POLITICE ȘI ȘTIINȚELE COMUNIC ĂRII PROGRAMUL DE STUDIU: RELA ȚII INTERNA ȚIONALE ȘI STUDII EUROPENE FORMA DE ÎNV ĂȚĂMÂNT: CU FRECVEN ȚĂ… [616867]

UNIVERSITATEA DIN ORADEA
FACULTATEA DE ISTORIE, RELA ȚII INTERNA ȚIONALE, ȘTIINȚE
POLITICE ȘI ȘTIINȚELE COMUNIC ĂRII
PROGRAMUL DE STUDIU: RELA ȚII INTERNA ȚIONALE ȘI STUDII
EUROPENE
FORMA DE ÎNV ĂȚĂMÂNT: CU FRECVEN ȚĂ

THE SINO -EUROPEA N
RELATIONSHIP

COORDONATOR ȘTIIN ȚIFIC ABSOLVENT: [anonimizat]. univ. dr. Istvan Polgar GUILLAUME BLONDEL

ORADEA
2017

Contents
1. The return of Europe to China ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. .. 3
111. The end of the colonial influence of Europe in China ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………….. 3
112. Late return of relations ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. . 4
113. First developments ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……. 5
2. Primarily economic and commercial relations ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……… 6
121. Preponderance of economic and trade relations ………………………….. ………………………….. ……………………. 6
122. A secondary political and diplomatic role ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ….. 7
123. Tien Anmen : a brake in relations between China and Europe ………………………….. ………………………….. … 8
3. The strategic rapprochement between China and Europe (1990s) ………………………….. ………………………….. ………. 9
131. The challenges of a political rapprochement between China and the European Union ………………………. 10
132. The rapid development of political and diplomatic relations betwe en China and the European Union … 11
133. The prospects for a global partnership ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……. 12
PART TWO: THE REAL WEIGHT OF EUROPE IN CHINA ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. 13
1. The weaknesses of the European Community ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. … 14
211. geopolitical factors ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ….. 14
212. The geopolitical dominance of the United States ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………….. 15
2. Persistence of difficulties in Sino -European relations ………………………….. ………………………….. …………………… 17
231. opposing interests and perceptions ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……….. 19
232. Chinese opportunism ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. .. 20
PART THREE: WHAT PARTNERSHIP FOR TOMORROW ? ………………………….. ………………………….. ……………………….. 21

Already super -powerful demographic, China became in the 1980s, in only two decades, a super –
economic and commercial power. With a plethoric workforce and an internal market of more
than one billion consumers, it stirs up lusts. Also the European Union, economic giant and
political power in the making she wishes to develop close relations with China.
In this section, we will examine the real boom in the relations between Europe and China
in the 20th century. While they had virtually disappeared, they recovered rather late and have
since undergone constant progress.

1. The return of Europe to China
Looking at China today, it is hard to believe that in the early twentieth century Europe was so
influential that it is still f elt today as a profound humiliation by the Chinese. Yet the European
countries had imposed on the Middle Kingdom a real economic and technical hegemony before
being driven out at the end of the Second World War. It is only too late that the Sino -European
relations are re -established in order to gain a genuine boost.

111. The end of the colonial influence of Europe in China
If China and Europe had long established trade relations, the confrontation of the Chinese
Empire with Western civilization was partic ularly traumatic in the nineteenth century. Indeed,
the economic and technical superiority of the European countries was considerable even when
China was experiencing a period of withdrawal. This Europe an superiority resulted in a
" predation “China and it s wealth, especially after the opium wars where China has imposed
treaties that are very unfavorable to China : European countries acquire concessions in most
major Chinese ports where they enjoy exorbitant privileges (extraterritoriality, for example,
allows foreigners to escape Chinese laws ; the tariffs for European products are limited to
5%).
If these concessions will always constitute only a colonization of position made through the
opening of trading posts on the coasts of the China Sea, the Chinese keep in mind the " unequal
treatments "Which were imposed on them by the Europeans. Even today, the Western
occupation is like a real trauma. The latter holds a large part in the Chinese imaginary and partly
explains the mistrust, even distrus t, of the Chinese in their relations with the Westerners as well
as the strong will to keep their independence vis -a-vis the western influence.
But successive crises will take place in China since the beginning of the twentieth century, which
will be the c ause of the departure of the Europeans of China. Thus the nationalist thrust and

xenophobic riots forced the Europeans to reverse the autonomy of the concessions (1920s). Then
it is the question of extraterritoriality that is questioned. With it, is que stioned the subsistence of
most of the European concessions in China. In the early 1930s, Europeans abandoned their
concessions. In 1946, the Shanghai concessions were abolished. All that remains is Hong Kong,
restored to the British after the departure of the Japanese and Macao which remains Portuguese.
But beyond the European presence in China, it is more broadly the end of European
influence in the Far East since the great colonial empires fall one after the other after the Second
World War : The Netherlands leave Indonesia in 1945, Britain lost its Indian empire in 1947,
France lost the Indochina in 1954, Singapore became independent in 1965.1

112. Late return of relations
The Cold War largely explains the lack of relations betwee n European countries and China
after the end of the Second World War . But it is thanks to an evolution of the political -economic
context that they will be able to reconnect in the early 1970s.
First of all, it can be noted that from 1971 China be gan to engage in a genuine policy of
openness towards the United States. After a long period of autarkic withdrawal from China, Mao
Zedong changes his attitude in his relations with the two superpowers : the USSR is considered
an immediate threat far more dangerous than the United States . There is thus a real reversal of
geopolitical representations : Maoist China gradually opens up to the Western world and offers
the image of a certain respectability .
Then China's strategy evolves with the d evelopment of the " theory of the three
worlds "Which Deng Xiaoping presented to the UN in 1974.2 China divided the world into
three poles : the first world consisted of the two superpowers ; the second world was
composed of developed countries, su bject to superpowers and less imperialist than in the
past ; the third world, including China, was made up of developing countries. This new
conception of the world represented an alternative to the confrontation of the two blocs and
reflected the Chines e leaders' view of the hierarchy of threats and potential alliances : alliances
between countries of different worlds could take place to face a common threat.
In this context, European countries become potential allies. In addition, they have al so
begun a process of détente with the countries of the Eastern bloc in Europe. In 1972, the

1 Chan, Kenneth. "Images, visibility and the prospects of soft power of the EU in Asia: the case of China." Asia
Europe Journal 8.2 (2010): 133 -147.
2 Khoo, Nicholas. Collateral Damage: Sino -soviet Rivalry and the Termination of the Sino -Vietnamese Alliance .
New York: Columbia University Press, 2011, p 82 -84.

European Economic Community (EEC) agreed to organize a European conference on security
and cooperation issues. The CSCE (conference on security and co -operation in Europe) was held
in July 1975 in Helsinki and affirms principles of peace and détente between East and West on
a sustainable basis of wider economic and humanitarian cooperation. The East -West dialogue is
open in Europe and China will be able to take a dvantage of it to get closer to the EEC. It was
from May 1975 onwards that relations were officially re -established between the European
Community and China .

113. First developments
The European Community is a rapidly developing economic and c ommercial
construction . This is why the first Sino -European relations were based essentially on economic
and commercial bases. The first agreement between the EEC and China was signed in April
1978. It is a trade treaty (" trade agreement ").3
Trade r elations between China and the EEC countries are expanding rapidly. They are also
encouraged by the new policy of Chinese leaders after Mao's death. Indeed, from 1978, Deng
Xiaoping implements a policy of reforms whose dominant problem is the rapid
moderni zation. The " policy of the four modernizations "Identifies four priority areas :
agriculture, industry, science and technology and the military. It then plans to accelerate
openness to the outside world and a decentralization of the Chinese economy. Thus, starting in
1979, a progressive economic opening was implemented to replace the Chinese collectivist
system which was not able to meet the requirements of the policy of the four modernizations.
The 1978 agreement soon proved insufficient to take into account all the trade which had
developed since 1978. As early as 1980, China benefited from the Community preference. In
addition, a new, wider agreement was signed in 1985. It is an agreement on economic and trade
cooperation aimed at promotin g, on the one hand, China's scientific and technical progress and
on the other to give China the most -favored -nation clause . The objectives are mainly
commercial : promotion and intensification of trade, strengthening of economic cooperation
and encour agement of investment. The agreement also provides for the development of
economic cooperation in order to foster the development of industry and agriculture (promotion
of co -production, joint ventures, technology transfers, etc.).
Relations betwe en China and the EEC continue to grow and are making steady
progress. For example, in 1987 an agreement was signed on the establishment of a center for the
application of biotechnology to agriculture and medicine. In October 1988, the EEC opened a

3 Wong, Reuben, The issue of Identity in the EU -China relationship, Politique européenne 1 (2013), p. 158 -185.

delegati on in Beijing. It was from this date that political relations between China and Europe
began. There are more meetings between Chinese leaders and European ministers. The
geopolitical rapprochement between China and Europe seems to have begun in 1989 when
relations will be abruptly interrupted after the events that took place in Tien An Men Square.

