Putins fourth term [608585]

Putin’s fourth term
The twilight begins?
by Stanislav Secrieru & Vitali Shkliarov The Russian electoral cycle began with parliamen –
tary and partial local elections in September 2016,
continued with presidential elections in March
2018, and ended with a series of regional elections
in September 2018. The incumbent United Russia
(UR) party boosted the number of seats it con –
trols in the lower house of parliament, the Duma,
by 105 compared to 2011,1 and despite a few lo –
cal defeats in 2018, remained the dominant po –
litical force across the country . Dmitry Medvedev
kept his seat and position as prime minister and
the government itself underwent only a moder –
ate reshuffle. Moreover, President Putin not only
avoided any weakening of his own position but,
on the contrary , arguably grew stronger as he was
re-elected by almost 10 million more votes than
in 2012.2 There are no serious potential challeng –
ers on the horizon and he remains the sole person
who takes important domestic and foreign policy
decisions.
With the dust now settling, Russia’s political sys –
tem appears strong and durable at first glance.
However, on closer inspection, the political land –
scape is less stable and more crisis-prone than at
any time in the recent past. The illusion of sta –
bility conceals multiple weaknesses, which are
slowly sapping the vitality of the political system.
The presidency , the system’s key institution, is
a case in point. Given his easy victory in March 2018, it seems counterintuitive to argue that
President Putin is becoming progressively weaker.
Nevertheless, several factors are gradually under –
cutting his standing, a process which, in turn, is
likely to have future knock-on effects for Russia’s
Summary
>Russia recently concluded a major electoral
cycle (2016-2018) that extended the life-ex –
pectancy of the current political system.
>By all outward signs, the president, the sys –
tem’s key figure, has avoided any weakening
of his position and emerged stronger after
the elections.
>Nonetheless, President Putin faces four
short- and long-term vulnerabilities: a lack
of an appealing metanarrative for a fourth
term in office, declining output legitimacy ,
an overconcentration of power and expec –
tations surrounding his eventual departure
from the Kremlin.
>Regardless what decision the president makes
by 2024 (to stay or leave), Russia has entered
a prolonged period of uncertainty and fluc –
tuations in political power are looming.
11
2 0 1 8
Photo by Tom Grimbert on Unsplash
European Union Institute for Security Studies European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) November 2018
1

Of course, this trend is multi-causal. Unpopular
decisions pushed by the Kremlin, such as raising
Value Added Tax (VAT) from 18% to 20% and
increasing the retirement age (from 55 to 60 for
women and from 60 to 65 for men),10 took a toll
on the president’s ratings. But at the same time,
the absence of a persuasive grand narrative de –
prives Putin of a powerful tool to manage public
expectations, divert attention and combat dissat –
isfaction if needs be.
Figure 1 | Overall, do you approve or disapprove of
Vladimir Putin’s actions as President of Russia?
% of respondents
Data: Levada-Center, 2018
T wo examples demonstrate how a metanarrative
can make a difference in the midst of painful re –
forms. In 2014, the government launched a new
phase of healthcare reform, which sought to re –
duce the number of hospitals and medical person –
nel. The Accounts Chamber of Russia concluded
in 2015 that, as a result, medical services worsened
and became more costly and less accessible.11 The
poorly planned and executed reforms were met
with vocal opposition from medical profession –
als, but not from the public at large: the Kremlin’s
patriotic narrative which centred on safeguard –
ing Russia from external threats helped to capture
public attention and prevent mass demonstrations
on social issues. It is therefore no surprise that a
Levada-Center opinion poll revealed that the
number of Russians who believed that Russia fac –
es an external military threat went up from 51%
in 2013 to 68% in 2015.12 The doctors’ protests
eventually fizzled out in 2015, and there was thus
no need to resort to large-scale repression.
In 2018, however, the plan to raise the pension age
was not backed by a larger narrative which would
either explain the rationale of the reform or de –
flect public attention from it. Instead, the Kremlin
decided to push it quickly through parliament 2010 2012 2014 2016 20180255075100
approve
disapprove
no answerentire political edifice. What vulnerabilities does
President Putin face in his fourth term in office?
What are the drivers behind them? And how
might these play out in the future?
