Iulian Chifu Nato 2010 [615451]

IULIAN CHIFU
NATO
NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT,
ROMANIAN APPROACH
Editura Curtea Veche
București
2009

Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naționale a României
CHIFU, IULIAN
NATO – and the New Strategic Concept Romania’s
priorities / Iulian Chifu. – București: Curtea Veche, 2009
ISBN 978-973-1983-31-8
327.51
Tipãrit la „Curtea Veche“ Trading S.R.L.

Foreword
“NATO New Strategic Concept, Romanian Approach” is a book and a
study that offers some guidelines, debates proceeding, positions andarguments for the future Romanian mandate in the debate regarding thefuture Strategic Concept, but also some ideas to the Group of Experts of theSecretary General for drafting the Strategic Concept. It also helps themember states, partners and interested countries to realize the complexity ofpositions and issues, the concerns inside the Romanian society but also inthe partner countries, all influencing the position of Romania.
The policy paper that reunifies the whole texts of the book and the debates
during this project is offering five premisses, nine fundaments, six
ballances, five principal interests of Romania for the Strategic Concept.
These are the main findings of the project and the result of the researchconducted during six month.
The five premisses for the debate are:
1.We all need NATO : so the changes in the Strategic Concept and the
debate itself are designed to enforce, transform and adapt NATO inorder to better fulfill its objectives and tasks. The process or the resultscould harm what we have achieved, the organization or the capacity offulfilling its tasks.
2.Credibility and legitimacy of the Alliance : the two components of the
good governance inside the alliance, with the requested transparencyand the needed qualified access to NATO core documents are supportedby the debate and the process of obtaining a new strategic concept. Weneed a new strategic concept because the world has changed and ischanging nowadays, so the Alliance should adapt to the new realities.And the debate is healthy because we can all see the perception, needs

and position of our respective populations and our allies’ ones on the
main issues, their concerns, the ones of our Allies and give legitimacyto our decision makers and to the Alliance itself.
3.Not questioning existing and adopted decisions : the political and
negotiation process for obtaining the consensus in the NATOdocuments in summits, ministerial meetings and meeting with partnercountries, either in NRC, NUC, NGC, in the EAPC or in 28+1 format,with the Global Partners or in ISAF format are forms of acquis we takeas granted and we do not revise except if strong proofs are showing usthat such documents are in an opposition with the fundamental values,principles, objectives of the Alliance, are harming the transatlantic link,the peace and stability or are contrary to the principles of the UN Chart.
4.Maximum effectiveness, maximum benefits, minimum costs: The
new Strategic Concept is a public diplomacy instrument, a consensualinstrument design to be use in all the member countries: in that respect,the result and form of the New Strategic Concept should give as muchinstruments, reasons and arguments to each member state for obtainingthe domestic support for NATO’s existence, activity and policies, withthe less costs for each member country in the same respect.
5.Indivisibility of security, unity and solidarity in all forms for the
member states is key to the sustainability of the Alliance, to itseffectiveness and credibility, as well as to its main strategic instrument,deterrence, both nuclear and conventional.
The nine fundaments are:
1. NATO fundaments
– Reaffirmed values, objectives and obligations of the Washington
Treaty which unite Europe with the United States
– Adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations.
2. Objectives and strategy
– NATO – essential transatlantic forum for security consultations
among Allies.
– Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and collective defense, based on
the indivisibility of Allied security4 Iulian CHIFU

– Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conven-
tional capabilities
– Reinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear and conventional
disarmament
3. Vision and instruments
– Vision: Europe whole and free – Task: better address today’s threats and to anticipate tomorrow’s
risks
– Instrument: NATO’s enlargement the instrument, with an historic
success
– NATO’s open door policy: all European democracies, sharing the
values of our Alliance, willing and able to assume theresponsibilities and obligations of membership, can contribute tocommon security and stability.
4. Threats and challenges:
– Global threats: terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, proliferation
of their means of delivery and cyber attacks.
– Challenges: energy security, climate change, instability emanating
from fragile and failed states
– Interdependence: Our security is increasingly tied to that of other
regions, due to the objective process of globalization.
5. Directions of NATO’s transformation and adaptation:
– Improve our ability to better meet the security challenges – Three important areas continuously addressed with an integrated
response and equal interest: the Alliance territory, emerge atstrategic distance or closer to home.
– Solidarity: Allies must share risks and responsibilities equitably.– Suitable instruments and resources: capabilities more flexible and
deployable, quick and effective response, wherever needed, morecost-effective.
– Priority: strengthen NATO’s capacity to play an important role in
crisis management and conflict resolution, where our interests areinvolved.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 5

6. Cooperation and integrated response:
– Strengthen cooperation with other international actors: the United
Nations, European Union, Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe and African Union
– A comprehensive approach to meet new challenges– Combining more effectively civilian and military capabilities. – Key priority: helping the Afghan Government to build a
democratic, secure and stable country that will never again harborterrorists who threaten international security.
7. European pillar:
– A stronger and more capable European defense – Support for strengthening EU’s capabilities and capacity to address
common security challenges.
– Non-EU Allies fullest involvement possible is important– NATO-EU relationship a functioning strategic partnership,
mutually reinforcing and complementary.
8. Global Partnerships:
– Developed relationships with all partners with a joint commitment
to cooperative security, both in our neighbourhood and beyond.
– Partners in a community of shared values and responsibilities.
9. Russia
– Openness for a strong, cooperative partnership between NATO and
Russia
– Respect for all the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding
Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration
– Ready to work with Russia to address the common challenges we
face.
The profile assumed by Romania during this debate, described above as a
consensus-generating ally with creative and balanced approaches . The
concept of the Alliance of balances embraced by Romania has six
balances :
1.Trans-Atlantic balance : a balanced distribution of responsibilities,
contribution and resources and a better synchronization of the6 Iulian CHIFU

modernization rhythms of capabilities between North Atlantic and
European allies.
2.Balance between the Allies : reaffirming the consensus rule for the
decisions taken inside the Alliance, avoiding the use of veto butsupporting solidarity, cohesion and effective work between the allies,but also a balanced representation of all the allies in the decision
making, executive and working bodies of the Alliance at all levels.
3.Balanced perception of security risks : between new challenges and
old challenges, territorial defense and expeditionary forces, operationsat the strategic distance and operations against risks and threats in thevicinity, regional and global threats and risks, actual and future risks.
4.Balance between the Alliances responsibilities and objectives ,
territorial defense, expeditionary capabilities, response to new threats.
5.Balance in the allocation of capabilities of the Alliance, for tackling
security challenges with direct impact on NATO’s territory, appeared atthe strategic distance or near the allied territory.
6.Balance between the level of ambition of the Alliance and its real
possibilities of fulfilling them , meaning political will, resources,
sharing burden and roles with other security organizations.
In the Romanian position elaborated and proposed, we have identified five
main interests :
1.Pragmatism and values in NATO
The balanced position of Romania between pragmatism, interest andvalues, which should be pragmatism limited by our values . This
means to take a kind of neo-liberal approach, where the target is itsinterest and the pragmatic fulfilling of NATO role and objectives, butlimited by the set of common values that the member countries andallies are sharing. The fact that the first paragraph of the Declaration onAlliance Security is mentioning the values, objectives and obligations isa good step forward to argument and support this way of addressingthings in the new Strategic Concept.
It is the same with the relation with Russia, we have to realize and
cooperate where we can, with an open door policy, but at the same timeto engage and check at every moment the behavior and actions of
Russia toward NATO, its neighbours and its own citizens. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 7

2.A special accent regarding the threats in the vicinity
The new Strategic Concept is a good opportunity for Romania andother countries for making the right accents to its own interests, comingfrom the Western Balkans, Black Sea and Eastern neighbourhood,meaning addressing threats in the vicinity . We have to mention
terrorism, proliferation of WMD and their means of sending to thetarget (missiles), energy insecurity, protection of the routes for energysupply, piracy, etc are challenges and threats we should respond to. If
we are taking also the weak and failed states and the threats comingfrom this instability at the borders of the Alliance – refugees,
migration, trafficking of weapons, etc – we have a big picture that willsupport our angle of view which is not aimed at over-exposing this typeof threats, but to gave them an equal space and position in order of
being considered by the Alliance. We need to find in the new StrategicConcept the definition, in a balanced way, of two types of missions ,
territorial defense and expeditionary forces, with two different paths,operations at a strategic distance and operations for tackling threats
and challenges in the vicinity .
Romania sees a continuous approach between the three components –
that should be mentioned equally in the new Strategic Concept as it hasbeen done in the Declaration of Alliance Security. The meaning is thatthe national interests (and the Alliance ones consequently) linked withdefense and security are achieved through the defense of the territory ,
and means to tackle threats and challenges at a strategic distance or inthe vicinity, but also the participation in operations at a strategicdistance are helping to keep the threats away from the national
territory and to prepare and train the army in combat conditions that
will help in improving the country’s and Alliance deterrence capacity
through the fact that its army did take part in real operations during thewar.
3.Prioritization of the threats and challenges to be addressed
In the debate regarding regional versus global NATO , with a balanced
approach of Romania, the Allies have to take in consideration Article 5
and the way of acting accordingly, the credibility of the Alliance in thatline, the relationship between national interests and Alliance8 Iulian CHIFU

interests , and prioritization linked to cost or consequences for the
Alliance. These issues should be addressed, as well in the partnership
key and in the relations with Russia .
It is sure that we do not need NATO as a tool box , good and useful for
all threats and challenges where we do not have other instruments,because NATO has a clear task and objectives, being made for specificpurposes. It is also clear that NATO cannot do everything, because ofthe means, resources and capabilities. This is the place where we shouldtalk about prioritization of the tasks and the way of addressing such a
challenge. NATO cannot address everything , but the Alliance should
think and plan for every one of those threats and challenges, in all the
fields of interest together with relevant regional and global institutionsand agencies. With this, a suitable role could be found in everyproblem, and the efficiency of NATO should be discussed through the“right institution, right time, right task” concept of the approach.
4.Post conflict reconstruction and nation building capabilities
Here is an important task that Afghanistan, Iraq, but also Kosovo andBosnia Herzegovina has told us. The lessons learnt should come back
from the history and help us deal with a better result with those issuesin the future. In that respect, we did realize with the PRT-ProvincialReconstruction Teams, that the reconstruction, conciliation, and
settlement stages of a conflict should begin simultaneously. This comes
from the fact that those processes had proved to be mutually self-potentiated ones, so that reconstruction and conciliation are processesthat should begin at the moments that peace keeping or peaceenforcement or combat troops are on the ground, if possible alreadyimbedded with the combat troops. Those processes are helping thesettlement of the conflicts. Moreover, this is also helping another taskthat came with the human rights and responsibility for each human life:R2P, the responsibility to protect civilians and population.
This task open the way for a unique cooperation between military and
civilian capabilities, soldiers with police officers, public administration
experts, civil emergency instruments, democratization and rule of lawcapabilities, trainers in human rights and media, humanitarian aid andNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 9

health assistance alike, state or private own capabilities, governmental
and non-governmental expertise at the same time, in the same place, inan hostile environment . This opens the door for new capabilities
needed in the alliance framework, but also on national interest.
There is the place to think if the failed state/weak state threat or
challenges linked to this type of threat, separatism and other type ofsimilar threat and challenges are not well served by a joint military-
civilian capability of state building , able to install in any type of
environment an administration as such ready to act and able to begin
in real time the state building in the space of its responsibility, with
all the instruments needed for that matter. The very existence ofAfghanistan as an operation could serve for training this capability
which could be used afterwards in all the places where it will berequired. This is a direction where Romania could contribute, developand have an added value and an issue that deserves fighting for in thenew Strategic Concept.
5.Energy security beyond critical infrastructure protection
Talking about energy security , we have to refer on what has been
achieved and the way forward. NATO has embraced the part linkedmore to what we call critical and energy infrastructure protection
but not much more. In Europe, there are two approaches to thedefinition and solution of energy security, meaning free access toalternative sources and to alternative routes for energy supply, for a
part of the EU and NATO countries, and interdependence for another
part of the European and NATO countries. In the first part, we aretalking about the need to have alternative sources and alternative routesin order to avoid energy disruption and political, strategic and security
conditionality, affecting even the normal life and capacity of a countryto defend and protect its security, on the other part the solution is seenas being engaging the producer and the transit countries in order to
interconnect their interest to those of the consumers and to grant that
their interests are observed.
Coming back to NATO, we have several steps already covered. At the
Bucharest summit, an important progress has been achieved by defining10 Iulian CHIFU

the areas where NATO will engage the field of energy security and let
to a special evaluation the task of finding other fields where NATOcould be involved. We are talking already about information andintelligence fusion and sharing, projecting stability, advancinginternational and regional cooperation, supporting consequencemanagement and, for sure, supporting the protection of criticalinfrastructure, on land, under the water, wherever this infrastructure isbuild. Energy security is a major component and we think that theAlliance should definitely consider the possibility of using the military
force for defending its economic interests in the energy supply field ,
in strict conditions but in a symmetric approach.
For Romania, the Wider Black Sea Region is the first importance and
in this respect, this region should be considered with its particularrelevance on energy security in Europe, related to both protecting the
energy infrastructure and providing and securing the resources .
These issues should be addressed, as well in the partnership key and in
the relations with Russia .NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 11

FIRST PART
NATO’s New Strategic Concept.
Romanian Approach

POLICY PAPER
Iulian Chifu*
Chapter I
Methodology, Premises and Background of the Study
The present study is the result of a full and comprehensive program
conducted by the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center Bucharestwith the support of the financial support of NATO PDD, the East-EastProgram of the Soros Foundation, and Black Sea Trust of the GermanMarshall Found. The program took place between July and November 2009and included four workshops and an international conference (see Annexes)as well as the present policy paper.
Program and methodology
In the consultation, exploratory and preparative period, we had the full
support and participation of the Euro-Atlantic Council Romania, theNational Defense College, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministryof Defense. The four debates have been organized in cooperation with thosefour institutions according to very strict programs. At these debates, we hadwelcomed through VCR the presentations of NATO officials like the NATODeputy Secretary General, Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero, AdmiralGianpaolo di Paola, Chairmen of NATO Military Committee and AntonioOrtiz, Policy Adviser, Policy Planning.
* Iulian Chifu teaches Conflict analysis and Decision in Crisis at the National School for
Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest and is director of the Centre for ConflictPrevention and Early Warning, Bucharest. This material is the result of contributions fromcolaborators of the CPCEW, with the special mention of Gilda Truica, of the EuropeanInstitute of Romania.

The final international conference hold on 22-24 of October benefited from
the presence of Dr. Jamie Shea, Director for Policy Planning, NATOInternational Staff and representatives from allied countries, the partner andneighbour countries. The purpose of the conference was to test Romanianpositions and ideas and to get the inputs, concerns and ideas of ourneighbour countries, of the partner countries and NATO’s officials. Theideas came from the academic community, the civic society, the expertcommunity, the officials and the young generation of scholars and students.
Moving to the methodology used for our policy paper, we undertook the
gathering of the premises and principles that should guide the debates andelaboration of the new NATO strategic concept, as well as the basicpremises already agreed during NATO’s Strasburg and Kehl summit thatlaunched the process of reflection of the new Strategic Concept, especiallythe provisions of the Declaration on Alliance Security which was thereference document and starting point in these debates.
The next stage was meant to gather the different issues and a compre-
hensive agenda on the debates linked to NATO and the new StrategicConcept, using the Alliance and Romanian’s documents and researches. Theresult was a list of themes of debate, with alternatives and arguments. Thiswas the most important component of our policy paper, because it is usefulfor every researcher and official to see a comprehensive approach to thesubstance and content of this debate in Romania.
The next step was the assessment of the Romanian security and strategic
interests regarding the NATO strategic concept debate. We are focusing noton all the issues presented, but only on those that are directly interestingRomanian strategic profile, in accordance with what we know andappreciate as being those choices. The arguments of those choices are there,as well as more profound ones in the text that follow the policy paper.
Last but no least, we are addressing in the last part of our policy paper the
commitment oriented approach, which is the one that we are recommending andadvocating for. Consistent with this type of approach, we are trying to underlineRomania’s priorities in this field in order to substantiate and legitimate itspositions through changes, actions and initiatives undertaken domestically, in thesecurity sector and complementary fields, in order to be credible whensupporting one or another option, position in a particular issue.16 Iulian CHIFU

At the end of the day, we have a full assessment on the debates in Romania
regarding the new NATO Strategic Concept, the positions that should beembraced in a neo-liberal key– a theoretical and pragmatic approach,limited by the respect for the common values – with the recommendationsissued for Romania’s position and internal needed changes to prove theadaptation to the future documents and positions that we are supportingduring the debate.
The present policy paper is, by no means, replacing the official Romanian
internal official debate and our task is not to elaborate the Romanianmandate. This task belongs to our officials which will adapt the generalassessment and positions to their profile in the negotiations, the flexibilityof the issues proposed, the negotiability of those positions and the limitsimposed by the diplomatic game and grouping for obtaining severalcommon elements in the future Strategic Concept. But our policy paper canplay a guiding role for this purpose and can help our officials, as well as ourallies and partners, in understanding the content and rational of suchpositions that Romania will embrace during the negotiations.
The content of the study
The present study is a comprehensive one, covering all the moments of the
project. In the forefront we have the policy paper, with the assessment, theanalysis of the positions according to Romanian national security interestand the commitment oriented provisions needed to support, enforce andgave credibility to our positions. They do not have the form ofrecommendations but more the one of guidelines to think about. The lastpart comprises the general NATO official roadmap, positions anddocuments about the technical steps in adopting the new strategic concept.
Than we have two basic studies involving the main issues regarding
NATO’s evolution in the last years and the basic motivations of the point inthe agenda. Here we are focusing on the changes that intervene in theinternational environment in the last period and the way forward, tryingalso to underscore the trends of evolution of the international communityand the way NATO should adapt, as well as a comprehensive paper andapproach to the NATO-EU and NATO-ESDP relations now and in thefuture.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 17

These two comprehensive studies are followed by some of the presentations
and points made during the conference. We have some 19 papers more orless elaborated from our main speakers or discussants from Romania, theallied countries or the partner and neighbour countries, both expert andNGO approach and the official positions expressed during the debate. Wecan also find some basic presentations debated during the workshops.
The next part refers to the positions undertaken during the NGO and young
experts’ debate. Our colleagues covered the main issues debated with therespective positions presented and criticized during those debates. Last butno least, we do have the annexes on the content, agenda and participants ofthe international conference and of the four workshops undertaken duringthis program, coordinated by our Center.
Accepted Premises for the policy paper
As for the premises , we are using some criteria, underlined as follows. The
idea was not to limit the free thinking or to create boundaries to theexpressed positions – we can see this by the content of the presentationsincluded in this study – but more to organize the debate, to obtain somepeaces of effectiveness in this debate and to avoid contradictions betweenthe finding of the study and the purpose of the study, analyzing a position ofRomania in the debate and negotiations for the New NATO StrategicConcept. As a result, we have the following premises and principles to beobserved by the acceptable proposals for NATO adaptation, transformationand changes:
1. We all need NATO : so the changes in the Strategic Concept and the
debate itself are designed to enforce, transform and adapt NATO inorder to better fulfill its objectives and tasks. The process or the resultscould harm what we have achieved, the organization or the capacity offulfilling its tasks.
2.Credibility and legitimacy of the Alliance: the two components of the
good governance inside the alliance, with the requested transparency
and the needed qualified access to NATO core documents are supported18 Iulian CHIFU

by the debate and the process of obtaining a new strategic concept. We
need a new strategic concept because the world has changed and is
changing nowadays, so the Alliance should adapt to the new realities.And the debate is healthy because we can all see the perception, needs
and position of our respective populations and our allies’ ones on themain issues, their concerns, the ones of our Allies and give legitimacyto our decision makers and to the Alliance itself.
3. Not questioning existing and adopted decisions : the political and
negotiation process for obtaining the consensus in the NATOdocuments in summits, ministerial meetings and meeting with partnercountries, either in NRC, NUC, NGC, in the EAPC or in 28+1 format,with the Global Partners or in ISAF format are forms of acquis we takeas granted and we do not revise except if strong proofs are showing usthat such documents are in an opposition with the fundamental values,
principles, objectives of the Alliance , are harming the transatlantic
link, the peace and stability or are contrary to the principles of the
UN Chart .
4.Maximum effectiveness, maximum benefits, minimum costs : The
new Strategic Concept is a public diplomacy instrument , a consensual
instrument design to be use in all the member countries: in that respect,the result and form of the New Strategic Concept should give as muchinstruments, reasons and arguments to each member state for obtainingthe domestic support for NATO’s existence, activity and policies, withthe less costs for each member country in the same respect.
5.Indivisibility of security, unity andsolidarity in all forms for the
member states are key to the sustainability of the Alliance, to itseffectiveness and credibility, as well as to its main strategic instrument,deterrence, both nuclear and conventional.
In this respect, for the purpose of elaborating the new Strategic Concept, the
Declaration on Alliance Security adopted at the Strasburg-Kehl NATO
summit is the most important document, already accepted by the memberstates, a reference document and a starting point for all the debatesNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 19

related to the future NATO Strategic Concept. It this respect, we will
observe the following fundaments :
1. NATO fundaments
– Reaffirmed values, objectives andobligations of the Washington
Treaty which unite Europe with the United States
– Adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations.
2. Objectives and strategy
– NATO – essential transatlantic forum for security consultations
among Allies.
– Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and collective defense , based
on the indivisibility of Allied security
–Deterrence , based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and
conventional capabilities
– Reinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear and
conventional disarmament
3. Vision and instruments
– Vision: Europe whole and free
–Task: better address today’s threats and to anticipate
tomorrow’s risks
–Instrument: NATO’s enlargement the instrument, with an
historic success
– NATO’s open door policy : all European democracies , sharing
the values of our Alliance, willing and able to assume the
responsibilities and obligations of membership, can contribute to
common security and stability .
4. Threats and challenges:
–Global threats : terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, proliferation
of their means of delivery and cyber attacks. 20 Iulian CHIFU

–Challenges : energy security, climate change, instability emanating
from fragile and failed states
–Interdependence : Our security is increasingly tied to that of other
regions, due to the objective process of globalization.
5. Directions of NATO’s transformation and adaptation:
– Improve our ability to better meet the security challenges
– Three important areas continuously addressed with an integrated
response and equal interest: the Alliance territory , emerge at
strategic distance or closer to home .
–Solidarity : Allies must share risks and responsibilities equitably.
–Suitable instruments and resources : capabilities more flexible
and deployable, quick and effective response, wherever needed,more cost-effective.
–Priority : strengthen NATO’s capacity to play an important role in
crisis management and conflict resolution, where our interests
are involved.
6. Cooperation and integrated response:
– Strengthen cooperation with other international actors: the United
Nations, European Union, Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe and African Union
–A comprehensive approach to meet new challenges
– Combining more effectively civilian and military capabilities .
–Key priority : helping the Afghan Government to build a
democratic, secure and stable country that will never again
harbor terrorists which threaten international security.
7. European pillar:
– A stronger and more capable European defense
– Support for strengthening EU’s capabilities and capacity to address
common security challenges.
– Non-EU Allies fullest involvement possible is important– NATO-EU relationship a functioning strategic partnership,
mutually reinforcing and complementary.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 21

8. Global Partnership:
– Developed relationships with all partners with a joint commitment
to cooperative security, both in our neighbourhood and beyond.
– Partners in a community of shared values and responsibilities.
9. Russia
–Openness for a strong, cooperative partnership between NATO
and Russia
–Respect for all the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding
Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration
– Ready to work with Russia to address the common challenges we
face.22 Iulian CHIFU

Chapter II
Themes and agenda for the debate
on the New NATO Strategic Concept
We did try to evaluate the issues discussed in the framework of the debate
for a new NATO Strategic Concept. For that matter we took somealternative sources: the agenda presented by the former Secretary General,Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the seminar on the 7
thof July launching the debate
on the new strategic concept, the themes discussed at the four officialExpert Group seminars, the Romanian themes of debate used during theproject – a result of a negotiation between our proposed agenda, the officialRomanian agenda and NATO PDD input – the Romanian Militarycontribution as well as the ideas that came from the Romanian researchassessment on the future of NATO. The bases of departure should be theDeclaration on Alliance Security adopted in Strasburg-Kehl. The results arethe following:
1. Themes from the strategic concept seminar, 7
thof July Launching
NATO’s New Strategic Concept debate
Conceptual debates:
– Strategic international environment and challenges for NATO – Strengths and weaknesses of NATO: old wounds of the Iraq conflict– Evolution and adaptation of NATO instead of a clear definition of
objectives and future roles(George Bernard Shaw: all the big truthsbegin with a blasphemy). The necessity is no longer at stake.
– NATO a tool box: taxi company responding to needs and calls versus
existing and defining tasks (the issue is not what NATO could do, butwhalt NATO should do)
–Not adapting missions to our needs and capacities, but defining
needs and capacities adapted to the realy important challenges forour security. That is the definition of the main theme of the NewStrategic Concept.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 23

