foreign policies of main actors and it will also make
reference to other geopolitical issues that affect the calculations of developing, exploiting and
transporting t he region's hydrocarbons. The goals are to examine the nature of outside
involvement in the region, to point to the role of intern actors, and to assess trends for future
development.
In the literature view of Black Sea region, the study finds out that the re is a limited
number of academic studies concentrated on Black Sea energy problem, cooperation and
competition between states. The policy papers prepared by think thanks or research centers on
this issue are much more common. Moreover, it is difficult to find a full -fledged book focusing
on the energy problem involving all states in the Black Sea area. Many papers and books focus
on issues such as history, security, strategy, neglecting the economic field.
A very good work in this field is the book "Oil a nd Gas Pipelines in the Black -Caspian
Seas Region" written by Sergey S. Zhiltsov, Igor S. This book can be considered springboard
for pushing further the study of the energy and geopolitical issues encountered by the countries
of the Black Sea -Caspian Sea region. The book represents a comprehensive investigation transit
potential of the Black Sea -Caspian Sea region.
Other book is ” Energy Security in the Wider Black Sea Area – National and Allied
Approaches” , written by E. Lyutskanov, L. Alieva, M. Serafimova . This book focuse on crucial
aspects of energy security, and covered issues such as energy security as part of national
securi ty concepts, transnational energy projects of European Union and the Wider Black Sea
area, national approaches to energy security, critical infrastructure aspects of energy security,
support for establishing alternatives in energy security.
The relevance o f the issue is due to the growing role of energy sector, the import of
energy resources in Europe, the energy supply, economic balance of power in the region. There
is a need to identify the future ways of energy development in Europe by studying the
coope ration and dispute between the Black Sea countries. I decided to include all energy
corridors from Black Sea in my research, because it’s a good example of international
cooperation between Black Sea states and oil and gas companies.
The main method conduc ting this research is assessment and analysis of facts, economic
and historical data, official strategies and political decisions. Based on this, I prove my
hypotheses .

The work is structured in three chapters , introduction and conclusion. In the first
Chapter I will present my work more in details, focus on the geopol itical importance of Black
Sea, emphasizes the main global actors in region and their interests.
The second Chapter is devoted to the theoretical framework. To better understand the
issue a nd positions of the actors, I present the geopolitical approach from the point of view of
interstate competition and cooperation. I will focus on relation between Russia and European
Union, European Union and Post -Soviet States and the position of Turkey t owards EU and
Russia.
In the third Chapter I will explain all the energy corridors and de geopolit ical implication
for the states.
The main goal of the research is to answer the following research question: What can
be done to improve the existing cooperation between the Blac k Sea countries in the energy
field? To answer this question I identify the reasons for cooperation and dispute in energy
sector.

Chapter I: Black Sea – the space of geopolitical interest

I. The geopolitical importance of Black Sea region
Located between Europe and Asia, the Black Sea region, is not only a question of
geography but also related to politics , economy, security and culture2. The Black Sea has been
a crossroads of civilizations, continents, and global powers. It is situated at the centre of the
triangle formed by Europe, the Middle East, and Eurasia. Therefore, the region and its peoples
share some characteristics with all these territories. Islam and Christianity came face to face
in the region. A great struggle took place between the crusaders and the Turks, then between
the ottomans, Western powers, and Russia. Initially, the Ottomans managed to control the
whole area and declared the Bla ck Sea an Ottoman lake. Then Russia gradually took hold of

2 R. Hatto, O. Tomescu, The EU and the Wider Black Sea Region. Challenges and Policy Options , Garnet Policy
Brief, No . 5, 2008, p. 1 -10.

the northern section and reached the sea. However, it failed to penetrate in all parts of the
Black Sea and the sea itself became a dividing line between two glob al powers and two
civilizations3.
The fact that about two thirds of world oil reserves and more than one third of global
natural gas reserves are located in the Middle East means the area has an over whelming strategic
importance. However , new petroleum reserves have been discovered in the Caspian Se a vicinity
and Central Asia4.
The Caspian Sea region, is an important oil -producing areas. The estimation of total oil
and gas reserves in the region vary widely, because not all of the hydrocarbon deposits have
been found. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates 20 billion barrels of oil and 243 Tcf
of natural gas in as yet undiscovered, technically recoverable resources. Much of this is located
in the South Caspian Basin, where territorial dis putes over offshore waters hinder exploration5.
Though having reserves is advantageous , having the resources for production and
transportation is essential. In this regard , the Black Sea area encompasses countries that have
resources for production, as well as those that are consumers, and because of its geographical
position , most of the pipelines hav e to cross the Black Sea region6. Moreover, Black Sea’s
geopolitical value increases today not only for the discovery of the Caspian oil deposits, but
also the Black Sea region's energy potential is made up of from reserves rich in energy
resources. These are comparable to those in the Caspian basin (the Black Sea would have
reserves of about 10 billion barrels of oil and 1.5 tho usand billion m3 of natural ga s. However,
the depth of these reserves does not make them easy to exploit7. Therefore, from a classical
geopolitical point of view, the Black Sea region is a cornerstone of Euro -Asian stability and
security. It is part of a very important and sensitive ar ea with major natural resources and major
strategic transport and energy corridors8.
Therefore, a ccording with Halford Mackinder's theory of concentric zones, the Black
Sea could be considered as part of internal ring. According to Mackinder's Law, who controls
the internal ring (or Spykman’s rimland) dominates the central area (heartland), and who

3 Idris Bal, US policies towards the Black Sea region, In: Giray Saynur Bozkurt, The Blue Black Se a: New
Dimensions of History, Security, Strategy, Energy and Economy , Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, p. 210.
4 Idris Bal, US policies towards the Black Sea region, In: Giray Saynur Bozkurt, The Blue Black Sea: New
Dimensions of History, Security, St rategy, Energy and Economy , Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, p. 211.
5 U.S Energy information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=12911 , 07.04.2018.
6 Idris Bal, US policies towards the Black Sea region, In: Giray Saynur Bozkurt, The Blue Black Sea: New
Dimensions of History, Security, Strategy, Energy and Economy , Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, p. 211.
7 Ludmila Ro șca, Elvira Senic, Geopolitica și geoenergia în regiunea Mării Negre , In: Revistă științifico –
practică, No 2/2013, Chi șinau, Institutul de Relații Internaționale din Moldova, p. 12.
8 A. Goncharenko, The Wider Black Sea Area : New Geopolitical Realities, Regional Security structures and
Democratic Control : A Ukrainian View , Nato Defense College Occasional Paper,No 11, 2005, p. 23.

dominates the central a rea it actually dominates the World Island and therefore, the whole
world. If we consider that Mackinder identified Eurasia as the central area, and the internal belt
– Eastern Europe, it is clear that the Black Sea is a part of internal ring, and its tran sformation
into a stable and secure region is a key factor in promoting democracy and Western values in
Eurasia. But, t he Black Sea cannot be considered a single region without taking into account
the space within its immediate vicinity9. Geo-politically, geo-strategically and geo-
economically, this area comprises the territories of the six riparian countries: Bulgaria, Georgia,
Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine . The strategic significance of the Black Sea goes far
beyond the 6 riparian states. It embraces both the space of Eastern Europe and Balkan, the
Eastern Mediterranean and that of Eurasia (Caucasus, Caspian Space)10.
Thus, t oday is talking about the concept of “Wider Black Sea Region” , which has been
launched in a study by researchers Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson in 2004 . After the
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the USSR itself, in turn opened
the door for a new chapter in the region's history. The wider Black Sea region must also in clude
the states: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan , the Eurasian energy corridor linking the Euro –
Atlantic system with the energy reserves in the Caspian Sea area and with the Central Asian
states11.
Also, the term "wider" reflects the common position that the Black Sea group should
not be perceived as an exclusive club and that the Black Sea region extends beyond the littoral
territories to adjacent areas that are culturally, politically and economically related to the
former. The region includes according to the EU, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova to the
west, Ukraine, Russia to the north, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan to the east, Turkey to the
South. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Greece are not coastal states but historically close, with
close ties making them regional actors12.
Black Sea region is a strategic bridge connecting Europe with the Caspian Sea area,
Central Asia and the Middle East and, further, with south -east Asia and China, and it is
characterized by close ties and great potential, but also by diversities and rivalries; whereas the
region comprises the EU Member States Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, the candidate country

9 Mihai Ionescu, After hegemony. Four security scenarios for Eastern Europe in the 90s, Scripta Publis hing,
1994, p. 67.
10 Pierre Verluise, Géopolitique de la mer Noire : enjeux et perspectives, In: Défense nationale et sécurité
collective, No 8/9, augustt -septemb er, 2008, p. 39 -42.
11 Ronald D.Asmus, Bruce P. Jackson, The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom, in "Policy Review ", June
2004, p.17 -26.
12 Lebriz Yakacikli, Initiatives de cooperation dans la région de la mer Noire, Fédéralisme Régionalisme, Vol .
11, No. 2, 2011, https://popups.uliege.be/1374 -3864/index.php?id=1073 , 14.04. 2018.

Turkey and the ENP partners Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgi a, the Republic of Moldova and
Ukraine, as well as the Russian Federation as a strategic partner13. Another global entity with
far-reaching geopolitical value is the United States of America. Thus this region became an
intersection of the interests of the world's major players, especially those of cooperation and
competition in the energy field.
In terms of global energy consumption, the International Energy Agency (IEA)
highlights a faster increase in the share of renewable sources and natural gas. Total energy
demand in 2030 will be with 50% higher, and for oil with about 46%. Oil reserves can support
current consumption levels only by 2040, and natural gas by 2070. Forecasts point an economic
growth, which will im ply increase energy consumption.
At the moment, t he rise of energy demand combined with geopolitical factors, especially
with the situation in the Middle East, led to a rise in crude oil and natural gas prices. Another
factor that has led to a rise in the price of oil products has been the lack of refining capacities.
To all this has been added the tendency manifested by some states to supplement the stocks to
deal with crisis situations. These elements underpin the reorientation of the energy policies of
countries that are net energy importers, in the sense of increasing attention to improve energy
efficiency14
Perhaps nowhere in the world, the economies of states do not depend so much on energy
resources as the states around the Black Sea. The world economy, in general, and the European
one, in particular, are closely related to energy raw materials. We assist in moving the world's
energy production from the Northern industrialized (USA, Russia, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela)
to the developing South (Casp ian countries, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Angola, Nigeria)15. The
US Department of Energy estimates that the proportion of world oil production to North
producers will drop from 27 percent in 2004 to 18 percent in 2025, while South production will
grow from 50 percent to 61 percent.16
From this perspective, we are witnessing a struggle today for access to the resources of
the Black Sea area. This is marked by two major issues: Russia's monopoly of energy
production and the transit monopoly of Ukraine, which leads to direct threats to Eu rope's energy
security. However, not all Black Sea states have energy resources. Armenia and the Republic
of Moldova are devoid of oil and gas. Instead, the Russian Federation holds first place in the

13 Official Journal of the European Union, 11.5.2012, EN C 136 E/82
14 Strategia energetică a Romaniei pentru 2007 -2020, p 5-6,
15 Grigore Alexandrescu, Managementul diferen țelor în realizarea securit ății la Marea Neagr ă, Editura
Universită ții Naționale de Ap ărare ,, Carol I”, Bucure ști, 2007, p. 28 -29.
16 www.eia.doe.gov ,

world in natural gas reserves and the world's second la rgest, both in oil production and export.
Differences also exist in the way raw materials are processed. Azerbaijan ranks second in the
region but does not have enough processing capabilities, which is why it needs to export crude
oil and gas. Romania has refining capacities higher than extraction possibilities, which it
complements through imports.17
The politics of energy will bring together the countries of the wider Black Sea zone in
new ways and will remain a source of rivalry in others. In the early 1 990s, the oil and gas from
the fields around the Caspian Sea, sparked an energetic contest among individual states and
multinational corporations. For many years, the various corridors that Caspian oil might take
were the subject of wide -ranging debate. So me companies and governments advocated
traditional routes to ports on the eastern coast of the Black Sea and then via tanker to the
Mediterranean. Others argued for a new pipeline that would bypass the Black Sea region
altogether and head south through Ir an, a proposition rejected by the U.S18.
The politics of energy corridors ended with an agreement to construct an underground
transit system from the south Caucasus to the eastern Mediterranean. In this case we have the
example of Baku -Tbilisi -Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. BTC had a vital effect on the economies of
the transit and terminus countries. But the future strategic impact of BTC and other oil and gas
routes is uncertain. On the one hand, increased revenue can fund infrastructure projects and
contribute to development in some of the poorest part s of the Black Sea zone. On the other
hand, increased revenue coming to the Georgian and Azerbaijani states may well be earmarked
for military modernization and create the conditions for an eventual attempt to retake lost
territories, Abkhazia and Nagorno -Karabakh, by force. The politics of oil and gas have not only
strategic -level implications for the entire region but also domestic political and security
dimensions in the countries that benefit most directly from the region’s hydrocarbon wealth19.
In this regard, Black Sea is both a "closed" sea and a link in a geopolitical system, even a
"melee" if we think of the Caucasus. In the broad sense, the area includes several frozen
conflicts: Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno -Karabakh20. This conf licts

17 Grigore Alexandrescu , Managementul diferen țelor în realizarea securit ății la Marea Neagr ă, Editura
Universită ții Naționale de Ap ărare ,, Carol I”, Bucure ști, 2007, p. 30.
18 Charles King, The Wider Black Sea Region in the twenty -first century, In: Daniel Hamilton, Gerhard Mang ott,
The Wider Black Sea Region in the twenty -first century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives , Center of
Transatlantic Relations, Washington D.C., 2008, p. 16-17.
19 Charles King, The Wider Black Sea Region in the twenty -first century, In: Danie l Hamilton, Gerhard Mangott,
The Wider Black Sea Region in the twenty -first century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives , Center of
Transatlantic Relations, Washington D.C., 2008, p. 17.
20 Pierre Verluise, Géopolitique de la mer Noire : enjeux et perspectives, In: Défense nationale et s écurité
collective, No 8/9, august -septemb er 2008, p. 39 -42

undermine Euro -Atlantic strategic, economic and democratic interests in this region and
jeopardize the prospects of integrating its countries into the broader structures of the West.21 In
the same time , Black Sea region for Europe became critical, because of frozen conflict , which
could destroy Europ ean continent stability. The conflicts can disturb the way of oil and gas
transit from Caspian Sea and Central Asia , consequently this region has a big imp ortance for
European security both in energy and political aspects. 22
From an energetic point of view, one must be aware of the existence of a geopolitical axis
between three seas: the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean23. Oil and gas
pipelines are numerous:
1) Baku -Tbilisi -Ceyhan, (BTC) transports oil form the ACG, Shah Deniz and Tengiz oil
fields in Kazakhstan to Baku by tankers, then via Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey;
2) Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) transports oil from the Tengi z oil field from
Kazakhstan to the Russian Port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea;
3) Uzen -Atyrau -Samara transports oil from the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan to Russia
(before the CPC this was the main export line in Kazakhstan);
4) Baku -Novorossiysk transpo rts oil from the Sangachal oil field in Azerbaijan to the
Russian Port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea;
5) The planned Kazakhsta n Caspian Transportation System (KCTS) will transport oil
from the Kashagan and Tengiz fields in Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan: oil would be
transported through the future Eskene -Kuryk p ipeline on the Kazakh Caspian Coast to
an oil terminal where it would sail to Azerbaijan and from there on through the BTC
Pipeline to international markets vi a the East -West Energy Corridor24.
There are other less important oil pipelines such as Baku -Supsa (also known as the Westen
Route Export Pipeline and Western Early oil Pipeline ), which transports oil from the Azeri
Chirag -Gyuneshli oil fields in Azerbaijan to the Georgian Port of Supsa on the Black Sea Coast
near Batumi. Some oil products are exported from the Russian Port of Tuapse located on the
Black Sea Coast.

21 Vladimir Socor, Frozen Conflicts: A challenge to Euro -Atlantic Interests In: Ronald D. Asmus, Constantin
Dimitrov, Joerg Forbrig, A new Euro -Atlantic S trategy for the Black Sea region, The German Marshal Funds of
the United States, 2004, p. 127.
22 Nataliya Nechayeva -Yuriychuk, The EU Position toward Frozen Conflicts Influence on Security and Energy
Stability in Black Sea , in: НАУЧНИ ТРУДОВЕ НА РУСЕНСКИЯ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ , 2010, том 49, серия 5.2 ,
p. 52.
23 Pierre Verluise, Géopolitique de la mer Noire : enjeux et perspectives, In: Défense nationale et s écurité
collective, No 8/9, august -septemb er, 2008, p. 39 -42.
24 Sergey S. Zhiltsov,Igor S, Oil and G as Pipelines in the Black -Caspian Seas Region , Springer, 2016, p. 11.

