National University of Political Studies and Public Administration [615170]

National University of Political Studies and Public Administration
Faculty of Communication and Public Relations
Master in Communications and EU Affairs

Dissertation thesis
Public attitudes towards the EU in the United Kingd om. Reflection of
Euroscepticism in political discourse on Brexit in the UK

Coordinator:
University lector
Flavia Durach
Student: [anonimizat] – Laura Ionita

Bucharest, July 2020

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Content

1. Introduction

2. Theory
a. Public opinion and EU attitudes
b. Europeanization, British Euroscepticism and Brexit

3. Practical section – Case study
a. Alignment of UK political discourses and public opi nion regarding
the level of Euroscepticism (2015 – 2019)

4. Conclusion

5. Bibliography

6. Annexes

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Introduction
Nowadays , before the Coronavirus pandemic had spre ad throughout the world, another
subject had caught up the attention of not only Eur opean leaders and population, but also
international key actors, that being the decision o f the United Kingdom to exit the European
Union. This process has started since 2016 after th e UK held a referendum to ask the British
citizens whether they still agree that their countr y should a member of the Union, or whether
they want to exit this community. The citizens have decided and it is from then that the UK had
activated the Article 50 from the Treaty of Lisbon, beginning the negotiations with the EU for
their withdrawal Agreement.
The purpose of this dissertation thesis is to ident ify the level of Euroscepticism in the UK
from 2015 to 2019, presented both by the citizens a nd by the leaders of Britain.
It is in this context that I have considered as an interesting point of analysis the story
behind the decision of Brits to exits the European Union, thus reflected though the existent
Euroscepticism in the UK. In this context, two elem ents are to be reflected upon, first of all the
characteristics of the British Euroscepticism, its history and causes and on the other hand, this
level of skepticism reflected in the opinion of the British citizens. To find out the specific
elements that can be identified in the British Euro scepticism it is relevant to introduce in this
discussion the general ideas promoted by the genera l Euroscepticism. This allows a broader
image on this phenomenon and a possible comparison of the UK with other countries, in the
context of a general pattern.
Besides describing the British Euroscepticism, I ha ve also chosen to talk about the public
opinion of the British citizens in regards to their perception on the European Union, to identify
the characteristics and level of Euroscepticism amo ng the population. As it was the Brits who
have voted to exit from the EU, I have considered i t is relevant and important to highlight this
aspect in the discussion. By analyzing and comparin g the existent data available from the
Eurobarometer I have decided to only look at inform ation from the period 2015 – 2019, as this
includes the period before the referendum and after the results, during the negotiations with the
EU.
The public opinion is one of the two elements I hav e decided to analyze in this context;
another one that I have considered to be interestin g is the level of Euroscepticism that can be
identified in the same timeframe in the leaders’ pu blic discourses. As they are the representatives

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of the country and are the ones who present to the public the European and national perspective,
form a political and even higher level, I believe i t is important to also take into consideration
their point of view on the relationship of UK – EU.
In this context the structure of the thesis is divi ded in a theoretical approach and an
analytical one, firstly mentioning the general appr oach of the Euroscepticism in the European
space and then in the British context, and then ana lyzing the case study. This case study is
organized in two parts, first an analysis of Euroba rometer data to find out the public opinion
related to the European Union and the level of Euro scepticism that can be identified through
their reactions, and, the discourse analysis of dif ferent speeches of UK’s leaders. This
information is collected from the period 2015 -2019 , from before the referendum and during the
negotiations with the EU.

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Theory
Chapter 1: Public opinion and EU attitudes
Introduction
The world has been constantly changing from the beg inning of times, especially when it
comes to giving a voice to the people, but in the l ast centuries we have been part of some
important modifications on the international scale that has enabled us to be more vocal regarding
national and international aspects. People from all over the world, of all ages, religions and
gender have been able to speak up and receive inter national recognition for their beliefs and
speeches, some simple examples being Martin Luther King Jr., Malala Yousafzai, Greta
Thunberg. In this context, recent events and manife stations are also proof that with the freedom
of speech people have succeeded in making their wor ds count, here we can recall those who are
fighting worldwide for the LGBTQ rights, gender equ ality or protection of the environment.
This augmented value of the “popular” voice on the international scene is one of the reasons
why there is higher interest in studying the public opinion in different aspects and levels, whether
we are talking about nationally, regionally or glob al scale. Comparing the situation from the 21 st
century with that from the 19 th century, when public opinion was beginning to be m ore relevant,
it could be said that we have legally consolidated the voice of the citizens. Even if it has not yet
reached this point, the countries have made changes in order to get closer to the Latin proverb,
“vox populi, vox dei” (the voice of the people is th e word of God), giving the population more
rights, making their opinion count and focusing the national and international actions on the
needs of all inhabitants. Even if the concept of pu blic opinion may not be new, its regulation is
rather recent, as Habermas explains in “Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere ”
(Habermas, 1962/1989), the “public sphere”, as he d efines it, was institutionalized in the 19 th
century in some of the European countries by the bo urgeois society. Another factor that has
contributed to the development of the concept is th e development of the Enlightenment
throughout Europe, promoting the need to replace ol d monarchy systems with efficient
democracies (Donsbach &Traugott, 2008, p. 12). The democratic system would have meant
more power given to citizens and the obligation of the ruler to promote their well-being.
This idea has proved to be a success among the citi zens, as people started to fight for their
opinions and fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech and thought, things that were not

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approved by the monarchies, as they were built as a uthoritarian regimes. The French empire, for
example, as well as the extremist regimes developed in the 20 th century, focused their policies
and priorities solely on ensuring the high-quality lifestyle for leaders and the class of people that
was promoted by the regime. In this context, the id ea of public opinion was restricted to a
category from the social class, meaning also that t he term of public was restricted.
Public opinion and democracy
Moving on from the totalitarian and authoritarian r egimes, a new governing reform appeared
and remained the model for modern states, the democ racy. Considered to best represent the
interests of all citizens and lead to a welfare sta te, the majority of states have decided that this i s
the most efficient way to keep the people content b y listening to their opinion and letting them
have their say regarding the domestic policies. Fro m its Latin origins demos, translated as
people, the democracy centers its priorities and po licies on raising the life standard of all citizens
of a state, this also being translated into listeni ng and respecting their opinion. Taking into
consideration the fact that most of today’s states are functioning following this regime as basis, it
is very important to analyze the relation that exis ts between these two elements, the democracy
and the public opinion.
One of the most important steps towards a freedom o f speech and acknowledgment of
citizens’ opinion in a state, was through the Frenc h “Declaration of Human’s and Citizen’s
Rights of 1789” which defined:
“the free communication of ideas and opinion as one of the most precious rights of man:
every citizen can speak, write, and print with free dom, but is responsible of the abuses of this
freedom in the cases determined by the law” (Conseil Constitutionnel, “Déclaration des Droits
de l'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789”).
This idea has not been forgotten, but has been used later on, in 1792, only three years after
the French Revolution, when the term of public opin ion was introduced for the first time in the
French Parliament and its importance was highlighte d “ it is certainly right and prudent to
consult the public opinion” (Habermas, 1962, p. 65). Here, even though the term : “to consult ”
does not necessarily mean that the opinion expresse d on certain subjects should be respected, but
taking into consideration the wish of citizens when discussing about the functioning of the state
is a first step towards a welfare state. This was a lso a sign given from those governing the
country, possibly after seeing the power of citizen s in the French Revolution, that they have

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understood the importance of consulting the citizen s in regard to the way a country function. One
of the possible reasons behind this sudden raise of interest in the public opinion, was based on
precaution learned from the revolution and fear of the leaders to lose their legitimacy and their
power. That is how the public opinion has slowly be gun to be “ one power among other powers”
(Habermas, 1962/1989, p.135).
The definition used for public opinion has evolved since 1791, just to appear in a new form
through a more recent document, the Universal Decla ration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1948 and which r egulated for the first time a series of
fundamental human rights that every UN member count ry should respect:
“everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and ex pression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, rec eive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.” (United Nations, “Universal Declaration of
Human Rights”, art. 19).
Even if the majority of citizens earned this right after 1948, once the communist regime had
settled in soviet countries, this freedom has been once again restricted. Citizens have gained it
back only in 1991, after the regime was eradicated, moment which marked the beginning of a
new era. After this and the fall of the Iron Curtai n, through the democracy that has been
established in all post – soviet countries, the cit izens words started to have more importance. The
democratic regime has offered citizens the freedom of speech and so, the public opinion has
reappeared, this time, focusing on all individuals and evolving into different types of public
opinions. In this context there are two visions of the democracy that can be identified, one that
concentrates on satisfying the individual needs and does not see the nation as a whole (self-
sufficient individual), and the other which recogni zes the fact that the mass opinion is more
important, because, unlike the personal opinion, th is one does not make decisions on the spur of
the moment and it should be taken seriously into co nsideration when talking about citizens’
needs. (Lippmann, 1998, p.228). The multidimensiona lity of public opinion in a democracy has
been observed also by other authors, Brookes and Ma nza talking about an individual and macro-
level, but also about a dimension that refers to th e scope of the government and a cultural one.
(Brookes, Manza, 2007, p.124)
These elements which represent the diversity of pub lic opinion within a democratic country
can also be analyzed through our day to day life, a s there is a distinction from what we call

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public and private. Though, the concept of public i s not a concept that is only understood by
leaders, high representatives from the social class , but also by the citizens who are confronted
each day with this diversity. The two aspects menti oned could be compared with the existence of
the private and public life of a person (Lippmann, 1998, p.82) both necessary in a society. The
private life symbolizes the personal issues regardi ng ones family, friends and his activities during
leisure time, which he can decide for himself with no need to explain, on the other hand, the
public life is the way a person acts within a socie ty influencing more than just his own life. This
could mean his implication in school, work, volunte ering or even politics, all activities that take
place within a community that does not affect just one person. The same aspects are present in a
society at a macro level, when talking about the so ciety as a whole, the same relation should
exist between the private and public.
The public appears for every citizen and implies th eir possibility to express their opinion on
matters regarding not only their lives as they are affected by national legislation, but also
regarding international aspects. This concept is re flected also through the possibility to own
something and claim your rights regarding that spec ific object, house, terrain in front of the state
and its authorities. The public has multiple meanin gs, very well described by Habermas:
“juridical as in the public access of citizens, poli tical meaning public interest, representation as
in pubic event and communication as in making somet hing public.” (Habermas, 1962 apud
Donsbach &Traugott, 2008, p.2).
These meanings are to be completed and analyzed lat er on, an interesting aspect introduced
being that opinion of a majority, or the public opi nion regarding a certain subject influences the
rest of the population. This aspect is being discus sed by Noelle Neumann, through the concept of
spiral of silence, a theory to describe the “ increasing pressure people feel to conceal their vi ews
when they think they are in the minority” ( Neumann,1962, p.372). In her perspective the media
has people mistaking what the public opinion really is and because people are afraid to be
isolated from the rest, they tend to think a certai n way so to be aligned with the majority.
(Neumann,1962). Taking these elements into consider ation, Neumann defines the public opinion
as “ attitudes one can express without running the dange r of isolating oneself; a tangible force
that keeps people in line” ( Neumann,1962, p. 372).
This social sciences perspective of public opinion has been studied more and more, resulting
in many different thesis and theories regarding its meaning. Because of this multitude of

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approaches, there isn’t one definition of the term, but several perspectives regarding its value,
some saying that the concept is just an idea and ot her implying that the public opinion is a
quantifiable element from the society. For example , Shepard describes it as a large number of
persons, “individuals ” as he calls them, and not something so abstract a s “the nation, society or
a higher entity” (Shepard, 1909, p. 35). There are other authors th at say public opinion is an
utopic term, an ideal, “a picture inside men’s heads, the picture if thems elves, others, their
needs, purposes and relationship” ( Lippmann, 1922, p. 18).
There are other authors who did not align themselve s with one definition, but agreed to more
of them, as is for example Harwood Childs who ident ified 48 definitions (Childs, 1965 apud
Donsbach and Traugott, 2008, p.1). The author does, whoever, identify common elements that
helped him offer a more general description of what the public opinion is in his opinion; a
flexible standard that we try to modify according t o our wishes and so we both mold it and
follow it, the democratic system through propaganda being a contributing factor to its shaping.
(Childs, 1965, p. 129).
Among all 48 definitions he also stresses out the i mportance of this term in every domain
from the social sciences, as for example in politic s, its “ influence upon government and the
influence of official as well as unofficial agencie s of government upon it” ( Childs, 1965, p.38).
The most visible moment in politics when the public opinion has its say is in elections, being
an important factor in the citizens judgment of pub lic policies and their votes. (Stoeckel, 2012,
p.27). In this political context an important contr ibuting factor to the public opinion is the
involvement of a leader, using his discourse and po wer to influence he distributes the attention of
the citizens towards actions which he thinks may le ad the whole society to a more prosperous
life. (Wrone’s, 2006, p. 492). The role of a leader is also very important in the public opinion, as
he is the representative of the population and so, he is the one to express the opinion of the
population, of the mass (Lippmann, 2009, p.244).
Mass media
Being such an interdisciplinary term, its use can a lso be found in other ramifications of the
social science, which are very well explained in th e Sage Handbook of public opinion research.
As an example given in the book, sociologists are i nterested in the capacity of public opinion to
influence the behavior of persons in order to bette r integrate in a society; on the other hand, in