– The New Strategic Concept is decided because a strong NATO is the
one where debates do happen with good solutions that make thecohesion and solidarity, not avoiding those debates. Democracy, publicsupport, accountability and responsability, good governance in thisfield.
Principles and enforcement:
– Collective defense, Article 5, main accent, Partnerships, Equal sharing
of the burdens inside the Alliance and solidarity – basic principlesagreed. The terrorist attack became an issue for activating Article 5, notonly direct attack on the territory.
– Other new conditions should be added in the future as well as other
kind of NATO collective responses for other scenarios of classic
threats – terrorism and proliferation – and threats less easy identifiablelike energy security, cyber defense, threats linked to climate change,weak and failed states, access and division of the internationalresources like the water.
– From security of the states to security of the persons – human
security and responsibility to protect – UN Chart
Means already settled :
– From peace keeping to peace enforcement– Challenges of the counter insurrection– International cooperation– Comprehensive approach
Operations:
– Military operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. – Intervention after the support of the international community– Military capabilities needed in order to avoid to ethnical cleansing
campaigns or blocking terrorist insurrections
– NATO cannot be defined only by its operations. Its activities are not
only resumed to Afghanistan and Afghanistan is not only NATO.Linking NATO to a specific operation makes its credibility in danger asit happens every time as a new operation is launched
– Operations are still important, but normative aspects are following: non
proliferation treaties, arms control regime, confidence building24 Iulian CHIFU

measures, transparency between countries, training international law
enforcement agents for fighting terrorism and proliferation, commonanti piracy legislation are complementary instruments. Balance betweendefense and diplomacy.
Transatlantic consensus
– Real and true consensus establish a real solidarity, burden sharing and
cost sharing, a real base for the Alliance
– The debate should arrive at a conclusion for a sustainable, long term
document, suporting NATO’s decisions.
– A common approach to threat perception between the allies– Global versus regional NATO, regionalisation of the Alliance– Influence of the last attack – terrorism, pirracy proliferaion, cyber
attack, migration
– Relation with Russia between opportunities and security issues– Afghanistan threat versus “making the good think for the wrong
purposes” (TS Eliot).
– Not uniformity or conformity, but a democratic organisation, with vivid
debates, but with reflections of the interests of 28 countries of theAlliance
– The question of choice and prioritization of the threats: Not too many
particular threats at the same time, usefull for all purposes, but notspecialized in any direction. Distinction between real threat andperceived threat. The accent on the threats the mosturgent whichconcern all the countries of the Alliance
– Cases where NATO will play a major role, and cases where it will only
help and support
NATO purpose and objectives:
– The population do not know what for NATO– Knowing the actions, but not the link with the principal and
fundamental objective of the Alliance – common defense and facingtogether common security threats – and their particular interests
– Knowing the role but not understanding the usefulness of the Alliance – Communication, but also a lack of formal mission statement of the
Alliance in the 21-st century proving why we still need NATO, what isits added valueNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 25

– Not just a shopping list of real or potential challenges, nor just an
elegant description of the world but to provide detailed guidance toNATO governments on the political and military policies and get publicsupport
2. Proposals of the Secretary General:
–No distinction between security at home and security abroad
(impact of the globalization)
• Article 5 can apply outside NATO territory as much as inside.• Not just to make our populations secure, but feel secure
–Article 5 collective defense commitments taken seriously – not
just on paper but through planning and exercises as well as havingthe necessary capabilities to call on in crisis situations.
• The threats to our security today lie mainly outside Europe-
reinforcing ISAF
• Reassuring Allies who feel less secure than others in their
immediate neighbourhood: unity, indivisibility, solidarity
–Transformation and new NATO Reform and efficiency : where
and how NATO needs to transform its forces – both for Article 5and non-Article 5 missions.
• Capabilities and equipment that are not directly linked to our
operations
• Defense planning and capabilities better linked to lessons
learned
• A new NATO doctrine on counter-insurgency •Capabilities increasingly expensive and the financial crisis: to
do more, not less, in common funding of operations – transport
aircraft, helicopters or intelligence or reconnaissance assets.
–Type of forces: the balance between land, air and naval forces.
Growth of naval dimension rapidly focus on piracy, the High
North, maritime energy transportation networks, prevention ofclandestine transfers of missile technology and weapons of massdestruction.26 Iulian CHIFU

–Look at our level of ambition of the Alliance. Is it still the right
one?
–Avoiding crisis and interventions where we can. NATO is good
at responding after the fact; but it is not so good at anticipation andprevention.
•Better in consulting about deteriorating situations and potential
flash points
• Improving our overall quality of political consultations and
debate.
• Share much more intelligence in the Alliance • Have more political discussion of – and action on – the many
good analyses that the civil and military experts in NATO HQ
–New Generation of Partnerships . Continued growth of NATO’s
partnerships – Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue,or the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
• Getting the best value out of our partnerships
• Cooperating on other challenges: energy security, proliferation,
cyber, terrorism
–NATO-Russia relationship – a mature relationship
•Restart the NATO-Russia cooperation in the Mediterranean
and Afghanistan
•Re-launch : character of our relations, define NATO’s essential
interests and objectives and unify our thinking
•To articulate common differences but also common interests
• To encourage and organize real cooperation .
• Relation broad and multi-facetted .
• One of the most delicate but important debating topics
–NATO-EU relations
• Our missions, our memberships, our geographical areas of
interest, our capabilities are increasingly overlapping
• Our definition of the security challenges and the means to
tackle them is also increasingly a shared NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 27

• NATO-EU relationship has become more pragmatic, a true
strategic partnership
• A much better job of combining the complementary assets of
NATO and the EU.
• They should work together where necessary, not just where they
can.
3. The themes of the four official Expert Group Seminars
One seminar will look at NATO’s core tasks and functions :
– The meaning of collective defense and deterrence in today’s
environment;
– How to confront a broader spectrum of threats to our populations;– NATO’s role in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.
Another seminar will look at NATO as a part of a network of security
actors in:
– Contributing to global civil and military crisis management – NATO’s likely tasks with a view to enhancing cooperation with
international organizations and NGOs.
A third seminar will look at NATO and the Euro-Atlantic security
environment :
– NATO’s role in building security in the Euro-Atlantic area, – Enlargement – NATO’s partnerships – Relations with Russia.
A fourth seminar will look at forces and capabilities :
– Defense planning and transformation. – Procurement at a time of increased financial constraints – that requires
flexibility and prioritization.
4. Themes and issues address in the Romanian debate
Panel 1: Adapting NATO’s strategic concept in order to address the
21
st century challenges. NATO multi-tasking?
Focus points:
– Sharing security burdens inside NATO while preserving trans-Atlantic
partnership and solidarity;28 Iulian CHIFU

– The meaning of Article 5: balance between conventional and
asymmetric threats
– Balancing the colective defense, operations in vicinity and the need for
actions at a strategic distance, executing collective defense whilepursuing “out of area” operations
– Terrorism and WMD proliferation: the role of missile defense,
disarmament and non-proliferation;
– Increasing NATO’s role in dealing with cross-border threats and
challenges
Panel 2: Managing challenges and opportunities in NATO’s wider
neighbourhood. Partnership network as investment in trans-atlantic and international security. The relevance of NATO’scritical neighbourhoods: the Balkans and the wider Black Searegion.
Focus points:
– The need to build circles of stability in the Balkans – Black Sea-
Caucasus – Central Asia; the Mediterranean region – Middle East –Afghanistan
– What is the role for neighbourhood/regional instability in the future
Strategic Concept?
– The right mix of NATO policies and instruments: partnerships,
enlargement; reforms; cooperation and dialogue;
– The role of partnerships in a broad sense (including partners across the
globe);
– Working with Russia in the 21
stcentury;
– Working with other organizations (UN, EU, UA, others);– Working with emerging powers (China, India);– NATO building security capacities (the role of NATO’s partnerships
with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq)
Panel 3: Balancing NATO’s focus between collective/territorial defense
and the need to be effective at strategic distance
Focus points:
– Article 5 for the 21
stcentury;NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 29

– Contingency planning for the new members;
– The value of the NRF;– Striking the right balance between Article 5/Non Article 5 operations;
Capabilities and resource requirements
– Conceptualizing Afghanistan in the new strategic concept (NATO’s role
in stabilization and reconstruction missions).
Panel 4: New threats: Energy Security, Cyber Defense, And Critical
Infrastructure Protection
Focus points:
1. Energy security: the right mix of policies, instruments and partners; 2. Critical infrastructure protection and NATO role3. Cyber-Defense;4. NATO’s role in maritime security and protection of sea lines of
communications
5. Romanian Military Debate
A. Military policy bodies
– Common understanding and implications of the existance and the
application of Article 5.
– Article 5 linked with the threats to be faced: terrorism, proliferation of
the WMD, granting energy security, climate changes, protection of thecyber space, critical infrastructure protection
– Significance of common defense, links of this main mission and the
security of the Alliance – expeditionary forces, crisis response missions
– Maintaining the credibility of Article 5 and explaining the strict
conditions of using it.
Prioritization of the tasks– The prioritization of tasks is needed because of the limitation of
resources, comparing to the “standard” rules of resources for amaximum level of operational needs for facing all the possiblesituations that are
–A hierarchy of priorities and tasks of the Alliance should be put in
place – assuming the risk of the bad choices versus the credibility of
the Alliance and assuming commitments that could be fulfilled30 Iulian CHIFU

–Assesment of the performances of the member states and balancing
theequal sharing of responsibilities between nations.
Relations with Russia
– Major concern and dilema within the HQ, international staff and inside
the nations
– Unique partnership with Russia – the NRC – and allies that are seing
Article 5 as being associated with Russia. The Russian Georgian warworsened the divergences.
– Choice: common values or common interests? Should it be a red line
and where?
– Should we plan for a possible aggression from Russia? – How much Russia should be involved in NATO’s decisions
Main issues to be solved by the NSC:
– Fundamental tasks of the Alliance in the security field– NATO’s commitments in the globalization era– Transatlantic cohesion– NATO-EU relation– NATO’s partnerships– Transformation: structures, forces and capabilities .
– As a result, military body should make the operational planning,
resource planning and elaborate suitable strategies
B. Romanian HQ approach
– NATO world policeman or observer , monitoring the environment,
early warning and prevention, less action
–Unlimited responsibilities in a limited space versus limited respon-
sibilities in an unlimited space
– Balance between strategic planning for territorial defense and expe-
ditionary forces
Needed changes
– Effeciency: Avoiding bureaucracy through a nuanced consensus for
taking decisions
–Solidarity in the commitments and participation in operationsNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 31

–Colective response against terrorism, cyber defense, energy security,
climate change and critical infrastructure protection in transborder areas
Colective defense effectivness-prioritization:
– Collective defense must remain the core mission of NATO (according
to Romanian Defense Strategy)
–Conflict prevention and solidarity as key factors
–Military operations depending on capabilities , forces at the disposal
of the Alliance and oportunity -security situation of the allies requires
that
– Enlargement of the colective defense aplication to cyber attacks and
disruption of the energy flow – colective answers, not always
military actions
– Granting all alies that they will bot be obliged to face those challenges
by themselves
– New understanding of Article 5: when it is active, conditions and time
frame – because of the new aspects and globalization of threats and
challenges without borders
– Need to address collective security when defending common values
and interests
– The principle of equal sharing of the burdens
– Collective defense should provide the response capacity against
present dangers and threats to the security
– Balanced approach to collective defense for expeditionary forces and
national interests
– Suitable forces and capabilities for the full range of military
operations home and abroad, from peace keeping to combat actions
–Collective defense is the main task, crisis response and operations out
of area are designed according to the existing forces and capabilities
and the colective security needs
The New Strategic Concept must:
– Clearly establish the aim, the objectives and functions of the Alliance– Define challenges and threats to the Alliance’s security
– Indicate the instruments and capabilities needed – Define the steps for applying the Article 532 Iulian CHIFU

– Establish engagement rules, principles of Collective defense and
cooperation insight NATO
–Cooperation with EU in the fied of security planning for avoiding
duplication in the process of building capabilities.
Non Article 5 operations
– Coordinating actions with the international comunity in a non-Article 5
crisis regarding :
• Coordinated planning and assesment and intelligence sharing
• Synchronizing military activities with multiple actors and
collaboration
•Common strategic objectives andcoherent strategy
• The credibility of international force against the rebels
• Getting the support and confidence of population .
• The power of the media andstrategic communication
Territorial defense and the operations “out of area”
– Expeditionary operations with maintainance of needed forces for
territorial defense
– Respect to national security interests of the small countries
– Right balance with national interests first , than Alliance interests
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
– Ballistic missile are an important threat to the territory and population
of NATO states
– Common anti-ballistic missile program was conceived exactly for the
territorial and collective defense
– Principles of indivisibility of the security and collective solidarity for
vulnerable countries in this field
–Engaging Russia in this field, for the needed cooperation for the
security of the Black Sea
Maritime security
– A key element of the Global security and stability
• Strategic importance of the maritime communication lines – 90%
of the international trade NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 33

• Disruption of energy flows , terrorism, WMD proliferation ,
migration
–Complementary role to international civil agencies and maritime
authorities, law enforcement agencies
– Defining maritime missions which require collective response
–Strategic interests of the Alliance from the maritime security
perspectives
•Territorial integrity of the maritime space of member countries
• Protection of the population, installations, goods and critical
infrastructure protection in the maritime area
• Preventing the proliferation of WMD• Protecting critical and energy infrastructure
•Freedom of navigation and access to surface and water resources
– Tackling current and future threats
• Stability in the Arctic region
•Migration due to an increase level of the sea
•Natural disasters
•Lack of resourses
•Raising of the competition for resources
– Cooperation and information sharing with international organizations
– ONU, EU, IMO
Military elements which should be included
– Viable form of a rapid reaction force , integrated with EU needs,
avoiding duplications
–New threats – new priorities- new tasks flexible and adapted to
priorities , established with regard to:
•Most likely threats for the Alliance at least for the next decade
•Prioritization on already identified threats as: terrorism,
proliferation, failed states, cyber attacks, energetic security, piracyand climate change
• Conditions for enabeling the application of Article 5
–Vision for the future NATO:
• common defense of the allies , indivisibility of their security
•exporting security worldwide
•building global security34 Iulian CHIFU

– Avoiding blockages for NATO activities:
• Lack of common perception of threats and risks
• Incapacity of allocating enough resources for operations (EU lack
of public support for NATO operations, lack of political will)
• Possible US selective disengagement from EU security issues
Main developping lines and fieds:
Operational field:
–Reanalyzing Article 5 for a common understanding of the conditions
and time frame for enacting it
– Clarifying the balance between collective defense and collective
security
–A n unique perception of common risks in operations
–Participation to operations at a strategic distance with units and/or
financial compensations
– Balancing Article 5 andnon Article 5 operations
Capacities and transformation
–Granting capabilities needed in order to react to the predictable risks
and threats
– Needed capabilities for reaction in crisis situation
–Integrated operations with other organisations/international actors
– Deterrance and strategic instruments for a convincing political tool
–Strategic communication in crisis
– Cost oriented comand and control operationalization –Coordinated Response force with EU demands, in a NATO pre-
paredness and traning style
Partnerships
– Cooperation with the international actors – UN, EU, OSCE
– Re-establishing cooperative relations with Russia
–Partnerships – PfP, ID, MD, ICI
–Global partners: Increasing interaction with non-member states and
others international actors
– Developing the relation with EU/ESDP for a better cooperation in
complementary conditions – based on the fact that the forces are thesame, the troops are the same, deficits are the same, so the priorities
should be harmonizedNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 35

The Alliance is perceived as an organisation with impressive resources . In
the context of an increasing complexity of the Global security environment,the problem of capabilities will become one of the main factors to have a
great influence on Alliance’s credibility .
It is obvious that the rhythm and adapting capacity of the Alliance to the
international environment (political, military, security, economic ) must bemaintained and also sustained. The Alliance would have to define the new
priorities in a changing security environment.
At the same time with the process of developing the new strategic concept,
the member states will have to judge the role of the Alliance as a whole,
not only in a symbolic, but also in a functional way.
There are two conceptions regarding the future role of NATO. One
consideres that the Alliance should remain regional , in essence dealing
with collective defense missions (Article 5) while the other points out thestrenghten of the Global role of NATO , underlining the fact that ignoring
the Global dimension would be the end of the Alliance. There are alsocommon points and balanced approach between those two positions:
collective defense missions are the main subject on the agenda of suportersof NATO globalisation while global problems appear on the supporters ofthe regional dimension side.
6. Issues already settled in the Declaration on Alliance Security
As we have mentioned in the principles used in order to make the analysis,
since we have the Declaration of Alliance Security Issued by the Heads ofState and Government participating in the meeting of the North AtlanticCouncil in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009, the provisions mentioned area component of the acquis of the Alliance, so there is no sense to get backon the same issues again. The declaration helps us to establish the commonposition on 10 of the main issues adopted at the last summit:
– Fundaments of NATO
• The values, objectives and obligations of the Washington Treaty • Transatlantic link Europe with the United States and Canada• The purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 36 Iulian CHIFU

– General objectives, strategy and means
• Transatlantic forum for security consultations among Allies
• Article 5 and collective defense
• The indivisibility of Allied security
•Strategy : deterrence, based on nuclear and conventional capabilities
•Means: reinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear and
conventional disarmament
– Development of the organization: vision and enlargement policy
• Vision: a Europe whole and free •Policy: NATO’s enlargement – an historic success, NATO’s open
door policy
•Condition for accession :
• European democracies • Share the values of our Alliance • Willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of
membership
• Whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.
– Developments of the objectives, cooperation, integration
• New, increase global threats:
• Terrorism• Proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery • Cyber attacks• Other challenges :
– Energy security- Climate change – Weak and failed states
•Interdependence : security is increasingly tied to that of other
regions.
– Mission statement
a. Improve our ability to meet the security challenges we face that
impact directly
• On Alliance territory – territorial defense
• Emerge at strategic distance – expeditionary forcesNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 37

• Or closer to home – operations in the vicinity
b.Solidarity, indivisibility of security, common defense : sharing
risks and responsibilities equitably
c. Capabilities more flexible and deployable , so we can respond
quickly and effectively , wherever needed
d. A leaner and more cost-effective organization
e.New capacity: important role in crisis management and conflict
resolution
– Global cooperation
Partners: international actors – UN, EU, OSCE, African Union Purpose : to deliver a comprehensive approach, combining civilian
and military capabilities more effectively. Mission in Afghanistan : helping the Afghan Government and its
people to build a democratic, secure and stable country that will neveragain harbour terrorists who threaten Afghan and international security.
– NATO-EU(ESDP)
• A stronger and more capable European defense • Welcomes EU efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to
address common security challenges
• NATO-EU relationship – truly functioning strategic partnership
mutually reinforcing and complementary.
– Partnerships
• Joint commitment to cooperative security with all our partners,
both in our neighbourhood and beyond
• Partners are key in implementing the vision of a community of
shared values and responsibilities .
• Value the support of our partners to operations and missions.
– NATO-Russia relation
•A strong, cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia
•Respect for all the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding
Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration
•Ready to work with Russia to address the common challenges38 Iulian CHIFU

– NATO transformation: guiding lines
• To better address today’s threats • To anticipate tomorrow’s risks
7. Rationalizing the issues – alternative options
The most important ones:
– NATO as the main organization for defense and security or seen as
one of the options for security or, as well, as a historical tool thatlink countries and less a defense and security tool.
– In this respect, the second alternatives are between defense alliance
or alliance for security also. Article 5 should remain at the level ofcommon defense or should it be extended to common security.
– Pragmatism and values in NATO/values and interests
• Territorial defense-expeditionary forces• Threats at a strategic distance-in the vicinity• New and old threats and challenges• Deterrence-operations• Prevention, early warning-combat operations- post-conflict
operations, crisis management, post-conflict reconstruction
– Solidarity and unity, cohesion versus “big guys” or “Concert of
Powers” approach:
• Decisions taken altogether or taken by the “big powers” • Consensual approach or imposing the decisions taken in small
circles of the “big guys” than imposed to the small countries, newallies, countries with less contribution to NATO’s operations
– Prioritization of the threats and challenges to be addressed
• Regional versus global• Globalization versus regionalization of the Alliance• Tool box or partnership with purpose/tool box or box with all tools• Prioritizing the tasks: cost oriented-consequence oriented
– Post conflict reconstruction and nation building capabilities
• Military-civilian capabilities of NATO or only military approach• Post-conflict reconstruction and state building: common capa-
bilities versus sharing tasks with other organizationsNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 39

– Energy security beyond critical infrastructure protection
• Definition of Energy security: alternative sources and routes versus
interdependence between producers, transport countries andconsumers
• Where to use military power: only critical infrastructure pro-tection,
reaction to the use of military power against economic/energy interests or use of power for granting access to resources.
– US and NATO:
• US lead NATO versus EU balancing the decision• US engaged in Europe versus US out of Europe• How US sees NATO: most important alliance or one of its
international tools/unilateralism first or multilateralism first
– Relevance of Article 5
• Cornerstone or historic and symbolic role• Theoretical and symbolic but unaplicable or aplicable• Undefined conditions for accessing it or clear definition and
conditions
• Easy to access if needed or complicated conditions to enable it• Automatic consequence or unbinding for the Allies• Quick reaction or medium term as technical time to apply it
– Legitimate use of force:
• Self defense versus crisis management• UN Security Council Authorisation or non-limited acces to the tool• Preemption versus prevention in the use of force• The war and military force or the use of law enforcement agencies
and organized crime against terrorism
– Balances in the Alliance
• US first or a balanced distribution of responsibilities, contribution
and resources and a better synchronization of the modernizationrhythms of capabilities between North Atlantic and European allies.
• US military contribution and EU paying for operations and its own
share
• Balanced representation or main countries first approach in the
decision making, executive and working bodies of the Alliance at alllevels40 Iulian CHIFU

• Perception of threats and risks: between new challenges and old
challenges, territorial defense and expeditionary forces, operations atthe strategic distance and operations against risks and threats in thevicinity, regional and global threats and risks, actual and future risks.
• Responsibilities and objectives and not enough capabilities and
resources, matching the level of ambition and possibilities
– Solidarity, unity and cohesion in the Alliance
• Common perception of threats and challenges or differences of
views
• Alliance interests or national interests first• Regionalization, groupings, New and Old Europe plus the US,
Europe and North America, or one Alliance
• Common capabilities and forces or national interoperable forces
committed in a case by case way
• Military forces open to all operations and mission or national
caveats, common command and control or national commandprevailing
– Enlargement
• Open door or stoping the enlargement Eastern• Decision of the Alliance or “not to bother Russia” approach• Privileging common decisions or using veto unilateral blockages
(Macedonia)
• Getting willing countries on board sooner or observing the rules and
strict provisions of the Alliance
• Waiting for the process to be completed by the countries or
supporting the transformation and guiding the aspirant country
– Relations with Russia
• Cooperative/confrontational approach• “Russia first”, Russia has a word or ignoring Russia in NATO
decisions
• Partner, enemy or complex relation with all aspects• Threat or not a threat for NATO countries• Ignoring Russia behavior inside and in the post soviet space,
pragmatism and NATO’s interests or using NATO values andprinciples when assessing Russia’s laws, norms strategies
• Engaging Russia, involving Russia or relying on RussiaNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 41

Chapter III
Romanian Security Interests
and the new NATO Strategic Concept
1. Romanian Security Interests and NATO
Romania is designing its security establishment on a four track approach:
– strategic partnership with the US– membership in NATO– membership in the EU– a designed network of strategic partnerships – Poland, Turkey,
Sweden, partnerships for Europe – France, Poland, economic
partnerships – Azerbaijan, Germany, Austria, South Korea.
The commandments of its approach are:
– More action with more efficient use of resources– Integrated approach: foreign policy, security and defense
We believe in an integrated approach to foreign policy, security and
defense. The integrated approach is a European model, which we find in theTreaty of Lisbon and that economic and financial crisis that we are crossingis an effective solution in spending resources. In the context of anincreasingly complicated international environment, we want more actionwith the most efficient use of resources.
By security we understand the three levels approach – the national, societal
and human level, that of the individual. The individual shall prevail andcollective levels to address matters to the extent that serve the needs ofRomanians – citizens, taxpayers and holders of sovereignty. Security isviewed in a complex form, with the military, political, economic, social andenvironmental components, as well as new modern dimensions of energysecurity, cyber security, granting critical infrastructure protection, access towater or food.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 43

