Lect. Univ. Dr. Ana-Maria Groza Graduate, Dumitru Ema -Denisa UNIVERSITY OF CRAIOVA FACULTY OF LAW THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE… [614561]

UNIVERSITY OF CRAIOVA
FACULTY OF LAW

MASTER THESIS
BUSINESS LAW

Supervisor,
Lect. Univ. Dr. Ana-Maria Groza
Graduate,
Dumitru Ema -Denisa

UNIVERSITY OF CRAIOVA
FACULTY OF LAW

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
REGARDING THE FREE MOVEMENT OF
WOR KERS

Supervisor,
Lect. Univ. Dr . Ana-Maria Groza

Graduate,
Dumitru Ema -Denisa

2018

Summary

Introduction ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …………. 1
Chapter 1 ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………..
The importance of free movement of workers ………………………….. …………………… 3
Chapter 2 ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………..
Labor mobility in EU ………………………….. ………………………….. ……………………….. 5
Case study ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………
Case C -230/17 ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …….. 7
Case C -144/17 ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …… 18
Case C -652/15 ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …… 31
Conclusions ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………… 45
Bibliography ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………. 47

Introduction
1

Introduction

The four main economic freedoms of the EU are the free movement of
workers, free movement of goods, free movement of services and free
movement of capital. The main focus of this thesis is the free movement of
workers. Historically speaking, the first time this right was mentioned was in the
Treaty of Rome in 1957. Back then this right had only economical grounds.
Things started to change after the Treaty of Maastricht and the right of free
movement of workers became an essential part of Eur opean citizenship.
In the present, the right of free movement of the workers is guaranteed by
European Law and granted to all citizens of EU Member States.
But what does freedom of movement mean? Freedom of movement
allows citizens of EU Member States to move to another Eu Member State,
alone, or with their families to find employement there and finally to establish
themselves there on the same terms as nationals.
Because this right is guaranteed by the European Legislation, the citizens
of EU Member St ates who move to another EU Member States are protected
against descrimination and they are entitled to equal treatment as the nationals.
However, despite the integration of regulations regarding this matter, EU
citizens are still reticent to move in any other member state, meaning that the
free movement in EU remains still at very low levels.

Introduction
2

The importance of EU citizens exercising their right to freedom of
movement in any member states of the EU focuses on economical growth and
expansion of work force.
Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to examine all the issues that EU
citizens migh t ecounter while moving to another member state of the EU by
analyzing the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice regarding the free
movement of workers in the EU, presenting case studies and taking a closer look
at the legal issues that have occu red and how the European Court of Justice
approached them.

The importance of free movement of workers
3

Chapter 1

The importance of free movement of workers

The Treaty of the European Union guarant ees four fundamental freedoms:
free movement of workers, free movement of goods, free movement of services
and free movement of capital. 1
The free movement rights are an important part of the European Common
Market. Although people have been granted this r ight by developing a legal
framework in the EU, the actual mobility of EU citiziens on another Member
States remains pretty low.
To try to understand the importance of free movement of workers we will
analyse different perspectives to this issue.
From a s ocial perspective, the issue of free movement of workers is
examined by Geddes, his considerations regarding this matter being that the
migration of EU citizens to another member states can be a very important
factor in the political context.
When it comes to the legal perspective, the EU case law „White‖ shows
how the rights of workers connect with the rights they have as EU citizens. As a
conclusion, we see that the most important objective in this matter it is rather a
political one than an economical on e.

1 Barnard, Catherine. 2007. The Substantive Law of the EU: The four freedoms, Oxford University Press

The importance of free movement of workers
4

Talking about the economical purpose, we will analyse next Borjas,
whose theory was that the pattern that appears in migration issues mostly has to
do with workers looking for better working conditions and better life conditions.
Therefore, it is common that they are seeking to move from countries with low –
economy to countries with a higher economy in different fields.
Concluding, the examples offered above justify why free movement of
workers is so important from a social, political, economical pe rspective.

Labor mobility in EU
5

Chapter 2

Labor mobility in EU

As we have seen in the past chapter, although the right of freedom of
workers exist, few of them actually take advantage of it. In this chapter we will
explore the reasons that led to this current situation.
One of the main reasons is the fact that many people consider that the
difficulties they might encounter once they find themselves into another country
are hard to overcome.
They argued that they can lack language skills, or they won‘t be able to
quickly adjust to a new culture, traditions and standards, or that they won‘t
accomodate working with people that aren‘t the same nationality as they are.
Others have shown concerns that they won‘t be getting the same social
treatment as they get in their own country or that they won‘t be granted social
protection and social services.
Another category of potential workers are the students. Although they are
not as skeptical about moving i nto another country for work purposes, they
worry that their education won‘t be recognised in certain states or that their lack
of experience will constitute an obstacle in finding a job.
Analysing the reasons mentioned above, we can agree that all of them are
legitimate reasons. However it points out that many of the people that could be
interested in applying for a job abroad, aren‘t fully aware of their rights and they
still lack knowledge in this matter.

Labor mobility in EU
6

A solution, in this case, would be to make people more aware about
what‘s going on, what their rights and obligations are in the moment they decide
they want to work in another country and with the right type of information
provided their concerns will be put to rest.2
Another thing to consider is the legislation regarding this matter, that
should get more popularity among citzens of the EU via social channels, where
everything is more accesible and spreaded to a large number of people.
Concluding, by conducting a camp aign of awareness of the right s and
obligations of EU citizens, by offering real and complete information to all
people interested in pursuing a career in another member state, the level of labor
mobility should eventually increase.

2 Zimmerman, Klaus. 2005. European Labor Mobility: Challenges and Potentials. DE Economist.

Case Study
7

Case study
Case C -230/17
Erdem Deha Altiner
Isabel Hanna Ravn
v
Udlændingestyrelsen3

Issue in fact

This issue concerns the interpretation of Article 21 TFEU and of Directive
2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States.
The request has been made in proceedings between Erdem Deha Altiner
(‗the son‘) and Ms. Isabel Hanna Ra vn (‗Ms. Ravn‘), on the one hand, and the
Udlændingestyrelsen (Immigration Office, Denmark), on the other, concerning a
decision adopted on 3 June 2016 (‗the decision of 3 June 2016‘), confirming the
previous decision of the Statsforvaltningen (Regional St ate Administration,
Denmark), which had rejected the son‘s request for a residence permit in
Denmark, as a family member of Ms. Ravn, a Union citizen.