Caspian natural gas goes to European markets via the following main pipelines:
1) The ”Central Asia Center" (CAO gas pipeline system, built between 1960 and 1988 in
the USSR, carries gas from the Dauletabad gas field and the Caspian Sea Coast fields
in Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia where it links with the
Russian gas pipeline network;
2) "Baku -Tbilisi -Erzurum" (BTE, the South Caucasus Pipeline" (SCP) runs parallel to
BTC and supplies natural gas to Georgia and Turkey from the Caspian Shah Deniz field
in Azerbaijan;
3) "Blue Stream" is a major offshore gas pipeline that crosses the Black Sea and carries
gas from Russia (Beregovaya) to Turkey (Durusu Terminal);
4) We should also mention the Dzhubga -Lazarevskoe -Sochi” offshore gas pipeline
located along the Russian Coast on the Black Sea, 172 km long. This pipeline is supply
aimed to s to the City of Sochi and other recreation villages on the Black Sea Coast.
There are plans to construct Trans -Caspian gas pipeline between Turkmenbashi in
Turkmenistan and Baku in Azerbaijan, "Blue Stream 2 ” between Russia and Turkey,
"South Stream" between Russ ia and Bulgaria, and "TurkStream" between Russia and
Turkey25.
The presence of important natural resources , energy corridors and other issues mean that
the region is extremely important. Competition and conflict among regional actors and the
widespread pe rception that the region is not able to solve its problems alone have led to the
involvement of external actors and competition among them in the region26. The main actors in
region are: European Union, Russia and United States.

II. The EU interest in the Black Sea Region
The European Union is made up of 28 Member States and has about 508 million inhabitants
starting with 2015.27 After, Romania and Bulgaria joined to the EU, the Union focuses more on
its Southeast periphery and especially the wider Black Se a area. A new conceptual framework

25 Sergey S. Zhiltsov,Igor S, Oil and Gas Pipelines in the Black -Caspian Seas Region , Springer, 2016, p. 12.
26 B.P. Jackson, The Soft War for Europe’ East, in R. D. Asmus, Next Steps in F orging a Euro Atlantic Strategy
for the Wider Black Sea, Washington DC, German Marshall Fund of the US, 2006.
27 https://europa.eu/european -union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/eu_in_slides_ro.pdf

was lunched to change the perception that the Black Sea is a periphery of Europe and a new
strategy was necessary to interact towards Central Asia and Middle East28.
Today, EU is one of the major global energy consumer, and it does not even produce half
the energy it consumes. Therefore, EU is forced to import from abroad about 54% of its own
needs, a percentage which seems to be going up to 70% in 2030. Oil represents the largest
proportion of total energy imports (60%) followed by gas (26%) and coal (13%) while
renewable resources and electricity are below 1%29.
The geopolitics of energy remain a driver of EU prosperity and security. So, the Black Sea
Region became an area of development opportunities, but also a means o f ensuring its energy
security30. Although this topic has been on the agenda since the 1973/74 oil crisis, it has taken
the past few years for it to undertake serious efforts to formulate a common energy policy. Due
to growing global energy needs, declining European energy production, and rising energy
price s31, the EU can be seen as a regional actor in Black Sea region after 2003, when the
European Security Strategy became the first official document to declare the EU` s growing
interest in the Wider Black S ea area32.
During a dispute between Russia and Ukraine, started in 2006 the volumes of gas
destined to Europe was disturb33. Consequently, the EU developing a European Strategy for
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, which focuses on diversifying sources of supply
and exploiting alternative energy resources. Two years later European Commission decided
enhancing the EU gas security of supply architecture. In this strategy recognized that the
diversification of gas and oil is one of the EU’s highest energy security priorities34.
The EU aspires to this diversification to reduce the potential effects of an interruption
of energy flows. M oreover, Russia cannot, meet the growing energy needs of Europe35. The gas

28 Zacchary Ritter, EU Engagement in the Black Sea Region: Ch allenges and Opportunities for the EU, German
Institute for International and Security Affairs, Working Paper Research Unit, No: FG3 -WP/09, December 2006,
p. 7-8.
29Sanam S. Haghighi, Energy Security – The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major Oil
and Gas Supplying Countries , Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007, p. 10.
30 Andrei Josan, New security dynamics and the rapid -changing regional energy architecture of the Black Sea
area, Review of the Air Force Academy, No 2 (24), 2013, p. 77.
31 La sécurité énergétique en Europe: état et perspectives, Politique de sécurité: analyses du CSS, Zur ich, No 36,
june 2008, p.1.
32 Andrei Josan, New security dynamics and the rapid -changing regional energy architecture of the Black Sea
area, Review of the Air Force Academy, No 2 (24), 2013, p. 77.
33 Nataliya Esakova, European Energy Security: Analysing the EU -Russia Energy Security Regime in Terms of
Interdependence Theory , Springer VS, 2012, p. 240.
34 Manfred Hafner, The Southern Gas Corridor and the EU ga s security of supply: What’s next? , Natural Gas
World, 14 November 2015.
35 La sécurité énergétique en Europe: état et perspectives, Politique de sécurité: analyses du CSS, Zur ich, No 36,
juin 2008, p.2.

reserves in Russia’s Western Siberian and Europe’s North Sea fields become depleted.
Russian’s extensive pipeline network has proven to be a reliable supplier of natural gas to
Europe, but, greater competition through multiple pipelines will help European consumers
secure a broader range of choices36 .
The Russia dominance of the market is a barrier to diversification. The natural gas is at
the center of diversification eff orts. The current infrastructure of European gas transport is
linked to Russia. The EU is dependent on the new pipelines until the process for liquefied
natural gas, the corresponding terminals and transport vessels have a higher level of
development. So f ar, EU has focused mainly on strengthening ties with the Caspian states of
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran. This region has the double advantage of large
unexploited gas and oil reserves and a geographical location in southern Russia making d irect
transport lines to Europe possible37.
To reduce dependence on Russia, the European Union, imported gas through Baku –
Tbilisi -Ceyhan pipeline. Azerbaijan can emerge as the key supplier of gas to finance and build
new pipelines into Europe38. The EU's biggest pipeline project is the Nabucco line, which has
to bring Caspian gas through Turkey, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. Two other
major projects are the Turke y-Greece -Italy Pipeline and the Trans -Adriatic Pipeline to be built
by EGL, a Swiss company, and Statoil Hydro, a Norwegian company39.
There is a significant efforts to construct gas pipelines originating in Azerbaijan or even
Turkmenistan, transiting through Turkey and supplying gas to Western consumers. The Trans –
Anatolian Natura l Gas Pipeline (TANAP), for example, is intended to give Azerbaijan a means
of breaking Russia’s monopoly on gas exports from the former USSR to the West. If Iranian
gas ever reaches Europe, it too will transit the Black Sea. So long as Europe relies on na tural
gas for energy, the Black Sea will remain a crucial energy transit corridor40.
But t he role of Black Sea region becomes increasingly import ant for energy security of
European Union. After Bulgaria and Romania entrance into the EU, the role of Black Sea region

36 Matthew J. Bryza, ,”The policy of the United States toward the Black Sea Region” in Ronald D. Asmus (ed.,
Next Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea , Washington, D.C., The German Marshall
Plan Fund of the United States, 2006, p. 41 -42.
37 La sécurité énergétique en Europe: état et perspectives, Politique de sécurité: anal yses du CSS, Zurich, No 36,
june 2008, p. 2.
38 Matthew J. Bryza, ,”The policy of the United States toward the Black Sea Region” in Ronald D. Asmus (ed.,
Next Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider B lack Sea , Washington, D.C., The German Marshall
Plan Fund of the United States, 2006, p. 41 -42.
39 La sécurité énergétique en Europe: état et perspectives, Politique de sécurité: anal yses du CSS, Zurich, No 36,
june 2008, p. 2.
40 James R. Holmes, The Geopol itics of the Black Sea, America has the Caribbean, China has the South China
Sea, and Russia has the Black Sea, The Diplomat, april 16, 2014.

for Europe became critical. Indisputable fact, that the region is situated at the crossroads of
trade and energy transit ways from Caspian Sea to Europe. Frozen conflict presence and
activation in the region can destroy European continent stability. The EU states depend a lot on
the situation in the Black Sea region. And Black Sea states depend on EU foreign policy. So,
they are interdependent, and European Union is trying to influence on the process of frozen
conflicts41. For example, Transnistrian region is the transit state through which gas flows from
Russia to Europe. This unresolved conflict has rather important impact on energy stability of
the Europe. Then, during the war between Georgia and Russia, the part of the Baku -Tbilisi –
Ceyhan pipeline was destroyed and started to work just within several weeks. That influenced
on energy stability of the Europe and demonstrated that the situation in the South Caucasus
region is far away from stability42.
The EU gradually started to realize that the establishment of a single, coherent policy
framework towards the Black Sea region has been a necessity. In this regard the EU adopted
”the European Neighborhood Policy” in 200443, followed by the Black Sea Synergy Strategy
in 2007 as an intermediary step towards a cohesive EU strategic visio n for the region. This was
the first document that identified the key areas where regional cooperation could be promoted
including, among others, issues of energy, trade, transport, etc., as well as contacts between
local authorities. Since then, the main objectives have been to stimulate reforms in the policy
and economic sectors of the countries of the region, support stability and foster growth44.
In 2008, the European Commission lunched the Eastern Partnership for Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in order to strengthen the stability in region. It will
include a deeper cooperation to enhance the energy security of the part ners and the EU , and
support for economic and social policies designed to reduce disparities within each partner
country and across borders45.
The EU has developed a sp ecial relationship with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation .
Three EU Member States are BSEC members: Bulgaria, Greece and Romania. At BSEC's 2007
summit in Istanbul (commemorating the 15th anniversary of the organization), the EU was

41 Nataliya Nechayeva -Yuriychuk, The EU Position toward Frozen Conflicts Influence on Security and Energy
Stability in Black Sea , in: НАУЧНИ ТРУДОВЕ НА РУСЕНСКИЯ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ , 2010, том 49, серия 5.2 ,
p. 52.
42 Nataliya Nechayeva -Yuriychuk, The EU Position toward Frozen Conflicts Influence on Security and Energy
Stability in Black Sea , in: НАУЧНИ ТРУДОВЕ НА РУСЕНСКИЯ УНИ ВЕРСИТЕТ , 2010, том 49, серия 5.2 ,
p.54,56.
43 https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/policy , 14.04.2018.
44 Yannis Tsantoulis , Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership: Different Centres of Gravity,
Complement arity or Confusing Signals? , ICBSS, Policy Brief, No. 12, February 2009, p. 1 -2.
45 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Eastern Partnership, 2 008.

granted the status of permanent observer. Since then, the EU has generally been a cknowledged
to be the most active of BSEC's many observers and ‘sector partner states'46. A new European
initiative was launched in a special meeting of the BSEC Council of Ministers of Foreign
Affaire on 14 February 2008 in Kiev. They said that significant EU involvement could increase
the potential for cooperation in the Black Sea region and produce results in a number of priority
areas: transport development and interconnection, energy and communication, increased trade,
investment, as well as transit nee ds. Ministers expressed their interest in promoting dialogue
between energy producers, consumers and transit countries to ensure equitable access to energy
markets and resources, enhance energy security47.
Therefore, i t is obvious that the European Union perceives the Black Sea region not only
as the space that is intersected by the energy routes that guarantee the supply of European
countries with the necessary resources, but also as a bridge linking Europe and the Caspian
region, rich in hydrocarbons. Th e connection between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea
develops new international relations, which will lead to the formation of a unified geopolitical
space48.

III. US interest in the Black Sea Region
According to realist theory, after 1989 the world moved from a bipolar situation to a
unipolar situation, thereby upsetting the previous balance of power. After 1989, the US
dominated the world in a hegemonic fashion to some extent triumphing over a lame USSR and
Warsaw Warsaw Pact that gra dually fragmented.
During the G W Bush regime (2001 -2008) there was US interest in Black Sea region.
Also the 'Bush Doctrine’ pursuing US interests and encouraging the spread of democracy,
including in the wider Black Sea region. During the Bush Junior al l around the Black Sea
countries feared Russia more and looked to the US and NATO to protect them. Then, Obama's
foreign policy initially seemed to be one of reversing some of the previous president's policies
and focusing on more cooperation in the world rather than confrontation. This included US
relations with Russia, and the situation in Black Sea Region49.

46The EU's Black Sea policy: Where do we stand?, p. 7, DG EXPO/B/Pol Dep/Note/2013_221.
47 Michael Emerson, The EU's New Black Sea Policy: What Kind of Regionalism is This? , CEPS, Working
Document No.297/july 2008, p. 113 -115.
48 http://www.fonduri -ue.ro/ro -bmn,
49 Carol Weaver, EU Neighbourhood, Conflict Zone or Future Security Community? The Politics of the Black
Sea Region, Routledge, 2013, p. 64 -65.

As a glob al power, the United States has in terests in the Black Sea because, American
policy towards the region flows from what has been its policy toward Europe since the fall of
the Berlin Wall: ,,to promote a region that is free, prosperous, peaceful, secure, and whole ”50.
The attention and involvement of the US in Black Sea region gained significant ground
after the 9/11 attacks to US. The region began to be perceived by the US as the back door to
Broader Middle East and North Africa Region51. In the same time, t he US tried to prevent
terrorist attacks directed by various rebel groups on oil and gas pipelines supplying EU and
NATO member states.
The Black Sea region is a "gateway" of the West to the energy resources of Central Asia
and the Caspian region.52 The American corporations have interest in Caspian Sea. American
corporations (with, it should be added, substantial assistance from British Gas and British
Petroleum) in the 1990s were “by far the lead players” on the investment side, obtaining
substantial percentages in major projects in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Four American
companies —ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, Phillips, and Unocal —held th e largest “national
share” (36 percent of the total) in various production -sharing agreements signed in the 1990s53.
As a rule, regions without clearly defined borders rarely become hotspots for foreign
investment. Yet the Caspian Sea's maritime borders st and out as an exception to this rule. This
region has seen a decade long legal battle over who controls these vast resources. Despite the
ethno -political tension in the region and the myriad of scholarly voices predicting that the lack
of maritime borders would lead to "conflicts, crises and wars in the Caspian region," the Sea
has seen a flurry of activity in the post -Soviet era. IOCs led by British Petroleum (BP) and
Amoco have plowed ahead, investing well over $20 billion in exploration and extraction of
the regions hydrocarbons. Relying on behind -the-scenes American support, today they sit atop
one of the world's most lucrative energy deposits54.

50 Wilson Ross, US policy in the Black Sea region , http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_58.pdf , p.2.
51 Ronald D. Asmus, Developing a New Euro -Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region , The German Marshall
Fund, Istanbul, No. 2, 2004, p. 20.
52 Matthew J. Bryza, ,”The policy of the United State s toward the Black Sea Region” in Ronald D. Asmus , Next
Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea , Washington, D.C., The German Marshall Plan
Fund of the United States, 2006, p. 38.
53 Paul Kubicek, Energy politics and geopolitical co mpetition in the Caspian Basin , Journal of Eurasian Studies,
Volume 4, Issue 2, July 2013, p. 171 -178.
54 Ilya Bourtman, “ No Borders, No Problem: Why the Lack of a Legal Framework in the Caspian Sea is not
Affecting Energy Exploration ,” SAIS Review 26:1, Winter -Spring 2006: 109 –110.

