On Politics and Airpower [626596]

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

On Politics and Airpower

by

LtCol Bradley J Smith
United States Air Force

Col Gary Snyder
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABST RACT

AUTHOR: LtCol Bradley J Smith, USAF

TITLE: On Politics and Airpower

FORMAT: Strategy Re search Project

DATE: 09 April 2002 PAGE S: 43 CLASSIFICATION: Un classified

Airpower advocates point to the exponential in creas es in pre cision, stealt h and power of modern
air systems as proof positive of a new era in wa rfare. Yet su ch claims ca nnot be isolated from
the political objective air power ultimately serves. This paper explores the advantages and
disadvantages of the str ategic employment of airpower from a political p erspective. The
inherent political advant ages are intr oduced first along with a summary of current stra tegic
airpower theory. Next s ome of the limitations of strategic a irpower are explored with examples.
Finally, the politica l employment of US strategi c airpower is summarized for each major conflict
from World War II to Kosovo to illust rate how politics and airpower interact at the stra tegic level.
Politics of ten drives stra tegy, playing to both airpower's strengths and weaknesse s. The author
concludes t hat while th e advantages of modern US airpower make it an obvious choice for
achieving n ational obje ctives, political leaders need to be a ware of the long term cost and
limitations of reliance on airpower as a strategic means.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. ……………………… III
PREF ACE ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………… VII
ON POLITICS AND AIRP OWER …………………………………………………………………………………………. ……….. 1
THE POLITI CAL PROMISE OF ST RATEGI C AIRPOW ER………………………………………….. 1
ASYMMET RIC WARF ARE AND CONV ENTIONAL DETERRENCE ……………………………… 1
PRECI SE POLITICAL CONTROL …………………………………………………………………………….. 2
FEWER CASUALTIES …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 2
DIRECT ATTACK ON T HE ENEMY’S WILL ………………………………………………………………. 3
POWER PROJECTION …………………………………………………………………………………………… 3
STRATEGI C FLEX IBILITY………………………………………………………………………………………. 3
INFORMATI ON DOMINANCE ………………………………………………………………………………….. 4
RAPID VI CTORY …………………………………………………………………………………………………… .4
SUMMARY ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …..4
AIRPOWER UBER ALLES – THE AIRMAN’S PERSPECTI VE……………………………………. 5
AIRPOWER IS INHERENTLY A ST RATEGIC F ORCE ………………………………………………… 5
AIRPOWER IS TARGET ING, AND T ARGETING IS INTELLI GENCE ……………………………. 6
AIR SUPERIORITY IS T HE FIRST PRIORIT Y FOR AI R FORCES ……………………………….. 7
AIRPOWER IS PRIMARILY AN OFF ENSIVE W EAPON ……………………………………………… 7
AIRPOWER PRODUCE S PHYSI CAL AND PS YCHOL OGICAL SHOCK BY DOMI NATING
THE FOURTH DIMENSION TIME …………………………………………………………………………….. 7
AIRPOWER CAN C ONDUCT OPE RATIONS A T ALL LEVE LS OF WAR
SIMULT ANEOUSLY ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 8
PRECI SION AIR WEAPONS HAVE REDEFI NED THE MEANING OF MASS ………………… 8
AIRPOWER SHOULD BE CONTROLLED BY AI RMEN ………………………………………………. 9
TECHNOL OGY AND AI RPOW ER A RE INTE GRALLY AND SYNE RGISTICALLY
RELATED ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ……9
AIRPOWER INCLUDES NOT ONLY MILITARY ASSETS BUT ROBUS T CIVILIAN
AVIATION ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. …….9
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SUMMARY: THE AIRMAN’S PERSPECTIVE …………………………………………………………… 10
THE LIMITS OF AIRPOWER …………………………………………………………………………………. 11
THE TRUE MEASURE OF AIRPOWER …………………………………………………………………… 11
POLITICAL LIMITS ON AIRPOWER ……………………………………………………………………….. 12
AIRPOWER DEPENDS UPON THE VULNERABILITY OF T HE ENEMY …………………….. 13
ATTACKI NG AN ENEMY’S WILL DEPENDS ON HI S POLITICAL VULNERABILITY …….. 15
AIRPOWER LACKS PERSISTENCE ………………………………………………………………………. 15
POLITICS AND AIRP OWER IN PRACTICE …………………………………………………………….. 18
WORLD W AR II: US STRATEGIC BOMBING …………………………………………………………… 18
KOREA ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. ……20
VIETNAM ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …..21
THE PERSI AN GULF WAR ……………………………………………………………………………………. 23
AIRPOWER OVER KOSOVO …………………………………………………………………………………. 24
CONCLUSI ON……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 26
ENDNOTES ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. …………………….. 29
BIBLIOG RAPHY ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………. 33

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PREF ACE

The many p olitical para doxes of strategic airpo wer have always fascinated me. While
airpower's vision has oft en exceeded its strateg ic reach, the exponential gains we ha ve made in
targeting an d precision delivery of weapons may usher a ne w age of less costly warf are.
Unmanned vehicles, de spite the eth ical cha lleng e they present, offer to t ake warfare even
further. Yet all of this technology cannot be eval uated in iso lation of the p olitical impacts. This
paper makes an attempt to balance t he claims of airpower against its polit ical limitatio ns.
Airpower, like any mean s, cannot be separated from the objective it serves. Therefor e an
evaluation of airpower must be in lig ht of its int eraction with p olitics at the strategic level.

I would like t o express thanks to my family , particularly Miss Lisa for her support durin g
this effort. My ad visor, Col Gary Sn yder, has also been a gr eat friend an d supporter. Thanks
also to the US Air Force and Army for providing this unique opportunity to spend a year in the
study of hist ory, strategy and nationa l policy.

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ON POLITICS AND AIRPOWER

THE POLITICAL PROMISE OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER
The political object – the original motive for the war – will thus determine both the
military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.”
– Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Chapter 1

Airpower advocates are staunch in their defense of airpower as the new form of warfare.
The deadly combination of US dominance in reconnaissance platforms, stealthy precision strike
systems and real time information systems ma ke possible the near-real-time targeting and all-
weather destruction of targets undreamed of during the Gulf War. They argue that yet another
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has occurred and that has redefined warfare in the 21st
century. Yet, as Clausewitz points out, it is the political object that is dominant in any
consideration of utility. To consider airpower’s incredible technical or military achievement in
isolation from the political objective is foolishness. The claims must be evaluated in the light of
their contribution to the overall political object and political utility. Airpower is therefore nothing
more than a relatively new means to achieve the political objective. The decision to use airpower either alone or in combination with other means is a strategic choice. While military
commanders might make this strategic choice alone, history has shown us that the strategic
employment and limitation of airpower is oft en made at the political level. This section
introduces the major claims of airpower’s advantages from a political perspective. Later sections will place these claims under the harsh light of reality and explore the unstated political
limitations of modern airpower. The final secti on will examine the politics of airpower in the
major conflicts since World War II and present some lessons we can draw for the modern form
of warfare.
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE
The combination of American precision airpower and information dominance has been
hailed as the modern form of asymmetric warfare, leveraging technological superiority to
achieve unprecedented military victory. The lethal combination of stealth, precision strike,
satellite and airborne reconnaissance potentially allows any fixed surface target on the planet to
be targeted and destroyed in a matter of hours. This uniquely American asymmetry provides
such a dominant US advantage that it effectively serves as deterrence to potential enemies who
might threaten US interests abroad. Air Force historian Richard Hallion calls airpower “the