The lack of a metanarrative
The first vulnerability is that Putin’s (probable) last
presidential term lacks an overarching narrative
that goes beyond securing voter turnout on the
day of elections; one which could help preserve
public backing for the duration of his mandate.
Previously , he skilfully used such narratives to set
and dominate the public agenda while maintain –
ing majority support. This helped to minimise the
scale of repressive tactics and allowed him to gov –
ern largely by consent.
In 2000, for instance, Putin built his campaign
around the mission to regain control over the
Chechen Republic and restore order to a coun –
try shaken by a prolonged economic crisis and
rampant crime.3 In 2004, Putin declared “war” on
the oligarchs who had enriched themselves in the
1990s while the general population became poor –
er, and promised greater prosperity to citizens.4
After Medvedev’s intermezzo (the 2008-2012 pe –
riod that coincided with the modernisation nar –
rative),5 Putin returned to power in 2012 under
the banner of conservative values (family , religion,
patriotism).6 This conservative message was rein –
forced by the annexation of Crimea in 2014, as it
resonated emotionally with many Russian citizens
who perceived Ukrainian sovereignty over the
peninsula after the collapse of the Soviet Union as
a “historical injustice”.7
But in 2018, Putin and his campaign staff failed to
generate a metanarrative which convincingly ex –
plained why the incumbent president deserved a
renewed mandate. They also failed to lay out the
direction in which the president wanted to take
the country during his new term. Thus, Putin’s
campaign lacked aspirational elements. Instead of
inventing a new narrative or even recycling old
ones, his supporters framed the re-election bid as
a necessity for the country – in other words, “be –
cause there are no viable alternatives to Putin”.9
The message indicated that without Putin, living
standards and public order might suffer, thereby
encouraging people to opt for stability . This prob –
ably helped to secure his re-election, but might
not be enough to ensure sustained public backing.
Between April and September 2018, Putin’s ap –
proval rating slipped dramatically from 82% to
67% (the lowest in four years). Moreover, the
number of people who think that the country
is heading in the wrong direction went up from
27% in March 2018 to 41% in September 2018.9
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) November 2018
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In 2018, Vladimir Putin tried to capitalise on his
achievements in the foreign and security policy
field. For instance, the election day was purpose –
fully moved to the anniversary of Crimea’s annexa –
tion, so as to act as a reminder of Putin’s recent for –
eign policy victories. However, whereas support for
the annexation of Crimea remains consistently high
in opinion polls (88% in March 2018),18 its emo –
tional effect has naturally decreased with the pas –
sage of time. Simultaneously , the public is less and
less impressed with the Kremlin’s foreign policy
stunts: in January 2017, 64% considered Russia’s
foreign policy a success, whereas this number de –
clined to 52% by August 2018. When respondents
were asked what are the main failures of Russia’s
foreign policy , after tensions with West (sanctions)
and Ukraine, they listed domestic price hikes and
declining living standards.19
Interviews by Russian sociologists with focus groups
support this notion of an increase in public anxiety
about the financial impact of foreign policy adven –
tures on citizens’ prosperity . In particular, respond –
ents complain that too much attention and money
is spent on defence and military operations, resent
the costs associated with Crimea’s annexation, and
express alarm over the prospects of Russia financ –
ing Syria’s reconstruction.20 It seems that after four
consecutive years of falling living standards, soci –
ety’s mood is slowly changing. In 2017, citizens’
real incomes fell to 2009 levels.21 At the same time,
concerns over social problems reached or surpassed
the levels seen before the annexation of Crimea (see
Figure 3).22 Therefore, despite attempts by the pres –
ident to surf on a wave of foreign policy successes,
the public is slowly awakening to the dangers and
costs of Russia’s assertive foreign policy .
Figure 3 | Three societal problems which worry
Russians most
(multiple answers possible)
Data: Levada-Center, 2018Poverty/most of the
population living in povertyPrice increases
A rise in
unemployment
0255075100
2013 2014 2015
(no data)2016 2017 2018during the summer holidays and the FIFA World
Cup (hosted by Russia) in June-July 2018. But
the move backfired: in the absence of a convinc –
ing narrative, the painful reform was perceived by
the public as a hasty and cynical attempt to trans –
fer the costs of government blunders to common
citizens.13 Opinion polls revealed that 89% of re –
spondents opposed the pension reform,14 and even
President Putin’s lengthy TV intervention in August
to retroactively defend this measure and placate
public anger had no effect. On the contrary , 39% of
respondents thought that the president’s proposals
to soften the reform changed nothing, while 25%
thought that his proposals made things worse.15
Dissatisfaction with the reform spilled over into the
streets: protests against the pension reform rocked
Russia throughout late August and early September
2018.16 In order to restore calm, the Kremlin had to
step up repression.
