Roec Nato Warsaw Summit Beyond For 1480354971 [606659]

NATO WARSAW SUMMIT & BEYOND
Special Report

AUTHORS

Eugenia Gu ṣilov (ed.) Octavian Manea
Iulia Joja George Vi ṣan
Ștefan Popescu Eliza Gheorghe
Liviu Tatu Arm and Go ṣu

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This Special Report is the product of the partnership between Romania Energy Center and the
NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

Copyright © 2016
Romania Energy Center
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-973-0-22814 -4

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without
permission in writing from Romania Energy Center.

Project coordinated and edited by Eugenia Gusilov.

319 A Calea Calarasi, Suite 7, Bucharest, Romania, 030622
Phone: +40 314 328 737
Web: www.roec.biz
E-mail: [anonimizat]

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CONTENT

Foreword ( Eugenia Gu șilov)
4
Executive Summary
5
Chapter 1: NATO’s access -denial problem after Warsaw
(Octavian Manea and Iulia Joja)
7
Chapter 2: NATO missile defense – fundamentals, vulnerabilities and perceptions
(George Vișan and Ṣtefan Popescu) 27
Chapter 3: Nuclear Deterrence Today
(Eliza Gheorghe and Liviu Tatu )
40
Chapter 4: Turkey
(Eugenia Gu șilov, Ṣtefan Popescu, Liviu Tatu)
54
Report Conclusions 69
Afterword ( Armand Go șu)
71

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FOREWORD

A constellation of disruptive factors looms on the horizon: Brexit, U.S. elections and the possibility
of a Donald Trump presidency, the n there are the unusual events in Turkey this summer. The “black
swan ” events are multiplying and challenge established conventions. This Special Report is a unique
collec tion of views on key security issues facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its members. The
architecture of the Report is designed around four topics: the A2/AD issue after the Warsaw Summit,
a discussion of ballistic missile defense in Europe, nuclear de terrence and Turkey.

The A2/AD bubble is a double -edged sword, argue Octavian Manea and Iulia Joja in chapter 1 which
features an excellent discussion on access denial, decisions taken at the Warsaw Summit, and the 2nd
offset strategy. The analysis provi des context for some of the big lessons downloaded by the current
top leadership at Pentagon in preparing itself for a new RMA.

In chapter 2, the authors, George Vi șan and Ṣtefan Popescu, focus on a topic of great interest to
Romania – the ballistic miss ile defense shield (BMD). The presence of the shield, of American and
multinational forces can create the temptation to sub -finance your own military forces and the
authors caution host states to avoid the pitfall of c omplacency and fix deficiencies in the area of
conventional military capacity. Moreover, their text provides valuable insight into differences in
perception towards the BMD project which stem from different historical experiences and strategic
cultures.

Chapter 3 offers a bold look into a t opic that is usually reserved for the analytical and military
establishment of nuclear capable states. Going beyond basic deterrence is dangerous warn the
authors of the chapter, Eliza Gheorghe and Liviu Tatu, who signal changes in nuclear postures of
U.S. and Russia. In addition, the text offers a rare insight into the relation between the provider of
security umbrella and its protégées and cautions against the danger of dragging the patron, and
ultimately the entire alliance, into an unwanted conflict.

Finally, the last chapter is dedicated to events that unfolded in Turkey (a key NATO member state)
this past summer: the coup, its aftermath, and impact on the country’s relations with the U.S., NATO
and Russia. It pinpoint s the role Turkey has in NATO, bu t also discuss es the geopolitical ambitions
which could dilute Turkey’s position in the Alliance going forward. What happens in Turkey next
has a double significance, as it is a key country for both the All iance Southern and Eastern Flanks.

We hope you wi ll find the report stimulating and thought provoking.

Eugenia Gu șilov
ROEC Director
Bucharest, October 5, 2016

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chapter 1 is an insightful discussion about the A2/AD issue after Warsaw. Is there really no reason
to panic regarding the Russian access -denial archipelago? Wales sent a message of a weak,
nevertheless clear alarm – the Alliance refused to declare Russia an advers ary, but considered it a
threat. A lack of consensus among the 28 Allies continues to prevent a common perception of and
approach to the relationship with Russia. The chapter lays out all the thorny issues: diverging threat
assessments within the Alliance, NATO’s “reinforcement trap”, Europe’s gaps in air and maritime
forces, Bucharest’s very low ability to deter and what can be done to contribute more to maritime
deterrence in the Black Sea. It takes stalk of the reassurance measures decided in Wales and i n
Warsaw and maps out some of the advances of Eastern European states in thickening up deterrence
in the East. The authors take note of Romania’s learning curve in framing the security threats in the
wider Black Sea area. Before 2015, Romanian officials we re very skeptical about A2/AD and
reluctant to acknowledge the very existence of the issue publicly. Today, Romania seems to
officially join the club of those NATO Eastern Flank allies (like Poland and the Baltic states)
profoundly concerned about the emer ging of the A2/AD bubbles in their proximity. However, the
problem Romania and the Alliance face with regard to the Russian threat in the Black Sea is creating
and developing a yet altogether virtually inexistent deterrence, first by punishment, then by de nial.
The second part of the chapter explains the renewed Alliance focus on finding the next -wave
deterrent technology and associated revolutionary operational construct. It offers an illuminating
account of the second offset strategy: the context in which it appeared, its key architects, goals and
battle test. The search for the 3rd offset strategy (currently underway) has its own architects, who
access the past and its lessons in order to leverage the next wave of weapon -systems, to rethink and
update ope rational constructs for an A2/AD environment.

Chapter 2 focuses on the NATO ballistic missile defense in Europe. It provides context for
understanding the reason for its existence, its initial design (and subsequent amendment), it discusses
issues that a re less known to the general public such as missile defense economics or gaps in
Romanian air defense systems . By default, the protection of the missile base at Deveselu falls to the
host nation, Romania. Therefore, awareness of how well or ill -equipped is Romania to deal with
potential cruise missiles strikes or air strikes (their concentration in the Black Sea is not accidental)
against missile defense assets deployed on Romania’s territory is key. As is the understanding of
how Russia is hedging against the U .S. missil e defense deployments in Europe.
Furthermore, this chapter offers a rare perspective on perception of the missile defense project. Much
like in the story with the elephant and the blind men, Europe’s BMD is viewed differently, based on
different historical experiences and strategic cultures. The concept of ‘strategic defense’ itself is
perceived as an extra -European (America n) one, since Europe has consider ed up until now tactical
missile defense only . There is the American view, then there is Europe’s fragmented vision (with
France at one end of the spectrum, pushing for greater European strategic autonomy , and the Eastern
European host nations, at the other end, who see the BMD as an additional layer of security, on top
of Art 5 guarantees). Finally, there is the Russian perception who fears any upset of the global
strategic balance (i.e. any increase in the U.S. technologic al advantage ), even if the BMD does not
affect Russia’s land -based, underwater or nuclear deterrent.

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Chapter 3 examines the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s strategy. It has two distinct parts: one
which looks at deterrence between the U.S. and Russ ia, the second one which looks at the reliability
of the American nuclear umbrella over its junior allies in Eastern Europe. Since the crisis in Ukraine ,
both Russia and the U.S. have increased the profile and operations of their nuclear -capable forces.
These two countries still hold over 90% of the nuclear warheads that exist in the world today (an
estimated 15,000). What is yet more alarming, for the first time since the end of the Cold War,
military exercises have include d nuclear strike scenarios (Russi a’s Zapad 2009 simulated the limited
use of nuclear weapons ). To make matters worse, Russia now admits a limited nuclear strike for de –
escalation purposes: the so called ‘ escalate to de -escalate ’ policy. The role of the nuclear arsenal is
no longer viewed as having mostly political value. These changes in Moscow’s and Washington’s
nuclear posture spill into extended nuclear deterrence (END) territory. NATO is an alliance like no
other – a nuclear alliance . But it is beset by two problems. First, Washington will have difficulty
using END for anti -proliferation purposes, in other words, to keep its allies non -nuclear. The UK
and France do not make their arsenals available for the kind of nuclear sharing schemes the U.S. has
enforced since the Cold War, which leaves the U.S. in a unique position. Collective security
commitments in nuclear alliances are meant to create the impression that all allies are created equal.
Yet, geography and history quickly dispel such illusions. Ev ery country tries to become the “special
partner” and di stinguish itself from other protégés by hyping the threat, provoking the adversary, or
playing the victim. This attention -seeking behavio ur poses the danger of dragging the patron, and
ultimately the entire alliance, into an unwanted conflict . The ongoing one -upmanship between
Romania and Poland presents NATO, and the United States, with a difficult circle to square: how to
reass ure two competing junior allies without causing further trouble with Russi a.

Chapter 4 focuses on Turkey, a pillar state for the security of both the Southern and Eastern Flanks
of NATO . Turkey has been a valued member of the Alliance since the 1950s. It has the second
largest standing military power in NATO and is the most imp ortant NATO regional power in the
Black Sea and in the Middle East. The chapter looks at what Turkey means in NATO and employs
an interdisciplinary approach (military, foreign affairs and economic perspective) to shed light on
the elephant in the room: the consequences of the failed coup attempt and, in parallel, the 8 month
hiatus in its relations with Russia, followed by the subsequent rapprochement. The shooting of the
Russian jet brought a nadir in Turkish -Russian relations, an episode that was put to r est at the end
of June by the official apologies of the Turkish president. However, the mid-July coup seems to have
created a watershed moment in Turkish -Russian relations. Turkey’s political messaging to Russia
since has been loud and unequivocal, and stands in contrast to messages sent to the West. What
implication may this have on Turkey’s relations with its Western allies? Or, is this just rhetorical?
NATO is a military alliance, but it also represents a community of shared values. Turkey’s latest
authoritarian accents place it much closer to the Russian and Chinese models than to those of NATO
member states. Recent events do raise a legitimate long -term question: what does the new normal of
Russian -Turkish relations mean for NATO? Drawing a firm conclu sion is premature, but it has
become evident that Turkey wants more geopolitical optionality.

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Chapter 1

NATO’s access -denial problem after Warsaw

by OCTAVIAN MANEA and IULIA JOJA

How A2/AD umbrellas impact regional security and NATO’s deterrence posture

The Wales and Warsaw summits made significant progress in the effort of readjusting the Alliance
to the realities of the post Crimea security environment, but the Alliance still faces a growing
strategic gap from the perspective of responding to the Russian access -denial archipelago (the so
called A2/AD bubbles ) that is spreading from the Barents and Norwegian Seas, to the Baltic and
Black Seas, and even to the Eastern Mediterrane an. The Alliance is currently assuring the security
of its allies through the promise of power projection, deploying rapid reaction forces in order to
reinforce the attacked member. The cent er of gravity of NATO’s recipe for defending its members
remains essentially an expeditionary one. The biggest problem that the A2/AD systems pose is that ,
once deployed very near to NATO states borders , they are in fact challenging and potentially
neutralizing the core aspect that, in theory, makes NATO’s collective def ense pledge credible – the
ability to project its forces and reinforce its flank members. The progress made by Russia in
mastering the precision -guided warfare by building dense concentrations of Integrated Air & Missile
Defenses (IAMDs) complemented by surface -to-surface ballistic missiles and land -air-sea launched
cruise missiles , especially in Crimea and Kaliningrad , has enhanced the overall ability of Moscow
“to deny the use of the airspace of border countries, and even constrain the movement of ships a nd
land forces in a crisis or conflict. ”1 There are many observers that make the case that there is no
reason to panic relative to the development of the A2/AD bubbles because of their inherent defensive
nature.
Generally, the opinions with regard to the nature of the threat (or lack thereof) stemming from Russia
can be summed up into two (oppos ing) points of view: on the one hand, there are those that argue
that Russia is a real threat, based on the aggressive and threatening rhetoric adopted by Moscow an d
the military aggressions of their armed forces on many single occasions (including countless
violations of NATO airspace), as well as through the massive and generally unannounced
provocative military exercises organized at NATO’s borders. On the other hand, there are those that
deny the threat represented by Russia and justify its aggressions with ambiguous historical and social
explanations. They argue that sanctions against Moscow should be lifted and the Alliance should
not respond in kind, with a det errence buildup, as it would lead to military escalation. Arguably , the
most famous such position with a credible voice within NATO was adopted by German foreign
affairs minister Frank -Walter Steinmeier, who stated before the Warsaw summit that " What we
shouldn't do now is inflame the situation further through sabre -rattling and warmongering ," and

1 Luis Simón, Research Professor at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), “The A2/AD
Predicament Challenged NATO’s Paradigm of Reassurance Through Readiness”, Small Wars Journal , June 9, 2016 ,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the -a2ad -predicament -challenges -nato’s -paradigm -of-“reassurance -through –
readiness”

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allies " are well -advised to not create pretexts to renew an old confrontation" and that it would be
"fatal to search only for military solutions and a policy of d eterrence ".2

Such a perspective on an apparently objective issue, one that is measureable with data, seems
striking. However, modern, interdisciplinary approaches towards international relations have shown
that discourse and perception often overthrow mat erial reality. The way we perceive a military
capability at our border – whether we consider it a threat or not – is shaping our reality. Concepts
such as threat, enemy, offensive/defensive constitute social reality and are subject to interpretation,
despi te – disregarding what neorealists might argue – the availability of data, because data in itself
– such as a dual capability Russian aircraft violating NATO airspace – can be perceived to differing,
sometimes even opposing extents.

The same way data is s ubject to perception and interpretation at an individual level, discourse and
narratives shape reality at the macro level: once perceived as a major threat to national security, a
military aircraft violating airspace – or an A2/AD bubble – can be construct ed through discourse
and become social reality; or, the opposite perception – an accidental and non -threatenin g action of
a partner. This is h ow Steinmeier’s narrative ends up to be opposite to Angela Merkel’s one, who
argued on the eve of the Warsaw summi t that Moscow has undermined European security in “words
and deeds” by infringing Ukraine’s borders and has “profoundly disturbed” NATO’s eastern
members, who “therefore require the unambiguous back -up of the alliance”.3

The discrepancy between Germany’s two leaders on one hand, and Berlin’s (as well as Paris’)
general leniency towards a compromise with Russia and the acceptance of Moscow’s violations of
sovereignty and international law, on the other hand, can easily be explained not only through
economi c incentives, but also through strategic culture. Germany and France have a long tradition
of strong bilateral relations with Russia, imprinted as a relation between two empires with major
cultural affinities , which is perceived by the public as being jeopardize by a limited conflict with a
new state, on which Russia may have historical claims. Moreover, German public opinion is
fundamentally pacifistic, a trait which is deeply rooted in Berlin’s strategic culture. Th us, any
scenario of possible military escalation with Russia is met with unwillingness and the vastly
preferred approach towards Moscow – disregarding of how aggressive Moscow’s actions in Eastern
Europe might be – is political and diplomatic efforts to de-escalat e and normaliz e relations.

What is missing from this analysis is the reality that an A2/AD bubble is a double -edged sword
projecting a sort of shield under which the potential for aggressive contingencies cannot be excluded:
“A2/AD capabilities ar e not only useful for defense, but they can also be useful for offence because
they enable an aggressor’s forces to operate with greater impunity” , according to Ian Brzezinski, a
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy.4 It is here where the
A2/AD variable connects with another important piece of the post Crimea puzzle – the hybrid
challenge, making a geopolitical fait accompli more likely: “A2/AD and ‘hybrid’ can reinforce each
other in at least two ways. They create a sort of “double deterrent” to NATO intervention in a

2 “German minister warns NATO against ‘warmongering’”, BBC News, June 18, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europe -36566422
3 “Angela Merkel says Russia damaging European security”, Financial Times, July 7, 2016,
http://www .ft.com/cms/s/0/b2d16102 -4446 -11e6 -9b66 -0712b3873ae1.html#axzz4KEHSSQKY
4 Ian Brzezinski, “What Would Make The Warsaw Summit A Success”, RealClear Defense, August 23, 2016,
http://www.realcleardefense.com/2016/08/23/what_would_make_the_warsaw_summit_a_success_285090.html

9
military crisis, i.e. by first generating a blurred or non -military cause that may negate the legitimacy
of an imperiled ally’s invocation of Article 5, and then by raising the specter of a defeat for any
NATO force that would be dispatched, thus strengthening the sense of a geopolitical fait accompli
in the minds of risk -averse (Western) European.”5 In short, the whole access -denial security
ecosystem in which the Alliance is operating today is creating what in NATO circles is called a
“reinforcement trap” that has major consequences for its deterrence credibility: “ either we reinforce
our Baltic allies but we have to face a huge cost to do so by basically destroying most of the air –
defen se systems in Kalining rad and face a Russian counteroffensive. Or we don’t do anything and
don’t come to the help of our Baltic allies but obviously this would be the political end of the Alliance.
We need a smart broad strategy to break away from the reinforcement trap so that we shouldn’t [be]
facing very bad trade -offs between two very bad and costly choices. ”6

Moreover, A2/AD bubbles are defensive only in the initial buildup phase. Once a major power, such
as the Russian Federation, installs and deploys to the respective area an accumulation of powerful,
medium -range land, air and particularly maritime military capabilities, the A2/AD quickly becomes
offensive in nature. See ISW map on Russian A2/AD range , on p. 10. This is the case of both
Kaliningrad and increasingly Crimea, where Moscow has progressively deployed conventional and
nuclear medium -range capabilit ies that now constitute a threat to the national security of member
states that border the Baltic and Black Sea s. The immediate and direct effect of A2 /AD buildups is
the access limitation of the bordering states to non -territorial spaces, first navigation of international
waters, then the restricted or even denied access to the exclusive economic zones (EEZ). See Annex
I, on pg. 24. This access to non -territorial space constitutes in itself an aggression and creates
insecurity. Furthermore, the offensive n ature of the A2/AD bubble can be extended by capability
buildup, accompanied by an aggressive rhetoric and threats, to the extent that it may ultimately affect
the territorial integrity of the bordering NATO member states.

One key aspect that can be obser ved in Romania is a gradual learning curve in the domestic public
discourse in framing the security threats in the wider Black Sea area. Before 2015, Romanian
officials were very skeptical about A2/AD and reluctant to acknowledge the very existence of the
issue publicly. Today, Romania seems to officially join the club of those NATO Eastern Flank allies
(like Poland and the Baltic states) profoundly concerned about the emerging of the A2/AD bubbles
in their proximity. In a speech delivered at a CEPA conference in Bucharest, in early June 2016 , as
a preview of Romania ’s core agenda at Warsaw, Mihnea Motoc, the Romanian Defense Minister
made it very clear that he perceives the developments in the Black Sea after Crimea as transforming
Romania in a “frontline state”. It is in this context that the Russian deployment of A2/AD measures
“are a real game -changer, essentially altering the very fabric of the security environment ” by
jeopardizing the freedom of navigation in the region. From Romania’s persp ective , there is a clear
common denominator between the Black and the Baltic Seas: they are both access -denial
ecosystems. In the words of the Minister of Defense, Romania has “ another Kaliningrad and very
likely a Kaliningrad+ in our vicinity ”.

5 Luis Simón, Research Professor at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), “The A2/AD
Predicament Challe nged NATO’s Paradigm of Reassurance Through Readiness”, Small Wars Journal , June 9, 2016
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the -a2ad -predicament -challenges -nato’s -paradigm -of-“reassurance -through –
readiness”
6 Interview conducted by Octavian Manea with Fa brice Pothier, until recently , head of policy planning in the office of
the NATO Secretary General , Summer 2016 .

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Source: Institute for the Study of War (ISW), August 29, 2016

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This very specific reading of the new operational realities made Romania to plead in Warsaw not
only for an equal level of security across the whole Eastern Flank, but for a credible reassurance via
a “robust defense and deterrence posture at the shores of Black Sea ”. In general, it can be concluded
that the access -denial environment in the Black Sea has become a major variable shaping the
perception of Romania’s national security establishment. The pr oject of the new Romanian Military
Strategy adopted in May 2016 by Romania’s Supreme Defense Council (CSAT ) right before the
Warsaw summit noted that , although there is a low probability, “ a military aggression enabled by
the A2/AD capabilities in the Bla ck Sea basin is the main threat to Romania’s security .”7 Even the
Romanian president said in one of his major foreign policy speeches that the instability in the Black
Sea ecosystem is driven by the Russian efforts of “ imposing access -denial zones ”.8

From a maritime perspective , in both seas, Russia as a mature A2/AD actor will be well positioned
to impose air and sea exclusion zones or increasingly be able to exert its influence and coercive
potential over “ exclusive economic zones and continental shelf e xploitation claims ”.9 And there is
no shortage of potential clashing points in the Black Sea, especially in those resource -rich segments.
Overall, in both ecosystems “we are observing an Anti -Access/Area Denial strategy, which is one
that we need to keep an eye on because it can restrict the ability of commerce and freedom of
navigation and sea lines of communication that are in international waters. Those waters are called
international waters for a reason. They belong to no one and they are there for all nations to be able
to navigate with commercial vessels that contribute to prosperity, and as well, naval vessels that
contribute to security” , said recently Vice Admiral James G. Foggo, III, Commander, Naval Striking
& Support Forces NATO.10

From a hardw are perspective it is important to understand the specific shopping list that is at the
heart of the Russian access -denial bubble in Kaliningrad, a variable fundamentally challenging the
ways states in the proximity (and part ) of the Baltic regional ecosys tem have ensure d so far their
security:

7 Selections from Strategia militară a României – Forțe armate moderne, pentru o Românie puternică în Europa și în
lume approved by the Romanian Government on 28th September 2016, : “Cu toate că o agresiune militară în Europa
prezintă o probabilitate scăzută, capacitatea declanșării unei astfel de agresiuni , potențată de realizarea capabilităților
anti-access și de interdic ție zonală (Anti -Access/Area Denial – A2/AD) în bazinul Mării Negre, reprezintă principala
amenințare la adresa securității României și a statelor din regiune .” (p. 8)
8 Discursul Președintelui României, Klaus Iohannis, Reuniunea Anuala a Diplomației Române, 31 august, 2016 : „La
acestea se adaugă consolidarea forțelor armate ale Rusiei la frontiera sa vestică, încercările de impunere a unor zone de
excludere a accesului în Marea Neagră și utilizarea Mării Negre ca platformă de proiectare a forței milit are în estul
Mediteranei.” http://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/discursuri/primirea -sefilor -de-misiuni -a-consulilor -generali -si-a-
directorilor -institutelor -culturale -romanesti -cu-prilejul -reuniunii -anuale -a-diplomatiei -romane
9 British MOD, “ Future security c hallenges in the Baltic Sea Region ”, a study for the Swedish Armed Forces by the
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, November 2015, pp. 19 -20.
10 The 44th Iteration of the BALTOPS Maritime Exercise, special Briefing by Vice Admiral James G. Foggo III, Rear
Admiral Paddy McAlpine, Rear Admiral Francesco Covella, Lieutenant Colonel Per Gottfridsson, Commander Jarmo
Holopainen via teleconference hosted by The Brussels Hub, June 8, 2016,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ime/useuropeanmediahub/transcripts/2016/258258.htm

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A2/AD assets in Kaliningrad and Baltic Sea Region

Asset* Type Operational
Range Notes
OTR -21 Tochka
/ SS-21 Scarab Short range surface to
surface missile 70-185 km One missile brigade deployed in
Kaliningrad;
Iskander -M/ SS –
26 Stone Short range surface to
surface missile Around 500
km A missile regiment has been
deployed close to the Polish border.
Set to replace OTR -21 Tochkas
deployed in Kaliningrad;
S-300M / SA -10
Grumble Long range surface to
air missile 150-200 km Deployed in Kaliningrad ;
S-400 Triumf /
SA-21 Growler Long range surface to
air missile 250-400 km Deployed in Kaliningrad ;
P-800 Oniks /
3M55 /SS-N-26
Strobile Supersonic anti -ship
missile 300 km To be deployed in the future aboard
ships and as part of Bastion -P
coastal defense missile complex;
3M54 Kalibr /
SS-N-27 Sizzler Supersonic/subsonic
anti-ship missile and
land attack cruise
missile 50-2500 km To be deployed in the future aboard
new corvettes and frigates. Possibly
already deployed on submarines
assigned to the Baltic Sea Fleet;
P-270 Moskit /
SS-N-24-
Sunburn Supersonic anti -ship
missile 120-250 km Deployed aboard ships of Baltic Sea
Flee. Can be launched from aircraft;
Kh-35/3K60 Bal
/ SS-N-25
Switchblade Subsonic anti-ship
missile 130-300 km Deployed aboard ships of the Baltic
Sea Fleet. Can be launched from
aircraft and deployed as part of the
coastal defense system 3K60 Bal;
Kh-22 / AS -4
Kitchen Supersonic anti -ship
missile 600 km Deployed as part of the weapons
system of the Tu -22M3 Backfire
bomber;
Kh-15 / AS -16
Kickback Supersonic anti -ship
missile 300 km Deployed as part of the weapons
system of the Tu -22M3 Backfire
bomber.
*Asset designation is given according to Russian and NATO weapon classification systems. Weapons system data used
is taken from Federation of American Scientists (fas.org) and Global Security (globalsecurity.org) websites.

The big difference between Kali ningrad and Crimea bubbles is that while the former “ expands over
much of allied territory, protecting an enclave from where the Russians can easily project force
under the cover of those systems into the allied territory”11, Crimea is not (yet) directly th reatening

11 Interview conducted by Octavian Manea with Stephan Frühling, an Associate Professor in the Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, Australian Nationa l University, Summer 2016.

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the territorial integrity of the NATO Black Sea allies. Given its proximity to the Baltic States, the
Kaliningrad bubble can cut the reinforcement routes, including the Suwalki Gap that can be used by
NATO rapid reaction forces to support them. F rom this perspective , the Black Sea NATO members
are not necessarily exposed to a similar reinforcement trap. There are experts that are also
questioning Russia’s rationale for using its Crimean A2/AD portfolio for coercive actions in the
Black Sea: “becom ing too aggressive in the Black Sea it will mean that they accept the consequences
and that they are trapped in the Black Sea without having the possibility to exit to reinforce their
forces in Syria and I don’t see them playing that card.”12
From a cyber perspective, denial of the information battlespace to an adversary is a key ingredient
for an A2/AD strategy. An enem y that cannot communicate and is unable to use its sensors, (i.e. is
deaf, blind and mute), is vulnerable to a decisive counte rattack. In this particular instance, the
electromagnetic dominance of the battlefield facilitates the offensive employment of A2/AD assets
and makes force projection or strategic reinforcement operations virtually impossible. For a detailed
discussion of the cyber component, please see Annex II on Russian electronic warfare capabilities ,
on pg . 25.