Western world’s asymmetric offset a gainst oppo nents who are compelled by doctrinal choice ,
economic n ecessity, or the realitie s of technolog ical circumst ances to rely upon older and less
relevant forms of warfare.”1 Some, including Ge neral Butler, former Strat egic Air Command
commander and General Horner, the air comman der during t he Gulf War believe that the US
advantage as so large a s to propose dismantling of US nuclear forces, ar guing that
conventional air forces can create ne ar-nuclear e ffects at le ss cost and wit h less poten tial for an
accident.2 Politica lly, the US has been able to leverage the th reat of US airpower credibly to
deter and even coerce fo es in a varie ty of situatio ns. For example, the threat of airpo wer played
a major role in convincin g Milosevic to agree to t he Dayton Accords.
PRECI SE POLITICAL CONTROL
Airpower advocates shiver at the tho ught of direct politica l control, which brings up vivid
memories of President Johnson sele cting individ ual targets a nd routes to be struck at his
“Tuesday luncheons” du ring the Viet nam war.3 Nevertheless, the suscept ibility of modern
airpower to politica l micr omanageme nt is a signifi cant advantage to political leaders. Airpower
is centrally planned. Political leader s can centrally control cla sses of targ ets and even select
individual ta rgets tailore d to limited objectives. I n addition, t he tempo, timing and pace of air
strikes can be tightly co ntrolled to support strat egic goals. Given sufficient resource s, one can
increase the intensity of air strike s at will, or cut t hem off entirely at a mo ment’s notice. Ground
forces do no t provide the same degree of direct centralized control or the ability to disengage
immediately once engag ed. Since airpower can be redirecte d at a mome nt’s notice directly
from Washington, it is p ossible t o use air power in areas where objective s are limited , and
means must similarly be limited. This allows airpower to be flexibly applied across the full
spectrum of geopolitica l operations, especially where periph eral interest s may not warrant the
deployment of US ground forces.
FEWER CA SUALTIES
Employing a irpower inherently place s fewe r frien dly forces at risk than e mploying
conventional ground forces. A large air operation might place a few hundred airman at risk at
any one time, while deploying a single army briga de potentially places tho usands at risk. US
technological dominance in the air f urther reduces this risk. As proof, both the Kosovo and
initial Afgha nistani campaigns are cited since n o US airman lost their lives to enemy fire. In
addition, air power advo cates make the claim th at modern airpower results in fewer e nemy
civilian ca sualties be cause military targets can b e directly str uck with pre cision weap ons that
limit collater al damage. In contrast, a conventional ground f orce must defeat intervening enemy
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ground forces and occu py civilian territories to d estroy these same strategic targets, potentially
at higher co st to the lo cal civilian po pulace. Lim iting friendly casualti es clearly limits t he
domestic po litical cost o f military action, while re ducing col lateral damage to the enemy provides
politica l advantages bot h at home and abroad.
DIRECT ATTACK ON T HE ENEMY’S WILL
Early airpower advocates such a s Giulio Douhet, writing in th e aftermath of the horrific
First World War, proposed using the third dimension not to a ttack enemy fielded forces, but to
bypass them and strike directly at t he enemy’s will.4 The pr omise of airpower is to avoid a war
of attrition b y striking dir ectly at the enemy’s heart, or main center of gr avity. Which targets
comprise the center of g ravity is a matter of considerable deb ate to this d ay, and will be
explored mo re fully in this paper. Nevertheless, airpower offers an altern ative to previous forms
of warfare by allowing us to strike at the enemy homeland without first d estroying int ervening
armies. As Clausewitz notes, “…three broad objectives which between them cover e verything.
They are the military power, the country and the will of the en emy.”5 Airpower can strike at all
three simultaneously and immediate ly. From a p olitical persp ective, the enemy’s war making
capability an d leadership can be dire ctly struck fr om the very beginning of the war, creating
immediate d anger and politica l pressure on a stat e’s leaders t o erode thei r will.
POWE R PROJECTION
Modern airpower represents the most rapid and lethal means for project ing US powe r
globally. Whether it is a B-2 operating directly from Whiteman AFB in Missouri, or T omahawk
Land Attack cruise missiles and aviation from a carrier battle group, the US uniquely possesse s
the ability to rapidly project overwhelming airpower to any regional conf lict. The fa ct that
substantia l land or sea- based airpo wer can be projected w orldwide more rapidly than
conventional ground forces is a signif icant strateg ic advantage for the United States. In addition
to the deterrence value, rapid power projection allo ws limited US air forces to flexibly respond to
developing politica l situations. The ability to pro ject airpowe r globally is a unique ca pability of
the United States, and th erefore provides a uniqu e geopolitical and strate gic advantage to US
forces.
STRATEGI C FLEX IBILITY
The ability o f airpower to be reconfig ured for many different kinds of missions and ra pidly
projected w orldwide provides treme ndous strate gic flexibility. The same command a nd control
plane that is monitoring drug missio ns in the Ca ribbean one day can be used a day or two later
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to direct figh ters in comb at. Transpo rts can be u sed to haul precision we apons to on e location
and humanitarian aid to t he next. Politically this g ives the President and S ecretary of Defense a
tremendous menu of strategic option s to sele ct from and allows the US to engage in a full
spectrum of operations worldwide to enhance an d protect US interests.
INFORMATIO N DOM INAN CE
Air and Space reconnai ssance p latforms create a unique worldwide cap ability to monitor
and intercep t enemy dep loyments, movements, communications, and assess int ent. In
addition, the tremendous integration of these pl atforms with US command and control systems
that has taken place sin ce Desert Storm now allow near real-time identification and t argeting of
the enemy. The Open Skies treaty a llows over head systems to monitor territory that is
inaccessible using other platforms. From a political perspect ive, the unique intellige nce
gathering ca pabilitie s provided by US assets provide both a peacetime and wartime advantage
by increasin g worldwide situational a wareness a nd in many cases in tercepting the movements
and intent of the enemy before a crisis develops. The recent integration of special operations
forces and CIA operatives publicize d in Afghani stan provide complimentary informati on to
enhance tha t gathered b y air and space asset s. Politically this can pr ovide a huge a dvantage in
negotiations, and peacet ime engagement as well as military operations.
RAPID VI CTORY
US airpower is an asymmetric worldwide strateg ically flexible force that can attack d irectly
at the enemy’s centers of gravity wit h minimal friendly casualties. The su m of these effects,
airmen claim, is a more rapid victory than is possible u sing conventional forces alon e. While
most theorists disco unt the idea that airpower should ever be used alone as it was in Kosovo,
many believe that the exponential gr owth in tech nical capa bility and capacity of US airpower
reduces the role of conventional gro und forces in future conf lict. Applyin g airpower for strategic
objectives d ecisively from the outset of a confli ct will result in a short conf lict with relat ively few
friendly casualties. Politically, a sho rt conflic t is desirable do mestically, particularly in a
democracy where public will must b e maintained. Similarly a short war i s more acce ptable in
the internati onal arena where allies and coaliti on partners must be retained.
SUMMARY
It is clear to see why airpower offers a polit ically attractive alt ernative to conventional
force. The promise of few casualtie s, worldwide mobility, rapid victory, precise pol itical control ,
and the asymmetric US technological advantage appear to make airpower the weapon of choice
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as we begin a new century. One might conclud e as Preside nt Johnson did that airp ower is an
awesome weapon that must be tightly controlle d lest it spark World War III. One might be led,
as some political leaders were during the Kosovo campaign, to believe that airpower alone can
win any conflict. Yet airp ower does not come without strings attached. In the next two section s
we will examine the basic theory of airpower and some of its limitations in an attempt to
determine some of the strengths and limits of air power application.

AIRP OWER UBER ALLES – THE A IRMA N’S PERSPECTIVE
The colo ssal maneuvers of the coalit ion armies in the de serts of Kuwait and Iraq
in 1991 may in retro spect appe ar, like the final charges of cavalry in the
nineteenth, an anomaly in the face o f modern firepower.
– Eliot Cohen6

