National School of Political Studies and Public Administration [613940]

National School of Political Studies and Public Administration
Department of International Relations and European Integration

Master Program:
Security and Diplomacy
Discipline:
International Organization and Institutions of Security

POSSI BLE TRANSFORMATION OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS IN THE POST -SEPTEMBER 11 ERA

Professor coordinator: Postgraduate sudent:
Prof.univ.dr. Vasile Secăreș Tărăboanță Andreea Mădălina

Professor assistent:
Octavia Moise

Bucharest
2018

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POSSIBLE TRANSFORMATION OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS IN THE POST -SEPTEMBER 11 ERA

Abstract

”Collective security is by nature a result of attempts to preserve the security of each and
every state, which has come together against a common enemy/adversary. This concept will
be analyzed in relation to the role of identity -building in the formation of co llective security
arrangements. Coercion has been one of the indispensable stimulants in state building. It is
evident that anything, which is gained with coercion, is exposed to threat and thus to implicit
vulnerability, as it is not achieved with the fre e will cooperation of others. Corollary to this
logic, it can be said that as states are the product of coercion, they are exposed to threats
against their security. Naturally, the essential minimum activities of a state have also been
related to the use o f coercion. Of these essential activities, war making and protection are
directly related to coercion. One can therefore readily understand that security has always
been a matter of critical importance for states since their existence is coercion -based. It is also
evident that in this course of coercion -based international affairs, states turn s help in their own
security. ”1

1 Hasan Ulusoy, born in 1966, is a Turkish diplomat. He has served at the Turkish missions in France/ the
Council of Europe, Nigeria and Iran, and now works as first secretary at the Turkish Embassy in Switzerland.
He has a MSc. in European Security from the London Schoo l of Economics (LSE) and a diploma from the NATO
Defense College. He is currently a PhD candidate in the field of international security at Middle East Technical
University. He is the author of several published works on international security and NATO issues.

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INTRODUCTION

This essay focuses on the concept of collective security with a view to
shedding some light on the possible transformat ion of current collective security
arrangements, i.e. “the post – September 11 era”2. It, by no means, intends to be
exhaustive as to the analysis of all related theories as well as the academic literature
on the topic. It rather aims to provide food for th ought on the subject.
Collective security is by nature a result of attempts to preserve the security of
each and every state, which has come together against a common enemy/adversary.
This concept will be analyzed in relation to the role of identity -buildi ng in the
formation of collective security arrangements. In the study, the following
argumentation will be utilized.
Coercion has been one of the indispensable stimulants in state building. In
fact, states are defined as “coercion -wielding organizations th at are distinct from
households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all
other organizations within substantial territories”3.
”It is evident that anything, which is gained with coercion, is exposed to threat
and thus to imp licit vulnerability, as it is not achieved with the free will cooperation
of others. Corollary to this logic, it can be said that as states are the product of
coercion, they are exposed to threats against their security. Naturally, the essential
minimum ac tivities of a state have also been related to the use of coercion. Of these
essential activities, war making and protection are directly related to coercion. ”4
”This shows the importance of wars in the history of states. It is even argued
that state struct ures appeared chiefly as a by -product of rulers‟ efforts to acquire the
means of war that affect the en tire process of state formation”.5
On the other hand, the other state activity of essential natur e, „protection‟ is
related to “ attacking and checking r ivals of the rulers‟ principal allies, whether inside
or outside the state‟s cla imed territory ”.6
In light of these observations, one can readily understand that security has
always been a matter of critical importance for states since their existence is
coercion -based. It is also evident that in this c ourse of coercion -based international
affairs, states resorted also to collective security efforts in various forms ranging
from collations to even pacts and alliances that would in turn help their own secur ity.

IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY FOR STATES

”Security is indispensable for states as they need to protect themselves from
threats. Security is primarily an issue of a nation's relations with other states or a
group of states. This relationship among states w hich feel threatened by each other is

3 C. Tilly , Coercion , Capital and European States, AD 990 -1992 , (Cambridge: Blackwell Pub., 1992),
p.1.
4 Ibid. p.96.
5 C. Tilly, „Reflections on the History of European State -Making‟, in Tilly, C., The Formation of
National States in Western Euro pe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp.3 -84.
6 Tilly, op.cit., in note 1, p.96.

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exposed to the security dilemma .” 7 ”It is generally argued that the security of nations
cannot be defined in general terms, nor can it be determined objectively. ”8 Definitions
depend on states perception about threat s and safety. Therefore, “on security no
precise definition has ever been achieved and probably never will be”9. “There
appears to be almost a studied vagueness about the precise definition of terms such as
security”.10
”This complexity is also related to t he problem of which areas of life are the
subject of security. In this regard, theoretical debate occurs between two views of
security studies, i.e., the “narrow” versus “wide” debate. For the followers of the
narrow approach to security, the traditionali sts, it is argued that identifying security
issues is easy as they equate security with military issues and the use of force. ”11
Traditionalists also strongly oppose the widening of security studies, as by
such logic, issues like pollution, disease, child abuse or economic recessions
could be viewed as threats to security. Here we see that the traditionalist view regards
only military and political subjects as the focus of studies in the security field.
”Yet, this approach has entered an impasse and led to i ncreasing
dissatisfaction in explaining the events taking place in the international arena later on.
As pointed out by one of the proponents of the wider approach, this dissatisfaction
was stimulated first by the rise of the economic and environmental agen das in
international relations during the 1970s and the 1980s and later by the rise of concerns
with identity issues and transnational crime during the 1990 ′s.”12
Today it is obvious that this narrow definition does not fully cover the
parameters of the new security environment in the aftermath of the end of the Cold
War. With the end of the Cold War and the break -up of the Soviet Union, the political
and inte llectual climate has changed. Studies in this regard have articulated very
different views about how to define the concept of security. ”The narrow definition of
security tends to focus on material capabilities and the use of military force by states.
This, however, contrasts with the distinctions among military, political, economic,
social, and environmental security threats. ”13
”Thus, with this transforming understanding of what security means today, the
advocates of the wider approach concentrate on discu ssing the dynamics of security in
five sectors, that is, military, political, economic, environmental and societal. ”14
”This methodological framework also seems to better serve distinguishing
security issues as “hard” and “ soft”. ”15

7 The security dilemma refers to the notion that a state‟s efforts to increase its security by threatening
another state, which then responds with steps to incre ase its own security, paradoxically erodes the first
state‟s security. See C. A. Kupchan, „The Case for Collective Security‟, in Downs, G.W. (ed.)
Collective Security beyond the Cold War , ( USA: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp.41 -69.
8 A.V. Geusau, The Security of Western Europe , (London: Sherwood Press, 1985), p.2.
9 C.Thune, “Problems of Transition” in J.Alford et al, Europe in Western Alliance ,(London: MacMillan
Press, 1988), p.87.
10 G.Edwards and B.Burrows, The Defense of Western Europe , (Norfo lk: Butterworths, 1982), p.91.
11 B. Buzan et al, Security, A New Framework for Analysis , , ( London: Lynee Rienner Pub. 1998), p.3.
12 Ibid., p.2.
13 P.J. Katzenstein (ed), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in Word Politics, (New
York: Cam bridge University Press, 1996), pp.8 -9.
14 See the introduction in Buzan, op.cit., pp.1 -21.
15 Generally speaking, security issues requiring military options and relating to defense are considered
„hard‟ ones whereas others that require non -military measures such as conflict prevention are regarded
as „soft‟. But this distinction today appears to be less relevant in view of events and experience in
world affairs. See for details M.T. Klare and D.C. Thomas (E d), World Security , (New York: St.
Martin‟s Press, 1 991).