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the domain of communication the phenomenon most ana lyzed is the influence of mass media
(Donsbach and Traugott, 2007, p.2).
When talking about communication and mass media, on e aspect that has been highlighted
lately considering all the changes at the internati onal level, is the representation of citizens, the
role of a legitimate leader of a state being to bes t represent the interests of the population.
Citizens have a policy representation in an indirec t way through elections and direct when
participating in a discussion with a politician in order for him to respond to what the public
wants (Soroka, Wlezien, 2009).
The mass media is also a contributing factor in inf luencing the decisions taken by politicians,
through the public opinion pooling that they either have created and analysed themselves or that
they have taken from other organisations. In this w ay, it is easier for representatives to know
what the public wants and needs, listening to their concerns being the role of a leader as their
representative (Soroka & Wlezien, 2009, p.2). Never theless, this information provided by the
mass media can also confuse the representatives, by describing the citizens as one entity, which
is not necessarily true, as any pooling is more or less restrictive not being able to capture all
opinions. (Miscke, 2014). However mass media sees i ts most important role in the face of major
policy changes, when the citizens have to be inform ed and the politicians need to know their
opinion.
I have presented the influence and importance of pu blic opinion, but only in a national
context and for the purpose of this paper I need to present its relevance at the regional level,
more precisely at the European one. Even if the EU is not a state, it is a community that
influences the life of citizens and has been an imp ortant topic the past couple of years, in the
context of Great Britain wanting to activate the Ar ticle 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. This moment
has shown how important the opinion of citizens on the EU really is and how it can even affect
the external and domestic policy of a country. This is exactly why I am going to focus next on
the opinions and attitudes on the EU that exist ins ide this community, as this is not a new
phenomenon to appear in the region.
Attitudes towards the EU
When talking about the European Union, the public o pinion towards the EU in each country
stands at the core of the European integration proc ess, cohesion and development of the union as
a whole community (Hajo, Schuck, Elenbaas, 2011, p. 242). As it was for the national context,

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this opinion is relevant for leaders at the level o f the EU as a whole to ensure the necessities are
met across the union. That is the reason why there are surveys through which different actors try
to find out the public opinion form all member stat es on the Union, including the factors which
may influence the citizens opinions on the EU. Sche uer and Schmitt agree that there are few of
these elements that have strong impact on the perce ption of people about the EU, such as the
possibility of enlargement and new members within t he EU, the adoption of the common
currency and the Turkish membership (Scheuer, Schmi tt, 2009, p. 22).
There are two kind of factors that are to be taken into consideration when talking about the
citizens attitude towards the EU, those that are ta ngible and those which are more or less
concepts, ideals. The first sphere is represented b y the economy, monetary and financial policies,
internal and external positions, politics, social a nd environmental decisions taken at the European
level. The economic regulations have been identifie d as one of the most important factors of
decisions when it comes to citizens building up the ir attitudes towards the EU (Scheuer, Schmitt,
2009, p.251, p.256). According to a study done by L auren McLaren, the European budget and
assistance is also a factor contributing to the cit izens’ opinion, those who live in a country that
receives more money tend to perceive their membersh ip in the EU as positive (McLaren, 2006
,p.45) These are not the only ones that influence t he opinion of citizens, but mostly every policy
that effects or is perceived as to have a negative impact on the country’s economy is important
for them to have a certain position. A very clear e xample could be highlighted from the Brexit
campaign which had at its core the negative attitud e towards the immigration and refugee policy
and regulations taken by the EU.
This example is also a very good case to show how i mportant is the opinion of leaders
towards the EU, when analysing the citizens attitud e, as they are the representative of the country
and can take decisions regarding the national posit ion on some aspects. The leaders or the
representatives of the countries are also very impo rtant in defining the cohesion on the EU, as
they can influence opinions from within the country and can create new partnerships with other
countries. Their implication and unity at the Europ ean level is a part of the integration process
and show the relationship between leaders, countrie s and societies. (Scheuer, Schmitt, 2009, p.
22).
The second sphere includes more abstract components to which citizens refer to, such as
identity, values, attachment to the concept of a Eu ropean community. Even if these are concepts

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hard to grasp, they help describe the Union as more than just an institution or organization,
transforming it into a true community of citizens t hat have things in common that go beyond
economy, democracy and so on. These concepts are ha rder to be identified as they are not
regulated and derive from the unity and cohesion of the Union and the citizens that are part of it.
The diversity of opinions towards all these element s differ very much depending on the
country, some of these components may be recognized only by some countries or citizens, like
the existence of a European identity or citizenship . (Di Mauro & Memoli, 2016, p.65). All these
different opinions translate into direct attitudes that citizens have towards the European Union,
representing beliefs that some may have and that th ey expose and are debatable in a society. The
analysis of the citizens’ attitudes towards the EU is a way to find out if there can truly exist a
European identity and what is there to be added in order to create a true Union of States. (Di
Mauro & Memoli, 2016, p.9). When social scientists began, in the 1990s, to analyse these
attitudes that citizens have towards the EU, they w ere preoccupied with analysing the level of
integration across the EU (Di Mauro & Memoli, 2016, p.11).
Later on, the importance of knowing the attitudes t owards the EU came with the need to
understand the trend and reasoning behind the votin g behaviour and at the same time according
the EU the legitimacy it needs as a community and s et of institutions. (Boomgaarden, Schuck,
Elenbaas and Vreese, 2011, p.242). As in the case o f a national system, leaders need to have
legitimacy for them to rule the country, this comin g from the approval of the citizens as their
representative, through voting. This legitimacy is, nevertheless limited and that is why
representatives need to make sure that in the meant ime of their mandate that the citizens still
accept them as their leader.
The same can be applied at the European level, only , at a bigger scale and with more costs
because, if the Union does not have the support of its citizens anymore, it could cease to exist as
an entity. Unlike a country, the Union is a concept that exists solely on the basis on the citizens
agreement through referendum to enter this communit y, if all countries decide that it is in the
best interest of their citizens to cease the existe nce of this Union, then, there is no other authorit y
that can stop that. Because the Union is composed o f democratic countries and has tried along
the years to reduce the existent democratic deficit from within the community, it is crucial for it
to have the legitimacy from the citizens. If the at titudes towards the Union start to become more
and more negative that shows a need for action at t he institutional level and European actors

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should start getting concerned and making the neces sary steps and changes to ensure that the
citizens are content with its functioning.
One important aspect that can be mentioned from ide ntifying if a person does have certain
attitudes towards the EU is the fact that people te nd to think they have more knowledge about
something if they have strong attitude towards that idea or object. In this case, whatever their
opinion towards the EU is, this will most probably be reflected in the ideas and events they recall
related to the European context, on which they base their assumptions and attitudes. Moreover, if
they are directly influenced by something that the Union has regulated or said, this will make
their attitudes even stronger and they will be more eager to acquire new information about the
certain topic that has affected them directly. This is the case for European policies or regulations
for or against something which represents something important to that certain citizen. (Holbrook,
Berent, Krosnick, Visser and Boninger, 2005, p.751 – 766).
Talking about the types of attitudes that citizens may have towards the EU, one of them is a
pro-European or pro-integration which supports “ upholding something by aid or adherence,
active promotion of interests, defending something as valid, right” (Easton ,1975 apud di Mauro
and Memoli, 2016, p. 8). With time another attitude towards the EU began to rise, especially in
the United Kingdom, namely, the Euroscepticism, or the attitudes that were against the European
integration. This public opinion has been reflected in the negat ive results in the referendums that
took place when ratifying the new Constitutional Tr eaty that would have transformed the EU into
a „Union of States”. Some countries have clearly re jected this solution and even after that the
Lisbon Treaty, have shown their reticent position t owards the actions of the European Union.
Concerning the pro-European integration attitude , there are multiple perceptions over it, one
being a general support and the other support for a specific element within the European Union
(Easton, 1975 apud Boomgaarden et al, 2011, p. 244) . The general support towards the EU is
translated into a positive attitude regarding the e xistence of this community along with its
principles, values and main policies. The specific one refers to the agreement and attitude that
citizens have towards one specific aspect from the European Union, whether we are talking
about one policy implemented or just the idea of a community. The specific support may be
towards concrete, quantifiable aspects or abstract ones. The two kind of support have been
studied in the article by Boomgaarden who therefore concludes by presenting different kinds of
support:

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1) “Utilitarian/specific/output-oriented support…” ( Boomgaarden et al., 2011, p. 245)
(meaning the benefits which one considers he has fr om being a member of the European
Union. This aspect is based on the economic cost-be nefit principle and reflects the
tendency that people have to consider joining an ac tion or group if they have something
to gain. This can be presented as a specific suppor t as it is mainly based on one aspect
from the whole spectrum offered by being part of an organization or supporting an idea,
the benefits. Because of this perspective those who are from within this category of
supporting people look at what could be the result of this idea, practically, not just in
theory. That is exactly why people from this catego ry focus more on policy decisions and
national implication, but, looking at the positive aspects from all these elements or their
positive impact. An aspect that is being highlighte d through the utilitarian support, as
Hobolt has specified, is that citizens with better education and well-paid jobs tend to
benefit more from the European trade liberalization and so, they become supporters of the
EU because of the economic benefits. He also specif ies that this principle applies at
national high-level, depending on their economic be nefits receiving EU funds, they also
tend to be supported of the European Union because of this financial benefit. (Hobolt,
2004, p. 666)
2) “… Affective/ diffuse/input-oriented support” ( Boomgaarden et al., 2011, p. 245) (the
role of emotions, the personal connection with the feeling of being a European citizen,
this kind of support is more recent and has also be come more important. The European
identity, values, principles and all social aspects related to the European Union are those
which this kind of supporters are most attentive to wards. This kind of support means
focusing more on the elements that make the EU this unique community, the inputs from
within the structure of the Union. These inputs giv en by the enlargement of the EU also
translate into bringing together the cultures, valu es and perceptions from different
countries (Hobolt, 2004, p.666)
This supporting side towards the European Union is only but one of the attitudes that people
have developed, nowadays we have seen through Brexi t, the leave of the UK from the EU,
another rising attitude, the Euroscepticism. Eurosc epticism has been defined by Taggard and
Szczerbiak as the “ contingent or qualified opposition, as well as inco rporating outright and

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unqualified opposition to the process of European i ntegration ” (Taggard and Szczerbiak, 2008,
p.7). There are several reasons which stay at the c ore of this attitude, but one of the main issues
brought up is the possible disappearance of the nat ion-state, people being concerned not only
about the physical and legislative borders of the c ountry, but also about the Union’s possibility to
take away part its national resources. Another aspe ct that I have also mentioned before is the
problem raised by immigration, citizens being worri ed about giving those who are not part of
their society, jobs and other social, health and ec onomic benefits paid from the state’s budget
made from the citizens contributions. (McLaren, 200 6, p.53)
But there were found different other concepts that describe the attitudes manifested towards
the community, such an example being presented in t he article “Mapping EU attitudes:
conceptual and empirical dimensions of Eurosceptici sm and EU support”. The first dimension is
presented as a new one, describing the Eurosceptic perspective that I have highlighted before,
with more accent on the emotional response of citiz ens. This response is mostly based on the
citizens’ fear or feeling of threat towards the Eur opean Union, caused by one or more of the
reasons I have mentioned, related to the nation-sta te, immigration or other policies representing
the emotional responses. The second dimension is re lated to the feeling of having another
identity, a European one and the third one is talki ng about the existing democracy and financial
functioning of the EU. The last two present another perspective on the European Union,
respectively the general support towards the EU, th e benefits of being a member and the future
support and strengthening of the EU. (Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, Vreese, 2011, p. 258)
An effective way to measure the attitudes towards t he European Union and to identify in
which countries the citizens are more attached to t he EU, is by looking at the data provided by
the Eurobarometer. This instrument is used by not o nly mass media, politicians, analysist, NGOs
and so on, but also by the citizens interested in t his domain, as the Eurobarometer is available
online to everyone who has access to Internet. The initial objective of this was to find out if a
European conscience is being formed and what do Eur opean think of the European Union. The
instrument is supported by the EU Institutional Rel ations and Communication Commissioner
consisting in a standard biennial face-to-face surv ey and other special barometers, resulting in 60
surveys per year. (Visser, Holbrook, Krosnick, 2005 , p. 584). This instrument is also a mean for
the politicians and representative both at nation a nd the EU level to know what the population
wants in relation with the EU. This information can be used in election campaigns or even by

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those who are already in the European Parliament, t o analyse towards which policies they should
focus or lobby more in the EU. Even though this is considered to be a very useful instrument, it
can also be a big form of manipulation used by all actors at national or international level.
As a conclusion of this chapter, a few important th ings need to be summarized and concluded
before talking more about the European integration process and Euroscepticism. First of all, in
the context of Brexit and the current situation at the European level, it is very important to recall
the relevance of the public opinion related to the EU. It is the public opinion of European citizens
towards the EU that gives this community its legiti macy needed to still function and is also a
validating form regarding the success or failure of the European integration. The attitudes that
citizens have towards the European Union are either positive, supporting the European
integration or negative ones, namely the Euroscepti cism and these attitudes are reflected in the
public opinion of citizens. Another aspect importan t to mention is that the attitudes and the
public opinion are either general ones that describ e the support or scepticism towards the
existence of the EU as a whole, or towards certain aspects of the Union, like policies, socio-
economic aspects or identities and values. The opin ion towards these aspects are a way to reflect
the evolution of the European integration and is im portant information for both national and
international actors, the Euroscepticism being one of the reasons why the Brexit referendum was
successful.