Some believe we have e ntered an era of Airpower Uber Alles – “airpower above all .”
Airpower advocates provide much promise to the politica l leader, but to deliver on these
promises they also belie ve airpower must be e mployed in a certain way . It is not en ough to
merely select targets an d bomb them. The tenant s of the a irman prescribe how airpower should
be employe d, how targets should be chosen and who should be in contro l of aerospa ce asset s.
While the air man’s doctrine is con cerned with details primarily at the oper ational level, their
implementation has strat egic and ge opolitica l implicatio ns. As we will see in the fou rth section it
is primarily this conflict b etween the operational doctrine and politics that fuels the fire between
airmen and their political leaders. It is important, therefore, to provide an overview of the
fundamental tenants of a irpower emp loyment fr om an airman ’s perspective before examining
the limitatio ns of strateg ic airpower employment . The ten pr epositions b elow are su mmaries of
Meilinger’s Ten Propositions Regar ding Airpower , which provides one of the best concise
overviews of modern air doctrine.7
AIRPOWER IS INHER ENTLY A ST RATE GIC F ORCE
One of the most controversial tena nts of airpo wer is the airman’s belie f in the primacy of
the strategic, rather than tactical employment of airpower. Airmen argue that airpower, by
exploiting th e third dimension, effect ively compresses the lines between strategic an d tactica l
operations. One no longer needs to defeat an int ervening army to attack the enemy capital or
destroy his f actories. O ne can stri ke directly at the will and capability to make war. In the
extreme, airmen argue that strike s against most tactical targets such a s fielded ene my forces is
a waste of airpower because it dilut es the focus on key centers of gravity. Airpower should be
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used to atta ck tact ical ta rgets only to the degree that they directly suppor t a strategic center of
gravity.
In contrast, Clausewitz argues that “…to overcome the enemy, or disarm him—call it what
you will—must always be the aim of warfare.”8 He further says that the most important act for
defeating th e enemy is “1. Destruction of his ar my, if it is at all sign ifican t.”9 In Clausewitz’s
time, the enemy army was the cente r of gravity, t he defeat of which ultimately resulted in total
victory. Soldiers argue, therefore, that airpower should be u sed as anot her form of fire in
support of ta ctical for ces engaging th e enemy army. The co nflict betwee n the airman’s
perspective and soldier’s perspect ive over the amount of airpower to be devoted to tactical
versus strat egic targets is a source of constant t ension that is frequently misinterpreted by
politica l lead ership.
AIRPOWER IS TARGET ING, AND T ARGETING IS INTELLI GENCE
If airpower possesse s the potential t o destroy any unburied target, the dilemma of
airpower employment be comes a simple question of which targets to de stroy and in which
order. Since airpower is finite, targ ets must be prioritized a nd assigned to ultimately achieve the
desired polit ical obje ctives, and not t o merely wreak destruct ion. This de pends upon accurate
and timely intelligence of large ene my s ystems as well as th e individual t argets withi n them.
Both the importance of a target in th e scheme of the military objective must be know n as well as
its vulnerability to air attack. Fina lly, intelligence must be ava ilable to a ccurately gauge the
effects of an attack on th e whole system. Without accurate in telligence one of the foll owing will
happen: the wrong target may be selected, the ta rget struck may ha ve no relation to the
objectives of the campaign, or the right target might be struck, but damage assesse d incorrectly ,
leaving an operational e nemy. As a result, the U S Air Force has investe d heavily not only in
reconnaissa nce platforms, but also the information systems needed to p rocess and disseminate
intelligen ce to the warfighter. While substantia l strides have been made in gathering and
distributing targeting inte lligence in the last 10 years, asse ssing the real e ffects of air operations
in terms of enemy capab ility and will still remains an art form.
In addition, t he direct tie from tactical tar gets stru ck to meetin g real strate gic objectives
can often be subjective a nd circuito us. This critical realizat ion has led to a modification of
Meilinger’s propositions in the form of Effects B ased Operations (EBO).10 Effects Based
Operations focus not on individual ta rgets but the strategic an d operationa l effects th at the
warfighter wants to creat e. Using systems-based intelligen ce, one then determines the best
targets to hit in parallel to create the desired effe ct on the ent ire system. In many cases, effects
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based opera tions are more efficient t han merely servicing a t arget list in priority order because
all targets in a given system need not be des troyed to create a system-wid e failure.
AIR SUP ERIORITY IS T HE FIRST P RIORIT Y FOR AI R FORCES
US Forces have not suffered a casu alty to enemy bombing since 1953,11 and with the
exception of Vietnam, US forces have enjoyed a long string o f victories u nder the cover of
friendly air forces. Since airpower came of age in WWII, whoever controlled the air b attle would
also shortly win the land or sea battle. There are two basic impediments to achievin g control of
the air, namely enemy air forces and air defense systems. To achieve lo cal air sup eriority, both
must be defeated over the intended area of operations . Achieving air su periority is t herefore a
prerequisite to engaging in a large-scale air offen sive, so air superiority is the first prior ity for
airmen. If sufficient for ces are available, other t argets may be struck in parallel, but the defeat
of enemy air forces and air defenses is always paramount in the airman’s mind.
AIRPOWER IS PRIMARILY AN OFF ENSIVE W EAPON
Airpower turns on its he ad the concept of force ratios and th e inherent a dvantage of the
defensive. While in con ventional la nd warfare the defense is always seen as strong er form of
warfare, in the air this is not so. The aerospace sphere is large and an at tack may be mounted
at any point from any direction poten tially wi th one’s entire for ce simultan eously. It b ecomes
impossible t o defend all areas equally without dispersing and diluting one ’s force. Def ending in
such a manner would give the enemy de-facto local air sup eriority through massed offensive
forces. In a ddition, airp ower knows no front line s, there are no flanks to turn, and th ere is no
terrain to ch annel an en emy’s forces along. Th e advantage in air is g ained by taking the
offensive and striking first. Therefor e air forces operate with no reserve, and are use d
offensively to strike an e nemy’s critical targets from the outset. To employ airpower in defensive
positions awaiting an en emy attack is a dangero us and pote ntially fatal mistake.
AIRPOWER PRODUCE S PHYSI CAL AND PS YCHOL OGICAL SHOCK BY DOMI NATING THE
FOURT H DIMEN SION TIME
Massed airpower can create devastating physical destruct ion over a fairly broad tactical
area in litera lly an instant of time. A single B-52 carrying 2000lb Joint Dire ct Attack Munitions
(JDAMs) can precisely destroy over a dozen tar gets in a sin gle pass wit h no warning and
leaving no trace other th an a trail of destruction in its wake. Planes oper ating in mass in a
coordinated attack can create havoc over an area and be timed within se conds of ea ch other.
The tremendous psych ological impact of these precisely timed yet unwa rned attacks can be
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overwhelmi ng. The ability of airpower to operate with great speed and surprise over at any
point at any time over th e battlefield can sometimes substit ute for mass. If force ca n be
unexpectedly applied at precisely th e right place and momen t with complete surprise it can often
overwhelm an unprepared foe. As airpower legend John Boyd said in his unpublished but
widely circulated theory, the goal is t o get inside an enemy’s OODA (observe, orient, decide,
act) loop by observing, deciding and acting faster than the en emy can rea ct to create a crushing
psychological strain on t he enemy mind. The go al is to over come the will to fight by dominating
time. Airme n will theref ore seek to create an extremely rapi d, high tempo air operati on that
masses effe cts in t ime as well as sp ace for maximal erosion of the enemy’s will.
AIRPOWER CAN C ONDUCT OPE RATIONS A T ALL LEVE LS OF WAR SIMULTA NEOUSLY
The inheren t flexibility of airpower all ows it to be used for a variety of missions
simultaneously including air superiority, strategic attack, inter diction, close air support and many
others. Airp ower can co nduct these missions simultaneously across the entire spect rum of a
conflict as lo ng as air su periority is e stablished over the operating area. Airpower, unlike ground
forces, need not engage in a counterf orce battle a s a prerequisite to strate gic attack. This
simultaneous, or parallel attack can create parallel effects, leaving the enemy with multiple
crises to deal with. The goal of para llel attack is to create strategic paralysis wherein an enemy
faced with simultaneous breakdowns at the strate gic, operatio nal and tactical level loses its
effectiveness and cease s to operate as a cohere nt force. Given sufficien t airpower and
targeting car efully design ed to create certain effects, it is theor etically possible to creat e total
strategic par alysis, effect ively breaking an enemy’ s will to figh t. Airmen will seek t o
simultaneously strike ke y strategic, operational and tactica l targets in th e hope that combined
effects will create strate gic paralysis in the enemy.
PRECI SION AIR WEAP ONS HAVE REDEFI NED THE MEA NING OF MASS
The concent ration of force and fires t o break thro ugh an enemy defense is called mass.
An inherent advantage of airpower is its ability to concentrate or mass on virtually any point in
support of o perational or tactical obje ctives. Unfortunately, airpower is a p recious reso urce and
early airpower required a substantia l number of airplanes to destroy a single target with high
probability and acceptab le losse s. The ability to mass was li mited by lack of preci sion and
capable ene my defense s. For example in World War II, to destroy a single small h ouse with
high probability required a force of 45 00 medium bombers accounting for both the hig h loss rate
and low precision.12 By Vietnam this number had dropped significantly to approximate ly 95
aircraft. By the time of Desert Storm, a single stealth air craft carrying two bombs could
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accurately h it the same target with very low pr obability of loss. Since De sert Storm, the JDAM
precision satellite guid ed weapon has proliferat ed to many US airplanes, and now a single
aircraft su ch as the B-2 and B-52 can actually d estroy a dozen or more targets in a single pass.
This unique ability to mass airpower with high pr ecision a t any point with no warning has
substantia l strategic, ope rational and tactical application since any target is potentially held
hostage to mass air att ack.
AIRPOWER SHOULD B E CONTROLLED BY AI RME N
Airmen believe that the unique chara cteristics of airpower and its employment mean t hat
airmen should control it. Just as dev eloping professional gro und or naval commanders requires
20 years or more of specialized train ing, the development of an air commander is equ ally
difficult. In addition, sin ce airpower is used centrally at the operational a nd strategic level, an air
commander must have a broad perspective of ai r weapons and their employment. Airmen also
believe in ce ntralized co ntrol and de centralized execution. The disaster of decentralized air
control in N orth Africa in WWII adequately demonstrated this. Though a irmen ma y deploy in
wings or sq uadrons, the y do not fight in wings or squadrons, but in ad-ho c package s tailored
individually for each ope ration and e ach target. Air assets th at may be la unched from anywhere
in the theate r, fly to orbit points to ref uel, and travel varied routes to precisely strike a t arget, all
the while pr oviding overlapping sup port for each other. Coordination of this delicate ballet is
best centrally planned by airmen. Ai rmen therefor e wish to centrally pla n and execute all air
operations in a given theater.
TECHNOL OGY AND AI RPOW ER A RE INTE GRALLY AND SYNE RGISTICALLY RELATED
Airpower has its root s in technology and depends more than other services on the
synergistic r elationship between the two. Technology to a very large degree determines the
precision, effectiveness and survivability of air pl atforms. In the era of be yond visual range
sensors and air weaponry technology’s influence is preeminent. Conside ring the incr eases in
technology since WWII with the intr oduction of space asset s, precision weaponry, stealth,
missiles, it is impossible to separate the dev elopment or employment of airpower from
technology. The preeminence of the US Air Force is built largely on superior technology, and all
US airmen h ave an interest in maint aining this t echnological edge.
AIRPOWER INCLUDES NOT ONLY MILITARY ASSETS B UT ROBUS T CIVILIAN AVIATION
Airpower cannot be isol ated to the military alone. As Billy Mitchell said in 1921,
“Transportat ion is the e ssence of civilization.”13 A robust militar y air force requires both a robust
9

aviation ind ustry and a strong civilia n aviati on el ement. These create th e technologi cal and
industrial ba se needed f or peacetime and wartime production. They also supply a civil aviation
fleet to supp ly trained pilots and surg e capacity tr ansport necessary for war. The US Civil
Reserve Air Fleet provides 90 perce nt of the wartime passen ger capabilit y and 30 percent of the
cargo haulin g capability.14 The dominance of the US commerci al aerospace industry in no small
way corresponds direct ly to US do minance in military airpower. U.S. civil aviation su pported a
$151B industry in 2001, of which onl y $34B were foreign or d omestic milit ary sales.15 The
civilian and military arms of the US work synergistica lly to enhance the t echnology and
capability of our airpower and airmen.
SUMMA RY: THE AIRMAN’S PE RSPECTIVE
Meilinger’s 10 propositions liste d above, modified with the addition of E ffects Based
Operations, provide a summary of current thought in airpower theory. Airpower is co nsidered
an extremel y powerful weapon for breaking the will of the en emy, but it must be used in a
certain way. Airpower must be used offensively, and not def ensively. Airpower should be
reserved for strategic pu rposes and not wasted on indecisive tactica l action. Airpower relies
very hea vily on intellige nce because without it no connection can be made between bombs
dropped and the strateg ic object . The mission of Air Superiority is a pre requisite to unrestricted
air action. A irpower cannot be deplo yed piecemeal or in an escalating manner. To produce
shock and d ominate the fourth dimension of time, airpower must be used overwhelmi ngly from
the start of conflict. Slo w escalation only dulls airpower’s sh arp edge. Airpower should attack
targets at all levels of war in parallel t o create stra tegic paraly sis. The tho usand-fold p lus gain in
strike precision have redefined what it means to mass airpower, in some cases req uiring only a
handful of planes to crea te dramatic effects. Airp ower, and indeed targeting should b e
controlled a nd employe d by airmen that underst and its stren gths and weaknesse s. Airpower
and technology are intrinsically and synergistically linked. US dominance in the air is a direct
result of it s technological advantage. Finally, robust commercial and in dustrial aviation is crit ical
for a strong Air Force.
Adhering to these propo sitions should result in success for the airman. Air theorists are
quick to po int out that places where airpower fa iled to achieve its obje ctive, such as the Rolling
Thunder ca mpaign in Vietnam, are marred by o ne or more violations of these propo sitions.
They are also quick to p oint to the p olitician, President John son in this case, as the source of
failure. As we will see i n the coming analysis, a irpower theory, while it captures some of the
inherent pitf alls in a ir employment, has some in herent assu mptions that often go un written by
10

leading theo rists. Next we will examine some of the limits i nherent in th e practical employment
of airpower.