To obtain direct access to this energy resources, the American strategy has entered a period of
commitment and presence around the Black Sea55. Thus, the US interests in the Black Sea may
be analyzed under following headings :
1) Market economic reform: –expanding economic freedom through transparent market
economies.
2) Energy and commerce: – expanding networks of multiple oil and gas pipelines to
bolster competition within European energy markets for the benefit of consumers
and increasing trade and economic development through transportation and
communications infrastru cture, small and medium enterpr ises, technology,
environmental pro tection and customs cooperation .56
The United States supports economic liberalization, free markets and wants countries of
the region to be integrated into the global capitalist system. In the years ahead, market
economics, unfettered and open trading and investment regimes, and the effective rule of law
to underpin the free marketplace will be essential elements for developing prosperity in the
Black Sea region. Within the regio n, the US Government encourages the development of
more honest courts, more predictable decision -making, simplified regulatory regimes, and the
fair treatment of investors, foreign and domestic57. Therefore, the US policy towards the region
is fueled by fol lowing elements: democracy and market reform, energy -trade and security58.
The Black Sea region is important as a route for the transport of energy. In this regard, the
US made the construction of new pipelines that would bypass Russia a major foreign polic y
priority. After weighing various options —routes through Iran were rejected outright, a trans –
Afghan gas pipeline was too risky59. In this regard, the US supported the Baku -Tbilisi -Cayman
(BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku -Tbilisi -Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline t hat have presented two
important energy supply projects for Europe60. The US has kept supporting for other pipeline
projects including the Nabucco Pipeline that will transport gas from Turkey to Austria. It

55 I. Lesser, Global Trends, Regional Consequences, Wider Strategic Influences in the Black Sea ,International.
Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) , No. 4, , Athens, 2007.
56 Matthew J. Bryza, ,”The policy of the United S tates toward the Black Sea Region” in Ronald D. Asmus, Next
Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea , Washington, D.C., The German Marshall Plan
Fund of the United States, 2006, p. 38 -42.
57 Idris Bal, US policies towards the Black Sea region, In : Giray Saynur Bozkurt , The Blue Black Sea: New
Dimensions of History, Security, Strategy, Energy and Economy , Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, p. 213.
58 F.S.Larrabee, The US and Security in the B lack Sea Region , Southeast European Black Sea Studies, Vol. 9, No
3, 2009, p. 302 -303.
59 Paul Kubicek, Energy politics and geopolitical competition in the Caspian Basin , Journal of Eurasian Studies,
Volume 4, Issue 2, July 2013, p. 171 -178
60 Gareth Winrow , ”Geopolitics and Energy Security in the Wider Black Sea Region ”, Journal of Southeast
European and Black Sea Studies , Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2007, p. 221.

believes that this and other pipelines will foster competition, help bolster global energy
supplies, and enhance the welfare of producing transit, and consuming countries in the region
and elsewhere61. The United States try to help European Allies strengthen their energy security
by diversifying their supp lies of natural gas (as well as oil). This goal can achieve by increasing
competition for European markets by providing multiple pipeline options to transport oil and
natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe62. Caspian Sea area and Central Asia are vit al
for stabilizing oil prices at a global level as well as securing energy provision63.

IV. The Russian Federation interest in Black Sea
In terms of energy power, Russia is the world's largest producer and exporter of natural gas,
the second largest oil exporter and the third largest energy consumer. In 2005, according to the
estimates of the World Bank, the oil and gas sector represented around 20% of Russia's GDP,
generated more than 60% of its export revenues (64% in 2007) and accounted for 30% of all
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country. Russia has the world's largest known natural gas
reserves. The other known major gas rese rves are all in the Middle East: Iran ( 15%) ; Qatar
(14%) ; Saudi Arabia ( 4%); UAE ( 3%). Russia has the eighth largest known oil reserves. The
largest known reserves of oil are in Saudi Arabia, followed by Iran and UAE, Russia and
Venezuela each have 6.6% .
Oil production in the Soviet Union peaked in 1988 at 12.5 million barrels a day. This figure
was halved after the collapse of the Soviet Union64. After the 1990 , gas, and to a lesser extent
oil exports, have been the key resource for economic survival of post -Soviet Russia65. As the
largest successor state of the Soviet Union, Russia was well -positioned to play an important
role in the Caspian basin and Black Sea region . In terms of energy, all former Soviet States
remained tied to old Soviet s tructures, which meant, among other things, reliance upon the
Soviet electrical grid, oil and gas pipelines, and ethnic Russian personnel to manage their
economic enterprises. Whereas Russia had a strong hand to play, in the early 1990s it was not
excessiv ely involved in the affairs of Central Asia and the Caspian basin. This policy changed
in the mid -1990s, reflecting a broader shift in Russian foreign policy away from Westernization

61 Idris Bal, US policies towards the Black Sea region, In Giray Saynur Bozkurt, The Blue Black Sea: N ew
Dimensions of History, Security, Strategy, Energy and Economy , Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, p. 214.
62 Matthew J. Bryza, ,”The policy of the United States toward the Black Sea Region”, p. 39 -42.
63 Idris Bal, US policies towards the Black Sea regi on, In : Giray Saynur Bozkurt, The Blue Black Sea: New
Dimensions of History, Security, Strategy, Energy and Economy , Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, p. 214.
64 The European Union and Russia, Report with evidence, European Union Commitee, 14th Report of Session
2007 -2008, p.45.
65 Ognyan Minchev , Major Interests and Strategies for the Black Sea Region , Institute for Regional and
International Studies, Sofia, 2006, p. 13, http://www.iris -bg.org/menu .php?i_id=419 , 06.05.2018.

and toward a “Monroeski Doctrine,” a policy that asserted special rights for Russia in the so –
called “near abroad” of the post -Soviet space66.
If we analyze the information above, Russia has a significant role in energy transportation
of the Caspian oil and gas to the Western markets67. Energy flows and exports constitute a
dimension of the Russian foreign policy for geopolitical control over the Black Sea region68. In
this regard, Russia opposed to p romote the Baku -Tbilisi -Ceyhan pipeline project, because this
pipeline was economically unfeasible and was really a political pr oject aimed at boosting the
influence and prestige of other powers in the south Caucasus69. Similarly, the Nabucco pipeline
project that will transport gas from Turkey to Austria, via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary
became a divergence between Russi an and EU interests70.
The construction of the Baku -Tbilisi – Ceyhan oil pipeline, has removed the Russian
monopoly on oil transit to the world markets. However, the Novorossiysk remains Russia’s
principal oil terminal, both for Russian and Kazakhstani petroleum. Further, the Ang lo-Russian
TNK -BP has managed to use the Odessa -Brody pipeline in a reverse mode, pumping Russian
oil from the Druzhba pipeline to the Black Sea region. More important is the fact that Russia
has substantially consolidated and expanded its position in the natural gas market. The
fundamental change occurred, when Gazprom dropped price subsidies for CIS customers and
started charging prices that were more market -oriented. Almost as importantly, Gazprom
insisted on the replacement of in -kind payments for gas t ransit by cash. In this case th e
company’s profits have soared71.
Russia’s energy security strategy strives to as far as possible secure European energy demand,
through controlling as large a part of upstream resources, transportation infrastructure, and
downstream markets as possible. Some agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on
pipeline construction along the East Caspian coast served to secure the export of large quantities
of oil and gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan through Russia’s pipeline network, and

66 Paul Kubicek , Energy politics and geopolitical competition in the Caspian Basin , Journal of Eurasian Studies,
Volume 4, Issue 2, July 2013, p. 171 -178.
67Russia: Country Analysis, Energy Information Administration Independent Statistics and Analysis, Oct ober,
2017, www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS , 06.04.2018.
68 Ognyan Minchev, Major Interests and Strategies for the Black Sea Region , Institute for Regional and
International Studies, Sofia, 2006, p. 13, http://www.iris -bg.org/menu.php?i_id=419 , 06.05.2018.
69 Gareth Winrow, Geopolitics and Energy Security in the Wider Black Sea Region , Journal of Southeast
European and Black Sea Studies , Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2007, p. 222.
70 Nicklas Nilsson, EU and Russia in the Black Sea Region: Increasingly Competing Interests?, Romanian
Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2008, p. 29.
71 Dimitri Trenin, Russia’s Perspective on the Wider Black Sea Region, , In: Daniel Hamilton, Gerhard Mangott,
The Wider Black Sea Region in the twenty -first century: Strategic, Econom ic and Energy Perspectives , Center of
Transatlantic Relations, Washington D.C., 2008, p. 114.

reducing supplies available for Nabucco. Russia has also engaged in several projects designed
to compete with new gas infrastructure to Europe. An effort in this regard is the South Stream
pipeline, which was initiated in June 2007 as a joint venture between Gazprom and Italy’s ENI.
South Stream constituted serious competition to Nabucco, and Russian efforts to promote the
pipeline since summer 2007 have rendered several successes in the Nabucco partner countries.
Bulgaria officially joined the project on January 18 and Hungary on February 28, 2008. On
January 25, 2008, Austrian OMV and Gazprom also agreed to turn the gas distribution site at
Baumgarten, planned to be the arrival point of gas through Nabucco, into a joint venture. While
Serbia i s not a Nabucco partner, its inclusion into the South Stream project enables the pipeline
to access Hungary from the Southand72.
Moreover, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan came to agreement on Moscow's request to route its South Stream gas pipeline
through Turkey's territorial waters. The South Stream pipeline being a very important project
for ensuring the energy security of the whole of Europe and opened the way to new, l arge-
scale energy projects between Russia and Turkey. The accord allows Russia's pipeline across
the Black Sea to bypass Ukraine's territorial waters, giving Moscow a completely independent
alternative to its overland gas routes via Ukraine to Europe73.
The energy dispute between Russia and Ukraine showed the impacts of energy flow
shortage by Russia on the energy supply security for European countries. Because of the
natural gas and transit prices, Russia cut off the gas supply to Ukraine . Thus the steps ta ken
by Gazprom have shown Europeans that their efforts since 2009, to diversify gas supplies to
the EU, have not been in vain. But, s ome experts form the Kyiv Center for Global Studies
"Strategy XXI" b elieves that any there is still not enough capacity to be able to bypass the
Ukrainian pipeline, and Moscow knows that this would undermine Gazprom's credibility as a
reliable natural gas supplier in the eyes of European customers74.
Transit countries such as Ukraine are largely a nuisance, from Gazprom’s pers pective. The
company has resolved to avoid overland transit wherever possible. In this case there is the
example of the Blue Stream and the idea of”Blue Stream 2”. At a different level, pipeline

72 Nicklas Nilsson, EU and Russia in the Black Sea Region: Increasingly Competing Interests?, Romanian
Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2008, p. 29.
73 Charles Recknagel, Putin Wins Turkey's A pproval Of South Stream Route, Radio Free Europe, 6 August
2009, https://www.rferl.org/a/Putin_In_Turkey_Seeking_Approval_For_South_Stream_Route/1793851.html ,
07.04.2018
74 Azad Safarov, Oleksandr Holubov, Russia -Ukraine gas dispute: Is Europe under threat?, Europe, 09.03.2018

projects help build new relationships between Russia, on the one hand, and the countries of
southeast Europe75.
Therefore, energy remains a dispute rather than cooperation in and around the Black Sea
region. Beyond even the widest definition of the wider Black Sea area, Russia’s energy
interests stretch as far as Al geria (gas), Liby a (gas and oil) , Israel (a potential customer of
Russian gas), Iraq (oil), Iran (nuclear, gas), Saudi Arabia (gas). Moscow, has probably no
interest at this stage to compete for dominance against the EU in the Balkans or against the U.S
in the Middle East, but it is clearly intent on making its presence felt, and its interests reckoned
with, in both places76.

Chapter II

Cooperation and dispute in the energy field between Black Sea countries

I. The energy relationship between European Union and Russia in Black
Sea
A stable energy relationship with Russia is in the interest of the European Union
because some hydrocarbon producing regions and some transit areas are unstable. Like many
highly dependent consumers, European Union countries need to diversify suppliers and import
routes. Russia has many advantages: it is close, it is a reliable traditional supplier and it is sta ble
internally . Russia is also the largest supplier of oil. On the other hand, the gas sector is more
interesting because Russia has the largest gas reserves in the world. Its share has been declining
in imports from the current EU since the end of the 1990s, as a result of a European desire to
diversify sour ces of supply. Russia is an essential partner of the European Union because some
states in its neighborhood have significant resources that they have to transit through Russian
territory to export to Western Europe. This is due to the geography of gas pipe line networks
inherited from the Soviet period.77

75 Dimitri Tr enin, Russia’s Perspective on the Wider Black Sea Region, , In: Daniel Hamilton, Gerhard Mangott,
The Wider Black Sea Region in the twenty -first century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives , Center of
Transatlantic Relations, Washington D.C., 2008 , p. 115-116.
76 Dimitri Trenin, Russia’s Perspective on the Wider Black Sea Region, , In: Daniel Hamilton, Gerhard Mangott,
The Wider Black Sea Region in the twenty -first century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives , Center of
Transatlantic Relati ons, Washington D.C., 2008, p. 116.
77 Yann Richard, Les stratégies de Gazprom : un problème géopolitique ?, Revue Géographique de l'Est, V ol. 50,
1-2, 2010, p.2 -3.

Thus, the EU in last few years become a geopolitical player in the Black Sea
region, with growing abilities to protect its interests in its South -Eastern neighborhood.
However, EU economic interests in the region in several instances contradict those of the
region’s major player, Russia, in a manner that is in many instances incompatible with the
emerging strategy of the EU. Therefore, increasing and deepening EU involvement in the region
will likely give ri se to increasing competition with Russia78.
Russia uses energy as a foreign policy tool, in post soviet countries. Russian geopolitical
realism comes into conflict with EU policies, in the ‘common neighbourhood’. European
Union is trying to establish new energy relationship whith these contries. To protect its own
energy security and to maintain its strategically position as the dominant supplier of gas to
Europe, Russia is actively undermining the EU’s efforts to diversify the sources of its energy
supply . It can be said, rather than being a ‘strategic partnership’, the overall EU -Russia
relationship is characterised by strategic rivalry79.
In economic sphere the geopolitical competition between EU and Russia is in energy
transportation routes. The radical developments in the Black Sea region started with Putin’s
assuming the presidency in Russia in 2000. The historical conflict between the West and Russia
has started. On the one side, the EU has begun to look for ways to decrease its natural gas
dependency on Russia by initiating new natural gas pipeline projects through the Caspian Sea.
With the problem of Crimea in March 2014, Russia gave a direct display of its reaction to the
possible new EU impacts on the former USSR countries, and accordingly on the Bl ack Sea
region, and to initiatives to build and use new pipeline routes to bypass the Russian
Federation80.
But, EU Member States depend on Russia's natural gas reserves. If relations with
Russia ceased, then the European Union would be in a rather difficul t situation because it
would have no way of securing the amount of gas and oil needed for its own consumption.81
Given its wealth of natural resources, Russia will remain the central energy partner of
the EU. But, since the gas dispute between Russia and U kraine in 2006, fears that Moscow
could exploit Europe's energy dependence for political purposes are increasing in Europe. In
truth, energy relations between the EU and Russia are characterized by a high degree of

78 Nicklas Nilsson, EU and Russia in the Black Sea Region: Increasingly Competing Interests? în Romanian
Journal of European Affairs , Volumul 8, Numărul 2, iunie 2008, p. 25.
79 Henry Helén, The EU’s energy security dilemma with Russia, in: POLIS Journal Vol.4, Winter 2010, p. 3.
80 Ozgur Ozdamar, What Should Turkey Do to Stabilise the Black Sea Region? , in Anahit Shirinyan and Louisa
Slavkova, Unrewarding Crossroads? Тhе Black Sea Region amidst the European Union and Russia, Sofia
Platform 2015, p. 183.
81 Pierre LORRAIN, „Incredibila alianță Rusia -Statele unite” ,, București, 2002, p.267

interdependence. Russia is highly depende nt on the European energy market. More than 60%
of oil and gas exports are destined for Europe. Russia is also dependent on Western technology
for the future transport of energy. Despite this interdependence, no stable energy relationship
has been establis hed between the EU and Russia82. In Russia, trans -border pipeline projects
were a political leverage tool to block off potential competitors from access to the EU market
and a geostrategic manipulation guaranteeing political influence over traditional areas of
control, such as South East Europe. On the other hand, the EU viewed the Black Sea region as
the road to its long -recognized need for both route and source diversification particularly of
natural gas imports. The distance between these two conflicting viewpoints grew further apart
as political turmoil divided Ukraine and revived the possibility of cuts of natural gas deliveries
to Europe83
The European Union is trying to establish a regulated energy relationship with Russia
in order to make it a predictable and secure partner in the long term. The European Commission
is thus at the origin of a model of regional energy integration based on the sharing of common
standards and rules. However, it is isolated because its initiatives meet with little en thusiasm in
the member countries and in the third countries concerned. There are differences of opinion:
between member countries that have neither the same interests nor the same policies, between
the member countries and the European Commission84.
The Members States have sought ways to diversify their sources, after 2006, but the
European Union did not seem able to coordinate its members' energy policies in a coherent
design, and not all EU Member States have understood the need to negotiate energy agre ements
in a unitary manner with Russia.85 However, it has proved very difficult to design and
implement a common energy policy. The energy mix and Member States' preferences for
energy policy differ, which prevents them from agreeing on common priorities an d concrete
measures.
The situation varies from country to country: Denmark and the United Kingdom are the
only countries in the European Union that have no dependency on oil imports, and the same