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Faced with such a comple xity, it is evident that disagreements on the
definition of security are probably unavoidable due to the different analytical
perspectives on the issue. Yet, in view of the presence of security risks of different
natures, it is, at least from the practical point of view, a fact that security at present
should be regarded as not merely, or even mainly, a matter of military policy, but of
broader economic and political policies. For threats to security are not necessarily of a
military nature, but they might derive from various other reasons. In view of the
above, one can draw two main conclusions. Irrespective of which subjects are to be
considered in dealing with the security concept, it seems evident that security is about
preservation of the existence of s tates. And, in this preservation effort, the military
component is always present even if as a last resort. Similarly, threat perception and
the nature of such perceived threats are important in determining whether and how the
perceived threat should be vi ewed as a matter of security. ”Here, one can see that any
phenomenon can become an issue of security when they are “securitized”. ”16 ”Thus, it
is evident that the meaning of a concept lies in its usage and is not something, which
can be defined analytically or philosophically. ”17

IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE
ROLE OF IDENTITY -BUILDING

History shows that “security, whether defined narrowly or widely, is a scarce
commodity”18. Therefore, it is generally acknowledged that in face of security thre at
perceptions, states feel forced to combine their efforts to strengthen their own
security. ”This brings us to the concept of collective security. Here, similar to the
conceptual problem in defining security, a precise definition of collective security
remains elusive. Not only do definitions differ, which is bound to happen in public
debate and scholarly discourse, but also some directly contradict each other. ”19
”In simple terms, collective security is related to efforts by a group of states to
act toget her in order to bette r preserve their own security. The term has been used to
describe everything from loose alliance systems to any period of history in which
wars do not take place. This wide spectrum is also due to the nature of security
threats. States ally to increase their security against perceived threats. ”20 ”In any
particular balance of power system, there are usually groups of states that share to
some extent an assessment of those threats. States face two kinds of threats in
general. ”21

16 Securitization, in the words of Bu zan, means a process by which “ the issue in question is presented
as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bonds
of political procedure”. See Buzan, op.cit., pp.23 -24.
17 Ibid. p.24.
18 J.C. Garnett, “Introduction: Conflict and Security in the new world order”, in M.J. Davis, (Ed),
Security Issues in the Post -Cold War , (UK: Edward Elgar Pub.Ltd, 1996), p.10.
19 G.W. Downs, „Beyond the Debate on Collective Security ‟, in Downs, G.W. (E d), Collective Security
beyond the Cold War , ( USA: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp.1 -17.
20 See K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics , (Reading: Addison & Wesley, 1979) and also S.
Walt, The Origins of Alliance, (Ithaca: Co rnel, 1987) .
21 See for details S. Weber, „Does NATO have a future?‟ in Crawford, B. (Ed), The Future of European
Security , (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1992), pp.360 -395.

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The first is usually the reason for which states join their forces in the first
place, i.e. an external threat from a potential aggressor who is not part of the group.
The second threat is of a more insidious but often just as dangerous nature, namely, an
internal t hreat from a member of the group itself that betrays its friends and uses force
against them. The first form of collective security is best illustrated by the alliance
system. An alliance functions as a collective body that defends its members from
securit y threats directed from outside. Thus it includes the concept of collective
defense as well. Moreover, although an alliance is focused on external threats, the
security is collective for its members. On the other hand, the best illustration of
security arr angements countering internal threats coming from members of a
collective security body is the “security community22”.
Collective security rests on the notion of one for all and all for one. Here, the
question of why states come together for collective secu rity can be argued is clear
enough. It is because they share the same threat perceptions against which they think
they will be better -off if they act together. Yet, the question of how they perceive the
same threat is not that clear. This brings us to the issue of identity -building.
”Identification is considered a social concept. ”23 The process of identity
formation is of a kind that develops within a social unit. “Any identification requires a
distinction just as any distinction necessitates some identific ation” .24 ”This brings us
to the self/other dichotomy. The self is identified in relation to its position vis -à-vis
the other ”25. In other words, all identities exist only with their otherness. “Without the
other, the self actually cannot know either itself or the world because meaning is
created in discourse where consciousness meets”.26
”Identification is of an exclusionary nature for the non -identified. In other
words, in the identification of a group of people as a community, this unit is
externalized of o r disassociated from the values, myths, symbols, attitudes and mores
of those (non -identified) with whom the unit does not identify itself. ”27
”It is also argued that the existence or the perception of threats from the other
inevitably strengthens the iden tity of the self. ”28
”The formation of the self is inextricably intertwined with the formation of its
others and a failure to regard the others in their own right must necessarily have
repercussions for the formation of the self. ”29 Identity is the key elem ent of a
cognitive region. Shared self -definitions create internalized norms that allow people
from different countries to know each other better and thus respond more effectively
to the common concerns.