2. Primarily economic and commercial relations
Between 1975 and 1989, the European Community and China will develop economic and
trade links. But at th e same time that economic relations are growing rapidly, political relations
remain distant. This situation is indicative of China's ambition in the world. With rising
economic power, China, a developing country, wants to establish strong cooperation, cond itions
for the development of its own economy. But it reserves its political relations with the two
superpowers (US and USSR) with which it claims to participate in global governance.

121. Preponderance of economic and trade relations
China has become an essential partner of the EEC and economic and trade relations have
become indispensable for Europe's own development. The trade agreements signed in 1978
enabled the exchange of more than 175 trillion euros of goods. On both the European and the
Chinese side, they have had a fundamental impact on their mutual economic growth.
China sees in the European market the best opportunity to develop its own economy. There
is strong economic complementarity between the two entities, with the EEC ab le to provide
high-tech technologies and products, while China makes its labor available to export
manufactured goods at low prices and in large quantities to Europe , a consumer market with
strong potential.
Thus the development of economic relat ions between the EEC and China has contributed
to the tremendous boom in China since the 1980s. Since 1980, Chinese GDP has increased by
9% per year. China turns its back on collectivization of economy : more than 40% of the
products of the industry come from private companies.
Initially, the development of trade relations with China opened up the huge Chinese market
to European companies. Cooperation between Chinese and European companies has been
formalized by numerous joint ventures : Alcatel's locations in Dongfeng, Citroën in Wuhan, and
many German SMEs in the Guangdong region, among others. On the other hand, technological
cooperation has made it possible to carry out ambitious equipment programs in China, such as
the Chinese nuclear power pr ogram (construction of the Daya Bay power plant).

The Chinese market is, indeed, the object of many fantasies and covetousness on the part of
Westerners : the mass of its population allows to imagine the opportunities of labor and of
consumption ; the extent of China's need for resources, goods and services attracts investors
who see China as the emergence of a new Eldorado. It should be noted, however, that European
companies are not the first or the most numerous to invest in China. This si tuation is due in
particular to the structural crisis experienced by EEC countries in the 1980s, but also to the
primacy of trade between members of the EEC which the rapprochement linked to the
establishment of the Common Market has favored. European FDI (direct investment abroad)
therefore remains quite low in China, but the complementarity of the markets of the two entities
as well as the provisions set up under the 1985 agreement make it possible to develop trade
between China and Europe. Thus , China be came the second most important partner of the EEC
after the United States.

122. A secondary political and diplomatic role
However, political and diplomatic relations remained in decline throughout this period : it
was not until 1988 that the EE C set up a diplomatic delegation in Beijing. There are two main
reasons for this political withdrawal from the European community. It is first of all linked to the
very nature of the European construction founded mainly on economic and commercial bases,
but it is also linked to the diversity of the bilateral relations that each European country
maintains with China.
In the first place, the European Community was first and foremost an economic
entity. Indeed, the great strides made by the EEC since its creation have tended towards the
integration of the member countries into a large common market. Yet evolutions towards a
political Europe are constantly opposed to the sovereignty of States. This was the case in the
early 1980s when Ms Thatcher's Brit ain opposed the European Community as a whole and
forced her to compromise . On the margins of the EEC, the political authorities are essentially
consultative bodies with no real decision -making power : the CSCE is only a conference that
monitors politic al, economic, military, humanitarian and other developments. without being able
to influence ; the Council of Europe is certainly a political forum in which international
problems are discussed but it has no supranational power to unify European policies .
Similarly, the establishment of a Community policy, even of an economic or financial
nature, is doomed to failure as soon as it runs counter to the particular interests of the Member
States. For example, financial integration remains insufficien t in view of the divergent views of
European countries. Thus we see that the rivalry between European countries still outweighs the

will for cooperation. Associations between European firms are few and sometimes not viable
(failure of the cooperation betwe en Dunlop and Pirelli in 1981). They prefer to cooperate with
non-European firms to increase their European market share (cooperation between Rover and
Honda and between Ford and Volkswagen in 1989).
Secondly, European countries do not apprehend r elations with China in the same way. This
situation is primarily due to the inheritance that each country has with China. Countries such as
Great Britain and Portugal which still have possessions in China (Hong Kong for Great Britain
and Macao for Portugal ) have close political relations, nevertheless dictated by their willingness
to regulate in good conditions the status of these possessions. Other countries formerly present in
China and Asia of the south -east (France, the Netherlands) have carried out policies of
rapprochement and cooperation with China. Their desire to regain influence in Asia encourages
them to increase bilateral ties with China: thus France develops an important cultural and
technical cooperation with China until 1989. The other cou ntries have not had relations
maintained in the past with China. They therefore consider their new link with Beijing only in
terms of trade relations. For example, Germany sees a complementary economic partner, which
is particularly attractive, and many Ge rman companies are signing very important contracts with
China (Volkswagen and BMW for the automotive sector, BASF and Bayer for chemicals and
many SMEs in the machine tool industry) .
In the face of a dispersed Europe and a still unclear politica l clarity, China tends to favor
bilateral relations with nations which, on an international level, cannot represent an alternative to
the political influence exerted at that time the two superpowers, the United States and the
USSR. True to its multipolar s trategy, China is not, however, hostile to open a dialogue with
Europe, but the political relations it maintains are considered second -rate relations.

123. Tien Anmen : a brake in relations between China and Europe
A brutal period of cooling b etween China and Europe stops the progression of relations in
1989. Indeed, the events that occur on the Tien An Men Square in Beijing lead to a strong ECE
reaction. It condemns China immediately : at the European Council meeting in Madrid on 26 and
27 June 1989, it decided to suspend high -level bilateral contacts and postpone new cooperation
projects. In addition, the UN decides on an international embargo on arms sales to China in
which all UNECE countries participate. The embargo on arms sales and mil itary cooperation has
a very strong impact in China, for which military development is one of the priorities (one of

Deng Xiaoping's four modernizations) in order to make its a modern and credible army,
necessary step in the defense of its political indepe ndence in the region.4
But the interests of lasting relations with China are at stake, especially at a time when the
European economy is entering a new period of economic crisis. The consequences of the cooling
of Sino -European relations on trade are indeed significant because of the large share of trade
with China in the foreign trade income of European countries. In France, for example, trade
growth was 3% in 1989, down to only 1.6% in 1993.
In addition, some EEC member countries – Great Britain and Portugal – have engaged in
bilateral political relations with China in the context of the handover of Hong Kong and
Macao. They have no interest in completely suspending relations with China. As a result, they do
not sign the Madrid decision a nd continue to have diplomatic and political ties with China.
Thus, facing the political stakes of certain countries and the economic interests of all, the
suspension of Sino -European relations will not last. France is the first country to renew l inks . It
is followed by Germany, Italy and then Spain. These countries, which have been nicknamed
" the Airbus Group "Prove that economic interests are more important than the political
posture vis -à-vis China. This behavior strengthens China's view of Europe as a second -rate
political partner. Until 2001, it will be wary of political relations with its European partners.
Faced with the diplomatic maneuvers of States, the political bodies of the EEC are
confronted with the fait accompli : the countries, by renewing bilaterally their relations with
China, empties the intentions stated in Madrid in 1989. It therefore resolves to declare officially
the re -establishment of the dialogue with China in June 1994.5

3. The strategic rapprochement bet ween China and Europe (1990s)
With the creation of the European Union , European political ambitions are more
assertive : With its new fields of application, European policy aims to make the EU a global
player that could represent an alternative to the United States on the international stage. China
seizes this opportunity to diversify its partnerships, always following a strategy to promote
multipolarity. Thus, the Sino -European relations will have a second development since the mid –
1990s.

4 Huang, Dong. "The Possibility of EU Lifting Arms Embargo on China in the Context of the Eurozone Debt
Crisis." In Conference Paper -UACES Annual General Meeting , pp. 3 -5. 2012.
5 Fox, John, and François Godement. A power audit of EU -China rel ations . London: European Council on Foreign
Relations, 2009.