Citizens security and safety, the purpose of Romania’s security policy
The tax paying, national soveregnty bearing citizen is Romania’s security
policy’s main purspose. Budgetary allotments in this field will have to abidethe priority lit established in this principle. Individual safety at home, on thestreet, at the work place an whereever the citizen lives or travels is thefundamental concern of foreign security and defense policy. There is a roleof the state’s institutions to defend property, individual liberty therespecting his rights.
We consider as serious crimes, that threaten the fundamental safety of the
citizen, drug traficking, arms traficking, people traficking, organised crimeand armed weapons assault, all of these being among the states’ priorities.The safety of children in schools, around school and on their way home isthe priority of the neighbourhood police. Subordonate to local publicadministrations, the police has to take on attribution concerning publicorder and citizen safety, while the National Police will handle serious crime,organised crime, arms, drugs, people traficking, money laundering.
The central and local administration have to pay special attention through
the Inspectorate for emergncy situations, in the forefront of assistanceservices for citzens in case of civil and medical emergencies. At the sametime, we consider it neccessary to develop and professionalize central andlocal administrative institutions in managing crisis and we support thecreation of a national system for preparing and assisting in crisis decisionmaking.
Concerning the citizens security, we support the essential component of
protecting the citizens’ economic right, including the right to work based onindividual capacity and equal access to oportunities and correct and equalretribution for his contribution to adding value to the society, in a regulatedand non-discriminatory labour market. We need the contribution of everycitizens, their qualified, hired work, best suited to their profile, qualities andaspirations.
We consider poverty, regional and status gaps as well as social alienation
insecurity factors and of great concern to our society. Equally limited44 Iulian CHIFU

equalitarian retribution can alienated top experts from the public sphere to
where ever they choose, whether in private companies or abroad due, to thelow level of attractivenss for state paid jobs.
Romania’s security option
Romania has chosen, nearly two decades ago, the Western Europe and
modern apporach for its security. From this point of view, our choice isbased on two pillars, a one Euro-Atlantic and a European one, with valueequal for Romanian security.
NATO is a wide spread political-military alliance, the most relevant at
global level, offering major opportunities for consulting with allies onsecurity, a common defense in the face of any external attack and a uniquecapacity to deter any such military operations against Romania . We believethat Article 5 should remain the cornerstone of the Alliance, with extendingthe definition of collective defense to energy, free access to resources cyberdefense and defense of critical energy infrastructure.
Fulfilling responsibilities undertaken by Romania in the NATO Defense
planning project is our political commitment to raising the Alliance’sstrategic relevance, fundamental for a ferm and stable relation, that shouldbe complementary to the EU’s security instruments.
We need to value the place, capabilities and our country’s strategic weight
in the Alliance, the contributions of foreign operations under NATO,through proportional representation in Alliance structures. We consider ituseful to identify some niche capabilities, at military, operational,diplomatic and intelligence level, as added value from Romania useful tothe Alliance and recognized as such.
Participation by rotation of military forces in external operations at strategic
distance or nearby, is a mandatory National Defense Component fortraining in real combat conditions. The Romanian Army must equallyparticipate in this form of training, to determine growth in combatpreparedness of the entire quota under arms, equipped with modernweapons suited to missions that require them.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 45

Romania’s position at the Alliance borders is a reality that requires an added
value in itself. We support the effective use of resources to equip the NATOprocurement through joint projects and sharing in the Alliance, somecategories of capabilities.
The Strategic Partnership with the U.S. is an essential component of
Romania’s position within trans-Atlantic structures. The StrategicPartnership is an essential tool for developing capabilities and using USexperience. The Strategic partnership requires a review and extension in theareas of cooperation for reducing threats and increasing quality oftechnology transfer – required in the position of a border country and to
introduce a dimension of education and transfer of know-how –
organization, methods of administration and curriculum design in educationand training in areas of the importance for Romania and NATO, by buildingthese capabilities in Romania at the highest global standards.
2. Romania’s expectations from NATO
In this respect, Romania expects that NATO exists with an improved
visibility and role in the region and the world and involving suitable
resources to ensure the credibility of its assumed role, objectives and tasks
and for acting whenever it is necessary, with an accent for the effectiveness
and efficiency of the means allocated, a shared responsibility between
member states proving solidarity, unity, coherence and indivisibility of
the Alliance. Moreover, Romania attaches a huge importance for theintegrated response using the suitable means of diplomacy, intelligence
and security, including military means. Conflict prevention and early
warning are as important as the response to threats and challenges, as it is
the case of crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction .
The development of the Strategic Concept should not be a process of re-
invention, but one of refinement and adaptation to the new security
challenges . It will not affect the basic principles and functions of the
Alliance – collective defense, transatlantic link, the indivisibility of
security, Allied solidarity – as settled by the Washington Treaty. 46 Iulian CHIFU

Romanian basic philosophy for NATO in the future is a strong and
sustainable transatlantic Alliance with both political powers andmilitary “muscles”, able to properly deal with the challenges of the 21stCentury .
Expanding and strengthening NATO’s partnership network , including the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership is part of this vision. NATO’s ability to projectcoherent demarches and a proper image in the extended neighbourhood of
the Alliance helps in finding solutions – for example in the Western
Balkans – to the “unfinished business” that still carries potential forgenerating instability.
Major stakes pursued by Romania with respect to the strategic thinking on
NATO’s wider neighbourhood refer inter alia to the preservation of values,
principles and commitments as basis for NATO’s cooperation with
partners. They also refer to the continuation of the “open door” policy
with emphasis on compliance with membership criteria. Also tostrengthening NATO’s partnerships and cooperation with the EU, UN, andthe OSCE and to specific contributions to the building of defense andsecurity institutions of states and/or organizations.
As a general assessment, we could say that Romania shaped the profile of a
consensus-generating ally with balanced approaches , interested in
drawing the attention of the Alliance on developments in its immediate
vicinity , particularly in the Western Balkans and the wider Black Sea
region. Romania believes that NATO should continue to improve anddemonstrate more clearly its ability to meet emerging challenges on andbeyond Alliance territory, including at the borders of the Organization .
NATO enlargement to countries of Central and Eastern Europe was a
remarkable success for the transatlantic Alliance. It proved to be a verypowerful tool to stabilize regions, encourage reforms and consolidate
Europe . Due to this process, NATO continues to play a special role in
unifying a continent divided for nearly half a century. And that is whyNATO should continue to promote tailored partnerships to foster greater
stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 47

Romania believes that the problem of “global NATO versus regional
NATO“ is only a false dilemma. In terms of geography, the main security
challenges for NATO originate from its wide neighbourhood , from the
former Soviet space to the Western Balkans, the Mediterranean and thebroader Middle East. And that makes peace and stability in the wider BlackSea region and the Western Balkans essentials to the entire Euro-Atlanticsecurity.
The Black Sea region is part of the European project of consolidating
stability throughout Europe through democracy, cooperation andintegration. It is an indispensable component of the Euro-Atlanticcommunity of security, democracy and prosperity. It is also important interms of diversification of energy sources and transport routes .
Furthermore, it has also an important stake for the new approach on missile
defense . Substantiating Alliance’s added value in managing new challenges
(energy security, maritime security, arms control, terrorism, proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, missile defense) means also a more secureand stable Black Sea area, and an increased security in the Euro-Atlanticenvironment.
Romania has no interest in remaining the Eastern border of the West.
Instead, we are determined to act as a catalyst of regional cooperation andEuro-Atlantic engagement in this region. Romania’s goal is to have asecure, democratic and prosperous Wider Black Sea Area at its borders. Webelieve that such a perspective is of regional and European interest and thatit is something worth striving for.
The process of upgrading NATO’s Strategic Concept provides an
opportunity for underscoring the profile of NATO’s partnerships and forhighlighting the need for NATO to contribute more to strengthening
security in its neighbourhood – the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the
wider Black Sea-Caspian region, Central Asia, Mediterranean and others.
This is the reason why Romania will adopt – during the upcoming debates –
an active and balanced stance , a creative and consensus-building
posture , which will reflect Romania’s specific interests, including those
related to the security of its immediate neighbourhood . We intend to play48 Iulian CHIFU

a constructive role in the conceptual debates on the future role of the
Alliance due to a special expertise resulting from our location at theAlliance borders with the Western Balkans and the Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian regions.
Romania strongly supports a consistent policy of strengthening and
developing NATO partnerships , with a special emphasis on the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership, while encouraging NATO’s proficient involvement
in the Western Balkans and the wider Black Sea-Caspian region. Beyondthe attention given to NATO-Russia relations, we are also interested insubstantiating the distinctive partnerships with Georgia and Ukraine ,
as well as the relationships with interested countries of the former Sovietspace and the Western Balkans. Consideration should be given as well toNATO’s relationship with the Republic of Moldova .
Romania is convinced that the Alliance will continue to pay right and
proper attention to its wide neighbourhood and Romania will make
every effort to support this strategic process.
3. Opinions and expectation of new EU and NATO members for NATO
and the ESDP
– Obvious warranties of solidarity in terms of security and
defense , both at NATO and EU level, within normal limits, fields
and with a credible presentation.
–US presence in the European security scaffolding and coun-
celling the transatlatic relation. For some countries that haveemerged from the space of limited sovereignty of socialism andthe Soviet state, the U.S. image, credibility and proven capabilitiesare very needed and expected, both for their leaders and theirpopulation, even if there is enough realism and responsibility tounderstand the limited capabilities and interests of the United
States , but also the costs , that each member must assume for the
benefit of Washington’s constant presence in the defense andsecurity of Europe NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 49

–The lack of contradictions between the US and major European
partners, but also EU coherence in actions concerning security
and defense
–Avoiding duplicating resources for NATO and EU from
members of both organisations
– The coherence and efficiency of NATO and EU actions for
European protection and security
– A reduction in the bureaucracy excess at EU institutional level
– An expertise, planning and capabilities transfer from NATO to
the EU onthe dimensions that the Union lacks
– A coherent agreement of sharing responsibilities between
organisations
– Unifying training, arming and calibres, procedures and typologies
for reacting between the capabilities at the disposal of bothorganisations
– Solving the blocking relations between the EU and NATO, from
the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle
– Eliminating singular veto situation on major Alliance decisions
like Greece’s position on Macedonia.
The NATO and EU new member states will look for a suitable answer to the
following questions and concerns:What are the military capabilities that should be shared and how?What should the strategic directions of development of weapons be?
– The security relevance of NATO and the EU
– The relevance, solid and credible armed forces, at least within
NATO
– Identifying the capability and added value niche for the EU
concerning European security
– Appropriate formulas for making common decisions– Colaboration, dialogue and common or complementary
capabilities in energy security, with special attention for criticalenergy infrastructure. 50 Iulian CHIFU

What are the implications of NATO enlargement on the EU? Does
NATO enlargement neccessarily mean EU enlargement (cases ofUkraine and Georgia)?
What should the relation with the Russian Federation be like?
For that last point, we have some tailored answers, according to the
expectances of those states. The relation with the Russian Federation is akey point in European and transatlantic cohesion . There have been
numerous studies where European states were categorized according to thedifferent types of relations they had with Russia. From the “old” and “new”Europe, a more crude way of categorizing, similar to the transatlantic onethat ”Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus”, we moved onto categories like “goodwill” and “retractile” with nuances like“pragmatically goodwill” and “pragmatically retractile” in relations withRussia.
EU member states have different approaces of the relations with the
Russian Federation. There are practically two ways of approaching it, fromthe different angles of security solutions, including energy security:
–Russia’s approach, interdependency as a solution
–Punishing Russia, isolating it and blocking all relations except
economic ones.
The purely cooperative or purely confrountational approach is too simplist,
too schematic and does not give enough insturments to approach Russia.This is why some experts propse a more refined approach:
–Cooperation, in most of the fields that define the relation with the
Russian Federation, not only in economics and trade, but also in issuesof security, such as terrorism, non-proliferation etc.
–Competition, in some matters concerning economics, political
solutions, strategic issues, especially concerning states in the East, indemocratisation and respecting human rights , in matters relating to
values of the Alliance.
–Confrontation in several directions
The Russian Federation’s refined approach can lead to developing a set of
instruments for each topic, in any area, whether cooperation, competitionNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 51

or confrontational. With the sum of these instruments at its disposal, both
the EU and every member state, or NATO itself, approaching the RussianFederation could be more effective.
4. Romanian Options for the main alternative issues debated
Let us now look at Romania’s Options for the main alternative issues
debated in the framework of the new Strategic Concept. These are linked tothe profile assumed by Romania during this debate, described above as a
consensus-generating ally with creative and balanced approaches. The
concept of the Romanian approach to the new Strategic Concept is the so-
called Alliance of balances .
The Alliance of balances is the result of a realist approach , as well as an
adapted approach , fitting the existing context, NATO’s role and its
objectives. In the debate about regional or global NATO , the choice is not
an Alliance with global responsibilities, but a trans-Atlantic Alliance able torespond to threats and to generate security at both the euro-Atlantic andglobal levels. Consequently, the Alliance of balances has six main
balances :
–Trans-Atlantic balance : a balanced distribution of responsibilities,
contribution and resources and a better synchronization of themodernization rhythms of capabilities between North Atlantic andEuropean allies.
–Balance between the Allies : reaffirming the consensus rule for the
decisions taken inside the Alliance, avoiding the use of veto butsupporting solidarity, cohesion and effective work between the allies,but also a balanced representation of all the allies in the decision
making, executive and working bodies of the Alliance at all levels.
–Balanced perception of security risks : between new challenges and
old challenges, territorial defense and expeditionary forces, operationsat the strategic distance and operations against risks and threats in thevicinity, regional and global threats and risks, actual and future risks.
–Balance between the Alliances responsibilities and objectives ,
territorial defense, expeditionary capabilities, response to new threats.52 Iulian CHIFU

–Balance in the allocation of capabilities of the Alliance, for tackling
security challenges with direct impact on NATO’s territory, appeared atthe strategic distance or near the allied territory.
–Balance between the level of ambition of the Alliance and its real
possibilities of fulfilling them , meaning political will, resources,
sharing burden and roles with other security organizations.
Romania is also prepared to put some accents in its position during thenegotiations in several fields:
–Indivisibility of the allies’ security, solidarity and cohesion of the
Alliance.
– References on NATO’s role as transatlantic consultation forum .
– Extended NATO influence in the vicinity of the Alliance , through
positive evolutions in the security field, an open door policy in the
enlargement field – with prudent approach to their democratic track
record and public support for a sustainable evolution towards and
inside NATO and an accent for the political conditions in a future
enlargement wave, and the NATO support for countries preparing to
join the Alliance
–Instability in the extended vicinity of the Alliance – Balkans, Black
Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, Mediterranean area, GreatNorth
– Extending and consolidating the partnership network of the Alliance,
including EAPC framework, NATO as a trainer for the defense and
security of other states or for other organizations, introducing thesystem of values, principles and commitments as a bases for the
partnerships.
– Consolidating Alliance’s role for the security of the EU and of the
World, based on the comprehensive approach principle, through a
consolidated EU-NATO relation, protecting NATO’s role in the future
discussion and negotiations about Europe’s security, strategic relationswith the UN and other regional organizations.
– Building a relation with Russia based on a balance between
principles and pragmatism , a partnership base on an “engage and
check” mechanism, able to lead to concrete and real cooperation, butalso to control its offensive policy, on a bases of values, principles andcommitments for that cooperation.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 53

– Substantiating the Alliance’s added value for managing the new
challenges – energy and cyber security, maritime security, arm control,
terrorism, proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery
– Realizing a missile defense shield that would cover the entire territory
of the Alliance
– Amplifying intelligence sharing at the level of the Alliance
– Cooperation in civil emergencies management
– Suitable management of the resources , through functional and
effective mechanisms such as common finance of the operations, whereit is possible, granting capabilities and troops for the operations,multinational and common capability pools.
– Reconsider and privileging Article 3 provisions of the Washington
Treaty, regarding the support for certain states including economical
support for ensuring that they develop needed capabilities for resisting
to an armed attack
– NAC should be involved in the process of debating and adopting the
Strategic Concept at all levels, including the final option of fine-tuningat the end.
Some issues must be developed and we are assuming, for ourselves, five
points in this debate:
– In NATO, Article 5 is approached from two perspectives:
•Minimalist : it was not applied until the 11
thof September 2001, at
the request of the US, therefore it is not used. Moreover, since theBaltic States do not have self-defense capabilities, it would also beadvisable to avoid its application or to use it in very strictconditions. Further more, the technical application of Article 5requires a minimum of three weeks for active common defense andtroops on the ground. This approach sends the core of NATO’scollective defense in a state of ridiculousness.
•Extended : even the NATO Secretary General proposed that the
reinterpretation of Article 5 in the context of new threats likecyber-defense and energy security in NATO understanding – the
protection of critical energy infrastructure on land or under water.The reaction for this support is that the idea of defense is becomingdiluted, goes too much into matters of security and that NATO isnot an international organization for collective security, but forcollective defense, and by dilution “more” could in fact be “less” . 54 Iulian CHIFU

Usually when we talk about reforming a system and an organization and
speeches cover such a wide range, the rule is to go back to one’s origins ,
so this would be reinforcing Article 5 , with its original meaning of
collective territorial defense of its members. This does not mean cancellingout of area operations, but on the contrary, it means that these elements areuseful for maintaining war away from the Alliance states’ territories andpreparing troops in real fighting and combat conditions.
– NATO must assume, more and more, a component that affects both
Romania, Poland, but also Nordic states, which is trans-border risks andthreats. As a state at the border of the Alliance , we have an extra task
of defending Alliance frontiers , this meaning defense against threats
such as:
• Ballistic missiles, •Weapons of mass destruction proliferation , which would be
brought and used in Alliance space through carriers missiles orthrough trafficking and smuggling systems of materials withdouble usage.
•Fighting terrorism , tied to people trafficking – including ter-
rorists, weapons necessary for terrorist operations, drug traffickingnecessary for financing said operations.
From this point of view, we see as useful the specific consideration of three
types of tasks for the Alliance: strategic distance operations, territorial
defense operations and operations in the vicinity, meant to fight this type ofthreats as well as military threats in the immediate vicinity of Allianceborders. The focus on operations in Alliance vicinity is necessary tounderline the preoccupation, interest and the need to counter trans-borderthreats, in the space borderline of the Alliance
–Solidarity within the Alliance , in keeping sovereignty in national
defense planning. From this point of view it is useful that the NewStrategic Concept of the Alliance contains a clear phrasing of these
elements of solidarity in external and territorial defense operations.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 55

Solidarity is quantifiable through all three dimensions and is considered to
be proportional with the states’ economic and military capacity . The
contribution is calculated in absolute value, so states have the right tochoose the actions and operations that they participate to. On the otherhand, we are against conditioning the type and geographical space ofmissions where some member states can participate (Caveats). We saw inthe case of Germany in Afghanistan that the Taliban and Al Qaeda terroristattacks spare no one, and insurgents will always look for the mostvulnerable spots where there is no disposition for a proportional response,to take action. In the face of terrorism, no one is speared or bypassed .
–Enlargement . Romania should advocate for NATO explicitly
maintaining the topic of Open doors policy for states that want o join
the Alliance, first of all for Ukraine and Georgia, with which theAlliance has intricate formulas for reform. Of course, the actualacceptance has to take place once the solicitant reached Alliance statesand has warranties for full integration in the Alliance, with theconditions stipulated in the Washington Treaty, namely insuring selfdefense and the ability to contribute to the defense and security of theAlliance. Also admitting a new member does not in any case dependonly on respecting accession conditions and the exclusive decision of
current members of the Alliance. No third party can influence the
relation between NATO and a potential future member, but only theexpressed will, achievements and reform of its security system at
Alliance standards can.
–The relation with Russia. The Russian Federation is an important
actor at euro-Atlantic level and NATO’s cooperation with Moscowmust take place based on the principles of the Rome Treaty and in theframework established when founding the NATO Russia Council .
NATO is not a threat to Russia, and Moscow collaboration in issues likeAfghanistan, fighting terrorism, nuclear proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction and anti missile defense is useful for the Alliance andhelp in consolidating mutual security .56 Iulian CHIFU

In this institutional framework we can discuss Russian proposals and
preoccupations concerning the Alliance. On the other hand, Russia is not amember of the Alliance so it cannot have a veto in Alliance’s policies ,
including the enlargement policy. Moreover, Romania should plead for theobservance of the values which are the cornerstone of the Alliance,including the rules of the UN Charter and of the fonding documents of theOSCE, organization in which both NATO allies and Russia are members.
We propose that the New Strategic Concept shall explicitly mention the
principle of equal state sovereignty , independence, territorial integrity,
peaceful resolution of the conflicts and the right to fight back in case of anattack. No form of limited sovereignty , special rights and spheres of
influence at the European level is acceptable.
5. Romanian’s position – fundamental interests
For defining Romania’s position and fundamental interests, we propose a
five point approach with suitable argumentation and solid base for the
future negotiations.
– Pragmatism and values in NATO
– A special accent for the threats in the vicinity– Prioritization of the threats and challenges to be addressed – Post conflict reconstruction and nation building capabilities– Energy security beyond critical infrastructure protection
This five steps approach can be the core of the concept embraced by
Romania for addressing the negotiations on the new Strategic Concept. Infront of these five points we privileging the five premises presented in the
methodological part, aimed at insuring that NATO position, objectives andcohesion are not harmed by the negotiations during the process ofelaborating the Strategic Concept. We also accept the profile designed forRomania’s position during the negotiations, of a consensus-generating ally
with balanced approaches, with the 6 types of balances already presented
above.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 57

A. Pragmatism and values in NATO
In this respect, there is a full dispute about the “Alliance of values” versus
“pragmatic alliance for fulfilling the objectives”. The economical and
financial crisis that hit most of the allies had reshape priorities in those
countries and defense was the first one to be cut at the chapter expenses. Ithappens with Romania, too, and this had an important impact especially inthe countries that already had problems of credibility, political will andpublic support for allocating fonds for defense and security maters.
But if we agree in taking the pragmatic stance , it would mean to use all the
means in order to fulfill the objectives of the Alliance with the smallest
costs , meaning the most efficiently possible. Our public will applaud such a
choice, but how much will this option help us?
For instance, in Afghanistan, maybe the cooperation on the ground with
Russia will help us. It will be less costly in money, political and symbolic
costs (going together at war will block a lot of criticism), but at what costs?How much do we have to pay for that matter, in symbolic, political,strategic and financial costs? Yes, we are talking about a route of access,about sharing intelligence, but there are limits , also pragmatic.
In the same issue, maybe we could use the help of Iran. It is a neighbour, it
has its own interests in the region, Tehran knows well the territory andmaybe better the enemy than ourselves. But could we take this approachjust for saving money and our soldier’s life? At what costs? Tolerating aradical Islamic country with nuclear weapons , a country that wants to
erase from the face of the Earth Israel, who supports a lot of terrorist groupsin the Middle East, who can control the oil in the region, is it a small priceto pay for the sake of efficiency, cost savings and pragmatism ?
The same goes about talking about our interests and the debate about
values . Those who talk about pragmatism talk about interests first ,
meaning that we can forget about the poor democracy and the level ofhuman rights and rule of law in Russia, just for the sake of saving ourinterest in energy supply. We have to forget about the Russian aggression inGeorgia, or call it otherwise, pretending that “Georgia has its share of the58 Iulian CHIFU

blame” in this war just for the sake of good partnership with Moscow?
There are countries in NATO who believe that Russia could be a threat for
their own sovereignty, national integrity and their independence, especiallyafter the Russia-Georgian war, and the unity and solidarity of the Allianceshould respond to those concerns, too.
This lead us to the explanation of the balanced position of Romania, who
should be pragmatism limited by our values. I am talking about a kind of
neo-liberal approach, were the target is its interest and the pragmatic
fulfilling of NATO role and objectives, but limited by the set of common
values that the member countries and allies are sharing. The fact that the
first paragraph of the Declaration on Alliance Security is mentioning thevalues, objectives and obligations is a good step forward to argument and
support this way of addressing things in the new Strategic Concept.
It is the same with the relation with Russia, we have to realize and
cooperate where we can , with an open door policy, but at the same time
Russia is maintaining plans, interests and actions that are harming the
Alliance and the member countries – Foreign policy strategy, military
doctrine, the federal law on Defense, the doctrine of using nuclear weapons,military relations with Iran, etc.
Defining NATO as an enemy , planning to interven in member or partner
countries in order to defend Russian’s interests wherever they are,
protecting pragmatic military trade interest are not the grounds for acompletely cooperative approach, but those of a more nuanced, multilevel,multi-track approach, with huge cooperative openness , but also place of
real competition and issues where our position are in direct conflict .
B. A special accent regarding the threats in the vicinity
Here too, we are referring to the points and arguments already mentioned in
the Declaration on Alliance security, using the fourth paragraph – threatsold and new, need to prevent and have a system of early warning – and thefifth paragraph, which states that NATO should improve its ability ofmeeting security challenges to its territory , coming from strategicNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 59

distance or closer to home. In this respect, the new Strategic Concept is a
good opportunity for Romania and other countries for making the rightaccents to its own interests, coming from the Western Balkans, Black Seaand Eastern neighbourhood, meaning addressing threats in the vicinity .
As we have seen, since the former Strategic Concept, in 1999, the
geography has lost most of its importance since globalization has brought apossibility for the enemy to project its force and use its capabilities at astrategic distance . We can accept this, as we have to accept that the threats
to our territory – described in Article 5 of territorial defense – are still a
concern. Last but not least, the threats and challenges coming from ourvicinity , “closer to home” as the Declaration states, should be an equal
concern.
In this respect, we have to mention terrorism, proliferation of WMD and
their means of sending to the target (missiles), energy insecurity, protectionof the routes for energy supply, piracy, etc are challenges and threats we
should respond to. If we are taking also the weak and failed states and thethreats coming from this instability at the borders of the Alliance –
refugees, migration, trafficking of weapons, etc – we have a big picture thatwill support our angle of view who is not aimed at over-exposing this typeof threats, but to gave them an equal space and position in order to being
considered by the Alliance.
So we need to find in the new Strategic Concept the definition, in a
balanced way, of two types of missions , territorial defense and expe-
ditionary forces, with two different paths, operations at a strategic distance
and operations for tackling threats and challenges in the vicinity . In this
respect, Romania sees a continuous approach between the three com-
ponents – that should be mentioned equally in the new Strategic Concept asit has been done in the Declaration of Alliance Security.
The meaning is that the national interests (and the Alliance onesconsequently) linked with defense and security are achieved through thedefense of the territory , and means to tackle threats and challenges at a
strategic distance or in the vicinity, but also the participation in operations60 Iulian CHIFU

at a strategic distance are helping to keep the threats away from the
national territory and to prepare and train the army in combat
conditions that will help in improving the country’s and Alliance
deterrence capacity through the fact that its army did took part in real
operations during the war.
For sure, another issue already discussed is present here. The indivisibility
of the security of the Alliance, the solidarity and unity in front of the
common threats and challenges has to put enough resources in order totackle those threats and challenges in the vicinity and protecting theAlliance borders. We need to have common pool of resources and
capabilities helping the countries situated at the NATO border to deal with
those challenges (as it is the case with strategic transport commoncapabilities situated in Budapest, an experience that could be used).
We are talking here about countries at the NATO borders like the Eastern
flank, but also the northern flank – Canada, the US, Norway – or theSouthern flank – Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Greece – who should takethe burden of blocking threats to the Alliance linked with the vicinity.Talking about the solidarity, unity and indivisibility of the Alliance defenseand security, we have to realize that NATO already has such a mission ,
Active Endeavour , which is dealing with the Southern flank. Why not
assuming the same type of need for all the borders of the Alliance, in thespecific conditions that they have.
We are talking also about modernizing the concepts of “new missions, new
capabilities, new threats/challenges ”. These should also be addressed by
the new look and the fact that territorial defense should be put back in
place, with a possible enlargement and modernization of its means – talkingcyber defense and energy security – and those threats in the vicinity and
such operations should arrive in their equal foot as those linked tooperations at a strategic distance.
Here we have the full debate on Article 5 , and we have above some way of
addressing it, extending its meaning and establishing clear rules of actingaccordingly, on the energy security treated beyond the critical
infrastructure protection and the role of NATO – our fifth point here–NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 61

missile defense (subject already addressed) or participation to the Alliance
missions, with shared responsibilities and burden between the allies. Here
is the place also to discuss, in the same scheme, the maritime defense and
piracy.
C. Prioritization of the threats and challenges to be addressed
Here is another important point of debate, with very clear interest for
Romania. We are talking here about the debate regarding regional versus
global NATO , with an equal balanced approach of Romania, again about
how much the Allies take in consideration Article 5 and the way of acting
accordingly, the credibility of the Alliance in that line, the relationshipbetween national interests and Alliance interests , and prioritization
linked to cost or consequences for the Alliance. These issues should be
addressed, as well in the partnership key and in the relations with Russia .
Yes, there are a lot of threats and challenges, old and new. The National
Security Advisor of President Obama, the general James Jones, stated andpresented the need for the Alliance to adapt on the run to new threats and
challenges. This should be a capability that we have to create for thealliance, a system of quick adaptation to such perspectives. In the field of
challenges the Alliance should, at least, think about the role it shouldassume are, according to the American official: nuclear proliferation andmoreover, nuclear terrorism, drug-terrorism symbiosis, crisis and economicfailure, energy supplies used as a weapon for political, strategic of securitypurposes, used in negotiations for control and persuading the “partners”,climate changes and energy related policies, energy and regional/localconflicts and unrests –Black Sea Region especially, maritime piracy,unconventional races for conventional arm race, destabilizing countries andregions with implications in transport routes and tourism.
It is sure that we do not need NATO as a tool box , good and useful for all
threats and challenges were we do not have other instruments, becauseNATO has a clear task and objectives, being made for specific purposes. Itis also clear that NATO cannot do everything, because of the means,resources and capabilities. This is the place where we should talk aboutprioritization of the tasks and the way of addressing such a challenge.62 Iulian CHIFU