22 This concept was first introduced by Van Wagenen, and later in 1957 developed by Karl Deutsch
with theoretical arguments. For the views of Deutch, see particularly E. Adler, „Europe‟s New Security
Order: A Pluralistic Security Community‟, and P.W. Schultz, „Competing for European Security: The
CSCE, NATO and the Europ ean Community in a Changing International Environment‟, both in
Crawford, B. (E d), The Future of European Security , (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley,
1992).
23 A. N. Yurdusev, "Avrupa Kimliğinin Olușumu ve Türk Kimliği” in Atila Eralp (Ed) Türkiye ve
Avrupa, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1997) p.18.
24 A.N. Yurdusev, International Relations and the Philosophy of History: a Civilizational Approach ,
(London: MacMillan, forthcoming), p.105.
25 K. Krause, “Critical Theory and Security Studies”, Cooperatio n and Conflict , Vol (33)3, 1998,
p.312.
26 I.B. Neumann, Uses of the Other , (UK: Manchester University Press, 1999), P.13.
27 Yurdusev, op.cit ., in note 22, p.107.
28 Yurdusev, , op.cit ., in note 21, p.21.
29 Neuman, op.cit., p.35.

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What constitutes the basis for collective security a rrangements is therefore the
mutual responsiveness developed out of answers to the questions of “who I am” and
“who the other is”. In other words, it is the collective identity, which lays the ground
for a sound collective security. The importance of ident ities can thus be summarized
as follows: common identities help to establish a security whose existence, i.e.
collective security, proves that members share common identities.
In view of the foregoing, one can easily understand that collective identities
and shared values as well as shared understandings as regards threat perceptions are of
significant importance for the creation of a workable collective security arrangement.
The identity issue entered into International Relations full -fledged with the
critical theories, such as “constructivism”. However, “mainstream” 30approaches also
acknowledge identity. But, how it differs from the constructivist approach is that it
presumes to know apriority what the self -being is defined as. ”The state as a unit is
assumed to have a single identity, across time and space whereas constructivism
assumes that the selves, or identities, of states are variable, they likely depend on
historical, cultural, political and social context .”31
Accordingly, as regards the object of se curity, the constructivist approach
questions how the object of security is constructed according to threat perceptions.
Here, the argument that discourses of threat are constitutive of the object to be secured
relates to the question of how such threats a re identified.
In view of the foregoing, one can see that constructivism helps better explain
collective security formations that are constitutive of collective identities. Thus, sound
collective security arrangements are forms of collective identity that exclude each
other on the basis of their distinctiveness.
”Throughout history, powerful countries have constructed three versions of
collective security arrangements at the global level. All these regimes, the Concert of
Europe, the League of Nations and t he United Nations, reject unrestrained power
balancing through competitive alliances that characterize laissez -faire approaches to
security. ”32
”Yet, they have all failed to provide for an efficient collective security
arrangement to diffuse war and conflic t.”33 Although in the case of the UN, one can
argue that it has helped prevent world wars since the second World War, the reason
for the absence of such a global war is in fact not the UN but the balance of terror
based on mutual nuclear deterrence that the two opposing military blocs pose. Here,
one can ask why they failed to form an efficient collective security arrangement at the
global level?
This can be explained with reference to identity issues in view of the previous
discussions on the importance of identity -building for the creation of collective
security arrangements. Here, it can be argued that those security regimes could not
establish a collective identity against a common threat. In other words, the selves in