Figure 2 | Does Russia face an
external military threat?
% of respondents
Data: Levada-Center, 2018
Declining output legitimacy
The second weakening factor at play is the presi –
dent’s declining capacity to deliver (also known as
‘output legitimacy’).17 While the aforementioned
grand narrative(s) helped Putin project a vision
of the future, each time he ran for office he also
backed his candidacy with a successful track re –
cord. In 2000, he drew on his past role as the prime
minister (August 1999-May 2000) who took up the
fight against the Chechen rebels. In 2004, Putin ran
as someone who as president brought order to the
country after the chaos of the 1990s. Upon his return
in 2012, he relied on his crisis management skills
as prime minister (during the 2008-2012 mandate)
to prove he was the one who safely steered Russia
through the global financial crisis and limited the
damage to the prosperity of ordinary citizens. 2009 2011 2013 20150255075100
don’t knownoyes
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) November 2018
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unattended, for which he simply has no time or
energy to focus on.
This reliance on micromanagement requires a hy –
peractive president. It is not enough for Putin to
sign decrees and issue orders: he needs to control
their execution lest they remain only on paper.
According to data released in 2015 by the All-
Russia People’s Front , a coalition of pro-Kremlin
non-governmental organisations and movements,
40% of presidential decrees and orders were not
executed.25 Even the presidential administration
recognises that there is a problem with the speedy
enforcement of normative acts issued by the presi –
dent: the Presidential Control Directorate itself
stated in 2015 that 70% of the president’s decrees
and orders had been shelved or implemented with
significant delays.26
In May 2018, President Putin signed a decree lay –
ing out new ambitious economic and social tar –
gets for Russia until 2024. But the chances that
the decree will be implemented are lower than in
2012, when Putin issued similar decrees (which
themselves had a poor rate of implementation).27
The lack of funds available (estimated to be $125
billion) is only half of the explanation.28 An over-
centralised system with an aging leader at its helm
is the other half.
Expectations about departure
A final factor that enfeebles President Putin is the
patronal nature of the political system which he
himself built. A patronal network forms the foun –
dation of this system, which structures and medi –
ates informal power relations between the patron
and clients, on the one hand, and among clients,
on the other hand. The president is the unques –
tionable master of the
network, the upper
echelons of which are
composed of the presi –
dent’s friends, former
colleagues and trusted
officials. The bottom
rungs of the network
accommodate a larger
swath of elites. As the
ultimate controller of
state resources, the
president can reward
clients for sustained loyalty or punish them for
perceived disloyal acts. Thus, the capacity to po –
lice the network is essential for maintaining its dis –
cipline and stability . Elections are another key ele –
ment for the network’s durability: they represent
a critical moment as the patron must display the
capacity to muster sufficient resources to secure
both an overwhelming victory and re-confirm his Given the circumstances, citizens expect the presi –
dent to re-pivot from external to domestic politics
and are waiting for him take action on the eco –
nomic front, where Putin does not have any recent
tangible wins to show. Moreover, in order to ensure
fiscal health, the Kremlin needs to go beyond par –
tial measures to plug the pension fund deficit. The
irony is that deep structural economic reforms, at
least in the short and medium term, will weaken
the president’s popularity and correspondingly his
legitimacy . There is therefore a lack of political will
to enforce the far-reaching economic transforma –
tions which are required. But even if such resolve
existed, the Russian political system, with its he –
gemonic president, has one inbuilt weakness that
undermines its capacity to deliver; the over-concen –
tration of power.
An overconcentration of power
The history of President Putin’s rule can be summed
up as an endless quest to concentrate power.
Previously independent actors from the 1990s (gov –
ernors, oligarchs, parliamentarians) were forced to
fall into line and find their place in the Kremlin-
centred machine of governance, the so-called ‘pow –
er vertical’.