82 La sécu rité énergétique en Europe: état et perspectives, Politique de sécurité: analyses du CSS, Zurich, No 36,
juin 2008, p 2.
83 Anna Dimitrovna, Game of Pipelines: the Future of the Energy Sector in the Black Sea Region beyond t he
Pipeline Knot, in Anahit Shiri nyan and Louisa Slavkova, Unrewarding Crossroads? Тhе Black Sea Region amidst
the European Union and Russia, Sofia Platform 2015, p. 192.
84 Yann Richard, Les stratégies de Gazprom : un problème géopolitique ?, Revue Géographique de l'Est, V ol. 50,
1-2, 201 0, p. 5 -6.
85 Biró Daniel, Relațiile internaționale contemporane. Teme centrale în politica mondial ă, Editura Polirom,
2013, p.78 .

countries Netherlands have no dependency on gas imports an d the largest consumers of gas are
Germany, the UK, Italy, France and the Netherlands86. Also a particular supply security
situation is prevailing in Eastern Europe and Central European countries. France, Germany,
Italy, which need many resources, has p erpetuated a one -sided dependence on Russia. Thus,
some Central European countries have sourced more expensive natural gas deliveries, for
example, from Norway, in order to diversify. Coastal countries like Poland and Croatia are
considering the constructi on of LNG regasification facilities87. Therefore, energy security
measures remaind to be in the hands of each member country, and individual national initiatives
still remain.
But in the absence of a common policy in energy area, that will test the Europe an Union
ability to collaborate with Russia. The fact that the EU and Russia did not find common ground
on Energy Charter Transit Protocol, coupled by Russia‘s withdrawal from the European Energy
Charter, significantly complicates cooperation of the two parties on energy investment and
transit matters88.
In this regard rhe European Union's strategy in the Black Sea should logically lead to
encouraging the diversification of oil and gas transit routes.89 The EU collectively tried to
elaborate alternative nat ural gas supply options to substantially differentiate natural gas
supplies. The Nabucco natural gas pipeline represents an ambitious attemp t in this direction.
The pipeline would have transported natural gas from the Caspian region and from the Middle
East through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Austria and then further to the West
European markets.90 However, euro debt crisis and geopolitical considerations, along with cost,
have now replaced this project with a more feasible one, TANAP, to be fin anced by Azeri and
Turkish investors along with Greek and Italian partners for the TAP segment. Russia favours
the TANAP -TAP route, wishing to link up with Turkish Stream across the Black Sea. This

86Sanam S. Haghighi, Energy Security – The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major Oil
and Gas Supplying Coun tries, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007, p. 10.
87 Julian Barquin, Jean Michel Glachant,Francois Leveque,Franziska, Security of Energy Supply in Europe:
Natural Gas, Nuclear and Hydrogen , Edward Elgar Pub, 2010, p. 11.
88 Anna Aseeva, EU -Russia Energy Relations : the Role of International Law from Energy Investment and Transit
Perspective, Collection Euryopa, Volume 65, 2011, p. 43.
89 Noëlle Lenoir , La mer Noire, nouvelle frontière de l’Europe inCercle des europeens,
http://www.ceuropeens.org/article/la -mer-noire -nouvelle -frontiere -de-l-europe , 25. 04.2018, 14:23
90 Caterina Carta, Stefano Braghiroli, Measuring Russia’s Snag on the Fabric of the EU’s Internatio nal Society:
The Impact of the East -West Cleavage upon the Cohesion amongst the EU Member States vis -àvis Russia,in
Journal of Contemporary European Research. Volume 7, Issue 2, pp. 260 -290.

wider rationale, with Russian involvement along with Azeri and Turkish component reinforces
the Regional Energy Model91.
Russia has also begun to implement its own diversification projects in an attempt to
decrease its dependence on its traditional transit countries, such as Ukraine, which sees around
80% of Russ ia’s gas exports transfer via its territory. The South Stream project are designed to
bypass traditional transit countries for Russian gas exports to the EU and thus diversify transport
routes92. The same mening have the gas pipelines from Baku in Azerbaij an and from
Kazakhstan, as well as from the West Siberian fields, to reach the Russian Black Sea shore at
the ports of Tuapse, and Novorossiysk. Development of new export routes is of major concern
as parallel American and EU initiated projects in the Cas pian and Southern Caucasus regions
are destined to circumvent Russia93. And, by building the Blue Stream pipeline from Russia to
Turkey, Gazprom sought to ‘cordon off’ the Turkish gas market against competitors.
Gazprom ’s plans to extend Blue Stream and Blu e Stream II are also part of its attempt to keep
competitors out of the main European markets94. Also, n ew fields could be developed in
Russia’s south around Astrakhan to the north of the Caspian Sea. Italy’s ENI and Gazprom
would jointly undertake development of the Astrakhan Field. This development could result in
providing gas to Turkey via the Blue Stream line under the Black Sea. In addition to these large –
scale projects, about 500 smaller gas fields in the European part of the Russian Federatio n could
be developed and brought on stream. Although they mostly contain less than 20 bcm of
reserves, they are advantageous in being close to domestic markets and existing grids, thereby
providing for substantial cost advantages with respect to both produ ction and transmission95.
But, t he EU -backed diversification projects are regarded by Moscow as threatening to
Russia’s interests for a number of reasons. Firstly, the transit of Central Asian oil and gas
through Russian territory, with the pipeline system being under state control, generates
substantial revenues. Moreover, Russian gas is more expensive than Turkmen gas, which is
why the purchase and exportation of Turkmen gas to the EU is more profitable for Moscow.
Secondly, according to both Russian and western energy experts, the Russian energy industry
shows signs of a possible energy deficit . Although Russia has the largest proved gas reserves

91 V. Yorucu, O Mehmed, The Southern Energy Corridor: Turkey's ro le in European Energy Security, Springer,
2018, p. 16.
92 Valentina Feklyunina, The ‘Great Diversification Game’: Russia’s Vision of the European Union’s Ener gy
Projects in the Shared Neighbourhood, In JCER Volume 4, Issue 2, pp 134 -135.
93 Dimo Böhme, EU -Russia Energy Relations: What Chance for Solutions?, Potsdam, 2011, p. 117.
94 Pavel Baev, Vaclav Bartuska, et all, Pipelines, politics and power The future of EU -Russia energy relations,
London, Centre for European Reform, p. 97.
95 Dimo Böhme, EU -Russia Energy Relations: What Chance for Solutions?, Potsdam, 2011, p. 63.

in the world, chronic underinvestment in the development of new gas fields and drying up of
existing fields c ould lead to a situation where Russia will not be able to maintain the required
level of export to the EU. This means that Russia increasingly needs to import gas from
Turkmenistan to ensure that its commitments to its consumer EU member states are met96.
In conclusion t he Caspian -Black Sea energy transit space could unite countries with key
transit routes and high import dependen cies, providing for a stronger stance in negotiations
with produc ers and consumers alike. This initiative gains importance in a context of relations
between Russia and EU increas ingly dominating multilateral energy relations in Eurasia97. But
the EU’s position towar ds Russia is weak because the Member States do not have a common
opinion on energy supply . The main problem is the E U’s lack of legitimacy over its member’s
energy policies. There is a general divide among member state’s overall policies toward Russia,
ranging from the frosty approaches of some of the new Eastern member states, to the close
relationships maintained by o ther states. Overall, the EU -Russia energy relationship has been
portrayed as one where two fundamentally opposing approaches to International Relations
meet. The EU and its institutionalist approach and its normative, soft, power, is facing
significant d ifficulties, in the field of energy as well as in the wider context of international
politics, when confronted by a realpolitik -pursuing and hard powerusing Russia98

I. UE- Poste Soviet countries cooperation in Black Sea

The importance of the Black Sea ca nnot be understood in terms of energy if it is not
understood how important it is to open up the Caspian oil areas and the Central Asian gas and
oil delivery system in to the European Union. Indeed, the Black Sea space is not a closed,
disconnected space. On the contrary. It is directly related to the new Energetic Game, which is
based around the Caspian Sea99.
According with some figures, the oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea put these
deposits to second place in the world. There are many speculations about possible reserves.

96 Valentina Feklyunina, The ‘Great Diversification Game’: Russia’s Vision of the European Union’s Ener gy
Projects in the Shared Neighbourhood, In JCER Volume 4, Issue 2, pp 134 .
97 Dimo Böh me ,EU -Russia energy relations: What chance for solutions?: A focus on the natural gas sector,
Potsdam 2011, p 96.
98 Henry Helén, The EU’s energy security dilemma with Russia, in: POLIS Journal Vol.4, Winter 2010, p. 33-34.
99 Ludwig Roger, De l’Europe du S ud-est à la Région Mer Noire : une Süd -Ost Politik pour la Commission
européenne? De l’endiguement de l’Union Soviétique à l’élargissement de l’Union européenne, Universi té de
Cergy Pontoise, 2014, p. 512.

The range of estimates is between 7 and 10 billion tons for the Russians, betwee n 7 and 14
billion for the Europeans and between 13 and 28 billion for the Americans100
The Central Asian countries have started to look for geographical diversification of their energy
ties, for reducing their dependence on Russian pipeline network101. In this case the EU
promotes diversification, market principles, and energy efficiency, which would lower their
dependence on Russia and thereby circumscribe the influence of Russia102.
In the mid -1990s, Europe launched support toward the new states from Cauca sus and
Central Asia. But, the TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe -Caucasus -Asia) and INOGATE
(International Oil and Gas Transport to Europe), focused primarily on smaller scale projects
and failed to achieve their goals of diversifying supply routes to Eur ope103.
Then, 1997 t o reduce rel iance on Russian energy, was founded the Organization for
Democracy and Economic Development ( GUAM) by the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. This international organization is based on qua drilateral
cooperation for the sake of a stable and secure Europe guided by the principles of respect for
sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of state frontiers, mutual respect, cooperation,
democracy, supremacy of law, and respect for human rights104. A final area of cooperation
within GUAM has been in the energy sector, for reducing reliance on Russian energy and find
alternative sources of oil and gas. As a result of this organisation, since 2007 Georgia is supplied
by Azerbaijani gas through the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline, Baku ‐Tbilisi‐Erzurum. Also was
made Efforts to build the Azerbaijani ‐Georgian supply of oil to Ukraine and Europe through
the Odesa ‐Brody pipeline105.
The EU has implemented regional initiatives towards the eastern neighbo rs bordering
the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. In 2004, the Baku Initiative, intended to create an energy
community uniting the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions. EU has signed Memoranda of
Understanding with several countries to build an energy bridge be tween Central Asia and
Europe by creating a common energy market with the countries of this region. These countries

100 Christophe Cordonnier , L'energie. Atout ou handi cap ? in Le Courrier des pays de l'Est, 2004/6 No. 1046, p.
100.
101 Jussi Huotari, Energy policy and (energy security) as a part of Russian foreign policy, in Nordia Ge ographical
Publications 40, 4, 2011, p.125.
102 Kataryna Wolczuk, Managing the flows of ga s and rules: Ukraine between the EU and Russia,in Eurasian
Geography and Economics, No 57:1, p. 116.
103 Mamuka Tsereteli, Economic and Energy Security: Connecting Europe and the Black Sea -Caspian Region, Silk
Road Paper, 2008, p.35.
104 REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://www.mfa.gov.az/en/content/557
105 Dr.Taras Kuzio, GUAM as a Regional and Security Organisation ,National Security and Foreign Policy o f
Azerbaijan conference, St Michael’s College, University of Toronto, 28 March 2008 .

are expected to bring their legislation into line with the acquis106. In November 2006, was
adopted an energy roadmap, a document to prepare the ground for a comprehensive legal and
regulatory framework governing an integrated EU -Black Sea -Caspian Sea Common Market.
The EU and the countries of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions agree on a common energy
strategy. Represented on the non -EU sid e were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan107. The new
initiative agreed on the following priorities for their cooperation in the energy sector: to
harmonize the legal and techn ical standards for the energy sector, to improve energy supply
and demand management, to enhance the safety and security of energy supplies, to promote the
financing for commercially and environmentally -viable and energy projects of common
interest108.
These initiatives have been continued, in the last decades. The European institutions
have developed programs and policies determined by the need to ensure energy security in the
Black Sea region. It was launched into the Black Sea Basin Joint Operational Prog ram 2007 –
2013 and 2014 -2020 funded by the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, which
wants economic and social development of the Black Sea regions.109
Born in 2002 from the desire to develop an area of prosperity and stability at the borders
of the enlarged European Union, the European Neighborhood Policy aims to strengthen
political, security, economic and cultural cooperation between the European Union and its new
neighbors immediate or close. Originally intended for the new Eastern neighbors (Ukraine,
Moldova and Belarus), in 2004 also include the Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia). The neighborhood policy is thus aimed at those neighbors of the European Union for
whom membership has not been established110.
Then, in May 2007, European leaders approved the European Commission's proposals
on Black Sea Synergy, a new regional cooperation initiative. The kick -off took place on
February 14 at the meeting in Kiev of 27 foreign ministers and their counterparts from the
countries of th e region, namely Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine,
Turkey and Russia. They form -with Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, the "Black Sea Council"

106 Yann Richard, Les stratégies de Gazprom : un problème géopolitique ?, Revue Géographique de l'Est, V ol.
50, 1 -2, 2010, p. 6.
107 Isabelle Facon, Russie -Union européenne : l'enjeu du voisinage commun, in AFRI, Volume VIII, 2007, p. 625.
108 Andris PIEBALGS, Baku -Tbilisi -Ceyhan pipeline is a milestone project for security of supply, SPEECH/05/301,
25/05/2005;
109 http://www.fonduri -ue.ro/ro -bmn ,
110 Union européenne – Russie : quelles relations ?, https://www.senat.fr/rap/r06 -307/r06 -30723.html ,
24.04.2018.

and the "Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization" where the EU has observer status111.
The E uropean Union, communicating on 11 April 2007 a document entitled "The Black Sea
Synergy – A new regional cooperation initiative" which aims to stabilize the region to ensure
Europe's guarantee of Caspian oil flows112. Energy is one of the main driving force s of the
initiative and therefore one of the key cooperation areas. The related EC Communication
highlights the role of the Black Sea region in the energy supply and transit to the EU markets.
Black Sea, therefore, represents a main component of the EU ext ernal energy strategy aimed
primarily at the diversification of supply. As far as the required energy transportation
infrastructure is concerned, EU has committed to the upgrading of the existing and the
construction of new energy transportation infrastruc ture, facilitating the necessary investments.
The Communication also proposes the development of a new Trans – Caspian Trans – Black Sea
energy corridor. Specifically, this corridor would serve to the development of sustainable and
ecological oil transportat ion and to the increase of the EU gas imports from the Central Asia
via the Black Sea. According to the Communication, the cooperation should be based on a
common legal and regulatory framework, aligned to the acquis communautaire and the
provisions of the Baku Initiative113.
In 2008 Poland and Sweden lunched the Eastern Partnership114. This is a joint policy
initiative which aims to deepen and strengthen relations between the European Union (EU), its
Member States and its six Eastern neighbors : Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova
and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership Platform on Energy Security brings together
representatives from the EU and the post-soviet countries to discuss ways to promote energy
security, renewable energy, energy efficiency, and nuclear safety. It also discusses the
construction of missing infrastructure links and ways to bring partner countries' energy -related
rules more in line with EU rules115 On 24 November 2017 at the fifth Eastern Partnership
Summit, many ener gy issues have been debated, Georgia's position being the most important.

111 Noëlle Lenoir, La mer Noire, nouvelle frontière de l’Europe inCercle des europeens ,
http://www.ceuropeens.org/article/la -mer-noire -nouvelle -frontiere -de-l-europe , 25. 04.2018, 14:23.
112 Ludwig Roger, De l’Europe du Sud -est à la Région Mer Noire : une Süd -Ost Politik pour la Commission
europée nne? De l’endiguement de l’Union Soviétique à l’élargissement de l’Union européenne, Université de
Cergy Pontoise, 2014, p.501 .
113 Maria Kottari, Vlad Popovici, Jaroslaw Wisniewski, Energy politics, pipelines and the Black Sea basi n: On the
route to diversi fication of EU energy sources, in Young Researchers series, Volume 4, 2013, p. 11.
114 Poland takes on Russia with 'Eastern Partnership' proposal in The telegraph, 25 May 2008,
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2027636/Poland -takes -on-Russia -with -Eastern -Partnership -proposal.html ,
01.05.2018, 13:24
115 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/eastern -partnership -platform -energy -security , 01.05.2018.15:34.