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Chapter 2: Europeanization, British Euroscepticism and Brexit

Europeanization –
The first half of the theoretical background of thi s thesis has focused upon the meaning
and importance of public opinion and EU attitudes, revealing that the central point of this essay
is directly related to the process of European Inte gration. It is in this context that, through the
second part of the essay, I will offer more details on this process, analysing its origins and
consequences, up to more recent times. I analyse th is phenomenon up to an ideology that has
much developed nowadays and even directly affects h ow the European Union is structured, that
being the British Euroscepticism leading in the end to what was coined as “Brexit”. The exit of
the United Kingdom from the European Union is a rat her controversial subject that is being
thoroughly analysed and is therefore, I believe, an interesting subject to focus upon.
The structure of this section is based firstly on d escribing the process of European
integration through the term and history of “Europe anization” presenting its relevance and
consequences. In direct connection to this I will c ontinue with bringing in the problematic of
Euroscepticism, giving more details on the British ramification, starting from where it began to
how it evolved until Brexit. Based on these argumen ts I will be able discuss further on about how
the idea of Brexit came to be, its popularity among UK’s citizens and the final result of the
referendum and the final decision. It is important to mention that besides the purely theoretical
description of the terms, the ideas will be present ed making reference to how the public opinion
perceived the new concepts and reacted to them.
I will start by discussing the term of “Europeaniza tion” which has been studied and
defined in so many ways by authors and political sc ientists. To have a general image of the usage
of the term from the last century until now, there is a research that has been conducted and
presented in the book The Politics of Europeanization edited by Kevin Featherstone and Claudio
M. Radaelli. The study had analysed 116 academic jo urnal articles listed in “Social Sciences
Citation Index”. This research found out that in th e 80s there were only 5 articles referring to
“Europeanization”, the number has slowly risen unti l 1998 remaining at an average of below 10,
when it suddenly went up in 1999 to 20 articles. Th e term has been used with four different
connotations: “ as a historical process; as a matter of cultural di ffusion; as a process of

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institutional adaptation and as the adaptation of p olicy and policy processes ” (Featherstone &
Radaelli, 2003, p.5).
The concept of Europeanization and European integ ration have been more and more
studied in the last century, after the position of Europe in the international context has been
established and there was no longer the fear of ins tability. After this moment of relaxation on the
reginal level, there was a will to search for a gen eral, upper, European power and authority that
could stop internal conflicts or prevent them from happening. A supranational power would also
mean safety and assurance, in a certain way. The la st general concern was related to the will to
keep the European space as peaceful as possible, ba sed on communication and interconnection.
(Wardhaugh, 2010). There was a visible rise of the European Uni on as a power, but the question
was if it could become an empire, too supranational with too much authority, which, after the
experiences from the French empire, Germany Nazis a nd Soviet Union was not for the moment a
wanted effect. This is the background on which auth ors have begun to write and do research on
Europeanization and its causes and consequences.
Most often the term of Europeanization has been use d in political science or law, often
being associated with the adaptation of nation-stat e at the European level and presenting new
forms of governance in EU, but later on has also be en discussed by anthropologists. (Conway &
Patel, 2010). From all the definitions used in this amount of time, one of the first and most well-
known definitions is used in 1994 by Ladrech who in cludes in his explanation the domestic and
the direct influence of the Europeanization in the national policy:
“an incremental process reorienting the direction a nd shape of politics to the degree that EC
political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and
policy-making’ (Ladrech, 1994, p.69)”.
Through this definition the author underlines the i mportance that the EU has in a
country’s own policy – making process, as the natio nal government has to adapt, learn and
change its own way of functioning so as to be part of the European Community. For Ladrech,
being part of this community means letting a supran ational power not only directly influence, but
function within your national system. By saying thi s it means that Europeanization is a process
through which the political and economic decisions taken at the European level directly affects
the way a state’s position towards some political a spects and the fluctuation of the national

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economy. The definition given by Ladrech can even b e proven by recent events such as the
economic crisis, when countries were affected one b y one through the effect of interdependency.
The idea that the country decides to transfer to th e European Union part of its power of
decision and lets its domestic policy be influenced by the decisions taken at a higher level is
therefore one of the characteristics of Europeaniza tion identified by most authors. The
connection between the domestic policy and the Euro peanization is acknowledged also by Borzel
who highlights the aftermath of the transfer of “po wer” from the national party to the European
one. In this situation she describes Europeanizatio n as “ a process by which domestic policy areas
become increasingly subject to European policy-maki ng” (Borzel, 1999, p. 574).
In a way, if we are to analyse these definitions, w e could consider them part of the
intergovernmentalism theory related to the European Union, because they view the process of
Europeanization through the lenses of the national level. Even if the whole phenomenon does
bring changes and influences to the domestic polici es and policy-making process, there is
another theory, neofunctionalism which could be fou nd in other definitions that focus on the
transformation that takes place at the European lev el. This is the case presented by authors such
as Risse, Cowles and Caporaso who define the Europe anization as “ the emergence and the
development at the European level of distinct struc tures of governance” (2001, p. 3). In this
case, the article does follow the changes that appe ar at the national level, but the main point of
their interpretation is that the process consists i n creating a supranational level that could
function rather independently through new instituti ons and instruments.
Another aspect that can be observed through these d efinitions is the perspective that they
apply, being focused on the political and social as pects of the society, talking about policy –
making and institutions, both at the EU and nationa l level. The cultural Europeanization or
otherwise called “Europe imagined” by Conway and Pa tel underlines the role that “language,
imagination, visualization and memory” ( Conway, Patel, 2010, p.8 ) have in creating a common
European space. Because the EU has enlarged in seve ral waves, we cannot say that it is defined
by its geographic barriers, but, another impact tha t the apparition of the European community has
had is over the cultural elements of a country.
As examples of cultural elements which have develop ed in time, in the European context
is the EU’s anthem, flag, European citizens rights, official languages, implementation of Euro,
the European identity.

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Although I have presented until now the concept of Europeanization as a process, this is
not the only perspective through which the phenomen on can be analysed. As presented by
Exadaktylos & Radaelli in 2012 in Research Design in European Studies. Establishing C ausality
in Europeanization there are two perspectives about this term. On one hand, we could envisage
it as an outcome, stating that a certain aspect of the national policy is more Europeanized than in
another country. On the other hand, we can analyse it as a process which has consequences on
different aspects at the national level (Exadaktylo s & Radaelli, 2012). The concept of” process”
is used by most of authors when describing the Euro peanization among who can be mentioned
Radaelli who sees this process, more complex with t hree parts. It is a process of construction,
diffusion and institutionalization of all the norms from the EU policy level into the national level
(Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003)
The problem is if there is no such change, can we s ay that Europeanization has not taken
place. According to Borzel that is not the case, as the “ member states are not merely the passive
takers of European demands for domestic change” ( Borzel, 2003, p.3). In this perspective he
says that if a state has been convincing enough and succeeds in implementing at the European
level a policy that resembles its own way of functi oning and so it does not need to make changes
to its domestic policy, then it does not mean that there is no process of Europeanization. In his
opinion the process can go either way, the European Union may cause the national institutions to
adapt to European policies, or the states may decid e on some aspects that might cause the EU to
change. Such example that is also the central thema tic of the essay is the decision of the Great
Britain to leave the European Union making the EU c hange its architecture, the number of
representatives in the European Parliament, its bud get and other such aspects. This process
works both ways as the UK also has to change its pe rspective and way of functioning because it
no longer has the financial support of the EU and n o longer benefits from the regulations applied
in the community, neither the free travel.
Now that we have a brief presentation of what Europ eanization has been defined in time
by different authors and perspectives, it is import ant to turn to what the effects of this
phenomenon are. One interesting research in this ex act perspective is presented in the book
Research Design in European Studies. Establishing C ausality in Europeanization (Exadaktylos
& Radaelli, 2012), which analysed several episodes in the German foreign policy and tracked the
Europeanization effects. From these historical epis odes the authors have reached the conclusion

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that there has been a great impact from the EU on t he foreign policy and especially bilateral
relations of Germany with Eastern countries (Exadak tylos & Radaelli, 2012, p.212). This is in
fact one effect that Europeanization may have on a country, influencing its principal actors,
shifting the foreign policy and prioritizing certai n areas of work.
Most often Europeanization’s effect and impact are seen upon the national policies,
administration and even structural institutionalisa tion of the state, but that does not mean that the
states are being influenced in the same way and tha t Europeanization has the same results across
EU members. Depending on their own development, cou ntries change more or less to be able to
apply the European regulations, such as the health- care regulation (Vollaard, 2009 apud
Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2012). The different impact on countries can clearly be seen when
talking about the Eurozone, where the influence of the process is not only towards the members
part of the Eurozone, but also for those who are no t and would wish to join the Euro area. In this
case the idea of a common currency across the EU wo uld strengthen its position and power in
commercial relations with other states, but also it would offer more transparency to the
commerce the EU does (Howell, 2004). In terms of impact, Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2012 )
create a framework, based on Heritier’s framework ( 2001), to measure the change brought by
Europeanization differentiating between a weak, str ong and an unclear impact Europeanization.
This is a method of process tracing, analysing and identifying a foreign policy element in time
and the variables that intervened in its evolvement . According to their logic regarding the
adapted expected outcomes of Europeanization, if th ere are facilitation factors in the process of
Europeanization, then the process is a strong one, but if there are no facilitation then this is a
weak Europeanization. All factors and policies of t he European Union, in their opinion,
contribute the Europeanization process, whether it is in a strong, weak or unclear way,
“depending on the expected level of contribution of other rival factors” (Exadaktylos and
Radaelli, 2012, p. 203)
Alesina and colleagues (Alesina and Wacziarg 1999; Alesina, Angeloni, and Schuknecht
2005) have discussed the desirable allocation of po licy responsibilities among local, national,
and EU levels from this point of view, and Hooghe h as also drawn on this literature in order to
distinguish policies from each other:
“Europeanization may be advantageous to maximize ec onomies of scale (. . .) or it may
be desirable to internalize negative externalities. (. . .) Where such economies of scale or policy

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externalities are weak (. . .), the relevant jurisd iction is national (or regional or local) ” (Hooghe
2002: 287–8).
However, Hooghe (2002) reaches very different concl usions: once we control other
features of each policy domain, “functionality” or “inherent internationalization” considerations
end up being a poor predictor of people’s views abo ut which level of government should do what
(p. 292). What are the other aspects of policies an d issues that seem to drive support for
Europeanization? First, according to Hooghe, a “spe nding logic” is at stake from the citizens’
point of view: policies where shifts of authority w ould involve greater distributional
implications, potentially destabilizing the interes ts of powerful groups in society and the
everyday policy delivery to citizens, are unlikely to receive public support for their
Europeanization. These are the policies that involv e greater financial flows from state to citizen,
such as health, education, and social policies in g eneral. Hooghe finds that support for policy
integration among mass publics is lowest for those policies (2002: 282), echoing Dalton and
Eichenberg’s conclusion that public support should be lower in policies related to standards of
living and the distribution of national welfare, a result of the potentially disturbing effect of
Europeanization on “ national welfare traditions and policies that repre sent historic (. . .)
national compromises ” (1998: 279).
A second potentially relevant attribute of policy a reas is the extent to which they conform
to a “social model” logic and how this is likely to increase citizens’ support for their
Europeanization (Hooghe 2002: 290–1). Since the 197 0s, using a dynamic interpretation of the
treaties, the EU engaged in a set of “new regulator y” policies, initially aimed at harmonizing
national standards in a variety of areas where thos e standards could work as barriers to trade
(Börzel 2005). However, with the Delors Commission, such prerogatives have increasingly
developed also as “market-correcting” policies, i.e . as a means with which to face the detrimental
effects of globalization on the political discretio n of governments and the economic security of
citizens. Areas such as regional asymmetries and de velopment, employment, social inclusion,
industrial regulation, scientific and technological research, and environmental or consumer
protection fall into this category. Indeed, Hooghe finds that these “social model” policies also
tend to elicit greater support for integration on t he part of citizens (although not among elites), a
finding that, again, Dalton and Eichenberg had alre ady hinted at in their descriptive analysis of
support for the Europeanization of employment polic ies:

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“citizens are receptive (. . .) to the EU’s argumen t that the functioning of the single
market requires economic mechanisms that reduce the uncertainties and costs of doing business
in the market” (1998: 279).
A fourth and final feature of policy domains whose impact on citizens’ views may need
to be considered is related to the actual involveme nt of the EU in the different issue areas.
Regardless of the judgements that can be made about the appropriateness of allocating policy
responsibilities to the EU and any other issue-spec ific aspects, citizens may also be influenced in
their evaluations by the extent to which those poli cy areas are already claimed by
internationalized agencies. De Winter and Swyndegou w’s analysis of European Election Study
data—where respondents were asked to state their pe rception of what level of government at
which issues were decided—lends support to this hyp othesis: “ the problem sectors that are
already perceived as being most Europeanized are at the same time those for which further
Europeanization is demanded most ” (1999: 58). Of course, such relationship, if it e xists once
other factors are taken into account, is neither ne cessarily deterministic nor unidirectional. As
Dalton and Eichenberg note for the case of environm ental policy, for example, public support for
European action actually preceded the enhancement o f EU responsibility in that area, an
enhancement that can conceivably be seen as a resul t of mounting public and interest-group
pressure (Dalton and Eichenberg 1998: 265–6).
Euroscepticism
Definition and historical evolution
Furthermore, if the Europeanization aspects have be en described, for the purpose of this
study it is important to present and explain anothe r aspect directly related to this phenomenon,
but in the opposite direction, Euroscepticism.
Euroscepticism can be envisaged as a reaction to th e Europeanization processes. The term
was coined in the United Kingdom, as the journal “T he Times” had provided in an article in
1985 what is believed to be the first use the conce pt of “Euro-sceptic” (Harmsen & Spiering,
2004). In the 80s the term was used to describe a specific political orientation in the United
Kingdom, especially from the Conservative Party (Us herwood,2017). After the initial
development in the UK, the term became more mainstr eam after the Maastricht Treaty, reaching
nowadays very broad lengths and influencing politic al parties, ideologies and even mass media

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and the population. Comparing this to nowadays defi nitions, we see that it is more general, for
example the Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Rel ations defines the term as:
“person, political party or group of people who are sceptical of the European Union and
European Integration. The range of Euroscepticism c an be a stronger anti-European position as
well as more moderate positions against key aspects of the European” ( Oxford Dictionary of
Politics and International Relations, ed. 4, 2018) .
While lack of support for policy integration seems widespread in countries such as
Finland, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark, t he opposite tends to happen in a country
such as Italy. Furthermore, not all countries can b e ranked in the same way concerning all types
of policies. While citizens in countries such as Po rtugal and Greece emerge as having as many
“sceptics” vis-à-vis the Europeanization of “intern ational” policies as citizens in countries such
as Denmark or the UK, their opposition to the Europ eanization of “sociocultural policies”—
education, health care, or culture—is clearly not a s pronounced as in other countries (Lubbers
and Scheepers 2005).
Except for Great Britain, where I have mentioned th at the term of Euroscepticism had been
launched, France has also been a representative of the Eurosceptic movement. One of the most
memorable moment was in the European Parliament, be tween 1960 – 1980 when the so-called
Gaullist MEPs advocated for protecting the national interests of France and preserve the nation-
state within the European Union, being opposed to t he European integration process (FitzGibbon
et al, 2017). The movement lost ground in the 80s w hen the MEPs have abandoned the idea and
joined the other movements for European integration , but we can see it has now been partially
reborn, at least at a national level through Marie le Pen and the Front National.
Historically speaking the Euroscepticism can also b e seen at the societal level, as an orientation
of the citizens opinion on the European Union, one manifestation being the case for the rejection
of the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark after a referen dum. (Usherwood & Startin, 2013)
A problem that often occurs with the Eurosceptics i s that they are perceived as being
negative towards the European Union, but not all of them oppose to the same thing, there is not a
clear definition of what exactly they are against ( Leconte, 2005). What is sure is that they are a
direct reaction to Europeanization, as they promote more or less what the populists promote, the
rise of national importance and power which is dimi nished as a result of Europeanization. These
general ideas of what Euroscepticism does and does not promote is well portraited by the two

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types that have been identified: soft and hard Euro scepticism, being visible the most at political
parties, the two concepts being identified by Tagga rd (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008). In response
to this definition FitzGibbon presented more possib ilities along with Eurosceptics, the
Eurorejects and Europragmatists (apud FitzGibbon et al., 2017)
Szczerbiak and Taggart define the party – based har d Euroscepticism as “ parties who think
that their countries should withdraw from membershi p, their policies being opposed to the whole
project of European integration” ( Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008, p.20 ). On the other hand, the soft
Euroscepticism is defined by them as “ concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to
expression of qualified opposition to the EU” ( Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008, p.2)
The parties that adopt a hard Eurosceptic vision de fy all that is related to the European
Union, we have as example UKIP which are against th e integration per se, we have the French
“Font Nation” and the Belgium Flemish extremist par ties which oppose the idea of Europe and
have a long history of Eurosceptic discourse (Usher wood & Startin 2012). On the other hand, the
same other depict the soft Euroscepticism as partie s who do not agree on few aspects related to
the European Union, not the concept as a whole, so it may be that there is a disagreement at the
social, economic or environmental level, but the id ea of European integration is not rejected.
Regarding the way Euroscepticism is to be studied a nd understood there are mentions that it
cannot be defined as an ideology, but more as a dis course. According to Flood and Usherwood
(2005) the Eurosceptic discourses often take one of the two position, either a perspective of “us
vs them” is presented, or the “Euro-myths” that dep ict the European Union through its worse
outcomes and, more like the UK campaign for Brexit, describes the community as a negative
impact for the nation.
One last aspect that must not be forgotten when ge nerally speaking about Euroscepticism is
the importance of the public opinion, as I have pre sented before, the opinion of the citizens has
been reflected over time, through referendums relat ed to the Maastricht Treaty and more recently
could be seen at the referendum for UK to leave the European Union. In shaping the public
opinion one important role is underlined by mass me dia, the TV, and digital media are sources of
campaign, fake news and an opportunity for Euroscep tics to make their voice listened. The true
power of the media has been reflected in the campai gn of the pro-Brexit in 2016, making the
majority of citizens vote for a leave from the Euro pean Union. The importance of mass media
has been highlighted by FitzGibbon et al. in 2017 w hen mentioning that the media “ have played

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a critical role in creating a platform for, and rai sing the public’s awareness of, transnational
Euroscepticism” ( FitzGibbon et al, 2017, p. 8). This is why the role of the public is so important
in the discussion of European integration, European ization and Euroscepticism, because citizens
are after all the ones who shape the country’s posi tion and future.
Regarding the Euroscepticism and its basis througho ut different member states, on the
basis of the political parties’ ideologies and mani festations a study has been written by the
Jaques Delors Institute (Bertoncini, Koenig, 2014) in which there are four sources of
Euroscepticism mentioned. The first regards the “ issue of democracy” (Bertoncini, Koenig,
2014, p. 5) and more precisely focuses on the democ ratic deficit of the European Union and its
legitimacy as an entity. This is a problem that the EU has tried to fix for a long time, especially
through the Lisbon Treaty ensuring more power to th e European Parliament and to the citizens
directly. The two authors mention that the most com mon issue is related to the lack of
transparency in the policy decisions and the high b ureaucracy existent at the EU level.
A second root is related to the nation-state, natio nalism and keeping the national
sovereignty, this being an issue raised even in pre sent days. After the World Wars there was a
national fear that transferring a part of the power from the national authority to an EU
mechanism would translate into the member state los ing its power and sovereignty. (Bertoncini,
Koenig, 2014)
A third factor is represented by the economic, fina ncial and monetary policies of the
European Union to which member state had to comply. Many reactions, especially after the
Single European Act in the 1980’s, were against the regulations imposed by the EU, which had
only amplified after the financial crisis hit the E uropean Union. The adoption of the EURO, the
strict austerity which, in the opinion of the Euros ceptics, led to unemployment in mass across the
EU and erosion of the welfare state (Bertoncini, Ko enig, 2014) were all elements mentioned by
Eurosceptics as negative impact of the EU.
The final cause of Euroscepticism is on a more soci o-cultural aspect and regards the
possible disappearance of the national identity, wh ich would be replaced by a European one, or
by the immigration force. Along with the fear of lo sing the nation-state and its authority, there is
also the rising problem of the immigration rate and freedom of movement which has allowed for
citizens from all across the EU to enter the Europe an countries and benefit from all services.
(Bertoncini, Koenig, 2014) This fear has risen espe cially with the refugee crisis and has been a

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campaign motive for the Brexit movement, rising als o issues in other member states, such as
Germany who has received more refugees than they co uld withstand. Besides this, the idea of a
European identity, along with the Euro has raised i ssues that maybe the existence of the EU is an
instrument to globalization, which was and still is not accepted by citizens.
McLaren has also identified factors that causes the raise of Euroscepticism, by examining
the citizens’ support towards European policies fro m the beginning of the 2000s and these are:
economic, institutional and socio-cultural elements (McLaren, 2002). She also argues that the
exclusive national identity is a contributing facto r to the economic perceptions regarding the
membership in the European Union and that the lack of trust in the institutions at the European
level are a strong motivation for Eurosceptics. Con sidering these aspects, she mentions that there
can be two kind of Euroscepticism, one based on the economic loses of the country as a member
state of the EU and the second one which is a natio nal – cultural threat to the nation-state and
individuality as a country.
Other authors implicate in this discussion the exis tence of populism and how this
emphasizes the Euroscepticism, these writers being Krouwel and Abts. These two say that is it
the role of populism to make the citizens oppose to the idea of being a member of the European
Union as it could diminish the national sovereignty which they so much support. (Krouwel and
Abts, 2007)
Euroscepticism in the UK
Historical evolution – present and implications
Euroscepticism had gained momentum not only at a th eoretical level, but also in real-life
policies, through the leaders of the European count ries. One significant example is the speech of
Margaret Thatcher in 1988 at Bruges as a reaction t o the proposal of an economic and political
European community coming from Jacques Delors. This discourse is significant when talking
about Euroscepticism because it was a moment captur ed by both media and politicians, marking
the beginning of new debates (Usherwood & Startin,2 012). The term of Euroscepticism started
to be analysed and used more, especially in the UK, developing so much as to even be
incorporated in the positions of some political par ties influencing the national politics and after
their entrance in the European Parliament, they cou ld influence also the European policy-
making.

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To go deeper into explaining Euroscepticism and fo r the purpose of this research I will
discuss a bit more specifically about the British E uroscepticism, where it started, how it
developed and it got to the Brexit campaign and res ults, starting from the Bruges speech, as
mentioned earlier. The Eurosceptic movement started unofficially early on in the 50s and 60s,
after the second World War when the idea of creatin g a European community to which the UK
was reluctant. There were even journals and TV seri es that would connect the European Union to
the Nazis making it harder for leaders such as Chur chill to convince citizens of Europe’s future
success and need (Spiering, 2015).
The UK submitted its first application for members hip of the European Community in 1961,
which was rejected by de Gaulle. A new application was set in 1967, but was rejected once again
by France, de Gaulle being so afraid of UK joining in that he threatened to dismember the
European Community if they were to join (Adam, 2020 ). After de Gaulle resignation, the UK
had again submitted their application and in 1972 t he country had finally signed the accession
treaty to the European Communities, becoming offici ally a member together with Denmark and
Ireland in 1973.
The Eurosceptics had another defeat in 1975 when t he Labour Party had a referendum
organized on UK’s continuing membership in the Euro pean Community and the results showed
that approximately 70% of the population wanted to stay in the EU. The Eurosceptics have
regained power in the 80s with Margaret Thatcher’s negotiations with the European Union (the
UK rebate example) through which she focused on the benefits of the country from being a
member state and discussing all elements not favour able for the UK (Forster, 2002). The Prime
Minister has perceived the membership in the Europe an Community as a threat, its peak being in
1983 when there was a manifesto to negotiate the wi thdrawal of the UK from the EC. Thatcher
became famous for her discourse in Bruges in 1988 a nd her reply “ I want my money back!”.
After the Maastricht Treaty there was the issue of becoming part of the Euro zone, which ended
in the UK’s opt-out, one of the major wins for Euro sceptics which allowed them not to converge
to the Euro (Forster, 2002). The Maastricht Treaty has also been a subject of dispute and it is
why in 1993 the UKIP party was founded campaigning for the leave of the UK from the
European Union.