This over-concentration of power bred a micro –
management style of governance. In turn, this dis –
couraged initiative and made bureaucracy , in the
absence of explicit orders from the top, often unre –
sponsive to people’s needs as bureaucrats sought to
‘play it safe’. For example, over the last years several
national emergencies (including fires and floods)
were dealt with effectively only after the direct in –
tervention of the president. In some cases (such as
the floods in Krymsk), more aid was delivered in
the early stages by self-organised volunteers than
by the state institutions.23
Another prominent ex –
ample is the frequent
visits by President Putin
to Sochi ahead of the
Olympic Games in 2014,
which were supposed to
put pressure on officials
in order to ensure that all
sporting venues and fa –
cilities were finalised on
time.
On the one hand, such an approach strengthens the
president, as it demonstrates that he is the only ac-
tor with the power to solve problems. It also helps
to build his public image of a ‘good tsar’ and out –
source responsibility for mistakes to ‘bad boyars’24
– in this case, the state’s top bureaucracy . On the
other hand, it weakens the president as for eve –
ry problem solved there are numerous issues left ‘This reliance on micromanagement
requires a hyperactive president. It is
not enough for Putin to sign decrees
and issue orders: he needs to control
their execution lest they remain only
on paper.’
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) November 2018
4

campaigns that seek to force political opponents
to leave the country – are already discernible. For
example, one study found that the number of po –
litical parties barred from local elections in 2018
increased by 50% compared to the local elections
in 2016.33 The arrest in August 2018 of several op –
position leaders (among them Alexey Navalny and
Sergei Udaltsov) in re –
lation to the pension
reform protests came as
another sign of grow –
ing repression.34 In
the coming years, the
space for independent
opposition is poised to
shrink yet further.
Still, it appears that
Putin is striving to re –
cover some sort of output legitimacy and will thus
seek to minimise the scale of repression. To govern
by consent is always cheaper: there are attempts to
compensate for the lack of an overarching narrative
of his presidency with grand infrastructure and so –
cial projects, for instance. These mega projects, be –
sides rewarding clients of the patronal network via
state-awarded contracts, have the aim of instilling
pride and creating an impression of rapid moderni –
sation.35 The opening of the Kerch bridge connect –
ing continental Russia with the annexed Crimean
peninsula ahead of the presidential elections and
Putin’s proposal to erect another mega-bridge in
the far east (to the island of Sakhalin), both widely
trumpeted by domestic media outlets, support this
assumption.36
President Putin’s interest in high-visibility projects
is likely to affect oligarchs who will be ‘asked’ to
co-finance them. The proposal by the presidential
economic adviser Andrei Belousov’s to collect $7.5
billion from Russia’s big businesses for social and
economic modernisation plans is an early sign of
the Kremlin’s intentions to squeeze more funds
from the private sector for its pet projects.37 This
message was reiterated by Putin himself in a more
subtle form during 4th Eastern Economic Forum,
when he proposed to “think how to stimulate
Russian exporters to channel part of revenues to
effective economic and social projects in the far
east”.38 It is also likely that this trend will intensify .
It cannot be ruled out, however, that in addi –
tion to mega projects, President Putin might once
again resort to a more assertive foreign policy to
restore legitimacy – 50% of Russians still regard
the recent past as a success in foreign policy terms.
Nevertheless, military adventures abroad do not
come without costs, and the public has lately
shown a preference for governance which focus –
es on solving rising internal economic problems.
Moreover, in the aftermath of the pension reform hegemonic status.29 President Putin recently did
well on both accounts.
However, the key element for the patronal net –
work’s stability is the clients’ expectation that the
patron will stay in power in the future.30 Back in
2007, as Putin’s second mandate neared the end,
anxiety among his clients
grew and voices calling
for him to stay for anoth –
er term (despite the con –
stitutional limit) became
louder.31 The dilemma
was settled through ‘cas –
tling’: Dmitry Medvedev
became president, while
Vladimir Putin took
over the executive posi –
tion. The latter moved
the centre of gravity to the Russian White House
and thus continued to preside informally over the
patronal network. This, however, proved not to
be a sustainable solution. Small numbers of elites
coagulated around Medvedev hoping to see him
run for a second term and build his own power
base. Thus, in 2012 Putin returned to the Kremlin
to prevent the network from further erosion and
eventual collapse. Medvedev gave up on plans for
an independent run, and at the end of his presiden –
tial term loyally vacated the office for Putin (even
though constitutionally he could have run for an –
other term). This ensured six years of relative calm.