Georgia shows its ambition to have in place a new gas market by 2019 and 2020
respectively. The Ten Year Development Plan of Georgia, based on EU foresees establishing
new cross -border connections with neighboring countries. The main challenge for the Georgian
natural gas sector is the need to ensure gas supply in extraordinary situations. Solutions could
be building a compressor station at the border with Azerbaijan, a new segment of the Georgia –
Armenia gas interconnector, as well as organizing reverse gas flows from Turkey to Georgia in
the context of the South Caucasus Pipeline. In the longer term, Georgia also supports the
development of White Stream and AGRI LNG to connect with We stern partners via Black Sea
routes116
The ex -soviet countries are characterized by two factors: First, the energy has been a
pivotal indicator of these countries’ economic and political trajectory since the collapse of the
USSR. Reforms in the energy sector have been a strong indicator of the overall will and capacity
to carry out domestic reforms writ large. Second, energy interdependence has had a profound
effect on the foreign policies of the post -Soviet countries, both for energy exporters or
importers117.
But the Caspian producers are deprived of the technologies and capital needed to exploit
their resources. . Cooperation with major Western companies is therefore essential, providing
them with excellent investment opportunities118. In this sense, Azerbaij an began negotiations
with Western oil companies in 1990 and intensified them after independence, leading in June
1993 to the adoption of a joint declaration between the national oil company Azeri (SOCAR)
and a consortium Western companies headed by Britis h Petroleum. This statement covers the
offshore exploitation of three deposits: Chirag, Guneshli and Azeri, with reserves estimated at
511 million tonnes. Due to the coup that took place shortly afterwards and the overthrow of
President Eltchibey, the cont ract could not be signed; moreover, Aliev's new government
suspended all operations, but a majority of Western companies was kept119. Then, Azerbaijan
created other consortiums, for the exploitation of several other deposits such as Karabakh ,
Shah -Deniz, Talish, Kiourdashi.120

116 Workshop on Regional Energy Interconnectivity Challenges 5 December 2017, Brussels, Belgium .
117 Kataryna Wolczuk, Managing the flows of gas and rules: Uk raine between the EU and Russia,in Eurasian
Geography and Economics, No 57:1, p. 116.
118 For more information see: Eric Hoesli, A la Conquête du Caucase, Epopée géopolitique et guerre d’influence ,
Syrtes, 2006.
119 Ludwig Roger, De l’Europe du Sud -est à la Ré gion Mer Noire : une Süd -Ost Politik pour la Commission
européenne? De l’endiguement de l’Union Soviétique à l’élargissement de l’Union européenne, Universi té de
Cergy Pontoise, 2014, p . 518.
120 Alain Giroux ,,La Caspienne : un ‘gâteau pétrolier ’ à partage r”, in Le courrier des pays de l’Est, octobre
1997, No 423, p. 9.

A result of cooperation between EU and Azerbaijan is the Baku -Tbilisi -Ceyhan oil
pipeline. BTC was opened on May 25, 2005, in the presence of Azeri, Georgian, Kazakh and
Turkish leaders, as well as representatives of Western countries and representatives of the EU
Commission. The BTC connects the capital of Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea with the east –
Mediterranean coast of Turkey. This pipeline could make some of the region's poor countries,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, energy -rich states and thus change the political balance
in the region121.
The project was well received by Georgia. The BTC pipeline benefit the Georgian
economy, and it will also strengthen Georgia's independence122. Georgia is crucial for exports
from the Caspian Sea, particularly as part of an alternative route to avoid Russian -dominated.
However, Georgia has many unresolved domestic problems, including the growth of separatist
movements. Although Georgia may seek to be a reliable transit state, there are factors beyond
the government's control which undermine its reliability123.
Azerbaijan gained through the BTC pipeline a connection to international energy
markets. The pipeline is also an important contribution to the country's political and economic
independen ce. Azerbaijan has undergone a major economic and social transformation due to its
energy wealth, becoming the richest state of the South Caucasus124.
During the next years, Azerbaijan can emerge as the key supplier of gas to finance and
build new pipelines into Europe. Later, additional gas from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iraq
can also find its way into these European pipelines. Achieving this vision will require a new
round of cooperation among countries and companies, analogous to the public -private
partnerships.125 In this sense, a new result was made in Baku in 2016, through the proposal of
Southern Gas Corridor.
The Southern Gas Corridor was designed to connect the EU’s energy market to new
sources of gas in the Caspian region and the Middle East. As o ne of the EU’s priority energy
projects, at a cost of about US$ 45 billion, it needs to provide up to 20 percent of the EU’s gas

121 Hélène Carrere D'encausse, Nostalgie impériale, in Politique internationale, N 75, 1997, p. 66.
122 Ludwig Roger, De l’Europe du Sud -est à la Région Mer Noire : une Süd -Ost Politik pour la Commission
européenne? De l’endiguement de l’Union Soviétique à l’élargissement de l’Union européenne, Universi té de
Cergy Pontoise, 2014, p . 530.
123 Andrew Monaghan, Lucia Montanaro -Jankovski, EU -Russia energy relations: the need for active
engagement, EPC Issue Paper No.45, p.16.
124 Anna Matveeva, Conflicts in the Wider Black Sea Area in: Daniel Hamilton, Gerhard Mangott, The Wider
Bleack Sea region in 21 st Century, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Austrian Institute for International
Affairs, 2008 .
125 Matthew J. Bryza, ,”The policy of the United States toward the Black Sea Region” in Ronald D. Asmus (ed. ,
Next Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea, Washin gton, D.C., The German Marshall
Plan Fund of the United States , 2006, p. 41-42.

needs (or 60 bcm per year) to be economically and politically viable. The project concept calls
for the first gas supplies via Southern Gas Corridor to come from Azerbaijan’s gas condensate
field Shah -Deniz 2 and reach Greece and Italy in 2020. Shah -Deniz 2 would connect to EU
markets via three pipeline projects: the expanded South Caucasus pipeline, the trans -Anatolian
pipeline , and the trans -Adriatic pipeline. Brussels has stated several times that a Trans -Caspian
pipeline can be built to supplement these flows at a later stage with Turkmen gas. Brussels
continues to treat Trans -Caspian pipeline as an important component of So uthern Gas Corridor;
it could potentially provide 30 bcm of Turkmen gas per year, half of the Southern Corridor’s
projected capacity126. A part of Southern Gas Corridor is the the White Stream. This is new
cross -Black Sea infrastructure. It will transport T urkmen gas via the second string of the Trans –
Caspian Pipeline directly to Romania and other EU Member States. That gas would make
landfall across the Caspian Sea in Azerbaijan, be transmitted to Georgia’s Black Sea coast
through the expanded South Caucas us Pipeline in Georgia, enter the undersea White Stream
pipeline and be received in the EU at Romania’s terminal at Constanta127.
The country’s leadership from Azerbaijan is very well aware that up until now, shipping
natural gas to Europe was a commercial issue, but in the escalation of tension with Russia, it is
becoming a strategically critical issue as well, with Azerbaijan being perhaps the only feasible
major energy alternative to Russia. The EU will rely on Azerbaijan for more than 70% of its
energy s upply by 2030. However, in the long term, once relations with Iran normalise and that
country becomes an important hub for energy, Azerbaijan’s role might be undermined128.
Iran with its second largest gas reserves in the world can be the EU supplier. In th is case
a new gas pipeline will have to be constructed through the territory of Armenia. The idea to
make Armenia a transit country for the Iranian gas does seem quite attractive. Under such
circumstances the Iranian gas will be supplied to Europe by a ga s pipeline to be constructed,
passing through Armenia, Georgia, under the Black Sea to Ukraine and Moldova129.
An other problem is the gas crisis in Ukraine. Ukraine, like Georgia, is an important
transit country for energy supplies to European Union. High i nterdependence of russian gas for
Ukraine is deemed a key factor affecting the EU’s rule transfer in the eastern neighborhood.

126 Najia Badykova, EU's Southern Gas Corridor still lacks strategic approach, in Analytical Articles , March 30th,
2016 ,
127 http://www.white -stream.com/the -project/ , 29.04.2018, 21:40.
128 Arzu G eybullayeva, Azerbaijan: Striking a Balance between Russia and the West, in Anahit Shirinyan and
Louisa Slavkova, Unrewarding Crossroads? Тhе Black Sea Region amidst the European Union and Russia, Sofia
Platform 2015, p. 37.
129 Sevak Sarukhanyan, GAS TRANSI T PIPELINE IRAN -ARMENIA: A CHANGE OF DISCOURSE, Noravank Fundation,
http://www.noravank.am/eng/issues/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=12614 , 28.04.2018

Most post -Soviet states were dependent on gas supplies from Russia, yet they adopted vastly
different strategies to deal with the ir energy -poor status . Ukraine failed to introduce energy
efficiency and to diversify its supplies and contracts over two decades. Ukraine made some
efforts to diversify supplies to import gas from Central Asia, this strategy was foiled by Russia’s
contro l over the pipelines that delivered Central Asian exports to the West. Yet at the same
time, Ukraine behaved like an energy -rich state and kept prices low for domestic consumers –
low gas prices were one of the few public goods. This merely entrenched a cu lture of energy
waste and discouraged investment in the energy sector, including the pursuit of energy
efficiency and the extraction of remaining domestic gas reserves in the Black Sea130
In conclusion the EU and Russia were attempting to align states around the Black Sea
vis-à-vis the energy future of the region, both actors failed to recognize these states’ strife for
more self -centred and national interest driven energy strategies. By remaining focused on their
rivalry, neither Russia nor the EU succeed in offering an attractive, coherent and systematic
strategy to assist the Black Sea region states in tackling some of the fundamental challenges to
their energy systems. As a result, the inherently malfunctioning energy sectors of these states
generated syst em risks that challenged even the most basic level of political stability needed to
secure investments in cross -border energy projects131

II. Turk ey interest in Black Sea. The cooperation with EU and Russia
Turkey lies in the Southern part of the Black Sea. I t has the longest shoreline amongst
all littoral states and exercises jurisdiction over the Turkish Straits via a sui generi s legal
regime in accordance with the Montreux Convention of 1936. Turkey’s outlook to the Black
Sea region is very much conditioned by the Straits regime and its historical background132.
The Black Sea has been positioned in the international politics as a security corridor. With the
introduction of the Montreux Convention, the Black Sea has become excluded from the

130 Kataryna Wolczuk, Managing the fl ows of gas and rules: Ukraine between the EU and Russia,in Eurasian
Geography and Economics, No 57:1, p. 118.
131 Anna Dimitrovna, Game of Pipelines: the Future of the Energy Sector in the Black Sea Region beyond t he
Pipeline Knot, in Anahit Shirinyan and Lo uisa Slavkova, Unrewarding Crossroads? Тhе Black Sea Region amidst
the European Union and Rus sia, Sofia Platform 2015, p. 193.
132 Suat Kiniklioglu, Turkey’s Black Sea Policy: Strategic Interplay at a Critical Junction , in Ronald D. Asmus (ed. ,
Next Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea, Washin gton, D.C., The German Marshall
Plan Fund of the United States , 2006, p. 55.

conflicts of the global geopolitics. Moreover, the absolute control of territorial waters by any
maritime or exterritorial forces has been impeded through the Montreux Convention133.
Turkey is a key transit state as oil is transported through the Bosporus Straits and the
Blue Stream pipeline. Although the Bosporus Straits are international waters, Turkey has, in
the past, restricted the movement of long and large capacity tankers through the straits a t
night134. Turkey concerned about limiting the number of vessels that navigate this narrow
waterway, as the Turkish Straits have become one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.
Upwards of 54,000 vessels, including 5,500 oil tanker, pass through this passa ge every year.
This means that an average of 150 ships traverse the Straits every day. The Bosporus Strait
measures a mere 700 meters across at its narrowest point. An accident caused by terrorism,
extreme weather, or simple human error would be disastrous . Because of this danger, in 2002
Turkey limited the size of tankers transiting the Straits to under 200 meters at night and at other
times when visibility is limited135.Since this is the most cost -effective method of transport for
charterers and cargo -owner s, these restrictions create a more expensive chokepoint, increasing
both producer and consumer costs136.
In an effort to limit tanker traffic in the increasingly crowded Straits, Turkey has sought
the construction of oil pipeline routes that bypass the wate rway. The first such bypass route was
completed in 2006 and carries Azerbaijani oil from Baku, through Tbilisi, and into the Turkish
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. This pipeline is known as the Baku -Tbilisi -Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline. There is also a pipeline in Ukraine connecting the Black Sea port of Odessa to Brody.
This pipeline was originally intended to transport oil from the Black Sea via Ukraine to
European markets, but instead has transported Russian oil to the Black Sea — thereby adding
to tanker traffic in the Straits.137

133 Vulnerabilities and Opportunities in the Black Sea region. Romanian perspective; Turkish perspective , Policy
Pape r, 2017, p. 12 .
134 Andrew Monaghan, Lucia Montanaro -Jankovski, EU -Russia energy relations: the need for active
engagement, EPC Issue Paper No.45, p. 16.
135 Zeyno Baran, Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region in: Daniel Hamilton, Gerhard Mangott, The Wider
Black Sea Region in the twenty -first century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives, Center of
Transatlantic Relations, Washington D.C., 2008, p. 91-92.
136 Andrew Monaghan, Lucia Montanaro -Jankovski, EU -Russia energy relations: the need for active
enga gement, EPC Issue Paper No.45, p. 16.
137 Zeyno Baran, Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region in: Daniel Hamilton, Gerhard Mangott, The Wider
Black Sea Region in the twenty -first century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives, Center of
Transatlantic Relations, Washington D.C., 2008, p. 92.

Despite its status as a NATO member state, Turkey believes that its influence in the
region is a "historic right" that fully legitimizes the assumption of a regional leader role138.
Turkey want also to joint in European Union. It is differe nt from other countries currently
queuing for EU entry: it is big, fast -growing and strategically placed. Turkish politicians like to
stress that their country’s accession would add to the EU could help the EU to bring stability to
the Middle East, the Cas pian and the Caucasus; and it could add to the EU’s energy security by
acting as a bridge to the resource -rich regions in its neighborhood. Turkey’s development as a
European energy hub looks natural, given its lucky location between countries that harbour 70
per cent of the world’s oil and gas reserve to its east, north and south, and one of the world’s
biggest energy markets in the west139.
Turkey and the EU could benefit a lot from working together in the energy field. The
EU would gain a reliable alternat ive supply route. Turkey would gain transit fees and other
energy -related business; and, perhaps more importantly, the opportunity to prove that it is an
indispensable partner for, and eventually part of, the European Union. But at the moment, the
fact tha t Turkey is a candidate for EU accession appears to hinder rather than help EU -Turkey
energy cooperation140
But today, Turkey has no prospect of becoming an EU member in the next years but
still has ongoing engagements with Russia in economic and energy proj ects. Turkey would
want to be the “balancer” of the EU -Russian rivalry in the region141.
The geopolitical and geo -economic situation in this region is increasingly dependent on
the Russian -Turkish dialogue resulting from a complex, spontaneously evolving Eur asian
context. These transnational relations are occasionally under some turbulence, but in the last
quarter of the century, there seemed to be observed a positive upward trend. Since the early
1990s, Turkey plays increasingly active and important role in the Eurasian geopolitical and geo –
economic structure. It seems to be not only one of the priority Russia’s partners in Eurasia, but
also its strategic ally, rival, and a hypothetical “alternate.”142

138 Ognyan Minchev, Interese și strategii fundamentale pentru regiunea Mării Negre în Monitor Strategic, nr. 3 –
4/2006, revistă editată de Institutul pentru Studii Politice de Apărare și Istorie Militar ă, Bucure ști, 20 06, p. 12
139 Katinka Barysch, Turkey’s role in European energy security, Centre for European Reform, 2007, p. 1.
140 Katinka Barysch, Turkey’s role in European energy security, Centre for European Reform, 2007, p. 1.
141 Ozgur Ozdamar, What Should Turkey Do to Stabilise the Black Sea Region? , in Anahit Shirinyan and Louisa
Slavkova, Unrewarding Crossroads? Тhе Black Sea Region amidst the European Union and Russia, Sofia
Platform 2015, p. 181.
142 Alexandr G. Druzhinin, The Black Sea Region in Modern Russian -Turkis h Cooperation: Geo -Strategic Aspect,
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 2015, 5(Special Issue), p.81.