NATO cannot address everything , but the Alliance should think and plan
for every one of those threats and challenges, in all the fields of interesttogether with relevant regional and global institutions and agencies. Withthis, a suitable role could be found in every problem, and the efficiency ofNATO should be discussed through the “right institution, right time, right
task” concept of the approach.
Talking about efficiency , there are two schools of thinking how to address
the threats and challenges when you are always going to have less meansthat necessary for everything. It is sure that you would need to cut some ofthem, usually the ones with less probability to happen. Here is the usual
cost-oriented approach , when the only limit is the amount of resources
needed and the efficiency of the allocation for each of those threats andchallenges.
But this is a simplistic view, and, in real life, every puts the decision maker
in a bad position of explaining why, for a specific case, the costs have
driven him to ignore a threat which was present and lead to a lot of
victims and symbolic costs. These are the lessons learnt from 9/11. That iswhy the other school tried to address the things in a consequence oriented
way. This approach made the decision makers allocate the money for thethreats and challenges the most visible, with the hugest impact to thepopulation.
Here too, some side effects are very visible: to rely on the most visible
threats and the ones perceived the most by our public means, sometimes, to
rely on the most visible ones and touching through the media. This leads topopulism and governing with the eyes on the media and on the polls,another bad choice. That is why, here again, Romania should plead for a
balanced approach : efficiency limited by the impact and consequences .
This is a fine line that the Alliance should find its way. But this does notmean that efficiency is a replacement for correct and responsible
allocation of means, resources and capabilities by each country, and here
too, the debate on solidarity, indivisibility and unity comes back, with therequest of a proportional contribution to alliances’ needs.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 63

As we have said before, there is a place of talking about regional or global
NATO, with the result of a regional alliance with global reach versus globalalliance with regional agenda. The balanced approach should gave equalattention to both agenda, without regionalizing NATO and its agenda or
moving too far from the original objectives of common defending the allies.The national interests should and will prevail in the decisions of the
alliance but the existence and the effectiveness of the Alliance is also anational interest for all the member countries, and the cohesion is a must
for the credibility of the Alliance that we all are cherishing.
And we have again the Article 5, which is the link and cornerstone of the
Alliance, so the rules of applying Article 5 should be very clear, explainedin the spirit of the Washington Treaty, and applicable to all the NATO
member countries . According to the original 5 point premises of our study,
quoted in the methodological part above, we have to take as granted theAlliance in the form that we have now, and to prepare for defending it nomatter which country is at stake. If this is not the case, we cannot fulfill theobjective or we have hesitations when such a moment comes, the
credibility and the very existence of the Alliance is at stake.
D. Post conflict reconstruction and nation building capabilities
Here is an important task that Afghanistan, Iraq, but also Kosovo and
Bosnia Herzegovina has told us. The lessons learnt should come back from
the history and help us deal with a better result with those issues in thefuture. Only lately, the Afghanistan strategy, as the Iraqi one before it, hasmade a theory and relied on theoretical grounds . In this respect, we have
seen, in Afghanistan, for instance, that the old Johan Galtung model ofsolving conflicts (used first in the conditions of the cold war) is no longer ofsome help, or if you want, his curve has been slightly modified by thereality of the speed of the society and the complexity of the today conflicts.
In that respect, we did realize with the PRT-Provincial ReconstructionTeams, that the reconstruction, conciliation, and settlement stages of a
conflict should begin simultaneously. This comes from the fact that thoseprocesses had proved to be mutually self-potentiated ones, so thatreconstruction and conciliation are processes that should begin at the64 Iulian CHIFU

moments that peace keeping or peace enforcement or combat troops are on
the ground, if possible already imbedded with the combat troops. Thoseprocesses are helping the settlement of the conflicts. Moreover, this is alsohelping another task that came with the human rights and responsibility foreach human life: R2P, the responsibility to protect civilians and
population.
This task open the way for a unique cooperation between military and
civilian capabilities, soldiers with police officers, public administration
experts, civil emergency instruments, democratization and rule of lawcapabilities, trainers in human rights and media, humanitarian aid andhealth assistance alike, state or private own capabilities, governmental andnon-governmental expertise at the same time, in the same place, in anhostile environment . This opens the door for new capabilities needed in
the alliance framework, but also on national interest.
There is the place to think if the failed state/weak state threat or challenges
linked to this type of threat, separatism and other type of similar threat andchallenges are not well served by a joint military-civilian capability of
state building , able to install in any type of environment an
administration as such ready to act and able to begin in real time the
state building in the space of its responsibility, with all the instruments
needed for that matter. The very existence of Afghanistan as an operationcould serve for training this capability who could be used afterwards in all
the places where it will be required. This is a direction were Romania couldcontribute, develop and have an added value and an issue that deservesfighting for in the new Strategic Concept.
E. Energy security beyond critical infrastructure protection
Here is another vital point for Romania, even though there are several
critics that claim – in NATO and the EU – that our country has nolegitimacy and credibility of addressing those issues since it is one of the
less dependent on imports of energy supplies. The reply to such claims isthat the energy is not an unfinished resource and that in a mater of 15-20,
30 years at most, if there is no change in the sources of energy and thehumanity will still depend on oil and gas Romania will be in the samesituation as other states are already. The second response is that theNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 65

weaknesses of our allies are NATO’s weaknesses as a whole and are our
own weaknesses . That is why the subject should be in the forefront of our
legitimate interests.
Talking about energy security , we have to refer on what has been achieved
and the way forward. NATO has embraced the part linked more to what wecall critical and energy infrastructure protection but not much more. A
completely different approach is the one of the US which gave to its armythe task of maintaining the free access to energy resources , so that the
energy flows without blockages, and at a suitable price .
In Europe, there are two approaches to the definition and solution of energy
security, meaning free access to alternative sources and to alternative
routes for energy supply, for a part of the EU and NATO countries, and
interdependence for another part of the European and NATO countries. In
the first part, we are talking about the need to have alternative sources andalternative routes in order to avoid energy disruption and political,
strategic and security conditionality, affecting even the normal life andcapacity of a country to defend and protect its security, on the other part thesolution is seen as being engaging the producer and the transit countries
in order to interconnect their interest to those of the consumers and to
grant that their interests are observed.
Coming back to NATO, we have several steps already covered. At the
Bucharest summit, an important progress has been achieved by defining theareas where NATO will engage the field of energy security and let to a
special evaluation the task of finding other fields where NATO could beinvolved. We are talking already about information and intelligence fusionand sharing, projecting stability, advancing international and regionalcooperation, supporting consequence management and, for sure, supportingthe protection of critical infrastructure, on land, under the water, whereverthis infrastructure is build.
Those tasks are already linked with the threats in the vicinity presented
above, maritime security and Article 5 , as we have seen above. And
nuanced positions could help developing the fields and areas where NATO66 Iulian CHIFU

can have an added value in energy security. Several non-papers in that area
have been circulated for the purpose of a common understanding andpolitical agreeable solution for all NATO countries. At the Bucharestsummit, Poland and Romania presented the non-paper “Energy security:
possible Deliverables for the Bucharest Summit ” and the US presented
their own paper in this respect. And Romania is still supporting a more
ambitious approach to energy security .
Important progress has been made also with the endorsement of The Report
on relevant issues and activities regarding energy security and a new
evaluation is suppose to be done with respect to NATO’s role in the field ofenergy security with a view to the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon. Thisevaluation should be oriented towards the future, trying to predict future
threats and challenges in the field where NATO could come with an added
value, with options and recommendations for further refining andimproving NATO’s role in the field.
If we have to refer to the “The Russian National Security Strategy until
2020” approved in May 2009, we have to consider the fact that this official
document presenting the guiding lines of the Russian Federation futureplanning, strategies and capabilities are referring to the possibility of using
the military force for defending economic interests . In that respect,
energy security is a major component and we think that the Alliance shoulddefinitely consider the possibility of using the military force for
defending its economic interests in the energy supply field , in strict
conditions but in a symmetric approach.
For Romania, the Wider Black Sea Region is of first importance and in
this respect, this region should be consider with its particular relevance onenergy security in Europe, related to both protecting the energy
infrastructure and providing and securing the resources . These issues
should be addressed, as well in the partnership key and in the relations
with Russia .NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 67

Chapter IV
Looking inside the box:
a commitment oriented approach
In this part of the policy paper we are going to look inside of the situation
of Romania, its way of fulfilling the existing commitments taken when
entering NATO and who it should react in order to get the legitimacy for
asking for the allies support for the approaches and issues it want tointroduce inside the new Strategic Concept. We are talking about a
commitment oriented approach , identifying the changes and impro-
vements Romania should take inside the country, by itself, in order tosupport its credibility and legitimacy in demanding those ideas inside the
new Strategic Concept. We are referring strictly to the five main interests
for the strategic concept.
1. Pragmatism limited by our values
This means, for Romania, to approach the sensitive issues for the Alliance
in coordination, with direct compatibility and cohesive way with its allies,sharing information afterwards, without provoking sensibilities andreactions of the allies, in a consensus building behavior.
This goes without saying that in the relation with Russia, we have to realize
and cooperate where we can , with an open door policy, but at the same
being cautious in the bilateral relations for not creating problems to ourallies and to the alliance and to avoid teasing Russia or harming NATO andRussia’s relations. At the same time, we have to react at any law, norm,statement and gesture of Russia that is against the common principles ofcooperation stated in the NATO-Russia founding act, or values againstNATO’s core ones.
Russia should be listened to, but should not have a vote or a veto in the
Alliance decision making structures. The Russia first approach is ascomplicated as ignoring Russia, but it is easier to watch inside thearguments to see if it is a real and legitimate concern or a marginalperception, blockage oriented for the alliance. The Alliance should not useNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 69

its capacities and creative strength in order to find always ways to respect
Russia’s interests when this comes into conflict with our interest andspecially with NATO’s core values.
2. A special accent for the threats in the vicinity
For being credible for this part, Romania should first respect its own
commitments in the capacity building part and acquisition of the neededtechnique in order to protect itself for the main threats, than for defendingNATO’s borders.
Second, Romania should have a proportionate and even above the medium
participation to operations out of area, at a strategic distance, for enforcingits contribution and position inside NATO and having the legitimacy toclaim for solidarity in tackling threats in the vicinity. For that matter, itsparticipation to the other mission in the vicinity, like the Operation ActiveEndeavour, should be a priority.
Romania should have its own program and actions oriented towards energy
security, as defined by the National Security Strategy, and to preparecapabilities to defend NATO’s border from the air, the sea and the ground.Common pool of capabilities should be embraced in the fields were thecosts of such an approach is prohibitive.
Cyber defense should be a basic concern and capabilities should be put in
place for a comprehensive approach engaging civilian agencies from theMinistry of Communication and information technology, the SpecialTelecommunications Service and the intelligence and military bodiestackling with respective parts of the cyber defense. Exchange of goodpractices, international cooperation and experience should be welcomed andintegrated by Romanian specialized agencies.
Maritime defense and maritime security is of first importance for Romania.
Someone could talk about the unbalanced capabilities that the countrieslittoral at the Black Sea have, with Russia and Turkey dominating thepicture and Ukraine coming in third. Accepting that a real battle in the sea is70 Iulian CHIFU

hardly going to happen, Romania should have capabilities to defend its
territorial waters and to cooperate in this field with other countries of theAlliance. A survey of the capabilities put in place in the Black Sea by otheractors should be also of first importance, with a consecutive reaction inbalancing the defense capabilities in this field. Once those capabilities willbe in place, they could be used in anti-piracy NATO operations.
Anti-ballistic missile defense is another concern since Romania is under the
range of an attack from missiles coming from Iran. The indivisibility ofdefense should enable NATO to have an integrated system defending all itsterritory and Romania is interesting in getting the capabilities important forprotecting its territory and citizens from this type of threat.
3. Prioritization of the threats and challenges to be addressed
Here is another important point of debate, with very clear interest for
Romania. We are talking about the regional versus global approach, with anequal balanced approach of Romania, about how much the Allies take inconsideration Article 5 and the way of acting accordingly, the credibility of
the Alliance in that line, the relationship between national interests and
Alliance interests , and prioritization linked to cost or consequences for
the Alliance. These issues should be addressed, as well in the partnership
key and in the relations with Russia .
Romania is supporting the unity and common capabilities of the Alliance,
with a balanced approach for threats to Alliance’s territory, coming fromstrategic distance or from the vicinity. But this allows other type of specificarrangements and strategic partnerships inside the Alliance to enforce thecommon approach of these partners to the commonly perceived threats inthe region.
The indivisibility of the Alliance security and common defense should lead
to planning for threats at the Eastern border of the Alliance, and to commonand equal security for all the states at the border of the Alliance. Theprocedure of planning for different type of threats and challenges, as well asfor the specific geographic zones should be applied to this region too.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 71

Nuclear proliferation and moreover, nuclear terrorism, drug-terrorism
symbiosis, crisis and economic failure, energy supplies used as a weaponfor political, strategic of security purposes, used in negotiations for controland persuading the “partners”, climate changes and energy related policies,energy and regional/local conflicts and unrests –Black Sea Regionespecially, maritime piracy, unconventional races for conventional arm race,destabilizing countries and regions with implications in transport routes andtourism, all are threats and challenges that Romania is considering for beingaddressed inside NATO or with NATO’s support by the involved countries.
The main stance of Romania in the prioritization field has been already
underlined in the third chapter above. But this is not an excuse for notallocating suitable resources for the defense. In this respect, Romaniashould come back to the 2 percents share of the budget for the Ministry ofDefense and up to 2,38 % through state guarantees for the militaryacquisitions and procurement. The effectiveness and efficiency of theprocurement should be improved in order to prove to the citizens and taxpayers that the money is correctly spent.
Populism, governing with the eyes on the polls or with the eyes on the
media, conflicts and splits in the society should be of first importance andRomania should reject these as threats to the national security. Regainingand enforcing societal cohesion, obtaining the public support for aprofessional Government, designating ministers and persons in publicpositions should be de-politicized and competence-oriented, and thisprocess should be assumed by all the parties. The education system shouldbe improved in order to produce the needed and well trained humanpersonal for all the needs of the society.
4. Post-conflict reconstruction and nation building capabilities
Here is an important task that Romania should assume for its own. At the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs some post-conflict reconstruction capabilitiesare on the process of being formed, and the monitoring mission in Georgiawas of good help. A training center for operations using both military and72 Iulian CHIFU

civilian personal is already in place at the Defense Academy, and training
courses could be found at the Diplomatic Academy, when or a full masterdegree program in Conflict Analysis and Decision making in crisis alreadyexists at the International Relations and European Integration Departmentof the National School for Political and Administrative Studies.
The need for a post-graduated school or a national institution granting the
capacity for training all officials at different levels for a professionaldecision making in crisis, with a research and methodological componentshould be of first importance for rationalizing and taking the best use ofthese experiences in Romania, and the National Defense College could be asuitable place for these kind of studies.
For Afghanistan, Romania should take over a PRT and train its personal to
face a state building and post-conflict reconstruction operation in thoseconditions, a capability civilian-military, the way it was described above, inthe third chapter.
5. Energy security beyond critical infrastructure protection
For having the credibility and legitimacy to demand more than critical
infrastructure protection for energy security, Romania should first changeits own national provisions allowing the military to intervene when itseconomic or energy interests are harmed, when threats to the deliveries, tothe transportation lines or sources countries are at risk. In this respect,Romania itself should have bilateral and strategic relationships withproducers and transport countries and help them getting close and enterNATO for ensuring its own energy security.
That is a constant position that Romania embraced the one of supporting
Ukraine and Georgia in making the suitable transformation and get accessin the Alliance, and the same interest is proved for the Republic ofMoldova. And the support for sovereignty, integrity and independence ofthose states are also supported by the Alliance as a whole since Bucharestsummit.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 73

For the critical infrastructure part, Romania should make its own national
plans and assessments and protect in real terms its own infrastructure at thenational level, with the suitable means, including military ones whenrequested. This type of plan can show the interest and concern, as well asthe legitimacy in demanding this type of approach at the Alliance level.74 Iulian CHIFU

Chapter V
Background on the New Strategic Concept NATO
official documents
1. NATO and the new Strategic Concept
What is NATO’s New Strategic Concept?
At their Summit in Strasbourg / Kehl on 3 and 4 April 2009, NATO’s Heads
of State and Government tasked the Secretary General to develop a newNATO Strategic Concept. This exercise should be completed by the time ofNATO’s next Summit, which is expected to take place towards the end of2010. The Summit also tasked the Secretary General to convene and lead abroad based group of qualified experts who will lay the ground for the newStrategic Concept. This will be done with the active involvement ofNATO’s highest decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC).
Why does NATO need a new Strategic Concept?
A sound transatlantic consensus on NATO’s roles and missions and on itsstrategy to deal with security challenges is essential if NATO is to functionoptimally. The Strategic Concept is the core NATO document thatestablishes and reflects this transatlantic consensus. Clearly, as the securityenvironment that NATO has to deal with changes, so the Alliance’sStrategic Concept has to be periodically updated. The current Conceptdates from 1999, a time when NATO had 19 members compared to the 28 ithas today and when NATO’s focus was very much on challenges withinEurope or on Europe’s periphery.
Clearly the new Strategic Concept, which must be elaborated and approved
by all 28 current Allies, has to take account not only of the way in whichsecurity challenges have evolved, such as the new emphasis onproliferation, failed states, piracy, energy supplies, terrorism and climatechange, but also of how NATO has adapted and transformed in the lastdecade to be able to better tackle these challenges. The new StrategicConcept will therefore not be only an analytical document. It will need alsoNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 75

to give specific guidance to NATO governments on how they need to
further transform the Alliance and their own national defense structures andcapabilities to be successful in meeting NATO’s core tasks in the 21stcentury. The Strategic Concept must also give public opinion in the Alliancecountries and beyond a clear sense of why NATO still matters and how inmany ways it is helping to make them more secure.
How would a Strategic Concept be developed?
The process leading to the new Strategic Concept will be an inclusive one.All Allies, from the largest to the smallest, will be actively consulted andinvolved. Moreover, the process should engage partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the IstanbulCooperation Initiative, as well as partners cross the globe. The processshould also be transparent and engage other key international actors such asthe EU and the UN as well as NGOs and all those in the strategiccommunity who believe they have something useful to contribute andexpertise to offer. Finally, an interactive dialogue with the broader public isencouraged via this special web module run by NATO’s Public DiplomacyDivision.
The Group of Experts will begin its work in early September and will
divide its activities into two phases. The first phase, to run from Septemberto mid-February, will be devoted to engaging the broader strategiccommunity and policy makers in a dialogue on the challenges facing theAlliance. It will be called the reflection phase and will be organised arounda series of four seminars devoted to different topics of relevance to the newStrategic Concept which will be held in NATO countries.
The second phase will involve the Group of Experts travelling to each
NATO capital to present the results of the Group’s internal deliberations andpreliminary conclusions directly to NATO governments with a view toreceiving initial comment and feedback. This will be known as theconsultation phase.
The Group of Experts will meet periodically with the Secretary General,
who has overall authority over the Group’s work, and with the North76 Iulian CHIFU

Atlantic Council and other stakeholders at NATO Headquarters. The Group
of Experts will also meet in private session to advance its own thinking.
After the completion of the reflection and consultation phases the work ofthe Group of Experts will be finished. The Secretary General will take theprocess forward by presenting his report, taking into account theconclusions and recommendations of the Group of Experts, to the Allies.On the basis of the reactions and political guidance that he receives fromAllies, the Secretary General will then prepare the first draft of the newStrategic Concept for negotiation among Allies during the late summer andautumn 2010 and in the run-up to the next NATO Summit.
Once the text has been approved by Heads of State and Government at this
Summit it will henceforth become NATO’s new Strategic Concept.
2. A Roadmap for the New Strategic Concept
At the NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009, Heads of State
and Government (HoSG) tasked the Secretary General to develop a newNATO Strategic Concept. This exercise should be completed by the time ofNATO’s next Summit which is expected to take place in Lisbon in late2010. The Summit also tasked the Secretary General to convene and lead abroad based group of qualified experts who will lay the ground for the newStrategic Concept. This will be done with the active involvement of theNorth Atlantic Council (NAC).
Guiding principles
NATO’s current strategic concept dates back to 1999. A sound transatlanticconsensus on a new NATO strategy is an indispensable element of theAlliance’s strategic adaptation. The Strategic Concept is a central piece ofNATO’s acquis. Politically, it occupies a place second only to theWashington Treaty.
This calls for an inclusive and participatory approach from the biggest to
the smallest Ally. Moreover, the process should engage Partners in theEuro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue and theIstanbul Cooperation Initiative as well as partners across the globe.Furthermore, the process should be transparent and engage other keyNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 77

international actors such as the EU and UN as well as other types of NATO
interlocutors, like NGOs. Finally, an interactive dialogue with the broaderpublic is encouraged. To this end, this website dedicated to the processleading to the new Strategic Concept has been established.
The Group of Experts
In order to facilitate the working process, the Secretary General has todayappointed a broad based Group of Experts. The 12 group members havebeen appointed in their personal capacities. The Group of Experts includes abroad spectrum of large and small NATO members and offers a balancedcombination of insiders and outsiders, including from the private sector,think tanks and the academic community. Dr. Madeleine Albright, formerUS Secretary of State, will chair the Group of Experts with Mr. Jeroen vander Veer, former CEO in Royal Dutch Shell, as vice-chair. To ensure closecoordination between the Group of Experts and NATO Headquarters, theSecretary General has designated a small NATO team lead by Dr. JamieShea, head of Policy Planning Unit, to function as a secretariat and staffsupport.
A three-phased approach
The process leading to a new Strategic Concept will have three distinctphases: a reflection phase through a series of seminars; a consultation phasewith allied capitals; and a drafting and final negotiation phase.
Reflection phase:
A series of seminars hosted by individual allies will take place in order toenhance the strategic debate. The seminars will engage all stakeholders andrelevant players – Permanent Representatives, Military Representatives,NATO Strategic Commands, the Military Committee, officials fromcapitals, strategic thinkers and partners as appropriate. Each seminar willcover a specific aspect of the Strategic Concept.
One seminar will look at NATO’s core tasks and functions: the meaning of
collective defense and deterrence in today’s environment; how to confront abroader spectrum of threats to our populations; NATO’s role indisarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.78 Iulian CHIFU