131. The challenges of a political rapprochement between China and the European Union
What characterizes this renewed development of Sino -European relations, after the sudden
break in 1989, is the development of political and strategic relations whic h had only seen limited
progress to date. This new upsurge in political relations between China and Europe is the result
of two converging factors : first of all, a major geopolitical evolution with the collapse of the
USSR in 1991 and the entire sociali st bloc ; secondly, a political ambition of Europe affirmed
by the implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
First of all, the Cold War is the meaning of the failure of the socio -economic model of
people's democracies and th e collapse of Communist systems in Europe and the Soviet Union. If
the threats to stability in Europe are real, the bipolar crystallization disappears, leaving China
facing the United States as the only global superpower. Beijing is feeling these upheavals as
threats to its independence : moreover, the Chinese fear as much the geographical encirclement
and the ideological isolation as the penetration of the western ideas in the country. Moreover,
because of the disappearance of the USSR, China proves less useful in the global strategic
game. Fearing marginalization and being brought back to middle and regional power, China
must establish strong political and strategic ties outside the Asian zone. It is therefore seeking
new alliances to counterbalance the weight of the United States and avoid political
isolation. China therefore has an interest in political rapprochement with Europe.
In addition, it is in full economic change. The break -up of the socialist bloc forced it to
adapt quickly to the rul es of capitalism. This is why Deng Xiaoping is accelerating the
movement and, in January 1992, evokes the innovative concept " of socialist market
economy ". 6But in order to sustain the pace of change, China needs powerful economic
partners who suppor t it politically in its entry into the market. Europe, with whom it has
significant economic and trade relations, can offer this support. Thus, China's strategic
rapprochement is still dictated by a utilitarian vision of Europe, as well as the development of
economic and scientific co -operation.
The second factor in the strategic rapprochement between Europe and China is linked to
new political developments in European integration. The 1990s are, indeed, a decisive period for
Europe. 1 January 19 93, the Maastricht Treaty enters into force and founded the European
Union . With it, Europe has an institutional framework unique to the world : for the first time,
countries abandon a part of their sovereignty to the benefit of a supranational organiza tion. This
is the case particularly in the monetary area where Europe is adopting a single currency, the euro

6 Brodsgaard, K. E., & Rutten, K. (2017). From Accelerated Accumulation to the Socialist Market Economy:
Chinese Economic Discourse and Development From 1953 to Present, p. 94 -122.

(put into circulation on 1 January 2000) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) . Since then, most of the EU's progress has been mad e in the political sphere. The Treaty
of Amsterdam (October 1997) created a High Representative for the CFSP (in 2006, Mr Javier
Solana). In February 2001, the Treaty of Nice created a Political and Security Committee (PSC)
to define the political orient ations of the EU. A declaration on the future of Europe is also
annexed to the Treaty of Nice, which provides for the drafting of a European Constitution. This
draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was finalized in 2003 and proposed for
ratification by the .
Thus, in the mid -1990s, China and Europe became aware of their respective interests in
political rapprochement. This is reflected in the establishment of a global partnership in 1998.

132. The rapid development of political and diplomatic relations between China and the
European Union
Since the late 1990s, political relations between China and Europe have seen a new
beginning : Sino -European relations have taken a more strategic turn and political and
diplomatic excha nges are multiplying. In June 1994, an ambitious framework was put in place to
organize the political dialogue. In this context, regular meetings between EU ministers and China
are scheduled, two annual meetings are to be held between the EU Ambassador to China and the
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as two meetings between the Minister Foreign
Affairs of the European country holding the European Presidency and the Ambassador of China
in that country. It was under the British Presidency that a political document entitled
" establishment of a global partnership with China ". This document of intent proclaims the
ambition of the EU to raise its relations with China to the same level as those with the United
States, Russia and Japan.
It is also under the British impulse that it is decided to set up meetings mechanisms for
European and Chinese leaders. In April 1998, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji and Tony
Blair inaugurated the first EU -China political summit in London7. A second sum mit was held in
December 1999 in Beijing with the arrival of Romano Prodi, President of the European
Commission. A third summit is also taking place in Beijing in October 2000, which will
strengthen and intensify existing cooperation between the EU and Chi na. These solemn meetings
have since been systematized and are the driving force behind a genuine rise in European
relations in all fields.

7 van Valkengo ed, E. G. "EU -China Relations: The influence of member states’ preferences on decision -making."
Master's thesis, 2015.

In May 2001, the European Union's strategy vis -à-vis China was formulated in a
communication from the Europ ean Commission. It sets out five policy objectives : Greater
integration of China into the international community ; support the development of a society
based on the rule of law, respect for human rights and democracy ; promote China's integration
into the global economy ; improve the use of European Community funding and improve the
image of Europe in China.
Thus the European Union is increasingly involved in political affairs concerning China. In
line with the Sino -European relations fra mework that has been built since 1998, the subjects
dealt with focus on issues related to China's economic development and political advances in
democracy and human rights. In particular, human rights issues are being raised at Sino -EU
meetings, with the E U reiterating China's respect for fundamental freedoms and guaranteeing
democracy .

133. The prospects for a global partnership
At the political level, the European Union and China have established close ties since 1998,
the most important of wh ich are the EU -China summits. These meetings are the opportunity, at
first, to make common statements. Europe and China thus take joint positions on a number of
topics whose scope is meant to be global. For example, the Copenhagen Summit (September
2002) t ackles concrete issues such as the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, respect for
human rights and the non -proliferation of weapons. In a second step, they further develop
cooperation between the European Union and China. For example, at the Brussels summit
(September 2001), agreements are proposed for cooperation in the fight against illegal
immigration.
EU-China relations then develop around a comprehensive partnership. Indeed, through a
number of cooperation projects, Sino -European relatio ns are experiencing a remarkable
growth. The EU supports the development of China in many fields (culture, education but also
economy, technology, justice , etc.). This support is most often provided by the contribution of
European funds. Thus the EU is se tting up a budget of more than 7 million euros to help a rural
development project in the Panam region of Tibet. It also extends to China the ECHO
(Humanitarian Aid to Victims of Natural Disasters) program. The latter benefited in 1996 during
an earthquake in Yunnan.8

8 Fox, John, and François Godement. A power audit of EU -China relations . London: European Council on Foreign
Relations, 2009, p 19 -32.

Co-operation does not only mean making funds available. Many organizations are created
by Europe to accompany the development of the Chinese economy. Thus, economic cooperation
often means making available European technology and know -how. An agreement signed in
1999 allows for scientific and technological exchanges between China and Europe, enabling
China to benefit from Europe's technological advances in many fields (industry,
mining, energy , transport, etc.). If for Europe these t echnology transfers have appeared positive
in the context of harmonious and social development of China's economy, for China, they
represent a chance, an opportunity to leapfrog the least cost.
Relations between the EU and China have enjoyed great success in 2001 during
negotiations for the entry of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO)9. In May 2000, the
EU and China signed an agreement paving the way for China's accession to this organization. A
year of negotiations was needed to achieve this. Indeed, China did not meet the necessary
conditions First, there were still many constraints from the socialist state economy in the
management of companies and, secondly, many protectionist rules (export subsidies for whole
sectors such as agribus iness, prohibitive customs duties) . Moreover, its economy was not
competitive in an open market, Chinese state companies are very capital asylum to adapt to
international competition. The entry of China into a market economy for Europe represented a
funda mental advantage: the huge Chinese consumer market opened to European companies. She
used all his weight to allow China to meet WTO requirements. Of a political point of view, the
EU – with the United States – proposed some arrangements of WTO during an undetermined
transition. On the other hand, it unblocked more than € 20 million to help the Chinese
government to implement commitments under the WTO (eg assistance to Chinese grain
producers). With support from the EU, China could well in late 2001 join the WTO with
engagement costs kept to a minimum but with increased economic opportunities.

PART TWO: THE REAL WEIGHT OF EUROPE IN CHINA
If the growth of China -EU relations is remarkable, it should however be noted that the
geopolitical weig ht of the European Community in China remains lower than all of its
competitors in the region. Indeed, if, as we have seen, the European Union seeks to become more
involved in China by forging closer political and diplomatic relations, it has many disadvan tages
and still experiencing several difficulties.

