Research NotesMan-portable air defence systems [608327]

Research NotesMan-portable air defence systems
(MANPADS) are short-range surface-to-air mis sile systems
1 intended for
attacking and defending against low-flying air –
craft. Some are crew-served (known sometimes
as CREWPADS), but most are easily handled by a single individual and are shoulder-launched.
MANPADS are generally categorized according
to their guidance systems: passive infrared (IR) seekers, radio command line-of-sight (CLOS),
and laser-beam riders.
2 Initial models of IR-
seeking missiles could engage a target at alti –
tudes of around 2 ,000–3,000 m and from slant
ranges3 of about 4,000 m (Jane’s, 2006, pp. 3–50;
1985, pp. 132 –37). They were often inaccurate
and susceptible to basic countermeasures.
Moreover, most could engage aircraft only from behind. Today’s most advanced MANPADS can effectively engage aircraft at ranges of up to 8,000 m ( 5 miles) and from multiple direc –
tions (Saab, n.d.).
Initial development of MANPADS began in
the 1950 s. Anti-aircraft guns from the Second
World War were of limited use, and consumed vast quantities of ammunition, against increas-ingly fast jet aircraft. The United States devel –
oped the Redeye—which got its name from the infrared homing device in its nose—over the better part of a decade, and it entered into production in the mid- 1960s (Parsch, 2002). The
Soviets fielded their own system—the Strela- 2
(also known as the SA- 7, which is used here,
or Grail)—in 1968.
4 Both were ‘tail-chase’
systems effective only when fired at the target from behind. By the end of the 1960s only
these two countries produced MANPADS, although Sweden and the United Kingdom
had under taken research and development of
indigenous weapons.
The 1970 s saw a significant expansion of
the industry. The United States began devel –
opment of the Stinger missile system in 1972
(Parsch, 2002 ) and production began in 1979
(Jane’s, 2006, p. 43). Work on the Soviet Strela- 3 (SA- 14 Gremlin) began in 1968 , and it entered
service six years later in 1974 (Jane’s, 2006, p. 30).
Like their predecessors, these systems were IR-seeking missiles, but they were able to engage targets from multiple directions (not just from behind). Second-generation IR seek –
ers also achieved a greater effective range and accuracy. The British Blowpipe system was based on radio CLOS technology, while the
Swedish RBS- 70 uses a laser beam-riding
system (Jane’s, 1985 , pp. 133 –34).
Whereas the first 25 years of MANPADS
research and development had resulted in just
four countries producing weapons, the next 25 years saw this number rise considerably. More than 30 countries have manufactured an entire system, produced important compo –
nents, or upgraded certain aspects of an exist –
ing system such as target acquisition (Small Arms Survey, 2008 , pp. 34 –35).
Licensed production and reverse engineer –
ing (unauthorized copying of existing systems) of mostly early Soviet models largely explain this increase in states’ production of MANPADS. The issue of licensing is sensitive and conten –
tious for the Russian Federation and many former Warsaw Pact countries. Moscow claims that current MANPADS systems are being
produced illegally in some of these countries.
Those accused retort, however, either that no such licence exists or that the models being produced are their own missiles, i.e. that they reflect years of indigenous improvements (Small Arms Survey, 2007, pp. 20–21). For some
producers there is no pretence of any licence having existed. In the late 1970 s, for example,
the Egyptians produced a reverse-engineered
copy of the SA- 7, called the Ayn-al-Saqr. In
1974 the Egyptian government allegedly sup –
plied Beijing and Pyongyang with a small
number of SA- 7s in appreciation of their Man-Portable Air Defence
Systems (MANPADS)WEAPONS
& MARKETS
NUMBER 1 • JANUARY 2011
Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 1 • January 2011 1

2 Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 1 • January 2011Table 1 Selected incidents of reported MANPADS attacks on civilian aircraft
Date
dd.mm.yyLocation Target Fatalities Description
12.03.75 Vietnam Air Vietnam Douglas C-54D-5-DC26 The passenger airliner, en route from Vientiane, crashed some 350 km (215 miles) northeast of its scheduled destination, Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City). All passengers and crew members were killed.