Another seminar will look at NATO as a part of a network of security actors
in contributing to global civil and military crisis management and NATO’slikely tasks with a view to enhancing cooperation with internationalorganisations and NGOs.
A third seminar will look at NATO and the Euro-Atlantic security
environment: NATO’s role in building security in the Euro-Atlantic area,enlargement and NATO’s partnerships including relations with Russia.
A fourth seminar will look at forces and capabilities, including defense
planning and transformation. It will also look at procurement at a time ofincreased financial constraints – that requires flexibility and prioritisation.
The Group of Experts may also, as appropriate, explore other relevant
topics.
The Group of Experts will start its work on 4 September when the Secretary
General convenes an informal meeting with NAC for an initial exchange ofviews. The Group of Experts will meet periodically with the SecretaryGeneral and will submit a progress report in time for the Foreign Ministersmeeting in December 2009.
Consultation phase:
Following the seminars, experts will visit Allied capitals to discuss theirfindings and proposals with governments and, where possible, par-liamentary committees. Public outreach events could be organized on theseoccasions by the capitals concerned.
In April 2010 the Group of Experts should present their analysis and
recommendations to the Secretary General.
Based on the experts’ analysis and recommendations and Allies’ initial
reactions the Secretary General will produce his own report on elements ina new Strategic Concept. It will be submitted to governments and – beforethe summer holiday – the Secretary General will collect political guidanceon the drafting of the new Strategic Concept.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 79

Drafting and final negotiation phase:
After the summer 2010 the Secretary General will prepare his draft of theconcept, and he will meet with Permanent Representatives to discuss theevolving drafts. Finally, the Secretary General will present his StrategicConcept text to the NATO summit expected to be held in the autumn of2010. After approval by HoSG it henceforth becomes NATO’s newStrategic Concept.
3. Declaration on Alliance Security
Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April2009
We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, met today in Strasbourg and Kehl to celebrate the 60thanniversary of our Alliance. We have reaffirmed the values, objectives andobligations of the Washington Treaty which unite Europe with the UnitedStates and Canada, and have provided our transatlantic community with anunprecedented era of peace and stability. We have also reaffirmed ouradherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UnitedNations.
NATO continues to be the essential transatlantic forum for security
consultations among Allies. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty andcollective defense, based on the indivisibility of Allied security, are, andwill remain, the cornerstone of our Alliance. Deterrence, based on anappropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a coreelement of our overall strategy. NATO will continue to play its part inreinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear and conventionaldisarmament in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, aswell as non-proliferation efforts.
NATO’s enlargement has been an historic success in bringing us closer to
our vision of a Europe whole and free. NATO’s door will remain open toall European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which arewilling and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations ofmembership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security andstability.80 Iulian CHIFU

Today, our nations and the world are facing new, increasingly global threats,
such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, theirmeans of delivery and cyber attacks. Other challenges such as energysecurity, climate change, as well as instability emanating from fragile andfailed states, may also have a negative impact on Allied and internationalsecurity. Our security is increasingly tied to that of other regions.
We will improve our ability to meet the security challenges we face that
impact directly on Alliance territory, emerge at strategic distance or closerto home. Allies must share risks and responsibilities equitably. We mustmake our capabilities more flexible and deployable so we can respondquickly and effectively, wherever needed, as new crisis emerge. We mustalso reform the NATO structures to create a leaner and more cost-effectiveorganization. We will strengthen NATO’s capacity to play an important rolein crisis management and conflict resolution where our interests areinvolved.
We aim to strengthen our cooperation with other international actors,
including the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Securityand Cooperation in Europe and African Union, in order to improve ourability to deliver a comprehensive approach to meeting these newchallenges, combining civilian and military capabilities more effectively. Inour operations today in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, our armedforces are working alongside many other nations and organisations. InAfghanistan, our key priority, we are committed to helping the AfghanGovernment and its people to build a democratic, secure and stable countrythat will never again harbour terrorists who threaten Afghan andinternational security.
NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European
defense and welcomes the European Union’s efforts to strengthen itscapabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts in which theirfullest involvement possible is important, as agreed. We are determined toensure that the NATO-EU relationship is a truly functioning strategicpartnership as agreed by NATO and by the EU. Our efforts should bemutually reinforcing and complementary.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 81

We will develop our relationships with all our partners, both in our
neighbourhood and beyond, with whom we have a joint commitment tocooperative security. Our partners are key in enabling us to implement ourvision of a community of shared values and responsibilities. We value thesupport that many of our partners bring to our operations and missions.
A strong, cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia, based on
respect for all the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act andthe 2002 Rome Declaration, best serves security in the Euro-Atlantic area.We stand ready to work with Russia to address the common challenges weface.
We are committed to renovating our Alliance to better address today’s
threats and to anticipate tomorrow’s risks. United by this common vision ofour future, we task the Secretary General to convene and lead a broad-basedgroup of qualified experts, who in close consultation with all Allies will laythe ground for the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Conceptand submit proposals for its implementation for approval at our nextsummit. The Secretary General will keep the Council in permanent sessioninvolved throughout the process. 82 Iulian CHIFU

SECOND PART
Debates

SECTION I
NATO AND THE BIG ISSUES OF THE NSC
Chapter I
Adapting NATO to the changing International
System/Arena
Iulian Chifu
Changing the nature of International Relations?
Excepting the current assesments of the international security environment,
one cannot ignore a deeper situation that questions not only the situationand the changes in the security environment, but also the deeper change inthe nature of international relations, of its rules, its normes, the actors andtheir characteristics, the mechanism used by these actors and their goals onan international scale.
What would be the premises for talking about the 8
thof August, the day
Georgia was invaded by Russia, but also the Opening day of the SummerOlimpics in Beijing, as a new 9/11 and the changing nature of internationalrelations?
Arguments
Supporters of the theory that we are at the begining of a change in
international relations also state the New World Order, neccessary becausethe system has entered a type of chaos that contains numerous threats:

– No major change took place after the Russian-Georgian war, but we
all realised that NATO and the euro-atlantic area do not have theneccessary instruments to get Russia to follow a certain policy or tobring it to a status quo ante if it got sidetracked. There are no methods
so we are dealing with a crisis of methods at an international scale.
– At the same time we are dealing with a crisis of principles, a moral
crisis because all the rules pertaining to international law that werebroken by Russia were previously broken by the West, with its broadmeaning.
– At EU and NATO level, when a joint decision is made, it reflects the
common denominator of the views of Member States, which is verylow and indicates a major institutional crisis
– The three crisis pertain to the international relations and international
law crisis.
– West-aphalian peace or the UN with its charter, or the Helsinki
Conference with its principles of security in Europe would not,according to this way of thinking, be valid: sovereignities are not equal,the rule of non intervention in internal affairs, the rule of non-use offorce for conflict resolution are not abided by, self-determination forpeoples is not respected but extended to minorities and other strangeidentity types, the actors are no longer states but groupes, minorities,people, the world is different.
– The rules of non-proliferation are no longer respected either, after the
last nuclear technology transfer from the US to India.
There are two possibilities: The first would be to try to go back to the order
we lost – which would not be possible because the Helsinki Conference, forexample, could not take place again and the consensus could not be reachedby compromise without the bipolar order. The second would be reaching aNew World Order, or at least a European one. We are not dealing with theend of the Unipolar Order – even if it was not effective it was neveraccepted unanimously and was assumed in nuances by the US – but with adisorder where power, military force, military instruments, sui generis,whatever works, no rules and without taking responsibility for actions.86 Iulian CHIFU

This is why it would be neccessary to find restrictions and rules for using
force, not letting ourselves go with the flow, but participating in buildingthe new order. It is obvious that until an agreement that impliesresponsability is achieved we will go through new crisis, human and statetragedies. An international conference is needed for governing intervention,the situation of new players, etc. All those interested must attend thisconference, in order to decide what to do with non-state actors – whether itis the media, companies, people – rights, duties and responsabilities must beattributed. The mechanism should give a check and balance solution.
Counter-arguments
There are a couple of counter-arguments which plead for the lack of a
tearing apart in the international system on the 8
thof August. There are
those who see NATO’s and the European Union’s capability to limit and putout the conflict as a definitive elimination of the use of force, after thisexperience, but the argument is based on a scenarion of non-escalation theconflict through the presence of NATO ships in the Black Sea and the non-transmission of this conflict in the Ukraine-Krimeea and the Republic ofMoldova-Transnistria. And such a scenario has yet to be validated.
Moreover, in case we accept the non-escalation scenario in the Russian-
American or Russia-NATO geopolitical dispute, using force or otherinstruments repetitively by Russia, to re-state its hegemony in the region isa clear signal of a shifting paradigm and a period of instability and conflictuntil a rearrangement of the institutional raports in international relations,that will reflect both the current force balance and Russia’s will andaspiration to come back to the forefront.
At this time, no solution in Georgia is immediately evident, we do not know
what a withdrawral means and if international peace-keeping forces will bebrought on the field. Thus even this step contributes to the real argumentsconcerning a change in the nature of international relations. In any case, we believe that the West – both the US and NATO, the EU orits individual members – as well as the other international actors are fullyaware of the threat that Russia represents for the peace and stability of thecurrent system, as its position as a super power and its use of force to getrecognition of prerogatives demanded in post-soviet space are beingNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 87

questioned. Moreover, we consider that the international system is moving
towards a new period of turbulence, on top of the one introduced by thenon-state actors in assymetrical format, after 9/11, a turbulence thatreintroduces open conflict and using force between actors with majormilitary capabilities, which is why Russia’s approach will be multi-layered,with levels of communication and cooperation, of competition and ofconfruntation and conflict. For each and every one of these levels everymajor actor will develop adequate formulas and instruments ofapproaching Russia, thus in every serios actors’ toolkit we will find all thetypes of instruments for approaching Russia on different levels. In this newway of arranging the pieces of the GO board, every pre-positioned piecewill have its importance and will be an added value asset for allies andpartners, and thus every country will prove useful for a certain level ofapproaching Russia.
Also, this perspective will certainly lead to the need for decisional,
instrumental and institutional coherence both in the transatlantic relation –who this way will fill the last cracks in NATO and EU foundations.Introducing a Common Foreign Policy for the EU and a capable andconsistent defense, comparable to that of NATO is becoming a mutuallyacknowledged necessity for both institutions.
And in the case of an expansion of the conflict, the escalation can lead to a
aknowledgement of the situation by a player that has left the system andmust be bordered, limited in these actions and brought to a state of stability.So the final consequences of this “system change” or even that of the natureof the international system are hard to identify and either way it is too earlyto give a final verdict on the matter.
The idea that there is no change in the World Order also proclaims the fact
that the nature of international relations is the same, the magnitude of thechanges is reduced to the simple change by transformation and we are notdealing with a revolution, with a change in the continental plates that willaffect the entire system but just with changes that maintain the same rulesand the same actors: moreover, biased conclusions about the change in thenature of international relations would only arise because of the massmedia, which puts at the corner stone of everything ratings and advertising,88 Iulian CHIFU

so not neccessarily the truth. If there is no blood it is not on which is why
the changing world order, the fall of the former world order, the change inthe nature of international relations is so intensely publicised. – There are changes, structural ones, changes in the way major actors
work, actors who move by the same rules, with the same reasons and the same principles – cooperation, competition and conflict/confrontation as part of the game.
– The world remains westphalian, where the states are the main actors,
that do as much as their power permits, can rightfully take internationallaw, whose origin can be traced in the major actors’ actions, where theyneed it,
– Russia wants to regain its strategic, nuclear, political and military
power status.
– The US is rearanging its power but unipolarism died in the middle of
the 90s, if it ever existed. And in the case of the Gulf wars, and inAfghanistan a large coalition was in place, so any wish to extendunipolarism was rejected by everybody, foremost by the US which donot want and have never wanted such a responsability.
– The states continue to work with one another through the prism of
power and their own capabilities.
Changing the new security strategies
Of course no one has time for the theoreticists to discover the meaning and
the answer to the question: are we dealing with a change in the nature ofinternational relations that was brought on by the cold war? Pragmativelyand objectively both states and actors reacted by revising security strategiesbased on an approach that is imposed in the logic of western evaluation andplanning. Thus the new strategies must take into account the coexistence ofthe models, concuring interpretations and conceptions, so that they canpreempt reactions based on perceptions generated by actor following adifferent theory. Consequenlty we consider the following theories to bevalid:
–The world is unipolar, from the security and military point of view. In
this case the undisputed superpower is the US who invested double theamount spent by all other states on its military budget for militaryresearch, moth scientific and technological. The world is unipolar andNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 89

from the point of view of the values and the model towards which all
citizens, from states that have grown accustomed to this way andstandard of life, aspire to, as liberal democracy is defining for the West– and that includes the US and Europe, but also Japan, Australia orSouth Koreea as states that have embraced the same set of values andhave a high level of development and standard of living
–The world is uni-multipolar, with an anarchic perifery. Uni-
multipolar because the US does not act as a superpower but based on a
series of regional power and also because the West itself is verymultipolar and irregular in terms of solutions and options. It is preciselyinternal intergovernmental institutional democracy that make Westernmultipolarity a reality.
–The world is in post-transition as a force of instability. This theory
claims that the transition is over and what we have now is a final post-transitional situation which is unstable, being a risky society that a greatnumber of citizens have adapted to, especially young people of up to40, who no longer tie thenselves to imutable means by contracting longterm credits, who do not assume perenial identities and loyalties butonly pragmatic and temporary ones, who live in rentals, are ready tochange their work place overnight and are adaptable to the new saferand more profitable environment, true global citizens who are notaffected by the credit crunch because they do not want houses, do nottie themselves to things, are very active and mobile, and choose the bestspace given by two coordinates: minimum risk or maximum amount ofoportunities, according to individual characteristics. Those who arefamily oriented and view security as a living condition move towardsthe areas with a minimum ammount of risk. Those who areadventouros, pragmatical and who to gain head to the areas that havethe most oportunities, which are not neccessarity the safest. This newcategory fundamentally influences the security of any state, a realistactor called to adapt to a post-modern world.
Taking into account all three ways of looking at the world is neccessary to
create a strategy adaptable to the current situation.
It is obvoius that in the system we have second generation actors – the
bipolar world – who orientate their reality according to the bipolar modelwhich brings them to situations that they do not understand and90 Iulian CHIFU

consequently cannot react to. This is because judgement is no longer a
black and white dihotomy but a leveled affair, according to interests, thatleads to changing alliances and different opposite sides for every topicdiscussed – a relfex of the democratisation taking place in the contemporaryworld and of the extreme pragmatism of states, called to satisfy the needs oftheir own citizens.
In the contemporary world we cannot contest the coexistence of protostate
actors, pseudo-state structures based on clans, exntended families and otherroots from before nations or peoples were formed who have not yet reachedmodernism. This reality is especially present in Africa but also in someregions of Asia and even Latin America. The approach of a state or of theinternational community as a whole must be take into account the stage ofdevelopment of the actors and its perceptions.
Transatlantic relations and global governance
The origins of transatlanticism. From the Soviet threat to global challengesThe problem of transatlantic relations is one of the most studied areas of
international relations, whether the point of view is chosen with the help ofthe analytical instrument used by historians, experts in international trade,foreign policy advisors, theoreticists and representatives of politicalphilosophy, experts in global security or in international law. The history oftransatlantic relations was shaped in the bipolar era that succeded theSecond World War and reached its peak built on cooperation and mutualinterests in turning the democratic world against soviet ideology expansionin the Cold War era
After half a century, the topic of declining transatlantic relations made its
way to a debate agenda that does not have a liniar trajectory, is detachedand mostly academic and leaves behind the teoretical inputs of diversevisions on the future of the euro-atlantic partnership. The topic of declinereafirmed itself of the stage of international relations controversies bytaking the critical dinamic of the events that generated the decline itself.More than the slow, progressive tear between two strategic visionsconcerning world order, the American and the European one, the split had acritical, sudden and dramatic moment, in 2003, after the start of the war inIraq.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 91

Although predictable, the tipping point of the decline of the transatlantic
alliance was all the more dramatic because of the speed with which itpassed beyond more or less temperate debates behind closed diplomaticdoors and into the media spotlight and into the public opinion’s eye, fromboth the US and the EU member states, thus generating real anti-americanor anti-european streaks and not least producing splits between Europeancountris. Once an outsider, the unique European voice turned out to be
unconvincing, an obvious symptom of the irregular character of the Union’sdivided foreign policy. Brought to an intergovernmental level, the debatesrelated to the critical phase that transatlantic relations are going through,concerning the relevance, force, effectiveness of this alliance have broughtto the forefront the divide between the old and the new Europe, betweencore-states of the European constructions – France and Germany on the oneside, who were joined by Great Britain and Spain, thus opting to supportinterventionist american side in the Iraq issue.
The start of the Iraq war, in the context of the fight against terrorism,
reestablishing peace in the Middle East and democratizing the Arab worldwas the most sensitive element in the divergences relating to transatlanticrelations. The stage of dissent was completed by the tasks concerning theKyoto protocol and the International Penal Court, talks which on the wholehave slowed down the tryout to set an agenda for converning euroatlanticinterests and moreover, have burdened the efforts to define a viabletransatlantic strategy to approach these common challenges.
In such a critical point, the question related to the future of the transatlantic
relations, the need, importance and efficiency of this partnership is ever solegitimate. It is still possible to make-up a common European answer to the
current challenges on the world scene. The history of the transatlantic
partnership traces, in a way, the direction towards the right answer. The keyto this partnership has always been complementarity. It is a premise
response to a question-excuse. The transatlantic relationship has alwaysbeen a necessary partnership and not a cooperation based on substantialaffinities. The key to this partnership with a history of over half a centurywas, as mentioned above, complementarity. Balance and efficiency dependon how complementarity partners accept the legitimacy of the differencesthat separate them and set common interests before national interests or the92 Iulian CHIFU

union to which they belong. As long as the most important challenges on
the global stage are global threats it is essential to be able to count on theconsistency of American and European responses to these challenges if nottheir unitary character.
At the origin of the Cold War, the central element of this complementarity
was, in essence, the consolidation of a common front against sovietexpansion, rebuilding the European continent after the Second World Warwith the American support that was part of the US missionary project toprotect the vulnerable territory beyond the Atlantic which shared,structuraly speaking, the values of democracy. From the “Truman doctrine”to the Marshall plan – as fundamental elements of American comitmenttowards European reconstruction over a century ago – and until the EU27system of today, the virtues of transatlanticism built of complementarity hada much larger echoo than in the times of crisis that have marked theevolution of relations between the US and Europe. Appealing to the memory of the postwar crisis and the value of U.S.support, there are still many political scientists, analysts and even Americanpolitical leaders who argue the vehemence of criticism that is linked toEuropean position in that, on grounds of membership is a relatively mingledUnion policy, especially in economically strong , the Europeans haveforgotten that this Union project and its evolution would not have beenpossible without support and without U.S. military protection under theNATO umbrella. Forcing this key historical duplication, the name of thePresident GW Bush and his foreign policy strategy was even associatedwith those of his HS Truman. Moral duty to confront “evil“ wherever itcould be found – the impoundment Soviet threat to security and Americanway of life (Truman, March 1947, message to Congress), the combat of theterrorist threat (Bush after the attacks of September 11, 2001) – was, indeed,raised with an almost messianic declarational patheticism.
Still the contexts are diferent as are the threats and thus, the actual nature of
American interventionism, the answers to these challenges andfundamentally disctinct. The ideological father of Containment strategy,
G. F. Kennan insisted from the very beggining that power should not beperceived as a military threat. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 93

The content of the threat identified by Kennan in trends of expansion of the
communist world was a political-ideological one. The fight against theintrusion of communist ideology in the sphere of democratic countries wasunderstood by American politicians as a general conflict between good andevil. The weapons of the Soviet forces were those posed by militarypotential, but consisted of “the art“ of exploiting the weaknesses of liberaldemocratic societies and “speculating what is bad rather than good inhuman nature“. While any military intervention at that time was consideredby Kennan as counterproductive and ineffective, he suggested an inductiontactic among Soviet elites to the idea that excessive expansion of theirinfluence could result in attracting the U.S. military in neighbouring areasexposed to Soviet control. Kennan speculated, in fact, Soviet sensitivity toso-called logic of force to generate the Russians tend to withdraw quicklybefore armed threat.
After nearly sixty years, the different ways in which we report to the logic
of force, understood as military intervention, give rise to a new paradigmefor investigating the dynamics of the transatlantic phenomenon. There is, onthe one hand, a different placement of the “enemy“ (if we take the issues ofterrorism) against the logic of force, at least at the psychological level. Aradical mind perceives military threat as a challenge and automaticallyrejects the alternative of withdrawal, opting to sacrifice, pulling back andattacking.
On the other hand, separate reporting to the logic of force is one of the
fundamental causes of differences that emerged in transatlantic relations inthe early 21st century. After the U.S. attack on September 11, 2001,American strategic view of global security was focused on the benefits ofmilitary intervention exacerbated as the ultimate option in counteringterrorism. The shock transferring a “war“ which defies any attempt oflocalization, a conflict that was driving the whole world built on values ofdemocracy and freedom around it and straight into the heart of theAmerican continent, was the decisive moment that marked the entry of U.S.foreign policy in an era which we call a force diplomacy era.
On the European side of the Atlantic, the old coalition of Europe continued
to express its option for a multilateralist approach centered on a peaceful94 Iulian CHIFU

strategic culture, to provide long term benefits of diplomatic negotiations in
international organizations, to invoke the constraints of law and to call ontechnical more subtle persuasion (even based on economic sanctions) inexchange for coercion. The European response to the same globalchallenges facing the U.S. is therefore built on a vision that emphasizes thepower of diplomacy.
This diagnostic of division that marked the transatlantic relations in the
aftermath of the Iraq is , in our opinion, the key element that caused theEuro-Atlantic community to divide itself, without shading all theincompatibility that led to these trade-offs, such as : some differences ofperception on current global threats, gaps between military resources andcapabilities, distinctive emphasis placed on values, religion, all causing agradual deepening of the differences that emerged in terms of strategies totackle the global issues. Most elements of incompatibility will be furtherdeveloped in the pages of this work. What we have designated as separatereporting to the logic of force particularly looks at the area of globalsecurity that we propose to stress upon. Different visions of U.S. and EUconcerning the security challenges on the agenda are those that havebrought to the forefront the great theoretical dispute of “unilateralismversus multilateralism “. Redefining the dual concept in relation to currentdevelopments on the international scene and identifying and analyzing thecosts and benefits of indiscriminately applying one or the other of the twoprinciples in the sphere of foreign policy decisions were the basis of trialsof experts on transatlantic issues to investigate, explain and, if possible,outline scenarios and recommendations to overcome transatlanticdisagreements.
But before deepening the topic of declining transatlantic relations and the
causes that generated tensions between the two sides we consider isnecessary to clarify what we mean by “ relationship / partnership / trans-
atlantic community “, to identify the poles of this report, to more
accurately portray the preferences, reactions and positions of actorsinvestigated regarding current developments in international relations. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 95

Europe and America: between different profiles, values and interests
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet system were
interpreted cvasiunanimously as reaching effects of the promotion ofcommon transatlantic international values of democracy, human rights,economic liberalism and the success of multilateral cooperation to ensuresecurity. Theorists of the transatlantic ‘crisis’ generally relate to thehistorical background of transatlantic cooperation as a marker for detectionof key questions on the nature of disagreements arising after the Iraqi crisis,the substance of their temporary or structural, context, but also how toharmonize the two views on the new world order.
The basic question whose answer may lead to other problems of the
transatlantic partnership being clarified is ontological in nature and can beformulated as follows: Do we still have a transatlantic community? Former
French Foreign Minister Jean François-Poncet believes that the strength oftransatlantic relations depends on the one hand, on the extent to whichexisting or emerging incompatibilities in the two systems of values, oneAmerican and one European, will result in undermining the Euro-AtlanticPartnership. On the other hand, by looking at the relations between the twoactors from a neorealist perspective, this partnership is not an end in itself,relations between states are not essentially based on partial or completesharing of values but on common interests which issues directions ofcooperation between state actors were analyzed. Only after investigating thenature of the discrepancies occurred on the set of values and privateinterests may we try to formulate a conclusion relating to revivingtransatlantic relations.
The antagonist painting between America and Europe is quite complex and
illustrative. We should focus on several attempts of portrayal of “Euro-peanism“ and “Americanism“ in the light of attempts to find a “commonpolitical mentality ”. Walter B. Scolombe brings to the forefront a “lithanyof contrasts” that captures a patriotic, conservative, religious, capitalistic,entrepreneurial, individualistic America that assumes an exceptionaldestiny, is innovative, inclined to technology, unilateralist, willing and ableto use military force whenever necessary, despite international opinion andconstraints and rules of international law. Europe, by contrast, is in96 Iulian CHIFU