9 Erixon, F., Messerlin, P. and Sally, R., 2008. China's Trade Policy Post -WTO Accession: Focus On China -EU
Relations. ECIPE, Brussels , p 1-32.

In this second part we will first study the factors behind internal and external weaknesses
of the European Community in its relations with China. Then we discuss the difficulties and
unresolved p roblems affecting recurrently relations between the EU and China. Finally, there are
still significant disabilities decreasing the scope of Sino -European relations. These disadvantages
are all the result of a lack of a coherent EU as pragmatic and opportun istic China relation .

1. The weaknesses of the European Community
The EU's weaknesses in establishing itself as a leading partner in China are two different
types. They are related, firstly, low geopolitical presence and, secondly, domination vi rtually
unchallenged US in the region.

211. geopolitical factors
The EU knows strong geopolitical constraints: absent physically Asia and too distant
historically and culturally, it is hard to match for its competitors who do not know these
geop olitical weaknesses.
The geography is, first, an important factor. But beyond the distance between China and
Europe (more than 8 000 km of distance between Brussels and Beijing) and the physical absence
of Europe in Asia The geopolitical dy namics of Europe have ever brought, since the end of
World War II, to turn its back on Asia. The Cold War brought Western Europe into the alliance
with the United States. Atlantic link becomes vital to safeguard it against the Soviet Union. It
soon formali zed by the North Atlantic Treaty (April 1949) that strengthens the bridge between
America and Europe face a Eurasian enemy. European construction, then center the actions and
focus the energies of European countries on their own future. The successive crea tions of the
ECSC (April 1951), WEU (October 1954) and the EEC (March 1957) established in Europe the
foundations for new political and economic relations between European countries. The main
issues of the European Community will then mainly related to its own evolution. Successive
enlargements and deepening of EU policies and economic and commercial developments they
have gradually driven away Europe of the global geopolitical dimension it had before the Second
World War. Moreover, shortcomings in the pol itical construction of Europe have long favored
bilateral relations in each European country. Also only powers with an international political role
(mainly France and Britain) have developed comprehensive policies with China . The
geopolitical weakness o f the European Union at international level has long been a handicap in
its relations with China, which saw it as a secondary actor, the limited political influence.

This relative lack geographical and political Europe is more a weakness than its main
competitors in China do not know these frailties. Indeed everyone – Russia, Japan and the United
States – are present in one way or another in China. Russia, first of all, has a common border
with China of 4 370 km. Relations between China and the USS R influenced the geopolitics of
Asia as a whole throughout the Cold War. If the two countries had turned his back to the 1970s,
after the fall of the " big brother " Soviet, Sino-Russian relations have only grow. This
resurgence can be attributed to two reasons. On the one hand, Russia has kept a great influence
in the Central Asian republics that have become as many partners for China . It therefore has an
interest in developing political agreements that preserve regional stability and to preserve China
threat from the north . On the other hand, Russia is a partner with regard to economic and
technical cooperation. Thus, eight technical agreements were signed in 1998. Moreover, the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in June 2001 provides for military -techn ical cooperation.
Japan, then, has long been a geopolitical rival China in the Far East. The two countries are
not just geographical neighbors, they also have important cultural ties : Japan is one of the world
' sinicized "Who suffered for c enturies the cultural and geopolitical influence of China.
Relations between the two countries are so complex and tumultuous, China showing a
superiority complex vis -a-vis Japan which meets from it an inferiority complex. Today, both
countries are in fierc e competition. Economically, if China has experienced a boom, this is not at
the expense of Japan remains the second largest economy and is also one of the main
beneficiaries of the Chinese economic boom . Politically, Japan is the main strategic partner of
the US in Asia. This is fueling Chinese resentment regularly expresses his displeasure (her
repeatedly to demand the " apology " from Japan for its crimes committed during World War II
is an example ). Sino-Japanese relations is therefore akin to a power struggle for regional
dominance in Asia.

212. The geopolitical dominance of the United States
But the emphasis on the European Union to China is also related to the influence and the
role it can have in Asia. Now the EU faces an old geopol itical dominance of the United States
was further strengthened since the 2001 terrorist attacks This dominance makes the EU the
influence problematic in China. US dominance was born in the Cold War when only major
Western power able to have a global influe nce, she was confronted with the USSR and the China
of Mao, who wanted to play a role in the great diplomatic game between two superpowers. She
was born at a time when China is dissociated from the USSR: Henry Kissinger (Chief of US
National Security Co uncil Richard Nixon) takes advantage of this loophole to inaugurate a

rapprochement with China (1972)10 . First conceived as circumvention of the USSR, these
specific and pragmatic relations have longer needed after the fall of the Soviet Union. But for the
United States, maintain their influence in Asia is needed : they adapt the theories
of containment to China they consider a threat to regional stability. Furthermore US interests are
numerous in Southeast Asia : from the legacies of the past to pr eserving the stability of a
major economic area for them with the presence of Japan and emerging countries with which
trade is flourishing, Americans under guardianship Southeast Asia. This supervision is exercised
in a very dissuasive two ways : firstly, the US has stepped up bilateral agreements with countries
in the region, on the other hand, they ensure a permanent military presence as shown in the map .

The period from 1991 to 2001 was a period of tension between the US and China. The
latter resents the pressure of US influence in the region and feels threatened. Thus several
incidents between the two countries punctuate the China -US relations .
The attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States inaugurated a new US policy in
Asia. First traditional alliances are strengthened, particularly with Japan and Australia that
encourage an increased presence of the United States under the guise of fighting terrorism. Then
the intervention in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban (2001) moved th e US in Central Asia : US
troops are in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan. They also occurred in the Philippines in 2003.

10 Rapprochement with China, 1972, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969 -1976/rapprochement -china , accessed
07/05/2017.

2. Persistence of difficulties in Sino -European relations
Besides the geopolitical weakness of the European Community in t he region, we must also
see that China -EU relations are disturbed by recurring problems that have long hindered the
establishment of lasting trust.

221. Unresolved issues
Some of these difficulties are still unresolved issues : the issue of huma n rights, Tibet or
the arms embargo are still stumbling blocks between the EU and China.
The issue of human rights has long been a subject of tension between China and the
European countries and, even if she knows a healing today, European resent ment is still present,
especially because of the absence actual progress on this. China, aware of this fact, is never
comfortable and tends to react harshly when the subject reappears. The tactic has worked in the
past : it plays on the economic interests of bilateral trade relations to evade the question .
It is the same for the Tibet issue. China long criticized the European relations with the
Dalai Lama. But the sensitivity of this issue in European public opinion encourages the EU to
respond regularly for Tibet. The resolutions of the European Union for a settlement of Tibetan
autonomy problem are still unanswered from Beijing. In 2006, the EU seems resigned to
peaceful relations on Tibet before the real alternative to appeasement and lack of spirits in the
region.
The question of the arms embargo is the only European sanctions enacted during the 1989
events China, considering this penalty as a humiliation, especially after the successive mergers
which were established between it and t he EU regularly calls for lifting the embargo.
If France expressed support for the resumption of arms sales in 1997, this idea is far from
unanimous. The question is a source of additional stress that the EU wishes to raise in the
context of the establishm ent of a strategic partnership with China. If Europeans arrive gradually
a consensus, they are then faced with strong opposition from the United States: the lifting of the
embargo on arms sales would strengthen the Chinese military potential thus giving Be ijing an
advantage over in Taiwan. It would give him further strengthened influence in the various
rivalries that pitted him against it s neighbors in Southeast Asia. In late 2004, Europeans were
thus arrived at an agreement on the lifting of the embargo fo r the summer of 2005 but pressure
from Washington returned the position of Britain which then opposed the resumption of sales of
China weapons (March 2005). Moreover, the passing of the anti -secession law legalizing the
possibility of non -peaceful resoluti on of the Taiwan issue (March 2005) makes them hesitant
Europeans on this issue.