3 Curia.europa.eu/juris/documents

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8
The son was born on 2 September 2004 in Turkey and is a Turkish
national. Metin Altiner (‗the father‘) mo ved to Denmark on 17 July 2008, was
divorced from the mother and re -married, on 26 October 2010, Ms. Ravn, a
Danish citizen, who at the time was resident in Denmark. The judgment
pronouncing the divorce of the parents awarded parental authority over the so n
to his mother, a Turkish national, and he thus lived with her in Turkey.
Ms. Ravn and the father resided in Sweden from 1 December 2012 to
24 October 2014. During the periods between 1 August 2013 and 9 September
2013 and between 8 July 2014 and 2 September 2014, the son went to Sweden
with a visa valid throughout the Schengen area and stayed with them.
On 24 October 2014, Ms. Ravn and the father returned to Denmark
where they still reside. On 25 June 2015, the son entered Denmark with a visa
valid throughout the Schengen area until 30 September 2015.
After receiving, on 15 July 2015, the written consent of his mother, the
son appl ied two days later for a residence permit from the administration of the
Danish State as a family member of his father‘s wife, Ms. Ravn.
By decision of 9 March 2016, the regional authorities of the Danish State
refused that application on the ground that it was not a natural consequence of
the return of Ms. Ravn to Denmark. It is apparent from the file submitted to the
Court that, in its rejection decision, those authorities stated that they did not take
a position on the question of whether the stay of th e son in Sweden had enabled
him to create or strengthen his family life with Ms. Ravn in that Member State.
This rejection was the subject of a complaint to the Office of Immigration,
rejected by the decision of 3 June 2016.
In that decision, the Immigrat ion Office indicates that the son did not
enter Denmark together with Ms. Ravn and that his application for a residence
permit is not a natural consequence of the return of Ms. Ravn to Denmark.
According to that office, the derived right of residence in De nmark for a third –

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country national who is a member of the family of a Danish national returning to
Denmark after residing in another Member State, is time -barred if the family
member does not enter into Danish territory or does not submit an application
for a residence permit in Denmark as a natural consequence of the Danish
citizen‘s return.
On 15 June 2016, the son and Ms. Ravn brought proceedings against the
Danish Immigration Service before Københavns Byret (District Court,
Copenhagen) which, by orde r of 18 October 2016, referred the case to the Østre
Landsret, before which it is currently pending.
That court states that the parties disagree on the compatibility with Union
law of the condition laid down by Danish legislation, according to which t he
right of residence of a third -country national, who is a member of the family of a
Danish national returning to Denmark after having exercised his or her right of
free movement, is subject to the condition that the entry into Danish territory of
that fa mily member, or the submission by that family member of an application
for a residence permit, are ‗the natural consequence‘ of the return of the Danish
citizen in question. The claimants in the main proceedings argue that that
condition is contrary to EU law, in particular Article 21 TFEU.
In those circumstances, the Østre Landsret (High Court of Eastern
Denmark) decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following question to
the Court of J ustice for a preliminary ruling.
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in their observations
submitted to the Court, the Belgian and Norwegian Governments, referring to
the relatively short duration of the stays of the son in Sweden, expressed doubts
as to whether it can be considered that he had gen uine residence in that Member
State such as to allow the creation or strengthening of family life between
himself and the Union citizen in question, namely Ms. Ravn, such as would
afford him a derived right of residence in Denmark on the basis of Union law .

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The Norwegian Government considers that, in those circumstances, the question
referred might be considered purely hypothetical.
It is true that it is the genuine residence of the Union citizen and of the
family member who is a third -country national in the host Member State which
creates, on the return of that Union citizen to the Member State of which he is a
national, a derived right of residence on the basis of Article 21(1) TFEU for the
third -country national with whom that citizen lived as a fam ily in the host
Member State.
In the present case, it is apparent from the information supplied by the
referring court, in paragraphs 13 to 15 of this judgment, that the son‘s
application for a residence permit on the basis of EU law was ultimately re fused
by the Immigration Office on the ground not that the son‘s stay in Sweden had
not enabled him to create or strengthen his family life with his father and
Ms. Ravn, but that his entry into Danish territory and the submission of his
application for a r esidence permit were neither concomitant with the return to
Denmark of Ms. Ravn nor a natural consequence of that return, as required by
Guideline No 1/14.
According to settled case -law, questions on the interpretation of EU law
referred by a nationa l court in the factual and legislative context which that court
is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the
Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to
rule on a question referred by a na tional court only where it is quite obvious that
the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the
main action or its object, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court
does not have before it the factual or leg al material necessary to give a useful
answer to the questions submitted to it.
In those circumstances, and without prejudice to the possibility, for the
referring court, if necessa ry, to verify the factual premi ses of the administrative

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act challenge d before it, it cannot be held that the question, which concerns, in
essence, the compatibility with EU law of national legislation such as Guideline
No 1/14, has no connection with the subject -matter of the main proceedings or
that the problem is hypothet ical.
The request for a preliminary ruling is therefore admissible.

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Legal aspects

By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 21
TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which
does not provide for the grant of a derived right of residence under Union law to
a third -country national who is a family member of a Union citizen who is a
national of that Member State and who returns there after having exercised h is
right of freedom of movement, when the family member of the Union citizen
concerned has not entered its territory or has not applied for a residence permit
‗as a natural consequence‘ of the return to that Member State of the Union
citizen in question.
In that regard, it should be recalled, at the outset, that the Court has held
that, where during the genuine residence of a Union citizen in a Member State
other than the Member State of which he is a national, pursuant to and in
conformity with the conditi ons set out in Article 7(1) and (2) of Directive
2004/38, family life is created or strengthened in that Member State, the
effectiveness of the rights conferred on the Union citizen by Article 21(1) TFEU
requires that the citizen‘s family life in the host Member State may continue on
returning to the Member of State of which he is a national, through the grant of a
derived right of residence to the family member who is a third -country national.
If no such derived right of residence were granted, that Union citizen could be
discouraged from leaving the Member State of which he is a national in order to
exercise his right of residence under Article 21(1) TFEU in another Member
State because he is uncertain whether he will be able to continue in his Member