THE LIMITS OF AIRPOWER
Bombing is often called 'strategic' w hen we hit t he enemy, and 'tactical' when he
hits us, and is often diff icult to know where one finishes and t he other begins.
-Air Vice-Marshal J. E. 'Johnnie' Joh nson, RAF

THE TRUE MEA SURE OF AIRP OWER
Airpower is only effective if it suppor ts the polit ical objectives of the state. As Clause witz
says “… it is clear that w ar should ne ver be thought of as something auton omous but always as
an instrument of policy; otherwise th e entire hist ory of war would contrad ict us.”16 Airpower as a
means cannot therefore be separate d from its object. Alterna tively, as Clodfelter puts it, “… the
supreme test of bombing’s effica cy is it s contr ibution to the na tion’s war aims.”17 The
effectiveness of airpowe r is therefor e not meas ured in numbers of target s, tanks or b uildings
destroyed. Even the Air Force’s con cept of “Effe cts Based Operations” may miss the mark if the
effects prod uced are not related to th e object of b ending ene my will. Creating “Strategic
Paralysis” and getting in side the ene my’s OODA loop may be insufficient if it does not compel
an enemy to do our will. An air operation, whether done joint ly or alone, can only be measured
in terms of it s contribut ion to the overall object ive. Airpower must be directed at the e nemy’s
will. Its effe ctiveness ca n only be evaluated by a ssessing air power’s con tribution to a chieving
that objectiv e. This i s the politica l value of airpo wer that will form the basis for the an alysis that
follows.
In the same passage as the quote ab ove, Clausewitz introduces a second and critical
point: “The first, the supr eme, the mo st far-reaching act of judgment that a statesman and
commander have to mak e is to estab lish by that t est the kind of war on which they are
embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alie n to its
nature.”18 This concept wi ll become central to the politica l anal ysis that foll ows. We will find
that airpower most often reaches it s limit as a means when it is applied to a type of wa r for
which it is ill suited. Airp ower is cap able of many things, but airpower alone is no pa nacea. Just
as individual instruments of power each have limit s on the gra nd strategic level, airpower too
has its l imit at the strate gic level. A irpow er alone cannot achieve even many military objectives
11

much less all political objectives. Air power mu st be employe d on the gra nd strategic level in
combination with other forms of military, diploma tic and econ omic power.
POLITICAL LIMITS ON AIRPOWER
The “Airpower Uber Alles” doctrine p reviously discussed po ints to a crit ical limitation of
airpower as a means. To be used “p roperly” ai rpower must be employed in certain w ays.
Airpower must be employed strategically agai nst enemy cen ters of gravity. It must be
concentrate d in space a nd time to produce psychological a s well as physical sho ck. Airpower
should not b e employed by gradual escalation , but should be massed and used at all levels of
war simultaneously to produce strat egic paralysis. Airpower should be u sed offensiv ely and not
defensively. Airpower should be use d to strike d irectly at the will of the en emy, and Jo hn
Warden points out that it should str ike enemy leadership dir ectly if possible.19 Yet what is the
outcome if politica l objectives do not support the immediate o verwhelmin g strategic a pplication
of airpower? As Clause witz points o ut, “War is n ever an isolated act.”20 Politica l will a nd the
politica l obje ctive often work to limit war and carry it away from the extre mes of the ideal case.
Limited wars, for examp le, are executed to achieve limited objectives short of total enemy
destruction. These limit s, by their very nature, inhibit the ap plication o f military force often in
negative ways. Even worse, if the p olitical leade rship fails o n the grand strategic level to
correctly det ermine “the nature of th e war,” they risk applying entirely the wrong military means
to achieve their objectiv es. Never was there a b etter exampl e than the Rolling Thund er Air
operation executed by the United States in Vietna m from 196 5-1968.
Clodfelter, in his analysis of the Viet nam War titled The Limits of Airpower argues tha t
airpower’s f ailure in Rolling Thunder is due in no small part t o the excessive use of “ negative”
objectives o r restriction s. He carefully defines “p ositive” obje ctives as “th ose that were
obtainable b y applying military power” while “negative” objectives are th ose obtaina ble only by
restricting m ilitary power.21 In detailed analysis, Clodfelter demonstrates ho w President
Johnson’s n egative objective of avoiding escalation with China and Russia comes to
overshadow the positive objective of winning the war in Vietnam. Johnson’s now lege ndary
restriction s include not o nly types of weapons and targets, bu t also sort ie rates, bomb loads and
even routes of approach to individual targets.22 Targets near Hanoi and Haiphong were totally
excluded and B-52 strikes were almost totally limited to tactical air supp ort at or below the
demilitarize d zone. Tig ht control on the pace of the operatio ns resulted in a very gra dual
escalation that robbed airpower of its psycholog ical sho ck. The net result was not strategic
paralysis of the enemy b ut a paralytic and ineffe ctive air ca mpaign. Airpower advo cates point
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quite correct ly at Rolling Thunder as a prime exa mple of how to politically assure that an air
campaign will fail. Yet Johnson did not initiate a nd tightly co ntrol Rolling Thunder to assure its
failure. Rat her Preside nt Johnson weighed the politica l risk of the unrestricted bombing of North
Vietnam and assessed that military failure was perhaps more acceptabl e than the p otential
escalation a superpower confrontatio n. In additio n, Johnson f eared diverting politica l capital
away fro m his "Great Society" dome stic program . Military means were simply subordinated to
the political objective.
Rolling Thu nder is by no means the last example of political objectives in terfering with the
effectiveness of an air campaign. In the 1991 Gulf War, tho ugh relatively few limits were placed
on airpower, one saw a politica lly dir ected imme diate halt on bombing around major Iraqi citie s
after the Fe bruary 13th raid that dest royed a civilian bomb shelter.23 The o bjective to a void
civilian ca sualties outwei ghed the military obj ective of bombing Baghdad. Even when bombing
of targets ne ar cities re sumed, each target had t o be approved in Washington by political
leaders. Political leaders put even more extreme limits in pla ce during th e Kosovo campaign.
Targets had to be appro ved by a joint board of all 19 NATO nations, an d a strategy of gradual
escalation reminiscent of Rolling T hunder was used to slow ly step up the pressure o n
Milosovich. Bombing around urban targets was severely limited due to European memories of
capitals burning during WWII. Like Rolling Thu nder, this co mpletely eliminated the
psychological shock ele ment from t he campaign, significant ly drawing it out. Like th e Iraqi
campaign, politica l leade rs determined at the time that the neg ative object of limiting ci vilian
casualtie s outweighed the positive military object of winning by bombing near urban targets.
AIRPOWER DEPE NDS UPON THE VULNE RABILITY OF T HE ENEMY
Airpower alone cannot a chieve all ob jectives. Ca rl Builder in his book The Icarus
Syndro me introduces a simple but valuable con cept of airpo wer’s limitations. He sta tes
concise ly “Airpower can be employe d decisivel y in war when an enemy’s essentia l means for
waging war are vulnerable to attack f rom the air.”24 His analysis is part of h is chapter e xamining
airpower’s f ailure in Viet nam, but the axiom is universally applicable. Airp ower is an industrial
age weapon. Strategic airpower originally was focused on t he vulnerable industry and cities
created by the industrial revolution. As Builder p oints out, Air theory had its infancy in the post
World War I era where theorists were searching f or an altern ative from th e devastating trench
warfare. Entering World War II, US air theorists focused on t ransportatio n and indust rial targets
precisely be cause these were perceived as vulnerable and supplied the nation’s me ans for war.
13

Several corollaries fo llow from this vulnerability theory. Industriali zation, how easy it is to
target the e nemy, and t errain all pla y a significa nt role in the effectiveness of airpow er as a
means. The centraliza tion of resour ces, populat ion and indu stry make an industrial state much
more vulnerable than an agrarian sta te. A state such as Germany in Wo rld War II is therefore
much more vulnerable to air attack t han an agrarian enemy such as Kor ea or North Vietnam.
The ease of target identif ication from the air is a lso critica l for airpower. A conventional
mechanized army is mu ch more vul nerable to air attack than an unconventional guerilla army.
Vulnerability also plays a key role when we consi der terrain. A dispersed enemy in difficult
terrain may be nearly impossible to target solely from the air, while on op en terrain h e may be
extremel y vulnerable. T he corollarie s that can b e derived from Builder’s vulnerability theory are
nearly endless, but they all focus on two key capabilitie s req uired for air power: first, the ability or
airpower identify a target and second the ability o f airpower to destroy it. I f both canno t be done
reliably, the n airpower cannot be eff ectively emp loyed.
Applying this vulnerabilit y theory to the failure of Vietnam, one readily arrives at the
second maj or conclusio n regarding Rolling Thu nder. As int roduced at t he beginnin g of this
section, Cla usewitz says that the most far-reaching judgment to be made at the outset of a
conflict is the nature of t he war to be fought. In t he Rolling T hunder peri od of 1965-1968, US
forces were engaged pri marily in a guerilla war a gainst a l imited number of Vietcong supported
by North Vie tnam. Not u ntil the later Tet offensive did the nat ure of the war change to a more
traditional conflict involving conventional North Vietnamese forces. Despite the fact that the
Vietcong re quired meager supplies and had multiple routes t o conduct th eir guerilla war,
airpower was used in a t actical a nd interdiction r ole to attempt to interce pt these sup plies and
bomb guerilla forces. A conventional air strategy was adopted against an agrarian an d
unconventional enemy. The enemy proved largely invulnerable to either strategy. It was not
possible to interdict the small amount of ammun ition and su pplies that sustained the Vietcong.
Since the Vietcong were indistingu ishable from the local pop ulation and engaged in hit and run
tactics, it wa s also very difficult to effectively apply tactical air power in all but the most limited of
circumstances. In short, the enemy and his sup ply lines cou ld not be reliably located or
targeted, so airpower was an inappro priate means for this stage of the war.
The apparent invulnerability of cert ain targets t o airpower continues to plague airpo wer
application to this day. Mobile targets pose a particularly vexing problem. For exampl e in
Desert Storm, the negative political objective of keeping Isra el out of the war drove what
became “the great scud hunt,” consu ming 1,460 strikes an d a large percentage of th e precious
F-15E night sorties as well as a num ber of Special Operations teams. Nevertheless, a post war
14