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Later on, in the 1999 Nigel Farage was elected as a MEP and in 2014 the UKIP made their
presence felt at the European level when they gaine d 24 seats at the European Parliament’s
elections (BBC 2014).
Brexit – a fora of manifestation of the British Eu roscepticism
From 2010 when David Cameron came to “power” in th e UK there was a strong shift for
Euroscepticism, the party UKIP making the issue mor e salient and Cameron wanting a
renegotiation of the Lisbon Treaty, keeping his cou ntry a member of the EU, but with better
conditions for the Britain. (Adam, 2020). The drama tic raise of UKIP was registered in the
European elections in 2014 when they got the highes t percentage of the votes, then Cameron’s
initiative of the EU membership referendum. In an u nfortunate turn of events, the campaign
made in 2015 turned out to be in favour of the UK l eaving the EU, presenting facts information
that highlighted the benefits of the country after leaving the Union and how much it had already
lost because of its membership. This was only a sig n that the prime minister had lost control of
the slogan of the campaign. With Nigel Farage advoc ating for “Leave”, the results of the
referendum did not seem so clear, as more and more arguments about the financial contribution
that the UK gives the EU, the jobs that Europeans a llegedly steal from the UK national citizens,
the fear of immigrant and refugees have all been as sets for the “Leave” campaign and it is so,
that, the final referendum ended with a favourable vote for leaving the EU.
Although the referendum was advisory and the gover nment was not obliged to respect it
(European Union Referendum Act, 2015), by political considerations the Article 50 was
triggered by the UK in March 2017. In 2019 in UK th ere were general elections, which turned
out favourable for the Conservative Party, whose le ader is Boris Johnson, as we have seen this
party is in favour for Euroscepticism and so is Bor is whose mandate was clear, finishing the
agreements that allows UK to leave the European Uni on. The agreement between the EU and
UK should have taken place before 2019, but the exi t of Britain has just happened on the 31 st of
January 2020, the transition period while the two p arts can negotiate additional arrangements
until December 2020, the new rules that have been n egotiated will apply from 2021. (Gov.uk –
The UK has left the EU)
This is a very good example of how important campa ign strategies are and how fast
Eurosceptics have taken advantage of a small mistak e from the part of Cameron, this was the
peak point for the British Eurosceptics who have fi nally got what they have been fighting for, the

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independency of the United Kingdom. The reason why the UK decided to join the future
European Union and continue to be involved, include s an economical reason as apparently, the
EU represent Britain’s biggest trading market. They were later on called by Stephen George in
1998 an “awkward partner” (George, 1998), so the re lationship between the two was never
totally agreed on both sides.
Another explanation could be that the UK has ofte n decided to better partnership with the
USA, especially in their trying of constructing a B ritish cultural identity and promote the
Anglophone globalization. (Baker & Schnapper, 2015) . The reason why the UK had decided to
become a member of the European Unions had also had mostly economic reasons and because of
the necessity to join the EU, not out of other conv ictions. (Adam, 2020). This attitude has been
also reflected throughout time, for example the UK’ s leaders compromising with the EU in
favour of the UK and not agreeing to contribute dir ectly to something from which they would
not have much to win from are , the reason of the e xistence of the rebate and not funding the
Common Agricultural Policy The British identity has also represented a very important aspect in
the causes of the British Euroscepticism, which, co mpared to the general one is more focused on
keeping the national identity, than on the economic aspects (Evans&Butt, 2005).
These elements are all political or social but now I will focus on the public opinion of the
UK regarding Euroscepticism, because it has been mo re Eurosceptic than the average opinion of
European states. The Eurobarometer since 1973 until 2015 did show that British citizens were
consistent with their Euroscepticism, with little u nderstanding or agreement with the European
identity of themselves. (Baker & Schnapper, 2015).
Presenting the historical events of all these pro cesses and the link between them helps
understand the causes of Brexit, of the public opin ion towards the EU and of the leaders’
position depending on the time and government. It i s very important when studying the public
opinion to know about the history behind what we wa nt to study, because, the citizens do not
form an opinion from one day to another, this is cr eated in time and is strongly affected by the
history of the country and its positions in time. B ecause of the Brexit decision and the history
with the European Union and Euroscepticism that Gre at Britain has, it is even more interesting in
studying the impact that these years of opposition to the EU have done to the citizens and to the
way leaders address the problematic of the European Union.

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Ch.3: Case study
Alignment of UK political discourses and public opi nion regarding the level of
Euroscepticism (2015 – 2019)
Research design and methodology
Introduction
Drawing on the theoretical framework described in t he previous chapters, this thesis presents
an analytical approach, focusing on the specificiti es of the British Euroscepticism as reflected by
the elites and citizens of UK in a pre- defined tim e line. More specifically, the objective of this
paper is to identify the common elements of British Euroscepticism existent in the elites’
discourses and public opinion, between 2015 and 201 9.
Even if, as I have mentioned in the theoretical par t, the British Euroscepticism is not a new
concept, being present in the UK from before the 20 00s, I have chosen the time frame from 2015
to 2019, taking into consideration the recent event s of Brexit. The decision taken by referendum
by the British citizens for the UK to exit the Euro pean Union has represented a unique event,
never happened before. Exactly because of this extr eme result of a country leaving the Union, I
have considered it to be relevant and interesting t o analyse the Euroscepticism level in this
period of time. I have realized this through two el ements, the elites’ discourses and public
opinion, the two being relevant both at national an d international level.
To further analyse the chosen timeline, the year 20 15 has represented an important year for
the UK national situation and a first step towards the activation of the Article 50 of the Lisbon
Treaty. On 7 May 2015 there was a general election and shortly after the first concrete actions
were taken for the legislation of a referendum that would ask the citizens whether they still want
the UK to be a European Member State, or if they wo uld rather that the country left the Union.
The winner of the general elections, David Cameron has been an important actor in the “Leave”
campaign, as he was the one who had promised the re ferendum and a new negotiation regarding
the UK’s membership in the EU. (R. Adam, 2020)
Even if the United Kingdom has official left the Eu ropean Union on the 31 st of January 2020,
the election that took place on the 12 th of December 2019 had ensured, through Boris Johnso n’s
victory, the final result of the discussions betwee n the UK and EU. A second reason for choosing
this date is because the national public opinion po lls published by Eurobarometer had not been
finalised at the date this thesis has been written. As this is the instrument that has been used for

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the analysis of the public opinion in UK form 2015 it would not have been methodologically
correct to choose another instrument that would hav e been more current, for the 2020 data.

Research questions
To achieve the objective of the thesis, I will addr ess the analysis by focusing on three research
questions as follow:
1. How is the British Euroscepticism being reflecte d, in the discourses of UK elites, in the period
2015 – 2019?
2. What are the characteristics of the UK popular E uroscepticism in the period 2015 – 2019, as
reflected by the public opinion in this interval?
3. In the defined timeline, 2015 – 2019, which are the convergence elements between the
Eurosceptic characteristics of UK key speeches and of the public opinion measured by the
Eurobarometer?

Research method
1. Qualitative – discourse analysis
To answer these questions, I will use two separate research methods that will help me
identify the Euroscepticism in the discourses of UK elites and in the public opinion of British
citizens, in the mentioned period of time. The qual itative research approach is used when
analysing words in order to understand the meanings behind socio-political problems, a
phenomenon, but also public behaviours and opinions , which is what we are trying to find out
through this thesis.
The approach I will use in this case is based on th e inductive reasoning, meaning that the
research is not based on a hypothesis that is ought to be confirmed or not, but on an analysis of
all provided information and formulating a probable theory based on this.
Based on this, I will begin the qualitative approac h with the critical discourse analysis of
some of the most impactful speeches in the UK on th e subject of European Union and European
integration, in the period 2015 – 2019. This method describes language as a tool used by actors
to shape the reality we live in and change certain social constructions and power relations, being
more than just a projection of reality (Wodak and F airclough, 2011). The critical discourse
analysis theorists have mentioned also that those i n power are able to transform the ideas that

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they create and promote, into truths believed by th e society, being able to change the social
environment. (Rabinow, 1984)
In this context, the level of analysis that I will use for these discourses is the model from
Norman Fairclough of the three dimensions: textual, discourse practice and contextual. For this
purpose, I will analyse the text of the discourses focusing on the words used, the lexical used,
whether there are synonyms, metaphors or other idio ms that may highlight the Eurosceptic
character of the speech. Concerning the second leve l I will focus on the connection that speeches
have with the public opinion and between them, whet her the attitude is similar, the same or
whether the representatives have made use of some o f the expressions used by others. The third
contextual level is analysed by shortly mentioning the reason behind the speech, what action has
taken place so that there was a need for a discours e from a representative in the UK.
The key representatives on which I will focus are t he most important persons from the UK at
the time mentioned, mostly the prime ministers and the Queen, but also persons which were
directly involved in the Brexit phenomenon like Nig el Farage, David Cameron, Boris Johnson. I
can also compare the speeches with some of the famo us ones of Margaret Thatcher, Winston
Churchill or Tony Blair.
It is also important for the analysis to mention wh ether the representatives are part of the
Eurosceptic group or not, this can be reflected thr ough the party they are in , while taking into
consideration the ideology and attitude the Party h as represented in the past and in that specific
context.
One of the sub-methods of CDA that I will use for t his thesis is the discourse-historical
approach (DHA), which is based on political perspec tives, public opinion, international relations
(Fairclough, 2013). Besides giving the possibility of analysis in time, this approach is also
multidisciplinary and multidimensional, “ following several areas of discourse studies: disco urse
and identity; discourse and politics/policy/polity; discourse and history; organisational
communication…” (Flowerdew & Richardson, 2017, p.48). As the elites ’ discourses may have
different approaches is it very useful that this di scourse analysis includes multiple types of
domains. It is important to recall also that the DH A is an instrument that especially analyses the
language used by those in power who have the suffic ient means to influence the society and
living conditions. (Reisigi & Wodak, 2017).

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For this part I have chosen to analyse public speec hes that have been addressed to the
population, in this context I did not choose discou rses in the European institutions, conferences
or national corpus, such as the updates to the Hous es of the UK’s government. The only such
example I have chosen is the Queen’s speech from 20 15, but, her position is not her owns as the
discourse is written and approved beforehand by the Cabinet. In total I have chosen a number of
X speeches, trying to select for each year between 2 – 4 discourses, so as to keep a balance
between the years. As actors I have mostly chosen t he Prime Ministers of the UK (David
Cameron, Theresa May, Boris Johnson), with the exce ption that for Boris Johnson I have also
chosen a speech from before he was elected as to be able to compare his attitude in the two
situations. In the analysis I have looked for the p ersonal attachment and involvement with the
EU, European countries or the exit of UK and the id eas that were proposed (remain or leave
campaign).

Data selection
The qualitative method, discourse analysis. I will analyse the following discourses:
→ 27 May 2015 – The European Union Referendum Bill – Queen's Speech 2015 –
Source: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32894214
From 2015 I have decided to analyse two discourses, the first one being that of the Queen
at the instalment of a new Parliament, on the 27 th of May, also called the European Union
Referendum Bill. Even though this speech is being d elivered by the Queen it is important to
know that it is first of all written and then appro ved by the Cabinet. In this speech the Queen uses
only the future tense in speaking of what her gover nment will do, proving a certainty regarding
the future of the UK. In this context she only ment ions that an in-out referendum regarding UK’s
membership in the EU will be held before the end of 2017 and that the government will be
seeking to “ renegotiate the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union and pursue
reform of the European Union for the benefit of all member states .” . One fact that is important
to highlight is that she mentions how this renegoci ations will benefit all member states, not only
the UK, even though she uses the words “ our country” in her discourse. Her speech is more of a
proof of certainty that the citizens will be asked for their opinion regarding the status of UK in

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the European Union and that this relationship must be discussed for the setting of new rules. It is
not a political speech, so all it does is to bring out facts, not taking anyone’s side

→ 10 November 2015 – Prime minister speech on Europe at Chatham House – Source:
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-minist ers-speech-on-europe
The speech given by the Prime Minister David Camero n starts by mentioning his own
discourse from a few years ago and how he did say t hat there is a need for reform inside the EU.
What is interesting in this speech is that when the P.M uses the first person he always uses the
past tense or present (especially I want), but when he comments about the EU he uses the future
tense or the imperative (need, have to, must…). He also always separates the UK and the
Member States (which he calls member nations, Europ ean partners or ancient nations) saying
that the reform would benefit the UK and the member states, not considering them as one. The
words that he frequently uses are “ British people”, “our country”, “Britain”, “our peo ple”, but,
when talking about the EU and the relationship with this community he mentions the negative
words such as “ threat”, “problem”, crisis”, “concern”.
This discourse is constructed on two parts, on one hand the PM shows the support
towards the UK remaining in a reformed EU “ Britain’s best future lay within a reformed
European Union” . “…I will campaign to keep Britain inside a reformed European Union… ”. His
direct support towards the staying of the UK as a m ember state is best highlighted in his final
remarks, “ Work with me to get that better deal for Britain.” He also highlights that by leaving
the EU the UK will not directly be better or more p rosperous, this being a question of time. He
does not deny the benefits of the UK as a European member state, “I was clear that Britain gains
advantages from her membership of the EU.”, “over a million Brits benefit from their right to
live and work anywhere in the EU.” Other arguments brought up as reasons for not leavi ng the
EU are the economic reasons, the free trade agreeme nt, but also other aspects that directly
influences the citizens like free travel, the opt-o ut and eurozone bailout. Through this he
mentions that the UK may stay in the EU with its ow n principles respected, suggesting in a way
that the UK should not leave the Union.
On the other hand, another part of the discourse is focused on the issues brought up by
the UK’s membership of the EU, in this context he a lso makes use of others comments, like
Churchill (“ noble continent”) and the Dutch (“ Europe where necessary, national where

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possible”) and mentions “ our” economy, security, nation and future. In this conte xt, the focus is
on the national perspective and the better future f or the UK. From the mentions that he makes
regarding the needs of the UK inside the EU I can l ist the redistribution of power to the national
governments, not entangling the UK in a United Stat es of the EU ( “I am asking European
leaders to end Britain’s obligation to work towards an ever closer union”) , EU legislation
cannot oblige the national creation of new rights. Other mentions related to the issues brought up
by the UK membership is represented by the migrants problematic, even though it is not
highlighted throughout the speech, the PM does offe r numbers regarding the number of migrants
and refugees that the UK supports from its own budg et.
In the end, the PM does not make a final decision a nd leaves it in the citizens’ hands, at
the referendum, saying that whatever the decision t hey will apply it, but, at the same time he asks
them to think what the best choice would be for the UK, where they could prosper more.
However, as can be seen it is clear that he leans t owards staying in the EU, but requesting new
reforms.
→ 2 / 20 February 2016 (comparison) – Prime minister speech on EU reform – Source –
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on -eu-reform-2-february-2016
The first speech I have chosen to analyse for 2016 two speeches of the Prime minister
Cameron, just to make a comparison between its stat ements and how they change in such a short
time, the first one being on the 2 nd of February 2016 and the second on the 20 th of February 2016.
It is relevant to mention this, as to see the chang e of the level of Euroscepticism in the Prime
Minister’s speech before the referendum in June, th e same year. This first speech is after the
publication of draft negotiating text by the Europe an Council President through which he
mentions the problems that the UK has with being a member of the EU. First of all, he mentions
the sovereignty (“ losing ourselves in some kind of European superstat e” ), the excess of
bureaucracy and regulations at the EU level, keep t he pound and make sure there is no
discrimination in the EU (“ there has been a danger in recent years that this h as looked a bit too
much like a euro-only club ”) and last, but not least, the migrants problem wh ich he also
mentioned in his 2015 discourse. He then mentions t hat all these issues are being mentioned in
the documents proposals elaborated by the European Council (“ it is there in black and white”) ,
most of the accent is put on the final issue, he mi gration one, giving a signal of the modifications
existent in the documents regarding the benefits of migrants once they arrive in the UK.