222. Economic issues
Other difficulties in the economic field, appear today in the open. China is a major
economic partner for the EU, however, Europeans feel that their economic relations with it are
not satisfactory.11
The first complaint of Europeans regarding the widening trade deficit between China and
Europe. It has continued to grow during the 1990s, while China -EEC trade was surplus for the
EEC at the beginning of their commercial relationship. The following tables depict the
inexorable widening trade deficit of the Union European:

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

EU trade in goods with China

Exports 51.7 63.7 71.8 78.3 82.4 113.5 136.4 144.2 148.2 164.6 170.4
Imports 161.0 195.8 233.9 249.1 215.3 283.9 295.1 292.1 280.1 302.1 350.4
Balance -109.3 -132.1 -162.0 -170.8 -132.9 -170.5 -158.6 -147.9 -132.0 -137.5 -180.1

Total extr a-EU trade in goods

Exports 1 049.5 1 152.5 1 234.5 1 309.1 1 094.0 1 353.9 1 554.4 1 684.7 1 736.6 1 702.9 1 791.3
Imports 1 183.9 1 368.3 1 450.3 1 585.2 1 235.6 1 530.8 1 729.7 1 798.3 1 687.3 1 692.2 1 725.6
Balance -134.4 -215.8 -215.9 -276.1 -141.7 -176.9 -175.3 -113.7 49.3 10.7 65.8

China / Total extra -EU

Exports 4.9% 5.5% 5.8% 6.0% 7.5% 8.4% 8.8% 8.6% 8.5% 9.7% 9.5%
Imports 1.6% 14.3% 16.1% 15.7% 17.4% 18.5% 17.1% 16.2% 16.6% 17.9% 20.3%

This deficit is the result of a very rapid increase in European imports (they are multiplied
by 2.65 from 1995 to 2000) while exports grew at a much slower pace (they are multiplied by
1.72 over the same period). If Europeans denounce the insufficient openness of the Chinese
market and a climate unfavorable to investment, these results also reflect European weaknesses
with China in economy and trade: low investment , exports and the attractiveness of European
produc ts.
The second complaint concerns the European competition that Chinese products are
starting to affect European products. The textile crisis that has occupied most of China -EU
relations in 2005 has revealed that the EU is the combination of aggre ssive capitalism with a
right to the very liberal labor associated with low wages make China a formidable competitor,
capable of supplying the entire European market for manufactured products at prices on which
European companies cannot align.

11 Fox, John, and François Godement. A power audit of EU -China relations . London: European Council on Foreign
Relations, 2009, p11.

Economic problems and disputes currently training worsening economic tensions fueling
many fears and resentments in Europe. They also contribute to the Europeans out of their
" worldliness " against China. They then realize that China's economic aggression re presents a
serious threat to the entire European economy, including through proven business intelligence
techniques.

3. handicaps and burdens
The actual weight of the EU in China also depends on the perception that Beijing of
European influence on Sino -European relations. But they are impaired as a result of the parasitic
influence of bilateral relations : the special relations between China and some countries in the
European Union may sometimes conflict with the consistency of a common policy vi s-à vis
China. Moreover, the geopolitical ambitions of China weigh on relations with the EU as they are
increasingly seen as utilitarian relations rather than truly strategic relationships.

231. opposing interests and perceptions
As we have see n, European countries have different perceptions of their relationship with
China. Depending on the history of bilateral relations, European countries are therefore more or
less preferred policy with China. France and Britain are certainly the European cou ntries linked
the bilateral relations with China the most successful. Thus, she has developed a special
partnership France, alongside the EU's partnerships: May 16, 1997, France and China sign a joint
declaration for a global partnership. On this basis, th e Franco -Chinese relations have developed
around many economic or cultural policy meetings. This Franco -Chinese dialogue is built around
two key concepts : Promoting multipolarity and cultural plurality .12
Yet the EU and its Member States share c ommon objectives which are the foundations of
the various partnership agreements signed with China since 1985 : Help China progress towards
political and economic reforms, promote respect for human rights, resolve disputes through
exclusively peaceful ch annels fit into the international society respecting the rules, open its
market etc. But this common base too general does not eliminate bilateral relations. If often the
European states do not have the same objectives (France and China share the same visi on of a
multipolar world, it therefore seeks to develop privileged political relations with it, while
Germany favors economic relations and mainly commercial), it happens sometimes that they

12 China and France aim to build a long -term full partnership,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_6 65543/3604_665547/t18031.shtml, accessed 27/04/2017

oppose. Thus the impossibility of EU to reach a common position o n the issue of Kosovo in
1999 and Iraq in 2002 highlighted the limits of the political construction of Europe. It remains in
effect, subject to the interests of sovereign states often opposed.
China has long played divergences between member state s. Dealing primarily with the
states her favor , she even opposes them sometimes to get what she wants EU. Thus, during
negotiations in 2002 to recognize Europe the status of approved tourist destination, China has
sent to the European Commission but has n ot had a satisfactory response. She then turned to the
Member States, some saw it as an opportunity for economic gain to become a favorite tourist
destination of China. Germany and Spain were ready to sign bilateral agreements when, aware of
the disadvanta ges of this approach in a disorganized, Member States have finally found a
common position.

232. Chinese opportunism
We can see that China's policy vis -à-vis Europe is mainly made of pragmatism and
opportunism. It seems, indeed, have focused on China -EU relations utilitarian look. Thus, in the
1970 -1980 years, they were part of a broader rapprochement with the Western bloc as a
counterweight to Soviet power with whom she had distanced. But in the context of the Cold
War, it was mainly for China t o interfere in the relationship between Washington and Moscow to
create triangular relationships that would integrate Beijing. The European Community had no
place in this triangle, it was not useful to develop political partnership with her. However, there
is no conflict of immediate interests between them and the same China shares common interests,
especially in the field of economic relations: the development of relations with the EU on
economic and commercial bases can be that mutually beneficial.
After the fall of the USSR, China is faced with the American superpower and it seeks to
develop political ties with the EU as a counterweight to the United States in the context of
promoting multipolarity. If China has developed its relations with the EU to counterbalance US
influence, it has also used its European partner based relationships it had with the United States.
Thus, in times of tension, it was close to the EU , while in periods of relaxation, she turned away
Europeans always emphasizing Was hington at the expense of Brussels. This is the case after the
attacks of 11 September 2001 when China opens a new strategy virtually alliance with the
United States sometimes akin to a new Sino -American bipolarity .
Pragmatic, China also knows ho w to play on the greed it excites among Europeans: the
signing of commercial contracts with large European groups to the extensive media reach
(Airbus, Alstom, Carrefour) are useful for him obtain political gestures in his favor : the

constructive dialogue on human rights in China was launched especially for political discourse
does not harm large commercial contracts that China was preparing to sign.
Finally, we have seen, China -EU cooperation that China has encouraged are those that can
allow it to leapfrog the lower cost ; thus it favors the scientific and technical partnerships to
benefit from the advanced European technology and adapt it to its industries. The United States,
far more wary and more pragmatic in their approach to the Chinese ec onomy, do not export
technology or know -how by installing joint ventures: either implanted directly US companies if
the Chinese government accept and transfer of know -how are in some strategic sectors (as is the
case in the services sector where Wall mart, For example, has established cooperation with
China in the field of staff training), or they export manufactured goods directly from the United
States. Only the EU seems ready to engage China on numerous scientific cooperation in cluding
in strategic areas .

PART THREE: WHAT PARTNERSHIP FOR TOMORROW ?
China -EU relations are marked by ambivalence. On the one hand, everyone receives the
interest he may withdraw a stable and balanced relationship. On the other side, each sees the
other as a casua l partner which is approached according to economic and political opportunities
of the moment. These two political rising powers each have the ambition to play a role in global
governance. Each of these regional powers has also aims to become a global play er on the
international stage. They are therefore bound to become strategic partners.
We will study in Part perspectives and reflections on the development of a comprehensive
partnership between the EU and China. First, we show how today the EU is a global strategic
partner on the world stage. Then we will present what role the EU can play in today's
China. Finally, we will consider a few lines of thought on the convergence and weaknesses of
Sino-European relations.

1. The European Union as globa l strategic partner
Since the late 1990s, the European Union is becoming a global player: alongside its
economic and financial expertise, is now recognized it a political and strategic competence. It is
becoming a global geopolitical power whose i nfluence continues to grow. And China has
recognized this and therefore believes the EU in a new way, more strategic.