survey b y American intelligence concluded that t here is no pr oof “that CENTCOM succeeded in
destroying a single SCUD.”25 Similar failures occu rred when we attempted to use airpo wer
alone to sto p the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. De spite the bulk of the air e ffort originally
concentrate d on Serbian forces dep loyed in Kosovo, the US was unable to stop mobile Serbian
forces armed with small weapons from evicting and burning t he houses o f ethnic Kosovars.
From high altitude it was impossible t o accurately identify and target mobile infantry forces
acting unop posed again st unarmed civilians. Th is process, called Time Sensitive Targeting,
has improve d in the air o perations over Afghanist an, but only with the presence of gro und forces
to confirm and mark targets.
ATTACKI NG AN E NEMY’S WILL DEPE NDS ON HI S POLITICAL VULNERA BILITY
Extending Builder’s theo ry on vulnerability to the politica l sphere we come up with the
interesting a ssertion that Airpower is effective wh en an enemy is politica lly vulnerable from the
air. Because an attack on the enemy’s will is a s much political as physical, physical vulnerability
alone is in sufficient. Thu s Douhet’s 1 921 vision26 of flying beyond directly a t the enemy’ s heart
to break his will to fight d epends hea vily on the politica l vulnerability of th e enemy reg ime to air
attack as we ll as the willingness of th e attacker to accept co llateral damage. This cou ld explain,
in part, the r elative invulnerability of the British fa cing the German Blitz in 1940 as well as
strength of t he Japanese and Germans in the fa ce of brutal allied bombi ng from 1944-1945. In
each case d espite horrifi c damage to both civilian and industri al targets th ese nations not only
persevered but remained an effective fighting for ce. Churchill, Hitler and the Japanese Emporer
managed to retain resilie nt political systems and effective co ntrol despite the severity of air
attack. Their politica l systems were not particula rly vulnerable to conventional air atta ck.
If we look at the recent e xample of Af ghanistan, o ne might surmise that the Taliban
government was politica lly vulnerable to US air attack. After a relatively short US air and
special op erations camp aign, the Taliban gover nment and forces collapsed overnight. Major
Taliban commanders and their force s switched sides in large numbers as they saw the politica l
winds begin to change. Though the attacking coalition groun d forces pla yed a major role, it
appears fro m initial rep orts that the Taliban capitulation was more of a politica l colla pse than a
military defeat. The Tali ban were politica lly vulnerable to US attacks, re sulting in a re latively
quick US v ictory .
AIRPOWER LACKS P ERSISTE NCE
One of the truly innovative strategic t hinkers in re cent times is Archer Jon es. Jones, a
scholar of a ncient warfa re largely untrained in modern doctrine puts forth an interesting set of
15

observations based on t he breadth of history from ancient times to the present.27 Jones argues
that there are four funda mental strategies that h ave been pursued in all wars and that these four
can be differ entiated alo ng two axes (Table 1). First, Archer introduces what he calls a “raiding”
strategy, where the basic objective is not to per manently occupy the enemy territory, but rather
to temporarily enter enemy territory to achi eve one’s objective and then r eturn to one’s home
when the raid is complet e. The coun ter strategy is a “persiste nt” strategy where one aims to
occupy enemy territory and either control it for a purpose or annex it. These two stra tegies form
the first axis in Jones’ matrix, and answer the “how ” of the strategy. A strategy ma y either be
raiding or pe rsistent.

Persisting Raiding
Combat
Persistent-Combat Raiding-Combat
Logistics
Persistent-L ogistics Raiding-Logistics
TABLE 1: A RCHE R JONE’S STR ATEGY MAT RIX

The second axis in Jone s’ strategic matrix determines the “what” to attack. One op tion is
to engage directly in a “combat” strategy aim ed at destroying the enemy’s force. The second
option is to engage in a “logistic” str ategy that is aimed at denying the enemy the means for war.
These corre spond surprisingly well with Liddle-H art’s direct and indirect strategies fro m his book
Strategy ,28 with the direct being combat and indire ct being log istical. The cross of the se two
axes allows four fundamental grand strategies a s shown in t able Table 1 . For example,
destroying an enemy army and permanently occupy ing its capital is a persistent-co mbat
strategy, while a guerilla raid on an a rms depot is a raiding-lo gistics strate gy. Each strategy has
advantages and disadvantages depe nding on the objective to be reached. Persistent
strategies, f or example, are strategically more decisive but also generally more costly than
raiding strat egies. Similarly, direct combat strategies are gen erally more costly than logistics
strategies. Jones argue s that histor ies greatest captains pre fer the indire ct logist ics strategies
to combat strategies primarily because they requi re less e ffort. The selection of str ategy is
determined by the strategic art that links the strat egic objective to its means.
Airpower can engage in a policy of r aiding but n ot persisten ce. Raiding and persiste nt
strategies e ach have their strengths and weakne sses. Wh ile a raiding strategy such as
16

airpower can freely destroy targets to attempt to persuade an enemy to ta ke a certain action, it
cannot contr ol an enemy’s future act ion. It can p ersuade an enemy, e ven decisively coerce or
compel an enemy but it cannot permanently assure that the enemy will not alter his course in
the future or engage aga in in undesirable action. The close st airpower can come to a persistent
strategy is a strategy of “air occupat ion” w here one attempts to approximate persiste nce by a
series of raids. The limits of a non-p ersistent strategy are best describ ed by Clausewitz, who
states:
“If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situa tion that is even more
unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of the
situation must not b e merely tran sient —at least not in app earance. O therwise
the enemy would not give in but wait for things t o improve.”29
The strategic employme nt of airpower is esse ntially a raidin g-logistic str ategy. Its aim is
not to directly destroy en emy co mbat forces but to deny the enemy the means to fight . This
strategy traces right back to the “ind ustria l web” theory devel oped by the Air Corps Tactical
School (ACTS) in the in terwar years and follows through as a n unbroken t hread to tod ay’s
airpower doctrine.30 The goal is to create losse s in industry, infrastructur e and nation al
command ta rgets that ar e so damaging that continui ng the co nflict is futile . The limits of such a
strategy are obvious. Fir st, it does not destr oy the enemy’s combat forces, and theref ore the
enemy retai ns at least p art of his ca pability to fig ht. Second, as noted ab ove it is not a
persistent st rategy.
Interestingly a “raiding-lo gistics” strat egy fits per fectly with US national st rategy. First, it is
an “economy of force” approach that is minimalist in nature. Raiding is in herently less costly in
blood and tr easure than persistent strategies, an d indirect lo gistic strate gies are also less costly
than combat strategies. Using airpo wer before engaging in o ther forms of combat therefore
minimizes the risk for US forces. This minimalist approach also reduces, though it do es not
eliminate, th e need for a large standing army. T he US has historica lly opposed a larg e standing
army both o n constitut ional and eco nomic grounds. Second, since US n ational strat egy
emphasizes the expansion of democracy and free ma rkets rather than US territory, a raiding
strategy prevents any misperception that US forces may persist. Through raiding, the US can
engage an e nemy for limited object ives where important US interests are not necessa rily at
stake. If a p ersistent strategy were used for the se lower priority national interests, p ublic
sentiment might turn aga inst action. Airpower, therefore, lowers the threshold of pain to give
politica l lead ers more freedom in engagement overseas.
17

POLITICS AND AIRP OWER IN PRACTIC E
When my b rother and I built the first man-carrying flying machine, we thought
that we were introducin g into the world an invention which would make further
wars practically impossible.
– Orville Wright, 1917