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However, at the end of the speech he does admit tha t these aspects are not yet approved and so
does not offer any guarantee to the citizens, but h e views their acceptance as a great asset for the
UK, reasons for which they should remain in the EU:
“If I can get these terms for British membership, I sure would opt in to be a member of
the European Union because these are good terms and they are different to what other countries
have. ”
Compared to this statement, on the 20 th of February the Prime Minister made another
speech following the Cabinet meeting on the UK’s ne w settlement with the EU. In this statement
he approaches the problem from a general point of v iew mentioning the Cabinet’s proposal of
keeping the UK inside the EU, meaning that there is support to his idea:
“And the Cabinet agreed that the government’s positi on will be to recommend that
Britain remains in a reformed European Union”.
This is the first time that he clearly states his p reference for staying in the EU and at the
same time accusing those who are for the UK leaving the Union: “Leaving Europe would
threaten our economic and our national security.”,” All they are offering is risk at a time of
uncertainty – a leap in the dark.”

→ 9 May 2016 – Boris Johnson’s speech on the EU refer endum – Source:
https://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/05 /boris-johnsons-speech-on-the-eu-
referendum-full-text.html
Another important speech from 2016 is that of Boris Johnson, the leader of the “Leave”
campaign in the UK, from the 9 th of May 2016 where he talks about the EU referendum that has
been established to take place of the 23 rd of June. This analysis is also important as a comp arison
with the speech he has later on in 2019, in the pos ition of Prime Minister, so as to see if he keeps
his position as vehement and clear support of the B rexit movement. In the discourse from 2016
Boris mentions that the first agreement to joined t he EU does not resemble the present Lisbon
Treaty and the current Union which cannot be called democratic (“ anti-democratic absurdities of
the EU” ). An interesting aspect is that, compared to the p revious discourses of David Cameron,
this speech focuses on a plural perspective, using the pronoun “we” and the imperative
“must/have to” a lot, meaning that there a collecti ve need of action form the inside of the UK. It
invites the citizens to take a look at the recent m odifications at the European level and in the

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Lisbon Treaty (“ look at the”, “you only have to read”) while presenting some facts to raise
awareness of the important contribution of the UK t o the EU in the detriment of the national
priorities. Using numbers and percentages as basis of these facts and information represent a way
for him to convince the population, as it is clear that this is speech through which he wants to
attract the citizens into voting for the exit of th e United Kingdom from the EU.
Johnson’s uses harsh words such as “ adjudicating”/ “it is absurd” related to the power
that the EU has taken from the UK and the country’s difficulty in having free trade deals with
third important countries. He also makes use of the Prime Minister’s speech in February and the
agreement signed with the EU “It is above all bizarre for the Remain campaign to say that after
the UK agreement of February we are now living in a “reformed” EU”. On this basis he argues
that the EU did not do any substantial modification s as they were asked and in this situation the
government of the UK should plead for the leaving o f the country from the Union, because they
did not respect what they had promised. Once again by using numbers and statistics he proves
that the UK has had less exports and presents other negative aspects, while mentioning that this
has happened in other countries also. In the end he says that in the EU there is a low level of trust
“partly for the obvious reason that people often fai l to understand each other’s languages” and
that the UK like other European citizens feel alien ated towards the EU flag. Even with leaving
the EU, Johnson highlights that it does not mean le aving Europe. We can clearly see that this is a
campaign speech highlighted by the last remark: “Vote Leave on June 23, and take back control
of our democracy.”

→ 24 June 2016 – David Cameron’s resignation speech – Source:
https://www.smh.com.au/world/brexit-vote-transcript -of-david-camerons-resignation-
speech-20160624-gprh35.html
Before I speak about this speech I consider it to b e important to mention that the Queen
also had a speech before the results of the referen dum on the 23 rd of June, in which she only
mentioned that her government will hold this refere ndum and that proposals will be brought
forwards for a British Bill of Rights. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-
speech-2016 ) .
I shall not analyse in detail the speech of Cameron , but I believe it to be important as it is
his last speech as Prime minister and this allows m e to compare it with the previous speeches, he

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had held in 2015 and earlier in 2016. In this speec h he mentions his position, “ I was absolutely
clear about my belief that Britain is stronger, saf er and better off inside the European Union”
and in this context he uses mostly the pronoun “I” and past tense as to highlight what he has
done during this campaign and in his position as Pr ime Minister. Considering that he was
promoting the staying in the European Union, he has decided to resign and let someone else
conduct the process of the UK leaving the EU, as it was decided by the British population.

→ 13 July 2016 – Theresa May delivered her first stat ement as Prime Minister, Source :
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-fr om-the-new-prime-minister-
theresa-may
Following this decision, on the 13 th of July Theresa May has held her first, rather sho rt,
statement as the new Prime Minister of the United K ingdom. In this context she recognizes the
positive aspects of David Cameron’s government and mentions that her party is also called
unionist, meaning that it is important for her that the UK is a united country where everyone has
the same benefits: “ we believe in a union not just between the nations of the United Kingdom but
between all of our citizens”. She frequently uses both the second and first person (I, we, you) and
the future tense when talking about the objective a nd future actions in the new context.

→ 17 January 2017 – PM Theresa May set out the Plan f or Britain including the 12
priorities that the UK government will use to negot iate Brexit – Source:
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governme nts-negotiating-objectives-for-
exiting-the-eu-pm-speech
In this first statement Theresa May recognizes the importance of the European Union,
“we are a European country – and proud of our shared European heritage” , even if the
population voted the exit from the EU, she still wa nts o keep a tight relationship with the Union
and considers that it is in the country’s best inte rest to support the success of the EU. In this
discourse May mostly uses the plural “we” when talk ing about the UK and verbs such as
“want”/”will be/continue” is relation to the UK- EU situation after the referendum’s decision. An
idea that has been heard before is repeated here, “ We are leaving the European Union, but we
are not leaving Europe” , also the UK is described several times in this sp eech as Global Britain
highlighting its characteristic of being able to ha ve relations with countries from all over the

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world. This Global Britain also means the possibili ty of economic, trade, customs and different
agreements that the UK will be able to do freely wi th third countries and with the EU. Even
though this is a speech about the UK leaving the EU and mentioning that the country does not
want “the bits” of the membership, but fully accept s the meaning of exit, May’s words also
highlight the new positive UK – EU partnership. Th e 12 facts mentioned by May present what
the government and her will be focusing on in the n ew set-up with the European Union. Here she
mentions that internal agreement and union is impor tant, also saying that it is important for the
policies and systems to “ serve the national interest” , one aspect that is focused upon is the
immigration factor, “ Brexit must mean control of the number of people wh o come to Britain from
Europe”. May does also say that “ the days of Britain making vast contributions to th e European
Union every year will end ”, therefore she focuses on the national aspects an d benefits, having a
more soft Eurosceptic perception.
In the end of the speech she mentions that she want s to arrive to an agreement regarding
the relationship with the EU in a period of 2 years , until the Article 50 process has concluded.
She does not underestimate the power and need of th e Union, but, in exchange, considers the
best approach is to have a new partnership with the EU and says, multiple times in the discourse
that this new relationship would be in the benefit of the UK and of the member states. All
throughout the discourse she mentions some relevant EU actors and that she understands the
position of the EU leaders, but at the same time re minds that they both need each other to be able
to evolve in time. In the last part of the speech M ay mentions all benefits that the UK has and the
reasons why it is an important country for the Euro pean Union as a partner.

→ 22 September 2017 – PM’s Florence speech: a new era for cooperation and
partnership between the UK and the EU – Source:
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence -speech-a-new-era-of-
cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the- eu
In this speech Theresa May comes to Florence and be cause of this place tends to mention
more the European Union and the fact that both Euro pean countries and the UK are going
through a period of transformation, showing that “ we want to be your strongest friend and
partner as the EU and the UK thrive side by side.” It is interesting enough in this statement that
May uses the plural of “we” for actions of the futu re in relation to the European Union, but,

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when it comes to the decision of leaving the Europe an Union she mentions that the British
citizens had decided that they want to regain the s overeignty of the state. She had also made
some comparisons with the situation from Italy and the UK mentioning similarities, so as to
highlight that even though “ we have left the EU, we do not leave Europe”. In regards to a new
partnership, May mentions that they “must” arrive t o a compromise and create a new framework,
instead of using ones that are already existent, “ for our mutual benefit”. She does say a couple of
times in the discourse that she sees the new framew ork with optimism and ambition, even though
she knows that disputes are inevitable. By analysin g the following aspects mentioned in the
speech it is clear that this one is not held in the UK for British citizens, as there is almost no
negative aspect mentioned about the EU and moreover the PM says that “ we protect Europe
together from the threats” and describes the UK as “ a proud member of the family of European
nations” . These aspects prove that this is a soft Euroscept ic discourse, the elements that can be
considered more Eurosceptic and slightly attacking or forcing the EU countries to react being
mentioned at the end. In the conclusions May says t hat “The best way for us both to succeed is to
fulfil the potential of the partnership I have set out today.” By using these words, she approves
that her proposal is the best solution to the partn ership idea of the two entities, even though she
recognizes that “this is not something that you – our European part ners – wanted to do. It is a
distraction from what you want to get on with” , but urges in a way the European leaders to take
act into agreeing with this plan. Other European pr iorities are no longer set as important, the
focus being on the situation with the UK and settin g their new relationship, which does show a
little of nationalism from the part of May.

→ 2 march 2018 – PM’s speech on our future economic p artnership with the European
Union – Source – https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on -our-future-
economic-partnership-with-the-european-union
From the holistic analysis of this discourse one as pect is clear, the fact that when May
talks about the proposals from the UK’s side she us es the term “we want” and the future “will”
when talking about what the EU would confer this co untry, but, when looking from the other
side, she uses the word “should” when talking about the things that the UK would do in this new
partnership. In this context it seems like she does not want to involve the UK into anything for
sure, nor does she want for the government to make promises, but, when it comes to the EU, she

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demands that some things are to be respected and do ne. She uses the pronoun “I” when talking
about the efforts that she makes in the process of discussions and regarding her previous
commitments to the citizens and speeches at differe nt conferences. The focus on this speech is of
more nationalist, on “ bringing our country back together” , especially taking into consideration
the fact that the exit of the UK has effects and “c hallenges” for Northern Ireland and Ireland.
Regarding the future of the UK, May presents her pe rception as optimistic, saying that whatever
the result they will keep growing, but, she does no t forget to underline that the UK is still
European, even after leaving the Union. This discou rse is more categoric clearly stating the
needs of the UK and the country’s requests from the European Union, taking into consideration
both the national sovereignty and the European laws . The speech ends with two iconic replicas of
May that address the European Union and the fact th at the European legislation and treaties will
no longer apply to the UK after the exit: “We know what we want. We understand your
principles.” . This is no longer a campaign discourse, but more, an information towards the
British citizens and maybe a signal for the Europea n leaders in the debate and negotiations of the
Exit conditions.

→ 15 November 2018 – PM’s statement on Brexit – Sourc e –
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-ma de-by-the-prime-minister-15-
november-2018
Following the decision of two cabinet ministers inc luding the chief negotiator on the
withdrawal to quit May’s government, because of the draft Withdrawal Agreement and the
Outline Political Declaration regarding the UK’s fu ture status and relation with the EU, the
Prime Minister has delivered a press conference in this regard. In the beginning of the speech
May has a personal approach of the situation as she states that she “ do not judge harshly those of
my colleagues who seek to do the same but who reach a different conclusion… I am sorry that
they have chosen to leave the government and I than k them for their service”. In this context she
mentions her involvement in the negotiations and th e fact that her approach has put the national
interests first. From here on she mentions all elem ents existent in the Agreement which the
government wants to agree upon, stating some elemen ts that highlight the national control of
several elements (“ full control”). The difference with this speech is that it underlin es the
necessity of internal cohesion and integrity of the UK’s territory with the Northern Ireland and

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Ireland which are also affected by this decision. N ow, more than focusing on the relation with
the EU, the focus is brought upon the unity inside the UK and delivering a Brexit that is
favourable for all the United Kingdom.