30 By “mainstream scholarship ”, the paper refers to theoretical approaches that have dominated
international relations since the Cold War, i.e. (neo) realists, liberalists (neoliberalists institutionalism),
which work on the basis of positivist/rationalist parameters. See for details, K. Krause, “Critical Theory
and Security Studies”, Cooperation and Conflict , 1998, Vol.33(3) , pp.298 -333, and also J. Fearon and
A. Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism”, in W. Carlsnaes (et al) Handbook of International
Relations , (London: Sage Pub.lt d, 2002), pp. 52 -73.
31 T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, International Security ,
Vol 23(1), summer 1998, p.176.
32 See for details, particularly A. Bennet, and J. Lepgold, “Reinventing Collective Security after the
Cold War”, Political Science Quarterly , Volume 18, Issue 2, 1993.
33 Ibid.

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these organizations did not come tog ether against a common “other”. In the Cold War
era, the “other” was the East for the West and vice versa, although members of both
Blocs remained in the same global security regime, the UN. Therefore, their stay in
the UN was not due to the creation of a common identity but due to a felt need.

IMPACT OF THE POST -COLD WAR

The post -Cold War has had a considerable impact on this state of affairs. The
end of the Cold War, which for almost half a century had been the symbol of division
in Europe, was marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall on October 3rd 1989. The fall of
the Berlin wall meant also the collapse of the ideological walls which had divided
Europe for so many years.
The end of the Cold War even raised questions regarding the necessity of
NATO as mi litary alliances normally dissolve once their common ene my has been
defeated. However „with the rise of non -conventional and asymmetric security threats
this was proven not to be the case ”34.
These threats to international security are not totally new pheno mena.
However, what is new in this sense is the effect of globalization on these threats.
Today, in a world where things have increasingly become more transnational and
interdependent, owing to the effects of globalization , any incident in a country or in
region, be it a terrorist act or an ethnic conflict, poses threats to other areas due to the
domino effect. As a corollary to this, threats that transcend borders happen to affect
security more rapidly, more severely in an ever -expanding magnitude with spi ll-over
effects. These threats inevitably necessitate collective responses as they affect almost
all states in one way or another.
In such an environment, Europe in particular and the world in general have
witnessed several hot conflicts and wars in just o ne decade in the post -Cold War era,
which amounts to more than occurred in the whole course of the Cold War years. The
European continent, which had been free from wars since the end of World War II,
once again became a continent of conflict and death with a wars that erupted in its
very midst, like in the territories of the former Yugoslavia or in its vicinity, or like the
Caucasus or elsewhere like in the Middle East, i.e. the Go lf war.
In view of this, one can argue that the basic premises of mainstream
scholarship, such as anarchical setting, power politics based on national interests, etc.,
are still present in the world affairs. True, mainstream scholarship failed to anticipate
the end of the Cold War. But, the world order, which has replaced the Cold War era,
still proves the validity of mainstream scholarship. States act in pursuit of preservation
of their interests and of protection of their security in the face of both conventional
and non -conventional security threats. However, the main question he re is how they
gather support from other states for such policies and how legitimacy is attained for
them. In fact, the transboundary effects of such security threats help states gather the

34 Asymmetric threat is defined as a threat that can cause harm in bigger magnitude than its size. Such
threats vary from international terrorism, ethnic conflicts and religious fundamentalism through
organized crime, drug trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to mass migrations,
environmental disasters, poverty etc. See Erkem, S., “11 Eylül 2001: Terrorizmin Yeni Miladi”,
Stratejik Analiz, Sayı 18, Ekim 2001. Asymmetric threat is also defined as a threat that does not follow
the rules of fair warfare including surprise attacks, as well as warfare with weapons used in an
unconventional manner. See www.rand.org/news links/terrorism.ntml .