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State of origin a family life with his immediate family members which has been
created or strength ened in the host Member State.
Moreover, it the clear from the case -law that the conditions for granting,
when a Union citizen returns to the Member State of which he is a national, a
derived right of residence, based on Article 21(1) TFEU, to a third -country
national who is a family member of that Union citizen with whom that citizen
has resided, solely by virtue of his being a Union citizen, in the host Memb er
State, should not, in principle, be more strict than those provided for by
Directive 2004/38 for the grant of such a right of residence to a third -country
national who is a family member of a Union citizen in a case where that citizen
has exercised his right of freedom of movement by becoming established in a
Member State other than the Member State of which he is a national. Even
though Directive 2004/38 does not cover such a return, it should be applied by
analogy to the conditions for the residence of a Union citizen in a Member State
other than that of which he is a national, given that in both cases it is the Union
citizen who is the sponsor for the grant of a derived right of residence to a third –
country national who is a member of his family.
However, it should be borne in mind that the derived right of residence,
recogniz ed under Article 7(2) of Directive 2004/38, to family members of a
citizen of the Union who is established within the territory of a Member State
other than that of which he is a national, is not subject to the condition that they
be on the territory of that Member State within a certain period after the entry of
that Union citizen.
Under that provision, in such a situation, a derived right of residence is
granted to fam ily members of a citizen of the Union not only when they
‗accompany‘ the Union citizen to a Member State other than that of which he or
she is a citizen, but also where they ‗join‘ that citizen in that Member State.

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However, it must be noted that any r ight of residence in an EU Member
State of a third -country national derives from the exercise of freedom of
movement by a Union citizen.
As the grant of a derived right of residence on the basis of Article 21(1)
TFEU aims to allow the continuation, in the Member State of which the Union
citizen concerned is a national, of the family life which has been created or
strengthened with a family member who is a third -country national in the host
Member State, the competent authorities of the Member State of which the
Union citizen has the nationality are entitled to verify, before granting such a
right of residence, that such a family life between the Union citizen and the
third -country national who is a member of his family had not been interrupted
before th e entry of the third country national into the Member State of which the
Union citizen in question is a national.
For the purposes of such verification, the Member State concerned may
take into account, as an indication, that the third -country national, who is a
family member of one of its own citizens, entered its territory a significant
period of time after that citizen‘s return to th at territory.
However, it cannot be ruled out that a family life, created or strengthened
between a Union citizen and a member of his or her family who is a third –
country national, during their stay, pursuant to and in conformity with Union
law, in the h ost Member State, might continue despite the fact that that citizen
has returned to the Member State of which he is a national without being
accompanied by the family member in question, who may have been obliged,
for reasons relating to his personal situa tion, profession or education, to delay
his arrival in the Member State of origin of the Union citizen in question.
Accordingly, the fact that the submission of the application for a
residence permit was not ‗a natural consequence‘ of the return of th e Union
citizen is a relevant factor which, although not decisive in itself, may, in the

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context of an overall assessment, lead the Member State of origin of the Union
citizen in question to conclude that there is no link between the application and
the ex ercise by that citizen of his freedom of movement and, consequently, to
refuse to issue such a residence permit.
In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question
referred is that Article 21(1) TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding
legislation of a Member State which does not provide for the grant of a derived
right of residence in another Member State, under Union law, to a third -country
national family member of a Union citizen who is a national of that Member
State and who returns there after having resided, pursuant to and in conformity
with Union law, in another Member State, when the family member of the
Union citizen concerned has not entered the territory of the Member State of
origin of the Union citizen or has no t applied for a residence permit as a ‗natural
consequence‘ of the return to that Member State of the Union citizen in
question, provided that such rules require, in the context of an overall
assessment, that other relevant factors also be taken into accou nt, in particular
factors capable of showing that, in spite of the time which elapsed between the
return of the Union citizen to that Member State and the entry of the family
member who is a third -country national, in the same Member State, the family
life created and strengthened in the host Member State has not ended, so as to
justify the granting to the family member in question of a derived right of
residence; it is for the referring court to verify whether this is the case.

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Personal opinion

The matter of this case concerns the right of citizens of the Union and
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the
Member States.
The legal framework for this specific issue can be found in Article 21
TFEU4, which states:
“1. Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the
limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures
adopted to give them effect.
2. If action by th e Union should prove necessary to attain this
objective and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the
ordinary legislative procedure, may adopt provisions with a view to
facilitating the exercise of the rights referred to in paragraph 1.
3. For the same purposes as those referred to in paragraph 1 and if
the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting
in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may adopt measures
concerning social security or social protection. The Council shall act
unanimously after consulting the European Parliament. ―

4 Eur-lex.europa.eu

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17
The issue here is whether a third -country national family member of a
Union citizen who is a national of tha t Member State has a derived right to live
in Denmark based on his family relationship with a resident member of this
state.
Analyzing the legal framework and the arguments that have been raised
regarding this matter, I think that the claims made by ms R avn are legitimate,
and the relevant factors concerning this issue are not whether the permission for
residence has been asked or not as a natural consequence, but the family life that
has been created and consolidated during a period of time between ms Ra vn and
her step -son.
Therefore, I believe that the Court ruling in this case is in conformity with
the Union Law and it respects the rights gr anted by the EU to its members, as
they have been stipulated in Article 21 TFEU .

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Case C -144/17

Lloyd’s of London
v
Agenzia Regionale per la Protezio ne dell’Ambiente
della Calabria5

Issue in fact

On 13 August 2015, Arpacal launched an open tendering procedure for
the award of a contract for insurance cover services, with a view to covering risk
linked to the agency‘s civil liability towards third parties and workers for the
period covering the years 2016 to 2018. The contra ct was to be awarded on the
basis of the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) criterion.
Amongst others, two Lloyd‘s syndicates, Arch and Tokio Marine Kiln,
participated in the call for tenders. The tenders were both signed by the Special
Agent of Lloyd‘s General Representative for Italy.
By decisions of 29 September 2015 and 1 October 2016, Arpacal
excluded those two syndicates from the procedure, on the ground of
infringement of Article 38(1)(m), quater, of Legislative Decree No 163/2006.