Scolombe opinion progressive, secular-oriented social values (if not
socialist), limited, culturally closed, carefull and not very able to usemilitary force and attached to multilateralism in decision-making processes.
Of course, each of these features is debatable and has at least one key flaw
of ultra-simplifying outlining contrasts, in addition to undeniable Americanbias, moreover, explainable for a holder of numerous senior positions in theDepartment of Defense of the U.S. The vision presented by U.S. official isvery close to the famous view exposed in July 2002 by the Americanspecialist in security studies Robert Kagan in the article Power and
Weakness.
By launching highly controversial ideas, subject to a heated debate, Robert
Kagan proposes an approach to fundamental differences between Europeand the U.S. based on the concept of power, but he reduce it to the sense ofmilitary force. In any dispute about power – the efficacy of power, morality,power or use of this opportunity – the American vision is essentiallyantagonistic to the European view from Kagan’s point of view. Simplifyingthe thesis that he supports, Europeans share the weak psychology, refusingto use force just because they do not have the tools necessary to impose thisway, and Americans opt for being the strong, because they hold thesupremacy of military power and conviction that the logic of force leads torapid and reliable results.
Many of the ideas addressed by the author’s approach portrait are almost
undeniable. It was not necessarily the means of presentation of the modelsof Kagan that were criticized by scholars of international relations, butrather the premise of his approach, seeking to anchor and justify his visionby reducing the size of the issue to military power.
“Europe goes beyond power in a closed world, of laws and rules,
cooperation and transnational negotiation. It enter the post-historicalparadise of peace and relative prosperity, a kind of Kantian eternal peace.The United States, however, remain immersed in history, exercising itspower in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international law is notcredible and where security, protection and promotion of liberal order stilldepend on the possession and use of military power. This is why in mostNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 97

international and strategic issues of today’s world, Americans are from
Mars and Europeans are from Venus”.
The unilateralism that characterises U.S. foreign policy is motivated by the
need for the U.S. to be free from all constraints of international rules, tohave room to maneuver to directly and quickly address any kind of threat,coercing its opponent and not persuading it. Unilateralism is directly relatedto American exceptionalism, as the US has the moral duty to confront“evil“ because it is the only power able to eliminate it.
The European approach, more complex, nuanced and sophisticated, is based
on an indirect and subtle influence on the soft dimension of power ratherthan the hard power. The European Union is built on a strategic culture ofnegotiation, cooperation and economic exchanges. The European projecthas a visionary dimension, relying on long-term results, slower, butinducing reforms from within a society (state or region), with its activeparticipation. The very principle behind the expansion of EU accession is avoluntary act and not the result of external constraints. For Europeansmultilateralism requires a culture of alliance and consensus achievedbeyond the barrier posed by diversity, through a joint effort of moderationof national pride.
That is why we believe that European reluctance to use force and opting for
diplomatic negotiation tools is not evidence of weakness. On the contrary.Dealing with “evil“ to transform it is infinitely more difficult than removingit. Sure, and here Kagan is right, there are situations in which diplomaticand economic ties instruments (whether incentives, whether sanctions) arecompletely inapplicable, and the only solution is to resort to force. Kagangoes further with analysis of different approaches to the idea of power inUS and European foreign policy. Modern European foreign policy is basedon what he calls modern European strategic culture and is characterized bya conscious rejection of the European past marked by war generated by theclash of national egoism and hegemonic ambitions. Refusing to use militaryforce, the Europeans are basically trying to forget the past. Not incidentally,Kagan cites the famous speech of Joschka Fischer at Humboldt Universityin Berlin: “The key concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is rejectingthe European balance of power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of98 Iulian CHIFU

individual states which occurred after Peace of Westphalia in 1648”. In the
same context, Fischer points out that the new Europe was made possible bythe two major historic decisions, “the U.S. decision to remain in Europe“and “France and Germany’s decision to respect the principle of integration,starting with economic cooperation”.
We will try to counterbalance the series of critical references by oposing to
the two pro-American visions of US EU antagonisms a set of featureswhich distinguish the European spirit and aim to bring more clarity on “common European policy mentality“, as they appear in an arrticle by twoEuropean philosophers , Jacques Derrida and Jurgen Habermas. Six majordistinctive features can be extracted from that article: secularization andsuspicion towards “transagression of the border between politics andreligion“; confidence in the states’ “guidance and organizationalcapabilities“ and skepticism about the achievements of the market; the lackof “optimistic expectations, naively built on technological progress;“preference for“ social security guarantees of the welfare state and forregulation based on solidarity “; a low degree of tolerance towards the useof force, the aspiration towards an“ international order governed by law,support for multilateralism and mutual limitation of sovereignty”.
There are views that Europeans’ attempts to build an identity in contrast to
American identity demonstrates not only the ambition of recoveringindependence in thought and action, a unitary“spiritual shape“ (Habermas,Strauss-Kahn), preserved despite the diversity and European dissonances.As Timothy Garton Ash states, an elitist idea of a Europe as Not America –defended with the gun of habermasiene “philosophical density“ andreinforced by the “hyperbolized political eloquence“ of the former Frenchfinance minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn – starts from the premise thatEurope is different from America, that differentiation tones give a higherprofile in relation to the U.S. profile and, therefore, it is possible anddesirable that the European identity is built based on these differences(elements of superiority). The “Europe as Not-American“ philosophy canalso lead to conclusions regarding the vulnerability of European identity,which cannot get a pronounced profile by any other means than byreference to particular features of Americanism and sometimes evenopposing them. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 99

The two profiles investigated are distinctly illustrated in different examples
of transatlantic literature. A possible recap of these contradictingpeculiarities might be presented thus:
Europe America
Peaceful tendencies War like tendencies support formultilateralism Preference for unilateralisminternationalism Nationalismsoft power hard powerCivilian power Military powerliberalism Realismsustainable development Consumerismuniversal Provincialpost-modern ModernWelfare attitude Materialismcomunitary Individuallystate confidence Self confidenceSocial liberalism Social conservatorismProgressive OrthodoxSecular ReligiousModesty AmbitionPragmatism UtopiaRisk aversion Risk toleranceFacing the past Facing the future
Despite all these differences, the western pro-american orientation – rooted
in the mentality of Europeans during the Cold War and reflected at the levelof economic, political or social thinking – had a major impact not only onthe way Europeans reacted to international events but was, above all, anessential element of the process of constructing a European identity. Muchof the success registered on an economic and social level in the EuropeanUnion were associated and explained on the proximity to the United Statesof America, sometimes being interpreted as effects of the duplication of theAmerican social paradigme. The viability of the euroatlantic project is,above all, a political priority that targets the consolidation of thetransatlantic security community started with the creation of NATO on the
principles of liberalism, mainly: collective identity based on commonvalues; economic interdependancy based on common material interests;common ideas; a joint network of common institutions. 100 Iulian CHIFU

Within this transatlantic community whose system of values – although
rooted in the same liberal tradition of illuminism – received distinct toneson each of the two shores of the Atlantic as the European partner reached, inparalel with the expansion process, a degree of economic, political andinstitutional integration that imposed the need for the EU to reposition itselfboth in its relation with the US as well as on the international stage. Thereis, on the one hand, the Union’s heightened interest to participate, alongsidethe US, in the process of defining the international agenda, by overcomingits traditional junior partner status in setting priorities on this agenda. Onthe other hand, the global agenda challenges are, through their transnationalcharacter, prone to intergovernmental partnerships, based on a multilateralinstitutional mechanism for international or regional cooperation.
Engaging the U.S. and the EU in resolving a current international problem
is therefore essential way by opening a new chapter in transatlantic relationsand overcoming past disagreements. In a speech in Paris in February 2005Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signals US availability to “cooperatewith Europe in our common agenda” and mentions the fact that “Europehas to be prepared to work with America to make freedom the globalprinciple of governing in the 21
stcentury”.
According to the U.S. official, the agenda of US-EU cooperation is alreadyextensive, as is the ongoing process of identifying new elements andcommon interests: “We agree on the threats we face today: terrorism,proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organizedcrime and underdeveloped states. “Several months later, EuropeanCommission President Jose Manuel Barroso said in turn in a speech inWashington DC:“ If America gives more attention to Europe today it is due,I think, to the fact that we tried hard to make them listen. If America definesbecoming more EU-US relations in light of what we can do together topromote democracy and freedom, this is a consequence of the fact that wehave already shown that we have results on the international scene.”
All these threats to global security are, in fact, raised not only within the
U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), they are mentioned in the EuropeanSecurity Strategy, and their importance is confirmed by the UN High LevelPanel on the well-known Report “A more secure world: our sharedresponsibility.“ Beyond international security threats, common challengesNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 101

of the global agenda now facing the two actors are linked to environmental
degradation, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, energy resources andlimiting the pandemic risk. These points on the international agenda may beaddressed more effectively in a collective manner, thereby increasing thechances of settlement, than if they remain targets of unilateral initiatives,separated, taken by major international players. This step is based on theidea of “ global governance “.
Global governance: premises, definitions, institutional elements
Global Governance is a relatively recent concept used in the problems of
international relations, its reputation is due to theoretical developments andinternational trends that have intensified academic debates on the idea of“globalization“ and its context, renewing global order. The changes facingthe international economic environment and policy changes aimed ataccelerating the rise in the international order established was bipolar. Thereare many views on the categories of factors that had a major impact on theprocesses of reorganization of international economical and politicalcontexts that were due also rethink global power relations. Two of these“mega-trends“ are demographic changes affecting the world
heterogeneously and the second is globalization.
Concerning globalization , this process is determined by the explosion of
scientific and technological innovations in various fields such asproduction, transport and communication, reducing time and space limitsand increasing phenomenon of inter-networking and globalinterdependence. The effects are both positive and negative pendulatingbetween opportunities and risks of globalization on the economy.Economical crisis that have surfaced in the last decade in Latin Americancountries, Asia or Russia highlight vulnerabilities associated with economicconnections becoming stronger, the risks extend financial crisis from onecontinent to another, and reduced capacity of the institutions national andinternational to anticipate and prevent such a global crisis. The positiveeffects of globalization, while beneficial, are found distributed in differentparts of the world and create a disparity that attracts even more attention tothe need to impose new rules for reforming and increasing the efficiency ofglobal governance. 102 Iulian CHIFU

The original meaning of “globalization“ has a neutral substrate
characteristic to concepts used to describe objectively, certain processes,such as in this case, the processes resulting from the technologicalrevolution. For example, Charles Doran presented globalization assomething that “is at the crossroads of information technology and globaleconomy“. This can be quantified in terms of intensity, coverage, volumeand value of international transactions in the global sphere of information,finance, commerce and administration. A substantial increase in the rate ofthese transactions has been seen in the last decade and, therefore, their levelis a measurable manifestation of globalization.”
From a concept of economic origin, the term came to acquire, after 2001, as
Z. Brzezinski argues, political and emotional overtones, with contradictorymeanings. Beyond the idea of globalization associated with the onset of anage of international openness, transparency and cooperation, the time hascome for it to be synonymous with “moral obtuseness and indifference tosocial injustice, which are accused of the richest countries in the world and,in particular, U.S. “ According to Brzezinski meanings of globalizationserve everyone, as definitions for certain empirical realities or normative.For some, the concept reflects what exists objectively diagnosing globaltransformations, others define what should or should not exist, making useof it to display a preference doctrine (sentence) or substantiation ofcounteraguments against it (antithesis ), and for many analysts the conceptof globalization is the strength of political and cultural criticism aimed atattacking the legitimacy of the current global hierarchy.
Precisely by the nature of multidimensional and contradictory implications,
globalization is a major factor influencing international developments notonly economic, but political and cultural. Although we will not payparticular attention to the cultural dimension of globalization, we note that aworld characterized by excessive interconnection does not automaticallybecome more homogeneous, both cultural homogenization andfragmentation, even alienation, the effects so often encountered in thecontext globalization. Depending on endogenous factors such as cultural,social, political or economic influence of different companies side pressuresNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 103

of globalization, the trends may oscillate between contamination and
cultural confrontation, can lead to conflicts between value systems orcontroversy concerning, for example, ethical implications of scientificprogress, particularly in biotechnology and its effects on the environment.We mention these issues precisely because the cultural impact ofglobalization is interdependent with its effects on national and internationalpolitical sphere. At this level, reactions induced by globalization can takevarious forms of political and economic nationalism, encourage activismand religious fundamentalist movements can result in different protestscoming from the non-state actors (civil society, NGOs, transnationalnetworks , lobby groups, etc..), whose potential to influence the domesticpolicy or foreign governmental actors is increasing.
Therefore, in a global context of increasingly higher complexity,
heterogeneous and interdependent, whose developments are difficult topredict, which – in addition – no longer has a center of international politicalsystem built on the principle of confrontation East versus West,globalization is considered by many authors as the most important factor toinfluence international politics. The challenges of the global agenda requirecoordinated responses, collective, made in an effective global governancesystem, in which “power“ cannot be understood solely on the basis ofeconomical, political or military variables, its size, but must be redefined as“ the power to attract and maintain international consensus “.
The effects of globalisation must be mastered or, put differently, governed.
The global agenda, although defined from a sector point of view, is in itsturn characterised by interferences that show up between global governanceon an economic level (through laws, rules, elements of stability andpredictability of the markets), concerning development aid, theenvironment, migration, energy, global security (confronted with newtransnational, subnational and overnational assymetric threats) etc. Theefficiency of global governing depends a great deal on the power andinterest balance and the whether or not it will be reached between the greatinternational powers and between these powers and the the diversity of non-state actors that influence the reconfiguration of the international system. 104 Iulian CHIFU

What is global governance?
The approach by which states, together with other international actors
actively cooperate to resolve problems on the global agenda is a possibledefinition, in the broad sense of global governance. The concept of“governance“ is often associated with the very concept of “management“ inorder to avoid possible confusion between the idea of global governanceand that of world government in the sense that term is used to describe thatform of institutional organization with the executive role in a state. A reportfrom the Commission on Global Governance of the United Nationsformalized to some extent this concept within international decision makersdefining it as: “the suite of ways in which individuals public and privateinstitutions shall manage the common affairs, ongoing process ofcooperation and compromise between different and conflicting interests,including official institutions and regimes endowed with executive powers,and various informal arrangements agreed by the people and institutions orperceived to be useful“.
Before gaining the reputation enjoyed by thoroughly analysed concepts
pertaining to International Relations, the term “governance“ was used byJames Rosenau to describe how to regulate the relations of interdependencein the absence of control exercised by political authority. This idea of lackof global political supreme courts is emphasized in the definition of AdilHajam of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy: Global governance isglobal process management in the absence of world government.”Management involves the idea of action, organization or supervision and, asmentioned above, does not refer to the question of creating centralisedinternational institutions. It is, moreover, the common element of thevarious definitions that have endorsed the idea of global governance: theabsence of a single political authority. It is also completely eliminates theappearance of the traditional separation of national-level internationaldecision-making and recognizing the role non-state actors, including civilsociety.
Rosenau’s definition is based on the idea of substituting the supreme
importance of states in international relations by the rule of relationsbetween individuals, companies, those relationships described by KeohaneNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 105

and Nye as “transnational“. There are changes occurring in the international
system because, among other things, the phenomenon of fragmentation ofidentity, simultaneously with that of integration (fragmigration)“ asreactions to globalization.
Another type of conceptualisation of global governance stresses the
practical dimension of coordination mechanisms that are controlled by theimplications of the globalization process: “In general terms, globalgovernance refers to systems of international rules, policies and coor-dination mechanisms that are designed to manage multiple implications ofglobalization.”
We will focus on two approaches to theoretical investigation of the idea of
global governance that emerge, one that draws focus to the link betweenglobal issues, global goals and their concerted approach and the other bybuilding explanatory substance to the concept of “power“, one of the keyconcepts of International Relations.
Martin Ortega offers a definition of global governance based on the idea of
managing global issues and tracking global objectives through concertedefforts of states and other international actors. In addition to globalchallenges involving the need for a collective approach (environmentaldegradation, climate change, peacekeeping and security, combatingterrorism, poverty and underdeveloped states, organized crime, etc..),identifying global targets is a defining aspect of global governance.Whether it concerns the strengthening and promotion of internationalprinciples, to promote democracy, human rights protection, crisismanagement and peacekeeping, the availability of states to divide theirefforts between the pursuit of national interests and identify, that is onlytargeting the global targets in 20th century, after the Second World War. Aset of broad objectives was included, for example, in the United NationsCharter, but their success was limited during the Cold War, given the deepdisagreements among the permanent members of UN Security Council.Only after the overall objectives of the 1990 agenda were set the agendawas clearly defined and monitored with great consistency.106 Iulian CHIFU

Referring to the concerted efforts of state and non-state actors is also very
relevant to include the prerequisite of international cooperation under themultilateral system, to solve problems that cannot be addressed individuallyby states, with unilateral instruments. This is generally the argument ormultilateralism, a concept which will be discussed in detail in the nextchapter. Concerted efforts occurre as defined by Thomas G. Weiss:“collective efforts to identify, understand and solve global problems whosesolution exceeds the capacity of individual states”. All these networks ofmechanisms of cooperation and coordination (horizontal – between statesand international organizations, but also vertical – between national andinternational institutions and citizens), and the interferences betweendifferent areas covered by the act of global governance (security, economy,environment , transport, etc..) complicate attempts to examine this conceptbased on traditional notions of international relations, such as legitimacy,representation or leadership.
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall believe that normative views on
global governance – that promote understanding this concept as analternative organization of relations between state and non-state actors inthe international arena without strong emphasis on the idea of power – aresomewhat limited. The absence of political authority (power center) is notequivalent to absence of power role in global governance. The two authorsprovide a definition of global governance based on the significance ofinstitutional power, one of the four types of power covered by them intaxonomic picture of this concept: direct power, compulsory power,institutional power, structural power and power production. More relevantin this context is the institutional power and the productive power, bothpracticed on the indirect route. Institutional power operates through variousinstitutional arrangements, decision-making processes or other informalmeans, diffused to influence agenda setting and decisions on items on theagenda. Productive power is exercised in the social processes associatedwith defining and changing identities, the meanings or rules of conduct inthe context of international relations.
Based on these aspects of power, global governance can be understood
according to the scale proposed by Barnett and Duvall, as a form ofinstitutional power exercised on a formal or informal level, and in order toNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 107

coerce other states and global actors (such as multinational corporations)
through the creation of institutional mechanisms for regulation and settingstandards to be met. Decisions in the context of global governance arebased on cooperation and consensus.
For example, the European Union and United States practice the
institutional power and productive power. Either through multilateralinstitutions or international financial institutions, the G8 or United NationsSecurity Council. Questions about how to exercise these types of power andresults of cooperation between the two actors in international institutionsshould be made from, first, the fundamental dilemma of global governanceeffectiveness in the current international context. There are authors whoseem to link skepticism with the existence of global governance that acts asa pure theoretical construct. Such dilemmas are raised by the fact that,despite the presence on the international scene of institutions with auniversal vocation through which global governance can be exercised actuntil now, the most important global issues – especially those relating tointernational security – have been addressed rather fragmented, either onthe basis of unilateral decisions, or through flexible forms of cooperation,such as, for example, the controversial “Coalitions of the willing“mobilized by the U.S. for the global war on terror.
Developments on the international scene that generated the pessimism of
such visions of global governance stalemate, and even the multilateralism“crisis“, bring to the forefront two fundamental issues. On the one hand, thequestion of reform of international institutions (particularly the UN) torespond to new global challenges and, on the other hand, highlight the clashof strategic vision to re-issue the international system shared by the mostpowerful global actors – the EU and the U.S.. We will discuss in more detailin another section of the paper how the transatlantic partners report to theopportunities and constraints involved in global governance but , when weoperate with other relevant conceptual distinctions such as the dichotomy of“unilateralism-multilateralism“ . What is noteworthy in this context is thatthe chances of effective global governance depend both on how the U.S.will take a constructive position of global leadership and the extent towhich the EU will be able to take a proactive stance in promoting thosevalues and principles that may influence the reconfiguration of the inter-national political system based on multilateralism. 108 Iulian CHIFU

Institutional aspects
The effectiveness of global governance thus depends on the credibility of
the multilateral approach to global issues on the agenda of the institutions,organizations and international systems with a universal vocation, that is theinstitutional infrastructure of global governance. In addition to bilateralism,regional multilateralism (the foundation of the European integration project,as well as other types of regional alliances with a lesser degree ofintegration), minilateralism (applied ever more frequently in collectivesecurity, but also at the economic level), we can talk about globalmultilateralism, which is key to the success of what was previously definedas global governance. All types contribute to multilateralism but theefficiency of global governance, given its multidimensional elements ofcooperation and interference processes vertical, horizontal or cross.Development of international organizations as a result of processes ofinstitutionalization of coordination mechanisms between internationalactors and to the identification of permanent ways of interaction andinterconnection within intergovernmental or non-state actors can lead tostrengthening the role and legitimacy of the institutional infrastructureglobal governance.
There are, on the one hand, renowned stage actors of global governance,
international institutions that operate globally, both politically andeconomically: the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO),International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. On the other hand,less formal intergovernmental alliances like the G8 or the World EconomicForumare are increasingly more visible. We should not ignore the influenceof non-state actors such as the Global Pact, the International LaborOrganization, private associations (International Chamber of Commerce),nongovernmental organizations, some political movements or transnationalreligious organizations, financial markets, multinationals etc.
The period immediately after 1990 is often considered “the revival of
multilateralism“, given a series of developments that led to thestrengthening of certain international or regional organizations or thecreation of new international regimes. The Cold War brought with it acertain revival – but an insufficient one – the United Nations SecurityNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 109

Council. Also the number and the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions
has grown. At regional level, simultaneous processes of enlargement andeconomical and political integration that crossed the European Union havehelped strengthen its role on the international scene, especially with thecreation of its foreign policy and security dimension in 1992. A number ofregional conflicts have brought with it the international community’s effortsto restore peace and stability in various areas such as Central America,Balkans, Middle East and Southeast Asia. In 1995 the General Agreementon Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was transformed into the World TradeOrganization. The Kyoto Protocol on the environment was adopted in 1997and in 1998 the Rome Statute on the establishment and operation of theInternational Criminal Court was adopted.
All these events, processes, international agreements and institutional
developments can be regarded as consequences of the success of multi-lateral negotiation approaches and historical and institutional opportunitiesfor the exercise of global governance based on the principle of multi-lateralism.
The unilateralism-multilateralism report: contradiction, causality or
flexibility? Europe, America and selective multi-lateralism
1.Bilateralism or paralelism for bilateral relations under the cover of
multilateralis
When we set out to analyze developments in transatlantic relations and to
anticipate some of their prospects we face to a certain extent the captivity ofa layered, heterogeneous and strategic scale of cooperation and coherencebetween the fluctuations of foreign policy visions of the two actors, the U.S.and the EU. The relationship between transatlantic poles is very difficult topenetrate by the “lens“ of bilateralism, given the fragmented views offoreign policy, sometimes incompatible, expressed by Member States of theEuropean Union, backed by the mixture of intergovernmentalism andcurrently characterizing supranationalising the Union’s foreign policy,outlining it with a fragmented external profile on the international scene.The limits of the bilateral institutional framework and the difficulty of110 Iulian CHIFU

accurately circumscribing players of the reports/ partnership / transatlantic
community have direct implications on attempts to capture more accuratelythe preferences, interests, reactions and their positions regarding majorissues on the global agenda today .
2. The international context and the emergence of global governance
The challenge arising from shortages in the bilateralism paradigm is added,
as mentioned, to the requirement of placing this work in an angle ofintegrated analysis that transcends the Transatlantic and the backgroundprojects it on the ongoing efforts to redefine the global order. The end ofbipolarism and the East-West division axis diversifies the typology ofpower relations between international state actors, complicating the classicpattern of monolithic configuration of alliances built on the principle ofbendingi before a single, identifiable threat (the expansion of Sovietideology). First, the current international system is marked by elements ofunipolar, nonpolarity, multipolarity or complicating the algorithm forcalculating the costs and benefits option for solution states multilateralcooperation, especially when the issue is freedom of action of a superpowerthat has the privilege of military rule, such as American power. Further-more, international developments influenced both the political and theeconomical and cultural globalization, which tends to substitute theprinciple of East-West confrontation as a key element of impact in shapingrelations among states. Moreover, in the context of globalization, issues onthe international agenda are of unpredictable, interdependent andtransnational actors making by both state and non-state of coordinatedresponses, collective, in an effective system of governance overall. Overallefficiency of the government’s credibility depends on its normativedimension, that of approval and compliance with international regulationssets universal vocation to underpin the current functioning of globalgovernance organizations with aspirations embracing both the compositionand the tasks undertaken (United Nations, World Trade Organization,International Monetary Fund).
Recovering the convergence of the transatlantic vision in the hierarchy of
global issues and their approaches may stimulate efforts to reform andstrengthen the infrastructure of global governance facing a number ofNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 111

difficulties both in terms of legitimacy and the institutional and decision-
making. The very notion of global governance is to be made by critics ofmultilateralism as key test of relevance, since in the view of this side oftheorists of international relations, multilateral cooperation withininternational organizations such as the United Nations system “reduces“ thevoluntary restraint margins, using a certain way of binding instruments ofinternational legitimacy as artifices of inertia. Therefore, although theconcept of global governance is very current and exciting in the theoreticalapproaches of international relations and multilateral cooperation keyinstitutions operating in the global arena, in a more or less effective waythan a half a century ago, their slowness, their partially outdated characterand the delaying of recent reform initiatives have led to the shaping of anagenda of global governance that might actually start from the 2010-2012 .
3. Multilateralism – instrument or purpose?
The range of theoretical instruments that can be used when analysing the
possibilities of redefining the transatlantic partnership based on thecommon goal of ensuring a new global leadership, and thus shaping acommon agenda of priorities to reflect the challenges, interests,opportunities and the availability of the U.S. and the European Union tofind a modus operandi focused on addressing them in a concerted manner
brings to the forefront the issue of “lateralisms“ in the context ofinternational cooperation. The theoretical dispute “ unilateralism versus
multilateralism “was triggered after the onset of the conflict in Iraq and the
shaping of the well-known picture of transatlantic censorship, on thebackground of a myth of antagonimss between a unilateral America and amultilateral Europe, essentially built on the to straightforward and tainted,due to a contextual simplicism, illustrations offered by foreign policycommentators on both sides of the Atlantic.
Understanding the idea of global governance is closely related to clearly
defining the principle of multilateralism as the cornerstone concept ofbuilding international regimes and organizations, institutional structures thatprovide an organized framework with claims of predictability in terms ofmultilateral cooperation between actors global system. In the context oftrying to expose the general definitions of multilateralism as a principle of112 Iulian CHIFU