Reassurance and deterrence measures adopted by NATO since Ukraine

The Wales summit (2014)

Its main purpose was highjacked by Russia’s unexpected aggression in Ukraine. From an Alliance
critici zed for overall lack of purpose, negligence of collective defen se (in light of a short age of
threats after the end of the Cold War) and excessive emphasis on expeditionary warfare, NATO
faced overnight the challenge of a military aggression in its immediate neighborhood and a threat to
the security of its entire Eastern flank.

With this in mind, at the summit in Wales the Alliance new member states re visited the issue of the
Russian threat with far more assertiveness than after the Russo -Georgian war in 2008 and confront ed
their reluctant Western counterparts. Wales was marked by the urgency to reassure its Eastern
European member states and increase the mili tary readiness in case of a Russian aggression directed
at NATO territory.

However, the outcome (measures to bolster readiness) was to be limited, given the needed consensus
of 28 member states. In terms of military strategy, Wales create d a mild deterren t by punishment.13
In terms of political statement, Wales sent a message of a weak, nevertheless clear alarm – the
Alliance refused to declare Russia an adversary, but considered it a threat.

12 Interview conducted by Octavian Manea with Guillaume Lasconjarias , Advisor in the Research Division of the NATO
Defense College, Summer 2016.
13 Deterrence consists of the threat to impose high costs for violent action and a promise that abstaining from violence
will remove the threat (see Schelling, 1960, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 7
“This definition co vers deterrence by denial (not allowing the adversary the capacity to commit successful aggression)
and deterrence by punishment (dissuading the adversary from using force by making it more costly) “ – see Glenn H.
Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a T heory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961),
14–16, cited by Adler, E., 2010, “Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Performative Power and the Strategy of
Conventional and Nuclear Defusing”, Security Studies, 19, p. 209.

14
Before the 2014 NATO summit, in the immediate aftermath of crisi s in Ukraine , Allies already
under took some deterrence measures. The NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission was substantively
strengthened and the U.S. established the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) of an initial 1
billion USD for one year, intended to reassure European allies of U.S. commitment to their security.
Additionally, Washington deployed two more B2 stealth bombers to Europe.

The deterrence initiatives established in Wales are known as the NATO Readiness Action Plan
(RAP), a set of assurance m easures aimed at enhancing the military protection of Alliance’s Eastern
flank. In practice, this meant: the non -permanent but continuous rotational presence of NATO troops
on Eastern European allied territory; the establishment of a 4 ,000-strong Very High Readiness Joint
Task Force (VJTF); the commitment to complex exercises that cover both crisis management
missions and collective defen se; updating of defense plans (including contingency plans);
preparation of national infrastructure in the region; establ ishment of multinational command and
control cent ers on the Eastern flank, and positioning facilities, equipment, supplies and logistics
specialists on the flank to enable rapid reinforcement and deployment in case of an aggression.

The measures were impo rtant steps to reassure Eastern member states and came with considerable
costs for training and maintaining high readiness forces. However, in light of the massive Russian
threat , they don’t constitute more than deterrence tripwires and raise only mildly t he possible costs,
as even after Wales , NATO continues to rely on in -depth defen se.14 More importantly, the ample
and expensive measures adopted under RAP only defend against linear, conventional attacks, while
hybrid threats are only beginning to be addres sed. Furthermore, the rotational NATO forces
established after the 2014 summit remain non -permanent, as NATO members refuse to commit to a
permanent military presence on the Eastern flank.

The Warsaw summit (2016)

The debates that took place in anticipat ion of the NATO summit in Warsaw had a common
denominator: Russia. While “Old Europe” was set to cool the dispute down and reduce or even lift
sanctions on Moscow, “New Europe” aimed the opposite – to strengthen the Alliance’s defensive
presence on the Eas tern flank in light of the continuous military threat stemming from Russia, both
in terms of rhetoric and action.

Beyond the progress in increasing NATO’s conventional deterrence and assessing the
implementation of RAP, the Warsaw summit’s conclusions rem ained uncertain in terms of stances
of heaviest players and of result s: Germany’s stronger role in European security (as laid out in the
2016 White Paper15), was clouded, however, by the Merkel -Steinmeier ambiguity; the pledged
increased cooperation between NATO and the EU looks to be difficult and is regarded with wariness.
The Warsaw summit means the continuation of measures initiated in Wales: enhanced land forces
in the immediate proximity of Russia, w hich are considered as essential to the Baltic States and
Poland. As expected, the cent er of gravity of the Warsaw summit was the Nordic Eastern flank. Four
multinational battalions – coordinated by Germany, Britain, Canada and the United States as

14 Kufčák, J. (2014). NATO after the Wales Summit: Readying the Alliance for the Future, Association for International
Affairs, Policy Paper , 3, 2014.
15 Federal Ministry of Defe nse, White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bu ndeswehr, 2016:
https://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pNyydL3y1Mzi4qTS5
Ay9lPzyvJz8xJRi_ YJsR0UAIHdqGQ!!/

15
framewo rk nations – will be deployed in the Baltic States and Poland. Furthermore, through ERI ,
1,000 U .S. troops will be stationed in Poland, possibly in the Suwalki gap .16 Poland will also host
the command cent er of a U.S. armored brigade (4,000 forces), with ro tational units placed on the
Eastern flank, including in Romania. Thus, the Warsaw focus was on battle groups and deterrence.

On the other hand, the South of the Eastern flank received far more modest attention. The only
commitments snatched from the Bul garians and Poles were to participate in the establishment of a
multinational brigade under Romanian command. Romania’s initiative for a regional fleet failed
spectacularly through the unprepared veto of Russian -influenced Bulgaria before the summit, thus
calling off – for now – any common maritime deterrence in the Black Sea. Thus, Warsaw shaped a
new reality: the North and South of the Eastern flank are in different solidarity leagues .

Given Bucharest’s failure to secure a regional Alliance response to the Russian military build -up in
the Black Sea, Romania sought in Warsaw an enforced allied naval presence on its coast to protect
the freedom of navigation, as well as the country’s national security, for which the new military
strategy assesses the Black Sea A2/AD as its greatest threat.17 A decision on the issue of the Black
Sea A2/AD was postponed until the NATO ministerial meeting in October 2016 , but a significant
decision is unlikely, as it would involve a complex debate of regional sea and air capabi lities
necessary for countering the Russian A2/AD.18
Along with implementation of measures decided in Wales, conceptually, the approach was
maintained beyond Warsaw . In spite of the Eastern European calls, the Alliance refuses to establish
a permanent military presence on the flank and maintains its hope for co operation with Russia,
ignoring Moscow’s adversar ial character. In the aftermath of Wales, a recommendation (but not a
compulsory measure) was formulated to increase military budgets to the mandat ory 2% of the GDP
and dedicate 20% of the military budget to research and development. The Warsaw summit
represented a benchmark for noting an increase in defen se budgets:

Net defense budgets variation in Europe between 2015 and 2016

Source : Budgets and Cooperation in Europe: Developments, Trends and Drivers, edited by Alessandro Marrone,
Olivier De France, Daniele Fattibene, January 2016, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/pma_report. pdf

16 The territorial strip between Kaliningrad and Belarus, vital to ensuring the land access of NATO troops to the Baltic ecosyst em.
17 Military Strategy of Romania, 2016, Decision to approve, pp. 7 -8, http://dlaj.mapn.ro/arhiva2016.php
18 NATO Warsaw summit communique, article 41, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm

16
Trend of European defense spending since 2007

Source: European defense spending 2015: The force awakens, European Union Institute for Security Studies brief ,
Stanley -Lockman, Z., & Wolf, K. (2016)

Thus, compared to Wales, the Warsaw summit was more about reviewing the reassurance and mild
deterrence measures adopted and complementing them with more modest measures. The aftermath
of Warsaw will mean less of an implementation schedule, given the reduc ed number of measures
decided upon. The 2016 summit meant a fragmentation of the Eastern flank into North and South,
with the North benefitting from a military build -up and the South remaining a no man’s land, divided
between unconventional threats stemmin g from the Mediterranean, the A2/AD build -up and hybrid
threat taking place in the Moscow -controlled Crimean peninsula.

NATO’s European capability gap

The last two NATO summits – in Wales and in Warsaw – were all about increasing readiness.
However, wh en theory is confronted with practice, the numbers don’t add up . NATO readiness
reached a record low in 2014, and only recently started a slow path towards growth. Defined as the
ability to perform a task that is assigned to it (in terms of both manpower a nd equipment), in technical
terms readiness translates into flying hours, steaming days, tank miles and training events.19 While
NATO formulated the RAP and established the VJTF in Wales, if measured in numbers, the overall
readiness of European allied forc es disproportionately dropped at the end of 2014: readiness levels
for air forces were below 50%, while land and maritime force readiness also faced a series of critical
concerns20 in France, Germany, UK and Italy, Europe’s largest armed forces.

19 De France, O., 2016, “ What Is NATO Ready for? Making the Case for ‘Strategic Readiness’ ”, in Enrico, F., Sonia,
L., & Alessandro, M. (2016). What Nato for What Threats? Warsaw and beyond.
20 Idem.

17
The decrea sing trend of military readiness started in 1990 and was steadily maintained over the next
decade, only to be further aggravated after 2001 by the tendency of European governments to largely
abandon investments into defen se. After 2007, the downward trend was reduced, but only a relative
increase can be seen in light of the Russian invasion of Crimea. The downward trend of military
readiness in Europe is directly proportionate to the dwindling defense budgets. After 2008, but also
before (due to the lack of an immediate threat), Europeans have not been incentivi zed to invest in
military budgets. Moreover, beyond technicalities, readiness is also about interoperability, threat
adaptability, projection capacity, as well as political will and consensus.21 When a ssessed, one can
easily draw the conclusion that Europe fails to lead in any of these areas. But the most evident
problem remains the lack of consensus among the 28 Allies, which makes NATO unable to define
its perception of and relationship with Russia.

Even though RAP and VJTF are designed to address the readiness and responsiveness and adapt the
Alliance’s military posture overall, they fail to fill Europe’s major capability gap. In terms of
Western European powers, the major gap is reflected by the na ture of the national armed forces.
With the exception of UK, Western and Central European armed forces are predominantly
continental, and thus designed around the concepts of mobili zation and territorial defen se.
Consequently, Europe has major gaps in air and maritime forces generally, and significant specific
gaps in terms of strategic airlift and air -to-air refueling. In practice, this means that continental
powers have a medium readiness when it comes to territorial defense, and are faced with major
mobi lization, logistical, projection, efficiency (in terms of threat adaptability), and, of course,
multinational interoperability problems when it comes to defending NATO territory. Given the
Alliance refusal to establish permanent deterrence structures on it s Eastern flank and continued
reliance on in depth deterrence, readiness in numbers con tinues to be a challenge despite RAP and
VJTF.

When it comes to South Eastern Europe and particularly Romania, the situation is even grimmer. In
the last 15 years, in t he context of its NATO integration in 2004 and 9/11, Romania has overtly
focused its defen se capabilities on expeditionary warfare. Heavily participating in the war in
Afghanistan and in the coalition of the willing in Iraq, Bucharest has largely neglected its defense
capabilities, in spite of being a continental armed force. After 2008, the rhetoric indeed switched
towards a greater emphasis on territorial defense, but it was not translated into acquisitions. Most of
the equipment Romania owns dates from t he communist time , is outdated and not interoperable.

Today, Bucharest has to drastically restructure both its strategy and its armed forces. However, the
process is slow and seems at times aimless. The necessary steps Romania needs to take in order to
be able to defend its territory if attacked is to develop the ability to deny access to the battle space –
in this case the Black Sea via anti -ship, surface and air capabilities, while protecting the critical
infrastructure and military assets.22

For Roman ia, this means a systematic assessment of its capabilities and priorities, a much stronger
emphasis on territorial defen se and, of course, the development – with help from its Allies – of its

21 Idem.
22 Bugajski, J. and Doran, P., 2016, “Black Sea Defended . NATO Responses to Russia's Black Sea Offensive”
https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2684 .

18
naval force. Beyond national capabilities, a necessary (but diff icult) endeavor will be the partial
integration of its forces with Bulgaria and Turkey.

Given the lack of preparedness and Bucharest’s very low ability to deter, NATO will also have to
boost Romanian defense in order to avoid the unlikely scenario of a full-blown war caused by the
Romanian inability to deter. This means an in -depth focus and investment in NATO air and maritime
defense in the Black Sea. Unlike the Baltic A2/AD, where the focus is on strengthening land forces
and moving NATO deterrence fro m punishment to denial, the Black Sea bubble is all about air and
maritime denial and medium range defense. For NATO, this raises several non -exclusive
possibilities:

1) creating a semi -integrated structure for the Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish navies with
funding for modernization of their infrastructures, and ideally including the transfer of Allied
naval capabilities as national to circumvent the limit ation s of the Montreux Convention;
2) a rotational air patrol ;
3) the deployment on the Black Sea coast of an ti-ship and anti -aircraft.23
Such measures would necessitate a re -evaluation of NATO strategy. First and foremost, it would
mean linking deterrence with territorial defen se. In practice, this means the further development and,
most of all, full implementation of the NATO Maritime Strategy as the foundation for building
capabilities on the South Eastern flank, including effective electronic reconnaissance and command
capabilities, enhanced cyber defen se and intelligence penetration, an extended an d in-depth
development of missile capabilities and effective anti -submarine capabilities.24 Second, this also
means the necessary alignment of the NATO Eastern flank strategy with the Alliance, as well as
U.S. strategic priorities.

These possibilities, ev en though costly and in need of a great allied effort, seem doable on paper. At
a closer look, however, political considerations impose drastic limits. The most obvious problem is
that of transnational defense cooperation among three countries with differi ng, at times opposing
views on the mutual threat – the Russian A2/AD bubble. As became evident yet again by the
unexpected Bulgarian veto of the Romanian pre -Warsaw initiative of a multinational fleet and the
declaration regarding the Bulgarian position vi s-à-vis Russia as amicable, a Romanian -Bulgarian in –
depth defen se cooperation is unlikely. The same goes for Turkey, where recent events and latest
policy positions question its role as a member of the Alliance (see Chapter 4 of this Special R eport) .
In the end, the problem Romania and the Alliance face with regard to the Russian threat in the Black
Sea is creating and developing a yet altogether virtually inexistent deterrence, first by punishment,
then by denial.

23 Idem.
24 Idem.

19
Offset strategies as ways to strengthen conventional deterrence

Historical background

Before discussing in detail the broad contours of a third offset strategy, it is important to clarify first
the historical legacy of its precursors. It is key to understand the underlying strategic reality that
forced the United States to adopt its second offset strategy, one that “ was consistently pursued by
five administrations during the 1970s and 1980s. ”25 At the center of it are three main characters –
Harold Brown (U.S. Secretary of Defense dur ing the Carter Administration, 1977 -1981), William
Perry (Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) and Robert Komer (Undersecretary
of Defense for Policy) – that had pivotal roles in shaping it.

By mid 1970s, the conventional balance betwe en NATO and the Warsaw Pact has been significantly
altered in favor of the latter.26 At the time, “ NATO and the United States were looking at a Soviet
Union with parity in nuclear weapons and about a 3 -fold advantage in conventional weapons ”27,
William Perry would later remember. The trends were pointing out towards a conviction that the
Soviet Union was enjoying “ conventional warfare superiority in Europe ”28, not everywhere, but in
the right places where it really mattered, the eventual “ geograp hical breakthrough corridors ”29 that
could be used by the Warsaw Pact as invasion routes into Western Europe. Tactically, these choke
points were providing a sort of collective center of gravity for the NATO defenses. While overall
NATO had superior force r atios and a very diversified, but loose and highly dispersed portfolio of
capabilities, its posture was far from adequate to respond to the Soviet challenge particularly at these
strategic pressure points.30 The biggest problem for the Alliance was that the Warsaw Pact forces
were channeling their resources in order to establish a significant competitive advantage by
optimizing their posture for “ an overwhelmingly armored and air blitzkrieg thrust across the NATO
Center Region ”31. So what was to be done?

The choice that was made then was to gradually build a credible conventional deterrence -by-denial
posture aimed to demonstrate the ability “ to prevent a quick conventional Soviet victory by
stabilizing for at least thirty days a line near the inner German bo rder. ”32 In short, if the focus of
the Warsaw Pact was on “ out-massing ” the NATO forces through multiple follow -on echelons, the
Alliance’s core objective was to “ outlast a Soviet blitzkrieg (…) by strengthening initial anti –
blitzkrieg defense ”.33 Towards th is effect and under the guidance of the Carter administration, the
Alliance will begin a process of profound readjustment in terms of its geographical posture and
capability investments. The signature initiatives taken then would sound highly familiar to t he

25 William J. Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence”, in Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 4 (Fall 1991), p. 69.
26 Blowtorch, location 4889 of 10212.
27 William J. Perry, „Technology and National Security: Risks and Responsibilities”, France -Stanford Center for
Interdisciplinary Studies April 7 -8, 2003 , http://stanford.edu/dept/france -stanford/Conferences/Risk/Perry.pdf
28 Harold Brown, Star Spangled Security. Applying Lessons Learned Over Six Decades Safeguarding America ,
Brookings Institution Press, 2012, location 199 of 6490 (chapter 1).
29 Harold Brown, Thinking about National Security. Defense and Foreign Policy in a dangerous world , Westview Press,
Boulder, Colorado, 1983, p.102.
30 Robert Komer, RAND, p. 4.
31 Idem
32 Harold Brown, Thinking about National S ecurity. Defense and Foreign Policy in a dangerous world , Westview Press,
Boulder, Colorado, 1983, p.102.
33 Robert Komer, Maritime Strategy Or Coalition Defense? , University Press of America, Lanham, 1984, p. 80 -81.

20
observers of the post Crimea NATO summits in Wales (fall 2014) and Poland (summer 2016). They
all share a common denominator: a tailored mix of forward presence, pre -positioning of equipment,
improved readiness, advanced interoperable command -and-contro l elements while developing the
capability for rapid reinforcement through rapid reaction forces. All these building blocks were
perceived as essential for projecting a credible deterrence message, but insufficient. They needed a
force multiplier. In hinds ight, the jewel in the crown was what has been called as the second offset
strategy . Its core logic was grounded in an insight observed in market patterns: “ there are levels of
strategy for a nation just as there are for a firm that is developing strategie s to deal with its
environment and competitors ”, concluded Andrew Marshall, the director of Pentagon’s Office of
Net Assessment, in a memo where he made the case for the necessity of developing a competitive
strategy under which the DoD should invest in “ areas of competitive advantages for ourselves that
we believe are naturally enduring, or can be made enduring through appropriate research and
development, training etc. ”34 This is the general philosophy that will guide William Perry’s journey
as the archite ct of the second offset strategy whose purpose by design was to “ compensate for the
Soviet size advantage in conventional forces and thus re -establish general military parity and shore
up deterrence. ”35 It was a conscious effort of harnessing the very niche technological advantages of
the information age (especially the progress in microelectronics and computers) where America was
uniquely positioned and place them in the service of reinforcing conventional deterrence by
gradually fielding a new generation o f weapons that would “ enable revolutionary, decisive
battlefield prowess even against considerably larger forces. ”36 Concretely, it was an innovative bet
on blending and networking three core dimensions: stealth technology, the progress made in the so –
called “smart weapons” precision -guided munitions regime, sensors that could provide very detailed
real-time battle spac e awareness in relation to the location of enemy forces. Some signature products
that later will make a great career and whose seeds were planted in this early stage were the F -117,
the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) and the GPS (Global Posit ioning Satellite).
All these revolutionary trends (fitted more for the iconic Star Wars movie) will merge in order to
create a “system of systems”, a reconnaissance strike -complex that aimed “ to find and destroy
follow -on echelons of Russian troops before they reached the central front .”37

The embodiment of the vision will be the Assault Breaker concept that operationally was aimed at
“disrupting”, “interdicting” and neutralizing the successive waves of an armored assault intended to
overwhelm and out -mass the NATO forward defenses and penetrate into Western Europe before the
Alliance could mobilize.38 Of course, the technology was not in itself a panacea. It had to be
embedded in force structures and be used under the logic of very specific operational cons tructs (like
the Air -Land battle). Overall, the second offset strategy was a way to restore the credibility of the
deterrence measures in Europe and can be seen , retroactively , as a major causal mechanism for
changing the Russian calculus:

“it clearly in fluenced Soviet perceptions about deterrence. By demonstrating the capability to

34 A.W. Marshall, Competitive Strategies -History and Background, March 3rd, 1988, p.2
35 William Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2015 , p. 33.
36 Ibidem, p. 35.
37 Robert Tomes, „An historical review of US defense strategy from Vietnam to operation Iraqi freedom”, Defense &
Security Analysis , Vol. 28, No. 4, December 2012, p. 305.
38 Robert Tomes, “The Cold War Offset Strategy: Assault Breaker and the Beginning of t he RSTA R evolution”, in
WOTR, November 20, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/the -cold-war-offset -strategy -assault -breaker -and-the-
beginning -of-the-rsta-revolution/

21
look deep and shoot deep into Warsaw Pact territory in the 1970s and 1980s, NATO called into
question the underlying Soviet operational concept at the time for combined arms g round
maneuver. (…) It did influence Soviet calculations about the balance of power and bolstered
deterrence along the Central Front in Europe. It certainly sowed doubt in their minds about the
feasibility of achieving the timelines underpinning their oper ational plans ”.39

This particular understanding became a guiding lesson with major influence on the thinking of the
current leadership in the Pentagon who concluded that the whole effort launched under the Carter
Administration and bolstered by Reagan had a systemic effect , making war less likely in Europe
essentially by reinventing NATO’s deterrence credibility via the offset : “by 1984, we convinced the
Soviet general staff that they could not achieve their conventional objectives .”40 Ultimately, the
Desert Storm operation against Saddam Hussein provided the real -world proof of the concept behind
the technological bet of the second offset strategy since the Iraqi military was a mirror image of the
Soviet one, in fact a “ miniature Warsaw Pact military ”41 and “ the fourth largest army in the world. ”

Why do all these matter and what is their current relevance?

The main takeaway is that the second offset strategy was a way to preserve the status -quo in Europe
by thickening up deterrence, sustaining it and fixing the NATO conventional imbalance in Europe:
“containment, deterrence and offset strategy were the components of a broad holding strategy
during the Cold War. (…) it did not change the geopolitical conditions which led to the Cold War,
but it did deter another World War and it did stem Soviet expansion in the world until the internal
contradictions in the Soviet system finally caused the Soviet Union to collapse.”42

Nonetheless, by harnessing this very diversified mix of initiatives (new philosoph ies for employing
force, the asymmetric advantage of deep attack smart munitions, readjustments in the overall posture
of the Alliance) that reinvented NATO in the Central Front, the message sent to the other side was
loud and clear: “ we are able to defeat you because we have concepts, infrastructure and technologies
that will disable your strategy. You will take a great risk in attacking because we would be able to
deviate your intent. The concept was to develop an RMA kind of thinking – structures, concep ts,
technologies – that combined will send a message that you cannot defeat us ”43, concluded a NATO
research expert . These are some of the big lessons that are informing the current discussions on the
third offset strategy.

39 Robert Martinage, former Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (2010 -2013), “The Third Offset Strategy in Historical
Context”, Small Wars Journal , January 29, 2015, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the -third -offset -strategy -in-
historical -context
40 Remarks on Third Offset Strategy as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, Brussels, Belgium, April
28, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech -View/Article/753482/remarks -by-deputy -secretary -work –
on-third -offset -strategy
41 Ashton B. Carter, „Keeping America’s Military Edge”, in Foreign Affairs , vol. 80, no.1, January/February 2001, p.
99.
42 William J. Perry, „Technology and National Security: Risks and Responsibilities”, France -Stanford Center for
Interdisciplinary Studies, April 7 -8, 2003, http://stanford.edu/dept/france -stanford/Conferences/Risk/Perry.pdf
43 Interview conducted by Octavian Manea, Summer 2016.

22
Garry Kasparov meets Ex-Machina and Ender’s Game

For a few years now, Pentagon’s leadership is emphasizing the need to invest in a new offset strategy
(a third one) able to consolidate U .S. conventional deterrence in the new security environment. While
it was an effort initiated in Chu ck Hagel’s term as Secretary of Defen se (2013 -2015), the real chief
architect of the whole philosophy will remain the Ashton Carter – Robert Work team, whose efforts
over the last two years have defined the vision of the third offset strategy.