311. Development of the European Security Strategy

The willingness of the European Union to participate in the security in the world dates back
to June 1992 at the meeting of the Western European Union (WEU) in Petersberg. The European
Community declares that occasion his willingness to participate in conflict prevention and crisis
management. The Petersberg Declaration is the or igin of the Petersberg tasks WEU wishes to fill
without having to call in NATO .13
First emancipation of the European Community in relation to the Atlanticist link Petersberg
must see to confirm the development of a genuine European Security Strate gy with the European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This is based on three main principles. First, the ESDP is
not the role of deploying a global military power. It is a stabilization policy and international
security which aims to maintain or restore peace. In this context only, the Petersbe rg tasks are
not enough. EU forces must be able to intervene in a wider field including disarmament
missions, support for the fight against terrorism, etc. The ESDP represents a new political and
military tool that can meet the new EU influence ambitions.
The second principle is multilateralism. The EU intervenes only under the aegis of the
resolutions of the UN Security Council. This principle has led, in June 2004, an agreement
between the EU and the UN. This agreement defined the conditions that the UN could call on the
EU to conduct peacekeeping or peacemaking operations: first, the EU could intervene to
coordinate the missions of many of its Member States (c This is the case of
missions monitoring ) ; second, it could itself conduct operations on request of the UN. This
was the case of the operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003).
The third principle states that the EU leads a security policy on several dimensions, n ot just
on the military dimension. This actually represents the originality of the European Security
Strategy. Designed primarily as a civil power, the EU is considering the role of the military
intervention as secondary. Military action complements a comp lete action, taking into account
all areas for stabilization and restoration of security in the area where it operates. Thus, the
answer may be, as necessary, economic, political, environmental, humanitarian, social, legal, etc.
For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU sets up a military force for peacekeeping
(EUFOR Operation Althea ), Policy monitoring mission (EUMM ), a Police Mission (EUPM )
as well as technical assistance tools (eg, the CFAA, a Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office).

312. The European Union as a global player

13 The Petersberg Declaration – Western European Union, http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf, accessed
07/05/2017

If the European Union has developed a new security strategy, it is because it is now
considered a global player. The EU is a political entity that aims to offer an alternative to
American policy in the internatio nal arena She must have a global reach to offer its specific
vision of global governance. It is in this context that it has moved closer to emerging powers
such as China that have, like her, a future role on the international stage. The EU and China have
indeed interest to act as strategic partners on the one hand, they are both political rising powers
and, secondly, they have converging positions, including the role of organizations international
and multilateral systems.
As a global player, the EU differs from other powers, including the United States, a number
of aspects. We can define this actor according to three criteria. It is primarily a civilian power.
This notion implies that the means to carry out his policies are primarily civilian mea ns. This is
the case with the establishment of numerous cooperation and aid systems. It is then a normative
power. It is thus seen through its policy of promoting a regulated globalization. This concept
aims to regulate globalization to promote equitable d evelopment and environmentally friendly. It
is the same for the promotion of democracy and human rights. Finally, a geopolitical power
whose economic weight gives it a significant global influence. But rather than forcing through
coercion, the EU prefers t o use incentives (often through a system of financial incentives). The
EU is thus the largest development aid donor in the world.14
So it is with the European Union's policy vis -à-vis China She takes a comprehensive
strategy in which it wishes to strengthen its dialogue with China on three levels. At the bilateral
level, the EU continues its policy of promoting respect for fundamental rights and democracy. At
regional level, the EU as a strategic actor is closer ASEM (Asian -European Meeting) for
cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security in the region. At the global level, the EU
seeks to develop a more frequent dialogue with China on global governance issues by promoting
a coordinated EU -China, supporting the concept of multilateralism i n dealing jointly security,
non-proliferation of weapons, the fight against terrorism and the new environmental challenges.

313. The new assets of the European Union
Surely, the EU still keeps an economic appeal for China: with 200 billion, it is its lar gest trading
partner ahead of Japan. This economic incentive is also due to the fact that the EU is a
complementary partner of China. On the one hand, the European market is strong demand for
Chinese manufactured goods. On the other side, through the many scientific and technological
cooperation, the EU participates in the development of the Chinese economy. But, moreover, the

14 Thilo Bodenstein , Achim Kemmerling , The European Union as a Collective Actor: A id and Trade in African
Public Opinion, Development Policy Review , 2017 , p 35.

EU can increase its economic influence through the introduction of the euro which can
eventually compete with the dollar. The politi cal motivation that prevailed in the establishment
of a single currency is, in effect, ofbalance of " monetary authorities ". China may be
tempted to play on this register to counterbalance US economic influence as already envisaged
Russia.
The EU's second asset is the credibility of its foreign policy and common security. Indeed,
she began to forge a geopolitical identity through military interventions it has made. The
European troops have regained control of three holding peacekeeping oper ations in Macedonia
(2003), the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003) and Bosnia (2004). In addition, the first
European battalions are operational since 2005 . Finally, the EU set up the European Defense
Agency which aims to coordinate the policies of Memb er States in the acquisition of weapons
and equipment .
The last thing the EU is its political emergence on the international stage. It can now be a
credible alternative to American policy behind that China, by providing support, may oppose
Washi ngton's unilateralism. The EU's image is, indeed, often drawn as an anti-American . The
historical, cultural past, political and economic relations are so many shared values underlying
the specificity of Europe compared to the United States. For a non -European, Europe differs
from America in many ways and that is what he seeks in its relations with it. Even if the current
failure of the draft European Constitution shows the differences and difficulties of a common
definition of what a European, what unite s (shared values), foreign observers see the emergence
of a common European identity that is defined (or they define) as opposed to American values.

2. A new role for the European Union to China ?
Faced with increasing pressure from the United States after the attacks in 2001, China is
turning to the European Union which it finally become aware of the political and strategic
role. This new vis -à-vis EU's attitude is formalized in 2003 in a comprehensive strategic
partnership.15

321. A new geop olitical
2001 represents a break in the chaotic relationship between China with the United States
since the fall of the Soviet bloc. With the coming to power of George W. Bush, could be
expected to more strained relations . But Chinese leaders hav e no interest in a crisis with the
US , it favors a moderate diplomatic attitude. Moreover, immediately after the attacks of 11

15 EU RELATIONS WITH CHINA ,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/116848.pdf, 08/05/2017

September 2001, Jiang Zemin supports the anti -terrorism policy of the United States. China is
well aware of the shock that had received the US would make them react badly. Its alignment
with the Americans thus appears as a way to contain US unilateralism. On the other hand, the
frontal opposition with the United States is not an option since its emergence on the international
stage is not possible in the context of a bipolar rivalry with the United States.
China approves the Afghan campaign against Ben Laden and then enters the great alliance of
countries against international terrorism. It seems to open a new era in US -China relat ions :
Beijing binds slightly more in the US, discreetly recognized as the dominant world power. This
should involve, in addition confirmed the will to avoid a confrontation between the two countries
and increased cooperation in the field of intelligence, a rather neutral attitude to Chinese all Bush
administration initiatives justified by the fight against international terrorism .
True, China and the United States maintain the best relations since 2001 long . But can we
yet talk of a new allianc e between the two powers ? The conciliatory attitude of China in the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks seems dictated by the desire not to be marginalized . But
it does not abandon its strategy to promote a multipolar world. His position alongside Fr ance and
Russia against the United States on intervention in Iraq (2003) illustrates this strategy. Only, she
would probably not against the Americans but in second curtain of anti -war behind the front two
supporters of multilateralism, it can act and asse rt its traditional opposition to the domination of
its policy by another nation.
Thus, in the US by bypassing the consultation bodies that China has, since 2001, conducted
a diplomacy of influence within international organizations likely to conta in American power
from within (APEC ASEAN, Asian Regional Forum, ASEM organization of Shanghai). China,
acting as intermediary between the US and North Korea illustrates this change diplomacy to
prevent the US to be alone to make decisions unilaterally.

322. An awareness of the new political role of the European Union
The changes in Europe since the Maastricht Treaty (1992) are studied carefully by the
Chinese who then take the measure of European construction. Their perception of a Europe that
is emancipated from the United States, who knows organize around common projects and
represents an international economic power now has an international currency able to compete
dollar makes them aware of the character profound and irreversible European int egration.
China's interest in the European Union is even stronger than the economic and trade ties are
already strong. See an important economic partner to develop a strategic vision and a
comprehensive policy is in line with the promotion of mult ilateralism.

This growing interest in European construction can be measured in particular through
official meetings taking place between China and the European representatives. The speech
seems more direct, whereas before, the Chinese were still t rying to compete in Europe with the
United States. Moreover, European construction is considered a model by China, which has set
up a unique development concept " peaceful rise ". Launched in late 2003 at the request of Hu
Jintao, the concept of peace ful rise is to balance China's development in a peaceful environment,
better security and greater regional influence with international multilateralism allowing China to
become a real power that has worldwide. European integration has succeeded, thanks to a rapid
economic and technological development, to federate formerly antagonistic states around a
project. And recently, integrating the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, despite their
economic and technological gap, she managed to avoid Europe a long p eriod of instability. The
stabilizing virtues and growth in Europe are now recognized in China tend to be a model for
thepeaceful rise.