For President Putin, the 2018 mandate is the last
one under the current constitutional term limits.
Although there are still six more years to go, the
tensions among clients regarding the future power
architecture will grow with every passing year. The
president has repeatedly denied an intention to in –
troduce amendments allowing him to stay in the
Kremlin beyond his current term.32 These declara –
tions also deeply unsettle the network’s clients who
have no clear indication about the patron’s, and
accordingly their, future. The challenge for Putin
is how to keep these anxieties about his possible
(scheduled or unexpected) exit in check and main –
tain peace in the network. What is certain is that
this protracted vulnerability will haunt the presi –
dent in the years to come.
Managing creeping weaknesses
In the past, a combination of a grand narrative and
output legitimacy helped President Putin to govern
largely by consent rather than coercion. The deficit
of both elements in his fourth term makes govern –
ance more costly . To maintain stability and ensure
compliance, Putin will have to rely more on target –
ed coercion. New repressive drives – which include
arrests and short spells in prison or harassment ‘The expectations concerning Putin’s
eventual departure is the trickiest of all
the vulnerabilities to deal with, and he
will probably delay the decision until
his final days in office in order to avoid
becoming a lame duck.’
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) November 2018
5

banks, in 2018 a new development occurred: the
position of minister of agriculture went to the son
of one of Putin’s close associates.41 Often, the ap –
pointment of privileged children is not designed to
enhance the efficiency of the state apparatus, but
to ensure loyalty and stave off rebellion by aging
clients.42
The expectations concerning Putin’s eventual de –
parture is the trickiest of all the vulnerabilities to
deal with, and he will probably delay the decision
until his final days in office in order to avoid be –
coming a lame duck. The longer he procrastinates,
however, the deeper the disquiet will be among
elites and the higher the risks are of intra-elite
squabbles getting out of control. To keep anxious
elites behind him or prevent the formation of al –
liances which might challenge him, the president
will most likely increasingly resort to repressive
tactics.
Previously , Putin combined sticks and carrots to
ensure elite loyalty . However, in his third mandate,
he began to rely more than before on repression as
a means to control elites.43 This was largely con –
ducted under the banner of fighting against cor –
ruption: there was a marked increase in the num –
ber of cases where secondary-level elites (regional debacle, society’s tolerance and patience with new
economic burdens might run thin. Thus, unlike in
the cases of Crimea and Syria, another attempt to
use pugnacious foreign policy to restore legitimacy
at home has a serious chance of backfiring.
The president has sought to improve the inefficien –
cy of the highly centralised system. However, he
chose to optimise the system in its existent form
rather than opt for decentralisation. This optimisa –
tion is being conducted with a biological factor in
mind: the old loyalists in the presidential adminis –
tration and central and local governments are slow –
ly being replaced with younger (and expectedly
more efficient) officials. The trend was observable
during the previous presidential mandate (in 2016,
the head of the presidential administration Sergey
Ivanov was replaced by the much younger Anton
Vaino), and is likely to gather pace as the ruling
elite ages. However, it is a temporary fix. As one
Russian observer put it: “the elite has undergone a
rejuvenation, not through cultivation, but through
additives. As a result, its resources have become
more reliable, but only for a limited time.”39
There are also children of former high officials among
the young cadres.40 If previously they were mostly
promoted to top positions in state corporations and Figure 4 | Russian mega-projects and events
including budget estimates in $ billion
Data: Multiple public sources
including 3.1-kilometer
cable−stayed bridge to the Russky Island at cost of $1.1 billion 27 new sporting
venues built
costs include building
sport venues and
infrastructure projects
in and around Sochi,
roads, railroads,
and power plants19-kilometer bridge from
mainland Russia to
annexed Crimea across the
Kerch Straithosted in 11 cities,
3 stadiums renovated,
9 stadiums built, in
addition to infrastructure
(hotels, airports,
public transport)
under consideration − 6-km bridge connecting Sakhalin island with the Khabarovsk region
APEC SUMMITSUMMER UNIVERSIADE
WINTER OLYMPICSBRIDGEWORLD CUP
BRIDGE
21.556.551
3.714.2
VladivostokKazan
SochiKerchMoscow et al
Sakhalin
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) November 2018
6

At the same time, to avert further erosion of do –
mestic legitimacy at a low cost the Kremlin will
not hesitate to use old – or initiate new – crises
in the EU’s eastern and southern neighbourhood.