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support of like -minded states and act collectively to protect thei r security against such
threats.
Collective security arrangements have been seriously proposed after every
large -scale war, such as the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II. The
end of the Cold War followed the same path both in academic and stat e circles. In this
regard, naturally the UN, being the only global organization for collective security,
has been called upon several times.
”In the post -Cold War era, the UN Security Council has adopted a series of
resolutions availing itself of the right to humanitarian intervention. That self –
empowerment has followed a gradual but uneasy process through a number of
experiences as witnessed in various wars and fights such as that of the Gulf, Bosnia
and Somalia. ”35 Despite this gradual progress in fulfilli ng its task of collective
security, the UN faced a deadlock during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Due to Russia
and China‟s objection to a military operation against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the UN could not reach a decision authorizing the formatio n of a military
force with the Security Council mandate and this implicitly left it up to NATO to take
the responsibility.
In light of these one can see that even in the post -Cold War era the UN system
has maintained the inertia it derives from its organiz ational set -up. This can be
attributed to the following: In the post -Cold War era, although one of the Blocs
disappeared, it was evident that at least the old leader of the East, i.e. Russia on the
one hand and the USA together with the rest of the Western Bloc on the other,
continued to regard each other as “other”. This was because they have not been able
create a collective identity (self), as they could not define a common threat (other)
either.

POST -SEPTEMBER 11 ERA

The world that embarked on a new m illennium with these important shifts in
international affairs in general and in the collective security field in particular, was
unable to avoid the tragedy of September 11th. The terrorist attacks of September 11
have changed many, if not all, parameters in world affairs, and have important
repercussions for security in a variety of ways and the approach to collective security
is no exception to this.
”In the wake of the terrorist attacks, NATO allies lined up behind the US and
in an unprecedented display of support and solidarity they invoked, on 12 September
2001, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of the Alliance, the core clause of collective
defense, for the first time in the history of the Alliance.”36 This decision seems to have
constituted a dramati c shift in the conceptualization of what forms hard and soft
security issues. First, it was bitterly confirmed that terrorism is one of the most
dangerous non -conventional asymmetric security threats. Similarly, it was also
confirmed that terrorists can ea sily access weapons of mass destruction. More
importantly, with the invocation of Article 5 and the military operation directed
against the al -Qaida terrorist network and its sanctuary the Taliban regime, it has
become clear that the fight against terroris m, which was always regarded as a matter

35 See for details C. Guicherd, “International Law and the War in Kosovo”, Surviva l,, Volume 41, No:
2, Summer 1999.
36 See NA TO Press Release on 12 September 2001, www.nato.int .

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of soft security, would also require hard security measures, including military ones, in
the post -September 11 era.
In this context, one can argue that the 11 September terrorist attacks have
provided a conducive atmosphere for the creation of a new “other”, i.e. common
enemy. This was “terrorism”37. In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks the
international community has apparently realized that terrorism, as a global
phenomenon, must be combated in a sp irit of solidarity. Heads of states, prime
ministers and ministers at many levels, have expressed and reaffirmed their
determination to play their part in a co -ordinated manner in the coalition against
terrorism under the aegis of the United Nations.
Thus, in the post -September 11th era, almost all states seem to have found a
new „”other”, terrorism, against which they are still identifying themselves.
Particularly, at the summit meetings that took place in 2002 between the Russian
Federation and the USA, N ATO, and the EU respectively, this new approach has been
clearly underlined by stating that terrorism is their common enemy. It can, therefore,
be argued that states at present gradually come together and develop a common
collective identity in opposition to a commonly perceived security threat, the “other”.
This is terrorism in particular and other non -conventional security threats of
asymmetric nature such as WMDs (weapons of mass destruction), religious
fundamentalism and extreme nationalism, which are e ither the root cause or the means
of terrorism.
The presence of such a ”common enemy” which has been already condemned
by almost all UN member states, no doubt constitutes an important opportunity to
facilitate the creation of a workable collective securit y arrangement at the global level
in the future. Continuing efforts within the UN framework, which were launched with
UNSC resolution 1378 underscoring among other things that the terrorist acts
committed on September 11th 2001 posed a threat to internat ional peace and security
and in this context reaffirms the inherent right of individual or collective self -defense
in accordance with the UN Charter, albeit falling short of providing a clear definition
terrorism, have yet brought about significant norms i n the fight against terrorism.