The third offset strategy is first of all an answer to a multipolar world, where China and Russia are
becoming mature A2/AD powers. In a way , it is the end of the unipolar technological cycle, because
both China and Russia are mastering today the precision guided mu nitions regime that was at the
core of the second offset strategy , developing counter -intervention bubbles (some of which expand
well over the territory of NATO allies , see p. 10) that keeps at bay the power -projection capability
of the other side. Neutralizing these traditional key tenets of reassurance and deterrence can have
major destabilizing effects, especially for U .S. allies placed in the proximity of super -regional
powers that displayed direct revisionist impulses ( Russia and China). This is the context in which
U.S. has embarked on a new offset journey trying to preserve its technological edge by leveraging
the next wave of weapon -systems. The overall purpose (very much inspired by the whole experience
of the second offset strategy ) is to strengthen conventional deterrence ultimately aim ing to
“eliminate any incentive for pre -emption or aggression, convince our competitor to change their
strategic calculus and reduce the chances that a miscalculation could lead to a major power
conflict. ”44

The historical reality that drives this effort is similar to what happened previously in the inter -war
period, when Germany was able to leverage the available technological advances in key domains –
radio, aviation and mechanization – combining them in new creative formulas and forging
revolutionary operational constructs (the so called blitzkrieg ) that transformed the way wars were
fought.45

Today the whole intuition that underlines the third offset strategy is very 21st century oriented and
is rooted in something that happened in 1997, when a computer beat the famous world champion
Garry Kasparov. Eight years later, “ two amateurs, working with 3 PCs defeated a field of chess
champions, grand masters, and machines themsel ves. It was the machines – well, Garry Kasparov
using the strategic analysis of a human, combined with the tactical acuity of a computer. ”46 It is the
nexus between human and learning machines, the ability of technologically enabled decisions
(potentially better and faster) that might impact how war will be fought in the near future. The end
result could be a reconnaissance strike complex on steroids, with a very 21st century flavor – a
comprehensive human -machine battle network able to synchronize operatio ns across multiple

44 Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work at the Space Symposium , Colorado Springs, Colorado, April 12,
2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech -View/Article/723498/remarks -at-the-space -symposium
45 Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work speaks at the Air Force Association's Air, Space and Cyber Conference in
National Harbor, Maryland., Sept ember 21, 2016,
http://www.defense.gov/Video?videoid=484215&videotag=Latest%20Videos&videopage=3&ccenabled=false&video
page=1&ccenabled =false
46 Speech at the CNAS Defense Forum as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, JW Marriott,
Washington, D.C., December 14, 2015,
http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech -View/Article/634214/cnas -defense -forum

23
domains: “ the advances in artificial intelligence and autonomy will allow the joint force to develop
and operate advanced joint collaborative human machine battle networks that synchronize
simultaneously operations in space, air, sea, un dersea, ground and cyber domains. ”47

How is this applicable to the current European theatre, a highly constrained A2/AD environment
where a potential adversary not only leverages the proximity, but has at his disposal a highly
sophisticated arsenal of “ precise guided munitions, advanced air -to-air and anti -air defenses, very
long-range artillery, and very effective cyber and EW weapons ”48? During the second offset, the
Assault Breaker progra m was deeply embedded in the NATO operational and organizational
constructs (Air -Land battle and FOFA -Follow on Forces Attack) that neutralized most of the
assumptions on which rested the theory of victory of the other side. In today’s Europe, where the
main challenge is maintaining the freedom of movement and the ability to project power to secure
and defend allies whose territory is cover ed by Russian A2/AD bubbles, the option encouraged by
the Pentagon top leadership could be that of a Raid Breaker capability, essentially a protective
umbrella that will shield the rapid reaction forces (like VJTF) in their way to the flank. Concretely ,
this could take the form of a multi -domain human -machine enabled battle network capa ble of
orchestrating precise fires with artillery, rockets, conventional ballistic missiles complemented by
MD capabilities.49 But as it was the case during the second half of the 1970s and 1980s, the Alliance
renewed focus on finding the next -wave deterren t technology should be mirrored by a significant
process of rethinking and updating its operational constructs for an A2/AD environment .
Going back, NATO’s own history, suggests that i t is the mix of pre -position ing of equipment,
forward presence oriented posture, reinforced by traditional power -projection capabilities and
combined with new ways and means to offset the competitive advantages of the other side (time,
space, quantity) that will ultimately convey a deterrence effect changing the Russian perception on
its ability to change the status -quo. After Warsaw, d eterring Russia still remains the main game in
town because “an unstable Russia could at some point be unable to resist the opportunity to exploit
an overwhelming local advanta ge to take Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and present the West with
a nuclear -backed fait accompli ”.50

47 Remarks by Deputy Secretary Work, Satellite Industries Association , Washington, D.C., March 7, 2016,
http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech -View/Article/696289/satellite -industries -association
48 Remarks by Deputy Secretary Work on Third Offset Strategy as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work,
Brussels, Belgium, April 28, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech -View/Article/753482/remarks -by-
deputy -secretary -work -on-third -offset -strategy
49 Idem .
50 Julien Lindley French, The Barrons Revolt: Why Big Wars Start, September 19, 2016 , http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.ro

24
ANNEX I: Risks for Romania’s EEZ after Crimea’s Annexation

After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine de facto lost more than half of its EEZ to Russia .
The annexation made Romania and Russia bordering maritime states and jeopardizes Bucharest’s
sovereignty of resource -rich perimeters in the Black Sea. The most problematic area may be a
maritime strip disputed between Ukraine and Romania of which Bucharest was awarded 80%
following a trial against Ukraine at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2009. Before the ICJ
decision, R omanian estimates for the disputed strip were 70 Bcm and 1 2 Million tons of oil .51
Romania and Russia do not differentiate between the 2009 gained perimeter and the rest of the EEZ s
(no demarcation exists between the EEZs of newly annexed Crimea – now claimed by Russia,
Ukraine’s remaining EEZ, and Romania’s current EEZ) which may be the object of future dispute s.
According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), states have exclusive sovereign
rights of exploration and exploitation of natural resources in the EEZ, but only operational rights, as
EEZs fall into the legal category of international wat ers, which does not limit the traffic of other
states.
If Romania were to hold on to economic sovereignty over its continental shelf as a response to
Russian military activities in its EEZ , it would most likely not receive support from the U .S.
(support ing a UNCLOS interpretation that favors great naval powers , plus the risk of antagonizing
Russia is too high) or the EU ( which hasn’t developed a clear policy on EEZ and its position towards
Russian aggression is non -consensual). On the other hand, Russia’ s repeated aggressions in the
Black Sea make belligerence towards Romania in the Black Sea likely.

From a military point of view, Romania’s only viable option towards Russia is deterrence through
military acquisitions that would significant ly increase th e costs of a Russian attack. Air defense and
short – and medium range missiles must be a priority. Beyond this, Romania should develop a
modernization plan for its naval forces, which must be focused on defense capabilities, especially at
tactical level (co astguard vessels and submarine).

The ris k factors t o exploration for companies that have le ased on this strip from Romania could
include: media debate and environmental protests ; bribery ; endangering the pipeline approval
process ; and s ubversive attacks on pipelines . As a result of possible subversive Russian activities in
various stages of exploration and produc tion, Western companies may withdraw from the Romanian
market , putting the long -term energy secu rity of Romania , and the region , in jeopardy.

Russia may also resort to military force by: attacking exploration activities in the Romanian EEZ
and declaring it an accident; threatening with military power and mobilizing naval forces in the
vicinity of exploitation operations (see the 2011 Cyprus inci dent, where Turkey conducted military
exercises in the vicinity of exploration to intimidate companies and Russia sent two attack
submarines in support of Cyprus52). Romania is unable to militarily protect its explorations in its
EEZ due to the unavailabili ty of required capabilities and the risk of conflict in a territory that is not
protected by Art. 5.

51 Magraon Andreea , Roxana Petrescu , Mihaela Popescu , “Romania a castigat la Haga procesul cu Ucraina”, Ziarul
Financiar, F ebruary 3, 2009 , http://www.zf.ro/politica/romania -a-castigat -la-haga -procesul -cu-ucraina -3857285/
52 The International Coordinating Committee "Justice for Cyprus" (PSEKA) , “Russia Sends Nuclear Subs To Patrol
Cyprus Waters ”, September 12, 2011, http://www.pseka.net/news/index.php ?module=article&id=12018

25
ANNEX II: Russian electronic warfare capabilities

U.S. and NATO forces enjoyed a net superiority over the electronic battlespace over the past 25
years, ever since the first Gulf War. Then , satellite imagery, secured satellite communications, early
warning aircraft (AWACS, JSTARS) , Ground Positioning System (GPS) and electronic
countermeasures allowed for a quick victory against an Iraqi army that could no t muster the latest
technological advances. After 1991 the development of network centric warfare, GPS guided
weapons and sensor fused weapons further secured the West’s battlefield superiority.

However, that superiority is now being challenged as access to technology is widespread and as
other countries begin to learn how to employ sophisticated sensor, targeting and communications
systems as well as how to counter such systems. The advantage has now been transformed into a
disadvantage that can be explo ited by other competitors. China and Russia have taken note of the
western style of warfare and have taken steps to counter it. In the words of Allan Shaffer, Pentagon’s
chief engineer, “ We have lost the electromagnetic spectrum… That’s a huge deal when yo u think
about fielding advanced systems that can be [countered] by a very, very cheap digital jammer. ”53
The Ukrainian war has highlighted Russian military capabilities in the information battlespace.
Russian forces successfully jammed Ukrainian military’s communications during the conflict in the
Donbas, electronic countermeasure (ECM) systems brought down Ukrainian UAVs by successfully
jamming their GPS signals, electronically fused artillery rounds were neutralized in flight and
Ukrainian command and cont rol centers were put out of commission.54 The electronic superiority
thus achieved gave Russian and rebel forces almost free reign over the battlefield. Russian electronic
warfare systems have also been used to support operations in Syria and to buttress th e nascent
A2/AD bubble around Latakia.55
Over the past decade, Russia has developed the doctrine of radio electronic combat on how to fight
in the electromagnetic spectrum. It is a broad framework that s urrounds the targeting of enemy
artillery, missile for ces, both conventional and nuclear, command and communication centers, radar
facilities, air defenses, logistics centers, enemy reserves and point targets that jeopardize advancing
military forces.56 Russia has organized its electronic warfare assets in ind ependent battalion and
brigade sized formations under the command of the general staff, which can be deployed relatively
fast and can be attached to other units.57
Electronic warfare systems have been developed and fielded that are aimed at U.S. and NATO ke y
assets in the electromagnetic spectrum. A particular target is the GPS without which it will be
impossible to navigate, locate or target an enemy. Russia is also developing and deploying a system
aimed at countering NATO’s “eye in the sky” – the E -3 Sent ry AWACS and similar systems.

53 Sydney J. Freedberg JR, “US Has Lost ‘Dominance In The Electromagnetic Spectrum’: Shaffer”, Breaking Defense ,
September 3, 2014, http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/us -has-lost-dominance -in-electromagnetic -spectrum -shaffer/
54 Phillip Karber and Lt. Col. Joshua Thibeault, “Russia’s New Generation Warfare”, Army Magazine , May 13, 2016,
available at http://www.armymagazine.org/2016/05/13/russias -new-generation -warfare/
55 Josh Cohen, “Do not underestimate the Russian military”, Intersection Project , January 6, 2016,
http://intersectionproject.eu/article/security/do -not-underestimate -russian -military
56 Col. (ret) Laurie Moe Bukhout, “Modern Russian Electronic Warfare”, ISITREP, 2016,
http://www.drs.com/sitrep/q1 -2016 -the-invisible -fight/modern -russian -electronic -warfare/
57 Paul Mcleary, “Russia’s winning the electronic war”, Foreign Policy, October 21, 2015,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/21/russia -winning -the-electronic -war/

26
Krasukha -4 as it is known, is able to jam aircraft, radar and , it is claimed, even low earth orbit
satellites.58
U.S. and NATO vulnerability to electronic attack is enhanced by a comparative lack of investment
and interest in the field. For example , after the Cold War , the United States Army had disbanded its
Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) units.59 However, the systems and tactics
developed by Russia are not invincible. GPS jamming can be overcome by using mor e secure
datalinks or by switching to inertial navigation chips (Micro -Technology for Positioning, Navigation
and Timing, Micro -PNT)60, but this technology is still in its infancy. The West has also other assets
that can be used to counter their Russian’s e quivalents such as the EA -18G Growler electronic attack
and anti -radar aircraft in service with the U .S. Navy. The capabilities of the Growler fleet will be
enhanced in the near future by adding the Next Generation Jammer to its arsenal.61 In the future , F-
35 Lightning II, which possess a sophisticated electronic warfare suit could be used to “burn”
through enemy electronic warfare systems.
Note : Annex II i s written by George Vișan

58 Josh Cohen, “Do not underestimate the Russian military ”, Intersection Project , January 6, 2016,
http://intersectionproject.eu/article/security/do -not-underestimate -russian -military
59 Sydney J. Freedberg JR, “Army Electronic Investment Lags Russian Threat”, Breaking Defense, March 21, 2016,
http://breakingdefe nse.com/2016/03/army -electronic -warfare -investment -lags-rhetoric -russians/
60 Robert Lutwak, “Micro -Technology for Positioning, Navigation and Timing (Micro -PNT)”, DARPA ,
http://www.darpa.mil/program/micro -technology -for-positioning -navigation -and-timing
61 Naval Air Systems Command , “Next Generation Jammer”,
http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.displayPlatform&key=CEE242AF -37FB -4047 -B84B –
33A830FE41BA

27
Chapter 2

NATO missile defense – fundamentals, vulnerabilities and perceptions

by GEORGE VI ṢAN and ṢTEFAN POPESCU

Missile Defense in Europe: the building blocks

At NATO’s Warsaw Summit in July 2016 the missile defense system in Europe has been declared
operational , even if parts of it a re still “under construction” (the interceptor in Poland). As NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated “ US ships based in Spain, the radar in Turkey, and the
interceptor site in Romania ”62 are operational, work together under the control center in Ramstein
(Germany) and make possible the interception of a ballistic missile which Iran could supposedly
launch towards NATO’s South -Eastern Flank. At the same time, system elements have been
formally transferred by Washington to NATO command. Conseque ntly, we are dealing with a
defensive equipment, as evident from the project title itself: anti -missile defense shield.
There are no less than 30 states in the world today pursuing or improving ballistic capabilities63, and
some of them would qualify as po tential threats to NATO. In addition, there is a high risk of
proliferation, of non -state actors wanting to own ballistic capabilities to be used against the West.
The spread of ballistic technology seems unstoppable despite adoption by the international
community of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987. NATO’s anti -missile
defense is thus a technology antidote to a technology challenge, a security measure to a security
challenge, a set of military measures that complements nuclear deterrenc e in relation to new nuclear
club entrants or to those states covertly developing nuclear military programs.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA ), signed on July 15, 2015 , made the European
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) an insurance policy against Iranian nuclear and ballistic
ambitions. Once fully implemented and operational , EPAA will complement nuclear deterrence and
will question the effectiveness of Iran’s ballistic missiles. The new approach places interceptors
aboard ships and in Roma nia and Poland, countries which are considered to have the ideal
geographical position for the missile defense of Europe.64 Originally, the EPAA was structured in
four phases.65 Phase I consisted in the deployment of missile defense ships to the Mediterranea n Sea
and Black Sea in 2011. The Ticonderoga class cruiser USS Monterey was the first ship to perform a
ballistic defense patrol as part of the new approach to the missile defense of Europe. Phase II saw
the deployment of the Aegis Ashore system at Devesel u, in Romania, in 2015. The Aegis Ashore
facility in Romania is equipped with 24 Standard SM -3 IB missiles capable of intercepting medium

62 NATO leaders bolster collective deterrence and defense, July 8, 2016, available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_133280.htm
63 NATO, "The Secretary General's Annual Report 2015", p. 37, available at:
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/2016 0128_SG_AnnualReport_2015_en.pdf
64 Gen. (ret) Bernd Kreinbaum, “Challenges for NATO Missile Defense”, The 5th Annual National Security Conference:
Missiles & Rockets – Challenges and Responses , May 13, 2009, available at
http://www.fisherinstitute.org.il/ _Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/KREIENBA.PDF
65 Arms Control Association , “The European Phased Adaptive Approach”, available at
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Phasedadaptiveapproach

28
range ballistic missiles. Additionally, between 2014 and 2015, 4 U.S. Navy destroyers were based
in Rota, Spain, to pe rform missile defense patrols. Phase III which should be implemented in 2018
will see the building of another Aegis Ashore facility in Poland, at Redzikovo, which will be
equipped with Standard SM -3 IIA missiles capable of intercepting intermediate range b allistic
missiles. These interceptors have some capability to deal with intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Phase 4 of EPAA was to be implemented after 2022 and entailed the deployment ashore and on ships
of the SM -3 IIB missiles which would have had an i ncreased performance against ICBMs. However,
Phase 4 was cancelled in 2013. Deveselu and Redzikowo bases, together with the Aegis cruisers and
destroyers, insure the protection of Europe against ballistic missile threats from Izmir and Incirlik to
London.66

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD): NATO capabilities due by 2018 vs . Russian response

Source: BBC

66 Jaganath Sankaran, “The United States’ European Phased Adaptive Approac h Missile Defense System: Defending
Against Iranian Threats Without Diluting the Russian Deterrent”, RAND, pp. 18 -26, available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR957.html

29
BMD Phases and how it works

Source: eurasiangeopolitics

30

Missile d efense vulnerabilities

Missile defense economics

Getting a missile to hit another missile is like hitting a bullet with another bullet – this oft repeated
adage by both missile defense advocates and detractors means that it requires a lot of time and
resources to make an antiballistic system work. Access to ballistic missile t echnology is much easier
now for both state and non -state actors than before the end of the Cold War. Develo ping ballistic
missiles is cheaper and efforts in this direction can be aided by states willing to share the technology
for a certain price – North Korea is the best example of ballistic missile technology proliferator.
The reality of missile defense technology is that right now it costs more to intercept a ballistic missile
than to build one.67 An SM -3 Block IB interceptor missile has an estimated cos t of 11.2 million
dollars apiece while an Iranian Shahab 3 or 4 missiles is much cheaper. To put things into
perspective , the missile defense base at Deveselu cost the U .S. Government around $ 1 billion68 and
the budget allocation for the Aegis Ballistic Mi ssile Defense Program for the 2017 fiscal year is $1.7
billion .69 Meanwhile, Iran’s defense budget for 2015 was $ 10.3 billion and has decreased by a third
since 2006.70 In FY 2014, the Pentagon spent 1.7% of its budget on missile defense that is $7.6
billio n71 – a staggering amount of money compared to Tehran’s military expenses. With a relatively
small investment in ballistic missile technology a state can impose large costs even on a great power
like the United States, forcing it to protect itself and its a llies from such a threat.
Then there is the issue of credibility of ballistic missile defense. In pure economic terms , the
advantage lies squarely with the proliferator/potential aggressor. A ballistic missile salvo is many
more times cheaper than a missi le defense counter -salvo. And even with a high performance syste m
like the AEGIS BMD there is a likelihood that some ballistic missiles will get through. Therefore ,
missile defense systems represent a strategic and political gamble that is underpinned by n uclear and
conventional deterrence . However, costs can be imposed on the potential proliferator by improving
ballistic missiles defenses and by threatening military retaliation. In the medium and long term,
integrated air defense and ballistic missile will be supplemented with directed energy weapons and
railguns (electromagnetic cannons).72 These systems are still under development and will be
deployed sometime after 2025.73 As with the current antiballistic technology, the costs of these new
generation weap ons system is rather prohibitive and only a technological breakthrough will lower
the costs for missile defense systems.

67 Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the future of t he Pacific , Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
2014, p. 111.
68 David Larter, “U.S. missile defense site in Romania starts up, angering Russia”, Navy Times ,
http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2015/12/17/romania -missile -shield -capable -putin -russia -navy/77478556/
69 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress”,
Congressional Research Service , May 2 6, 2016, p. 27, available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf
70 SIPRI Trends in world military expenditure , p.5, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1604.pdf
71 Richard Harrison, Ilan Berman, Ozzie Chung and Ben Ridder, “2015 Strategic Pr imer: Missile Defense Current
Capabilities, and Emerging Threats”, American Foreign Policy Council , p. 11, available at
www.afpc.org/files/getContentPostAttachment/253
72 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy lasers, Railgun, and Hypervelocity Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress”,
Congressional Research Service, p. 2 -5, available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44175.pdf
73 Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the future o f the Pacific , Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
2014, p. 113

31

Gaps in Romanian air defenses

These represent another matter of concern, in particular the vulnerability of the Deveselu site to
aerial attack, given the tense situation on NATO’s Eastern flank. Ballistic m issile defenses are
generally vulnerable to multiple missile attacks that deplete their stock of munitions and overwhelm
them, to air strikes by aircraft or cruise missiles – the latter vulnerability is quite serious for fixed
installations such as the one at Deveselu. S abotage or direct action can also compromise the security
of a fixed installation, although the probability of such attacks is remote. In case of ship based missile
defenses, such as the four destroyers deployed by the United States at Rota, on the Atlanti c coast of
Spain, the main threats come from coordinated air and naval attacks. Attack submarines, both nuclear
(SSNs) and their sophisticated conventionally powered counterparts (SSKs) represent a potent threat
to the missile defense ships patrolling in t he Atlantic, Mediterranean, Black and Baltic Sea s.
After the annexation of Crimea, Russia has deployed in the Black Sea modern surface and subsurface
combatants, capable of employing Kalibr cruise missile to strike land targets deep inside enemy
territory . The capabilities of these cruise missiles have been amply demonstrated in 2015 and 2016,
when Russian surface ships and a submarine from the Black Sea Fleet launched repeated strikes
against Syrian opposition and Daesh targets in Syria.74 By the end of 20 16, the Russian Black Sea
Fleet will have received 3 Admiral Grigorovich class guided missile frigates, 6 Kilo class diesel –
electric attack submarines and at least 2 Buyan -M missile corvettes.75 All of these ships are capable
of employing Kalibr cruise miss iles. Crimean naval shipyards have begun building two new missile
corvettes for the Russian Navy that may also be armed with land attack cruise missiles.76 Had there
been a consensus between the United States and Russia concerning European missile defense , this
situation would not have occurred. Consequently , by deploying cruise missiles in the Black Sea,
Russia is trying to increase the costs of ballistic missile defenses for the United States.
The concentration of cruise missiles and launch platforms in t he Bl ack Sea is not accidental and
represents countervailing response to the American deployment of the missile defense system in
Europe. Russia is employing these assets as a hedge against the U .S. missile defense deployments
in Europe. The mission of the Aegis Ashore installation in Romania is to defend against possible
ballistic missile attack originating from the Middle East. As such , the system is not capable of
dealing with cruise missiles that can be deployed from aircraft, surface ships and submarin es. By
default, the protection of the missile base at Deveselu falls to the host nation, Romania.
The Romanian Air Force is at the moment ill -equipped to deal with cruise missiles strikes or air
strikes against the missile defense assets deployed on Roman ia’s territory. The mainstay of the

74 Andrei Akulov, “Kalibr: Russia’s Naval System Upping Cruise Missile Game”, Strategic Culture Foundation , May
24, 2015, available at http://www.strategic -culture.org/news/2016/05/24/kalibr -russia-naval -system -upping -cruise –
missile -game.html
75 George Vișan, “Romanian Defense and Security”, ROEC , June 2016, p. 11 available at
https://www.roec.biz/project/romanian -defense -and-security -an-in-depth -perspective/
76 Morye Shipyard Lays Do wn 3rd Project 22800 Shtorm Missile Craft in Crimean City of Feodosiya, May 16, 2016,
http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence -news/2016/may -2016 -navy -naval -forces -defense -industry –
technology -maritime -security -global -news/3951 -morye -shipyard -lays-down -3rd-project -22800 -shtorm -missile -craft-
in-crimean -city-of-feodosiya.html

32
Romanian Air Force is still the MiG -21 Lancer77, a 60 year old design that had been upgraded
towards the end of the 1990s. Although Romania has acquired a squadron of F -16 AM/BM from
Portugal in 2013 and preparations are being made to acquire another one between 2017 and 2019,
24 aircraft are barely enough to protect its air space. Originally , it was projected that Romania
required 48 modern multirole fighters , however, financial issues led to an acquisition process
struct ured in batches and focused on used aircraft.
When it comes to ground based air defense systems, the situation is almost the same. While Romania
has invested heavily in modern radar systems since becoming a NATO member, its surface -to-air
missile systems are outdated. The most modern air defense system employed by Romania is the
medium range MIM -23 HAWK which has been acquired in 2004 from the Netherlands and became
operational in 2014 .78
The other medium antiaircraft defense systems used by Romania are of Soviet origin such as the S –
75M3Volkhov (SA -2 Guideline) in service with the Romanian Air Force, and the mobile 2K12 Kub
(SA-6 Gainful) in service with the Romanian Ground Forces. Short ranged air defenses are provided
by a mixture of Soviet systems manufactured locally under license (CA -94 and CA -95), Soviet
legacy systems (9K33 Osa/SA -8 Gecko and the S -60 57 mm antiaircraft cannon), locally developed
systems (A -436 30 mm antiaircraft cannon) and systems of western origin (O erlikon GDF –
003/Viforul 35 mm antiaircraft cannon and Gepard self-propelled antiaircraft system). Some of
these systems are self -propelled (SA -6 Ga inful, SA -8 Gecko, CA -95 and Gepard ) and their mobility
can be used to protect high value targets or maneuver ing military formations.
Recently , Romania has shown interest in modernizing its air defense by acquiring modern long and
short range systems .79 Given the vulnerability of the missile defense base at Deveselu to air strikes
and cruise missile strikes, as we ll as Russia’s ongoing efforts to increase its air power in Crimea,
Romania will likely acquire an integrated air and missile defense system in the near future. Although
Bucharest may be unwilling and incapable of investing $ 5 billion in an integrated air defense system
as Poland does80, it will probably try to come up with a more affordable alternative. Meanwhile , it
will consolidate and upgrade some of its current assets and rely on allied assistance to ensure the
security of its airspace. For example, i n the wake of the Ukrainian crisi s, U.S., Canadian and
Portuguese aircraft helped secure Romania’s air space.

77 Tony Ares, “Up close and personal with the MiG”, Aviation Week , September 28, 2015, available at
http://aviationweek.com/blog/close -and-personal -mig-21
78 Forțele Aeriene R omâne , “Sistemul HAWK”, available at http://www.roaf.ro/?page_id=2567
79 Sandra I. Irwin, “Lockheed Sees Potential MEADS Buyers All Across Europe”, National Defense Magazine , June 18,
2015, available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/post s/post.aspx?ID=1873
80 Jen Judson, “Critical Missile Defense Decisions in NATO Europe in 2016”, Defense News , December 29, 2015,
available at http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2015/12/29/critical -decisions -in-
european -missile -defense -expected -in-2016/77880760/

33
Russia and INF Treaty Compliance
The cruise missile threat to the Aegis Ashore bases in both Poland and Romania may be greater if it
is con firmed that Russia has been developing land based cruise missiles in violation of the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of 1987. Specifically, Russia has been suspected of
developing a land based cruise missile variant of the Iskander -M ballistic mi ssile system since
200781. The United States has called into question Russia’s compliance with INF Treaty since
2014.82 The range of the Iskander -K system may be around 2,000 km which would threaten not only
Deveselu and Redzikovo basis83, but the missile def ense command center at Ramstein air base or
the AN/TPY -2 radar stationed in Turkey.
The possible breach of the INF Treaty can be interpreted as a retaliatory measure taken by Russia
against the deployment of missile defenses in its vicinity and U.S. unilat eral withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty. Furthermore, the development of ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) by Russia
may in part be caused by its two neighbors, China and Iran, which are not parties to the INF Treaty
and have developed intermediate range ballistic missiles.