Seen from this perspective, a Ukraine absorbed
by its upcoming presidential and parliamentary
elections or a war-torn Syria (in case the deal on
Idlib collapses, for example) remain attractive tar –
gets for the Kremlin. However, such external en –
gagements might not pay off domestically . Thus,
still feeling vulnerable at home, the Kremlin will
probably be tempted to continue cultivating dis –
content in EU member states via persistent cyber
meddling in public debates (to amplify existent
societal cleavages) and electoral processes.
A reshuffle at the very top of the Russian state
(before or after 2024) may open a window of op –
portunity to rethink the EU’s current approach to
bilateral relations. That said, it is also equally pos –
sible that EU-Russia relations under a new ruler
in the Kremlin could take a turn for the worse.
Alternatively , a disorderly and inconclusive power
transition is likely to generate a cacophony of po –
litical messages coming from Moscow and thus
bring more uncertainty (at least in the short term)
regarding the future of EU-Russia relations.
Stanislav Secrieru is a Senior Analyst at the
EUISS.
Vitali Shkliarov is an independent Political
Consultant and Strategist.
Endnotes
1) James Masters, “Putin’s party wins majority in parliamentary
elections”, CNN, September 19, 2016, https://edition.cnn.
com/2016/09/19/europe/russia-parliamentary-elections/index.
html.
2) Andrew Roth, “Vladimir Putin secures record win in Russian
presidential election”, The Guardian, March 19, 2018, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/19/vladimir-putin-
secures-record-win-in-russian-presidential-election .
3) Vladimir Putin, “Russia at the turn of millennium”,
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, December 30, 1999, https://pages.uoregon.
edu/kimball/Putin.htm .
4) Pavel Voshianov, “Proekt vragi naroda [Enemies of people
project]”, Novaya Gazeta, July 9, 2003, http://2003.novayagazeta.
ru/nomer/2003/41n/n41n-s00.shtml .
5) “Medvedev programme speech”, Reuters, February 15, 2008,
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-medvedev-highlights/
medvedev-programme-speech-idUKMEDVEDEV0820080215 .
6) Melik Kaylan, “Kremlin values: Putin’s Strategic
Conservatism”, World Affairs, Vol. 177, No. 1 (May/June 2014),
pp. 9-17.
7) “56% of Russian citizens consider Crimea is a part of Russia”,
Crimea.kz, September 11, 2013, https://crimea.kz/73313-
Kremlievskiiy-sociolog-56-grazhdan-RF-schitayut-Krym-chast-
yu-Rossii.html .or federal officials) were arrested and sentenced
for corruption. Still, this phenomenon has not
reached sweeping levels and appears to be de –
signed to have an ‘educational’ effect on top-tier
officials.44 On the one hand, repression may en –
sure greater compliance and thereby cement the
network’s stability . On the other hand, large-scale
repression can also trigger serious discontent
within the network.
Even if Putin successfully navigates these chal –
lenges and decides to stay in power as president
(UR currently holds a constitutional majority in
the Duma so a constitutional change is not legally
impossible) or in any other official position which
would allow him to lead from behind after 2024,
expectations surrounding his exit will not just
persist but worsen. In 2024, Putin will turn 72,
and the anticipation of his eventual retirement will
be more acute than in 2018.
Putin will probably remain in power after 2024,
but an alternative scenario cannot be ruled out.
The contours of any future power arrangement
without Putin may take shape earlier than 2024,
but what could signal that a reset of the system is
imminent? A significant restructuring of the po –
litical landscape (including the leading political
parties) ahead of next Russian parliamentary elec –
tions in 2021 could be one of the indicators. It is
also not impossible that the current government
will not serve the full term. Although Putin has
not changed governments in the middle of presi –
dential term, this might happen for the first time
after the Duma elections in 2021. Replacing an
unpopular government (which implemented the
pension reform) with a new one led by a young
promising prime minister could be another mark
that the president has made up his mind to pass
the baton in 2024.