323. A new global strategic partnership
The new strategic rapprochement with the European Union and China was formalized on
10 September 2003 through a document entitled " Shared interests and challenges in EU -China
relations : a maturing partnership "16. It summarizes all the partnerships, agreements and
cooperation developed since 1998 and so has the diversity o f these relationships as converging in
a global partnership. Five principles should guide this global partnership and are set :
– improve the EU's image in China ;
– support the transition of China to an open society ;
– promote economic opening of China inside and abroad ;
– develop China -EU cooperation as mutually beneficial ;
– affirm a shared responsibility in promoting global governance.
These five principles of partnership, the latter two are particularly significant of the new
state of mind in which should build the EU -China relations. This is, firstly, to establish an
economic partnership in the mode of give -and win -win. As the two markets are complementary,
technical and comm ercial cooperation is reaffirmed, but as the Chinese aggression can hurt in the
short run to the European economy, the EU no longer wishes to extend partnerships in which it
loses. On the other hand, political dialogue is strengthened. It focuses on the co nvergence of
European and Chinese policies towards the promotion of global governance concerned with
international security (the fight against proliferation, fight against terrorism) but also mindful of

16 Shared interests and challenges in EU -China rel ations : a maturing partnership,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/124565.htm, 08/05/2017

environmental issues (collaboration on global environ mental challenges, joint work on SARS).
Finally, it presents a common vision of global governance mode : It must be oriented in a
multilateralist approach to international relations.
Closer coordination of the two players on the international sc ene, their convergent
positions and the impact of their joint initiatives allow to design strategic actions of global reach
serving interests. Thus technological, China joined the Galileo project to compete with the
American GPS Forward (April 2004). Also in June 2004, it supports the Cadarache site in
France for the implementation of the research reactor nuclear fission (ITER). This support brand
for China the beginning of a new technological cooperation in a highly strategic sector: energy.

3. The E U's influence in China today : strengths and weaknesses
In these new relationships become global, we can see that the European Union has
established itself over China. Less naive economically, more vigilant and more demanding in
their partnership , it fuels some dissatisfaction and some discontent on the part of China that
resents the EU's more mature attitude.

331. The influence of the enlarged European Union in the Asian region
The EU also adopted a strategy of influence in the Asian r egion. This strategy seeks to
mitigate geopolitical weaknesses of the European community in this part of the world where it is
absent. Without the means to compete with American influence, it nevertheless seeks to hear an
alternative route hoping it will b e relayed by China.
To develop a European policy towards Southeast Asia, the EU seeks to approach the Asian
regional organizations and build links between regional organizations. It is in this goal created
ASEM (Asian -European Meeting) summit in M arch 1996 in Bangkok.17 This association brings
together the Europe of fifteen and ASEAN which join South Korea, Japan and China. ASEM
was set up initially for commercial purposes : it provides a framework for economic cooperation
between Europe and Southe ast Asia with the aim of developing European investments that are
very low in the region. But if ASEM attempts to liberalize trade, it also provides an expanded
framework of cooperation by introducing cooperation in the fields of education, culture,
techno logy development and political dialogue.
The EU, at first, trying to impose in Asia as a key humanitarian and social actor in assisting
these countries. Asia contains two thirds of the poorest people on earth (800 million people live
on less than $ 1 a day). Food safety issues, health and access to basic health care are particularly

17 ASEM InfoBoard, http://www.aseminfoboard.org/content/history, 13/05/2017.

important and the EU wants to play a role in helping countries to resolve 30% of the total aid
sent to developing the Asia comes from the European Union.
Secondly, Europe is to emerge as a player in international security. This problem is
particularly important in Asia, which is in fact a major source of tension and conflict . ASEM is
for the EU, a platform in Asia to promote his vision of global governance. So the last summit
between Europe and Asia, which took place on 6 and 7 May 2005 in Kyoto is dominated by
discussions on the strengthening of multilateralism, United Nations reform and security
challenges, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of d estruction massive and
international organized crime .

332. The case of the Sino -German Relationship

The Sino -German relationship is an eloquent example of this Chinese strategy. The two powers,
who have always maintained close economic link s, have today a special relationship that comes
not only economic but also political, scientific and cultural. More generally, the strength of Sino –
German relations can play a driving role in China -Europe relations currently broken down.

Considering Berlin as a political and economic leader of the European Union, so must the old
continent, China has chosen to treat their relationship already close deepening it significantly, to
achieve its goal of penetration of the European market economy .

Sino-German economic rel ations, which are fertile, are constantly gaining momentum; they
gradually fortify the ties between the two countries, in particular with the establishment in 2004
of a strategic partnership between China and Germany. In 2014, the volume of bilateral trade
amounted to $ 177.75 billion, a significant increase of + 10.1% in just one year. The German
Federal Republic represents nearly 30% of China's trade in Europe and is dependent on 7% of
China's imports, its 3rd largest supplier. 18

As for China, in additi on to being the first customer of the German mechanical engineering
sector, it is the fourth recipient countries of exports from Germany, accounting for a share of
6.6% 18 of the German foreign trade. In August 2016, there were an estimated 5,200 German
companies in China, representing a payroll of 1.1 million Chinese.

18 The European Union and its trade partners,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/d isplayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.2.1.html, 15/05/2017

Despite a significant decline in trade volumes of 11.8% in 2015 due to a global economic
downturn, there has been an average increase of more than 10% each year since 2010.

As for investm ents, they are high since Berlin has invested nearly 40 billion in China in 2014,
against 1.4 billion for its partner.

Finally, the new "comprehensive" partnership of 2014 allows the Sino -German relationship to go
beyond the mere economic framework and to build in more varied fields such as environment,
culture and science; by the project of Xi Jin Ping to create a "green civilization".

The Sino -German bilateral relationship feeds on mutual interests. On the Chinese side, Berlin is
a gateway to Europe a s well as an investment source, as well as technology transfers. On the
German side, the dynamism of the Chinese economy offers a range of possibilities for its
industrial sector, highly focused on sustainable trade. Thanks in particular to trade with Chin a,
Germany is the strongest economy in the European Union, accounting for 21.2% of the EU's
GDP.19

The Sino -German bilateral relationship is very distinct from other relations that China has
established with the member countries of the European Union. Indeed, in March 2016, the
President of the German Federal Republic said in a speech at Tongji University in Shanghai that
Sino-German trade was greater than total trade between China and France , Italy, and Great
Britain together. A comparative study of econo mic ties between China and France, 3 rd economy
of the EU and partner of Germany in his head, clearly demonstrates this trend.

19 Share of Member States in EU GDP, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products -eurostat -news/ -/DDN -20170410 –
1, accessed 15/05/2017.

Although Paris and Beijing have rich political and economic relations, there is no common
measure with the strength of Sino -German economic ties. In 2012, France represented 1.36% of
the Chinese market, a rate five times lower than its neighbor on the other side of the Rhine,
which weighs 5.5% of the economy of the Asian giant. 1,200 French companies operate in
China, compared t o 5,200 German companies operating in the country. Chinese investment
in the hexagon was $ 700 million, while rising to 1.4 billion in Germany, twice. While Germany
is China's 3rd largest customer, as well as its 2nd largest supplier, France ranks only 22n d and
17th respectively.

This "symbiosis" between Berlin and Beijing raises many concerns in Europe, as it reveals the
fragility of what one would falsely regard as a homogeneous economic and political "bloc"; but
also, and jointly, because it leads to the recognition of a "German European Union," of which
dominant Berlin is the centrifugal point.

Indeed, Germany's industrial strength and its ability to become one of the world's leading
exporting powers shaped its relations with powers outside the Euro pean Union, including
China.According to some observers, the Asian giant is convinced of the German superiority over

his European counterparts and therefore prefers to dialogue with Berlin rather than the European
institutions, notably the CFSP. Shi Mingde , the Chinese ambassador to the German capital, said
that "pragmatic co -operation between China and Germany played a leading role in Sino –
European relations".

This assertion of the Chinese ambassador only revives the tenacious and lancinating concern of
the European nations to see Germany privilege its own interests over community interests.

It is true that the facts seem to support the most pessimistic analysts. Indeed, Germany has often
made the choice of unilateralism, yet in deep contradiction with it s political tradition, when its
economic interests were at stake.