The strongest point of cooperation was the increase in trad e relations. At the core of the
rivalry between Russia and Turkey was the odd perception of the geopolitical roles pitted
against each other as well economic matters such as energy143.
Turkey benefits from the Russian direct investment in the energy sectors in Turkey, co –
operation in energy infrastructure projects and Turkish trade in Russian natural gas144.
In fact, Turkey tries to maintain stable relations with both the EU and Russia, and to
balance the two. This aim of being a “balancer” might not be a delib erately formulated policy
option, but rather a natural result of a need to protect its interest’s vis -à-vis two great powers
on the coastline of the Black Sea, these interests being Turkey’s EU membership candidacy and
Turkey’s trade and energy interests i n its relations with Russia145.
In other opinion, Turkey is caught between various visions of its international role. Is it
a regional power, a ‘middle power’ or a multi -regional power? Turkey seeks to pursue what
Ahmet Dovutoglu has called a ‘good neighborh ood policy’. It wants to be a central player in
the region, rather than a bridge between East and West146.
Energy security has long been a vital priority in Ankara’s foreign -policy making. Its
relationship with regional producers has been determined by Turke y’s goal to be a transit
country from Russia, the Middle East and the Caspian Sea to Europe. The aim has been twofold:
(1) diversify energy suppliers in order to meet its own needs, and (2) increase the country’s
relevance as a transit zone147
On the one han d, Turkey co -operates with the EU to look for alternative natural gas
routes, and accordingly puts a lot of effort towards implementing pipeline projects that exclude
Russia such as the TANAP and Trans -Caspian pipeline projects. On the other hand, Turkey
collaborates with Russia on some other pipeline projects such as the Blue Stream and South
Stream pipeline projects148.

143 Giray Saynur Bozkurt, Security policy of Turkey and Russia in the Black Sea Basin, in
Karadeniz Araștırmaları, Number 30, 2011, p. 7.
144 Ozgur Ozdamar, What Should Turkey Do to Stabilise the Black Sea Region? , in Anahit Shirinyan and Louisa
Slavkova, Unrewarding Crossroads? Тhе Black Sea Region amidst the European Union and Russia, Sofia
Platform 2015, p. 182.
145 Ozgur Ozdamar, What Sh ould Turkey Do to Stabilise the Black Sea Region? , in Anahit Shirinyan and Louisa
Slavkova, Unrewarding Crossroads? Тhе Black Sea Region amidst the European Union and Russia, Sofia
Platform 2015, p. 183.
146 The Black Sea Region: New Conditions, Enduring Int erests, Russia and Eurasia Programme Seminar
Summary, Chatham House, 2009, p. 6.
147 Nona Mikhelidze, Nicolò Sartori, et al., The Moscow -Ankara Energy Axis and the Future of EU -Turkey
Relations, in Feuture Online Paper No. 5, p. 2.
148 Ozgur Ozdamar, What Sh ould Turkey Do to Stabilise the Black Sea Region? , in Anahit Shirinyan and Louisa
Slavkova, Unrewarding Crossroads? Тhе Black Sea Region amidst the European Union and Russia, Sofia
Platform 2015, p. 185-186.

Ankara granted Russia permission to construct the South Stream pipeline through
Turkey’s Black Sea territorial waters. South Stream was su pposed to bring some 63 bcm of
Russian natural gas to Europe. In exchange, Ankara secured significant price concessions from
Gazprom, as Moscow agreed to renegotiate long -term oil -indexed gas contracts. The decision
to negotiate transit access for cheaper prices was, however, criticized by the EU. However, the
South Stream pipeline project has been abandoned, owing to controversy over non -compliance
with European Union competition and energy legislation such as the Third Energy Package,
and was subsequentl y replaced by TurkStream149.
The TurkStream project was made public at the end of 2014 at the same time as the
abandonment of the South Stream project by the Black Sea in the midst of the Ukrainian crisis,
blocked by the European Union. The project provides for the construction of two pipelines
under the Black Sea. The capacity of each of these pipes is 15.75 billion cubic meters of gas
per year150.
The abandonment of the “South stream” construction in favor of the “Turkish route” for
Russian natural gas trans portation has significantly increased the meridional communication in
the Black Sea space and brings to importance the development of the Russian -Turkish Black
Sea coast. The gas transportation system is to become its key infrastructural element of these
relations, while the biggest settlement centers are to become the economic -urban dominants of
the coastal area151
In this context, Turkey plays a “bridge” role in the energy relations of the region in the
context of EU -Russia rivalry; in that, Turkey agrees t o help the conveyance of natural gas to
the EU from sources other than Russia, and at the same time, Turkey supports construction of
certain parts of Russian natural gas pipelines within Turkish territory and the Turkish exclusive
economic zone. In this wa y, Turkey both continues to export natural gas from Russia and helps
Russia to move its natural gas into the European territories. Playing a “bridge” role in this
respect not only allows Turkey to preserve its active participation in regional energy relati ons

149 Nona Mikhelidze, Nicolò Sartori, et al., The M oscow -Ankara Energy Axis and the Future of EU -Turkey
Relations, in Feuture Online Paper No. 5, p. 4.
150 La Russie et la Turquie signent le projet Turkstream, gazoduc sous la mer Noire in International, 10 .10.2016,
http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2016/10/10/la -russie -et-la-turquie -signent -le-projet -turkstream –
gazoduc -sous -la-mer-noire_5011396_3210.html , 30.04.12:40.
151 Alexandr G. Druzhinin, The Black Sea Region in Modern Russian -Turkish Cooperation: Geo -Strategic Aspect,
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 2015, 5(Special Issue), p. 84.

but also to guarantee itself in relation to its current and future natural gas needs. To put it anot her
way, Turkey forms its policy in the Black Sea region based on its economic interests152.
Also the Southern Gas Corridor will play a greater role in reducing the EU’s energy
dependence on Russia, Turkey's strategic position as a gas transit state is expected to gain
further importance. While Turkey is making efforts to diversify its supply sour ces by, for
example, building pipelines to transfer gas from northern Iraq, constructing an LNG terminal
or becoming a gas hub; the EU should consider building additional pipelines to the Trans –
Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP), and not abandoning the Nabucco -West project153.
Turkey’s role within the Southern Gas Corridor project is an energy transit hub. Because
Turkey imports 98% of its oil and 92% of its natural gas, Turkey does suffer from an account
deficit, but has an opportunity to make up some of that gi ven the current low price of oil. For
every $10 drop in the price of oil, Turkey gains about $4 billion in revenue. These lower prices,
in addition to working energy relationships with Russia and Europe, provide Turkey an
important geopolitical opportunity154.
Turkey has an interest in all wider Black Sea. In this regard, Turkey made advances
towards the establishment of the Caucasian Stability Pact. This platform of Stability and
Cooperation of the Caucasus is associated with the OSCE. It is hoped that it wi ll facilitate the
resolution of frozen conflicts in the region. In addition to security issues, Turkey's goal was to
restructure the economies of the Caucasus republics, ensure development and cooperation,
trade, support for the private sector and energy155.
The EU and Turkey are convinced that the conflicts have the potential to destabilize the
Caucasus with consequences beyond the region and need an urgent cooperation at regional and
international level. The conflicts will have consequences towards energy f ield156.
Whenever the process of Turkey’s final EU integration slowed down or was hindered
by barriers on its way, Ankara would start engaging more actively with the Black Sea states,

152 Ozgur Ozdamar, What Should Turkey Do to Stabilise the Black Sea Region? , in Anahit Shirinyan and Louisa
Slavkova, Unrewarding Crossroads? Тhе Black Sea Region amidst the European Union and Russia, Sofia
Platform 2015, p. 185-186.
153 Pinar E lman, Split Three Ways on Ukraine: Turkey in a Changing Regional Order, in Strategic File, Number 10
(46), 2014, p. 5.
154 Kevin Ryan, Southern European Energy Corridor: Status, prospects and geopolitics, event summary, Wil son
Center, p.3.
155 Lebriz Yakacikli , Initiatives de cooperation dans la région de la mer Noire, https://popups.uliege.be/1374 –
3864/index.php?id=1073&lang=en , 01.05.2018.
156 S Hunter, Borders, Conflict and Security i n the Caucasus: the Legacy of the Past, in Sais Review, Volume 26,
No. 1, 2006, p. 123.

especially Russia. The Russian Federation also was and is a strategic, eco nomic, and political
partner for Turkey from which Ankara cannot isolate itself.
Thus, Turkey pursues its foreign policy with its neighbors around the Black Sea and
elsewhere on the basis of bi – and multi -lateral relationships. It also becomes once again affirmed
that the major focus of Turkey’s foreign policy vis -à-vis the Black Sea region is mainly linked
to the preservation of the status quo in the region157.

Chapter III
The oil and gas routes – axes of the Black Sea geopolitics

I. Current gas and oil Transit Pipelines in Black Sea
Energy corridors are subjects of great geopolitical discourse. Energy Corridor is a route,
typically a pipeline on land or undersea for large -scale transport of hydrocarbons, connecting a
producing source to a market destination. It is manmade and requires huge upfront investment
for infrastructure and other facilities, such as transmission stations, storage and warehouses,
refineries and export/import termi nals and related infrastructure158.
According to energy corridors, the Black Sea has turned out to be a strategic region regarding
the gas and oil transit from Asia and Russia towards Europe. In this regard we have many gas
and oil pip eline which transport hydrocarbons.
The “Brotherhood” pipeline (Urengoy -Pomary -Uzhgorod) is the largest gas
transportation route, which started to work in 1967. It can carry over 100 bcm gas per year,
transiting Ukraine and running to Slovakia. In Slovakia, the pipeline is split and one branch
goes to the Czech Republic, and the second branch goes to Austria. This country plays an
important role in the delivery of Russian natural gas to I taly, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia159.
Other Russian gas transportation route is Trans -Balkan pipeline (845 km) transits Ukraine,
Romania and Bulgaria and passes through the Turkish towns of Hamitabat, Ambarlı, Istanbul,

157 Sophia Petriashvili , Where is the Black Sea Region in Turkey’s Foreign Policy?, in Turkish Policy Quarterly,
13.12.2015, http://turkishpolicy.com/article/777/where -is-the-black -sea-region -in-turkeys -foreign -policy,
02.05.2018.
158 V. Yorucu, O Mehmed, The Southern Energy Corridor: Turkey's role in European Energy Security, Spring er,
2018, p. 16.
159 http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/projects/transportation/ , 02.05.2018

Izmit, Bursa and Eskisehir before re aching Ankara. Gas imports started in 1987 and have now
a capacity of 14 BCM/year after expansion in 2002160.
Gazprom operates 156,000 kilometres of pipeli nes, the longest network in the world.
Together with Eni, it has constructed the 396 km Blue Stream gas pipeline which brings
Russian gas to Turkey over the Black Sea bottom at depths of over 2,000 metres. Blue Stream
is a vital component in Turkey's energy security, providing additional reliable supplie s in an
environmentally sustainable manner161.
In the r egard of oil, the most important Russian oil shipping port is Novorossiysk . In
2004 it had a shipping capacity of 45 million tons per year. Novorossiysk is ice -free all around
the year, but due to heavy storms in the region the port cannot be used for about three months
per year. Another shortcoming of the port is the fact that the oil tankers have to pass the
Dardanelles and the Bosporus, which raises the risk of great environmental damage. In 2003,
theses straits were passed by no less than 5500 oil t ankers with about 150 million tons of oil162.
Also, the Kazakh oil arrive in the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The Caspian
Pipeline Consortium (CPC) had completed 1,580km pipeline connects the Tengiz oil field in
western Kazakhstan with the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Costing $2.65bn, the Caspian
Pipeline is one of a number of projects designed to access the huge hydrocarbon potential of
the Central Asian regions that have been opened up by the collapse of Communism. The
pipeline was commissioned in 20 01. In 2008, the pipeline transported 675,000 barrels of crude
oil per day, comprising 557,000bpd from the Caspian region and 118,000bpd from the Russian
field163.
Other important pipeline was built from the Ukrainian Black Sea port Odessa to the
Southern Druzhba 164pipeline with a junction near the West Ukrainian Bro dy. This Odessa –
Brody pipeline had been built for the transport of oil from the Caspian region (Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan) to Europe, and there were additional plans to connect it with the Northern branch
of the Druzhba pipeline and/or to extend it to the Baltic Sea port Gdańsk. But after the pipeline

160 Ole Gunnar Austvik, Gulmira Rzayeva, Turkey in the Geopolitics of Natural Gas, Associate Working Pap er
Series, 2016, No. 66, p . 4.
161 Alexey Miller, South Stream and European Energy Secu rity, Gazprom paper, p. 9.
162 Roland Götz, Russia and the Energy Supply of Europe, in FG 5, 2005, p. 8.
163Adrian Dellecker, Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Bellwether of Russia’s Investment Climate? , Russia/NIS
Center, Paris 2008; https://www.hydrocarbons -technology.com/projects/caspian/ , 0305.2018, 12:56.
164 The Druzhba oil pipeline starts from Samara and is divided at the border of Russian and Belarus into thre e
branches. One branch of smaller dimension goes to Latvia, branching -off to the Lithuanian Baltic Sea ports and
to the Lithuanian refinery Maeikiai. The Northern main branch goes via Poland (refinery in Płock) to Germany
(the refinery in Schwedt on the Od er). A Southern branch goes through Northern
Ukraine to Hungary and Croatia with a branch to Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Roland Götz, Russia and the
Energy Supply of Europe, in FG 5, 2005, p. 7 .

was finished in 2002, neither suppliers nor purchasers of oil from the Caspian region were
interested in the route Odessa -Brody, therefore the Russian oil company TNK -BP suggested to
pump Russian oil from the Druzhba pipeline in the opposite direction from Brody to Odessa
and then transport it by tankers through the Bosporus to the world market165.
The last oil pipeline is Black Sea is Baku -Supsa . Known as the Western Route Export
Pipeline and Western Early Oil Pipeline166, Baku -Supsa pipeline runs from the Sangachal
terminal 40km south of Baku, to the Georgian port of Supsa on the Black Sea. In the beginning,
the project was designed for oil export within t he project over the Chirag Field. The terminal
has four reservoirs with a capacity of 120,000t, is equipped with offshore mooring and can
facilitate tankers with a deadweight of up to 150,000t. Russian Aviation bombed the pipeline
on 10 and 12 August 2008. Therefore, the Baku -Supsa pipeline, also known as the Western
Route Export Pipeline, was closed in August 2008 as a precautionary measure due to military
activities in Georgia. It was reopened in November 2008167.
An alternative to CPC is the oil pipeline Baku -Tibilisi -Ceyhan (BTC ). The pipeline
transports crude oil produced in the Caspian Basin, in places such as Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan, by a pipeline to a marine terminal on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey in Ceyhan
and then to the world markets by ta nkers168. The BTC measures 1770 kilometres and it will
allow Caspian oil shipments to reach the Mediterranean coast thereby bypassing the Turkish
straits, which are dangerously congested with oil tanker traffic169. With its annual capacity of
50 million tonnes , the BTC pipeline contributes to the expansion of the global energy supply.
With this project, Turkey expects annual revenues of about $ 300 million. The construction of
the pipeline cost $ 3 billion and employed nearly 15,000 people. This project is one of the pillars
of the East -West ene rgy corridor170.
Another significant accomplishment of the BTC development is that it was a catalyst
for the development of another important project, the SCP project, connecting Baku to
Erzurum in Turkey via Georgia, which will deliver 6 bcm of gas to Turkey per year under an
existing gas purchase agreement. Small volumes will be delivered to Azerbaijan and Georgia,

165 Roland Götz, Russia and the Energy Supply of Europe, in FG 5, 2005, p. 8.
166 https://www.bp.com/en_ge/bp -georgia/about -bp/bp -in-georgia/western -route -export -pipeline –wrep –
.html , 03.0 5.2018.
167 https://www.hydrocarbons -technology.com/projects/supsa/
168 Tuncay Babali, Implications of the Baku -Tbilisi – Ceyhan main oil pipeline project, In Perceptions, 2005, p. 29 –
30.
169 Baku -Tbilisi -Ceyhan pipeline fact sheet, Brussels, 13 July 2006, MEMO/ 06/282.
170 Ludwig Roger, De l’Europe du Sud -est à la Région Mer Noire : une Süd -Ost Politik pour la Commission
européenne? De l’endiguement de l’Union Soviétique à l’élargissement de l’Union européenne, Universi té de
Cergy Pontoise, 2014, p . 530.