CONCLUSION

This essay has attempted, in view of the argumentation developed in the
preceding sections, to suggest in brief the following: States as coercion -wielding units
are inherently vulnerable to outside threats, and thus in dire need of security measures.
This state of affairs also necessitates collective security arrangements for better
preservation of their own security and collective security arrangements can be better
utilized against an identified common enemy/ad versary.
The main argument is that the identity of each unit, i.e. state, is shaped in
relation to its opposition vis -à-vis those of others. In other words, the dichotomy of
the self/other is relevant in the identification process as all identities exist o nly within
the otherness relationship. In view of this understanding, it is argued that collective
security is based on the formation of a common identity of like -minded states (selves)
in opposition to a commonly perceived enemy (other).

37 Although there is yet no one common definition about terrorism and its forms, at least as a
phenomenon it is condemned by all states. The nature and content of terrorism indeed is subject to a
separate study which lies beyond the scope of this paper.

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10

All this argumen tation clearly reflects the relevance of the constructivist
scholarship in the developments towards a new collective identity of states to better
provide collective security. The central issue in the post -Cold War era is how different
groups conceive their identities and interests. In the absence of constructivist
explanation of identity -formation, it would be hard to contemplate the present issues
in the field of security studies in general and collective security in particular.
In this context, the Post -September 11th era seems to be conducive for debates
on the viability of workable collective security arrangements. This is particularly true
because today states tend to come together and thus form a collective identity at the
global level against a common ly perceived security threat, i.e. terrorism, and its use of
weapons of mass destruction. In other words, states perceiving common threats
construct collective identities against a commonly perceived/identified enemy, which
in turn help overcome the securi ty dilemma. Collective identities of the members of a
collective security arrangement against a commonly perceived enemy/ security threat
are essential for the existence of such an arrangement.
Perhaps, this is the first time all members of the internation al community and
particularly the Russian Federation, and the USA, i.e. “selves”, seem to have
established a collective identity against the common enemy of terrorism, i.e. “the
other”. Terrorism is increasingly used as a legitimizing factor in the eyes of the
international community as well as in international law for military operations against
a non -state group or another state.
”For instance, in pursuance of their policies for toppling the Saddam regime,
the US administration has undertaken a campaign a iming to convince the international
community that Iraq not only possesses WMD but more importantly provides them
for international terrorism. ”38 This is because terrorism is condemned by all as the
“other”.
To conclude, one can assert that terrorism emerge s as the common threat,
against which the international community seems to have built its own collective
identity. The present momentum in the UN as regards various works and studies
concerning the fight against terrorism is promising in this regard despit e its
institutional inertia deriving from veto rights. However, it is also certain that the onus
of proof for the possible transformation of the present regime in the UN into an
“ideal” collective security arrangement to face such common threats will rest with the
strength of this conceptual shift – recognition of terrorism as “other” – in the minds of
states (selves) in the future.
However, the author of this essay opines that had the ties of the Iraqi regime
with terrorism been proven, the military operati on of the USA and the UK without a
legitimate UN mandate would have been less criticized by the international
community, and that this would have even facilitated overcoming the veto threats of
the rest of the permanent members of the UNSC.

38 To date, the USA has not been able to provide any convincing evidence of Iraq‟s material support for
international terrorism let alone prove the presence of any W MD in this country.

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