→ 21 May 2019 – PM speech on the new Brexit deal –
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-o n-new-brexit-deal-21-may-
2019
This is the last speech of May as Prime Minister th at I will analyse, in the period 2015 –
2019 that I have chosen as timeframe. In the beginn ing of this discourse May also starts by
mentioning her aim in relation with the Brexit and her wish to have a deal when exiting the EU.
In this context she says that because of the differ ent votes from 30 MPs the UK did not yet leave
the EU, but “ I do not think we should give up” . Personally she says she is “ absolutely committed
to the UK continuing to lead the way on this issue” , using the pronoun “I” for actions that
describe May’s individual wishes for the present an d future, but also for previous actions taken
in the context of the EU – UK relationship, but for future actions she uses the “we” as meaning
her and her government. She often mentions that she believes it is a great opportunity for the UK
to leave the EU and regain its sovereignty and inde pendency, however she underlines the need of
a deal with the EU to exit. In this case she puts t he blame on the MPs if they do not agree to sign
the next deal and finish this process until the end of 2020. It is for the first time she clearly stat es
why the UK will be better off outside of the Europe an Union, without mentioning its continuous
relationship with this community: “ Out of the EU, out of ever closing union, free to d o things
differently”. In the end of the speech May requests the support f rom the population to find a way
through this period and agreeing with the MPs and t he European leaders to have an exit plan
decided and signed.

→ 24 July 2019 – PM – Boris Johnson first speech in Downing Street after becoming the
UK’s new PM- https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/boris-johnso ns-first-speech-
as-prime-minister-24-july-2019
Following the British elections in the summer of 20 19, the new prime minister was chosen as
Boris Johnson who has campaigned for the “Leave” of the UK from the European Union and
whose speech I have previously analysed to compare it with this one. The speech of Boris is

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much more straightforward and directly addresses th e citizens by employing a lot the pronoun
“you” or “thank you”. He is not denying the efforts made the PM before him, but does criticise
those who do not believe in the necessity or succes s of a Brexit Agreement/ Deal (“ I am
convinced we can do a deal”) . In this discourse he calls out directly to the ci tizens, but compared
to previous speeches of the PM, Boris uses the term “let’s” instead of “we will/must” through
this showing the direct implication of the populati on in the discussions with the European Union.
Compared also to his first speech, this time Boris does not try to convince the population of
anything in particular and does not use numbers or other certain information to back up what he
is proposing.
After having analysed all discourses there are some key factors that can identified and
that is the development regarding the approach towa rds the UK – EU relation and the importance
of the national perspective. While at the beginning there was support for staying in the European
Union, but in a reformed one, this attitude had cha nged, but not drastically after the referendum
from 2016. Starting from that point the PM supporte d the idea of exit, but adopting a rather
neutral position, saying that this process would be in the benefit of both the British nation and the
other European countries. There is a constant soft Euroscepticism that can be identified in the
discourses, but this attitude is most pronounced as time goes by, in 2019 it had arrived to the
point that the national interest was more important than anything else, showing to the citizens
that the European Union should follow the direction given by the UK. There is a clear sign that
no PM wants to personally recognize their implicati on in the future in regards to decisions that
have to be taken, before the referendum citizens we re the ones that were responsible for their
choice and after the government as a whole was pres ented as most important actor. The leaders
only mentioned themselves when talking about someth ing that had happened in the past or when
mentioning their commitments and achievements.
The imperative was frequently used when talking abo ut the European Union, meaning
that unlike the UK, the perception of the represent atives was that the EU was obliged to respect
the agreement presented by the British counterpart. On the other hand, when talking about the
British side the leaders do not think that the UK h as any obligation. As a conclusion, it is clear
that there is a Soft Euroscepticism that can be ide ntified in the speeches, no matter the period,
but, it is notable that as time goes by the attitud e towards the EU and European leaders worsens.
Even though there is not hard negative opinion in r egard to the EU as an institution or

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community, there is a higher nationalist protection ism that is reflected through the speeches. This
nationalism translates into seeing the benefits of the UK and ensuring the British citizens of the
efforts that are made to protect their interests in favour of the European suggestions

2. Quantitative research method –
The quantitative research method I have chosen for the analysis of the public opinion of
British citizens in regards to the European Union i s the correlation research design. This has
allowed me to analyse the relationship existent bet ween two overall variables, the public opinion
on some aspects mentioned in the Eurobarometer and the Euroscepticism that would result from
their answers. The correlation method helps one de termine if there is a connection between two
or more variables identifiable in a population or g roup, at the end being possible to say if there is
a positive correlation or a negative correlation. A lso, there are several types of correlation
research designs, the one used by me being the expl anatory one through which I have explored
“the extend to which the two or more variables co-v ary, where changes in one variable are
reflected in changes in the other.” (Creswell, 2008 , p.358)
The information retrieved from the Eurobarometer is a result of face-to-face interviews
conducted by the European Commission with British c itizens, two times a year, resulting in a
spring and autumn survey. The number of interviews varies from the minimum of 1.010 in the
Autumn Eurobarometer Survey in 2019 to the maximum of 1.365 in the Spring Survey of 2017.
These were all collected from the official website of the European Commission, the General
Directorate of Communication which has a dedicated webpage for Public opinion and
Eurobarometer surveys.
The questions I have chosen as variables for this a nalysis are the following:
1. In general, does the EU conjures up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly
negative or very negative image?
2. I would like to ask you a question about how much t rust you have in certain institutions.
For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to
trust it. The European Union (%)
3. For each of the following statements, please tell m e to what extend it corresponds or not
to your own opinion. You feel you are a citizen of the EU

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4. Please tell me to what extend you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements. (OUR COUNTRY) could better face the fut ure outside the EU.
These four questions were chosen, first of all, bec ause they can be found in all surveys and they
keep the same possible answers, which is very impor tant in making sure the data analysed is the
same in all cases. I have decided to choose questio ns that reflect both the way the EU is
perceived by the citizens and their direct connecti on with the community but on the other hand, I
wanted to highlight the role that the British would envision for their country to have in the EU.
The first question is a more general one that allow s the citizen to create the big picture
regarding it perception towards the European Union as an idea, institution and community,
regarding it as a whole. Taking into consideration the “Leave” campaign and the idea released in
2015 of the possibility to decide whether to remain or exit the European Union, it is interesting to
see the possible fluctuation or stability in the pe ople opinion regarding the EU. As I have
presented before, in the theoretical part, the mass media is a powerful instrument in manipulating
and changing citizens’ opinion, so, because of this campaign I wanted to see whether the
percentage of people who have a negative general pi cture of the EU would stagnate or rise.
Having a negative general perception on the communi ty could represent a first step towards a
hard Euroscepticism and rejecting all about the Eur opean Union, as a whole concept.
Following this, I have chosen a next variable that is in direct connection with the general
picture on the EU, more precisely, the level of tru st that citizens have in the European Union as a
whole. Choosing to speak about the union at a large r context is a way to connect the previous
identified concept to a more in-depth analysis of t he public opinion of the British citizens in this
concern. Having a level of trust in something means not necessarily that a person has a positive
perspective on that specific aspect, but it means t hat the citizens believe that the union has the
power and resources to help their country and make their living conditions better. When there is
lack of trust in the institution or person in power , whether we are talking about national or
international level, the respective actor may loose from its credibility and more important, from
its legitimacy. The legitimacy of the EU is set by the citizens trust and positive perspective on
the necessity and utility of the Union for their co untry and for themselves as individuals.
Going more in- depth with this analysis, I have the n chosen to analyse the way the
citizens feel regarding their direct connection wit h the EU, respectively whether they feel part of
a bigger and unified community, or if they still pe rceive themselves at the national level.

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Nationalism is an element which can be identified, in extremis, with Euroscepticism, soft or hard
one. Even if it is not a decisive aspect, if one ca nnot imagine himself as anything else but his
nationality and does not perceive the possible exis tence of a European identity, then this could
lead to the possible negation of the whole European Union.
The last question that I have decided to analyse is directly related to the relation between
the citizen and the country’s membership in the Eur opean Union, this being very relevant in the
context of Brexit and the manifestation of the Euro scepticism in the public opinion regarding o
the EU. The element in question here is the Europea n identity and citizenship, seeing if the
respondents recognize the existence of a second “na tionality” besides the British one, this being
a sign that they accept and identify themselves as part of a bigger community. The nationalism,
as an aspect present often in Eurosceptic tendencie s, would be reflected here if the citizens do
not attach themselves to the European identity and only consider themselves as a British person.
After having detailed these aspects I shall do an a nalysis on each of the questions and
answers given by the respondents in the period ment ioned from 2015 to 2019. To have a better
perception over the results, I will compare the nat ional results to the average at the European
level, the measure being translated into percentage of responses.
The first identified question is related to the ima ge the citizens have towards the
European Union, in general, the possibilities of re sponse being: total positive, neutral, total
negative and “Don’t know”. For the last answer I wi ll only mention that it has kept its percentage
to 2 – 4, except in Spring 2017 when it has risen t o 5 %, but for the purpose of this thesis I
should not detail this any more than this. The seco nd general aspect that can be mentioned is that
the positive answer always remains higher at the Eu ropean level with approximately 10
percentages, but at national level also, the positi ve reaction has always been higher than the
negative one.
In the first year from the chosen timeframe, 2015, the neutral answer has had the most
answers, rather balanced with the positive answer, reaching 36 – 37% compared to 30 – 32%,
whilst the negative reaction had 28 – 31%. Even so, the positive reaction is still lower than the
European average which had reached 37 – 41% of answ ers. The one answer that is of most
interest in the context of Euroscepticism is the to tal negative one, which has had a higher
percentage in 2016, reaching the maximum of 36% of respondents. Even if it may not seem a
high percentage, I must mention that it is with mor e than 10 percentages higher than the EU

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average at that time. Another aspect to be mentione d is that in the same year, the first three
variables had, at the UK level, approximately the s ame percentages, with a difference of 2 – 5
percentages, as comparing to the EU where there wa s a clear difference of approximately 10
percentages between the negative and positive aspec ts of the question. Continuing from 2017 the
fluctuation of the negative answers is rather stabl e, being a small difference of 2 – 4 %, from 29
to 33, at this point the percentages were closing i n with the European ones. In the autumn survey
of 2018, there has been a significant raise of the positive reaction, with 10 percentages higher
than in spring, but which has significantly decline d in the next survey from spring 2019 from 43
% to 38 %, keeping lowering in 2019.
After having presented these data, I shall do a sho rt analysis as to understand the meaning
of these percentages and their connection with the Euroscepticism characteristics of the popular
opinion on British citizens in the time line 2015 – 2019. This question shows that less UK
citizens than the EU mean have a positive perspecti ve towards the European Union in general,
this being an element of hard Euroscepticism, as th e negative image can easily be translated into
a negative attitude towards the EU as a whole. Whil e in the last years from 2017 the EU mean
regarding the percentage of people having a positiv e image on the EU has remained stable, for
the UK starting with the year of the referendum and continuing until the autumn of 2019 we see
a significant difference in this reaction. The year 2016 has also represented a year of change for
the percentage of citizens that have a negative ima ge of the European Union, even so, I believe
that this raise and the fact that the UK has always has a higher percentage than the EU mean
regarding the population with a negative perception on the EU, means that the British present a
higher level of Euroscepticism than the other Europ ean countries. In my opinion, highlighting
that more British citizens than the EU mean, have a negative perception on the EU is relevant in
identifying the level of hard or soft Euroscepticis m in the public opinion.
The second question is related to the level of trus t citizens have in the European level as
an entity, the variables being the following: tend to trust, tend to not trust and don’t know. From
the beginning I have to mention that the marker “I don’t know” is the highest one from the four
questions chosen, raising up to a percentage of 18, which is very relevant, considering the fact
that at the European level, the percentage has vari ed between 10 – 11 percentage. This indicator
has had a rather consistent percentage with that of the EU average, above with maximum 3
percentages, but has seriously risen in the Spring of 2017, when it had reached 18 percentage,

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compared to the European 11%. Then it had lowered a gain to 11 – 13% until the Autumn of
2018 when it had again risen to 16% and then keepin g straight at 15 % until the end of 2019.
Following this, the next marker that is of interest to underline the level of Euroscepticism
is the negative one, not trusting in the EU. Throug hout the predefined timeline this variable has
been significantly higher that the positive one, be ing, in general, a difference of 20 – 40 %
between the two, in the UK. The maximum difference has been reached in 2015, if in spring this
variable had 55% and the positive one 29%, in autum n it had raised up to 63%, respectively
23%, which compared to the European average each ha d a difference of 10 – 20 percentages
higher in the negative trend and lower in the posit ive one. The level of not trusting has slowly
lowered in 2016 and in the spring of 2017, arriving at 51% of respondents who did not trust the
EU, this being a difference of 20% with those who t rust in the EU. If at the European level we
can see a constant percentage at both the positive and negative aspects that has varied with 1 -2
percentage, this is the case for the UK only in wha t regards the positive reaction, remaining
around 31 – 29 % of respondent. However, the negati ve response varies substantially, in the
Autumn of 2017 it had risen with 8 percentages reac hing 59% of respondents, dropping slowly in
2018 firstly to 57 and hen 53 %. The rise comes aga in in 2019 when it reaches 56% and remain
stable for that year.
Through this second analysis I have also identified the trust in the EU in general as a
legitimacy issue and Eurosceptic manifestation of t he British citizens, considering the fact that,
compared to the EU mean, a larger portion of the re spondents do not trust the European Union.
With all the mentioned fluctuation existent at dist rust of UK citizens in the EU, this attitude has
remained in time more predominant than the tendency to trust in the community. This lack of
trust is also an issue of higher level of Euroscept icism existent in the UK compared to the EU,
this element being important as it defines the legi timacy that people give to the community and
their perception of the Union’s capabilities and po wer to make their lives better.
The third question analysed refers to the attachme nt of the citizens to the European
identity and seeing whether they consider themselve s as European citizens, or not. To this
question the markers used were split in several cat egories including the “I don’t know” answer,
in the following: “Yes, definitely”, “Yes, to some extend”, “No, not really” and “No, definitely
not”. In this case, there is a slight difference th at has occurred in 2018 and in the Autumn survey
of 2019, when the measurement applied has been spli t in two big categories, “Yes” and “No”.