Airpower in practice is a synthesis of politica l promise, theory and harsh r eality. Few
would argue against airp ower as a cr itical arm of the joint force. Yet airpower’s claim as a
strategic for ce of choice , and some airmen’s claims of what airpower can accomplish
strategically face a mixed record of both stunnin g succe ss and probing f ailure. This section will
explore in brief the major US conflicts and air strat egies in an attempt to explain how policy and
air strategy cooperate a nd collide in the US system.
WORLD W AR II: US STRATEGIC BOMBING
What is remarkable abo ut WWII was the ability of Army Air Corps leaders to persua de US
politica l lead ers to engag e in a large- scale stra tegic air camp aign at the e xpense of Army
ground forces. Airpower would be the only mea ns in the in itial phases of the war due to the
time required to develop sufficie nt ground and amphibious f orces neede d for major land action
in Europe. The planned cross chan nel invasion, dubbed ope ration Boler o, would be delayed
first to 1943 and then ag ain until June of 1944 while the mass of landing craft and material
necessary f or D-Day was built up in southern England. This factor, perh aps more than any
other, gave US air forces the unprecedented opp ortunity to test their theor y of daylight precision
bombing over Europe.
US airpower strategy as stated in Air War Plans Division–1 (AWPD-1) of August 194 1 was
aimed squarely at the German war-making cap ability, a logi stic-raid ing strategy. The primary
objectives d efined in the original pla n were: first, the disruption of Germa n electrica l power,
second the disruption of German tra nsportation, third the disr uption of the German oil and
petroleum system, and f inally neutralization o f the German Air Force as a prerequisite .31 The
writers of th e plan belie ved that victory coul d be achieved primarily through an air off ensive
lasting 6 mo nths after su fficient a irpower was built and deployed. A force of 207 groups, or
11,853 combat aircraft could be nee ded along with 37,051 tr aining aircra ft to back it up.32
Including support perso nnel this am ounted to ne arly 2.1 million men in the Army Air Corps
alone!
Political leaders placed few if any restriction s on airpower employment during WWII . The
grand strate gic objective of unconditional surr ender virtually eliminated negative political
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objectives. Early emplo yment of airpower against civilian tar gets in Lond on and Berli n resulted
in the intenti onal bombing of civilians by all sides. While the US use of daylight preci sion
bombing initially preclud ed intention al attacks o n civilian tar gets, in Febr uary of 1945 Dresden
was firebombed and sho rtly after additional cities in German y and Japan were intentionally
firebombed by the US creating casu alties in the hundreds of thousands. The only sig nificant
restriction that was adhered to by all sides was th e prohibition against che mical weapons.
Despite the huge scale of US strategic bombing in Europe, it did not have the decisive
politica l effects that many air theorist s expected. The effect o f the US “industrial web” attacks is
still a matter of some dispute. While the US Strategic Bombing Survey co ncluded that allied
bombing did have a maj or effect on German y’s economy, much of that e ffect came late in the
war. This was due to la ck of suff icient airpower mass, training, and precision in t he early war,
as well as th e lack of f ighter escort. In part this was also a f ailure of US intelligen ce. US
planners assumed that 1941 Germa n industry was strainin g significantly under the lo ad of
global war. In fact, Germany’s warti me economy was not significantly mobilized un til 1944.
Until that time it was rela tively easy t o absorb the limited scale and precision of US strategic
attacks. By the time US air forces re ached criti cal mass and achieved ai r superiority in mid-
1944, Germany was already suffering from maj or strategic setbacks on the Eastern front and a
breakout by allied force s in the West. It therefore becomes difficult to separate the eff ects of US
strategic bo mbing from t he general strategic co llapse of the Third Reich in 1944 and 1945.
Airpower played a critical role in the German def eat, but did not complete the job alo ne.
In Japan we see a simila r trend. While airpower was the critical tactical e lement in all of
the Pacific n aval campaigns, Japan showed sign ificant resilie nce to strate gic bombing. Japan
enjoyed relative security until November of 1944, when B-29’s launched t heir first raid from the
Marianas.33 The Japanese economy, unlike tho se of Europe, relied heavily on small fa mily
owned businesses to pr ovide much of their wartime production. As a re sult there w ere fewer
large industr ial targets. To attack Ja panese “ind ustry” the US therefore engaged in a rather
brutal policy of firebombing Japanese cities starting in the Sp ring of 1945. The result was the
wanton taki ng of civilian life on an u nprecedente d scale. In total 330,000 civilians we re killed
and 8.5 milli on left homeless.34 Despit e repeated raids, with so me more da maging that the
atomic bomb, Japan did not capitula te until atomic weapons were actually used at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.
This resilien cy of the civilian popula ce to strategic bombardment was another surprise of
the war. Air theorists such as Douh et and Trenchard had b ased their pr ojections of quick
civilian surre nder on the massive panic that set in after the German Zeppelin raids ov er England
19

in World Wa r I. Yet Jap an did not surrender to firebombing, nor did Germany fall to the
combined bomber offensive. Both were politica lly resilient t o strategic b ombing. The enemy
strength can be ascribed to at least t wo factors. First, the US was using a raiding-logistics
strategy to achieve the unlimited objective of unconditional surrender. One could arg ue that
achieving u nconditiona l surrender required a pe rsistent strategy. Second, as was mentioned
earlier, both German y and Japan reta ined strong and tightly controlled political structu res to the
bitter end of the war. Neither was po litically vulnerable to air attack.
A final para dox from W orld War II is that of the atomic bomb. Why, after enduring multiple
firebomb attacks equa l in scale to th e atomic attacks did Japan suddenly surrender t o atomic air
attack? Th e Pacific Str ategic Bombing Survey supports the idea that fire bombing wa s having a
substantia l effect. In March of 1945 when firebombing began, only 19 percent of the populace
believed Ja pan could n ot win the war. Just prio r to surrend er in August , that percen tage had
risen to 68 p ercent “of which more than one-half of the individuals interviewed credit ed air
attacks, rath er than atomic raids, a s the princip al reason for their belief s.”35 The survey
concludes t hat the atomic bomb merely acce lerated the forth coming Jap anese surre nder by
several mon ths, even absent a US ground invasion. Aside fr om firebomb ing, one must consider
the whole of the Japane se strategic situation at t he time of the atomic weapons. By the time the
last atomic weapon was dropped, th e bulk of the Japanese a rmy was trapped in China, and cut
off from the Japanese h omeland. Nearly 250,000 Japanese troops were trapped in Manchuria
alone facing near certain extinction a t the hands of the newly entered Russians. US naval
forces surro unded the Japanese islands, and e ven inte r-island traffic h ad effectively come to a
halt. The US ended the war with over 70 carrier s in the Pacific to Japan ’s four. As a n island
nation with f ew indigeno us resource s, Japan faced a bleak f uture that in cluded wide spread
starvation, total destruct ion of her ar mies, and the continued firebombing and eventual invasion
of Japan itself. Add to t his the demonstrated po ssibility of continued ato mic destruct ion and the
surrender of Japan in 19 45 seems le ss of a para dox.
KOREA
Unlike World War II, in both Korea and Vietnam the negative political o bjective of limiting
the scope of war prevent ed large-sca le strategic use of airpo wer. Though airpower played a
major role in both conflicts, its impact was primarily felt at the tactical ra ther than strat egic level.
In addition, t he vulnerability of two largely agrarian societi es to strategic a ir attack was limited.
Korea and Vietnam did not have the large industrial Rhine valley or vast cities of Japa n to
attack. Stra tegic airpow er therefore played a subsidiary role in both conf licts.
20

In the initia l phase of the Korean War, the focus of US airpower was almost purely tactical.
Available air forces were dedicated solely to slowing the North Korean advance and supporting
the meager forces remaining at Pusa n. Presiden t Truman, fearful of drawing the Chin ese into
the war, limited both gro und and air f orces in Kor ea to those necessary t o repel the North
Korean forces. Pursuit of the negative objective limited the e mployment of US force.
Restrictions lifted in Sept ember of 1950 after the successful I nchon invasion when the President
and the UN supported th e reunificat ion of Korea by force. The US struck the small nu mber of
important industrial targ ets in North Korea. By October, B-29’s had “pa ralyzed” North Korean
industry.36 Negative objectives enter ed again in Nove mber o f that year when China entered the
war. The Sino-Soviet Defense Pact fed Truman’s fears resu lting in a sta gnated front for the
remainder of the war. Airpower continued to sup port tactica l forces and maintain air superiority,
but did not e ngage in str ategic act ion.
The air strat egy in Korea can accur ately be classified as a r aiding-combat strategy.
Limited by politicians fro m attacking the logist ic bridgeheads North of the Yalu river, US air force
could only in terdict and d irectly bomb Chinese an d Korean combat forces. Further, since all US
forces were prevented from doing anything other than restorin g the 38th parallel lin e after
China’s entr y into the war, no positi ve military p rogress coul d be made. A stalemate was the
best possible outcome given the negative politica l object. F inally, one might note that airpower
had relatively few “strategic” targets in North Korea. Korea was primarily an agrarian state, and
not particula rly vulnerable to US strategic airpow er. Since North Korea was also tot alitarian and
faced with n ear annihilat ion before China’s interv ention, it ap pears that th e regime wa s
politica lly resilient.
The decisio n to handle t he Chinese with kid gloves was clear ly a political decision ma de
by Truman. It is intere sting to note t he radically different political approa ch of his successor, the
General turned Presiden t Eisenhower. Eisenhower covertly threatened to bring the war to
China and even intimated that nucle ar weapons were a possibility. This threat is wid ely credited
with bringin g North Korea to sign a reluctant but lasting tru ce.
VIETNA M
The interfer ence of polit ical leader s in military employment in Vietnam is legendary, and
requires litt le further explanation he re. Clearly the negative object of avoiding a war with China
or Russia o utweighed the positive politica l obje ct of winning the war in Vietnam. What Johnson
called "that little bitch of a war" became a symbol of the limits of American military power for a
21