03.07.78 Zimbabwe Air Rhodesia Vickers 782D Viscount38 An SA-7 missile hit the passenger plane’s right wing shortly after take-off from Kariba. The plane crash-landed. Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) rebels, responsible for the shooting, subsequently killed many of the plane’s survivors.
12.02.79 Zimbabwe Air RhodesiaVickers 748D Viscount59 ZIPRA fired on the aircraft with an SA-7 after it left Kariba, hitting the left engine, killing all aboard.
08.11.83 Angola Angola Airlines Boeing 737-2M2130 Immediately after taking off from Lubango, the plane crashed. National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels claimed credit for downing the plane with a missile. The Angolan government blamed the crash on a technical malfunction.
04.09.85 Afghanistan Bakhtar Afghan Antonov AN-2652 The plane was shot down with a surface-to-air missile shortly after take-off from Kandahar.
16.08.86 Sudan Sudan Airways Fokker F-2760 The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) firing a SA-7 brought down the aircraft shortly after take-off from Malakal.
11.06.87 Afghanistan Bakhtar Alwatana Antonov AN-2653 The plane was shot down near Khost on its way from Kandahar to Kabul.
08.12.88 Western Sahara Two T&G Aviation Douglas DC-7CF5 Two aircraft on the way from Senegal to Morocco were hit (in an engine) with SA-7s while flying at 3,352 metre (11,000 ft) over Western Sahara. One crashed, killing all five aboard. The other managed to land safely in Morocco.
06.04.94 Rwanda Rwandan government Dassault Falcon 5012 The plane, carrying the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda, was shot down on approach to Kigali from peace talks in Tanzania.
10.10.98 DemocraticRepublic of the CongoLignes Aeriennes Congolaises Boeing 727-3041 The plane was shot down with an SA-7 missile shortly after take-off
from Kindu.
02.01.99 Angola Transafrik Lockheed L-100-30 Hercules9 UNITA shot down the plane some 20 minutes after take-off from Huambo on the way to Luanda. (A Hercules aircraft had suffered a similar fate upon departing Huambo a week earlier, in which 14 people perished.)
28.11.02 Kenya Arkia Boeing 757-3E70 Two SA-7 missiles missed the plane carrying 271 people shortly after take-off from Mombasa.
22.11.03 Iraq European Air Transport Airbus A300B4-203F0 An SA-7 missile hit the cargo plane’s wing as it climbed past 2,438 m (8,000 ft.). The heavily damaged plane returned to Baghdad safely.
23.03.07 Somalia Transaviaexport IL-76TD11 The plane crashed after one of two SA-18 missiles fired by Hizbul Shabaab hit the plane shortly after take-off from Mogadishu
13.08.07 Iraq Nordic Airways MD-830 Pilots of the passenger jet said two missiles were fired at their plane after take-off from Sulaimaniya.
Sources: ASN (2010); Chivers (2007); USDoS (2005; 2008); UNSC (2007, para. 39)

support during the 1973 Yom Kippur
War. Subsequently, both China and North Korea produced their own ver –
sions of the weapon (Jane’s, 2006, p. 10).
There are also reports that the US
Stinger has been illegally copied, albeit
not as widely as Soviet models.
5
Later generation IR MANPADS
have longer ranges, more effective
seekers, and are more resistant to IR
countermeasures than their predeces –
sors (Jane’s, 2006 ). Many systems also
have larger warheads, with proximity, delay, or grazing fuses, which increase
the missiles’ lethality, and, in some
cases, the types of targets that can be
engaged. The Bolide missile, which is
compatible with the RBS- 70 launcher,
is reportedly effective against both
air and ground targets (Saab, n.d.).