thus contributing to the energy security of those countries. The initial capacity of the gas
pipeline will be 8.4 bcm per year with throughput capacity to be increased to up to 30 bcm per
annum, with the potential of being connected to Turkmen producers, aiming for transporting
gas to European gas markets171.
A potential impact on oil transit in the Black Sea region is the Istanbul canal. This canal
would link the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara by cutting a 45 -kilometer (28 -mile) rout e
through Turkey's largest city172. The canal is to provide relief to shipping traffic, particularly
oil tanker traffic, passing through the Bosphorus. The canal is to boast a capacity of 160 vessels
a day and is scheduled to be completed by 2023.The aim is to reduce the risks that may arise
from vessels carrying dangerous substances passing through the Bosphorus173.
Since 1990 was d eveloped a Western project to export the oil and gas from the Caspian
basin and Central Asia through non -Russian controlled pipelines in order to diversify European
energy suppliers and supply routes. As the oil from the region reached global markets throu gh
the Baku –Tbilisi –Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, and hence part of the idea of the East -West corridor
was realized, the attention shifted to focus on tapping the region’s gas reserves. Building
alternative transportation networks to carry the gas from the region was the second leg of the
project174.
For more than a decade, one of the most intriguing questions of European energy
security has been the realization of the Southern Gas Corridor, the network of pipelines
connecting Caspian and Middle Eastern resources to Europe. The Southern Corridor is
designed to be expanded as additional natural gas becomes available in Azerbaijan, and as
Turkmenistan. Furthermore, the Southern Corridor has the potential to incorporate natural gas
from the Eastern Mediterranean as wel l as Iraq, and perhaps even from Iran, which holds the
world’s second largest gas reserves175.
In this context, the project with the most a dvanced status is the Trans -Adriatic
pipeline /Trans -Anatolian pipeline that is currently under construction and will tr ansport gas
from Azerbaijan (Shah Deniz II field) via Turkey to the EU. In addition, the White Stream

171 Svante E . Cornell, Mamuka Tsereteli, Vladimir Socor, Geostrategic Implications of the Baku -Tbilisi -Ceyhan
Pipeline, In S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, The Baku -Tbilisi -Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West,
Central Asia -Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Stu dies Program, 2005, p. 23.
172 Turkey unveils route for Istanbul canal megaproject, http://www.dw.com/en/turkey -unveils -route -for-
istanbul -canal -megaproject/a -42157555 , 29.04.2018, 14:03.
173 Turkey unveils Canal Istanbul Project route, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/todays -headlines/turkey -unveils –
canal -istanbul -project -route/1031171 , 29.04.2018, 14:45.
174 Șaban Karda ș, Geo -strategic position as leverage in EU accession: the case of Turkish –EU negotiations on the
Nabucco pipeline, In Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2011, p. 38.
175 David Koranyi, The Southern Gas Corridor:Europe’s Lifeline? In IAI Working Papers No. 14, 2014 , p.3.

pipeline and the AGRI interconnector are two projects that compete regarding the connection
of Georgia to Romania via the Black Sea. Th e connection of Tur kmenistan de pends mainly on
the construction of the Trans -Caspian pipeline and the capacity expansion of the South
Caucasus pipeline. In the future, gas from Russia is planned to be supplied to Turkey via the
TurkStream pipeline that is currently under con struction176.
Trans -Anatolian pipeline is a gas pipeline that would run between Azerbaijan and
Turkey. Because Nabuc co natural gas pipeline, was no longer considered a commercially viable
project, it has been replaced by the planned smal ler-scale TANAP177.
In June 2012 Ankara and Baku signed an inter -governmental agreement on TANAP,
which could cost 7 billion dollars, and would be completed in six years. It would pipe 16 billion
cubic meters of gas per year from Azerbaijan. Part of the deal is also that Turk ey will keep six
billion cubic meters from this amount. The line is designed in such a way that its capacity can
increase depending on gas inflow: 23 bcm per year by 2023, 31 bcm b y 2026, and ultimately
60 bcm, by adding pipeline st rings through the same c orridor, mainly contingent on the
transport of gas across the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan. Gas is supposed to flow from the
Turkish border to the EU via new gas pipelines (Nabucco West and/or Trans -Adriatic
Pipeline)178.
The project is expected to be oper ational in 2018. O June 28, 2013, the Shah Deniz
consortium and its leading stakeholders (SOCAR and BP) concluded negotiations and chose
the Trans -Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) project to transport Azeri gas from the EU -Turkish border
to European markets. In su mmary, for Azeri gas to reach Europe, two pipelines will have to be
built. The first will connect Azerbaijan, via Georgia, to the EU -Turkish border, while the second
will transport the gas to its final destination. Together they will create the Southern Ga s
Corridor179.
The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP ) project is the western extension of the Southern
Gas Corridor (SGC). SGC is planned to export natural gas – initially 10 billion cubic metres
per year – from the Shah Deniz II field in the Caspian Sea to weste rn markets via the South
Caucasus Pipeline extension (Azerbaijan to Georgia), on through the Trans -Anatolian pipeline

176 Arno Häusler, Jens Hobohm, et. al., Perspectives of the Southern gas corridor, Commissio ned by Nord
Stream 2 AG, 2017, p. 4.
177 Michael Ratner, Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversificati on,In
Congressional Research Service, p. 1.
178 Adam Balcer,Between energy and soft pan -turkism:Turkey and the Turkic Re publics, In Turkish Policy
Quarterly, Volume 11, No, 2, p. 160.
179Erkan Erdogdu, Turkey’s Energy Strategy and its Role in the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor, In IAI Working Paper
No.1 4, 2014, p. 3.

(TANAP) stretching across Turkey, and then joining up with TAP at the border of Turkey and
Greece180. The Trans – Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) project, had no requirement for EU funds. It was
backed by two of the wealthiest European energy companies, Switzerland’s EGL and Norway’s
Statoil181. In fact, the TAP project was in the competition to deliver Shah Deniz II gas to Europe,
insofar as it lacke d political support from EU and member state institutions. The political
favourite was without doubt the European Commission’s flagship project Nabucco, a strategic
pipeline that would have brought Azerbaijani gas to those Central and Southeastern European
countries considered over -dependent on Russian supplies. Besides Nabucco, the Interconnector
Turkey -Greece -Italy (ITGI) project was also recognized as a project of European interest by
the European Union182.
According with the official site of TAP project t he pipeline will be finished in 2020, but
the schedule is in full alignment with upstream developments, which means that exact timings
will depend on the progress of the Shah Deniz Stage 2 development183.
Other pipeline under construction is TurkStream. The project will directly connect the
large gas reserves in Russia to the Turkish gas transportation network, to provide energy
supplies for Turkey, south and south -east Europe. The pipelines will enter in Black Sea, near
Anapa, and come ashore on the Turkish coast some 100 kilometres west of Istanbul, near the
village of Kiyikoy. From Kiyikoy, an underground pipeline will be developed connecting
TurkStream to the existing network at Luleburgaz. The route will continue from there to its end
point at the Turkis h-European border184. More than 50 percent of the Turkish Stream pipeline
has been completed. The Turkish Stream project envisages the construction of two pipelines.
One of the two pipelines has already reached the Turkey -Russia Exclusive Economic Zone. The
second pipeline will carry Russian natural gas to Europe, and the progress on the construction
of this pipeline will depend on from where Russian natural gas will enter Europe, the relevant
natural gas agreements to be signed and the route.The first stream of gas is expected to flow
through the pipeline in December 2019185.

180 Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), by BankTrack and Counter Bala nce, 2017.
181 John Roberts, The Southern Corridor: Baku -Tbilisi -Ceyhan’s gas legacy, In Turkish Policy Quarterly, Volume
11, Number 2, p. 80.
182 Nicolò Sartori, Energy and Politics: Behind the Scenes of the Nabucco -TAP Competition, In IAI Working Paper
No.13 , 2013, p. 2.
183 https://www.tap -ag.com/the -pipeline/project -timeline , 01.05.2018. 12:40.
184 http://turkstream.info/project/ , 08.05.2018, 17:48.
185 Over 50 percent of construction on first Turkish Stream pipeline completed, In Daily News, January 2 9 2018,
http://w ww.hurriyetdailynews.com/over -50-percent -of-construction -on-first-turkish -stream -pipeline –
completed -126444 , 07.05.2018. 18:45

II. Proposed Oil and Gas Transit Pipelines in Black Sea
A challenge that complicated oil transportation from the Caspian region, is the fact
that the prime southern Russian oil export route – the port of Novorossiysk – as well as routes
using the Georgian Black Sea ports of Batumi and Supsa, and the Ukrainian p ort of Odessa,
require tanker transits through the Bosporus Strait. The Bosporus slices through the center of
Istanbul, a city of twelve million inhabitants that has been designated by UNESCO as a World
Heritage Site186.
Because there is a constant risk of t anker accidents near the Istanbul city t his is why it
was considered how to bypass the Bosporus. There was plans provides for the construction of
a pipeline from the Romanian Black Sea port Constanța to Belgrade, which would create a
connection with the Cr oatian Adriatic port Omialj. As an alternative, pipelines could be built
from Constanța or the Bulgarian port Burgas either through Macedonia to the Albanian port
Vlore or, on a shorter route, to Ale xandroupolis in Northern Greece187.
The concept of the Burg as-Alexandroupoli pipeline (the Trans -Balkan Pipeline or
“TBP”) was first formulated by the countries of Russia, Bulgaria, and Greece during the years
1993 and 1994 with the purpose of creating a new and reliable oil import route for Russian
and Caspian -origin crude oil to Europe. This 280 -km pipeline, with 166 km passing through
Bulgaria, might have an initial annual capacity of 35 million tons, with a possible future
expansion to 50 million tons . The planned route of the pipeline had to consist of three l egs:
first, the oil would be shipped by tankers from Russian Black Sea ports to the port of Burgas
in Bulgaria. Second, the oil would be transported via overland pipelines to the Aegean port of
Alexandroupoli in Greece. And last, the oil would be loaded on to additional tankers and then
delivered to international markets. Essentially, the Burgas -Alexandroupoli pipeline would
effectively circumvent the congested Bosporus and Dardanelles straits and the reby enhance
EU energy security188.
Bulgaria agreed with Russia and Greece in 2007, after decades of discussion, to build
the pipeline and allow Russian crude to bypass the traffic -clogged Bosphorus Straits. But

186 Jonathan Elkind, Economic Implications of the Baku -Tbilisi -Ceyhan Pipeline, In In S. Frederick Starr, Svante E.
Cornell, The B aku-Tbilisi -Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West, Central Asia -Caucasus Institute & Silk Road
Studies Program, 2005, p. 40.
187 Roland Götz, Russia and the Energy Supply of Europe, in FG 5, 2005, p. 8.
188 John Papaspanos, Caspian energy geopolitics: The rise and fall of Burgas -Alexandroupoli, Research Peaper,
No. 148, 2010, p.10.

many voices have repeatedly said it was likely to walk out of the project becaus e of risks to
nature and opposition from local residents who fear it will hurt fishing and tourism and offer
few economic benefits189. In 2011 Bulgaria announcing its decision to walk out of Burgas –
Alexandroupoli oil pipeline project signed with Greece and R ussia. The reason was
environmental and financial concerns190.
Another alternative route but more expensive than Burgas -Alexandroupoli project was
Samsun -Ceyhan pipeline . This pipeline, also known as Trans -Anatolian oil pipeline, is
planned to be laid in Tur key to transport oil from the Samsun terminal on the Black Sea to the
Ceyha n terminal in the Mediterranean191. The pipeline was planned to carry as much as 1.5
million barrels of oil per day. The overland route of the pipeline would diminish environmental
effects and risks associated with tanker traffic in the Bosporus and Dardanelles192.Other
advantages of t he project can be summarized as follows: the proximity of Samsun to the oil
outlets on the Eastern Black Sea will minimize the seaborne transportation of oil in the Black
Sea; the existing energy infrastructure in Ceyhan obviates the need for undertaking new and
costly infrastructure investments193. The pipeline was expected to be commissioned in 2012 but
not yet realised because of concerns over its financi al viability194.
The Pan European Oil Pipeline foresees supplying regional and world markets with
crude oil from the Caspian region. The crude oil would be conveyed to the Romanian port of
Constanța, which would be linked to Janaf by a new pipeline through R omania and Serbia –
Montenegro, while a link with Trieste (and the Transalpine Pipeline) has also been projected195.
The project will be carried out under the European Community support program
“INNOGATE”. A cooperation protocol was signed, at government level , amo ng Romania,
Serbia, and Croatia196.

189 Tsvetelia Tsolova, Bulgaria to abandon trans -Balkan oil pipeline , In Reuters, december 7, 2011,
https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL5E7N71XD20111207?pageNumber =2&virtualBrandCha
nnel=0 .
190 Chryssa Liaggou, Sofia deals killer blow to Burgas -Alexandroupoli project,
http://www.ekat himerini.com/137764/article/ekathimerini/business/sofia -deals -killer -blow -to-burgas –
alexandroupoli -project , 05.05.2018, 13:23.
191 https://www.hydrocarbons -technology.com/projects/samsun -ceyhan -oil-pipeline/
192 Turkey's Samsun -Ceyhan oil pipeline shelved , https://www.upi.com/Turkeys -Samsun -Ceyhan -oil-pipeline –
shelved/24281366711120/ , 02.05.2018.
193 Turkey's energy startegy, 2008.
194 https://www.hydrocarbons -technology.com/projects/samsun -ceyhan -oil-pipeline/
195 Danijel Orešić, Pan -European Transport Corridors and Transport System of
Croatia, In Hrvatski geografski glasnik 66/2, 2004, p. 14.
196 Presentation Sheet of the Investment Proje ct Pan –European Oil Pipeline, Romania Ministry of Economy,
http://www.minind.ro/invest/new/Oil_and_Gas_Sector/CONPET/OG.C.1.09_peop_Engl.pdf

With regard to the overall project, initial feasibility studies have been conducted, but in
recent years there has only been limited progress. A PEOP Project Development Company was
founded jointly by Conpet Ploie ști (Romania), Oil Terminal Constan ța (Romania), Transnafta
(Serbia) and JANAF (Croatia). By now, the large -scale proposal has been effectively
abandoned after Italy, Slovenia and eventually Croatia withdrew their support one after another.
Following Croatia’s withdrawal from PEOP, Romania and Serbia have stressed the necessity
to create a new concept. A much smaller project proposal now aims to connect the national oil
transportation systems of the two countries. It is championed by Russia’s Gazprom Neft. The
pipeline would allow Gazprom to transport Russian crude oil via tankers to Constanta and
onwards to its Serbian refineries Pancevo and Novi Sad197.
The Burgas – Vlore pipeline will run for nearly 900 kilometres from the Bulgarian port
of Burgas, over the Blac k Sea to the Albanian city of Vlore on the Adriatic coast, crossing
Macedonia. The project was first conceived in 1994 but has suffered delays due to uncertainties
about whether there was sufficient demand198. Top representatives of Macedonia, Bulgaria and
Albania met on 2004 in Sofia to ink a memorandum of understanding with Ted Ferguson,
president of the AMBO (Albania -Macedonia -Bulgaria Oil) pipeline project. The American –
based Corporation has been struggling since 1994 to get the attention of key politica l and
industrial backers, in order to begin construction199.
The Interconnector Turkey -Greece -Italy (ITGI ) was a project proposed to supply
natural gas from the Caspian Sea and the Middle East to Turkey, Greece and Italy.The
collaborative agreement to build and manage the pipeline was signed by the representatives of
the three countries in July 2007 in Rome. The project has been given top priority by the
European Commission200. The Interconnector Tur key–Greece –Italy was one of several rival
projects competing t o launch the European Union –backed Southern Gas Corridor to Europe
with Azerbaijani natural gas. The ITGI was the weakest contestant and was shelved in 2012,
yielding to the Nabucco project, which, in turn, yielded to the Trans -Adriatic Pipeline project201.