generation, and led to a politica l transformation in the United States so la rge that its f ull impact
is still being evaluated.
For air lead ers, Preside nt Johnson' s interfer ence forms a classic study in how not to do
business. Johnson appr oved the targets to be hi t, how often they would be hit, what weapons
to use and i n some cases even the route to be used by the airplanes. T he Rolling T hunder
campaign designed to compel North Vietnam to stop support ing Viet Cong guerillas in the
South, was the almost the antithesis of the strate gic bombing principle s explained in section 2.
Rather than an intense campaign to maxi mize politica l shock, Rolling Th under was a graduated
campaign to slowly build politica l pressure. The strategy was primarily a raiding-combat
strategy, sin ce key logist ic targets ar ound Haiphong and Hanoi were sp ecifica lly excluded from
attack. Ene my vulnerab ility to air att ack was que stionable, since Viet Cong guerilla f orces and
logisti cs rout es were well hidden withi n the jungle s or civilian population centers and a lmost
impossible t o detect fro m the air. Military leader s also pl ayed a role by inflating clai ms of early
success and refusing to alter the cou rse of an increasingly bankrupt strate gy. Johnson,
politica lly unable to with draw, was also politically unable to e ngage fully lest it "distra ct" attention
from his "Great Society" domestic program. The net result w as a lot of b ombs dropped to little
effect.
The air war entered a new phase with Linebacker I and II u nder Presid ent Nixon. These
efforts had t he much mo re limited aim of forcing North Vietnam to negotiate in good fa ith. The
huge B-52 raids were st rategically f ocused on Hanoi and Haiphong, an d eventually forced North
Vietnam to negotiate an d sign an ag reement. Stra tegy shifted to a raiding-logistic st rategy,
designed in part to maxi mize psychological impact. Some saw this as a r eaffirmation of
strategic a irpower theory and refutation of the Rolling Thund er approach . Others point out,
quite correct ly, that the politica l situat ion under Nixon had changed signif icantly. The US was
already unilaterally pulling troops ou t in large numbers under a program of "Vietminization," and
it was only a matter of time before the US troop withdrawal would be co mplete. The North
Vietnamese correctly calculated that the US would not return to save South Vietnam in the
future. In a ddition, the enemy's vulnerability had changed. The Viet Cong were no longer a
viable force after the failed Tet Offensive, and North Vietnam had turned t o its conven tional
army to pres s its atta ck. These force s were much more susceptible to U S airpower and a
counter-logi stics strateg y. A combin ation of incr eased vulnerability, limit ed US objectives, and
the ongoing US ground withdrawal aided the Lin ebacker I an d II campaigns in ach ieving their
politica l obje ctive.
22

THE PE RSIAN GULF WAR
The Persian Gulf War, as the first m ajor post-cold-war conflict, gave the US its first
opportunity to stake it s place in the n ew world order. It also marks a major turning p oint in US
air strategy and doctrine . A significa nt power shift had occurr ed within th e US Air Force after
Vietnam. The fighter pilots that flew in Vietnam gradually replaced the strategic bomber pilots
that had led the Air Force since the Second World War. This "hostile takeover" as it is
sometimes called, led to a tactica lly focused Air Force. This permeated the entire Air Force.
Nuclear stra tegic inter ceptors were replaced by multipurpose fighters. A nuclear-h eavy
strategic do ctrine was r eplaced by the army led doctrine of " Air-Land battle." As Carl Builder put
it "The contributions of air power to Operation Desert Storm, the Vietnam War and Korean War
were domin ated by tactical air powe r."37
To a large d egree, the combat-raiding strategy of the Gulf War reflected th at approach.
Of the 35,000 strikes flo wn, 23,430 were against Iraqi groun d forces, an d another 6, 800 against
other Iraqi combat forces.38 The polit ical shackles on airpower were largely remo ved. Except
for some limitations de signed to minimize civilian casualti es and mass civilian sufferi ng, few
restriction s were placed on weapons or tactics. Conventional Iraqi force s in the desert were
exposed and vulnerable to identifica tion and air attack. US precision we apons, sign ificantly
enhanced fr om their early Vietnam d ays, played a pr ominent role in the dismemberme nt of Iraqi
military forces.
Despite the sortie count s, airpower over Desert Storm was n ot completely focused on
combat forces. In fact t he early focus of airpow er in the war was strateg ic targets. T his seco nd
major revolu tion was the revival of strategic bombing theory. Initiated by Col John Warden of
the USAF's Checkmate planning ce ll and prolif erated by the Black Hole cell in Ryahd, a
bombing campaign called Instant T hunder was the centerpiece of the Air Force's ear ly war
strategy. In a throwback to the found ations of ind ustrial web t heory of the Air Corps Tactical
School from before WWII, Warden proposed crea ting strategic paralysis in the enemy by
simultaneously striking key targets such as com mand and control nodes, leadership centers,
electricity and other infra structure. T he target of these attacks was strate gic and political, and
the aim was to destroy the enemy's will to fight. Warden, like earlier theo rists, overestimated
the effects o f his campaign by guaranteeing an Ir aqi collap se after only 10 days of bombing with
airpower alone. In practice, airpower created devastation on an unpreced ented scale, but did
not overcome Saddam Hussein's political will. He was physically but not politica lly vulnerable.
Nevertheless, many of Warden's resurrected str ategic theories would for m the foundation of air
theory for the modern Air Force.
23

The political legacy of the Persian Gulf War is w orth noting. Though airp ower alone did
not force Ira q's withdrawal from Kuwait, the daily gun camera videos sho wing the deadly
accuracy an d effectiveness of modern airpower firmly established airpower as a pote nt weapon
in the minds of US policymakers. Airpower could be used separate from and in advance of
ground forces. Airpower can be dep loyed quickly in defense of hot spots. Modern airpower is
extremel y precise and capable of wreaking great destruction. Airpower can be employed with
few losses a nd causes f ewer civilian casualti es than other means. These lesson s, which form
the modern politica l lega cy of airpower, were all f irmly established during Desert Storm.
AIRPOWER OVER KOS OVO
In Kosovo, the vision of modern airpower introduced in Dese rt Storm wa s forced to f ace
its limitation s, both at th e politica l and military level. General Wesley Clark, NATO commander,
was quoted as saying "T his was not, strictly spea king, a war."39 Kosovo wa s the first ev er
NATO led o peration, an d subject th erefore not to the loose coalition ru les of Desert Storm, but
the strict po litical limits o f the NATO charter. Th ese political limits were to prove a major
stumbling block, yet by coincidence also play a major role in NATO's success.
The military strategy in Kosovo was not that of Desert Storm. Kosovo was at its heart a
politica l war. Ground troops were ruled out from the start. Rather than a dopt the rapid decisive
paralysis of Serbian lea dership, NATO adopted a strategy of graduated pressure, re miniscent of
the Rolling Thunder ca mpaign of President Joh nson. Airmen jokingly called the ca mpaign
"Constant Drizzle" to contrast it with Warden's "I nstant Thun der" plan fro m Desert St orm. The
reasons were many. First, NATO be lieved Se rbian leader Milosevic would quickly sta rt to
negotiate on ce bombs actually start ed falling, so they limited the scope to limit damage.
Secondly, many in NAT O had vivid pictures of t he cities of Europe burning to the gr ound in
World War II and wanted to avoid that politica l perception in B elgrade. Third, NATO at its
essence is a consensu s organization so any strategy had to reflect the "lo west common
denominator" of the ninet een membe r nations. In many cases all 19 nat ions had to a pprove key
targets. Th e strategy was therefore a raiding-co mbat strategy, but one more like Viet nam than
Desert Storm. With no ground force to tie down or identify enemy force s, the Serbians were
able to easily mo ve sma ll units from house to ho use to continue their ca mpaign against the
largely defenseless Ko sovar civilians. These small units were hard to identify and target from
the air. Milo sevic, reading NATO's slow cam paign as a sign of weakness, decided t o instead
accelerated his process of ethnic cle ansing in Ko sovo.
24

Ironically, th e politica l weakness of NATO was also its strength. The o ne point that all
member nati ons were able to agree u pon was that they could not lose the war. The politica l
price of havi ng the NATO alliance fa il in it s first ever military operation was higher th an any of
the member nations cou ld bear. A series of public relation disasters such as the accidental
bombing of the Chinese embassy and the bombing of refuge e convoys started to erode public
support for t he war. As public sup port ebbed, p olitical leade rs pressed f or a quick e nd and the
politica l limits were ease d. In late May, General Clarke was finally given permission t o take out
the power grid and key national com mand and control center s. The shift from tactical to
strategic tar gets was se en as criti cal for winning the war. The increased military pressure
combined with political p ressure coming now from both Russia and the NATO count ries
ultimately forced Milose vic to negotiate a settle ment. The limited object ive was achieved and
peacekeeping forces w ere moved i n to stabilize Kosovo.
The war ove r Kosovo remains a military and political enigma. NATO's 19 countries w ent
to war without UN sanction to stop a civil war with few if any national inte rests at sta ke. The
bloodless airpower-only NATO win would appear to be a grea t victory both from a political and
airman's perspective. T hough the p olitical objective was limited, it was n ot trivial. Serbia in
effect ceded control of th e province of Kosovo to NATO force s; marking t he first time in history
that airpower alone force d a state to give up some of its sove reignty. Why then is there so
much political discomfor t? First, it is clear that K osovo brought to light so me political cracks in
the NATO al liance and military structure that po liticians wou ld prefer re mained hidden. Second ,
the air oper ation did not end the eth nic clean sing, but instea d accelerate d it. Not unt il
peacekeeping forces en tered Kosovo did ethnic cleansing actually end. Third, Koso vo revealed
that consen sus based coalition targ eting can re sult in a ran dom application of airpo wer that
does not ne cessarily support the str ategic obje ctive. Finally, Kosovo represents a po litico-
military ethical threshold that neither t he US nor its allie s were prepared to deal with. I f war can
now be fought entirely from the air using perhap s only 1,000 pilots witho ut a single loss, then
the friendly politica l cost approaches zero. It is what Michael Ignatieff d escribes a s a Virtual
War. As he puts it "…war without death – to our side – is wa r that cease s to be real t o us:
virtual war. If Western n ations can e mploy violence with impunity, will they not be tempted to
use it more often?"40 Will we enter wars we canno t get out of? Will the ea se of employing
airpower result in the overextension we have seen in all gre at empires of the ancient world?
Only the future will tell.
25

CON CLUSI ON
But I have s een the scie nce I worshipped, and the airplane I loved destroying the
civilizati on I expected them to serve.
– Charles A. Lindburgh