Political and diplomatic vulnerabilities
The year 2016 is an election year in the United States with national security and foreign policy a s
key campaign issue s. Missile defense has proven to be vulnerable to political turnovers in the United
States. In 2009 , the Obama Administration radically changed missile defense plans for Europe laid
out by the previous administration, after a reassessment of Iran’s capabilities. The forthco ming U .S.
presidential election may affect U .S. missile defense plans in Europe and elsewhere. Donald Trump ,
the Republican contender , has shown little interest in maintaining U .S. alliances and commitments,
especially NATO, which he described as being out dated.84
Poland and Romania, the hosts of the missile defense bases in Europe, have fraught relations with
Russia, due to diverging regional interests and historic grievances. Russia routinely issues veiled
threats to Warsaw and Bucharest for their partici pation in the EPAA. After the Ukrainian crisis,
Poland and Romania have requested a greater alliance presence on the Eastern flank to deter against
a possible Russian aggression. In the long run, this situation is untenable and may lead to increased
region al tensions. Efforts should be undertaken by bo th the host nations and Russia to normalize
their relations.

81 Global Security , “R-500/Iskander -K GLCM”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/iskander -k.htm
82 United States of America State Department , “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Agreements and Commitments", July 2014, pp. 8 -11 available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf. See also subse quent 2015 and 2016 reports.
83 Paul N. Schwartz, “Russian INF Treaty Violations: Assessment and Response”, CSIS , October 16, 2014, available at
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian -inf-treaty -violations -assessment -and-response
84 New York Times , “Transcri pt: Donald Trump on NATO, Turkey’s Coup Attempt and the World”, July 21, 2016,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald -trump -foreign -policy -interview.html

34
Perceptions of missile defense: United States vs. Europe

The American view
For the United States , limited missile defense for Europe is linked with the Iranian nuclear program
and its missile arsenal. In 2008, U.S. secretary of defense Robert S. Gates told outgoing president
Vladimir Putin that without an Iranian nuclear program there will be no need for the missile defense
of Europe, a point soon reiterated by president Barack Obama to its Russian counterpart, president
Dmitri Medvedev.85 The diplomatic and geopolitical importance of missile defense is not small. For
the United States “missile defense is a key element of U.S. security guarantees to its allies in Europe,
Middle East and South -East Asia”.86 Subsequently, given the limits of anti -missile technology to
stop a ballistic missile salvo, its function is first of all diplomatic, meant to strengthen America’s
presence at global level. The “phased adaptive approach” itself, which was adopted for Europe, is a
concession made to some big European states (to France and Germany, above all87) in the context
of the revived issue concerning European strategic autonomy, and foresee s a certain association of
Europeans to decision -making on this project. The concept aims to reassure these European states
which see the shield as an element of political control of European defe nse by the U.S., a competitor
to European missile and anti -missile industries and capacities, and a challenge to their “technological
sovereignty”.
Political, commercial and technological rivalries aside, there are other points of divergence, that are
deep, and irreconcilable in long -term without some mutual conce ssions. For France, the main
European “opponent” of the shield, the European Union (EU) is a “power multiplier”, a construct
compensating in part the loss of its colonial empire and supporting its long -term post -imperial
ambitions. As such, any element tha t deepens EU’s strategic dependency on the United States is
seen as an obstacle in the way of its own vision for Europe and of its own ambitions within the
Union. It is also a matter of principle: how can European defense rely first and foremost on non –
European capabilities? Especially, if the EU projects itself as a great international power.
Since missile defense represents just a deterrent while the conventional forces of host nations its
extension, Paris considers that Washington will hold a number of arms markets captive and will thus
have a major advantage on the new technologies segment . Secondly, for France, a country that has
a post -imperial space and therefore global ambitions, America’s already dominant position is further
reinforced: the element s of the shield are points of U.S. presence in addition to the big American
bases (Diego Garcia – in the Indian Ocean, the Azores, the Bermudas, or Island – in North Atlantic,
Okinawa and Guam – in the Pacific Ocean).88 Japan is a partner in developing the SM-3 IIA

85 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War , New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014, Kindle edition
86 US Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (BMDR) , pg. 37 -38, February 2010, available at:
http://archi ve.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf .
87 But also to Italy which, alongside France, is engaged in development of an European anti -missile program, SAMP/T
and SAMP/N. Great Britain is part of this program too, but it lacks the ambition to create an alternative to the American
system.
88 “The American anti -missile defense program thus plays an organizing role in international relations, comparable to
the force or even superior to the one played by nuclear deterrence during th e Cold War. The shield creates a relation
between the United States, the protector, and the other allied nations, the protected, which places the later in a difficult
position to ever manifest attitudes that are contrary to key American decisions. Moreover , the missile defense system
allows the U.S. to lead uncontested any alliance of the «the free world» – a name referencing the ancient Athenian
League.” Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commission des Affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées,

35
interceptor and may host Aegis Ashore bases on its territory in order to protect itself from the
increasing North Korean ballistic threat, as well as the more sophisticated Chinese one.89
There is a third element that has to do with a different str ategic culture and traumatic experiences.
Compared to France, in the U.S. there is a pervasive myth of the danger coming from the sky: Pearl
Harbor, the first soviet Sputnik, followed shortly after by Y uri Gagarin – the first man in space, the
Cuban missil e crisis, and more recently, 9/11. This security concern is widely reflected in American
literature and cinematography.
Such a perception does not exist in either France90 or any other European NATO member state (UK
did confront V1 and V2 German missiles d uring the World War II, but it is a singular and somewhat
remote episode). There is another explanation which has to do with the mutations that occurred in
the international system after the Cold War. In a “uni -multipolar” world91 alliances are no longer
blocks of ideological purity as they used to be prior to 1991. Turkey’s development over the last
decade, underscored by what happened in the second half of the summer this year, show how states
are starting to perceive more and more alliances as systems wit h a variable geometry. For France,
NATO is first and foremost a Western “reservoir of military capacities” which does not exclude
common tactical positions with Russia to form and exercise a counterweight to the Superpower
(l’Hyper -puissance )92. All these r easons weighed heavily when President François Hollande agreed
to the North Atlantic missile defense, at the NATO 2012 Chicago Summit, under the following
conditions:
“the complimentary and unsubstitutable character of missile defense compared to nuclear
deterrence; system adaptation to existent threats; political control by allies; limiting costs;
the need to preserve the EDTIB (European Defense Technological and Industrial Base) and
cooperation with Russia”.

The EU’s fragmented vision on Missile Defens e

Few European states have the industrial capacity to produce parts of a strategic missile defense
system (France, UK, Italy, Germany and Netherlands). Furthermore, there is no such concept in
Europe’s strategic thinking. European strategists consider tactical missile defense only. The concept
of ‘strategic defense’ is therefore an extra -European (Amer ican) one, which just recently entered the
specialized European vocabulary. Even fewer countries showed interest in an independent system,

sur la défense antimissile balistique , par MM. Jacques GAUTIER, Xavier PINTAT et Daniel REINER, Sénateurs,
N° 733, Sénat, Session extraordinaire de 2010 -2011, enregistré à la Présidence du Sénat le 6 juillet 2011, p. 118.
89 Sam LaGrone , “Report: Japan Interested in Aegis Ashore for Ballistic Missile Defense”, USNI News , September 16,
2014, available at https://news.usni.org/2014/09/16/report -japan -interested -aegis -ashore -ballistic -missile -defense
90 There was only one episode of perfect Franco -American solidarity on this topic: the Euromissile crisis, the deployment
of Soviet nuclear missiles SS -20 on European territory. Back then, France wholeheartedly supported the deployment of
U.S. Pershing missiles on the territory of the Federal Rep ublic of Germany.
91 Term coined by the French geopolitical theorist Jacques Soppelsa which designates a multipolar reality in which,
however, there is a dominant power.
92 The concept formulated by Hubert Védrine shows that keeping the status of France i s not a question framed only vis –
à-vis new emerging powers (such as Brazil, India and Indonesia), but first and foremost by comparison to the U.S. The
fight to conserve the international status of the French language is not against rising China, but agains t American cultural
hegemony. Cf. Hubert Védrine, Face à l’Hyper -puissance. Textes et discours 1995 -2003 , Paris, Fayard, 2003 ; Hubert
Védrine, « Que reste -t-il de l’hyperpuissance », Entretien réalisé par Pascal Lorot (Président de l’Institut Choiseul et
directeur de la revue Géoéconomie ), Révue Géoéconomie , n° 66, août -septembre -octobre 2013, p. 55 -64.

36
similar to the American one, which might be interoperable with the elements given by the Americans
to NATO.
Earlier this year, on June 12, the French and Italian Defense Ministers, Jean -Yves Le Drian and
Roberta Pinotti respectively, have signed an agreement for the development of a missile defense
shield (operated from ground, naval and air means) based on the Aster 30 Block 1NT interceptor.
The aim is to preserve some of Europe’s industrial and research capacity in the field, as well as some
strategic autonomy in the EU vis -à-vis U.S. and NATO. As in the case of Galileo (competitor
program to GPS) or Helios (Franco -Italian military observation satellites meant to offer capabilities
independent of the USA), so does in the area of missile defense some European nations look for
autonomy and breaking America’s monopoly (the Aster -based missile defense system has already
been exported to a number of states93).
It is worth noting that initially Germany wanted to make missile defense an additional item of
NATO -Russia cooperation. Like Paris, Berlin has its own technological ambitions, but its
simultaneous support for the Americ an project springs from the hope that missile defense will
generally suppress interest in nuclear arsenal. Most European states prefer either an active
participation (with components) to the American anti -missile system (the UK, Netherlands, and
Norway) or just diplomatic support of the project and hosting some of its elements (Romania,
Poland).
Host nations
The host nations , Poland and Romania, view the mis sile defense program as t he only U .S. and NATO
military assets permanently deployed on their territ ories and, a s such , the ultimate security guarantee
against Russian revisionism and aggression. This becomes evident when reactions of Central and
Eastern European countries to the U.S. missile defense plans are taken into account. When the
George W. Bush Administration decided in 2002 to deploy 10 interceptors in Poland and a radar
system in the Czech Republic, Romania felt left out and insisted on adherence to the principle of
indivisible security as defined by the Treaty of Washington. Conversely, w hen t he Obama
Administration surprisingly shifted from the Ground Based Mid -Course Defense system (GMD) to
the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System (Aegis BMD) in 2009, the decision shocked so much
the Polish leadership that it decided to build its own integr ated antiaircraft and missile defense
system94, despite the costs involved .

Russian perceptions

The placement of missile defense elements in Romania and Poland have created in Moscow the
conviction that NATO considers Russia a threat from which it must protect. Geography aside,
historical trauma has a role to play: the “Star Wars” Strategic Defense Initiative is seen by Russian
experts as responsible for the USSR’s demise which in turn degraded Moscow’s position in the
international system. This perception is reinforced by American support to color revolutions in the
former soviet area, support which is seen in Moscow as an encroach ment by Washington into its
post-imperial space. One may remind also of the assurances received by the Russians following the

93 Algeria, Morocco , Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Singapore, Great Britain.
94 Air Force Technology , “Poland selects Patriot missile system for WISLA program me”, April 23, 2015, available at
http://www.airforce -technology.com/news/newspoland -selects -patriot -missile -system -for-wisla -programme -4560568

37
retreat of their permanent bases in Georgia, according to which the space left empty will not be
occupied by Americans or by NATO.95
Another major trauma is the Western decision to bomb Serbia and Montenegro during the Kosovo
crisis in 1999 , without the backing of the UN Security Council and therefore Russia: in that instant
of deep socio -economic crisis, one of the few great power e lements Russia still had was its seat as a
permanent member at the UN Security Council. Some pundits saw Crimea’s annexation by Russia
as a reply to the extension of the American presence in the region, in Russia’s ‘near abroad’.96 This
has been a mainstay of the Russian strategy over centuries: not to have hostile states at its borders,
to say nothing about integration of a country such as Ukraine97 in rival alliances (EU and NATO).
Finally, the Russians are concerned that the American investment in anti -missile technology will
affect the global strategic balance and will increase the U.S. technological advantage.

Russia’s nuclear arsenal ensures that it is still a great power. Any threat to its arsenal and to nuclear
deterrence is considered a serious stra tegic challenge. In nuclear strategy , a missile defense system
is the shield behind which a state can launch a devastating nuclear attack against its adversary. The
significance of nuclear weapons is reflected in Russia’s 2015 national security strategy, w hich states
that it may use this type of weapons preemptively98, in a “limited nuclear de -escalatory strike” .99 In
practical terms , it means that Moscow can initiate a nuclear strike if necessary – for example , if faced
with defeat during a high intensity co nventional conflict – even if it hasn’t been attacked with nuclear
weapons. NATO’s military establishment fears that Russia may be tempted to grab a member state’s
territory and then threaten nuclear escalation if the Alliance prepares to take it back.100
Despite Russia’s public assertions, the EPAA doesn’t threaten its nuclear arsenal or compromise
nuclear deterrence . As a 2015 RAND study pointed out , the SM -3 interceptors cannot affect Russia’s
land based deterrent, even in the most unrealistic simulation s.101 As for Kremlin’s underwater
deterrent , for all practical purposes , it is invulnerable to the Aegis BMD System. Finally, the U .S.
decided in 2013 to discontinue the development of Phase 4 of EPAA, which involved the deployment
of SM -3 IIB interceptors, partly for reasons of cost and partly to allay Moscow’s fears concerning
the system’s capability to intercept ballistic missiles .
However, Russia’s objections to the limited missile defense of Europe are not linked to the
capabilities of the system. Moscow fears that the existing antiballistic technology will be further

95 See chapter VII (« La Guerre de Géorgie », p. 241 -303) on Russian -Georgian relations, written by Hélène Carrèr e
d’Encausse (the foremost French specialist on Russia), in La Russie entre deux mondes , Paris, Fayard, 2010.
96 Isn’t it the same type of behavior as in 1940? The occupation of Karelia, the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, Bessarabia
and North Bucovina in reply to German expansion. Creation of buffer zones and direct control of some areas with key
strategic position is a mainstay of Russian geopolitic s each time it perceives a threat in its near abroad.
97 Ukraine is not Russia, but Russia’s history starts in Kiev, said Hélène Carrère d’Encausse concerning Russia’s
perception of the line delineating the so called « Russian world » from the rest of Euro pe.
98 Adrian Croft, “Insight – Russia’s nuclear strategy raises concerns in NATO”, Reuters , February 4, 2015, available at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/02/04/uk -ukraine -crisis -russia -nuclear -insight -idUKKBN0L825A20150204
99 Nikolai Sokolov “Why Russ ia calls a limited nuclear strike ‘de -escalation’“, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , available
at http://thebulletin.org/why -russia -calls-limited -nuclear -strike -de-escalation
100 RUSI , “A briefing by General Sir Adrian Bradshaw KCB OBE, Deputy Supreme Alli ed Commander Europe”,
February 20, 2015, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_4qeyVKpTcI
101 Jaganath Sankaran, “The United States’ European Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System: Defending
Against Iranian Threats Without Diluting the Russ ian Deterrent”, RAND , p. 40, available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR957.html

38
developed in the future by the United States in order to neutralize or severely degrade Russia’s
strategic arsenal.102 This p erception was reinforced by the unilateral decision of the United States in
2002 to denounce the 1972 ABM Treaty which forbade the development of missile defenses. The
2009 decision of the Obama Administration to reconsider the European missile defenses di d not
improve Russia’s perceptions of it, but made them worse, as the Kremlin considers the Aegis system
far more effective than the GMD.103 Furthermore, the proximity of American and NATO missile
defense to Russia’s borders has fueled Kremlin’s fears concer ning the long term aims of U.S. policy.
Although the U .S. made considerable efforts to involve and cooperate with Russia on the issue of
limited m issile defense in Europe, the Russian defense and foreign policy establishment met them
with stiff resistance.104 In order to accept the deployment of such a sophisticated weapons system in
its proximity, the Kremlin demanded a level of political and legal assurances from the United States
that amounted to a veto right over its use and employment.105 For obvious reaso ns, the U.S. could
not acquiesce to Russian demands and missile defense has become one of the thorniest issues
between the two countries.

What are the likely consequences of all these perceptions?
The first one would be Moscow’s withdrawal from the Inter mediary -Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty which prohibited as of 1988 nuclear missiles with a 500 -5,500 km range. Such a decision
would complement Russia’s investments in anti -access systems (strategic air defense systems such
as S-400 and S -500) capable o f creating access -denial bubbles such as the ones in Kaliningrad,
Crimea and Syria which cover also parts of Turkey, the Baltics and Poland. See map on pg. 10.
At the same time, the missile defense system can be seen as a symbolic frontier between two bloc ks,
and this can drive Russia to have closer relations with China and Iran. Moscow is already in the
process of delivering S -300 systems to Iran.106 Russia and Iran are not the only countries opposing
the missile defense shield. China feels targeted by the i nterceptors that are to be placed in Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Russia’s participation in China’s naval exercises in South
China Sea shows the two are united against any strengthened American presence in the region.
Beijing’s future initiat ives will certainly focus on measures that limit or deny American air and naval
presence in the South China Sea.
As far as Europe and the divisions within NATO are concerned, the less France will be associated
to the missile shield from an industrial and decision making point of view, the more it shall be
tempted to develop tactical alliances with Moscow, to achieve greater strategic autonomy from
NATO and to move away from countries that are perceived as a U.S. “Trojan horse” in Europe.

102 Daniel Nexon, “Explaining Russian Opposition to European BMD”, May 5, 2012, available at
http://duckofminerva.com/2012/05/moscow -is-once -again -expressing.html
103 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War , New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014, Kindle edition.
104 Idem.
105 George Vișan, “Scutul antirachetă, pe ultima sută de metri”, November 1, 2013, available at
https://civitaspolitics.org/2013/11/01/scutul -anti-racheta -pe-ultima -suta-de-metri/
106 "L'Iran protège un site nucléaire avec un bouclier antiaérien", Le Figaro , 28.08. 2016 available at:
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash -actu/2016/08/28/97001 -20160828FILWWW00189 -l-iran-protege -un-site-nucleaire -avec-
un-boucli er-antiaerien.php

39
As for Romania, a country supporting wholeheartedly the missile defense system, there is a risk for
the American commitment to have the opposite effect: continued complacency, i.e. persistence of
deficiencies in the area of conventional military capacity. The presence of t he shield, of American
and multinational forces creates the temptation to sub -finance your own military forces (in
Romania’s case, the Type 22 frigates bought from UK have been waiting for upgrades and new
weapons systems for 16 years while the only Romani an submarine has been mothballed for 20
years).

In a nutshell, the ballistic missile defense system is operational, but political problems (commitment,
different agendas and threat assessment of NATO members) persist. Although the Iranian nuclear
dossier is far from being solved, the missile defense is a piece of the deterrent, but not the ultima te
solution. The United States will need to continue seeking diplomatic dialogue with Russia on missile
defense and arms control in Europe. Host countries (especially Romania) must pull their own weight,
not rely exclusively on the missile shield to compen sate for military weakness. The presence of
missile defense components on their territory must not lead to neglect of defense investments
(Romania) or to overconfidence (Poland) .

40
Chapter 3

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE TODAY

by ELIZA GHEORGHE and LIVIU TATU

This chapter examines the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s strategy. It is divided into two
sections: the first looks at nuclear deterrence between the U .S. and Russia, while the second
investigates the reliability of t he American nuclear umbrella over the junior allies in Europe, with a
specific focus on Eastern Europe.107

Nuclear weapons in an edgy world

In the afternoon of May 23, 1967 a very powerful solar storm turned off the newly installed
NORAD’s Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. Military leaders in the Pentagon thought of the
worst scenario – that Soviet Union had blinded U .S. Air Force eyes system for any incoming missile
or air threat. Thanks to the professionalism of officers from the Air Service Weather (U.S. Air Force )
who knew exactly what had happened , the alarm procedure for take-off of strategic nuclear bombers
had been canceled .108 If there is something worse than a full -scale exchange of nuclear weapons, it
is a full -scale exchange of nuclear weapons launched because of a simple misunderstanding .109 Since
the end of the Cold War , mankind has never been so close as it is today to a political mistake that
might include a direct confrontation between the West and Ru ssia involving the possibility of using
nuclear arsenal.

The u nlawful incursion on Georgian soil (2008 ), the illegal annexation of Crimea (2014) and the
hybrid proxy war in Eastern Ukraine showed that , after the end of World War II, Russia is the only
country that has modified its national borders by military means and is very determined to use its
conventional capabilities to fulfill its strategic goals. The Kremlin’s recent involvement in Syria has
demonstrated upgrades to conventi onal arsenal delivery system to specific medium or long range
targets – the newly Kalibr missile multiple launch on different targets from a very rapid and
modernized frigate and corvette located in the Caspian Sea .110

107 This paper focuses exclusively on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s collective defense arrangements. It is
possible that the balance of conventional forces also has an important deterrent effect. This aspect is discussed in more
detail in the first chapter of this report.
108 Delores J. Knipp et al., “The May 1967 great storm and radio disru ption event: Extreme space weather and
extraordinary responses ,” Space Weather Journal , 14, September 5, 2016, available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2016SW001423/full
109 Scott K. Johnson , “The Solar Storm that could have started a war,” ArsTechnica , August 19, 2016, available at
http://arstechnica.com/science/2016/08/the -solar -storm -that-could -have -started -a-war/
110 “On October 7, 2015, the Gepard class frigate and three Buyan -M class Russian Navy corvettes, part of the Caspian
Flotilla, launched 26 Kalibr -NK system cruise missiles 3M14T from the Caspian Sea at 11 targets in Syria. The missiles
traveled 1,500 km (932 mi) through Iranian and Iraqi airspace and struck targets in Raqqa and Aleppo provinces – the
territory controlled by the Islamic State. The K alibr 3M -54 (NATO codename – “Sizzler”, SS -N-30A) is a long -range,
low-flying cruise missile capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads. It has land-attack, anti-ship and anti-
submarine variants. The missile has a second stage that performs a supersonic sprint in the terminal approach to the

41
Russia is also in the middle of a broa d modernization of its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces.
Much of this process continues well -known programs that have been underway for many years, but
some developments are new. The upgrade s, together with an increased number of military exercise s
and operations, including explicit nuclear threats against NATO member countries (Baltic States,
Poland and Romania), contribute to growing concern about Russian intentions and, justify nuclear
modernization programs and political opposition to weapon pr ogram reductions in other nuclear
states .111 Russia’ s nuclear modernization effort will present the international arms control
community with new challenges .112 The broad modernization reflects the government ’s conviction
that nuclear forces , in particular strategic nuclear forces , are indispens able for Russia ’s security and
regional power status . Kremlin is motivated by a strong will to maintain parity with the United
States, but the development of multiple versions of the same missiles also indicates the s trong
influence of Russia’s military industrial complex on nuclear planning .113

Nuclear deterrence theory postulates that nuclear weapon states would refrain from capitalizing on
their atomic arsenals given that victory in nuclear war is impossible.114 This c reed appears to be
deeply engrained in NATO strategy. According to the Head of NATO’s Energy Security section
Michael Ruhle “deterrence is the threat of force in order to discourage an opponent from taking an
unwelcome action. This can be achieved through the threat of retaliation (deterrence by punishment)
or by denying the opponent’s war aims (deterrence by denial). This simple definition often leads to
the conclusion that all it takes to deter is to put enough force on display. As long as both sides act
“rationally”, i.e. according to a cost -benefit calculus, and if none of them is suicidal, their military
potentials will keep each other in check .”115 Yet contrary to deterrence theory expectations, the
United States and Russia have “both increased the profi le and operations of their nuclear -capable
forces since the Ukraine crisis.116 With the development of increasingly sophisticated armaments,
including nuclear weapons systems, Washington and Moscow appear more inclined to adopt “more
ambitious war -fighting s trategies that go beyond basic deterrence.”117 Russia, for example, embraces
a de-escalation policy which relies on a limited nuclear strike.118 In other words, Moscow considers
the possibility to use tactical nuclear weapons against its adversaries to ‘remind ’ them about the
devastation atomic bombs can produce. This ‘escalate to de -escalate’ approach challenges classical
notions of the inutility of nuclear weapons as military assets. Ruhle cautioned NATO member -states

target, reducing the time that target's defense systems have to react”. See Andrei Akulov (Colonel Retired), “Kalibr:
Russia’s Naval System Upping Cruise Missile Game,” Strategic Culture, May 24, 2016, availab le at
http://www.strategic -culture.org/news/2016/05/24/kalibr -russia -naval -system -upping -cruise -missile -game.html
111 Hans M. Christe nsen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , Vol.
72, No 3 (2016),125 -143, available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10 .1080/00963402.2016.1170359
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better,” The Adelphi Papers , Vol. 21, No. 171
(1981), 16; Scott Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York and
London: W. W. Norton and Company, 2002), 32 -33; Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Statecraft
and the Meaning of Armageddon (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 6.
115 Michael Ruhle, “Deterrence: what it can ( and cannot) do,” NATO Review Magazine , 2015, available at
http://nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also -in-2015/deterrence -russia -military/EN/index.htm
116 Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew G. McKinzie, “Nuclear Arsenals: Current developments, trends and capabilities,”
International Review of the Red Cross , Vol. 97, No. 899 (2016), 564, available at https://www.icrc.org/en/international –
review/article/nuclear -arsenals -current -developments -trends -and-capabilities
117 Ibid.
118 Nikolai N. Sokov , “Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De -escalation’,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ,
March 13, 2014, available at: http://thebulletin.org/why -russia -calls-limited -nuclear -strike -de-escalation

42
about reacting to Moscow’s nuclear strate gy when he emphasized that although “ Russia’s thinking,
both politically and militarily, is far more “nuclearised” than most Western observers believed. The
West does not need to mirror -image Russia’s approach.”119

This year, new satellite images have show n that Russia is investing heavily in building new nuclear
bunkers cent ers near Mount Yamantau, in Ural Mountains, but also in the vicinity of Moscow which
could be interpreted as a quiet preparation for a confrontation with the West, that could include ev en
a nuclear strike.120 Dr. Loren Thompson, a top defens e expert from the U .S. think -tank Lexington
Institute, told The National Interest: " The possibility of nuclear war between America and Russia
not only still exists, but is probably growing ." The place where it is most likely to begin is in a future
military confrontation o ver three small Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.121
In the meantime, the U.S. Navy has quietly built a new underground nuclear weapons storage
complex at the Strategic Weapo ns Facility Pacific (SWFPAC), a high -security base in Washington
that stores and maintains the Trident II ballistic missiles and their nuclear warheads for the strategic
submarine fleet operating in the Pacific Ocean.122 The SWFPAC and the eight Ohio -class n uclear –
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) homeported at the adjacent Bangor Submarine Bas e
are located only 32 km from downtown Seattle. The SWFPAC and submarines are thought to store
more than 1,300 nuclear warheads with a combined explosive pow er equivalent to more than 14,000
Hiroshima bombs.123
Global nuclear inventory (2016 est.)