5 Curia.europa.eu/juris/documents

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Informed by Lloyd‘s through its General Representative for Italy, the
referring court, the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per la Calabria (Regional
Administrative Court, Calabria, Italy), censured each of those two decisions by
judgments, respecti vely, of 19 January and 21 November 2016 and ordered, at
the end of each judgment, that the two syndicates be readmitted to the tendering
procedure.
By two decisions adopted on 14 December 2016, Arpacal again excluded
the two syndicates from the proce dure for infringement of Article 38(1)(m),
quater, of Legislative Decree No 163/2006 on the ground that the tenders were
objectively attributable to a single decision -making centre, since the technical
and economic tenders had been submitted, drafted and s igned by one and the
same person, namely the Special Agent of Lloyd‘s General Representative for
Italy (hereinafter ‗the decisions at issue‘).
Still through its General Representative for Italy, Lloyd‘s brought fresh
proceedings against the decisions at issue before the referring court. In support
of those proceedings, Lloyd‘s submitted that it is a ‗collective legal person with
multiple structures‘, forming a recogni zed grouping of natural and legal persons
(the members) who act independently within i ndividual groups, called
syndicates, which operate independently from one another and in competition
with one another whil st belonging to the same organiz ation. It argued that none
of the internal structures has autonomous legal personality but acts throug h the
General Representative who, for each country, is the sole representative for all
syndicates operating in that territory.
Arpacal argued, for its part, that several factors suggest that both tenders
are attributable to a single decision -making cent re, namely the use of identical
forms, the single signature of the same person as the Special Agent of the
General Representative for Italy, the fact that the official stamps on both
financial tenders bear consecutive numbers and the fact that the statemen ts and
declarations are identical. This, it was claimed, resulted in infringement of the

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20
principles of the confidentiality of tenders, fair and free competition, and equal
treatment of tenderers.
The referring court observes that, according to national case-law, where
several syndicates of Lloyd‘s participate in the same call for tenders, the fact
that the applications to participate in the tender and the financial tenders of those
syndicates are signed by Lloyd‘s General Representative for Italy entail s no
infringement either of Article 38(1) and (2) of Legislative Decree No 163/2006,
or of the principles of competition, independence and the confidentiality of
tenders. That case -law has, in this regard, highlighted the particular structure of
Lloyd‘s wh ich, in accordance with United Kingdom rules and regulations,
operates in different countries through a single General Representative.
Likewise, in its Opinion No 110 of 9 April 2008, the Autorità di Vigilanza sui
Contratti Pubblici (Supervisory Authority for Public Contracts, Italy), which has
since become the Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione (National Anti -Corruption
Agency, Italy), stated that the independence of syndicates and competition
between them serve to ensure free competition and the equal trea tment of
candidates.
The referring court is uncertain, however, as to whether the Italian
legislation at issue, as interpreted by national case -law, complies with EU law.
Admitte dly, Directive 2009/138 recogniz es Lloyd‘s as a particular form of
insuran ce undertaking, the members of which have the permit to operate within
the European Union through the intermediary of a single General Representative
for the Member State concerned. However, even if the syndicates of Lloyd‘s
operate independently of one an other and in competition with one another, the
fact remains that tendering procedures are governed by mandatory rules
intended to ensure observance of equal treatment. It is certain that, when Lloyd‘s
General Representative signs tenders submitted by syndi cates, he is aware of
their content. Consequently, the fact that the same person signs several tenders
submitted by different tenderers may undermine the independence and

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confidentiality of those tenders and, as a result, infringe the principle of
competit ion laid down, in particular, in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
In those circumstances, the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per la
Calabria (Regional Administrative Court, Calabria) decided to stay the
proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a
preliminary ruling.

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Legal aspects

It should be noted that, in the procedure established by Article 267 TFEU
providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is
for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to
it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have
to reformulat e the questions referred to it.
In this case, the main proceedings concern a public service contract for
insurance, in respect of which it is not specified whether the value reaches the
threshold set by Directive 2004/18. It should be noted, however, that the award
of contracts which, in view of their value, do not fall within the scope of that
directive is nonetheless subject to the fundamental rules and the general
principles of the FEU Treaty, in particular the principles of equal treatment and
of non -discrimination on grounds of nationality and the consequent obligation of
transparency, provi ded that those contracts have certain cross -border interest in
the light of certain objective criteria.
Consequently, it must be considered that, by its question, the referring
court is asking, in essence, whether the principles of transparency, equa l
treatment and non -discrimination, which derive from Articles 49 and 56 TFEU
and are referred to in Article 2 of Directive 2004/18, must be interpreted as
precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main
proceedings, which does not allow two syndicates of Lloyd‘s to be excluded
from participation in the same procedure for the award of a public service

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contract for insurance merely because their tenders were each signed by Lloyd‘s
General Representative for that Member State.
In this regard, it should be stated at the outset that, while Directive
2004/18 was repealed by Directive 2014/24 with effect from 18 April 2016, it is
apparent from settled case -law of the Court that the applicable directive is, as a
rule, the one in for ce when the contracting authority chooses the type of
procedure to be followed and decides definitively whether it is necessary for a
prior call for competition to be issued for the award of a public contract.
Conversely, a directive is not applicable if t he period prescribed for its
transposition ex pired after that point in time.
The tendering procedure at issue in the main proceedings was launched on
13 August 2015, whereas Directive 2014/24 was adopted on 26 February 2014
and, in any event, the time period for its transposition expired on 18 April 2016.
Consequently, Directive 2004/18 is applicable ratione temporis to the main
proceedings.
It is common ground between all interested persons having submitted
written observations that Lloyd‘s is a recogni zed grouping of members that are
natural and legal persons, which members, whilst acting through individual
groups — the syndicates — operate independently from one another and in
competition with one another. However, given that none of the interna l
structures has autonomous legal personality, syndicates may only act through
the General Representative, who is the sole representative for each country.
Lloyd‘s also stated that these syndicates constitute neither a fixed structure nor a
stable associat ion of members but rather a grouping of members, the
composition of which may vary, and that they each operate through a specific
management body which issues decisions that are binding on them, although
they do not have their own legal personality.