Modern US airpower is a potent and lethal political weapon for supportin g US objectives
worldwide. The inheren t politica l advantages are many including flexibil ity, speed, ability to
project pow er globally, f ewer friendly and collat eral casualties, inform ational dominance and in
many cases a rapid vict ory. Airpower also has t he advantage of offering a high degre e of
politica l cont rol. Yet airp ower is not an all-purpo se tool. Air men believe airpower should be
used in cert ain ways to achieve key military objectives, and t hey also beli eve that to use it
otherwise is not only wasteful but also counterpr oductive.
The challen ge of grand strategy is t o connect th e politica l objective to military and other
means while still ba lancing the need s of a variety of other, often confli cting politica l objectives.
The politicia n is not as concerned with the techn ology or doctrine of warfare as its contribution
to the grand set of competing politica l objectives. The politician may therefore choose to limit in
various ways the employment of airpower to achiev e other objectives. Airpower, by itself, a lso
has inherent limitations. As a creatio n of the indu strial age, a irpower depends on the
vulnerability of the enemy. If the enemy cannot b e identified and targeted from the air, it is
difficult to effectively employ airpower alone. Similarly, eve n if an enemy is physically
vulnerable, he may not be politica lly vulnerable to airpower.
A survey of major US air engagements of t he 20t h century shows both promise and cause
for caution. Though airp ower played a critica l role in every conflict, the r ole of airpo wer applied
strategically has been mixed. When unfettered from major po litical restraint, airpower has
created some spectacu lar military results, but t hese have not always translated dire ctly to
politica l resu lts. The pol itical vulnera bility appears again to b e at least as important as physical
vulnerability. Translating physical vulnerability int o politica l vulnerability fr om the air is not an
easy task. Further, airp ower appears better suit ed to achieving limited p olitical objectives alone
than unlimit ed ones. Th is may have to do with t he inherent limitations of a non-persistent
raiding strat egy.
The political implications of the virtual war from the air seen in Kosovo are both
breathtaking and scary. Modern airpower, if perce ived by politicians a s a low cost means to
politica l ends, is remarkably cheap in its entry cost. Yet, if t he last 60 years of airpo wer has
taught us an ything it is th at airpower is not an all purpose solution. It can achieve many
objectives alone, but it is not capable of achievin g all objectives alone. T hat is why the US
26

maintains a full spectru m balanced military force. The risk, then, is that we ma y cheaply enter a
"virtual war" that turns int o a much more costly re al war.
Finally, as was covered earlier, even when airpower is effective it is not p ersistent.
Though it ca n be used to compel an enemy to ac hieve a variety of objectives, it cann ot do so on
a persistent basis unle ss it is constan tly re-emplo yed. In each of the wars mentioned above
including Ko sovo, subst antial groun d forces wer e required t o garrison th e region and maintain
the peace o nce the air war ended. The broader use of airpo wer for economy may therefore
have the unintended con sequence of increasing , rather than decreasing t he role of gr ound
forces. If th e US engages in the unr estricted u se of "virtual war" to protect non-vital interests,
she may be engaging in a policy of o ver-extensio n. These po litical object s, once ach ieved by
military force, must be garrisoned. This would put the US on a histori cal path of over-extension
and decline similar to th at seen in fo rmerly great empires such as Rome, Byzantium and Great
Britain.
Despite airp ower's limitations, the cu rrent US advantage in airpower may indeed ush er a
brief period of "airpower uber alles." Nevertheless, it is clearly in the best interests of the United
States to cr eate a balan ced armed force capable of addressing the full spectrum of politica l
objectives. Even in an ideal world, t he US technological adv antage cann ot last forever. The
proliferation of technolog y throughout history has shown us th at eventually our enemi es will
match our capability. Until that hap pens, the ap plication o f airpower mu st proceed a long sound
politica l lines, with eyes fully open to potential lo ng term military and political pitfa lls.

Word Count = 11,739

27

28

ENDNOT ES

1 Hallion, Richard. "Air Power and Asymmetric Threats", Air Power and Joint Forces,
(Aerospace Centre 2000 Air Power Conference, Australia).
2 Mahnken, Thomas G. “F acing Nucle ar and Conventional Re ality”, Orbis Magazine,
(Winter 2000); Available from:
<http://www. findarticles.com/cf_0/m0 365/1_44/59120265/p2/article.jhtml?term=unilateral+nucle
ar+disarmament+Butler>; Internet Accessed 25 Feb 2002.
3 Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam, (New
York, NY: The Free Press, 1989), 1 20.
4 Meilinger, Phillip S. The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory , (Maxwell
AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997 ), 9.
5 Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Pre ss, 1984), 9 0.
6 Cohen, Eliot A. “A Revolution in W arfare”, Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (Mar-Apr 1996), 44-
45.
7 Meilinger, Phillip S. 10 Propositions Regarding Airpower , (Ma xwell AFB, AL: Air Force
History and Museums Program, School of Advance Airpower Studies).
8 Clausewitz, 77.
9 Ibid., 596.
10 Deptula, David A, “Firing for Effects”, Air Force Magazine , 84, no. 4, (April 2001): 41 -45.
11 Hallion, 1.
12 Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Airpower, 43.
13 Mitchell, Wi lliam. Winged Defense: The Development and Possibil ities of Modern Air
Power Economic and Military , (New York, Dover Publications, 1988), 77.
14 Civil Reserve Air Fleet Fact Sheet, Command a nd General Staff College; Available from
<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/usaf/AMC_Toolbook/CRAFDAT A.HTM>; Int ernet Accessed 10
March 2002.
15 Napier, David A. Aerospace Research Center 2001 Year-end Review an d 2002 Forecast ,
Aerospace I ndustrial Association ; Available from < http://www.aia-
aerospace.o rg/stats/yr_ender/yr_ender.cfm >; Internet Accessed 1 March 2002.
16 Clausewitz, 88.
17 Clodfelter, xi.
29

18 Clausewitz, 88.
19 Warden, Jo hn, “The Enemy as a System”, Airpower Journal, (Spring 1995); 41-45.
20 Clausewitz, 78.
21 Clodfelter, xi.
22 Ibid., 119.
23 Gordon, Mi chael R. an d Trainor, Bernard E., The General’s War, (Bost on, USA: Little
Brown and Compan y, 1995), 326.
24 Builder, Carl H., The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution
and Fate of the US Air Force , (New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Publishers, 1994) , 210.
25 Gordon, and Trainor, 2 47.
26 Douhet, Gu ilio The Command of th e Air, (1921).
27 Jones, Arch er, Elements of Military Strategy: An Historical A pproach ¸(Westport, CT:
Praeger Press, 1996), xv.
28 Liddel-Hart, B.H. Strategy, (New Yo rk: Meridian Books, 1991 ).
29 Clausewitz, 77.
30 Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven: Th e Evolution of Airpower Theory , 183.
31 Hansell, Haywood S. The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler , (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University,
1973) 88.
32 Ibid., 88.
33 Clodfelter, 7.
34 Ibid., 9.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 16.
37 Builder, 22 9.
38 Gordon and Trainor, 31 3.
39 Ignatieff, Michael, Virtual War: Koso vo and Beyo nd, (New Yo rk, NY: Metropolitan Boo ks,
2000), 3.
30

40 Ibid., 5.
31

32

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Builder, Carl H., The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate
of the US Air Force , (New Brunswick, USA: Tran saction Publishers, 1994 ).
Civil Reserve Air Fleet F act Sheet , Command an d General Staff College; Available from
<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/usaf/AMC_Toolbook/CRAFDAT A.HTM>; Int ernet Accessed 10
March 2002.
Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Pre ss, 1984).
Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam, (New York,
NY: The Free Press, 19 89).
Cohen, Eliot A. “A Revo ltion in Warf are”, Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (Mar-Apr 1996), 44-45.
Deptula, David A, “Firing for Effects”, Air Force Magazine , 84, no. 4, (April 2001): 41 -45.
Douhet, Guilio The Command of the Air, (1921).
Gordon, Michael R. and Trainor, Bernard E., The General’s War, (Boston, USA: Little Brown
and Compa ny, 1995).
Hallion, Richard. "Air Power and Asymmetric Threats", Air Power and Joint Forces, (Aerospace
Centre 2000 Air Power Conference, Australia).
Hansell, Haywood S. The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler , (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 1973).
Ignatieff, Michael, Virtual War: Koso vo and Beyo nd, (New Yo rk, NY: Metropolitan Boo ks, 2000).
Jones, Arch er, Elements of Military Strategy: An Historical A pproach ¸(Westport, CT: Praeger
Press, 1996 ).
Liddel-Hart, B.H. Strategy, (New York: Meridian Books, 1991 ).
Mahnken, Thomas G. “F acing Nucle ar and Conventional Re ality”, Orbis Magazine, (Winter
2000); Available from:
<http://www. findarticles.com/cf_0/m0 365/1_44/59120265/p2/article.jhtml?term=unilateral+
nuclear+disarmament+Butler>; Internet Accessed 25 Feb 2 002.
Meilinger, Phillip S. The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory , (Ma xwell AFB, AL:
Air University Press, 1997).
. 10 Propositions Regarding Airpower, (Ma xwell AFB, AL: Air Force History and Museums
Program, Sc hool of Advance Airpower Studies).
Mitchell, William. Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power
Economic and Military , (New York, Dover Publi cations, 198 8).
33

Napier, Davi d A. Aerospace Research Center 2001 Year-end Review an d 2002 Forecast ,
Aerospace I ndustrial Association ; Available from < http://www.aia-
aerospace.o rg/stats/yr_ender/yr_ender.cfm >; Internet Accessed 1 March 2002.
Warden, Jo hn, “The Enemy as a System”, Airpower Journal, (Spring 1995): 41-45.
34