Source: Arms Control Association

Note: There are approx. 15,500 nuclear warheads in the world today, of which cca. 10,000 in military service, the
rest being retired and awaiting dismantlement.

119 Ruhle, Deterrence .
120 Charlie Bayliss, “World War 3? Vladimir Putin builds nuclear bunkers as chance of all -out war soars,” Express ,
September 5, 2016, available at http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/707195/Vladimir -Putin -russia -top-secret –
nuclear -bunkers -moscow -world -war-three -Mount -Yamantau
121 Ibid.
122 Hans M. Kristensen, “Navy Builds Underground Nuclear Weapons Storage Facility; Seattle Busses Carry Warning,”
Federation of the Atomic Scientists Blog , June 27 2016, available at http://fas.o rg/blogs/security/2016/06/pacific -ssbn-
base/
123 Ibid.

43
The f ormer Cold War superpowers are still the most powerful nuclear actors in the world. Over 90%
of the current nuclear warheads are in the possession of Russia and the United States. The nuclear
arsenals of a ll other nuclear weapon states – Britain, China, France, India, Israel, North Korea and
Pakistan – pale in comparison, quantitatively and qualitatively.124

Source: Arms Control Association

First time after the Cold War: Nuclear strike scenarios in military exercises

Possession of huge nuclear arsenal and constant modernization programs of vehicles for delivering
it represent an alarming message to peace and security in some regions of the world. United States
is keeping much of its nuclear forces on constant alert.125 As Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew G.
McKinzie pointed out, such practices increase the risk of accidents, misinterpretation, and
compe titive risk -taking between the U.S. and Russia.126 Since 2009 , Russia has started simulating
conventional exercises that were interpreted by the North -Atlantic Council as a provocative scenario
against NATO countries .127 In March 2015, Russian Military Forces conducted very large exercises

124 Hans M. Kristensen and M.G. McKinzie, “Nuclear Arsenals: Current developments, trends and capabilities, p. 566.
and Nuclear Weapons Who Has What at a Glance, ” Arms Control Association , August 10, 201 6, available at
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat
125 Tom Z. Collina notes in his article for The National Interest that “The United States keeps much of its nuclear arsenal
on high alert, ready to launch on warning of a highly unlikely bolt from the blue Russian attack”. Tom Z. Collina,
“America Would Never Be the First to Use Nukes. So Why Say We Might?,” The National Interest , July 28, 2016,
available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america -would -never -be-the-first-use-nukes -so-why-say-we-17168
126 Kristens en and McKinzie, Nuclear Arsenals , 564.
127 “On November 18, the NATO International Military Staff (IMS) briefed the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the
Russian military exercises Zapad and Ladoga, which had concerned many Allies because of the provocative s cenario
that had Russia and Belarus repel an attack launched from Poland and Lithuania. (…) NATO IMS indicated that Russian
armed forces were: able to respond to a small to mid -sized local and regional conflict in its western region; not able to
respond to two small conflicts in different geographical areas simultaneously; not able to conduct large scale
conventional operations; and still relying on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, even in local or regional conflicts’’ .
See “23.11.2009, NATO -RUSSIA: NAC DISCUSSES RUSSIAN MILITARY EXERCISES,” Aftenposten , February

44
with 45,000 servicemen, around 3,000 vehicles, more than 40 surface vessels, 15 submarines and
110 aircraft, including long rage strategic bombers Tu -22M3, that were deployed to Crimea, less
than 400 km from the Romanian nati onal border.128
During the Zapad 2013 exercise, the Russian defense establishment tested the concept of total war.
Military units acted hand -in-hand with the Federal Security Service , interior ministry troops, police
and even local officials. This improveme nt in the interoperability among military, security and
civilian entities is a crucial aspect of how Russia believes “next generation warfare” will need to be
fought. In contrast to Zapad 2009, the limited use of nuclear weapons was not simulated during
Zapad 2013 .129 A meeting of NATO defense ministers in February 2015 discussed an internal report
on Russia’s nuclear strategy that expressed concern that the Kremlin may be lowering the threshold
for potential use of nuclear weapons in any conflict .130
In May 2014, more than a dozen of U.S. aircraft took part in a nuclear response exercise, only after
a week since Russia had carried out a large military application on its national soil. Global Lightning
(May 12 -16) exercise involved ten B -52 heavy bombers and s ix B-2 bombers that were simulating
a nuclear deterrence exercise, according to U.S. Strategic Command.131 “Exercise Global Lightning
14 has been planned for more than a year and is based on a national scenario”, U.S. Strategic
Command indicated.132 Army Lt. C ol. Stephanie Bounds, spokeswoman for Stratcom, explained that
Global Lightning 14 provides training opportunities and tests and validates command and control
procedures for U.S. Strategic Command and its subordinate units.133
The Russian war games from May 2014 included t he test launch of a SS -25 Topol intercontinental
missile and two SS -N-23 submarine -launched ballistic missiles. Additional missile firings included
six Russian air -launched nuclear -capable cruise missiles .134 Mark Schneider, a former Pentagon
nuclear strategy official, said the Russian exercises appeared intended as a political message to the

13, 2011, available at http://www.aftenposten.no/norge/23112009 -NATO -RUSSIA -NAC -DISCUSSES -RUSSIAN –
MILITARY -EXERCISES -192706b.html
128 “Russia Targets NATO With Military Exercises ,” Stratfor Analysis , March 19, 2015, available at
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia -targets -nato-military -exercises
129 Liudas Zdanavicius and Matthew Czekas, “ Russia’s Zapad 2013 Military Exercise. Lessons for Baltic Regional
Security,” The Jamestown Foundation , Washington D.C., December 2015, 6, available at
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Zapad_2013_ -_Full_online_final.pdf
130 "What worries us most in this strategy is the modernization of the Russian nuclear forces, the increase in the level of
training of those forces and the possible combination between conventional actions and the use of nuclear forces,
including possibly in the framework of a hybrid war," one diplomat said. Adrian Croft, “Insight – Russia's nuclear
strategy raises concerns in NATO,” Reuters , February 4, 2015, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk -ukraine –
crisis -russia -nuclear -insight -idUKKBN0L825A20150204
131 “U.S. Conducts Nuclear Response Exercises,” Defense One , May 12, 2014, available at
http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2014/05/us -conducts -nuclear -response –
exercises/84256/?oref=search_Nuclear%20NATO
132 Ibid.
133 “Just as technology changes, so do the threats. The e xercise provides the opportunity to incorporate the most current
technology and techniques in support of our mission. The command is constantly honing its capabilities to deter,
dissuade, and defeat current and future threats to the U.S. and our allies” said Army Lt. Col. Stephanie Bounds,
spokeswoman for Stratcom. See Bill Gertz, “U.S. To Conduct Strategic Bomber Exercise,” The Washington Free
Beacon , May 11, 2014, available at http://freebeacon.com/national -security/u -s-to-conduct -strategic -bomber -exercise/
134 Ibid.

45
West.135 The Russian military exercises came a month after Moscow conducted , on April 14, a test
launch of a new ICBM (called the SS -27 by NATO ) that carried multiple simulated warheads that
analysts say potentially violated the 2010 New START arms treaty .136 Simulation of nuclear
exercises by these two nuclear powers simply sends the message that nuclear arsenal is once again
an element of huge imp ortance in projecting options for strategic primacy. NATO gives Russia a
significant place in its strategic documents, at the same time, it sends a clear message about collective
defense for all its member states and, concerning deterrence, that it include s nuclear elements as
well.
This year, at the Munich Security Conference , NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg underlined
that “ deterrence is a key part of our overall strategy. Modern deterrence must deter today’s threats,
not yesterday’s. Whether they come from the east or the south, from state or non -state actors, hybrid,
conventional or nuclear. Deterrence starts with resolve. It’s not enough to fee l it. You also have to
show it. ”137 Demonstrating the deterrence capability of the Alliance means calibra ting an adequate
response , including preparation for a nuclear defense posture. The message outlin es the
determination of the Alliance to understand, analyze and act based on the current security
environment in which all Allies must be protected and in whi ch Article 5 security guarantees must
be as powerful as ever.

Extended Nuclear Deterrence – Challenges from Within

In the realm of nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and Russia, the traditional modus operandi has
come under fire because of the increased emphasis on atomic arsenals as weapons of war, instead of
political instruments. These changes in Moscow’s and Washington’s nuclear posture have spilled
into extended nuclear deterrence (END) territory. Two pro blems can beset nuclear alliance
dynamics. First, Washington will find it increasingly difficult to defend its nuclear apartheid
policy.138 The United States has fought a long battle against the spread of nuclear weapons.139 For
Washington, the ideal number of nuclear weapon states is one – the U.S.140 Every new addition to
the atomic club puts a dent in Washington’s position of power. The proliferation of nuclear weapons
greatly diminishes Washington’s power of coercion, and enables the weak to withstand the str ong.141
Like any other superpower, the U .S. wants to keep its capability to impose its will on others as intact
as possible. Extended nuclear deterrence helps Washington keep nuclear weapons out of the hands
of its allies. The message the U .S. sends to its p artners through END can be summarized as follows:

135 According to Mark Schneider, “Russia usually holds its nuclear drills in the fall and the timing of last week’s war
games suggests that the intent was nuclear intimidation against NATO over the Ukraine.” Cited in Gertz, “U.S. To
Conduct Strategic Bomber Exercise.”
136 Ibid.
137 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security
Conference, February 13, 2016, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_128047.htm
138 Shane J. Ma ddock coined the term “nuclear apartheid” to refer to the U.S. position on who should possess nuclear
weapons. Shane J. Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the
Present (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 1.
139 Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,”
International Security , Vol. 40, No. 1 (2015), 9 -46; Or Rabinowitz and Nicholas L. Miller, “Keeping the Bombs in t he
Basement: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan,” International Security , Vol. 40, No.
1 (2015), 47 -86.
140 Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid , 1.
141 Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” 16.

46
“We, the U.S., have the right to possess atomic weapons, while you, our junior allies, do not. You
should trust us with their use, but we cannot trust you.” This situation is unlikely to last for much
longe r.
Second, the United States, and implicitly NATO, will face growing pressures emanating from the
competition for preferential treatment among its protégés.142 Collective security commitments in
nuclear alliances are meant to create the impression that all allies are created equal. Yet, geography
and history quickly dispel such illusions. Every country tries to become the “special partner” and
distinguish itself from the other protégés by hyping the threat, provoking the adversary, or playing
the victim. Thi s attention -seeking behaviour poses the danger of dragging the patron, and ultimately
the entire alliance, into an unwanted conflict.143 The ongoing one-upmanship between Romania and
Poland presents NATO, and the United States, with a difficult circle to square: how to reassure two
competing junior allies without causing further trouble with Russia. The following analysis will
examine these two dynamics into more d etail.

Nuclear Protection vs. Discrimination

NATO revolves around the collective defense principle, which treats an attack against one member
as an attack against all.144 As the Strategic Concept adopted at the 2010 Lisbon Summit underlines,
“as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. ”145 With the American
atomic arsenal underpinning NATO’s response capacity, member -states find themselves benefitting
from Washington’s nuclear umbrella. The Deterrence and Defen se Posture Review, adopted at the
NATO Summit in Chicago (2012) , discusses the primacy of U.S. strategic nuclear forces in ensuring
the protection of all Allies, stating that “ The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is
provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States .”
The UK and France have “ their independent strategic nuclear forces, which have a deterrent role of
their own, [and] contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies ”.146 In the aftermath
of the invasion of Crimea, the UK renewed its Trident program – the foundation of the British
nuclear deterrent.147 On July 18, 2016, a majority of British MPs (355) voted to maintain and update
the Trident.148 According to Prime Minister Theresa May, the cost of the investment is estimated at

142 Eliza Gheorghe, ‘A Logic of Their Own: Regions, the Security Umbrella, and Reactive Proliferation,’ paper presented
at Reassessing the Global Nuclear Order: Past, Present, and Future, Melbourne, January 8 -10, 2015.
143 On how allies can drag their patrons into wars, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed
Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization , Vol. 44, No. 2 (1990), 140 -144.
144 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Collective Defense – Article 5, March 22, 2016, available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm.
145 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Active Engagement, Modern Defense – Strategic Concept for the Defense and
Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by Heads of Sta te and Government in
Lisbon, November 19, 2010, available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm?selectedLocale=en
146 Ibid.
147 The Trident program “ consist of four Vanguard -class submarines which can carry up to 16 Trident II D5
ballistic missiles, each armed with up to eight nuclear warheads. At any time, one submarine is on patrol, one is
undergoing maintenance, one is preparin g for patrol and one has just come off patrol and is recovering ”. See Emily
Allen and Ben Farmer, What is Trident? Britain's nuclear deterrent explained, The Telegraph , July 18, 2016, available
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/21/what -is-trident -britains -nuclear -deterrent -explained/
148 Rowena Mason and Anushka Asthana, “Commons votes for Trident renewal by majority of 355,” The Guardian ,
July 18, 2016, available at https://www.theguardian.com/uk -news/2016/jul/18/mps -vote-in-favour -of-trident -renewal –
nuclear -deterrent

47
more than 40 billion pounds. The UK and France do not make their arsenals available for the kind
of nuclear sharing schemes the U.S. has enforced since the Cold War – deployments of nuclear
weapons on the territory of NAT O allies – which signals their unwillingness to commit to the defense
of Eastern Europe in the same way the U.S. has committed since the end of the Cold War.149
The past 67 years give credence to the argument that Extended Nuclear Deterrence works well both
in theory and in practice: the Soviet Union did not invade Western Europe, despite having, at times,
conventional superiority on the central front. Yet, the premise at the heart of END – that in a world
of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), a nuclear pow er would put its own territory at risk for the
sake of another state’s interests – defies the realm of plausibility.150 The United States signaled that
it understood the risks of END when it embraced in 1968
the concept of “flexible response”, a policy whic h directed NATO commanders “to provide for the
employment as appropriate of one or more of direct defense, deliberate escalation and general
nuclear response, thus confronting the enemy with a credible threat of escalation in response to any
type of aggres sion below the level of a major nuclear attack .”151 Moreover, extending nuclear
deterrence over countries in the close vicinity of an enemy can be a reckless move, as it provokes
the foe into action.152 Given the considerable risks associated with END, why doe s the United States
remain so keen on it?
U.S. counter – and non -proliferation policy reveals a hidden goal of extended nuclear deterrence:
maintaining control over nuclear weapons solely in the hands of the United States. Washington does
not spread out its nuclear umbrella for purely altruistic reasons. In exchange for protection, it
demands a pledge from its allies not to develop atomic weapons.153 The United States behaves like
any other superpower: it tries to advance its national interest , sometimes to th e detriment of other
countries , and, in doing so, it relies on its own capabilities.154 To protect its position of power, the

149 Adam Mount, “Deterrence is the Best Assurance,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , August 31, 2016, available
at: http://thebulletin.org/deterrence -best-assurance9819 .
150 Edmon d Seay, “NATO’s Incredible Nuclear Strategy: Why U.S. Weapons in Europe Deter No One,” Arms Control
Today , November 2, 2011, available at:
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_11/NATO_Incredible_Nuclear_Strategy_Why_US_Weapons_in_Europe_Dete
r_No_One ; Ward Wilson, “The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence,” The Nonproliferation Review , Vol. 15, No. 3
(November 2008), 421 -439.
151 Harlan Clevelan d, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain , Harper & Row, New York, 1970, p. 82. Cited in Steven Pifer,
Richard C. Bush , Vanda Felbab Brown, Martin S. Indyk , Michael O’Hanlon, Kenneth M. Pollack , , U.S. Nuclear and
Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges, available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp –
content/uploads/2016/06/06_nuclear_deterrence. pdf
152 Daniel S. Geller, “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol. 34, No.
2 (June 1990), 291 -310.
153 Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition,” 11; Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear
Proliferation,” International Security , Vol. 39, No. 2 (2014), 7 -51; Nicholas L. Miller, “Nuclear Dominoes: A Self –
Defeating Prophecy?” Security Studies , Vol. 23, No. 1 (2014), 33 -73; Philipp C. Bleek and Eric B. Lorber , “Security
Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol. 58, No. 3 (2014), 429 -454; Jeffrey
W. Knopf, “Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses,” Jeffrey W. Knopf (ed.), Security Assurances and Nuclear
Nonproliferation (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 13 -38.
154 It can be argued that during the Cold War, the United States put its national interest ahead of those of its junior
partners – West Germany and Italy – when it pressured them into relinquishing the ir nuclear ambitions. Gene Gerzhoy,
“Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions,”
International Security , Vol. 39, No. 4 (2015), 91 -129; Leopoldo Nuti, La sfida nucleare. La politica estera ital iana e le
armi atomiche, 1945 -1991 [The Nuclear Challenge. Italian Foreign Policy and Nuclear Weapons, 1945 -1991] (Bologna:
Il Mulino, 2007).

48
U.S. has resorted to coercion against allies and enemies alike in its long -standing battle against the
spread of nuclear weapons.155
Washington’s attempts to maintain a nuclear monopoly within NATO failed on two occasions, when
the British and the French, respectively, acquired nuclear weapons. If the British decided to go
nuclear for fear they would otherwise lose their standing in the international arena, the French made
their nuclearization much more explicitly linked to their doubts about END. Charles de Gaulle
questioned the soundness of putting one’s fate in the hands of another country. As the French leader
famously argued, no U .S. president would “trade New York for Paris.”156
Aware of the credibility problems created by the advent of MAD, the United State s sought to
reassure its Western allies of its commitment through a variety of institutional mechanisms revolving
around ideas about nuclear sharing. One such proposal, the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF),
envisaged the creation of a joint fleet armed with U.S. nuclear weapons under the command of multi –
national crews.157 Such arrangements would have allowed for a situation where a German naval
officer could have carried out an attack with American atomic weapons. Faced with firm opposition
from the Eastern Bloc, the United States substituted a consultative arrangement called the Nuclear
Planning Group (NPG) for the MLF.158 The task of the NPG is to serve as a forum for the U.S. to
consult with its junior partners over nuclear policy. If judged by the consistency of American nuclear
posture, including its first -use policy, forward deployments, and ultimately, it s quest for military
primacy, the NPG has fulfilled its purpose. Yet, in many respects, the NPG remains a poor surrogate
for joint management of nuclear policy. No consultation, no matter how thorough and open, can
replace a physical finger on the button.
Time and again, European allies raised the specter of nuclear sharing to signal to the United States
their concerns over the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella. Statements like President Barak
Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, which announced that the United States will “seek the peace and
security of a world without nuclear weapons ,” lead NATO member -states to call into question
Washington’s commitment to their security.159 The East Europeans have worked relentlessly to
preserve a firm U.S. nuclear prese nce on the continent and to embed themselves in the decision –
making process.160 For example, in December 2016, Poland’s Deputy Defense Minister Tomasz
Szatkowski publicly discussed the efforts of the authorities in Warsaw to join NATO’s nuclear

155 Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear
Ambitions,” International Security , Vol. 39, No. 4 (2015), 91 -129.
156 Memorandum of conversation between US President John F. Kennedy and French President Charles de Gaulle, May
31, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961 -1963 , Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961 -1962.
157 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace. The Making of the European Settlement, 1945 -1963 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999), 215; Francis J. Gavin, “Blasts from the past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s,”
International Security 29, no. 3 (2004/2005), 107.
158 Seth A. Johnston, How NATO Endures: An Institutional Analysis (DPhil Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012), 167 –
171; Andrew Priest, “From hardware to software: The end of the MLF and the rise of the Nuclear Planning Gro up”,
Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher, eds. Transforming NATO in the Cold War challenges beyond
deterrence in the 1960s (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 148 -161.
159 See Nuclear Posture Review Report , April 2010, Department of Defense , p. iii, available at
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf
160 Liviu Horovitz, “Why do they want American Nukes? Central and Eastern European positions regarding US
nonstrategic nuclear weapons,” European Security , Vol. 23, No. 1 (January 2014); Valentin Vidu, “Europa de Est,
îngrijorată de excluderea regiunii din politica externă a SUA, ” Mediafax , July 16, 2009, available at:
http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/europa -de-est-ingrijorata -de-excluderea -regiunii -din-politica -externa -a-sua-4645587 .

49
sharing arran gements.161 The Polish official referred to “deficits in NATO’s nuclear deterrent
capability on its eastern flank” to justify his remarks.162 His statements, which analysts interpreted
as Poland’s desire to have U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on its territory, were later disavowed by
the Polish Ministry of Defense.163 NATO officials also denied any rumors that the alliance plans to
deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states or to change existing deployment
arrangements. S uch a move would nullify the pledge at the core of NATO -Russia Founding Act that
the Alliance has “ no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of
new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and
do not foresee any future need to do so. ”164 This last point dispels the buzz created after the attempted
military coup in Turkey in July 2016 about tactical nuclear weapons being relocated from Incirlik to
Romania.165
Yet such demands for nuclear weapons deplo yments would still be manageable, even if the allies
were not recanting. The worst -case scenario for the United States entails countries pursuing
independent nuclear deterrents. Washington understands that states have powerful incentives to
acquire atomic bombs, and that once they decide to go down the nuclear road, it becomes very
difficult to stop them. The tools the U.S. has relied on to prevent its allies from joining the nuclear
club range from sanctions, export controls, and bribes, to intimidation, i solation, and diplomatic
pressure.166 Some of the most successful instances of U.S. coercion against allies include the
rollback of the Taiwanese nuclear weapons program, the temporary freeze on South Korea’s atomic
ambitions in the mid -1970s, and the curbin g of the West German nuclear pursuits.167 These three
countries depended heavily on the U.S., not only militarily, but also economically and
diplomatically. Some scholars have argued that the most decisive factor in turning around these
proliferating protégé es was the threat of abandonment.168 The Korean leadership, for instance,

161 “Poland considering asking for access to nuclear weapons under NATO program,” The Guardian , December 6, 2015,
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/06/poland -considering -asking -for-access -to-nuclear –
weapons -under -nato-program .
162 Kingston Reif, “Poland Backs Away from Nuclear Sharing,” Arms Control Today , January 14, 2016, available at:
https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/20 16_0102/News -Briefs/Poland -Backs -Away -From -Nuclear -Sharing .
163 Defense Ministry denies considering access to NATO nuclear weapons, Radio Poland , December 12, 2015, available
at: http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/231762,Defence -Ministry -denies -considering -access -to-NATO -nuclear –
weapons .
164 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO
and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France, May 27, 1997, available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm .
165 Georgi Gotev, “US moves nuclear weapons from Turkey to Romania,” Euractiv , August 18, 2016, available at:
https://www.euractiv.com/section/global -europe/news/us -moves -nuclear -weapons -from -turkey -to-romania/ .
166 Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition,” 11.
167 Derek J. Mitchell, “Taiwan’s Hsin Chu Program: Deterrence, Abandonment, a nd Honor,” Kurt M. Campbell, Robert
J. Einhorn, Mitchell B. Reiss (eds.), The Nuclear Tipping Point. Why States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 293 -313; Alexander Lanoszka, “Protection States Trust?: Major
Power Patronage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics,” paper presented at the Nuclear Studies Research Initiative
Conference, Austin, TX, October 18, 2013; Robert Reardon, “Civilian Nuclear Technology Transfers as Counter –
Proliferation Leverage: A Re -Examination of South Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” paper presented at the ISA
Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA, February 18, 2015, 6; Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint,” 91-
129.
168 Kang Choi and Joon -sung Park, “South Korea: Fears of Abandonment and Entrapment,” Muthiah Alagappa (ed.),
The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008),
373-403; Eugene B. Kogan, “Proliferation Among Friends: Taiwan’s Lessons from 1970s -1980s,” paper presented at
the Nuclear Studies Research Initiative Conference, Austin, TX, October 18, 2013; Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and
Nuclear Restraint,” 91-129.