organization and various forms of multilateral cooperation as a means of
institutionalization of multilateralism we faced the third category ofchallenges mentioned in the initial considerations: those strictly theoretical.Although there is a common academic conglomerate of definitions agreedupon concerning the poles of the unilateralism-multilateralism relationship,there is not a unittary view regarding the impact of the two types ofapproach to international issues, on the efficiency of global government andthe priorities that were successfull or not. This theoretically identifiedaspect transpires, in fact, from the interpretation of views expressed byEuropean and US officials.
When the Secretary General of the European Union, Javier Solana, says that
“we Europeans are instinctively multilateralists and we wish the U.S. to bemore open to multilateralis solutions“, the European leaders’ option to shiftglobal cooperation towards multilateral institutions of global governance isobvious. On the other hand, the views expressed by U.S. Secretary of State,Condoleezza Rice – “multilateral agreements should not be considered endsin themselves“ – places alternatives of multilateral cooperation in a range ofscenarios that should not be generalized, since “ the performances ofmultilateralism do not justify the universal solution label for any type ofthreat to be countered at the international level. However the profoundlynormative difference of “multilateralism as an end in itself“ cannot beequaled with rejecting the idea of international cooperation andunconditionally assuming a unilateralist vision on global issues by the US.Moreover, neither can the assumption of multilateralism by Europeansinstinctively substantiate the myth of absolute fidelity to the approach ofEuropean multilateralist foreign policy. The solution for the multilateralistor unilateralist option is naturally expressed in terms of a pragmaticcalculation of costs and benefits of cooperation, in which the instinctivepreferences can be overturned by some particular circumstances. Obviousdiscrepancies that undermine the soundness of the multilateralist argumentas an end in itself can be seen between the theory of multilateralism and the
way transatlantic actors respect multilateral constraints .
Part of those supporting American unilateralism is generally tempted to
associate the sentence of multilateralism as an end in itself European vision,based on the idea that the project of European integration is essentially aNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 113

very advanced model of multilateral cooperation, which seeks European
partners to promote it globally. There is another camp of the defenders ofunilateralism, which, in contrast, see the European integration project as aCommunity-wide exhaustion of resources available to multilateral EUstates, which in turn affects its unilateral ways of manifesting theorganizations of global governance, particularly economic ones, where thecommission has the right to negotiate on areas of exclusive jurisdiction,doing so focused primarily on promoting European interests. This categoryof critics that frowns upon European impulses to self’proclaim themselves“champions of multilateralism” accuses old members of the EI ofoportunims, hypocrisy and giving priviledge to the forms of à la carte
multilateralism, that they consider unnacceptable when the US decide tostay outside of a framwork of cooperation promoted by European states (thecase of unilateralism by omission reflected in the rejection of the Kyotoprotocol).
Among EU countries, Germany is probably the state showing the most
profound devotion to all paradigms of multilateralism, promoting a foreignpolicy centered on the idea of negotiation and the reluctance to use militaryforce. In Germany today multilateralism is perceived almost as an end initself, an organizing principle behind a world based on the rule (Verrecht-lichung), which – some authors consider – shows up in the low interestshown by Germans to investigate risks and threats related to the scope ofcollective security (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,etc.). If, however, we discuss certain EU policies, about the new energysecurity or the suitability of a project like North Stream in the idea ofmandatory consultation of affected parties, we find in Germany an actorthat can act unilaterally to defend its own interests. Pushing multilateralismto extremes would raise major questions and call into question even thefundamental ideas and concepts such as sovereignty or freedom of states todecide their options in different areas.
There are more or less restrictive definitions of multilateralism, the idea of
flexibility in meeting certain constraints imposed by multilateral rules riskundermining, under this view, the very essence of multilateral cooperation.For example, J. Caporaso presents multilateralism as a form of organizationwhich asks of participants to give up short-term benefits, avoid the114 Iulian CHIFU

temptation to define their interests solely as national interests and also
requires the renunciation of ad-hoc coalitions and policies based ontemporary constellations of interests. However, the attitudes of transatlanticactors in relation to multilateral solutions are rather ambivalent, as bothU.S. and European Union selectivelly address the multilateral or unilateralapproach. Scenarios of what some authors call “selective multilateralism“help mitigating the perception of costs associated with the partially bindingnature of multilateral cooperation that substantiating the vision ofmultilateralism as a tool for promoting national interests and internationalcooperation to meet global targets , in order to exploit global opportunities,or share responsibilities of international risk control.
By promoting a multilateral foreign policy, states are faced with as John G.
Ruggie says, with a trade-off between reaching objectives and asserting
national interest – both possible in the context of a concerted approach – onthe one hand, and accepting the constraints and conditions involving theparticipation in such multilateral cooperation frameworks, on the other. Arelatively close vision is shared by Joseph S. Nye Jr, placing the costs ofmultilateralism in the category of those “investments“ that are recoverablethrough long-term benefits obtained through collective approaches tointernational problems. The thesis of multilateralism as a tool lies in the factthat theoretically states, key players in the existing forms of multilateralcooperation and state institutions, acting according to targets and interestsdefine and pursue their calling in various ways selected from a wider set ofinstruments, including that of participation in different alliances, coalitionsor international regimes. Based on the calculations of each protagonist ofinternational organizations or multilateral arrangements, this mean may beused or ignored. In game theory, cooperative attitude is a way of expressingof interest and defining the expectations relating to the interests of otherparticipants in the game, while the remaining stake is enhancing one’spotential gain. Cooperation means are,in instrumentalist theories, forms ofadjusting their policies according to the preferences of others.
The idea of multilateralism as a means to an end gives an arbitrary note
gives some to international cooperation, involving therefore the freedom toparticipate in scenarios of cooperation – either in international organizationswith a universal vocation, be it the ad hoc coalition, or in the context ofNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 115

compliance with agreements or treaties covering a particular area of
cooperation – but excluding the right to choose the unilateralist approach. Itcan be materialized through unilateral decision to initiate actions outside theexisting international regulatory frameworks, thus independent of the courtsdecision of multilateralism, or the decision to opt-out in relation to certainmultilateral regimes. Instrumentalist vision confers legitimacy of bothunilateralism and multilateralism, given the relativization of both foreignpolicy approaches and placing them in the area of mediation betweenpreferences and preferences derived absolute actors participating in the“lateralism game”.
Define the two terms on the background of instrumentalis considerations
generates a separation of the types of reports that customize the conceptualpair of unilateralism-multilateralism, making possible the coexistence ofantagonistic relations, causal and sometimes more flexible, by a subjectiveoverturn of the meanings of both concepts. Thus, as will be detailed insubsequent pages of this work, the report is mitigated, as first hand uni-lateralism proves to be a catalyst for the creation of multilateral coalitionsand therefore being reassessed as a tool of multilateralism.
European unilateralism
Beyond the straightforwards episodes of unilateralism on certain inter-
national issues promoted by some EU members such as the previouslydiscussed case of France , there are many views that identify an element ofambivalence in the profile of the Union regarding the propensity forunilateralism or multilateralism in global negotiations. Although instatements and at the programmatic level the multilateralism option – bothat the level of the Community and at a global level – is crystal clear, someauthors consider that the EU focus on strengthening multilateralism has ledto a kind of “structural unilateralism“, reflected in its means of interactionwith other parts of the international system. Van Oudenharen believes thatthe entire history of European integration was based on a slightlyhypocritical and opportunistic manner to develop and implementCommunity policies, which defines the contrasting behaviour of Union inthe community and abroad. The internal decisional pattern, based on theprevailing consensus method, differs from that used in the external116 Iulian CHIFU

relations, including – says Van Oudenharen – in the negotiation process for
EU accession: “externally, the EU has gained a reputation linked to its take-it-or-leave-it style of negotiation.”
There is a continuing tension between the self-defining of the Union as a
global inherent multilateralist and its ambition to strengthen its externalidentity drawing a line of demarcation that contributes to the increasedprofile with the help of instruments, from extra-European perspective, canbe perceived to be delivered unilateraliste. For example, along the steps tostrengthen the internal market and common agricultural policy, EuropeanCommission dismissed without any hesitation, existing multilateral rulesand, legally, with greater authority, if they contravened the imperativesEuropean project. In the 60 and 70 The European Commission started topreferential trade arrangements with former European colonies whoselegality was questionable in the context of GATT, but that Brussels hasrefused to submit to an examination of formal multilateral, confirming theirlegal nature on the basis a unilateral mechanism of “self-certification“.Also, in 80 years, in discussions on the single market project, the EuropeanCommission argued against any criticism on the scenario of a “fortressEurope“, but has shown on numerous occasions to abrogate unilaterallydetermine certain pre-existing obligations to multilateral and goals (forexample, where much publicized the new banana import regime,successfully challenged in the WTO by several Latin American countries).Development of CFSP and ESDP project itself was initially regarded withreticence, especially the U.S., as an unilateralist initiative to developmentsthat NATO had to adapt and readjust several times. Finally, critics of theUnion’s self-labelling as multilateral identified certain elements of uni-lateralism even in European law, given the support from the European Courtof Justice for claims expressed by the European Commission that MemberStates should abandon or renegotiate some treaties with third parties thatinclude clauses incompatible with the founding treaties or other directivesor regulations.
Van Oudenharen’s comments on the unilateralism of EU positions in
international negotiations on particular areas of Community competence ispartly supported, where inflexibility in support of certain interests of the EUis synonymous with unilateralism. The same can be said about theNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 117

association and negotiation take-it-or-leave-it style applied by the Union’s
to external relations within arrangements negotiated with the candidates.However, accession to the European Union is a voluntary act. Meetingcriteria for opening negotiations and the subsequent acceptance of technicaland political constraints, along with internal reform efforts in preparationfor the adoption and application of the acquis communitaire are part of thisdifficult accesion “ritual“ that each actor at the negotiating table has to face.The principle of conditionality can be viewed as an expression ofunilateralism and multilateralism. Unilateralism lies in the unequalpositions in a standard process of negotiation: the Union is definingconditions, and the candidate countries have to meet them. The acquiscommunitaire is not negotiable, and candidate states are required (withcertain transitional periods and derogations which were received bycandidates in the first wave of enlargement and, informally, for states thatjoined later) is a necessary condition of integration. Precisely to prevent anyshocks accession candidate countries come across a comprehensive internalreform is part of the preparation for accession to the Union. Therefore,long-term analysis of the restrictive and difficult path of integration of EUcountries is not only marked by the elements of a unilateral approachconcerning the technique of absorption of new states. It can be seen as away of testing and preparating candidates to “play“ the European game reapthe benefits of accession alongside the costs.
In any club, alliance or international organization expansion towards new
countries take place through selective, multilateral or bilateral negotiations,the original border between the “ins“ and “outs“ always placing aspirants inan inferior position and the unilateralist, discriminatory, unequal or rigidbehaviour of countries within that club is often observed.
Unilateralism, an equally acceptable alternative in a unipolar or multipolar
world
The defenders of unilateralism are found in American schools of thought
which explain and is explained by the fact that the U.S. received the label ofboth “champion of multilateralism“, but also that of “champions ofunilateralism“. The thesis that supports the legitimacy and efficiency of a118 Iulian CHIFU

unilateralist approach to foreign policy of a superpower is set against the
background of the unipolar vision of the international system and startsfrom the premise of a multipolar global order.
The author of the famous and controversial essay on unilateralism as the
natural and fundamental option for a hegemonic power to settle majorissues of a unipolar anarchic world, Robert Kagan, considers that thesupport of members states for multilateral institutions and rules ofcooperation is disproportional to the power of those countries. BecauseKagan’s thesis has already been commented in a previous chapter, in thecontext of illustrating the antagonistic profiles of Europe and America, wewill limit here to mention that, in Kagan’s view, powerful states tend toavoid the constraints of international rules, as oposed to poor countries’inclination to indulge and escape under the umbrella of multilateraldiplomacy. Great powers, like the European countries in the 18
thcentury or
the USA today, “more often fear the rules could constrain their power morethan they do anarchy, despite that their power still manages to providesecurity and prosperity.” The idea refers to both the U.S. assuming a specialrole to allow the defense of national interests and an active contribution tosolving global problems, but also refers to the risk that inaction could have,as we developed in another context, bureaucracy and inefficiency ofmultilateral rules governing international institutions.
However, as Charles Krauthammmer, another ardent advocate of the
unilateralist option, says: “The virtue of unilateralism is not only in that itallows the action, but that it forces it!” A strong argument for the use of theunilateralist solution when needed is related to the need to respond quicklyto confront and combat the current global threats, in other words, is relatedto the prevaling mantra that “the end justifies the means“.
When reaching, in turn, “the special role of America in the World“
Krauthammmer particularly emphasizes the idea of a hegemonic force –even if the unilateralist concerted action is not possible – to bring a newcoalition to revitalize the old coalition between states, managing to escapefrom the captivity induced by inertia or the absence of a decision taken atthe multilateral level. Another interesting argument that defends uni-NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 119

lateralism is introduced in this manner and that is the “ road opening role “
of unilateralism :
“The great coalitions are not created by the superpowers begging support
from allies. They are started by raising a position and inviting others to join.What even pragmatic realists fail to understand is that unilateralism is thesurest way to multilateralism.” (…)”. As I learned from the experience of theGulf War, the U.S. attitude of being a proactive leadership – and even thatwillingness to act unilaterally if necessary – is one that has mobilized thecoalition for the Gulf War. Without Bush senior’s statement on Kuweit –This will not stand! – and without the clear indication that America isprepared to act alone if necessary, it would not have been possible to createthis wonderful coalition that now, retrospectively, is so much applauded andillustrated as a model of multilateralism.”
Krauthammer generally uses historical examples related to defense and
security (the Gulf War, the latest conflict in Iraq), where the choice of U.S.unilateralism has led rather to various forms of minilateralism coalitionsthat were smaller, more flexible (Coalitions of the willing). Indeed, suchcollective actions are consistent with the broad sense of multilateralism(that cooperation between more than two states), but not the normativedimension with universalist aspirations: international compliance,generalizing principles of conduct and what Caporaso called the constraintof abandoning ad hoc coalitions and policies based on situationalrequirements or temporary constellations of interests. The argument ofunilateralism being the road opener to multilateralism (within the meaningof selective multilateralism or minilateralism) reveals some ambiguitiesarising from the degree of expansion of multilateral internationalcooperation (European multilateralism – the EU, transatlantic multi-lateralism – NATO global multilateralism – the UN, WTO etc.) or theinterpretation of the legitimacy of multilateralism on a gradual scale: acollective action taken by a limited group of countries has less legitimcythan a concerted approach approved by a court agreed that possesses globalvocation such as that of the United Nations Security Council?
If such a grid is not applied and supported and the idea of diversity and the
legitimacy of all types of international cooperation based on multilateral120 Iulian CHIFU

principles and rules is accepted and assumed by all Member States (in more
than two) involved in cooperation or another, then the only category ofunilateral action subject to criticism or interpreted as incompatible with theidea of multilateralism would be undertaken by a state in an isolatedmanner and in absolute contradiction to all internationally agreed rules.
The boundary between unilateralism and multilateralism is very often quite
vague, especially the idea of unilateralism and multilateralism that does notrefer to the decision-making and voting rules applied, but the wholeinstitutional edifice of international cooperation which includes both thedecision and its implementation. If the U.S. unilaterally decided to ignorethe decision of some multilateral international body, then introducinganother form of multilateralism, can be accused of breach of the principlesof multilateralism practiced only within the UN, but not absolute opacity tothe idea of collective action in the context another form, parallel,multilateral international cooperation through which believe they can betterfight a global threat (ie terrorism). The theme of terrorism in the context ofbroader issues of global security will be included in specific chapter on thisissue.
Most of the American visions which defend unilateralism are built around
the idea of inefficient practices within the UN multilateral approach and therisks involved in self-limitation in case the action is not unanimous or atleast accepted by the majority depending on the voting rules applied.
“Certainly a state acts in concert with others if possible. It is better that
others join it. Nobody plans to be unilateralist. Unilateralism simply meansthat someone who cannot allow himself to be the prizoner of other’s will. In2003, the choice was between a broad coalition and a narrow one, but notbetween a coalition, however limited, and none. There were seriousarguments against the war in Iraq, but the fact that the France was not partof the coalition was not one of them.”
According to true realist tradition, like Robert Kagan, Krauthammer
believes that power is the sole arbitrator and purpose tool that can bedefined as a system of international relations: “In an international systemwithout sovereignty, without a police court, without protection – whereNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 121

power is the sole arbiter, and history has endowed us with an unprecedented
power – we must be vigilant in preserving that power and the freedom touse it.”
Trying to answer – on the basis of visions presented over time by some of
the major schools of thought in international relations (isolationism, liberalinternationalism, realism, democratic globalism) – the key questions relatedto the kind of foreign policy that should be adopted by a unipolarsuperpower, the renowned american publicist Charles Krauthammer optsfor directions suggested by the vision of democratic globalism, which isadjusted with a filter of thought rooted in the neorealist soil. The act ofdoctrinal conversion gives birth to a realist conception of democraticrhetoric and tempers universalist aspirations of democratic globalism. In hisview, democratic realism must be targeted and limited, based on a “belief“part elitist, part realistic: “We are friends to all, but we come ashore onlywhere it really counts .”
Governing global security
The alternative of multilateral cooperation in international organizations is
already investigated in detail, starting from the premises of a “force ofattraction“ of multilateralism as an option for negotiation at theintergovernmental level and continuing difficulties encountered models ofmultilateralism. Among the challenges facing the current forms ofinstitutionalization of multilateral cooperation at international level we find:systemic or structural challenges arising from the reconfiguration of globalorder and relating to the state-centred paradigme, regulatory challenges thathave to do with the legitimacy, transparency and efficiency decision-makingprocesses and mechanisms of international organizations and “hegemonicchallenges“ under the new distribution of global power and impact of U.S.economic and military supremacy on a reconfiguration of the internationalsystem which does not exclude the alternative inclusion of multilateralismin the toolbox as a counterweight to American preeminence worldwide.
While in all the 27 EU Member States, the view on multilateralism is
multifaceted and not very homogeneous in terms of basic objectives thatunderpin the multilateral approach to global issues, the idea of “effective122 Iulian CHIFU

multilateralism“ is found – in the Union’s external strategy elements – as the
ultimate option for European foreign policy. Furthermore, unilateralism as amechanism of last resort, when a multilateral approach is impracticable orineffective, seems to be the strategy recommended by most Americans andthe U.S. agreed in general. The recipe for selective multilateralism, in otherwords, the scenarios of “à la carte“ multilateralism best defines transatlanticpreferences of both players accepting the constraints of participation incurrent forms of international cooperation.
The concept of global governance, addressed mainly in the context of
commercial or financial relations can be defined and analyzed in terms ofinternational security, but integrating it into a grid that goes beyondtheoretical premises of the neorealist vision of international relations isneccessary. According to Elke Krahmann, Krahmann the concept of globalsecurity governance is based on an initial premise that state actors are nolonger the only essential sources of threat to international security.Terrorism, international crime, proliferation are equally important, asotherwise stated in the 1995 report of the Commission on GlobalGovernance. Therefore, the same report concludes: “Global security mustbe extended from its traditional orientation to the security of states, so as toinclude security of people and the planet.“ The premise is closely linked tothe results of recent studies on security Global risks which reveals that thelikelihood of interstate conflagration in decline, in turn has greatlyincreased risk of internal conflicts and transnational threats
A second prerequisite which enables interoperability of the global security
concept of governance refers to the fact that – given the complex nature ofcurrent threats, domestic or transnational – resources of the member statesand effective national security policy arrangements are limited andsometimes outdated, especially when it comes to countering a transnationalthreat. Therefore, the tasks subsumed in broader security issues are handledlargely by organizations and regional or global security alliances, and anumber of private or nongovernmental actors in the area involved in thehumanitarian assistance, the human rights situation, refugees protection ormilitary training. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 123

The premise of reducing costs through shared responsibilities deserves, also
referred to that support, in turn, it supports the chance of effective globalgovernance in the security area. State monopoly in preserving nationalsecurity or international interests is less pronounced, especially in thecurrent neo-liberal rule in the sphere of values and norms of globalgovernance, such as for example privatization or market orientation.
Summarizing the substance of the premises that enable a better
understanding of global security governance concept, we can delineate fourfeatures of this approach to international security issues: 1. Intergovernmental collective approach within the global or regional
security emphasizes mutual trust and therefore decrease the risk ofconflict between states;
2. Multilateral cooperation in the global security governance area requires
the involvement of state actors and non-state actors
3. Concerted management of international security challenges sometimes
lead to a cyclical, structurally neutral ( “Coalitions of the willing“),more flexible coalition configuration reflecting the heterogeneity ofinterests and capabilities of stakeholders, coalitions acting in parallelwith the Old Testament more stable, but structurally antagonistic;
4. The overall project involves coordination of security multilateralism in
the area of security relations among states based on the rules that governand limit the use of force.
The alternative to mainstream multilateralism: a solution?
The US from inefficiency of multilateralism to unilateralism
Almost paradoxically, the history of the concept of multilateralism and
international regimes based on diplomacy through multilateral negotiationsbegins with U.S. willingness to promote the virtues of globalmultilateralism. The universality of values, collective security, internationalinstitutions, humanitarian law, etc. have their origin, like the League ofNations, forerunner of the UN body, in wilsoniam idealism. Certainly, interms of doctrine, the roots of a current thought school that best affirmeditself in the substance of American 20
thcentury “liberalism“is found in
German philosophy from the Enlightenment period. Kant’s politicalphilosophy, namely idealistic-rationalistic speculation linked the “eternal124 Iulian CHIFU

peace“ rational international conditions (the three items “final“) behind
them, have inspired initiatives in creating international peace organizations,the networks of transnational cooperation and the decision to include topicssuch as human rights protection and defense of democratic values in theinternational agenda. The influence of Kantian philosophy is reflectedaccordingly in U.S. initiatives on the foundation of organizations like theLeague of Nations, the United Nations and especially in the visionaryproject of European construction
After WWII, the U.S. helped create and strengthen international
organizations and multilateral institutions such as the UN and its specializedagencies, global economic governance institutions – the Bretton WoodsInstitutions (IMF, World Bank) and GATT, NATO — alliance based on theprinciple of collective security. They also inspired the creation of theOECD, the G7, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE). The idea of substituting the relations of force with collectivebargaining steps on a set of rules of law, institutions and procedures is oneof the constitutional legacies of the largest democracy in the world. U.S. estrangement from international rules and institutions – say somecritics of U.S. foreign policy – has been gradual, giving the first signs ofskepticism about the idea of containment of Washington’s politicalautonomy in the late 60s and early 70s, with the dollar crisis, during theNixon administration. It can be said that the option of tilting U.S. uni-lateralism and supporting a multilateral order was continuous and constant,as the U.S. choosing between a path and the other based on cost-benefitcalculation and the impact of reducing unilateral opportunities andacceptaning the constraints imposed by international regulations.
Contrary to Robert Kagan’s thesis on the inherent and inevitable attraction
between the world superpower’s unilateralism and self-decision, U.S.administrations have not yet opted to promote a principled unilateralforeign policy. Realistically assessing the costs and benefits of employmentin the “institutional bargain“ of multilateralism where the arbitrary exerciseof power is limited each participating partner in the game setup inter-national order. As Joseph S. Nye Jr, stated by multilateralism entails certaincosts, but over time the benefits outweigh the costs and the concertedapproach proves to be the best way to achieve long-term objectives, “a goodinvestment for the future of U.S.” NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 125