The future of EU-Russia relations
The way President Putin is handling his accumu –
lating domestic weaknesses does not indicate a
radical change in the tone and substance of EU-
Russia relations in the short to medium term.
Greater repression (even if targeted) might in –
crease the number of Russian activists or business
people seeking sanctuary in EU member states. In
turn, this will underscore the ever-growing nor –
mative gap between the EU and Russia. However,
to bridge the gap, bidding for Putin’s mega in –
frastructure projects might be open not only for
the patron’s clients but also to some extent for
European businesses, too. The working assump –
tion in the Kremlin is that the private sector still
can be a useful channel to erode the EU’s princi –
pled collective stance on Russia, which emerged
in the wake of the annexation of Crimea.
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) November 2018
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© EU Institute for Security Studies | QN-AK-18- 011-EN-N | ISBN 978-92-9198-653-8 | ISSN 2315-1110 | doi: 10.2815/2605658) “Mikhalkov does not see alternative to Putin”, Tass,
December 11, 2017, http://tass.ru/kultura/4802666 .
9) Levada Center opinion polls, https://www.levada.ru/en/
ratings/ .
10) “The President’s address to Russian citizens”, August 29,
2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58405 .
11) Nikolai Epple, “Russian Health Care Is Dying a Slow
Death”, The Moscow Times, April 16, 2015, https://
themoscowtimes.com/articles/russian-health-care-is-dying-a-
slow-death-45839 .
12) “Military service and military threats”, Levada-Center,
February 21, 2015, https://www.levada.ru/2015/02/21/sluzhba-
v-armii-i-voennye-ugrozy/ .
13) Denis Volkov, “No trust: What Russians think about the
pension reform plan”, Carnegie.ru, July 19, 2018, https://
carnegie.ru/commentary/76874 .
14) Opinion poll on pension reform, Levada Center, July
5, 2018, https://www.levada.ru/2018/07/05/pensionnaya-
reforma-3/ .
15) Opinion poll on pension reform, Levada Center, September
27, 2018, https://www.levada.ru/2018/09/27/pensionnaya-
reforma-4/ .
16) “Russia pension protests: Police break up opposition
rallies”, BBC, September 9, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-45463883 .
17) Fritz W . Scharpf, “Problem-Solving Effectiveness and
Democratic Accountability in the EU”, MPIfG Working Paper
03/1, February 2003, http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp03-
1/wp03-1.html.
18) “Crimea: four years later”, Levada Center, March 15, 2018,
https://www.levada.ru/2018/03/15/krym-chetyre-goda-spustya/ .
19) “Foreign policy: failures and successes”, FOM, August 27,
2018, https://fom.ru/Politika/14089 .
20) Denis Volkov, op.cit.
21) “Uroveni jizni v Rossii otbrosilo na 9 let v proshloe
[Living standards in Russia fell 9 years in the past]”, Finanz.
ru, January 25, 2018, https://www.finanz.ru/novosti/
lichnyye-finansy/uroven-zhizni-v-rossii-otbrosilo-na-9-let-v-
proshloe-1013996865 .
22) “Problems that worry Russians”, Levada-Center, September
6, 2018, https://www.levada.ru/2018/09/06/trevozhashhie-
problemy/ .
23) Natalya Nedzhvetskaya, “In the Wake of Krymsk Floods,
Social Media Powers Russian Relief Efforts”, Techpresident, July
18, 2012, http://techpresident.com/news/22585/wake-krymsk-
floods-social-media-powers-russian-relief-efforts .
24) Boyar: the highest rank in feudal society of the Grand
Principality of Moscow.
25) “Kak zastaviti vipolniat ukazi prezidenta [How to compel
officials to implement presidential orders]”, Parlamentskaia
Gazeta, November 10, 2015, https://www.pnp.ru/
archive/2015/10/12/kak-zastavit-vypolnyat-ukazy-prezidenta.
html .
26) Ibid.
27) Andrei Pertsev, “Putin’s May decrees five years after”,
Meduza, May 16, 2017, https://meduza.io/feature/2017/05/16/
mayskie-ukazy-vladimira-putina-pyat-let-spustya-oni-ispolneny .