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It is apparent from the order for reference that although, according to the
actual wording of the question referred for a preliminary ruling, the national
legislation at issue in the main proceedings allows two syndicates of Lloyd‘s to
participate in the sam e tendering procedure relating to insurance, even when
their tenders have each been signed by Lloyd‘s General Representative for Italy,
the main proceedings follow the adoption of several decisions, including the
decisions at issue, whereby Arpacal exclude d those two syndicates from the
procedure on the ground, specifically, that as their tenders had each been signed
by the Special Agent of that Representative, the latter must have been aware of
the content of those tenders.
In this regard, it must be noted that Article 45 of Directive 2004/18,
which specifies the grounds for the exclusion of an economic operator from
participation in a tendering procedure, does not provide for a ground for
exclusion such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which is intended to
prevent any risk of collusion between entities that are members of the same
organi zation. The grounds for exclusion provided for in that provision relate
only to the professional qual ities of the persons concerned.
However, it is clear from the case -law of the Court that Article 45 of
Directive 2004/18 does not preclude the option for Member States to maintain or
establish, in addition to those grounds for exclusion, substantive rules intended,
in particular, to ensure, with regard to pu blic procurement, observance of the
principles of equal treatment of all tenderers and of transparency, which
constitute the basis of the EU directives on public procurement procedures,
provided that the principle of proportionality is observed.
It is clear that national legislation such as that at issue in the main
proceedings, which is intended to prevent any potential collusion between
participants in the same procedure for the award of a public contract, seeks to

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safeguard the equal treatment of can didates and the transparency of the
procedure.
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, which constitutes a
general principle of EU law, such legislation must not go beyond what is
necessary to achieve the intended objective.
It should b e recalled, in this connection, that the EU rules on public
procurement were adopted in pursuance of the establishment of a single market,
the purpose of which is to ensure freedom of movement and elimin ate
restrictions on competition.
In that context, it is the concern of EU law to ensure the widest possible
participation by tenderers in a call for tenders.
It thus follows, according to settled case -law of the Court, that the
automatic exclusion of candidates or tenderers that are in a relationshi p of
control or of association with other competitors goes beyond that which is
necessary to prevent collusive behaviour and, as a result, to ensure the
application of the principle of equal treatment and compliance with the
obligation of transparency .
Such an automatic exclusion constitutes an irre futable presumption of
mutual interference in the respective tenders, for the same contract, of
undertakings linked by a relationship of control or of association. Accordingly,
it precludes the possibility for those candidates or tenderers of showing that their
tenders are independent and is therefore contrary to the EU interest in ensuring
the widest possible participation by tenderers in a call for tenders .
It should be pointed out in this regard that the Court has already held that
groups of undertakings c an have different forms and objectives, which do not
necessarily preclude controlled undertakings from enjoying a certain autonomy

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in the conduct of their commercial policy and their economic activities, inter
alia, in the area of their participation in th e award of public contracts.
Relationships between undertakings in the same group may in fact be governed
by specific provisions such as to guarantee both independence and
confidentiality in the drawing -up of tenders which may be submitted
simultaneously b y the undertakings in question i n the same tendering procedure.
Observance of the principle of proportionality therefore requires that the
contracting authority be required to examine and assess the facts, in order to
determine whether the relationshi p between two entities has actually influenced
the respective content of the tenders submitted in the same tendering procedure,
a finding of such influence, in any form, being sufficient for those undertakings
to be excluded from the proced ure.
As a r esult, in this case, the mere fact that tenders such as those in the
main proceedings have been signed by the same person, namely the Special
Agent of Lloyd‘s General Representative for Italy, cannot justify their automatic
exclusion from the tendering pro cedure at issue.
The distinction made in that regard by Arpacal in its written observations,
dependent on whether the signature relates to the candidates‘ applications to
participate in the tender procedures or to the financial tenders themselves, is
irrelevant. In any event, such a signature, even assuming that it in volves the
Special Agent and/or Lloyd‘s General Representative being aware of the content
of the tenders, does not prove per se that the syndicates consulted one another as
to the content of their respective tenders and that, as a result, the relationships
between them, together with the involvement of the Special Agent for Lloyd‘s
General Representative, actually influenced those tenders. The same applies to
the other factors raised by Arpacal, at paragraph 18 of the present judgment .

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In taking as thei r sole basis for excluding the syndicates the fact that the
tenders were signed by the Special Agent of Lloyd‘s General Representative for
Italy, the decisions at issue thus presumed there to be collusion, without the
syndicates having the possibility of p roving that their respective tenders had
been drawn up wholly independently of one another.
In that regard, it is clear from Directive 2009/138, and in particular from
Article 145(2)(c), that the EU law applicable to insurance activities expressly
allows Lloyd‘s to be represented with regard to third parties by a single General
Representative for each Member State, in such a way that Lloyd‘s may exercise
its insurance activities in Member States only through the competent General
Representative, inclu ding in the case of participation in calls for tenders
concerning the award of public service contracts for insurance, in the context of
which tenders submitted by syndicates must be signed and submitted by the
General Representative.
In its written observations, Lloyd‘s stated in this regard, which is a
matter to be determined by the referring court, that the General Representative
for the Member State concerned confines himself, in accordance with Lloyd‘s
internal procedures, to transmitting on hea ded paper, without participating in the
decision -making process of each syndicate, the content of the model response to
a call for tenders and standard forms completed and approved by each syndicate,
which, it is argued, guarantees that each syndicate oper ates in complete
autonomy in relation to other syndicates through its own management bodies.
In those circumstances, EU law precludes the automatic exclusion of the
syndicates of Lloyd‘s from the call for tenders at issue in the main proceedings
merely because their respective tenders were signed by the Special Agent of
Lloyd‘s General Representative for Italy. However, the referring court must be
satisfied that the tenders in question were submitted independently by each
syndicate.