197 Serbia, Croatia, Romania: Will Gazprom push PEOP oil pipeline East -West connection, Serbia SEE Energy
Mining News, https://serbia -energy.eu.
198 Go-ahead for Balkan oil pipeline, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2 /hi/business/4130271.stm , 01.05.2018, 22:45.
199 AMBO Trans -Balkan Pipeline Agreement Finally Signed,
http://www.balkanalysis.com/blog/2004/12/29 /ambo -trans -balkan -pipeline -agreement -finally -signed/ ,
04.05.2018, 19:25.
200 https://www.hydrocarbons -technology.com/projects/turkeygreeceitalypip/ , 06.05.2018, 16:54.
201 Vladimir Socor,Turkey -Greece -Italy Interconnector: South Stream’s Latest Avatar?, In Eurasia Daily Monitor
Volume: 13 Issue 47, https://jamestown.org/program/turkey -greece -italy -interconnector -south -streams -latest –
avatar -part-three/, 06.05.2018, 12:34.

The Nabucco project was a proposed gas pipeline which should to connect the Caspian
region, Middle East and Egypt via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary with Austria and
further on with the Central and Western European gas markets. The pipeline route with a length
of app roximately 3,300 km should start at the Georgian/Turkish and/or Iranian/Turkish border
respectively and run via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to lead to Baumgarten in Austria. The
pipeline's transport capacity is supposed to amount 31 bcm per year. From an EU point of view
Nabucco should represent an opportunity to diversify gas supply options and to reduce the EU's
dependency on Russia202. If Nabucco would have been achieved, it should to be a major step
towards the realization of an East -West energy corrido r, but pipeline project has been cancelled
in 2013. In 2012 the pipeline has had already been reduced in length from the original 3,900
km to 1,300 km. The eastern section, which was to have run from Azerbaijan across Georgia
and Turkey to the Bulgarian bo rder, was abandoned. Instead, the Trans Anatolian Pipeline
(TANAP), funded by Azerbaijan and Turkey, is due to come into operation in future203.
The Nabucco West is to supply Eastern and Central Europe wit h gas from Azerbaijan .
The project, involved a 1,300 -kilometer pipeline running entirely on European Union territory,
from the Turkish -Bulgarian border to the Central European Gas Hub at Baumgarten near
Vienna. The revised version of Nabucco eliminates the Turkish section, shortening the
pipeline’s length b y two thirds and correspondingly reducing the construction costs. On EU
territory, Nabucco -West proposes to take the same route as the original project204.
Even if Nabucco West is a realistic project, the TANAP Company had to choose
whether to connect with t his pipeline or the Trans -Adriatic Pipeline, which is aimed at
supplying the Italian market205. Also, Nabucco West was the rival of TAP, which would have
transported natural gas from Turkey’s western border to Austria. On June 28, 2013, the
consortium that c ontrols the Azerbaijani natural gas chose the TAP project to connect to
TANAP. The consortium did not rule out Nabucco West or a similar project at a later date when
more natural gas is developed206.

202 Caroline Dieckhöner, Simulating security of supply effects of the Nabucco and South Stream projects f or the
European natural gas market, In EWI Working Paper, No. 10/07, p. 4.
203 Clara Weiss,European Union’s Nabucco pipeline project aborted , In World Sociall ist Web site,
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/07/13/nabu -j13.html , 06.05.2018. 15:20
204 Vladimir Socor, “Nabucco -West”: Abridged Pipeline Project Officially Submitted to Shah D eniz Consortium
In: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume 9 Issue 98, https://jamestown.org/program/nabucco -west -abridged -pipeline –
project -officially -submitted -to-shah -deniz -consortium/ , 05.05.2018, 14:50.
205 Anita Sobjak, Konrad Zasztowt, Nabucco West —Perspectives and Relevance: The Reconfigured Scenario, In
RISM Policy Paper, No. 44, 2012, p. 1 .
206 Michael Ratner, Europe’s Energy Securi ty: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification,In
Congressional Research Service, p. 2.

South Stream estimated to cost 19 -25 billion euros, the project, upon completion, will
transport Russian natural gas to Bulgaria under the Black Sea and then carry this gas to Austria
and Italy along two yet to be determined routes. South Stream has competed for access to the
European gas market with several sm aller EU -backed pipeline projects, and Russian officials
wanted to complete construction of South Stream before one or more of these alternative
projects may come on stream207. But, t he Brussels -based EC, which is the executive branch of
the 28 -member state EU, had said that the South Stream pipeline was in breach of EU
competition law and bilateral deals with its calling points – Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Greece,
Slovenia, Croatia and Austria – all needed to be redrawn. It has since come to light that Volga
Group, who is on the EU's Russia sanctions list, owns two -thirds of the Stroytransgaz
consortium that is building the Bulgarian section of South Stream.The commission has called
that the Russian -led pipeline should be suspended until full compliance with EU legislation is
ensured and re -evaluated in light of the EU's energy security priorities208. After many setbacks,
the Russians fi nally cancelled the South Stream project in December 2014 and announced that
they had instead agreed with Ankara to build Turk ish Stream. In practice, Turkish Stream was
a variant of South Stream making its Black -Sea beachhead in Turkey, out of reach of EU
regulators209.
The Trans -Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) was promoted by the United States in the
1990s, initially aimed to promote gas exports (up to 30 billion cubic metres per annum) from
eastern Turkmenistan via a sub -sea pipeline and to the coast of Azerbaijan and on to Turkey.
From the very beginning the project has been problematic to implement, despite two successful
feasibility studies by Enron and Unocal, and the 1999 gas agreement between Turkmenistan,
Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Subsequently, the project became stalled and was finally
abandoned, mainly because of a conflict between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan ov er their gas
share in the proposed pipeline and the division of Caspian hydrocarbon fields. Although in May
2001 both countries tried to resolve such differences, the pipeline project became embroiled in

207 Cenk Sidar,Gareth Winrow, Turkey &South Stream: Turco -Russian Rapprochement and the future of the
Southern Corridor, In Turkish Policy Quarterly, Volume 10, Number 2, p.55.
208 Bill Lehane, EU calls for South Stream suspension, 28 May 2014,
http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/1157072/eu -calls -for-south -stream –
suspension?utm_medium=email&utm_source=free_article_access&utm_content=216709783 , 04.05.2018,
12:30
209 Indra Overland, The Hunter Becomes the Hunted: Gazprom Encounters EU Regulation, In Svein Andersen,
Energy Union: Europe's New Liberal Mercantilism?, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 118.

a dispute regarding an unclear legal status of the C aspian Sea, which in Soviet times was
controlled by the USSR and Iran. The two countries never established a maritime border210.
But in 2006 t he dispute between Russianand and Ukraine its impact on gas supplies
Europe -wide has suddenly reawakened interest in obtaining direct access to the gas reserves of
Turkmenistan211. The Europe is still interested in building of the Trans -Caspian gas pipeline,
but the prospects have not changed in the last couple of years, since all the main obstacles to
the implementatio n of this project, such as construction costs, competition with other projects,
gas demand stagnation in Europe, uncertainty about supplies from Turkmenistan, the
unresolved legal dispute over Caspian Sea territorial boundaries and Russian and Iranian
oppo sition to the project are still relevant212.
The White Stream is a proposed pipeline project to transport Turkmen gas via the
second string of the Trans -Caspian Pipeline (TCP) directly to Romania and other EU Member
States. That gas would make landfall acros s the Caspian Sea in Azerbaijan, be transmitted to
Georgia’s Black Sea coast through the expanded South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) in Georgia,
enter the undersea White Stream pipeline and be received in the EU at Romania’s terminal at
Constanta. From there, t he gas can flow through existing infrastructure in Ukraine, Slovakia
and Czech to Central and Northern European countries213. The project was promoted by the
London -based Pipeline Systems Engineering (PSE) and the New -York -based Radon -Ishizumi
consulting and engineering firms214.
On 14 October 2013, White Stream was included in the renewed list of key selected
energy infrastructure projects designated as a project of common interest, as a component of
the Southern Gas Corridor pipeline chain215.
And the Access to Turkmen for Europe may become reality in 2022. Trans -Caspian Gas
Pipeline and the White Stream may be built in some five years. As a result, in addition to 10bn

210 Shamil Midkhatovich Yenikeyeff, Kazakhstan’s Gas: Export Markets and Export Routes, Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies, 2008, p. 68.
211 Vladimir Socor, Interest rebounds in Trans -Caspian Piepline for turkmen gas, In Eurasia D aily Monitor
Volume 3, Issue 16, https://jamestown.org/progra m/interest -rebounds -in-trans -caspian -pipeline -for-turkmen –
gas/ , 07.05.2018, 19:50.
212 Sara Israfilbayova, Expert: Europe still interested in the Trans -Caspian gas pipeline In Azer News, 19 May
2017, https://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/113422.html , 06.05.2018, 20:43.
213 http://www.white -stream.com/the -project/ , 07.05.2018,13:40.
214 Vladimir Socor,Trans -Black Sea Pipeline can bring Caspian Gas to Europe In: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume, 3
Issue: 226, https://jamestown.org/program/trans -black -sea-pipeline -can-bring -caspian -gas-to-europe/ ,
06.05.2018, 18:30.
215 Ukrainian expert talks chances to re -launch White Stream, In Trend News Agency, 25 august 2017,
https://en.trend.az/business/energy/2790298.html , 07.05.2018.

cm to be received through the Southern Gas Corridor, Europe will get 16bn cm t hrough the
White Stream. This will give Central Asian gas 10% of the European gas market216.
The AGRI interconnector is the first proposed LNG Project to be developed in the
Black S ea. The AGRI was designed as an integral part of the Southern Corridor, providing the
shortest direct route for Caspian gas to European markets. The AGRI is expected to transport
liquefied Azeri gas from Georgia, across the Black Sea, to a LNG terminal to be built on the
Romanian Black Sea Coast. From that point, the gas will be pumped through Romanian natural
gas transmission system to Hungary, through the Interconnector between Romania and
Hungary ( Arad – Szeghed ) to be transported further to the European market217. The project
could begin in 2019, after Romania has set up its natural gas transmission network218.
Some researches testify that the Black Sea should not be seen only as a transport corridor
but also as potential hydrocarbons source. The oil and gas potential of the Black Sea is still
largely unknown and thus cannot be compared with that of the Caspian Sea. This is both
important for the security of EU energy supply and diversification of supply sources to the
countries of the Black Sea region219.
From a geological point of view the Black Sea is predominantly situated in the Black
Sea Basin which comprises two extensional areas, the Western and the Eastern Black Sea sub –
basins. These sub -basins are separated by a major rift shoulder; the Mid Black Sea High . The
western Black Sea is considered more gas prone while the east is dominated by oil. In Romania
the offshore drilling started in the mid -1970s and since then about 100 exploration wells have
been drilled. The drilling activity offshore Bulgaria started in the mid -1980s and some 30
exploration wells have been drilled so far. As of the early 1990s the Romanian and Bulgarian
waters of the Black Sea saw a growing interest from IOCs (International Oil Companies) with
drilling operations conducted further fro m the coast in deeper waters220.
Turkey is for now the most active riparian Black Sea country in terms of hydrocarbons
exploration, mostly offshore. Turkey has opened the path via the partnership of its state oil

216 Gas genatsvales: Georgia promotes Turkmen gas in Europe,31.01.2018,
https://eadaily.com/en/news/2018/01/31/gas -genatsvales -georgia -promotes -turkme n-gas-in-europe ,
07.05.2018.
217 http://agrilng.com/ , 05.05.2018. 20:23.
218 Gerea: Construcția AGRI va începe după 2019 In Focus Energetic, 25 June, 2015, https://www.focus –
energetic.ro/gerea -constructia -agri-va-incepe -dupa -2019 -27223.html , 07.05.2018, 15:30.
219 Maria Kottari,Vlad Popovici, Jaroslaw Wisniewski, Energy politics, pipelines and the Black Sea basin : On the
route t o diversification of EU energy sources, Young Researches Series, Volume 4, 2013, p. 52.
220 E&P activity in the Romanian and Bulgarian waters of the Black Sea: Where do we go from here?, In IS H
Markit, https://ihsmarkit.com/research -analysis/ep -activity -in-the-romanian -and-bulgarian -waters -of-the-
black -sea-where -do-we-go-from -here.html , 09.05.2018, 21:30

company, TPAO, with major international oil c ompanies for exploration in the deep waters of
the Black Sea in 2005221.

Conclusion
Being located at the intersection of Europe and Asia, the Black Sea is a region of great
geopolitical importance. It has drawn attention since the 1990s for geopolitical and economic
reasons. In ,,The Black Sea – A History ”, Charl es King argues that the wider Black Sea region
has often been a bridge rather than a barrier that links empires, na tions and states. So the
evolution of the region has strong roots in the history of the region.
A special status from a political and economic point of view, Black Sea received at the
end of the Cold War. Ethnic conflicts, the process of building the Post -Soviet states, the
presence of significant natural resources, and the energy corridors gave the region an extremely
high importance. The global perception that the region is unable to solve its own problems has
triggered the involvement and competition bet ween them in the region.
The Black Sea region has a major strategic importance for European Union, the Euro –
Atlantic Alliance and Russia. For the North Atlantic Alliance, the wider Black Sea region is a
bridge to the Caspian Sea -rich energy region and a ba rrier to terrorist threats from Middle East.
For the EU, the Black Sea region represents a space for the implementation of the European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which aims to establish a peaceful zone at its borders. The Black
Sea region for EU remains a production and distribution area of strategic importance for energy
security. Due to numerous natural resources in Caspian Sea, it has a significant potential for
diversification of energy supply. This diversification requires good and elaborate collaboration
with energy producing countries, transit countries and energy consumers.
For Russia, it remains a family space that was part of the Soviet Union or the Tsarist
Empire. Even if the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia still remains connected with t he Post -Soviet
states in many areas, the energy field being one of them.

221 Maria Kottari,Vlad Popovici, Jaroslaw Wisniewski, Energy politics, pipelines and the Black Sea basin : On the
route to diversification of EU energy sources, Young Researches Series, Volume 4, 2013, p. 52.

The EU is working with Black Sea countries through various programs aimed at
enhancing energy stability by modernizing existing energy structures an d building new
infrastructures. Sometimes energy cooperation is in conflict with the region's main actor,
Russia, who wants and maintains the energy monopoly in the region. Russia is totally in
contradiction with Europe's ambition to diversify its energy needs. The effects are visible in
developing projects to transport gas and oil into Europe. But even if energy diversification is
one of the objectives of the European Union, it does not compete with the individual interests
of the states in the union.
The end of the Cold War opened the Bla ck Sea region to external influences. This
process has changed after the countries of Eastern Europe have passed under the influence of
the EU and NATO. So the region has turned into a field of rivalry for global powers to promote
its main interests. In th is respect, the EU and NATO took the first step by adhering Romania
and Bulgaria to these organizations. Then Turkey's EU accession talks, the revolutions in
Ukraine and Georgia, and their desire to join NATO were faced with Russia's new foreign
policy.
Thus, the large global actors with varying degrees of floods in the region manipulate the
policy of the states of the Black Sea, with the findings visible in the energy field. Russia through
its foreign -neighboring policy, the EU and its member states throu gh various projects, the
United States through its military efforts against terrorism. Here we can also mention the
position of Turkey that is trying to maintain the status quo in the region and promotes economic
cooperation with the European Union and Rus sia. The relations between the four centers of
influence will shape the region in the energy field. Paradoxically, the Cold War has given a
degree of stability and security in the Black Sea region, which has disappeared in our days.
The Black Sea is a n imp ortant geostrategic corrid or for transporting energy . However,
the environment is marked by conflicts of interest that might turn into wars of different forms.
As a result, international and regional cooperatio n is needed in the region to solve all issues .
Thus , according to t he definition, international co operation is the deliberate modeling
of policies by states in order to solve a common problem or to obtain winnings on both sides.
In general, the effects of international cooperation are positive, but they can also be negative
when i nvolved other actors, than states.
As far as the Black Sea is concerned, for cooperation to be effective, states have to
respect the agreements and apply joint measures. Cooperative relations need not only be limited
to the countries around the Black Sea, but should be extended to the Caspian Sea. First of all,
countries around the Black Sea have to work together to solve energy problems. Such a

construction, even if it needs a massive support from the big powers or internat ional
organizations, must start from the inside
The non-state actors such as NATO and the EU have an important role to play in solving
the region's problems. But also NATO's involvement in the Black Sea region can trigger an
open conflict with Russia. Also , private gas and oil companies play an equally important role
by investing in the economic field by developing the infrastructure of poor countries in the
Black Sea region.
Regarding the future of this region, the efforts of the countries around the Black Sea
will be focused on the development of energy corridors able to connect the region economically.
These efforts will be made because, from the energy point of view, the Black Sea region is the
main transit space and, more than that, a major source of en ergy consumed in Europe.