50
became so afraid of a pullout of U.S. troops that it put its nuclear weapons program on the
backburner.169 Yet, recent studies have shown that the U.S. did not resort to outright bullyin g of
South Korea, realizing that doing so would only make the authorities in Seoul doubt the American
security umbrella even more and pursue an independent nuclear deterrent more vigorously.170 The
main lever the U.S. used against South Korea was the threat to withhold civilian atomic assistance
and to cut back on economic aid.171 These examples provide valuable insights into the challenges
the U.S. would face if the authorities in Warsaw or other Eastern European governments were indeed
musing about going down the nuclear path. New Europe depends on the United States for its security
needs. Yet, Washington has very little economic leverage on the new NATO member -states, given
that it does not count among any of these countries’ top five trade partners (in both exports and
imports). According to the most recently available data from globalEDGE at Michigan State
University , in 2014 the United States barely makes the top ten in terms of exports and imports for
countries in Eastern Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Sl ovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia,
Romania, and Bulgaria).172 Germany, on the other hand, represents not only the most important
exports destination, but also the main source of imports for most New Europe countries. In case
Eastern European countries start considering a nuclear hedging strategy, the United States cannot
threaten them with abandonment because such a tactic would aggravate New Europe’s insecurity
and push them even further down the nuclear road.173

Not All Allies Are Created Equal

Under the North Atlantic Treaty, all members of the alliance have the same rights and obligations.
All NATO countries benefit from the protection guaranteed under Article 5, regardless of their
wealth, size, population, or military contribution. Yet, in practice, eq uality remains an elusive target.
Not only do U.S. capabilities dwarf those of any other member -state, but the protégées themselves
pay careful attention to how they measure up against each other. Therefore, the alliance suffers from
both a free -rider prob lem and from a schadenfreude syndrome. This section focuses on the latter,
with a specific focus on “New Europe”.
The order in which the East Europeans joined NATO lies at the root of the jealousy these new
members feel towards each other. For these post -communist countries, NATO accession became a
matter of national pride, prompting them to define themselves not only in terms of their own
achievements, but also in comparison to the rest of the cohort.174 Poland’s accession in 1999, for
example, left Romania with a deep inferiority complex that still affects the Washington -Warsaw –

169 Jonathan D. Pollack, Mitchell B. Reiss, “South Korea: The Tyranny of Geography and the Vexations of History,” Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss
(eds.), The Nuclear Tipping Point , 254 -292.
170 Reardon, “Civilian Nuclear Technology Transfers as Counter -Proliferation Leverage.”
171 Ibid.
172 globalEDGE, Trade Statistics, Trade Partners for Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, 2014,
available at: http://globaledge.msu.edu/global -insights/by/country . The only exception is Estonia, for which the US is the 6th most important export
destination.
173 Nuclear hedging entails a strategy through which countries acquire the capability to build a nuclear weapon, but purposely de cide not to weaponize
and instead maintain the option to go nucle ar on short notice. Ariel Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International
Security , Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/2003), 59 -88.
174 This phenomenon has been described by Daniel N. Nelson and Thomas Szayna as “security envy”. See: Dan iel N. Nelson and Thomas Szayna,
“The Politics of NATO Enlargement in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia,” paper presented at the conf erence on NATO
Enlargement: The National Debates Over Ratification, October 7, 1997, available at: http://www.nato.int/acad/conf/enlarg97/nelson.htm . For an
analysis of the competition (and cooperation) between Poland and the Czech Republic see: Stephen R. Burant , “Poland and the Czech Republic on
the Road to NATO: Competition and Collaboration,” European Security , Vol. 6, No. 1 (1997), 82 -99.

51
Bucharest strategic triangle to this day.175 The Romanians have resorted to two levers to compensate
for what they perceive as Poland’s advantage vis -à-vis the U.S. and within NATO: the ir contribution
to the military alliance on the one hand, and their demands for deployments of weapons systems and
troops on their territory, on the other. These attempts to reach parity with Poland failed, adding strain
on the backbone of Extended Nuclear Deterrence – the belief that the nuclear protector will defend
all its allies equally.
First and foremost, the card Romania banked on has been its contribution in terms of personnel to
NATO’s military missions, with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan
being a case in point. The impetus behind Romania’s involvement in ISAF came not from a direct
threat posed by al -Qaeda to Romanian security, but from the desire to prove Bucharest’s reliability
and dependability to the American leadership.176 Romania’s rationale mirrored Poland’s, which had
25,000 military personnel serve in Afghanistan. Unable to match Poland’s contribution in numbers
– only 20,000 Romanian militaries fought in ISAF – Bucharest decided to keep its troops longer a nd
currently commits 650 soldiers to the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, compared to
Poland’s 200.177 Much to Romania’s chagrin, this contribution did not offset Bucharest’s lagging
behind on a much more important front – defense spending. Given the severe imbalance between
Washington’s war -fighting ability and that of its European allies, NATO members have taken upon
themselves the task of committing no less than 2% of their GDP to national defense. Only five of
NATO’s 28 member -states meet this goa l. Poland is one of them, Romania is not.178 In May 2016,
Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work praised Poland’s ability to fulfill its commitment. Romania
deservedly received a mere pat on the back for its pledge to do so.179 Poland has anchored in its
Constit ution the pledge of 1.95% GDP dedicated to defense since 2010 while in Romania it was
only in 2015 that the main political parties signed a pact to allocate 2% of GDP starting with 2017
for a decade.180 This differentiation will likely accentuate Bucharest’s insecurity and make Romania
lose trust in Washington’s willingness to come to its rescue in case of a war, undermining the very
basis of END.

175 On Romania’s inferiority complex towards its neighbors, see Lucian Boia, Romania: Borderland of Europe (London:
Reaktio n Books, 2001), 63. Romania, according to Ronald Asmus , who served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State and helped push NATO ’s expansion into Eastern Europe , had tried to present itself as “a Poland of the South” to
convince NATO of its strategic i mportance. Cited in Ioan Mircea Pa șcu, Extinderea NATO: Cazul României. Raport
Personal , 2007, 43, available at: http://ioanmirceapascu.ro/media/pdf/extinderea -nato-ioan-mircea -pascu.pdf .
176 Robert Kaplan cited by Octavian Manea, “Pivotul polonez: Pentru ce se înarmează Varșovia ,” FP Romania , March
21, 2014, available at: http://adevarul.ro/international/foreign -policy/pivotul -polonez -inarmeaza -varsovia –
1_532c0f850d133766a819249a/index.html . Romania joined ISAF in 2002 before it became a NATO -member, at a time
when the force was a U.S. -led coalition. The authorities in Bucharest were not the only ones to contribute to ISAF before
(without) being a NATO member. Bulgaria also joined ISAF, but in 2003. Other non -NATO contributors include:
Australia, New Zealand, Jordan, UAE, Singapore, and South Korea, to mention just a few.
177 Romanian Ministry of National Defence, “Afghanistan: 1600 Troops Deployed in the Hottest Area of Operations,”
Romanian Defence , 2013, 12 -13, available at: http://www.mapn.ro/publicatii/2013/defence.pdf
178 Naftali Bendavid, “Just Five of 28 NATO Members Meet Defense Spending Goal, Report Says,” Wall Street Journ al,
June 22, 2015, available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/nato -calls-for-rise-in-defence -spending -by-alliance -members –
1434978193 .
179 Lisa Ferdinando, “Work Salutes Contributions of Romanian, Polish Troops,” DoD News, Defense Media Activity ,
May 16, 2016, available at: http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/760715/work -salutes -contributions -of-
romanian -polish -troops .
180 Tomasz Szatkowski, “Polish Defense Modernization in the Era of U.S. Strategic Rebalancing,” Center for
European Policy Analysis, March 1, 2013, avai lable at:
http://cepa.org/index/?id=40d4415f72e9b4896ac2406b4a458d64 ; Marian Chiriac, “Romanian Parties Agree to Raise
Defence Spending,” BalkanInsight , January 13, 2015, available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/main –
romanian -political -parties -agree -to-set-aside -more -money -for-the-defence -budget .

52
Second, Romania has offered to host a variety of platforms, such as the missile shield, to strengthen
its ties to Washington. The missile defense saga has experienced many twists and turns. From the
beginning, the Romanians have had a chip on their shoulder because Poland had gained a head -start
on this issue, given their superior level of interoperability with other NATO assets.181 In 2002, the
United States began discussions with Warsaw the possibility of locating interceptor missiles on
Polish territory.182 However, i n 2009, President Barack Obama caused stupor in Poland when he
announced the cancellation of the projec t in its initial version.183 The Romanians relished this turn
of events, as it gave them the opportunity to boost their strategic importance and anchor the U.S.
more firmly in Bucharest’s security framework. Before the return to power of Vladimir Putin in
2012, the Russian Federation did not object as forcefully to a NATO missile defense system
deployed in Romania, clearing the way for a speedy implementation of the plan.184 Yet, as the
interceptors became operational, Moscow displayed a dramatic change of hear t, warning that the
missile shield had transformed Romania into a target for a Russian attack.185 In the light of this
remark, what appeared to be a boon for U.S. -Romanian relations and a symbolic victory over
Warsaw turned into a potential liability.
Also, when the Obama administration cancelled the Bush era plans for a European Interceptor Site
in 2009, it replaced them with a phased plan, the third pillar of which includes SM -3 Block IIA
interceptors which is scheduled for 2018. Poland decided to compleme nt the U.S. missile shield with
its own integrated air defense system (IAMD), at a rather hefty cost ($5 billion). The edge the
Romanians have now will dissipate soon, leaving them feeling vulnerable. To keep up with Warsaw,
Bucharest will likely put forwa rd proposals meant to increase the U.S. presence on its territory.
Why can the Romanians afford to jockey for position with the Poles? In the aftermath of the Cold
War, NATO entered a period of soul -searching caused by the disappearance of its principal
adversary – the Soviet Union. Democracy -promotion drove the 1999 and 2004 enlargement rounds,
leaving the ten candidates to vie for pole position on social, political, and economic matters. They
could not get a clear sense about their strategic importance b ecause NATO lacked the traditional
security threat it was created to fight against.186 The Russian Federation did not pose a real danger,
as it had not yet recovered from the economic debacle of the 1990s. Terrorist groups in far -flung
places like Afghanista n spurred NATO into action, dragging it into a crippling thirteen -year war.
But Al -Qaeda could not provide the fixed and easily identifiable adversary NATO needed to define
itself against. Gone were the days when everybody in NATO knew the Third World War would be
fought over Germany. NATO itself was changing and its new member -states were left wondering

181 Pașcu, Extinderea NATO , 47.
182 Olaf Osica, “Poland: A New European Atlanticist at a Crossroads?” European Security , Vol. 13, No. 4 (2004), 314.
183 Luke Harding, Ian Traynor, “Obama abandons missile defense shield in Europe,” The Guardian , September 17, 2009,
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/17/missile -defence -shield -barack -obama .
184 In 2010 and 2011, NATO and Russia “held productive exchanges” on a cooperative missile defense arrangement,
entailing the creation of a data fusion center and a planning and operations center. These discussions led to a misplaced
sense of optimism about Russia’s acceptance of BMD plans in Easter n Europe. Steven Pifer, “NATO -Russia Missile
Defense: Compromise is Possible,” The Brookings Institution , December 28, 2012, available at:
https://www.br ookings.edu/articles/nato -russia -missile -defense -compromise -is-possible/ .
185 Robin Emmott, “U.S. activates Romanian missile defense site, angering Russia,” Reuters , May 12, 2016, available
at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us -nato-shield -idUSKCN0Y30JX .
186 In the 1990s, NATO intervened in the Balkans, adding peacekeeping and peacemaking missions to its operational
menu. NATO enlargement, some would argue, was about strengthening countries around an area undergoing a fragile
transition and post -war reconstruction process. Philip H. Gordon and James B. Steinberg, “NATO’s Enlargement:
Movin g Forward; Expanding the Alliance and Completing Europe’s Integration,” Brookings Policy Brief Series ,
November 15, 2001, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/nato -enlargement -moving -forward -expanding –
the-alliance -and-completing -europes -integration/ .

53
about where they fit in the picture. In an attempt to establish their position in the pecking order, the
East Europeans let themselves get dragged into int ra-alliance competitions for status, which in turn,
led them to doubt American security assurances. Their distrust in END serves as a useful reminder
that states in an alliance have nothing to fear but fear itself, above all the fear that they are not as
special as their peers.

Conclusion
Since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, policy -makers and analysts have been talking about a New
Cold War. Washington and Moscow seem to be approaching the precipice once again. Yet, the
current situation could not be more different from the pre -1990 era. The Cold War taught the two
superpowers that nuclear weapons have little military value, but this lesson appears to have been
forgotten. Treating a limited nuclear strike as a viable solution for de -escalation goes aga inst the
very foundation of strategic stability. Nuclear deterrence, in its extended form, has also been
challenged from within, strained by doubts about its credibility and by the jealousy that junior
partners harbor towards one another. Given the collisi on course Washington and Moscow have
entered since 2014, a return to the Cold War – abidance by the mutual assured destruction (MAD)
principle – would be the better course.

54

Chapter 4
TURKEY
by EUGENIA GUȘILOV, Ș TEFAN POPESCU and LIVIU TATU

Turkey’s role in NATO
Turkey is a NATO member since 1952. It is the second largest standing military power in NATO
(612,000 men, WB), the most important NATO regional power in the Black Sea and in the Middle
East and a key country for dealing with the migrant crisis. More than that, it is home to tens of
American nuclear weapons stored at Incirlik Air Base as part of Turkey’s NATO obligation. In short,
Turkey is paramount for the security of both, Southern and Eastern, Flanks of the Alliance.
The last NATO Summit, in Warsaw, und erscored the need for a broad and consistent deterrence plan
on the eastern Flank. Turkey is the most important heavy -military ally in the Alliance’s South –
Eastern region and a potential fragile domestic regime could put a question mark over the capability
of NATO to defend its south -eastern flank. In the Black Sea, there are two regional powers – Russia
and Turkey, the last one is the only riverside country that can play a huge role in defending NATO
Black Sea countries and at the same time be compliant wi th the obligations of the 1936 Montreaux
Convention. That being said, Turkey is the only relevant NATO naval power in the Black Sea region.
Romania’s proposal for a NATO naval structure is not feasible in the foreseeable period without a
clear and strong s upport from Turkey, considering the regulations of Montreaux Convention, despite
NATO’s message of support to the region at Warsaw.187

Moreover, Ankara plays a key role for NATO’s ballistic missile defense system – “Turkey hosts a
forward -based early -warni ng BMD radar at Kürecik” as was underlined by the NATO Allies in
Warsaw this summer.188 The mobile AN/TPY -2 radar on Turkish soil is part of Phase 1 of the
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and works as an integrated instrument of the AEGIS
missile de fense system, being in direct link with the facility base in Deveselu, Romania, with Aegis
naval ships and with other facilities in Europe. Turkey is a trusted NATO Ally given its long –
standing request to the Alliance to house Patriot missile air defense s ystem on Turkish soil, after
numerous incidents when Russian fighters violated its airspace.189 After Turkey shot down the
Sukhoi Su -24M bomber last November, the need for deployment of the Patriot system on Turkish
soil grew bigger.

187“Appropriate measures, tailored to the Black Sea region and including the Romanian initiative to establi sh a
multinational framework brigade to help improve integrated training of Allied units under Headquarters Multinational
Division Southeast, will contribute to the Alliance’s strengthened deterrence and defense posture….” See Warsaw
Summit Communiqué. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm
188 Ibidem.
189 NATO to deploy Patriot missile system in Turkey again, Trend News Agency February 1, 2016,
http://en.trend.az/world/turkey/2488375.html

55
In addition, Turkey, t hrough its training and education centers, is part of the Defense and Related
Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative, launched in Wales. A demand driven tool for
projecting stability beyond NATO borders, the Initiative offers specialized assistance in the area of
defense capacity building (such as strategic advice, development of local forces by training and
education, support in logistics and cyber defense).190

NATO and U.S. military presence in Turkey

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS)

Last but not least, threats emanating to the south of Europe (Syrian war, refugee crisis and Daesh)
are a matter of concern for all NATO states, but they are paramount security threats for Turkey.
Before the Warsaw Summit, the country’s priorities were the civil war in Syria, refugees, terrorism

190 DCB Tools have been launched for Georgia and Jordan (in September 2014), Iraq (in July 2015), and Republic of
Moldova (in June 2015) . For each partic ipating country, the DCB package look different. For instance, for Iraq, it
includes: “assistance in the areas of counter -IED, explosive ordnance disposal and demining; military medicine and
medical assistance; advice on security sector reform; civil -milit ary planning support to operations; civil emergency
planning and civil preparedness; cyber defens e; and military training". For more on DCB, please see Defen se and Related
Security Capacity Building Initiative, NATO, June 27, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132756.htm

56
and Russia’s A2/AD capabilities in Syria.191 In the Final Communique of the Warsaw Summit, allies
acknowledged that, in addition to the Readiness Action Plan Assurance Measures , the “tailored
assurance measures for Turkey to respond to the growing security challenges from the south” 192
are contributing to the security of the Alliance as a whole. Turkey, Greece and Italy are on the
frontline of efforts to deal with the refugees’ crisis and cooperate with NATO and EU’s FRONTEX
agency.193 Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, in 2011, Turkey hosted more refugees than
any other country (2.5 million last year), according to data of the United Nations Refugee Agency
(UNHCR).194 That means that one NATO member country is d ealing with the brunt of the problem.
In March 2016, the European Union has reached an agreement with Turkey for a Refugee Facility
on Turkish soil for 2016 -2017 with an approved budget of EUR 3 billion. The facility, now fully
operational, has already all ocated EUR 740 million for both humanitarian and non -humanitarian
assistance, of which EUR 150 million contracted and, of these EUR 105 million disbursed.195 As
stated in the second report on progress made in the implementation of the EU -Turkey Statement,
despite the progress, “ the success achieved so far is fragile, and it is too soon to conclude that all
aspects of the EU -Turkey Statement are fully functional ”.

The EU, through FRONTEX, is extending cooperation with NATO on ref ugees in the areas of early
warn ing, surveillance activities, and intelligence sharing with Greek and Turkish Coast Guards in
order to increase detection rate and exchange data on smuggling. A key stake is boosting the capacity
of the Turkish Coast Guard in the Aegean (a EUR 14 milli on program is funded by the EU, plus an
additional EUR 20 million was committed in May for search and rescue operations).196 Moreover,
an operational framework has been put in place for the “One for One” Resettlement scheme197 which
is meant to strengthen conf idence of refugees in the legal pathways to enter the EU.

Nevertheless, despite the positive balance of its presence in NATO, over the last two decades,
Ankara has engaged in a profound strategic reorientation, a process which can impact the unity and
strength of the Alliance South -Eastern Flank in case of a major crisis with Russia. The end of the
Cold War and the exit from the logic of rigid alliances opened up the possibility for Turkey to create
a post -imperial space. It was underscored by the demise of the Soviet Union, and the resulting
independence of Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

191 Ozgur Unluhisarcıklı , Turkey focused on the South , in “National Priorities for the NATO Warsaw Summit”, GMF,
Transatlantic Take, No. 123/ May 2016, p. 8.
192 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8 -9 July 2016, available at https://nato.usmissi on.gov/warsaw -summit -communique/
193 Frontex was set up in 2004 and its role is to foster and streamline the cooperation between the national border
authorities of the EU Member States. See Frontex, Mission and Tasks, available at http://frontex.europa.eu/about –
frontex/mission -and-tasks/
194 UNHCR welcomes new finance instrument to aid refugees and hosts, The UN Refugee Agency, September 22, 2016,
available at http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/9/57e3d0db4/unhcr -welcomes -new-finance -instrument -aid-
refugees -hosts .html?query=Turkey%20refugees
195 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN
COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL, Second Report on the progress made in the implementation of the EU -Turkey
Statement, Brussels, June 15, 2016, pp. 11 -12, av ailable at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home -affairs/what -we-
do/policies/european -agenda -migration/proposal -implementation –
package/docs/20160615/2nd_commission_report_on_progress_made_in_the_implementation_of_the_eu –
turkey_agreement_en.pdf
196 Ibid, p. 3.
197 Under this scheme, the EU took upon itself to resettle “a Syrian from Turkey to the EU for every Syrian returned to
Turkey from Greek islands”.

57
and Tajikistan) and South Caucasus (Azerbaijan), and a reinforced Muslim identity in the former –
Jugoslav space (Bosnia, Kosovo). Balancing Russia in Central Asia and the Balkans was in sync
with American interests. But, Turkey’s ambition to become the cultural, economic and political
center of a regional Turkic construction were abandoned mainly for two reasons: the Taliba n threat
in early 2000s determined the ex -soviet Asian republics to prefer Russia’s strategic protection, and
Ankara’s pragmatic interest in economic cooperation with Russia (which only got stronger after
Erdogan’s party acceded to power, in 2002).
“Zero problems with the neighbors” and building “strategic depth”198 in the Muslim Sunni world
became a priority of Turkish foreign policy. This spirit made possible the signing of the Joint
Statement of profound friendship and multidimensional partnership with the Russian Federation in
December 2004, on occasion of Vladim ir Putin’s visit to Ankara. Parallel to developing relations
with Russia, and normalizing ties with Iran, Ankara discovered the Arab countries in North and Sub –
Saharan Africa and their markets. Turkey’s economic development (now the 17th largest economy
in the world and a full member of G20) and sustained demographic growth is what fed Ankara’s
geopolitical ambitions. The global city, Istanbul, now has more billionaires than New York, Moscow
and London, according to a 2010 Forbes ranking. Turkey is re -disco vering its Eurasian identity (that
of a bridge between West and East) and is abandoning its position of a Western outpost. The Arab
spring offered Ankara the possibility to aspire to the status of ‘beacon of the Muslim Sunni world’,
making the EU accession no longer a cardinal point in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s desire to be
part of BRICS199 is a clear indication that it wants to be one of the centers of the multipolar world.
“The world can no longer have only one command center ” said, in 2008, Abdullah Güll, the
conservative -islamic president, suggesting that the U.SA. should share global responsibilities.200 At
the NATO Summit in Bucharest, in 2008, Turkey was against Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO.
This was followed, shortly after, in August 2010, by the birth of a Russian -Turkish strategic
partnership and the creation of an intergovernmental body – the High Level Cooperation Council –
for joint cooperation in the Balkans, Middle East, and Eurasia. This explains why Turkey obtained
the status of “dialo gue partner” to the Shanghai Cooperation Organ ization (SCO) in April 2013.201
Along with these geopolitical ambitions which di lute Turkey’s position in NATO, there is another,
maybe more important, factor: managed democracy with authoritarian accents place T urkey much
closer to the Russian and Chinese models than to those of NATO member states.

The coup d’etat
The failed military coup in Turkey and events that followed it have been the object of much
speculation and contradictory information. In those hours, international TV channels showed the
image of an almost successful operation: the president and the government were chased away, the
Chief of General Staff was arrested, the headquarters (hq) of the national television was occupied.

198 Former Turkish Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, is its artisan. See Ahmet Davutoglu,
Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position , Istanbul, Kure Yayinlan, 2001.
199 Sébastien Hervieu, “En intégrant l'Afrique du Sud, les Bric s'affirment comme un club politique des pays
émergents ”, Le Monde , 15/04/2011.
200 Stephen Kinzer, “US Must Share Power in New World Order, Says Turkey’s Controversial President”, The
Guardian , August 15, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/16/turke y.usforeignpolicy .
201 “Turkey becomes partner of China, Russia -led security bloc” , Reuters, April 26, 2013, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/us -turkey -shanghai -idUSBRE93P17720130426 .

58
It looked like T urkey was about to relive the events of September 1980, when the army intervened
to correct the backsliding of the civilian power from the kemalist order. This initial impression is
what made Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his supporters claim that not only the army
was behind the coup attempt, but an entire conspiracy involving large segments of the state
apparatus. Despite the shaded areas, which only time will clarify, several aspects cannot be
questioned.