In May 2013, while some EU member states worried about the health of their photovoltaic
industry are trying to impose sanctions on China on solar panels, Angela Merkel – put under
pressure by German industry – burying this possibility by imposing, after many negotiations, a
consensus among the EU countries.

In addition, Germany has begun negotiations with Kazakhstan to ensure its supply of rare earths,
thus doubling the European Union, whi ch has itself entered into negotiations on raw materials on
behalf of all its member states member.20

Finally, to a lesser extent, it would appear that German officials benefit more from China than its
European neighbors.

However, Germany is aware that only, however powerful it may be, it will be impossible for it to
maintain a balance of influence with a superpower such as China. It therefore needs a united
European Union capable of carrying this strategic relationship with Beijing and extending it to
the entire euro area. To do so, it seeks to foster a dynamic conducive to consensus among
Member States, so that Sino -European relations are stimulated as much as possible and thus
prolific. Despite this benevolence, the repeated failures of the European Co mmission to reach an
agreement among its members that could lead to the establishment of a strategic partnership with

20 Germany -Kazakhstan Bilateral Relations, http://www.auswaertiges –
amt.de/EN/ Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01 -Nodes/Kasachstan_node.html, consulted the 10/05/2017

China on a European scale are annoying Germany, which is gradually dissociating itself from the
rest of Europe .21

Thus, the Sino -German r elationship, privileged, is a real engine for the Sino -European relations,
which struggle to take shape. However, this crucial role played by this partnership is the
symptom of a deep European asymmetry, both political and economic, since Germany, the
privileged interlocutor of China in Europe thanks to its strong economy, seems to take the place
of the Brussels institutions in the negotiations on Sino -European relations.

This poses risks for the EU: Germany, faced with Brussels' indecision, could decide to put its
own economic interests over European interests. Thus, Berlin would shape the Sino -European
relationship almost unilaterally, which is contrary to the founding principle of the European
Union endorsed by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 with the crea tion of the CFSP. The Sino –
German relationship once again denotes a European political dysfunction.22

333. The promotion of global governance

A key objective is to converge the two powers towards a common position on global
governance for which they have a shared responsibility. This position is based on the assertion of
principles common to the EU and China, particularly regarding the role of multilateral
organizations and systems. In this framework, several factors are all converging points for China
and EU policies. Each has an interest in developing its influence in a multipolar world : China
finds a way to counterbalance American influence ; EU sees the opportunity to represent a
credible alternative to the United States. Then,each has a simi lar design to its influence in the
context of global governance : Either through the European Security Strategy and the Chinese
peaceful rise, they favor development in stability and peace. By indirect characteristics of their
influence, we can even c onsider them both as geopolitical powers " soft ."
However, there are major limitations to the establishment of a shared responsibility in
global governance. EU opens its policy on the Asian region where it intends to develop its

21 KUNDNANI Hans, PARELLO -PLESNER , China -Germany : why the emerging special relationship matters for
Europe , Policy Brief, ECFR, May 2012.
22 CDU / CSU Group, Asia as a Strategic Challenge and Opportunity for Germany and Europe: Asia Strategy CDU
/ CSU Bundestag Fraction , decision of
23.10.2007, www.cducsu.de/Titel__Publikationen_Asien/TabID__13/SubTabID__100/InhaltTypID__16/ThemenID
__2000/StichwortID__79000 /in halt.aspx, accessed 07/05/2017

influence and therefore has an interest in a convergence of views with one of the most influential
Asian players. However, this is not necessarily the case for China whose concerns are mainly
oriented towards its own problems (first, the harmonious development of the ec onomy but also
the question of Taiwan, the sea influence China to control its energy supply, conservation of the
communist regime, etc.). So we can note that China remains a fairly volatile partner who stands
by the EU for raising issues that few problems in global governance and which follows the more
when the political stakes are high. Thus, it is not involved in the pressure on Iran's desire to
become a nuclear power. She does not sign the Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997 about controlling
greenhouse gas e ffects not to impede its businesses, highly polluting.
Furthermore, the difficulties of the political construction of Europe since the freezing of the
ratification of the 2005 Constitution of the project may reappear opportunistic reflexes Chinese .
So, when the EU appears divided, China may be tempted by a return to bilateral relations with
EU member states. In addition, by pragmatism, it can approach other partners. Currently, one can
observe also a sensitive combination of Beijing and Moscow. The y build their relations on
energy resource needs on the one hand, and on governance in Central Asia, on the other. Finally,
China pursues a policy vis -à-vis the US complacency as evidenced by its unconditional support
for the US intervention in Afghanistan and thata more moderate position on intervention in Iraq
today than it was in 2002.
Thus, we can see that China -EU relations are lacking consistency23. But the ambitious
framework for joint promotion of world governance, regular and sustained rela tionships are
necessary for the credibility of the partnership.

333. Towards a balanced co -development ?

Finally, another line of thought on the future of EU -China relations regarding the co –
development of both partners. We saw that the Euro peans, on the theme of development, had
realized its unbalanced nature, the Chinese pulling more benefits of the relationship with Europe
and even then aggravating the situation of EU Member States.24 They adopt from a position less
candid: aware of an imba lance which is growing, they have become more vigilant. They use all
means to monitor China's actions. They have imposed a regulation to China in the textile

23 Erixon, F., Messerlin, P. and Sally, R., 2008. China's Trade Policy Post -WTO Accession: Focus On China -EU
Relations. ECIPE, Brussels .
24 Barroso, J., and President of the European Commission. "The EU and China: shaping the f uture together." Speech
delivered at the Chinese Community Party Central School, Beijing on 27 (2007).

crisis . Furthermore, discussions are ongoing on whether to keep for China's Most Favored
Nation . Similarly, studying how certain protectionist barriers could not be reactivated.
By adopting a more demanding attitude vis -a-vis China, the EU is in a better position to
negotiate with her partner. Thus it imposed a new market in China: it balan ces the trade and
cooperation, especially economic and scientists with a social and environmental development
more assertive on the part of China. On the other hand, she does not hesitate to use its global
influence to bear in the negotiations: as she puts increasingly China competes with India. From
one point of view, one can even consider that maintaining the arms embargo is an opportunity
because it allows Europe to keep a strong argument in negotiations.
China is therefore becoming less sati sfied with its relations with the EU. Tighter
relationships are observed. Thus, the EU discourse becomes harder: in the textile crisis, for
example, she does not hesitate to threaten to withdraw from the agribusiness cooperation in
which China receives num erous technology transfer. The new EU requirements imposed on
China's efforts it was not prepared to provide: thus, in the environmental field, European
pressures are high that China adopts sustainable practices.
The EU tends towards a more bal anced co -development that China is struggling to
accept. But if this policy still has limitations due to the effect number that the Chinese market
product for European companies, it tends to prevail in the minds of Europeans. China reacts
badly to the new distrust of the Europeans but the household and emphasizes positive
relationships because it needs Europe to optimize its economic development through the
acquisition of knowledge and modern technologies.

CONCLUSION
By putting into perspective t he relations between China and the EU, it appears that they are
far from having the scope of relationships that China may have with other global players as the
US, Japan or Russia. They are even more modest than its relations with regional players such as
the countries of South Asia, Central Asia and India.
The growth experienced by thirty years for economic and trade relations between China
and the European Community cannot hide the weaknesses and limitations of a political and
strategic partnersh ip remained in the background. While it is now recognized as a global player
on the international scene, the EU has only a limited influence in China. It appears to have a lot
of difficulties to overcome its limitations and geopolitical disadvantages in th e region.
Furthermore, the European political construction is marked by numerous upheavals, the latest
being the freezing of the ratification of the draft European Constitution.

This chaotic construction can perplex China is an emerging economy a nd that needs
certainty. Therefore, although it is aware that the European Union is becoming a global player in
global governance, China is turning to its traditional strategic culture: defending the vision of a
multipolar world, it is concerned to preserv e its economic and political integrity against those
who threaten. Without real consistency, European influence does not seem able to threaten to
eventually China. One can wonder what future can be booked to the global partnership that the
EU has signed w ith China in 2003. If a real desire for balance in relationships is now clearly
displayed by Europe, it seems unlikely that a balanced co -development to continue in the long
term the level of bilateral relations. Also, deepening of inter -regional relations in the framework
of ASEM seems an interesting exhibition track for Europe. The needs and expectations are very
high in the region and the EU, civil power, is able to respond. In addition, partnerships with other
emerging countries in the region such as In dia can be considered to establish more broadly
influenced by the Europe -Southeast Asia relationship .