28) “Putin’s new decrees to require extra $125 bln of state
funds”, Reuters, May 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/
russia-putin-decrees-cost/putins-new-decrees-to-require-extra-
125-bln-of-state-funds-pm-idUSR4N1S900E .
29) Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics
in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press: New
York, 2015, pp.19-38.
30) Henry E. Hale, “Russian patronal politics beyond Putin”,
Daedalus, 146 (2), Spring 2017, pp. 30-40.31) “Putin soglasilsea vozglaviti spisok Edinoi Rossii na viborah
v Gosdumy [Putin agreed to lead the list of United Russia for
Duma elections]”, Newsru.com, October 1, 2007, https://www.
newsru.com/russia/01oct2007/putined.html ; “Putin v interesah
RF doljen ostavatsea ee rukovoditelem i posle 2008 goda [in the
interest of the Russian Federation, Putin must remain the leader
after 2008]”, Vek, February 21, 2007, http://wek.ru/kadyrov-
putin-v-interesax-rf-dolzhen-ostavatsya-ee-rukovoditelem-i-
posle-2008-goda .
32) “Putin zaiavil chto ne planiruet meniati konstitutsiu,
ballotirovatsea v 2030 godu [Putin declared that he does not
intend to change constitutions or to run for presidency in
2030]”, Radio Svoboda, March 19, 2018, https://rus.azattyq.
org/a/29108576.html .
33) Elena Muhametishina, “Regional election in 2018 set the
beat the record of party’s excluded from elections”, Vedomosti,
September 4, 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/
articles/2018/09/03/779823-regionalnie-vibori .
34) Marc Bennetts, “Alexei Navalny detained after call for
national day of protest”, The Guardian, August 25, 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/25/alexei-
navalny-detained-national-pension-protest ; “Left-Wing Leader
Udaltsov Detained Over Rally Against Retirement Age Hikes”,
The Moscow Times, August 15, 2018, https://themoscowtimes.
com/news/left-wing-leader-udaltsov-detained-rally-against-
retirement-age-hikes-62528 .
35) Robert W . Orttung, Sufian Zhemukhov, “The 2014 Sochi
Olympic mega-project and Russia’s political economy”, East
European Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2014, 175–191.
36) “Russian Railways to Spend $17 Mln on Bridge to Sakhalin
in 2018”, The Moscow Times, November 22, 2017, https://
themoscowtimes.com/news/russian-railways-to-spend-17-
million-on-sakhalin-bridge-5966 .
37) Polina Nikolskaya, Anastasia Lyrchikova, “Kremlin aide
wants top firms to invest more rather than pay windfall
tax”, Reuters, August 25, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-russia-budget-miningtalks-minister/kremlin-aide-
wants-top-firms-to-vest-morerather-than-pay-windfall-tax-
idUSKCN1LA0ER .
38) Plenary session of East Economic Forum, Vladivostok,
September 12, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/58537 .
39) Nikolai Petrov, “The Elite: New wine into old bottles?”,
Russian Politics and Law, vol. 55, no. 2, 2017, p.130.
40) “Fradkov says agrees to become new head of Russia’s
Promsvyazbank”, Reuters, January 19, 2018, https://www.
reuters. com/article/russia-banks-promsvyazbank/fradkov-
says-agrees-tobecome-new-head-of-russias-promsvyazbank-
idUSR4N1PB01D .
41) “Putin Leaves Russian Cabinet Little-Changed, Brings In
Close Ally’s Son”, RFERL, May 18, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/
putin-leaves-russian-cabinet-little-changed-brings-in-close-ally-
s-son/29235458.html .
42) Nikolai Petrov, op.cit.
43) Nikolai Petrov, “Repressii stali mehanizmom kontrolia
eliti [Repressions became mechanism of elites control]”,
Vedomosti, August 30, 2017, https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/
articles/2017/08/30/731537-repressii-kontrolya-eliti .
44) For more on institutionalisation of repression against
elites see: Kiril Rogov, “The Art of Coercion: Repressions and
Repressiveness in Putin’s Russia”, Russian Politics, 3 (2018),
pp.151-174.
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) November 2018
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