MANPADS and their missiles
were built in large numbers and trans-ferred widely, often without stringent
controls or oversight. More than 100
countries—and non-state actors—
possess these weapons (Small Arms Survey, 2004, pp. 83-87). Of the 500,000–
750,000 MANPADS believed to be in
circulation, some 99 per cent are esti –
mated to be in state inventories (GAO,
2004, p. 10 ). But many governments
and regional organizations deem the
stockpile man agement procedures for
tens of thousands of these weapons to be wanting (see, for example, Schroeder,
2007). The United States alone has de –
stroyed more than 32 ,000 MANPADS
since 2003 in more than two dozen
countries, and has improved security
in depots holding thousands more
missiles (USDoS, 2010 , p. 7; USDoS,
2009). More than 30 non-state armed
groups in more than 20 countries
are reported to possess—or have
possessed—MANPADS (Small Arms Survey, 2008 , pp. 32 –33), the result of
deliberate government policy, seizure
on the battlefield, lax export controls,
and stockpile mismanagement.
MANPADS are designed to func –
tion for many years. A shelf-life of ten or even twenty years is not unheard of.
The two SA- 7b MANPADS used in
the November 2002 attack against the
Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya,
reportedly comprised critical compo –
nents manufactured in the 1970s
(see, for example, United Nations,
2003, pp. 29–30; Richardson, 2003)
(See Table 1 on page 2 for examples
of MANPADS attacks on civilian air –
craft). Storage conditions can affect the longevity of the system.
6
Recent advances in MANPADS
technology have increased their range, speed, and target sets. New
motors, for example, have extended the ranges of systems such as the
Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 1 • January 2011 3Swedish Bolide, and increasingly
sophisticated proximity fuses allow for more effective engagement of smaller targets, such as UAVs (Jane’s, 2009a; Jane’s, 2009 b).
Other recent advances include the
introduction of automated command-and-control systems. Belarus and Israel have developed the Shlem and Red
Sky, respectively. These are integrated
multiple launch systems that rely on
global positioning and infrared tech –
nology to reach targets with greater accuracy. One added benefit is that the launch unit is equipped so that the operator can send cues to the launcher from a distance via computer (Gyürösi, 2003 ; Republic of Belarus,
2009; Jane’s, 2010 b).
Sourcing
This Research Note is based on Eric G. Berman
and Jonah Leff, “Light Weapons: Products, Pro –
ducers, and Proliferation,” Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 7–41. It has been updated
by Eric G. Berman and Matt Schroeder.
Notes
1 Short-range surface-to-air-missiles gener –
ally have maximum ranges of less than 10,000 m. Medium- and long-range surface-
to-air-missiles have maximum ranges more than ten times the distance of short-range models.
2 In addition to the three main types of guidance systems identified above, the Chinese produce a version of their QW-3 missile featuring a laser semi-active guid –
ance system (Jane’s, 2010a).
3 Slant range is the ‘line of sight’ distance between the weapon and target (in con-trast to the vertical altitude of the target).
4 Strela is Russian for ‘arrow’. Moscow designated it the 9K32M, but this text refers to it as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) desig nated SA-7b
or Grail, by which it is commonly known. Variants of the weapon are known as the Hongying 5 or HN-5 in China, the Anza in Pakistan, the Ayn-al-Saqr in Egypt, and the CA-94M in Romania.
5 For example, a Greek industrialist affili-ated with the licensed production of the Stinger shared proprietary information on the missile with the Soviets (Anastasi, 1987a; 1987b).
6 Thermal batteries used in MANPADS have long shelf-lives, but once activated
SA-7b missile recovered from an arms cache in Iraq, September 2008. Markings on the launch tube indicate that it
was manufactured in 1978.
Photo: United States Central Command (released to the Federation of American Scientists in May 2010)

4 Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 1 • January 2011About the
Small Arms Survey
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First published: January 2011
Credits
Authors: Eric G. Berman, Matt
Schroeder, and Jonah Leff
Design and Layout: Richard Jones
(rick@studioexile.com)
Contact details
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t +41 22 908 5777
f +41 22 732 2738to power-up the missile and guidance
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References
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This Research Note forms part of a series
available on the Small Arms Survey website
at www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/research-notes.html. The online
version of this document will be updated
as more information becomes available. For more information about MANPADS, please visit www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-
and-markets/products/manpads.html.