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Nevertheles s, it must be noted, as the European Commission has
submitted in its written observations, that the national legislation at issue in the
main proceedings does not appear to allow such an automatic exclusion, but
nonetheless allows the contracting authority to exclude tenderers where it finds,
on the basis of unambiguous evidence, that their tenders were not drawn up
independently, which is a matter that falls to be determined by the referring
court.
The principles of transparency, equal treatment and non -discrimination which
derive from Articles 49 and 56 TFEU and are referred to in Article 2 of
Directive 2004/18/EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on
the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public
supply c ontracts and public service contracts must be interpreted as meaning
that they do not preclude legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in
the main proceedings, which does not allow two syndicates of Lloyd‘s of
London to be excluded from partic ipation in the same procedure for the award
of a public service contract for insurance merely because their respective tenders
were each signed by the General Representative of Lloyd‘s of London for that
Member State, but instead allows their exclusion if it appears, on the basis of
unambiguous evidence, that their tenders were not drawn up independently.

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Personal opinion

This case concerns the interpretation of the principles of transparency,
equal treatment and non -discrimination which derive from Articles 49 and 56
TFEU and are referred to in Article 2 of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 .
As stated in Directive 2004/18/EC ―Cont racts should be awarded on the
basis of objective criteria which ensure compliance with the principles of
transparency, non -discrimination and equal treatment and which guarantee that
tenders are assessed in conditions of effective competition. … ‖ and ―Contracting
authorities shall treat economic operators equally and non -discriminatorily and
shall act in a transparent way. ‖
This means that in Lyod‘s case, in the event of any litigation in the host
Member State, the persons in question should not be tre ated less favorably than
if the litigation has been brought agains t business of conventional type.
The principle of transparency concerns two important matters: the access
to documents held by the institutions and a prohibition to change the terms of a
tender after the contract was concluded.

The principle of equal treatment requires that all persons in question
should be treated equally, regarding any matter of discrimination.

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I believe that, in Lyod‘s case, the ruling of the Court was correct in
arguing that the reasons for the exclusion from participation in a procedure for
the award of a public service contract for insurance were violating the principles
of transparency, non -discrimination and equal treatment, merely because the
respective tenders were each signed by the General Representative of Lloyd‘s of
London for that Member State .

The court doesn‘t find any evidence that could justify the exclusion, other
than the reasons mentioned above.

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Case C -652/15
Furkan Tekdemir
v
Kreis Bergstraße6

Issue in fact

Furkan Tekdemir, born in Germany on 16 June 2014, is a Turkish
national.
On 1 November 2013, Furkan Tekdemir‘s mother, also a Turkish
national, entered Germany under the cover of a Schengen visa for tourists. On
12 November 2013, she lodged an application for asylum with the Gieβen
branch of the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for
Migration and Refugees) (Germany). The procedure was still ongoing at the
time the order for reference was made. Furkan Tekdemir‘s mother does not hold
a residence permit but, as an asylum seeker, she does have the right to stay.
Furkan Tekdemir‘s father, also a Turkish national, entered Germany on
13 November 2005. Since 1 February 2009, he was employed in various jobs.
He has been in full -time employment since 1 March 2014.

6 Curia.europa.eu/juris/documents

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On 21 April 2008, Furkan Tekdemir‘s father initially obtained an
autho risation to stay on humanitarian grounds, which was renewed without
interruption until 30 October 2013. Since 31 October 2013, he has held a
residence permit, valid until 6 October 2016 and issued pursuant to
Paragraph 4(5) of the Law on residence.
Furkan Tekdemir‘s parents married on 23 September 2015.
Previously, they exercised joint custody over the applicant in the main
proceedings.
On 10 July 2014, Furkan Tekdemir, whose residence in Germany during
the six months following his birth was found t o be lawful by the referring court,
applied for a residence permit to be issued pursuant to Paragraph 33 of the Law
on residence.
By decision of 27 July 2015, the District of Bergstraße rejected that
application. As grounds for rejecting the application, the District of Bergstraße
stated, inter alia, that the competent authority enjoys a degree of discretion as to
whether a residence permit must be issued and, in the present case, it decided
not to exercise its discretion in Furkan Tekdemir‘s favour. The District of
Bergstraße took the view that it was not intolerable to require Furkan Tekdemir
to pursue the procedure for a visa ex post facto, even if that would inevitably
mean that he and his mother would, at least temporarily, be separated from their
father and wife, respectively. In addition, it decided that it was not unreasonable
to expect Furkan Tekdemir‘s father to continue the family community and
matrimonial life with his son and wife in Turkey since he was not recogni zed as
an asylum seeker or ref ugee and has Turkish nationality, as do his son and wife.
Lastly, the District of Bergstraße drew attention to the fact that Furkan
Tekdemir‘s stay in Germany was tolerated for the duration of the asylum
proceedings initiated by his mother.

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Furkan Tekd emir, represented by his parents, brought an action against
that decision before the referring court.
The referring court considers that the requirement for nationals of third
countries under the age of 16 years old to hold a residence permit constitute s a
new restriction within the meaning of Article 13 of Decision No 1/80.
However, given that such a requirement pursues the objective of
efficient management of migration flows, the referring court asks whether that
objective constitutes an overriding reason in the public interest capable of
justifying such a restriction and, if so, asks what the qualitative requirements are
for the existence of an overriding reason in the public interest in relation to that
objective.
In those circumstances, the Ve rwaltungsgericht Darmstadt
(Administrative Court, Darmstadt, Germany) decided to stay the proceedings
and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary
ruling:

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Legal aspects

By its questions, which it is appropriate to consider together, the referring
court asks, in essence, whether Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 must be
interpreted as meaning that the objective of efficient management of migration
flows constitutes an overriding reason in the public interest capable of justifying
a national measure, introduced after the entry into force of that decision in the
Member State in question, requiring nationals of third countries under the age of
16 years old to hold a residence permit in order to enter and reside in that
Member State and, if so, whether such a measure is proportionate to the
objective pursued.
In order to answer the questions referred by the referring court, it must,
in the first place, be determined whether the national measure at issue in the
main pro ceedings constitutes a new restriction within the meaning of Article 13
of Decision No 1/80, which the referring court considers to be the case.
In that regard, it should be noted that it is settled case -law of the Court
that the ‗standstill‘ clause c ontained in Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 prohibits
generally the introduction of any new national measure having the object or
effect of making the exercise by a Turkish national of the freedom of movement
for workers on national territory subject to con ditions more restrictive than those
which applied at the time when Decision No 1/80 entered into force with regard
to the Member State concerned.
According to the order for reference, under the national legislation
applicable to the facts in the main pro ceedings, nationals of third countries,