It is abundantly clear that, in the night of July 15 -16, a part of the Turkish army tried to remove
president Erdogan from power. This was acknowledged immediately after the launch of the anti –
coup operation by the PM Binali Yildirim: “ Certain individuals undertook an illegal action wit hout
support from the chain of command” . Shortly after, mutineers posted on the website of the Army
Chief of Staff an announcement stating that they took over, but will maintain “democratic order and
human rights” as well as Turkey’s “international engagem ents”. State -run Anadolu Agency
confirmed the military coup d’etat attempt (“a group of military men who try to trigger a revolt” )
adding that “ general Hulusi Akar, the Chief of General Staff, was taken hostage at the General Staff
HQ”. The Turkish public television TRT aired a putsch communique stating that the country is lead
by a “peace council” and that a state of siege and martial law are decreed. Finally, from an
undisclosed location, president Erdogan made an appearance via Facetime on CNN Turk, and talked
about “ the rebellion of a minority within the army ” and about its “ attempted coup d’etat ”.
International TV channels show the first images with tanks blocking the access to one of the bridge
over Bosphorus, tanks surrounding the parliament building, military jets flying over Ankara and
firing from a helicopter into a pro -Erdogan crowd. The enemy of the Turkish president, imam
Fetullah Gülen himself, exiled in the United States, condemned in those hours “ any armed
intervention in Turkey’s internal aff airs”. The purges that followed suit in the army offer a clue of
the coup scale: around 6,000 military personnel arrested202, including colonel Ali Yazici, key
military adviser to the president, general Bekir Ercan Van, commander of the Incirlik airbase, and
generals Erdal Öztürk and Adem Huduti, commanders of the 3rd and respectively 2nd army.203 In
total, 126 generals and admirals. The General Commandment of the Gendarmerie is subordinated to
the Interior Ministry, and the regiment for the protection of the p residency is dissolved .204

202 Out of 32,000 persons arrested, according to Turkish Justice Ministry official data cited by Euronews, France24,
Reuters.
203 Turkey has 4 army corps. The 1st army is headquarter in Istanbul with units in Eastern Thrace. It is in charge of
protecting the border with Greece and Bulgaria and the Bosporus and Dardanelle Straits. The 2nd army is headquartered
in Malatya (in South -East Anatolia) and is responsible f or Anatolia region and protection of the border with Syria, Iraq
and Iran. The 3rd army is the most important in size of all the ground forces of Turkey, it has its hq at Erzincan (North –
East of Turkey), and is responsible for the border with Armenia and G eorgia. Finally, the 4th army, also known as the
Aegean Army, has its hq at Izmir and is tasked with protecting Turkey’s West coast. Units present in North Cyprus
belong to the 4th army.
204 For an hour -by-hour account of events see materials by Reuters, AF P and the synthesis “Coup d'Etat en Turquie: le
récit heure par heure d'une nuit chaotique (photos + vidéos)” published on https://www.rtbf.be/info/dossier/tentative -de-
coup -d-etat-en-turquie/detail_coup -d-etat-en-turquie -le-recit-heure -par-heure -d-une-nuit-confuse -et-
historique?id=9355300 , “Turquie, le putch heure par heure”, http://www.slate.fr/story/121355/turquie -putsch -heure –
par-heure and "Turquie: comment s'est déroulée la tentative de coup d'Etat avortée. Dans la nuit de vendredi à samedi,
des mutins ont essayé de prendre le pouvoir. Francetv info revient sur les événements de la nuit”,
http://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/turquie/tentative -de-coup -d-etat-en-turquie/turquie -comment -s-est-deroulee -la-
tentative -de-coup -d-etat-par-des-militaires_1549637.html

59
Another clue is the speed with which the putsch was repressed, not so much the reaction of the
population and loyal forces as the quality of the putsch operations. Successive purges since 2007205
have affected the quality and unity of the officer corps which used to function as a caste. Pundits206
have underlined the amateurism, lack of coordination, certain useless actions of the military
personnel involved in Erdogan’s overthrow. One thing is cert ain, the action was triggered around 10
pm, while at 1:20 am the government was announcing that loyal forces have the situation under
control, although some “difficulties persist in certain areas of the capital and in Istanbul”. Although
the fire exchange intensified around 2 am and the parliament in Ankara is bombed by military aircraft
(2:30 am), any doubt regarding the outcome of the putsch dissipates the moment president Erdogan
lands on the Istanbul airport (3:30 am) and shows himself to his supporters . In the early morning
hours (6:30 am), Turkish TV stations air the first images with military personnel who surrender to
the security forces.
The third certainty is Turkey’s different perception: reserved attitude of NATO allies, in contrast to
support f rom the Russian Federation. The first reaction came from Paris: a mere recommendation
from Quai d’Orsay to French citizens in Turkey not to go out on the streets because of “serious
unfolding events”. The White House has announced that “ all parties in Turk ey should support the
democratically -elected Government of Turkey, show restraint, and avoid any violence or
bloodshed. (…) The President asked the Secretary to continue to keep him updated as the situation
unfolds ”.207 The tone of Sergey Lavrov, Moscow’s to p diplomat, Sergey Lavrov, although along the
same lines, was perceived in Turkey as more wholehearted: “ We believe that it is important right
now to avoid any bloodshed, any violent clashes, and all issues should be addressed and resolved
constitutionally in any country ”208 / “надо избегать любых кровопролитных столкновений и
решать возникающие в государстве ситуации исключительно в конституционном поле ”.209
Only after any trace of confusion has disappeared, subsequent Western reactions became more firm:
a spokesperson for Berlin Chancellery stated that “the democratic order must be respected”, NATO
and the European Union pleaded for avoiding a bloodbath and asked for “an urgent return to the
constitutional order”. The subsequent attitude of the Turkish authorities – president, Prime Minister,
Foreign Minister – and the messages they have sent have confirmed how much was appreciated
Russia’s position (Turkey’s foreign minister talked about Moscow’s “real support”) and how little
were appreciated the reserves initially expressed by NATO allies. The warming up of relations with
the Russian Federation was decided before the July 15 -16 events, but they were favored by Russia’s
attitude towards the Erdogan regime during the coup attempt. The explicit friendship manifestations

205 Ana Pouvreau, “L’évolution du rôle de l’institution militai re en Turquie (2003 -2015)”, in Tribune n° 648, 24 août
2016, Institut Méditerranéen de Défense et de Sécurité : http://fmes -france.org/wp –
content/uploads/2016/08/A.Pouvreau -L%C3%A9volution -du-r%C3%B4le -de-linstitution -militaire -en-Turquie -2003 –
20151.pdf ; Gilles Dorronsoro, Benjamin Gourisse, “L’armée turque en politique. Autonomie institutionnelle, for mation
de coalitions sociales et production des crises”, in Revue française des Sciences politiques , 2015/4, Vol. 65, p. 609 -631.
206 Edward Luttwak, “Why Turkey Coup d’Etat failed”, Foreign Policy , July 16, 2016:
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/16/why -turkeys -coup -detat -failed -erdogan/ ; Andrew Finkel, “ Turkey was already
undergoing a slow -motion coup – by Erdoğan, not the army ”, The Guardian , Saturday, July 16, 2016:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/16/turkey -coup -army -erdogan
207 White House Press Release, July 15, 2 016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the -press -office/2016/07/15/readout –
presidents -call-secretary -john-kerry
208 U.S. Department of State, Joint Press Availability With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, July 15, 2016:
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/07/260134.htm
209 Russian MFA, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions…., July 15, 2016,
http://www.mid.ru/en/vizity -ministra/ –
/asset_publisher/ICoYBGcCUgTR/content/id /2356206?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_ICoYBGcCUgTR&_101_INSTAN
CE_ICoYBGcCUgTR_languageId=en_GB

60
towards Russia (“my dear friend Vladimir” said president Erdogan several times during a subsequent
interview with Tass Russian News Agency210) and the arrest of pilots who shot down the Russian
jet at the Turkish -Syrian border (accused of playin g the game of the coup plotters , of the “enemies
of Turkey who want a worsening of its relations with Russia” 211) have to do, first and foremost, with
the long term future of Turkish -Russian relations, decided before, but reinforced by the July coup.
It seems that Russia has grasped better the context and informational flow than Turkey’s own allies.
President Erdogan’s visit to Sankt Petersburg on August 9, 2016 (accompanied by his Energy
Minister and the Chief of the main intelligence service, MIT), Ankara’s opening towards the regime
of Bashar al -Assad, Turkey’s intervention in Syria212 (impossible without an understanding with
Russia), the Erdogan -Putin prox imity exhibited during the G20 Summit in China stand in contrast
to Erdogan’s repeated accusations of harboring a terrorist (Fetullah Gülen) addressed to the U.S..
The fourth certainty is that the failed coup was used by president Erdogan to rid the Turki sh
apparatus of Fetullah Gülen’s followers, to sideline the opposition and pave the way to install a
presidential regime. The removal of 2,700 judges and the arrest of 5 members of the Magistrates’
Supreme Council and of 2 Constitutional Court judges means one thing: complete control over the
justice system, especially since many magistrates are suspected of being part of the Hizmet (Service)
organization213, which is patronized by Gülen. However, this strategy seriously undermines Turkey’s
European aspiratio n (whatever is left of it) as well as its desire to become a beacon of the Sunni
Muslim world.
The last certainty relates to the evolution of Turkish society and the army’s role in it. Since coming
to power in 2002, Recep Erdoğan never stopped diminishing the role of the army and dismantling
the “Kemalist military caste”, making use very adroitly of the EU requirements for civilian control
of military structures. The Ergenekon process (2007 -2009), inspired by Gülen’s brotherhood214,

210 “Erdogan Exclusive: New page in Russia – Turkey relations ”, interview with
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, conducted by TASS First Deputy Director -General Mikhail Gusman, August
9, 2016, http://tass.ru/en/world/893204
211 “Turquie: 2 pilotes ayant abattu un avion russe en detention”, Le Figaro , July 19, 2016, available at
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash -actu/2016/07/19/97001 -20160719FILWWW00012 -turquie -2-pilotes -ayant -abattu -un-
avion -russe -en-detention.php ; “Turkish pilots who downed Russian jet arrested over coup plot”, July 19, 2016, Politico ,
http://www.politico.eu/articl e/turkish -pilots -who-downed -russian -jet-arrested -over-coup -plot-erdogan/
212 Launched on August 24, 2016 in Jarablus region and codenamed Operation Euphrate Shield.
213 The Hizmet movement is a brotherhood, a social group built on religious criteria, founded in 1970 by Fetullah Gülen,
a mystical Sufi thinker who was designated as one of the world’s most influential intellectuals by Foreign Policy
magazine in 2008. His movement engul fed important segments of the Turkish elite, with the exception of the army.
Until 2011, when Erdogan and Gullen had a falling out, Hizmet supplied cadres to Erdogan’s party, the AKP. The
brotherhood has several million Turkish and Turkic followers, a netw ork of schools and churches all over the world.
Until July 2016, the brotherhood also owned Zaman, the most read Turkish d aily, and several TV channels, as well as a
financial institution – Asya Bank.
For a better understanding of the tradition of brotherh oods and secret societies in Turkey, please see Thierry Zarcone,
Le Croissant et le Compas : Islam et franc -maçonnerie, de la fascination à la détestation , Dervy, 2016. For more on the
doctrine of Gülen followers, please see Louis -Marie Bureau, La pensée de Fethullah Gülen: Aux sources de l’
« islamisme modéré », Paris, Harmattan, 2012. For more on Gülen’s involvement in Turkish politics and society, see:
Ali Kazancigil, “L’école avant la mosquée. Le Mouvement Gülen, une énigme turque », Le Monde Diplomati que, March
2014, p. 6 ( https://www.monde -diplomatique.fr/2014/03/KAZANCIGIL/50236 )
214 The Turkish army has traditionally been opaque to religious brotherhoods.

61
practically beheaded Turk ey’s General Staff (over 300 officers were purged from the army215)
resulting in the appointment of officers loyal to Erdoğan. More recently, the conviction of several
high ranking officers in 2012216, accused of organizing a plot, have affected the cohesion o f the
military body. The start of the military coup shows also some complicities from the intelligence
services, since the operation could not be known in advance and nipped in the bud.217 The rebels
represent the part of the army loyal to kemalist values: t heir communique resembles very much the
ones issued by the military in the successful coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980; the name of the rebel
military organization – The Committee of Peace in the Nation – is derived from Mustafa Kemal
Attatürk’s motto “Peace i n the nation, peace in the world”. But, in comparison to previous coups,
the army was not united this time and did not enjoy support from the urban population. Maybe, the
memory of the brutal repression that followed the military coup of September 12, 1980 , was also a
factor: 49 executions by hanging, 650,000 arrests, 30,000 persons forced into exile and 1.5 million
persons on which the secret service kept records. The police stayed loyal to Erdoğan after having
been purged itself of inconvenient officers i n 2014. At the same time, the plotters didn’t know how
to rally opposition parties, so that the only segment of civil society that made itself heard during the
hours of the coup was that of Mr. Erdoğan’s supporters. It is noteworthy that the imams, who are
public servants, played a key role, having effectively mobilized and called the population into the
streets to defend the regime.
Consequences

During the Cold War, Turkey has faced different military coup d’état episodes which is why some
may consider that the Turkish Army has a great experience in dealing with this kind of events, or
with the risks to foreign arsenal and foreign military staff on Turkish soil. Turkey has faced similar
coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s order ( enshrined in the 1923
Constitution) designed a secular Turkish state, one in which the Turkish Army has always been a
major player. But, as Dr. Ilter Turan explains218, the circumstances were very different this time:
“There was a routine to earlier military interventions. They would be preceded by an
erosion of national political consensus, an outbreak of continual violence, the decline of
faith in the ability of bickering politicians to address the crisis, a growth in citizen
expectations that only the military could restore law and order, military pronouncements
that politicians should put their house in order, and finally the military takeover. This
time, although Turkey’s politics were also highly polarized (…) there was no feeling that
the milita ry could do more than what was already being done. ”

215 Alican Tayla, “Le procès Ergenekon est -il toujours un vecteur de démocratisation en Turquie ?”, French Institute for
International and Strategic Relations (IRIS), April 27, 2011, http://w ww.iris -france.org/docs/kfm_docs/docs/ergenekon –
–27-04-11.pdf
216 “L’armée truque à la recherche d’un nouvel état -major”, l’Express, August 1, 2011,
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/2/monde/l -armee -turque -a-la-recherche -d-un-nouvel -etat-major_1017018.html
217 Later, data leaked to th e press, according to which authorities were informed late, at 4 pm (local time) of the day
operations were launched that some army units execute suspicious maneuvers. “Turquie: le maître espion d’Erdogan
dans la tourmente”, Le Parisien/Aujourd’hui en Fran ce, July 24, 2016: http://www.leparisien.fr/flash -actualite –
monde/turquie -le-maitre -espion -d-erdogan -dans-la-tourmente -24-07-2016 -5991235.php
218 Ilter Turan, “Saving Democracy Through Non -Democratic Means”, GMF Brief No. 140/2016, available at
http://www.gmfus.org/publicatio ns/saving -democracy -through -non-democratic -means. Dr. Turan is a professor of
political science at Istanbul Bilgi University and president of International Political Science Association (IPSA).

62
The heavy -handed government response to the coup, however, spells bad news for Turkish
democracy. The state of emergency allowed the government to expedite due process which means
that many innocent peopl e could have been wrongfully punished in what has been called “ the biggest
purge in Turkey's modern history ”. The numbers are staggering: cca. 100,000 people
dismissed/suspended, 70,000 detained and 32,000 arrested in, literally, all walks of life.219 How is
the government planning to correct the injustices? If Turkey reintroduces the death penalty (as the
president has suggested) that could significantly affect EU accession negotiations, although the
progress has been dire already (since accession negotiatio ns started in 2005, only 1 chapter out of
35 has been closed – Science and Research220). In both the EU and Turkey, there is an obvious
fatigue (with enlargement, in EU, with being kept at the door for so long, in Turkey). There is a fair
chance of a referen dum being organized with a question on whether it makes sense to stay on the
path of EU integration at all. If this happens, Turkey will likely engage in more geostrategic
optionality than it already has.

Turkey -U.S. relations , already volatile, will be further strained by the issue of Fetullah Gülen
extradition and a lengthy process is likely to produce further resentment in Turkey who sees him as
the mastermind of the coup. Turkey’s speculations that the U.S. may have somehow been involved
in the coup, were dismissed by the U.S. president. Traditionally, the U.S. military had very close
relations with their Turkish counterparts which would explain (but not justify) the sensitivity of the
Turkish civilian government. The U.S. p rovides some USD 3 -5 million in security aid to Turkey and
plans to sell it F -35 aircraft.221 Moreover, not only Turkey plans to purchase 100 F -35 strike fighters,
but it is a program partner, meaning that Turkish companies have commercial opportunities in t he
range of USD 12 billion.222 As recent as September, Lockheed Martin and Turkish Roketsan teamed
up to develop a next -generation, air -to-surface standoff cruise missile for the F -35 fighter jet.223 The
growing post -coup anti -American sentiment in Turkey bene fits none, and the Americans are making
efforts to dissipate any concern that they had any connection to the mid -July coup.224
An internal crisis is always different and unpredictable and may lead to a crisis between allies.
During the days of coup, there w as some uncertainty over the safety of the Allied forces in Turkey,
whether in reference to Incirlik Air Base or to the largest expeditionary commandment of land forces
of NATO – Izmir. The electricity was cut off for a short period at the Incirlik base. I t is worth noting
that Turkey has the right to deny access to the Incirlik base with a 3 -day notice (Zanotti & Thomas).
In this context, some Western analysts raised the question whether it is not better to move the nuclear
arsenal (a few dozen B 61 nuclea r gravity bombs) out of Turkey over safety concerns. But, unlike
other countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Netherlands) where host nations possess “dual –
capable aircraft”, the Incirlik base is considered by some analysts as just a “glorified storage de pot”

219 Mark Lowen, “Turkey post -coup purges convulse society”, BBC , October 3, 2016, available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europe -37517735
220 http:/ /ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed -country -information/turkey/index_en.htm
221 Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas , Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief , Congressional Research Service,
August 26, 2016, p. 6 -8, available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41368.pdf
222 https://www.f35.com/global/participation/turkey
223 Lara Seligman, “Lockheed Teams With Turkey’s Roketsan for F -35 Missile”, September 16, 2016,
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show -daily/afa/2015/09/16/lockheed -teams -turkeys -roketsan -f-35-
missile/32495881/
224 Thomas Gibbons and Neff , Erin Cunningham , “Pentagon’s top general seeks to cool anti -American sentiment in
Turkey”, in Washington Post , August 1, 2016, available at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/08/01/pentagons -top-general -seeks -to-cool-anti-
american -sentiment -in-turkey/

63
since there are no planes in Turkey certified to carry nuclear weapons.225 Nevertheless, the best
security guarantee is always the friendliness of the host nation, and it is this last point that was
challenged by events this summer.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg asked for “calm and restraint and full respect for
Turkey's democratic institutions and its constitution. Turkey is a valued NATO Ally.”226 The remark
– Turkey is a valued NATO Ally – sends a clear message to Ankara to remain anchore d in NATO’s
shared values and secure NATO’s arms and personnel at Incirlik and Izmir bases. When such an
important military ally faces domestic turmoil, that sends security concerns to Alliance members
and can have an impact on the organization’s plans in that region. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
also asked for calm and said that “ the Department of State was monitoring a very fluid situation”
and "emphasized the United States' absolute support for Turkey's democratically -elected, civilian
government a nd democratic institutions."227 In Kerry’s remarks, “fluid situation” depicts an
evolving crisis that could have triggered a bigger one in the region, taking into account the fact that
U.S. air raids conducted against the Islamic State (in Syria) from the In cirlik Air Base were
suspended during the days of the coup. This was unprecedented, since for the last 15 years the
Incirlik Base played a key role in U.S. military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and now in Syria,
against the Islamic State.228 The decisio ns taken by Turkey’s leaders after the coup was suppressed,
to target the Turkish Army and security structures elite, sends a very dangerous message to NATO
Allies: more instability in the South. Moreover, the purges in the military, are likely to reduce t he
combat readiness of the army (air force, in particular).229

The relationship between Ankara and Kremlin took an unexpected turn after the coup. In fact,
the mid -July coup looks like a watershed moment in Turkish -Russian relations. The diplomatic
overt ures of the Turkish president towards Russia indicate the will of Recep Erdogan for a new
chapter in Turkish -Russian relations. Russia is one of Turkey’s top 3 economic partners.
Value of Turkish imports, by country (2006 -2015)
Note: in thousand USD; Top 5 countries.
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

225 Jeffrey Lewis, America’s Nukes aren’t safe in Turkey Anymore , July 18, 2016, Foreign Policy Magazine, ava ilable
at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/18/americas -nukes -arent -safe-in-turkey -anymore/ ;
Dan Lamothe, The US Stores nuclear weapons in Turkey. Is that such a good idea? , July 19, 2016, The Washington,
Post, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ch eckpoint/wp/2016/07/19/an -old-nuclear -weapons -deal-
raises -new-questions -about -u-s-bombs -in-turkey/
226 NATO Secretary General statement on events in Turkey , July 16, 2016, available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_134194.htm
227 Turkey Coup: How Does NATO, the U.S. Respond? , July 15, 2016, NBC News, available at
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/turkey -military -coup/turkey -coup -how-does-nato-u-s-respond -n610641
228 Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas , Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations , Congressional Research Service, August
26, 2016, p.21, available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41368.pdf
229 Ilter Turan, op. cit.

64

Since 2006 until 2014, Russia consistently ranked first as a source for Turkish imports. Only in 2015,
did China and Germany overtake Russia in terms of value of imports (see table above), and
consequently as share in total imports – 12% of total imports came from China, 10.3% from
Germany and 9.8% from Russia. Turkish citizens enjoyed visa -free travel to Russia. Turkey is not
a resource -based economy , it has a strong services and financial sectors and it relies heavily on
FDI (est. USD 184 Billion in 2015230). It also means Russia is a key provider of mineral resources
(oil and natural gas in particular). Russia is Turkey’s largest supplier of natural gas (27 Bcm in 2015)
and Tur key is Russia’s second largest market after Germany. In 2014, 47% of the electricity
produced in Turkey was natural gas fired indicating a heavy dependency on Russian gas for power
generation:

Source: graph by ROEC based on data from Turkish Statistical Institute

It is against this background that the recent unfolding of bilateral relations was almost painful to
watch: the ill -fated downing of the Russian jet in November last year has triggered an “ice age”
(Евгения Габер ) in Turkish -Russian relations th at lasted 8 months.
Turkey’s industry is traditionally dominated by textiles and clothing sectors, followed by food
processing, mining (coal and copper), construction, lumber, paper, etc. Therefore, in the economic
sector, Turkish -Russian relations focus on 3 main areas: tourism, trade, and infrastructure (energy
and transport).
Tourism : Since the late ‘90s, the number of Russian tourists grew five times (less than 500,000
Russians opted for Turkey as a holiday destination in 1999) to reach 2.4 million (i n 2007) and 3.3
million (in 2014) making Turkey “ the most preferred holiday destination for Russians ”.231 The
downing of the Russian military jet in November 2015 has curtailed this burgeoning relation, so
much so that TV reports on Turkish tourism in the fi rst half of 2016 were showing depressing scenes
with empty resorts and hotels. Tourism, the “ golden segment of Turkey’s economy ” (turnover of
USD 31.5 Billion and 41.6 million visitors in 2015) was the hardest hit.232 Turkey made efforts to
diversify to othe r markets, but the loss of Russian tourists was not easy to substitute. Figures by

230 CIA World Factbook – Turkey, https://www.cia.gov/l ibrary/publications/the -world -factbook/geos/tu.html
231 Turkish Ministry oif Foreign Affairs, “Turkey´s Commercial and Economic Relations With Russian Federation”,
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s -commercial -and-economic -relations -with-russian -federation.en.mfa
232 Umut Uras , “Turkey tourism hit by Russia row and security concerns”, Aljazeera, March 31, 2016,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/turkey -tourism -hit-russia -row-security -concerns -160331041930972.html

65
Turkey's Ministry of Culture and Tourism cited a contraction of 90% y -o-y of Russian tourism to
Turkey in May 2016.233 This increased dependency meant that Russian sanctions, combined with
the heightened terrorist threat (Istanbul attacks) which dissuaded many European tourists, cost the
Turkish budget somewhere between 7 to 10 Billion USD of lost revenue this holiday season.
Tourism was also the first area in which Russia has lifted restrictions234 after receiving the letter
from the Turkish president at the end of June.
Trade : Turkey did not join European sanctions imposed on Russia, therefore the Russian embargo
on EU food products presented an opportunity for Turkey which has been accused of “exploiting”
the situation.235 Back then, the Turkish Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekci described the sanctions
as a “ window of opportunity for Ankara ”. Despite this accusation, if you look at the numbers, it
almost seems as if Turkey failed t o seize the opportunity. Overall, Turkey’s exports to Russia have
in fact decreased in 2014 -2015: according to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI), in 2015, the
Russian market ranked 11th among key destinations of Turkish exports, after Germany, UK, Ir aq,
Italy, USA, France, Switzerland, Spain, UAE and Iran. Moreover, the value of Turkish exports to
Russia has dropped by 40% in 2015 (USD 3.6 Billion) compared to the previous year (USD 5.9
Billion in 2014). However, despite accounting for just 2.5% of to tal Turkish exports, the bulk of
exports to Russia were fruits and vegetables:
Top 10 Turkish Exports to Russia (2015)
1 Fruits, nuts $600.1 million
2 Vegetables $336.9 million
3 Machinery $319.2 million
4 Vehicles $214.2 million
5 Plastics $186.2 million
6 Knitted or crocheted fabric $168.9 million
7 Electronic equipment $138.2 million
8 Iron or steel products $93.4 million
9 Manmade filaments $90.4 million
10 Manmade staple fibers $89.7 million
Source: http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top_turkey_exports.html

Turkey made significant inroads into the Russian market on the background of Russian counter –
sanctions to EU, a s far as fruits and vegetables are concerned . The thinking at the time was that it
simply made business sense. After the shooting of the Russian jet, Russia enacted an embargo on
Turkish products (fruits, vegetables, poultry and salt). However, Turkish products continued to reach
the Russian market via black market channels or by re -export through 3rd countries at a significant
mark -up. Turkish textiles, which were not included in the sanctions list, have been reported to be the
object of an “unofficial ban” with exports dropping significantly as well. It is worth noting that in
some vital areas, trade remained unhampered. For instance, Russian grain exports to Turkey

233 “Russia closes 'crisis chapter' with Turkey”, Aljazeera, June 29, 2016,
http://ww w.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/russia -closes -crisis -chapter -turkey -160629131937917.html
234 Указ № 314 «О внесении изменения в Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 28 ноября 2015 г. № 583,
June 30, 2016, http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/52300
235 Manolis Kefalog iannis, “ Turkey accused of 'exploiting' EU -Russia trade embargo”, September 9, 2014,
https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/opini on/turkey -accused -exploiting -eu-russia -trade -embargo

66
remained unaffected, since Turkey is the largest buyer of Russian wheat and sunflower oil (4.1
million tons of wheat last year).236

Infrastructure : Restrictions were introduced for Turkish citizens working in Russia while work on
Turkish Stream was suspended. Although Russia did ban construction projects with Turkish
companies in Russia, it made sure to allow room for exceptions (“ unless a special exemption is
granted ”).237 In designing the sanctions for Turkey, Russia was careful to exclude its most lucrative
business: natural gas sales. As far as energy infrastructure projects are concerned, Turkish St ream is
not the only energy project affected. Economic reasons forced Russia to put on the back burner
expensive mega -projects (such as the gas pipeline to China or the bridge over Crimea) out of desire
to save money. The outlook in Moscow is that the wors t is behind and that “the economy will muddle
through”.238 Romanian analyst Stanislav Secrieru explains Russia’s seemingly unusual willingness
to suffer short term economic loss by the fact that the ruling elite prioritizes military force over
economic state craft as the most effective foreign policy tool.239 However, in this case, economic
statecraft (sanctions) worked wonders. The Russian -Turkish showdown also has the merit of proving
the much bigger resilience of the Russian economy, which has been described lately as becoming
quite good at “downshifting” (doing more with less).
As far as Russian -Turkish cooperation on nuclear projects is concerned, there was a significant
degree of uncertainty in January 2016, as pointed by Sinan Ülgen : “Turkish and Russian authorities
have refrained from opining about the future of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, on which
construction was scheduled to begin in 2016. This silence, though, should not be construed as an
indication that the future of the project is secure. Rathe r, it is a reflection of the prevailing
uncertainty about the consequences of a unilateral withdrawal .”240 Following the meeting on
August 9, 2016, of the Russian and Turkish presidents, all uncertainty was removed: the Akkuyy
NPP shall be granted the status of “strategic investment project ”. Moreover, according to Turkey's
Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, his country will “initiate Turkish Stream works as soon as
possible and make necessary and additional agreements accordingly ". Investments in energy are
not affected by the July coup241, if anything, after the Russian -Turkish reconciliation, there is a
renewed interest. A new target for trade with Russia was announced: USD 100 billion.242 Turkish
subcontractors are once again essential for building all the in frastructure projects in the runner up to
the 2018 football championship. All these political messaging form Turkey suggest quite a U -turn
in bilateral relations that may not resume only to the economic sector. For instance, the press reported
that Turkey and Russia plan to establish a joint military, intelligence and diplomacy mechanism.243

236 “Factbox: Impact of Russian sanctions on trade ties with Turkey”, Reuters , June 27, 2016, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/us -mideast -crisis -russia -turkey -ties-fac-idUSKCN0ZD27M
237 Selin Girit, “Turkey faces big losses as Russia sanctions bite”, BBC, January 2, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europe -35209987
238 Stanislav Secrieru, “Why Russia does not retrench”, in New Eastern Europe , September -October No 5 (XXIII)/ 2016,
pp. 41 -44.
239 Op. cit.
240 Sinan Ülgen, “Is This the End of Moscow -Ankara Nuclear Cooperation?”, Op -ed, first published in the Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientist s, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/01/13/is -this-end-of-moscow -ankara -nuclear -cooperation/it80
241 “Hunger for Turkey’s energy investments unlikely to ebb: IEA”, The Journal of Turkish Weekly , July 22, 2016,
http://www.turkishweekly.net/2016/07/22/news/hunger -for-turkey -s-energy -investments -unlikely -to-ebb-iea/
242 Satuk Bugra Kutlugun, “Turkey signals joint defense plan with Russia”, Anadolu Agency , August 10, 2016,
http://aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey -signals -joint-defense -plan-with-russia/625918
243 Idem.