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Because of this reason and to not affect the final result of the analysis, I shall combine the first
two positive answers into one that would be a posit ive identification with the European
citizenship and the two negative answers into one t hat would be a negative response to the
identification as a European citizen. In this case, the positive reaction has reached up to 56% in
the Spring of 2015 and then has variated between 52 and 55% until the Spring of 2018. A sudden
drop has occurred in the Autumn of 2015, when the p ercentage dropped to 52% and then slowly
raised up each year with one – two percentages. In 2016 the response has varied just a little from
53 to 55%, keeping the same trend in 2017 with 54% and 55%. From Spring 2018 to Autumn
2019 the percentage has been the highest with 57% a nd 58 % in 2017 and in the Spring of 2019.
In autumn the percentage had suddenly dropped by 5 points percentages reaching 53%. Even if
this would mean more than half of the respondents t hat answered positively, if compared to the
European mean, then we can see that it is much lowe r than this one, the EU reaching up to even
73% in the Spring of 2019. For the negative respons e the UK stands with more than 10 % higher
than the European mean at approximately 40 – 45 % a nd the EU mean at 30 – 35 %. In 2015
there was a raise of 5% from the spring and autumn survey, from 42 to 47%, but which had
dropped in 2016, remaining at a constant of 45 – 44 until 2018 when it dropped even lower, to
40%. The year 2019 has represented an important rai se for this negative response, reaching to
50% of the citizens that do not identify themselves as a European citizen, but lowing with 5 % in
autumn to 45%. Still, this percentages represent a much higher value compared to the European
mean which stands at approximately 30% of the respo nses.
This is a question which answers more to the existe nce of a soft Eurosceptic perception
of the UK citizens towards the European Union, as t he citizenship is not a fact regulate through
legal framework. Being able to identify oneself wit h a concept that is not written or regulated is
an aspect that concerns whether that person truly a ccepts that he is part of a community, or it is
just a construct. In this concern, almost half of t he UK citizens have answered that they do not
identify themselves with the European identity and citizenship, this being a lower percentage
than of those who responded that they do identify t hemselves as an EU citizen, but, compared to
the EU mean it has another importance. The UK has a much lower percentage of people who
identify themselves as European citizens, compared to the EU mean which has also reached over
70% in 2019, while in the UK only 57% responding po sitive. This difference of over 10% is
relevant in sustaining my opinion that the British citizens are not as connected to the European

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Union as the rest of the Member states and do not f eel necessarily as being part of the same
community.
The fourth and final question is a direct one which implicates the citizens to argue
whether they believe their country would be better off outside of the European Union, this
question being a clear sign of Euroscepticism, as i t means that the citizens do not see themselves
as identifying with the EU. For this question which asked how much they agree that the UK
would be better outside of the Union, the answers t he citizens chose were: total disagree, total
agree and don’t know. An interesting aspect about t his last answer is that, compared to the
previous questions, here it has a constant much hig her percentage compared to the European
Union of even 5 percentages. This answer has reache d the same level or close to the EU mean in
2015, the autumn of 2016 and of 2017, in rest remai ning at a difference of above 3 percentages,
with a sudden raise from 2015 to 2016 with 10% (fro m 8 to 18). In this case the British citizens
response of total agreement that the UK would be be tter outside of the EU is constantly at least
10% higher than the EU mean, which did not reach ev en 35%, on the other hand the UK has had
a percentage of minimum 41. In 2015 the percentage of the responses have risen both for the UK
and the EU, in Britain the percentage being higher with 17% from 43 to 55, but, in spring 2016
this had suddenly dropped with 10%, whilst for the EU the drop was only with 1 %. Until 2018
this had slowly risen up to 49 %, with a percentage of 45, 46 and 48 in 2016 and spring 2017,
but, from that point on the percentage has slowly d ropped to 44% in 2018 to 41% in 2019. In the
same time both the “I don’t know” answer and that t he UK would be better in the EU have risen,
but not significantly, (14% respectively 45%). Even in this condition, the negative attitude is
much better pronounced than in the EU mean which ha s remained in this last two years at 30 -32
% of respondents believing they would be better out side of the EU. At the response that the
national country is better inside the EU, the diffe rence is at least as high as the other response, as
the EU mean is between 55 – 61% and the UK is betwe en 37 – 45%, a difference of 10% being
always present. As mentioned, in the last two years there is a risen percentage of UK citizens
who think that the UK would be better inside the Eu ropean Union, but still not reaching more
than 45% maximum in 2019. In rest around 40 -42 per cent of the citizens interviewed considered
that their country would be better as a member of t he EU, with a drop in the spring of 2016 to
37% and a raise to 18% of the Don’t know answer.

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This last aspect that I have presented regarding t he European membership status of the
United Kingdom is an element that defines the hard Euroscepticism, as I have already mentioned
in the theoretical part, those who think that their country should not be part of the European
Union are those who support a hard Euroscepticism. Even if the percentage of those who support
the country’s withdrawal from the Union is barely r eaching half of the population interviewed,
the comparation with the EU mean gives us a clear i mage of the attitude of British citizens, in the
European context. Taking into consideration the fac t that the EU mean is around 35%, the
meaningful difference between the two show a clear preference for hard Euroscepticism in the
UK. The fluctuation of percentages is also an inter esting aspect in the UK’s case, as there is a
period when a sudden drop from this hard-Euroscepti c perspective can be seen, for example in
2016 and in 2018 and 2019 when the pro- European at titude has seen a higher representation.
Even so, this is not enough for the percentage of t he citizens who support the remaining of the
UK in the European Union to be more than half of th e correspondents. The interesting aspect is
that this phenomenon occurs in the referendum year and during the negotiations started in 2018
on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, but these aspects are not to be covered in this part.
As a general conclusion to this analysis of the Eur obarometer data I believe that there are
elements presented that support the existence of bo th soft and hard Euroscepticism in the public
opinion of the British citizens regarding the Europ ean Union as a whole. Its existence is not
denied, nor is its elements, but, citizens do find hard to identify themselves as part of the
community and to attach to their national identity another element that would possibly even
diminish their nationalism. Another interesting asp ect, in my opinion, is the support for the UK
to be outside the European Union and the existent f luctuation in percentages in time, especially
after 2016 and in the last two years, 2018 and 2019 . Comparing these data with the EU mean
gives another understanding to the national and int ernational situation in the European context.
Limitations of the research
This analysis is restricted because of several aspe cts, first of all, in regards to the time
frame, as the research only stretches out from the period 2015 – 2019, missing out the
information after 2019 until the official exit of t he UK from the EU, in 2020. Second of is the
incomplete quantitative data that has been analysed from the Eurobarometer, as only a few
questions have been selected to find out the public opinion towards the European Union. The
Eurobarometer makes available a series of questions that have been asked to the European

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citizens in regards to different aspects that are r elates to the EU. This public opinion is being
restricted as I have chosen only a few questions to which the British citizens have answered and,
the Eurobarometer does not have a complete sample c ontaining all population from the country.
The last element of limitation is in regard with th e discourse analysis, as I have only chosen a
few speeches of the UK leaders from the chosen time interval, this being an issue as not all
positions are being reflected.

Conclusions

Throughout this thesis my main purpose has been to find out the characteristics and level
of Euroscepticism in the public opinion and elites’ discourses in Great Britain in the set time
frame 2015 -2019. I have analysed these aspects by making use of the Eurobarometer statistics
and information to find out the public attitude tow ards the European Union and also discourse
analysis to observe the evolution of the leaders’ a pproach towards the EU in public speeches.
These two methods have been analysed on the theoret ical basis of the general
Euroscepticism history and characteristics and more attention towards the British approach and
the Euroscepticism in the history of this country. Starting from the beginnings of the EU, until
the decision of UK to exit this union, the presente d information is not only a background, but
also an inside from the British citizens mentality. This short analysis of the general and British
Euroscepticism represent a way to identify the char acteristics that are specific to this and see
how they can be found in the public opinion and dis courses.
Through this limited research I have come to the re alization of the complexity of this
subject, but at the same time, as I have described before, I have come to the conclusion that there
are some specific elements of the British Euroscept icism that can be identified through the public
opinion and leaders’ speeches in the UK. First of a ll, to answer my first research question, the
discourses of British elites in the period 2015 – 2 019 have some specific elements that have been
identified as part of the Soft Euroscepticism at th e national level. The discourses analysed
present a more nationalistic approach, focusing on protecting the interests of the UK, but at the
same there is an attitude of understanding the Euro pean legislation. With this in mind the leaders
mention that the future EU laws will no longer app ly for them so there is no need for the state to
try and implement these ideas into a national legis lation.

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In regards to the second question, the public opini on reflected through the Eurobarometer
from the period 2015 -2019 shows that the citizens are not very Eurosceptic towards the
European Union, but still are more negative towards the EU in comparison the mean of the
European Union’s citizens. There is a constant high er negative perception from the British
citizens towards the EU, but this perception does f luctuate depending on the year, another
characteristic that can be observed is the number o f people who are uncertain or do not know
how to answer the specific question.
Nevertheless one last aspect that has been analysed in this essay is the common elements
between the Eurosceptic characteristics of UK key s peeches and of the public opinion measured
by the Eurobarometer. While they are both different and present other aspects, the two have
common aspects in the Eurosceptic perception on the EU. Both public opinion and leaders
present a more nationalist and protectionist attitu de towards the UK, but at the same time they
are not radical. They do think of the UK’s best int erest and do no longer identify with the
European Union, but even so, they are not radical i n their negative perceptions.
As a final conclusion I believe it is interesting t o expand this research much further and
analyse on a larger sample the discussion, includin g other speeches and maybe also a longer time
frame that could include the 2020 process until the UK officially left the EU and then the
accommodation process. Taking into account the Coro navirus pandemic and before that the
protests of British students against the actual exi t of the UK, a further analysis would be
interesting.

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• Other
1. European Union Referendum Act, 2015
2. Conseil Constitutionnel, “Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de
1789
3. United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rig hts”, art. 19
4. Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Rel ations, ed. 4, 2018

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Annex 1 – Eurobarometer analysis

UK EU 28 UK EU 28 UK EU 28 UK EU 28 UK EU 28 UK EU 28 UK EU 28 UK EU 28 UK EU 28 UK EU 28
Total Disagree 43% 58% 42% 55% 37% 55% 42% 58% 39% 60% 41% 60% 43% 61% 42% 61% 45% 59% 45% 60%
Total Agree 43% 30% 55% 34% 45% 33% 48% 32% 46% 30% 49% 31% 44% 3 0% 44% 30% 42% 32% 41% 31%
Don't know 14% 12% 8% 11% 18% 12% 10% 10% 15% 10% 10% 9% 13% 9% 14% 9% 13% 9% 14% 9%
Tend to trust 29% 40% 23% 32% 30% 33% 31% 36% 31% 42% 29% 41% 30% 42% 31% 42% 29% 44% 29% 43%
Tend to not trust 55% 46% 63% 55% 59% 55% 56% 54% 51% 47% 59% 48% 57% 48% 53% 48% 56% 46% 56% 47%
Don't know 16% 14% 14% 13% 11% 12% 13% 10% 18% 11% 12% 11% 13% 10% 16% 10% 15% 10% 15% 10%
Total positive 32% 41% 30% 37% 31% 34% 34% 35% 36% 40% 35% 40% 34% 40% 43% 43% 38% 45% 36% 42%
Neutral 37% 38% 36% 38% 31% 38% 30% 38% 30% 37% 28% 37% 33% 37% 29% 36% 31% 17% 33% 37%
Total negative 28% 19% 31% 23% 36% 27% 32% 25% 29% 21% 33% 21% 29% 21% 27% 20% 28% 37% 28% 20%
Don't know 3% 2% 3% 2% 2% 1% 4% 2% 5% 2% 4% 2% 4% 2% 1% 1% 3% 1% 3% 1%
Yes, definitely 24% 27% 22% 25% 28% 28% 27% 26% 27% 28% 26% 29% 29% 30% 32% 34%
Yes, to some
extend 32% 40% 30% 39% 25% 38% 28% 41% 27% 40% 29% 41% 29% 41% 26% 39%
No, not really 24% 20% 29% 23% 25% 22% 25% 22% 26% 21% 28% 20% 24% 39% 24% 18%
No, definetely
not 18% 11% 18% 11% 20% 11% 18% 10% 17% 10% 16% 9% 16% 9% 26% 8%
Don't know 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 3% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 53% 70%
45% 29% Image of the EU
Citizen of the EU 57% 70%
41% 29% 2018 Spring 2018 Autumn 2019 Spring 2019 Autumn
Our country
could better
face the future
outisde the EU 2017 Spring 2017 Autumn
Trust in the EU 2015 Spring 2015 Autumn 2016 Spring 2016 Autumn