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including those under the age of 16 years old, are required to hold a residence
permit in order to enter and reside in Germany. However, as regards child
nationals of a third country born in that Member State and one of whose parents
holds a residence permit in Germany, such as Furkan Tekdemir, the competent
authority may issue them with a residence permit ex officio.
It is also stated in the order for reference that, under the national
legislation applicable at the time Decision No 1/80 entered into force in
Germany, nationals of third countries under the age of 16 years old were
exempted from the requirement to hold a residence permit in order to enter and
reside in that Member State. On the basis of that exemption , those minors
benefited from a right of residence and were thus classed as nationals of third
countries holding a residence permit. The right of residence thereby granted to
those minors could nevertheless be limited in time by the administrative
authorit y ex post facto at its discretion.
After comparing the national legislation in force at the time Decision
No 1/80 entered into force and the national legislation at issue in the main
proceedings, the referring court found, without that finding being disputed by
the German Government, that the conditions for nationals of third countries
under the age of 16 years old to enter and reside in Germany laid down by the
latter legislation are more stringent than those laid down by the former.
Furthermore, the referring court states that, even if the national
legislation does not specifically govern family reunification, it may, however,
affect the family reunification of a Turkish worker, such as Furkan Tekdemir‘s
father, where, as in the present case, the application of that legislation makes
such reunification more difficult. Nor is that finding disputed by the German
Government.
The Court must therefore proceed on the basis that the national
legislation at issue in the main proceedings has tightened the conditions for the

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family reunification of Turkish workers, such as Furkan Tekdemir‘s father,
compared with those in force when Decision No 1/80 entered into force in
Germany.
In that context, the Court points out that, as is apparent from its case –
law, national legislation tightening the conditions for family reunification of
Turkish workers lawfully residing in the Member State in question, in relation to
the conditions applicable at the time of the entry into force in that Member State
of Decision No 1/80, constitutes a new restriction, within the meaning of
Article 13 of that decision, on the exercise by such Turkish workers of the
freedom of movement for workers in that Member State.
The national legislation at issue in the main proceedings therefo re
constitutes a new restriction within the meaning of Article 13 of Decision
No 1/80.
In that regard, the Court has already held that a restriction whose the
object or effect is to make the exercise by a Turkish national of the freedom of
movement of w orkers in national territory subject to conditions more stringent
than those applicable on the date of entry into force of Decision No 1/80 is
prohibited, unless it falls within the restrictions referred to in Article 14 of that
decision or it is justified by an overriding reason in the public interest, is suitable
to achieve the legitimate objective pursued and does not go beyond what is
necessary in order to attain it.
In the present case, the Court notes that the national legislation at issue
in the main proceedings does not fall within the restrictions referred to in
Article 14 of Decision No 1/80 in so far as, as is clear from the order for
reference and the observations of the German Government, that legislation
pursues the objective of efficient m anagement of migration flows.
It must therefore be determined, in the second place, whether the
efficient management of migration flows constitutes an overriding reason in the

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public interest capable of justifying a new restriction within the meaning of
Article 13 of Decision No 1/80, as the German Government maintains.
In that regard, the Court notes the importance that EU law attaches to
the objective of efficient management of migration flows, as appears from
Article 79(1) TFEU, which explicitly ref ers to that objective amongst those
pursued by the common immigration policy of the European Union.
Furthermore, it must be found that that objective is not contrary either to
the objectives set out in Article 2(1) of the Association Agreement or to tho se
expressed in the recitals of Decision No 1/80.
In addition, the Court has held that the objective of preventing unlawful
entry and residence constitutes an overriding reason in the public interest for the
purposes of Article 13 of Decision No 1/80.
In those circumstances, as the Advocate General stated in paragraph 17
of his Opinion, the objective of efficient management of migration flows may
constitute an overriding reason in the public interest capable of justifying a new
restriction within the me aning of Article 13 of Decision No 1/80.
In the third place, it must be ascertained whether the national measure at
issue in the main proceedings is suitable to achieve the objective pursued and
does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.
As regards the suitability of the measure for the purposes of the objective
pursued, the requirement for nationals of third countries under the age of 16
years old to hold a residence permit in order to enter and reside in the Member
State in question do es indeed enable the legality of the residence of those
nationals to be examined. Thus, in so far as the efficient management of
migration flows requires those flows to be monitored, such a measure is suitable
to achieve that objective. It is therefore, in principle, capable of justifying a
further restriction notwithstanding the ‗standstill‘ clause.

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As to whether the national measure at issue in the main proceedings
goes beyond that which is necessary in order to attain the objective pursued, it
must be observed that, in principle, the requirement for nationals of third
countries, including those under the age of 16 years old, hold a residence permit
in order to enter and reside in Germany cannot in itself be regarded as
disproportionate in relation to t he objective pursued.
However, the principle of proportionality also requires that the
procedure for implementing such a requirement does not exceed what is
necessary for achieving the objective pursued.
In that regard, the Court observes that Parag raph 33 of the Law on
residence leaves the competent authority broad discretion to decide, in
circumstances such as those in the case in the main proceedings, whether or not
to issue a residence permit.
In the present case, according to the order for ref erence, the District of
Bergstraße, in exercising its discretion, rejected Furkan Tekdemir‘s application
for a residence permit, taking the view, first, that it was not intolerable to require
him to pursue the procedure for a visa ex post facto, even if th at would
inevitably mean that he and his mother would, at least temporarily, be separated
from their father and wife, respectively, and, second, that it was also not
unreasonable to expect Furkan Tekdemir‘s father to continue his family
community and matri monial life with his son and wife in Turkey.
It is therefore common ground that the application of the national
legislation at issue in the main proceedings to a Turkish worker, such as Furkan
Tekdemir‘s father, has the effect of requiring that worker t o choose between
pursuing paid employment in Germany and having his family life profoundly
disrupted or giving up that employment with no guarantee of finding new
employment upon a return from Turkey.