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The renewed impetus and the new target for trade means that economic interdependence between
Turkey and Russia will only increase. With a population of 80 million (Jul y 2016 est.), Turkey has
enjoyed an enviable annual average GDP growth rate of 5% between 2010 and 2014. However, this
growth is expected to slow down, with Moody’s forecasting a 2.7% rate in 2017 -2019244, and the
IMF- a 3.4% growth (2016) and 3.5% (2017). H ence, Turkey’s drive and efforts to put economic
issues first.
Conclusions

Although drawing conclusions with regard to developments in Turkey may be premature245, the 300
dead, the images with tanks destroying civilian vehicles or those of military firing upon civilians will stay
for some time in the collective memory and will affect the credibility of the military body.246 At the same
time, the latest purges within the army will leave a mark on the quality of the Turkish officer corps. Above
all, the July attempted coup in Turkey this summer already produced a few notable consequences:

It further strengthened the unexpected breakthrough in diplomatic relations between Russia and
Turkey, although efforts in this direction predate247 the coup as well as E rdogan’s apologetic letter
to president Putin that resulted in the go ahead for “normalizing relations”. However, on a broader
scale, despite this Turkish -Russian rapprochement, “deep mutual mistrust” (E. Gaber248) remains.
Turkish -Russian relations face an uphill battle as the “knife in the back” may not be such a
forgettable affair.

It unnecessarily strained Turkish -American relations. Despite past incidents when Turkey imposed
restrictions on U.S. use of its territory and airspace (1962, 1975, and 2003), there was no such
outcome this time and no significant short and medium term ris ks to U.S. basing operations in
Turkey. As far as Turkey’s dynamic with NATO is concerned, there has been some aggressive
rhetoric towards the Alliance as of late. The Turkish ambassador to Russia Umit Yardim said
recently, that NATO is not in the position to dictate Ankara’s foreign policy: “ In no way can NATO
limit our contacts with other countries … It means NATO has no right to dictate its terms and tell us
who we should or should not meet and communicate with” .249 Moreover, a statement made in August
by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs is no less puzzling: “Turkey wanted to cooperate with
NATO members up to this point (…) But the results we got did not satisfy us. Therefore, it is natural
to look for other options. But we don’t see this as a move against NATO ”.250

244 Moody's revises Turkey's rating; outlook stable, Anadolu Agency , September 24, 2016,
http://aa.com.tr/en/economy/moodys -revises -turkeys -rating -outlook -stable/651663
245 A positive element is the abandonment of niceties towards the Islamic State.
246 In spite of the operation on Syrian territory aimed at restoring the army’s credibility.
247 Back in December 2015 regrets were expressed about the death of the pilot while in April this year representatives
of the two countries engaged in consultation br okered by Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazarbaev. On June 12,
Turkish officialdom sent its congratulations to Russian counterparts on the occasion of the Day of Russia. In paralleled,
working contacts continued at ministerial level.
248 Евгения Габер, “Я к Вам пишу … или Конец «ледникового периода» в отношениях Москвы и Анкары?”,
Зеркало недели , №25, 09 июля 2016 г., http:/ /gazeta.zn.ua/international/ya -k-vam-pishu -ili-konec -lednikovogo –
perioda -v-otnosheniyah -moskvy -i-ankary -_.html
249 “Turkish ambassador in Russia: NATO can't dictate Ankara's foreign policy”, Thomson Reuters Foundation News ,
August 11, 2016, http://news.trust.org/item/20160811093456 -2jq2h
250 Satuk Bugra Kutlugun, “Turkey signals joint defense plan with Russia”, Anadolu Agency , August 10, 2016.

68
Where does that leave the current state of NATO – Turkey relations? The noise aside, Turkey
remains the most valuable NATO ally in the Middle East. It is the most important NATO pillar in
the Black Sea region and in the Eastern Flank. So, what does this (so far rhetorical) distancing mean
for the Alliance? For countries on the Eastern Flank of the Alliance, NATO is the bedrock and only
true guardian of their security. In the context of a proxy hybrid war in Ukraine, Eastern Allies could
properly ask what does the new normal of Russian -Turkish relations mean for NATO? The Alliance
Eastern Flank states need to see solid proofs that Article 5 security guarantees are working.
Especially since, in the interwar period, CEE countries failed to rec eive the much needed help from
Western Powers. An unstable Turkey is not only a vulnerability of the Southern Flank, but may
prompt a weakening of the Southern part of the Eastern Flank. A stable and predictable Turkey is in
the best interests of all. NATO is a military alliance above all, but it also represents a community of
shared values. Turkey is not just a military ally or an airbase, but also a political and cultural model
for the Muslim world (arguably, the most successful one, a “model of models”). In this key, the most
important consequence of the coup (democracy backsliding and the turn towards more
authoritarianism) may yet be the loss of the moderate Islam model. It has become obvious that
although a NATO member, Turkey is on its own path, where it wants to enjoy more freedom to forge
strategic Alliances as it sees fit, and that means it may not always be the reliable partner the West
wants it to be.

69

Report Conclusion

The European order is once again at an inflection point. The 1990s unipolar hangover is over, being
replaced by a multipolar reality shaped by the return of great power competitions and raw Hobbesian
geopolitics. The normative post -war anchors of security – the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act and
the Paris Charter – are constantly challenge d by revisionist behavior . In short, “the Fukuyaman
quarter -century is drawing to a whimpering close. It is no longer about the victory of liberal
democracy, it is a scramble to protect it both abroad and at home ”251, as has recently defined the
Estonian President the new normal. This reality forced NATO to reinvest in its article 5 foundational
purpose – collective and territorial defense – and adjust its regional posture to the emergent security
environment. It is the jo urney that NATO embarked on at Wales, essentially a reassurance summit,
and a process that was reinforced this summer in Warsaw by deploying an enhanced forward
presence on the Eastern Flank.

Though the NATO Wales summit in 2014 marked the urgency to reassure Eastern European member
states and increase the military readiness in case of a Russian aggression directed at NATO territory,
the measures adopted served to create only a limited deterrent against the new threat the Alliance
faces and to address exclusively linear, conventional military challenges. The Warsaw summit two
years later was meant as a follow up to the Wales reassurance measures, as well as an answer to the
developing, non -conventional challenges in Eastern Europe. However, the Warsaw s ummit
conclusions remained unclear: nuclear deterrence has yet to be addressed, Germany’s leading role
in European security is limited by the lack of domestic consensus, NATO -EU cooperation is clouded
by Brexit and the suspicion of leadership overlap and l ack of political will , and, most importantly,
the Eastern flank was conceptually divided between North and South, leaving the Black Sea in a
strategic gap.

On the nuclear deterrence front, the objective both Washington and Moscow should aim for is
strateg ic stability. Arms races and war -fighting strategies relying on nuclear weapons go against the
core principles of the nuclear revolution. The U.S. and Russia need to remind themselves that nuclear
weapons have little military value, because a nuclear war c annot be won. Russia’s nuclear posture –
which emphasizes the feasibility of a limited nuclear war – undoubtedly weighs heavily in the minds
of U.S. military strategists and political leadership. If the United States adapts its posture to mirror
Russia’s, both countries – and the entire world for that matter – are worse off. At the same time,
failing to respond to Moscow’s increasingly nuclearized military strategy could send the wrong
signal to allies. Washington must therefore strengthen its nuclear umbre lla over its junior partners
without getting dragged into an arms race with Russia. Giving allies more of a say within the Nuclear
Planning Group could build up the credibility of American extended nuclear deterrence. Moreover,
getting the UK and France to make similar commitments as the U.S. to the non -nuclear NATO
member -states could reinforce the idea of collective defense. Last but not least, the United States
should increase its efforts to foster cooperation among junior partners, especially in Eastern Europe,
so as to prevent the competition among them from weakening the alliance.

251 Tomaas Hendrik Ilves, “The End of th e West as We Know It?”, The American Interest, June 2016,
https://www.president.ee/en/media/interviews/12368 -qthe-end-of-the-west-as-we-know -itq-the-american –
interest/index.html

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On the conventional deterrence front, d espite the fact that the Wales and Warsaw summit measures
have focused on increasing military readiness, the European capability gap r emains a major issue,
which renders European Allies virtually unable to defend their territory without American help.
When it comes to South Eastern Europe, the situation is even grimmer. Faced with the Russian
military build -up in Crimea, Allies such as R omania have to drastically restructure both strategy and
armed forces, in order to be able to deny access to the battle space and defend their territorial
integrity. This entails a systematic assessment of Romania’s capabilities and priorities, a much
stronger emphasis on territorial defense and, of course, the development – with help from its Allies
– of its naval force. However, in order to implement this process, Bucharest needs extensive political
will, significant help from NATO and would have to succe ed where it has so far failed – to rally
NATO member states and partners from the region for comprehensive common defen se in form of
an A2AD umbrella.

The overall NATO conventional deterrence on the Eastern Flank needs further development and
investments. One such niche is boosting the enhanced forward presence. As a recently retired British
General, Richard Barrons emphasized: “there is no force behind it, or plans or resilience (…). It is
an indication of how at this stage in our history I think many peo ple have lost sight of what a credible
military force is and requires. They think a little bit of posing or a light force constitutes enough and
it isn’t. ”252 The second dimension that it needs to be taken into consideration is related to the ways
and means necessary to preserve the ability to rapidly reinforce and project power in the frontline
states, some that might be already well under the coverage of the access -denial network of the other
side. Options to deal with the A2/AD scenarios should be devised: they could entail maritime and
commercial blockades, or investing in offset strategies, while developing the capabilities that will
give the ability to break and operate inside an access -denial shaped environment.

Limited ballistic missile defense remain s a key issue for NATO in the short and medium term. It has
both strategic and political implications that go beyond the limited scope envisioned when it was
implemented. If the ballistic missile defense is handled properly it may become one of NATO ’s
integration drivers, as well as an asset for both territorial defense and out of area operations. The
next 10 years may well see the rise of international tensions along with the advent of multipolarity
while Europe will see the likely development of an autono mous hard EU strategic core. If such is
the case , ballistic defenses are a strategic insurance policy for U .S. and European security. For
Eastern Flank member states , ballistic missile defense represents the embodiment of collective
security guarantees.

Last, but not least, keeping Turkey firmly anchored in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is
essential in the long term. Nevertheless, in spite of its importance, Turkey now faces a strategic
constraint: relative paralysis in relations with Russia, co ld relations with the West, and polarization
of Turkish society. Ankara’s post -imperial ambitions are not irreconcilable with NATO’s long term
interest. The bottom line is: there is no alternative for the Wes t/NATO to Turkey as a connector to
the Islamic world.

252 Julian Lindley French, “The Barrons Revolt: Why Big Wars Start”, September 19, 2016,
http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.ro/2016/09/the -barrons -revolt -why-big-wars -start.html

71
AFTERWORD

by ARMAND GOȘ U

Western chancelleries have “sold” to the public, especially to the one in Eastern and Central Europe,
the idea that the Warsaw Summit represented a historic moment, a milestone in the evolution of the
Alliance and that, from now on , the Eastern flank states, from the Baltic to the Black Sea will feel
much more secure, despite their proximity to Russia.

The documents adopted at the summit are unusually l engthy. The Final Communique has 139
paragraphs. Such verbosity can be explained only by NATO’s eastern members’ obsession with long
and convoluted legal documents. That is what they have been taught by their former Soviet
“comrades”, which in turn borrowed this practice from the Czarist bureaucracy. Amo ng the long
paragraphs that make happy one capital or the other, are hidden crucial military decisions such as
the creation of 4 multinational battalions in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Paragraph 41 of
the Final Communique announce s the formation of a multinational brigade on the South Eastern
flank and , the promise to assess a stronger Alliance naval and air presence in the Black Sea.

Russia is mentioned many times in the summit documents, yet Russia’s reaction does not live up to
expectations. It seems that president Putin has lost his appetite for dramatic statements and , on June
30, while celebrating Russian Diplomacy Day he merely acknowledged the increased NATO
military exercises in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, and assur ed that Russia will not be drawn into
a new arms race, but will focus on social -economic development.253 A few days later , in an interview
to Kommersant , Alexandr Grushko, Russia’s permanent representative to NATO, praised the
cooperation and peaceful relations between Black Sea States.254 However, Moscow , he said, is
concerned by the increased military presence in the Black Sea of outside actors, such as the United
States, which in Grushko’s opinion “destabilize”, “affect regional security” and “upset the strateg ic
balance”. Not e ven the spokesperson for Russia’s ministry of foreign affairs Maria Zaharova has
criticized the Warsaw Summit. On July 7, 2016, during a press conference held in Crimea, she
accused NATO that instead of focusing on international terrorism , it complains about the Russian
threat and suggested the West cooperate s with Russia. At the same time , Zakharova confirmed
Russia’s availability for a Russia -NATO Council (the activity of which was suspended after
Crimea ’s annexation) meeting scheduled on July 13, 2016 .255 A day after the NATO Council reunion
on July 8-9, Zakharova hit back with a communiqué where the main idea is that NATO leaders
rather256 turn their eyes to the South where the terrorist threat originates257 than look East and stop
portraying Russia as evil , in order to justify the adopted military measures .

253 <<Нельзя просто пропускать вранье в отношении России>>, http://kommersant.ru/doc/3026006 Putin’s speech
on Ru ssian Diplomacy Day stands in sharp contrast to statements made just a month before, in Athens, during the official
visit to Greece: „Putin says Romania, Poland may now be in Russia’s cross -hairs”, http://www.reuters.com/article/us –
russia -europe -shield -idUSKCN0YI2ER
254 «НАТО искусственно придумывает себе большого врага». Постпред РФ при альянсе Александр Грушко об
ожиданиях от саммита Варшаве, http://kommersant.ru/Doc/3031545
255 «Брифинг официалньного представителя МИД России М.В.Захаровой, Республика Крым, Российской
Федерации, 7 июля 2016 года».
256 <<Комментарий официального представителя МИД Росси и М.В.Захаровой в связи с саммитом НАТО в
Варшаве>>, http://www.mid.ru/ru/kommentarii/ -/asset_publisher/2MrVt3CzL5sw/content/id/2350611
257 Ibid.

72
How do we explain though Russia’s unusual moderate tone? The decisions adopted in Warsaw
seemed to shift the balance of forces, revolutionize deterrence and defense against Russian
aggression. They seemed, because in reality their military impact is low. The decisions taken in
Warsaw matter , first and foremost, for the Polish and Baltic public opinion which are the most
concerned by the annexation of Crimea and desta bilization of Ukraine. In February 2016 , RAND
has released a report which has some unsettling conclusions258: the Baltic states capitals can be
occupied in 36 hours; to deter a Russian aggression in Poland and the Baltic states , at least 7 brigades
are requi red ( one brigade has around 4 -5,000 troops, so around 35,000 soldiers would need to be
deployed ). Otherwise, there is a risk that the 4 battalions (4 -5,000 men) agreed in Warsaw to be
overwhelmed, especially those deployed in the Baltic s.

The core measur es adopt ed at the NATO Warsaw summit do not solve the security dilemmas of the
Baltics, because they do not take into account the increased efficiency of the Russian army, the fruit
of reforms undertaken by former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov (2008 -2012) who, after 150
years , has abandoned the concept of "mobilization of the entire people"259, and refocus ed the Russian
Army on elite units instead .260 Serdyukov's decision has affected several million people , but
provided t he Kremlin several highly effectiv e units , able to execute orders in just a few hours. I t
must be emphasize d that, there is no need for parliamentary approval for military operations in
Russia, so the speed of decision -making and troops deploy ment m ake a military tactic based on the
element of surprise very difficult to counteract. The senators in the upper house of the Russian
Parliament needed just one hour to vote for sending troops to Ukraine , in March 2014 , and less than
half an hour to approve sending troops to Syria , in Septemb er 2015.
Military analysts point out that the priority at Warsaw was not sending troops, but should have been
developing the capabilities to counter -balance the anti -access and area denial facilities, something
that is of concern for the Alliance as well.261 In recent years, Russia has built air, sea or land access –
denial systems in key NATO points that can potentially block the entr y of enemy forces in those
regions. There are three such anti -access "domes" on the Eastern Flank: in Kaliningrad, they cover
the Baltic countries and parts of Poland262; in Crimea, it aims to control the whole basin of the Black
Sea; in Latakia, Syria, it threaten s the central and southern part of Turkey, an important NATO
member .263 For example, the Crimean -based Iskander missiles (500 km range) can hit Constanta,
while Kalibr rockets (1,500 km range) can reach Ankara, Sofia, Budapest, Warsaw, Vilnius, or Kiev.
It is in this area, however, that the Alliance did not taken any decisive step in Warsaw. Thus, just
one month after the summ it in Warsaw, Moscow has strengthened the exclusion systems in Crimea

258 David A. Shaplak and Michael Johnson, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense
of the Baltics”, RAND Corporation , available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.
259 Alexander Golts, Rehearsals for war, co mmentary, European Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_rehearsals_for_war
260 Aleksandr Hramcihin, «Реформы Сердюкова: как хорошие идеи губили никудышным исполнением»,
http://www.forbes.ru/sobytiya -column/196865 -reformy -serdyukova -kak-horoshie -idei-gubili -nikudyshnym –
ispolneniem
261 «Источник в НАТ О заявил о планах альянса ответить на создание РФ мощных зон ПРО», Москва, 2 июля
2016 г., http://www.interfax.ru/world/517660
262 «Kaliningrad and the Suwalki Gap – a look from the other side », https://co rporalfrisk.com/2016/08/11/kaliningrad –
and-the-suwalki -gap-a-look-from -the-other -side/
263 Kathleen Weiberger, «Russian Anti -Acces and Area Deniel (A2AD) Range: August 2016 »,
https://iswresearch.blogspot.ro/2016/08/russian -anti-access -and-area-denial -html

73
by installing S -400 missiles.264

When implemented, the measures decided in Warsaw will not alter in any way the balance of
conventional forces in the Baltic region and even less so in the Black Sea area. On the contrary, the
more extensive military maneuvers conducted by the Russian army, in breach of the Collective
Security Treaty Organization , which requires information exchange, remain without adequate
response from the Alliance. Thus , it was reached a point where maneuvers involving more than
150,000 men with thousands of tanks and armored vehicles, are impossible to monitor because they
are not properly declared by the Russian side according to international agreements .265

Unlike other NATO summits, the Warsaw one – although initially announcing a mobilization of
Russian propaganda for political, diplomatic and military reactions to what Moscow calls the
"Western threat" – was commented in a surprisingly calm tone. The likely caus e of this repositioning
of the Russian propaganda machine might be that , a simple analysis has show ed the Russian s that
the Warsaw decisions did not alter the balance of power in Eastern Europe.

264 Emily Chan, „Russia deploys advanced surface -to-air missiles with a 150 mile range to Crimea amid escalating
tensions”, August 12, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3737920/Russia -deploys -advanced -S-400-air-
missile -Crimea -agencies.html
265 Alexander Golts, a rt. cit.

74
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

EUGENIA GUSILOV is the director and founder of ROEC. A Fulbright alumna and a graduate of Columbia University, New York (USA ,
2010 ), she has a Master of International Affairs with a concentration in International Energy Management and Policy and a Certifi cate from the
Harriman Institute with a thesis analyzing the Russian Production Sharing Agreements. Previously, she has worked as an analyst at the Romanian
Diplomatic Institute (Romanian MFA) covering international affairs, in particular political and energy affai rs in the Former Soviet Union countries.
Eugenia leads and represents the center, forges partnerships and maintains relationships with all relevant stakeholders. Resp onsible for planning,
coordination and implementation of ROEC projects and events, she ove rsees and enforces QC for all ROEC analytical work. Key expertise:
international affairs; energy geopolitics; energy economics; oil and gas policies ; strategic and commerc ial analysis of energy markets.

OCTAVIAN MANEA is a Research Associate at ROEC. A Fulbright alumnus and a graduate of Maxwell School of Public Affairs with a MA in
International Relations (Syracuse University, 2013) and a Certificate in Security Studies from the Institute for National Sec urity and Counter -terrorism.
He has been a n editor on international security and defense at ‘22’ weekly (since 2007) and at Foreign Policy Romania (since 2010), a contri butor to
Small Wars Journal (since 2011), and has written extensively on Euro -Atlantic security affairs, US foreign policy, Europea n and national security
(more than 300 articles). Octavian is the recipient of the 2011 Freedom House Romania award for Young Journalist of the Year in Foreign Policy .
Key expertise: international affairs; Euro -Atlantic security; NATO; US defense posture a nd warfare; foreign policy; energy security;
counterinsurgency.

IULIA JOJA is an independent Euro -Atlantic security expert . She has a MA in International Conflict Studies from King’s College War Studies
Department (2009 -2010) and a PhD in Romanian Strate gic Culture from NSPAS Bucharest (2011 -2015). In the past, Iulia has worked at the Permanent
Representation of Romania to the UN (2008), at the Romanian MFA (2009), at a MEP cabinet (2010), as a staff officer for Opera tions Logistic Chain
Management at NAT O ACT (2011) and a s adviser on security and defens e for the Roman ian Presidency (2012 -2014). Main topics of interest are
European strategic pr ofiles, national and NATO defens e planning, NATO and EU security and defens e policies.

GEORGE VISAN is a Research Associate at ROEC. A graduate of the University of Bucharest (MA in Internati onal Relations, 2009) , his main
research focus is the Black Sea security architecture in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis. George joined ROEC in 2013. I n the past, he has worked
with various Romanian and international publications and institutions such as “22” magazine, Foreign Policy Romania, Center f or European Policy
Analysis, Al Jazeera Center for Studies and Diario de Noticias and, was an assistant political analyst fo r the Limited Electoral Observation Mission
of the OSCE/ODIHR in Romania. George co -founded civitaspolitics.org, a portal dedicated to analysis of Romanian politics. Key expertise: foreign
policy, international security, NATO, grand strategy, military affa irs and naval policy.

STEFAN POPESCU is a Senior Analyst at ROEC. He hold a PhD in international relations from Paris 1 – Sorbonne (2013) with a thesis on
Albania in French foreign policy ( Summa cum laude ). In addition, he has a joint MA degree in geopolitics from ENS and Paris 1 – Sorbonne, a second
MA in international relations from Paris 1 – Sorbonne, and a postgraduate specialization in international public administration from ENA. In the past,
he inte rned with the French MoD on nuclear and anti -missile deterrence, worked as an adviser at La Francophonie, High Council, office of the former
UN Secretary General Boutros -Boutros -Ghali; as an adviser for Francophonie to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affa irs; and director for external
cooperation at the Romanian Cultural Institute. Currently, he is an Associate Professor at SNSPA. Key expertise: history of international relations,
European foreign policy, diplomacy, Eastern European studies, history of the Middle East, international organ izations.

ELIZA GHEORGHE is a Senior Analyst at ROEC. Since fall 2015, Eliza is a Stanton Nuclear Security Post -doctoral Fellow at Harvard
University (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, JFK School of Government). During 2014 -2015 she was a post -doctoral fellow at
Cornell University. She has a PhD from Oxford University (2014) with a thesis on ‘Atomic Politics: Romania’s Cold War Nuclear Acqui sition
Strategy, 1962 -1979’. Eliza graduated with honours from the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University (2010). She was a pre -doctoral
fellow at Sorbonne -Paris I, the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies – Bologna Center, and th e Norwegian Institute for Defense
Studies. Her work appeared in think -tank publications (ROEC, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Judith Reppy Institute for Peace
and Conflict Studies) and peer -reviewed journals (Cold War History, European R eview of History). Eliza specializes in security affairs, energy history,
nuclear proliferation, nuclear deterrence, and diplomacy with a focus on nuclear policy.

LIVIU TATU is an independent security expert. A graduate of the University of Bucharest (His tory Faculty) with a n MA in international relations
and a PhD is history . He has pursued a dditional training on international affairs and European integration at the Romanian Diplomatic Institute and
on analysis of terrorism at the Albanian Media Institute and Southeast Network for th e Professionalization of Mediam and other security and defense
focused programs organized by media institutions, international organizations and Defense Ministries of NATO member states. He authored articles
on NATO and UN Secu rity Cou ncil that were published in ‘Sfera Politicii ’ journal and ‘22’weekly. Area of interest: national security, NATO, UN
Security Council, and European Union security.

ARMAND GOSU is a Senior Analyst at ROEC. Armand i s Romania’s top expert on Russia, Ukraine and contemporary political developments
in the CIS countries. An associate professor at Bucharest University’s Faculty of Political Science (since 2004), Armand has been the adviser to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs on Former Soviet Union (FSU) c ountries (2010 -2012) and Editor -in-chief at ‘22’ weekly (until 2014) . A graduate of the
University of Bucharest with an MA in history (1986 -1991) and a PhD in Russian Studies (1995 -1998), he has been engaged in sustained academic
activity as a senior resear cher at the Romanian Academy’s Institute of History “N. Iorga” (1991 -2001) and at the Romanian Institute for Recent History
(2002 -2004). Key areas of expertise: Russian foreign policy, history and politics; political developments in Ukraine; Central Asia; Caucasus;
international affairs, NATO -Russia relation.

75

ISBN: 978-973-0-22814 -4