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39
The German Government explains that its national law does not exclude
the possibility of family reunification as between Furkan Tekdemir and his
father in providing that a procedure for a visa must be initiated ex post facto, in
the course of which the conditions for such family reunification will be able to
be examined. Accordingly, Furkan Tekdemir will have to initiate such a
procedure from Turkey so as to obtain a residence permit in order to enter and
reside in Germany on the ground of family reunification.
However, there is no element in the case file laid before the Court to
support a finding that it is necessary – for the purposes of examining the
lawfulness of the residence of nationals of third countries under the age of 16
years old in the Member State in question and, consequently, of attaining th e
objective of efficient management of migration flows – that child nationals of
third countries born in that Member State and residing there since their birth
must return to the third country of their nationality and initiate a procedure from
that third c ountry in the course of which such conditions will be examined.
In that regard, it has not been claimed, still less established, that only by
Furkan Tekdemir leaving Germany and initiating a procedure for a visa ex post
facto will the competent authorit y be in a position to assess the legality of his
residence on the ground of family reunification.
On the contrary, there is no reason to consider that all of the information
necessary for a decision on the right of residence in Germany of Furkan
Tekdemir is not already available to the competent authority and that it cannot
undertake that assessment, without the disruption referred to in paragraph 46
above, when deciding on whether to issue a residence permit on the basis of
Paragraph 33 of the Law on res idence.
Accordingly, in so far as, in circumstances such as those at issue in the
main proceedings, the application of the national legislation leads to

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40
consequences such as those described in paragraph 46 above, the Court finds
that its application is disproportionate to the objective pursued.
In those circumstances, the Court finds that, for the purposes of
Article 13 of Decision No 1/80, the procedure for implementing the requirement
that nationals of third countries under the age of 16 years old hold a residence
permit in order to enter and reside in the Member State in question, as regards
child nationals of third countries born in the Member State concerned and one of
whose parents is a Turkish worker with a residence permit in that Member State ,
such as the applicant in the main proceedings, goes beyond what is necessary in
order to attain the objective of efficient management of migration flows.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions
from the referring co urt is that Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 must be
interpreted as meaning that the objective of efficient management of migration
flows may constitute an overriding reason in the public interest capable of
justifying a national measure, introduced after th e entry into force of that
decision in the Member State in question, requiring nationals of third countries
under the age of 16 years old to hold a residence permit in order to enter and
reside in that Member State. Such a measure is not, however, proporti onate to
the objective pursued where the procedure for its implementation as regards
child nationals of third countries born in the Member State in question and one
of whose parents is a Turkish worker lawfully residing in that Member State,
such as the ap plicant in the main proceedings, goes beyond what is necessary for
attaining that objective.

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On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:
Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 of the Association Council of
19 September 1980 on the development of t he Association set up by the
Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic
Community and Turkey, signed in Ankara on 12 September 1963 by the
Republic of Turkey, on the one hand, and by the Member States of the EEC and
the Community, on the other, and concluded, approved and confirmed on behalf
of the Community by Council Decision 64/732/EEC of 23 December 1963 must
be interpreted as meaning that the objective of efficient management of
migration flows may constitute an overriding reas on in the public interest
capable of justifying a national measure, introduced after the entry into force of
that decision in the Member State in question, requiring nationals of third
countries under the age of 16 years old to hold a residence permit in o rder to
enter and reside in that Member State.
Such a measure is not, however, proportionate to the objective pursued where
the procedure for its implementation as regards child nationals of third countries
born in the Member State in question and one of w hose parents is a Turkish
worker lawfully residing in that Member State, such as the applicant in the main
proceedings, goes beyond what is necessary for attaining that objective.

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42

Personal opinion

This case concerns the requirement to hold a residence permit in order to
enter or reside in a Member State by nationals of third countries under the age of
16 years old.
The case presents a turkish national, Furkan Tekdemir, born in Germany
on 16 June 2014 , whose father has b een in full -time employment since 1 March
2014.
Furkan Tekdemir‘s mother, however, does not hold a residence permit,
but, as an asylum seeker, she does have the right to stay .
Furkan Tekdemir, whose residence in Germany during the six months
following his birth was found to be lawful by the referring court, applied for a
residence permit .
That application was rejected and the justification provided was that there
was a Member‘s State decision that required third country nationals under the
age of 16 years o ld to hold a residence permit in order to enter or reside in that
Member State.
The court analyzed the objective aimed in that specific decision by the
Member State in question and decided that it didn‘t apply to third country
nationals who have been bor d on that territory.
Personally, I agree with the Court‘s decision, because I believe that the
objective of preventing unlawful entry and residence should respect the principle
of proportionality, which states that the procedure for implementing such a
requirement does not exceed what is necessary for achieving the objective
pursued.

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In this specific case it would prevent a family reunification, being
disproportionate to the objective pursued and also exceeding what it‘s necessary
for achieving the objectiv e in question.

Conclusions
44

Conclusions

In the following, I will present the most important conclusions as well as
the personal considerations on the topic dealt with in the paper.
In the first chapter, called ―The importance of free movement of
workers‖, we follow the development of the rights regarding this matter, their
evolution in time and history and the way their role or their objective has
changed over time.
Furthermore we try to understand from various persp ectives on how
important the free movement of workers is and its impact over the citizens of the
membe r states of the European Union.
All the arguments provided will justify why the free movement of
workers has such a major role in the European Union, as s een from a social,
economical and even political point of view.
In the second chapter, called ―Labor mobility in EU‖, we discuss a few
aspects on why the people , although having the right to work in another member
state of the European Union , are still re ticent about taking such course of action.
Here we examine the various reasons that prevent the nationals of a
member state to find a job in another member state of the European Union,
reasons regarding matters such as: difficulties adapting, different cu ltural
standards, less social protection, fear of discrimination, etc.

Conclusions
45

Finally, in the third and last chapter we analyze some rulings of the
European Court regarding the free movement of workers, presenting a summary
of the issue in fact, examining the legal aspects and stating a personal opinion on
the solution given by the European Court.

46

Bibliography

1. Barnard, Catherine. 2007. The Substantive Law of the EU: The four
freedoms, Oxford University Press
2. Zimmerman, Klaus. 2005 . European Labor Mobility: Challenges and
Potentials . DE Economist.
3. Curia. europa.eu/juris/documents for the Case Studies presented
4. Eur-lex.europa.eu for Treaty articles
5. Wikipedia.com for a brief history on the development of the righ ts
regarding the free movement of workers in the EU