The most important mutations occurred after the end of the Cold War and
the emergence of the unipolar era dominated by U.S. supremacy. Initialpriorities announced by the U.S. presidential administrations (G. Bush, B.Clinton and GW Bush) placed in the forefront of their agenda of foreignpolicy efforts the need to improve relations with the UN and otherinternational organizations. George Bush, for example, obtained the supportof the United Nations Security Council for the Gulf War in 1991, and theInitiative in December 1992 to participate with troops in a humanitarianintervention in Somalia.
The onset of President Clinton’s coming into office had in the background
the same commitment to what Secretary of State Madeleine Albright calledassertive multilateralism, ensuring the success of ratifying the treaty on theestablishment of WTO and taking the U.S. decision to engage in militaryraids under NATO command in Bosnia, after 1994, and Kosovo (1999). Theopening towards international organizations was followed by internalchallenges related to hostilities. Republican Congress and its reluctance toUN members, but external circumstances as well, hijacked the multi-lateralist ambitions of the U.S. President. Among the “failure“ of theClinton administration’s multilateralist agenda includes the decision not tosign the Convention banning anti-personnel mines in 1996, the decision notto send to the Senate the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, failed efforts to ratify theTest Ban Treaty on nuclear weapons and last-minute signing of the treatyestablishing the International Criminal Court.
The clear reorientation of U.S. foreign policy to tackle international
problems unilaterally occurred with the inauguration of GW Bush’s term inJanuary 2001. The internal context had also a major impact on the adversityof most of the Presidents’ advisers (despite the opening of the values ofmultilateralism manifested by former Secretary of State Colin Powell) tothe idea of coercion U.S. freedom to act and the full observance ofinternational commitments. External partners and in particular promoters of European multilateralism assisted the U.S. withdrawal from thenegotiations on biological weapons, those related to child rights, to cancelthe signing of the Treaty on the International Criminal Court and theabandonment of the Kyoto Protocol, extremely popular in Europe. Themixture of unilateralist and multilateralist options continued to mark126 Iulian CHIFU

progress during Bush jr’s White House mandate: to obtain support United
Nations Security Council for war in Afghanistan, the successful launch ofnew negotiations in the WTO Doha in November 2001. Even the Iraqiepisode – which was the origin of major international disputes onunilateralism-multilateralism, – debuted on the world state as U.S.availability to fund the alternative collective confrontation of terroristthreat. In late 2002, the United Nations Security Council approved theresolution on resuming weapons inspections related to Iraq and warned Iraqof consequences if they were disobedient in this matter. Unable to obtainSecurity Council approval for the use of force, because France and Russiavetoed – not NATO but the U.S. has abdicated the multilateralist belief andsought flexible solutions to make the mobilization of those states willing totake part in the scenario of minilateralist collective confrontation ofterrorism under the aegis of the so-called “Coalitions of the willings“. Thediplomatic inflection occurred shortly before 9/11 has set the direction ofaction of the Republican team, amid an emerging political strategyrefocused on national interest.
“À la carte” multilateralism
The election campaign for U.S. presidential elections, especially in 2004,
brought back on the agenda of public debate the pros and cons of aredefinition of the U.S. position according to a strategy of prevalingunilateralism or multilateralism. The American vision of multilateralism asa tool and not as an end in itself appears to be structural rather thanenhanced by the background of political circumstances related to thedoctrinal direction of the White House team. Multilateral mechanisms areuseful only when they can promote the American national interest.Therefore, in cases where the assertion of this interest is subject to aunilateralist approach, the institutional framework of multilateral coopera-tion can be avoided: “The foreign policy of a Republican administrationwill certainly be internationalist, but will start from the basis of strongnational interest, not the interests of an illusory international community. “This is a placing in accordance with the multilateralism transposed in thenormes and institutionalised forms of cooperation that have an essentialparticularity of multilateral cooperation, mentioned by John G Ruggie: inpracticing a multilateral foreign policy, states are faced with a trade-offNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 127

between the objectives and promoting the national interest – that would be
possible only through a collective approach – and accepting the constraintsand conditions involving the participation of such multilateral cooperationframeworks.
Trying to identify and analyze the sources of American unilateralism,
Laurent Cohen-Tanugi believes that “American unilateralism is thesynthesis of natural, yet innovative underlying American diplomatictradition, between isolationism and interventionism, its two historic poles,under a triple mutation that characterized the post-Cold War internationalsystem.” Cohen-Tanugi refers to globalization, the total supremacy of theU.S., giving it an almost total autonomy in the full scale phenomenon ofantiAmericanism, reflected dramatically in the 9/11
thattacks. Thus,
unilateralism an intrinsic element of any foreign policy, becomes astructural component of U.S. global strategy in an era of globalisation,unipolarity and anti-Americanism worldwide. The impact of the events ofSeptember 11
thled to the revelation of contradiction between absolute
power and absolute supremacy of the U.S., while diagnosing thevulnerability of the strongest state in the entire world order and thechallenges of global terrorism. Those two factors, power and vulnerability,lead to a tilt of the strategic balance U.S. to unilateralism. The scenario ofunipolarity in international system is increasingly being replaced in theinternational relations literature by the reconfiguration scenario of amultipolar world order or the idea of establishing a non-polar order for the21
stcentury. Non-polarity differs from the idea of multipolarity by deleting
the idea of state actors as the single central paradigm of power and a diffuseredistribution of power between state and non-state actors, each possessingand exercising various kinds of power. For Haass, nonpolarity is governedonly by way of multilateralism and may take the form of a “concertednonpolarity“ based on the creation and use of multilateral cooperationarrangements that are less formal and with low aspirations for a globalconsensus. Haass believes the recipe for global governance in a nonpolarworld is selective multilateralism (à la carte), manifested in various formsof agreements signed between minilateralism or small groups and onspecific issues. The way to address global issues complicate classicaldiplomacy, negotiation and alliances created to address the internationalissues will be rather situational and selective. In a multilateral negotiation,128 Iulian CHIFU

they could share their views and interests on an issue and be inconsistent
on others, which means more flexibility and a more nuanced redefinition ofrelations between states, giving up the dual pattern-state rival alliedcountries. U.S. no longer has, therefore, the luxury of promoting aconsistent foreign policy that reflects the vision of “You are either with usor against us.”
Unilateralism as a mechanism of last resort, when a multilateral approach is
impracticable or ineffective, seems to be the strategy recommended by mostAmericans and agreed by the U.S. in general. It is, as mentioned above,prescription selective multilateralism, in other words, the scenario of“multilateralism à la carte“ as described by the former director for policyplanning in the U.S. State Department, Richard Haass, “What thisadministration will give is a la carte multilateralism. We will study each
agreement and will take a decision, rather than to have a broad approach.”
The selective tactic must be based on an algorithm that identifies
weaknesses and strengths of each possible approach, in particular contextsdetermined by developments on the domestic scene and that internationaldevelopments that the United States must report reactively or proactively.Joseph S. Nye Jr., although advocates for the multilateralist approach,accepts that there are situations where it is desirable to shift towardsunilateralism and suggests American decision makers a set of selection tests– Checklist for Multilateral Versus Unilateral Tactics- it identifies seven
criteria that can determine the balance tilting to either unilateralism ormultilateralism: 1. threat to basic survival interests; 2. impact on maintaining peace, 3. impact on strengthening global public good, 4. compatibility with national values; 5. situations / problems addressed intrinsically in a collective manner; 6. shared responsibility; 7. impact on soft power.
1. In critical situations that have implications on vital interests, not
unilateral decisions and actions should be excluded, but trying to getinternational support is also important. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 129

2. There are multilateral arrangements that may reduce the U.S. ability to
restore peace in certain regions of the world and, given the overall U.S.global military role, security-related interests are more pronounced. It isa situation which justifies in the view of Nye, U.S. reluctance to signthe Ottawa Convention banning landmines and especially the treatyestablishing the International Criminal Court, whose procedures,remain unclear, exposure of U.S. troops from unfounded accusations ofthe commission of war crimes.
3. Unilateral tactics that include elements of compromise to promote
multilateral interests, for the global public good are acceptable andadvisable. This is a special formulation of the argument “unilateralism= catalyst for cooperation“, a unilateral decision that may resultsometimes in creating stronger mechanisms for collective action. Theexample often given by Krauthammer on the mobilization for the GulfWar minilateral coalition by President Bush Sr may be inhanced by afactual reference which is the area of international trade. Introducingthe principle of multilateralism, by applying the most-favored-nationclause in international trade and formalization and generalization of thegold standard in the 19
thcentury had as a driver Britain’s unilateral
decision to open its markets and maintain currency stability.
4. U.S. participation in multilateral cooperation initiatives that promote
passivity or are contrary to American values must also be treated on aselective basis and reporting to international regulations impeding U.S.involvement in the defense of these values may be governed byflexibility. Chinese and Russian opposition in the UN Security Councilauthorizing the 1999 intervention in Kosovo, which aim to stop theactions of human rights violations is, in Nye’s view, a fundamental shiftin the U.S. towards the unilateralist option.
5. The great challenges on the global agenda – climate change, global
warming, pandemics, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,drug trafficking, transnational terrorism, etc. – belong to the category ofissues addressed in a concerted manner, given the impossibility ofresolution through unilatera means of global threats. In this case, theoption for unilateralism is not only not recommended, but isunnecessary, such threats can only be countered with instruments ofmultilateralism. 130 Iulian CHIFU

6. The division of responsibilities and costs is a major advantage that tils
balance in favour of the multilateralist approach, especially forparticipation in military operations. First, employing the U.S. militarywould respond to collective public preferences of the American public.Moreover, in practical terms, the umbrella for such multilateralism inmilitary commitments significantly reduces image and political costsassociated with the size of soft power that the U.S. has and that it has tomaintain in a measure equal with the hard power .
7. Soft power is likely to suffer most significant from variations and
oscillations between unilateralism and multilateralism. Constantinvestment in hard power instruments and their use in a unilateralmanner can lead to an inability to properly value and use soft power.Neglecting its importance leads the possibility to mobilise politicalresources neccessary for its consolidation and consequently determinesa fragmentation of the attractive side of power through excessive andarrogant use of unilateralism.
Under such a scale for cost-benefit analysis, transfering unilateralism from
the status of casual and temporary tactical arsenal to the status of absolutestrategic option would be counterproductive for a global superpower inthree ways: intrinsic nature of the most comprehensive global challenges,diminished transnational impact on soft power and the dynamic characterof sovereignty.
Strategy recommendations made by Nye are somewhat oriented on the
approach of emphasizing the virtues of multilateralism, many of the casespresented as potential exceptions to the rule of multilateralism applicationshall be accompanied by questionable arguments. Paragraph 3 is based onan argument built as a post-facto justification for recourse to unilateralaction . The reasoning flaw lies in the very universal nature of its applica-bility, because it places an argumentative path only theoretically speaking.Consequences cannot be anticipated – potentially (but not certainly)dynamicised for collective action – in the initial stage of choice for uni-lateralism. Unilateral action can have a positive impact on shaping thefuture of minilaterale (or multilateral) initiatives, but may end with a failure– both individually and collectively. Section 4 uses the argument of nationalvalue, which can be compatible or incompatible with a universally acceptedNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 131

value system within a framework of multilateral cooperation, such as the
UN. The argument defending national security through the exercise of forcecould be raised by any UN member state, including Arab countries, whichcould consider Jihad legitimate, through the persuasion of the moral debt todefend Islamic values. Nye’s check-list seems to be rather a usefulinstrument for U.S. foreign policy oriented towards „à la carte“ multi-lateralism which does not exclude, in certain situations, certain aspects ofthe international unilateralist approach. It is about dictated unilateraldecisions and actions – as American leaders themselves – inefficientinstitutions and multilateral cooperation schemes in meeting the newchallenges of the global agenda.
The danger of inertia or passivity generated by missing consensus or
unanimity necessary for the authorization of collective actions (especially inthe UN Security Council) cannot be invoked whenever the U.S. decides toignore the multilateral framework. Those decisions that favor action(independent and unauthorized multilateral courts) and the U.S. opt-outdecisions in certain multilateral arrangements are both labeled asunilateralism is US foreign policy. American unilateralism can therefore beone of employment (unilateralism of commission), and one of omission or
non-involvement). Unilateralism of employment is generally based on
American interventionism in solving certain global problems related to thesecurity sphere. “The war on terror“ – began after the attacks of September11 – is supported by a doctrine of national security strategy that confirmsthe legitimacy of preventive action, whether it is authorized by the UnitedNations Security Council or not. About duet preventive-preemptive conceptwe will discuss at greater length in another context.
Unilateralism of omission, rather well reflected in the decisions of the U.S.
administration during the mandates of Clinton and Bush II, is justified, onthe one hand, by the need to avoid risks posed by the confusing nature ofstandards and international regulations on which some multilateralarrangements operate ( such as the International Criminal Court). Moreover,the decision to opt-out of U.S. compared to some multilateral internationalregimes is a common preservation of freedom of action in priority areas ofnational interest. The most famous example concerns the abandonment ofthe Kyoto Protocol, rejected by U.S. Senate, the Test Ban Treaty or notsigning the Convention banning landmines. 132 Iulian CHIFU

The subtle interrogation in the subtitle of this chapter intended to surprise,
from an anticipatory angle, the complexity of a report that makes itextremely difficult to draw a line betweeen the two visions for foreignpolicy of inexorably unilateralist or evergreen multilateralist. The difficultyderives from the fact that, at the end of this work to investigate therelationship between unilateralism and multilateralism, one cannotformulate a response to the original question, making the relationshipunilateralism – multilateralism easily placed in the area of contradiction,causality or flexibility. The three levels of reporting do not cancel eachother but on the contrary, they preserve their fluctuations depending on thespecificities of the international theme analysed.
The current setting of the international system, the challenges of
globalization, interdependence and the transnational character of the greatthemes of this book make it impossible to build a comprehensive foreignpolicy strategy based on assumptions that are inherently unilateralist orinherent multilateralist. In addition, there are contexts in which the disputebetween what can be defined as unilateralist and what can be defined asmultilateralist is impossible to arbitrate and therefore difficult to solve,especially if we consider that the decisions of opt-out (unilateralism ofomission) in relation to certain projects or multilateral international regimesare sometimes criticized as hard as unilateral decisions to use force tocounter a threat.
The temptation to make generalized conclusions is risky, in that they
circumvent the details and can lead to distortion of the overall vision of theproblem studied, but have, on the other hand, certain virtues, enlightening,involving surprise at some patterns beyond fickle elements. It is almostclear that European states, taken in bulk priviledge multilateralist solutions,especially when the agenda is a security problem and the alternative use ofmilitary force is one of the options. Furthermore, decisions, documents andofficial statements of representatives of the U.S. administration, especiallyafter September 11
th, 2001, can lead to an open conclusion of U.S.
unilateralism as an option of last resort, where the regulatory burden ofmultilateralism is seen as an obstacle to U.S. policy objectives. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 133

Both the U.S. and the European Union have addressed, often in a selective
manner the multilateralist alternative or the unilateralist one according tothe stake. „À la carte“ scenarios of multilateralism could, on the one hand,partially mitigate the perception of costs associated with the binding natureof multilateral cooperation. On the other hand, going towards a flexiblemultilateralism involves risks comparable to opening a “Pandora’s box“from which, more or less legitimate arbitrary arguments can be extractedfor the defense of national interest by unilateral means. For the EuropeanUnion the surest way to strengthen the position as a global player is topromote the principle of “effective multilateralism“. For the United States,participation in infrastructure strengthening multilateralism seems to beperceived as a policy where assuming a certain kind of “captivity“involving the acceptance of international constraints. On the background ofthe two perspectives, multilateralist credibility depends on the effectivenessinstitutions of global governance in meeting the challenges of theinternational agenda, a theme that we try to analyze in the sections below.
NATO as a main representative of transatlantic relations concerning
security
To draw the main lines that could move NATO further, we use a form of
reviewing the main issues of restructuring the Alliance contained even inthe formulas and national projects that will fuel the future debate on theNew Strategic Concept a document that will most likely be approved by thereverential 60
thanniversary of NATO summit.
Thus we set out to illustrate the general debate concerning:
– NATO – regional or global alliance–N A T O – an Alliance based on common values and an effective tool to
defend its members
– What is NATO for the US today?– What do founding members think about NATO? What do new members
think about NATO?
– Will NATO and Article 5 become less and less relevant for EU member
states’ hard security?134 Iulian CHIFU

As methodology we consider the first rule approved by consensus between
the parties, the Washington Treaty with subsequent adjustments, the FinalDeclaration of the NATO summit in Bucharest and related documents andexisting strategic concept dating from the summit in Washington in 1999.Then we discuss how the regulatory provisions that are applied to thefeasibility and practical applicability of the options and future trans-formations of the Alliance can be foreseen.
A regional or global alliance?
We have several lines of evaluation of these perspectives: first, if NATO is
likely to become a collective security organization to replace the UN ordevelop, through a symbiosis or a contract with the UN, in the globalmilitary organization to apply the rules UN Charter / Treaty of Washington /new rules agreed. Although such a line of argument has been launched andseveral premises exist in that direction, we believe that it is unlikely such adevelopment will occur.
Subsequently, we address regional or global perspectives of NATO from
several points of view: location, coverage, if global. Then if contributors,partners, members, the new architecture of NATO could evolve into aglobal organization, the types of relationships with global players. Finallywe cannot overlook the chapter of resources and capabilities that limitNATO’s ability to work anywhere, anytime, under any conditions.
Elements of reform of the collective security system. A global NATO?
Current debates about the UN reform agenda prioritise actions to enhance
the efficiency of the organization in maintaining peace and security. Thecomplex file of restructuring and rethinking the decision making process inthe Security Council is only one faced of the need for the UN reform in thesphere of collective security, which depends on the stimulation of thereorganization of the entire system of global security, includingpeacekeeping efforts, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction.The vast majority of reports or studies related to the reform of collectivesecurity – the independent ones and those required by the GeneralSecretariat of the UN – But consider first of all, a critical evaluation andNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 135

formulation of recommendations on the actions described in Chapter VI of
the Charter, the peaceful resolution of disputes. It is an importantdimension, but certainly less sensitive and therefore has a low potential togenerate controversy that could paralyze the reform initiatives. The “heavy“part of the UN mission in the area of collective security is included inChapter VII, Action in cases of threats against peace, breaches of peace andacts of aggression. This part was deprived of recommendations even in theBrahimi Report, discussion on the reform measures of this type generallyresuming to “scriptwriting“ a very inconclusive restructuring of the SecurityCouncil.
The Brahimi Report, however,served as a reference for shaping the first
“doctrine“ written on the principles and parts of operations conducted byUN peacekeepers. Presented by the Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO) of the UN at the end of 2007, the “Capstone Doctrine“includes that core of unwritten principles derived from experience of over60 peacekeeping operations led by the UN since 1948. Exposure beyond theregulatory framework that guides engaging in peacekeeping operations, thedocument shows the evolution of the UN role in the entire spectrum of tasksrelated to peace and security (conflict prevention, peace restoration,peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building), with emphasis onpeacekeeping. The concept of “Peacekeeping“ does not appear verbatim inthe contents of the UN Charter and is more difficult to define and integrate.It could be placed, as stated by Dag Hammarskjöld, the second SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, somewhere in the chapter “VI and a half“ ofthe Charter, the traditional methods of peaceful dispute resolution(mediation and negotiation) and those involving the use of force authorizedunder Chapter VII was therefore undertaking a complex andmultidimensional. In the report prepared by the group of experts led byLakhdar Brahimi in 2000 the need to develop “a rapid and effectivedeployment capacities“ to engage successfully in peacekeeping missionswas signaled. The efficiency of the operational component of UN acticity inthe field of collective security largely depends on the progress ofinstitutional reform of the organization, particularly in terms of capacity ofthe Security Council to overcome a certain inertia in decision-making level,induced by different visions and interests of its Member States on a numberof particular challenges of global security and practical manners of fighting. 136 Iulian CHIFU

Therefore, given the risk of extending the status quo in the manner assumed
by the UN missions with the highest degree of difficulty of collectivesecurity, many opinions about the reform of the global security system areconverging to investigate the viability of alternative institutionalarrangements, that transcend the UN multilateral cooperation. It shouldbroadly include a possible order in global security, a more effective androbust one, based on UN Charter principles, but built beyond theinstitutional framework of the UN, in order to provide “backup solutions“where United Nations Security Council is faced with the inability toperform tasks subsumed under Chapter VII of the Charter. The scenario of aNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization expanded globally seems a viablealternative and quasi-legitimate according to theorists of collective security.Legitimacy derives from the fact that NATO is the only multilateral securityorganization whose consultative mechanisms and positions can becombined to accommodate the most important democratic powers of theworld, having the most integrated military structure which enables rapidand effective response against Security threats.
However, the legitimacy of such arrangements on a global scale can hardly
be justified by anchoring the principles and values of Western democracies,precisely because that would not meet the requirement of universality. Anetwork of coordination and multilateral cooperation such as the NorthAtlantic Council or NATO-Russia Council (eg. The NATO-NATO Asia orMiddle East) could be a way to extend the authority of the organization totake on security missions overall. The scenario of a “global NATO“ toreplace – as a “default contingency institution“ – the UN is under a criticalsituation to situation transatlantic dimension of security governance in thecenter of the entire edifice of multilateral cooperation in global security.Such a view reconfirms the importance of boosting transatlantic partnershipfor the success of efforts to strengthen the infrastructure of globalgovernance.
A regional alliance, with global partners
Washington Treaty by its name – “North Atlantic“, by its preamble – “is
intended to promote stability and welfare in the North Atlantic region andthe further specification of Article 6 of the area under Article 5, sub-sequently revised ( the disappearance of the Algeria department of France inNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 137

July 3rd, 1962, to win the state independence of Article 2 of Protocol to the
North Atlantic Treaty adopted with the admission of Turkey and Greece inNATO, on 22
thOctober 1951) a regional coverage. This refers both to the
geographical area of the location of its members – Article 10 states that theexpansion can only include European countries without a precise definition– as well as the area of action – Article 6 restrictedly mentions islandpossessions as the “North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer”.
The Bucharest Summit Declaration remains ambiguous on the definition of
NATO as a global or regional Alliance, but the entries in the text leadindirectly to the relevance of the global component. Article 4 welcomes theSecretary General of UN and bilateral cooperation (subsequently signed ina document stating the defense of NATO countries operations of the UNCharter principles and the quality of selective instrument of security whichNATO offers to the UN. To this we add the “ ISAF format “ meeting inBucharest, the first meeting where so called “global partners“ are namedand the importance of the Afghanistan operation is established (article 6 ofthe statement). In addition to this Article 16 mentions the situation in Darfurand Somalia.
But perhaps the most relevant article (in addition to bilateral granted UN-
NATO summit later) is Article 35 of the Declaration, which clearly showsan opening of institutional collaboration with “global partners“ who arepartly appointed, and which is the deep global component of the NATOsummit in Bucharest that points towards the institutionalization of acontractual relationship under the form of partnerships with non-MemberStates and will not become members but who participate in NATOoperations and will receive, in exchange for NATO support in the defenseand security area.
“Art 35. The Alliance attaches great value to the expansion of its diverse
relations with other partners worldwide. Our objective in these relationshipsis to include support for operations, security cooperation and an enhancedcommon understanding to promote shared security interests and democraticvalues. We made substantial progress in building political dialogue andcooperation in the development of personalized packages, a number of suchstates. We welcome in particular the significant contributions of Australia,138 Iulian CHIFU

Japan, New Zealand and Singapore to NATO led efforts in Afghanistan. We
also welcome the valuable contributions made by the Republic of Korea(South Korea-nn) efforts that support the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan.Recognizing that each of these countries wishes to pursue a single degree ofrelations with NATO and that other countries would continue forms ofdialogue and cooperation with NATO we also reiterate our desire tocontinue beyond individual relationships and to develop existing ones,according to the North Atlantic Council’s approval and at a level thatrespects mutual interests.“ From these provisions we conclude that the coverage area has become afundamentall global, that operations are no longer limited geographicallynor are types of partnerships, and there is a component and a fundamentalinterest on behalf of democratic states worldwide to join the defense ofcommon values elsewhere in the world, in open or close partnerships withNATO.
Instead the Strategic Concept maintains regional geographical references –
defense and security of its members but also the first reference of “out ofarea“ after the Strategic Concept of 1991, in Rome, assuming “stability inthe Euro-Atlantic“ is the main objective for which detailed risks, threats,types of forces and capabilities, geographical balance, speed deployment,method of financing etc., are given. It was normal as these were the firstoperations outside the Member States but at the same time as the NATOcrisis management capabilities were developed in areas of the Euro-Atlanticarea, because they could affect Member States. And here we can assumethat it is a regional reference, not beyond the size determined by theWashington Treaty. But this strategic concept should be revised andupdated, as it originated before September 11
th, 2001 and before the first
activation of Article 5 itself.
There is another dimension that announces the opening of a global
perspective with global relevancefor NATO actions and operations: energysecurity and how this is explained within NATO. Thus, Article 48 of thefinal declaration of Bucharest stated “We note the report“ NATO’s Role inEnergy Security “, prepared in response to tasks set by the summit in Riga.Allies identified principles which will govern NATO’s approach in this areaand pointed out options and recommendations for further work. Based onNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 139

these principles NATO will engage in the following areas: synthesis and
exchange of information and intelligence, design stability, promotinginternational cooperation and regional support; consequence managementand critical energy infrastructure support. The Alliance will continue toassess the immediate risks to energy security. We will ensure that NATOachievements represent added value and are fully coordinated andintegrated with the international community and a number of organizationsspecializing in energy security. We designated the Council, the PermanentSECTION, to prepare a consolidated report on progress in the area ofenergysecurity to asses during our 2009 summit.”
Without being a dramatic change of direction, there are two components
that have global lengthening: first that the energy resources come fromaround the world and NATO missions in the direction of safeguarding thefundamental energy resources may therefore expand globally. Thenconsequence management and protection of critical infrastructure -pipelines and sea routes, of equal importance – announce a new direction ofglobal development of NATO, and the need for global partners.
Now, if in fact we were to discuss current issues, which double the elements
of normative-legal nature, we can basically see that we deal with anAlliance with global lengthening, that although does not assume respon-sibilities in the world, in any transaction, not even those that interest the“global partners“, with whom it did not quantify the final formula ofcooperation and mutual support, except NATO led operations(Afghanistan), but who in fact, selectively act based on decisions fromapplications throughout the world. Thus, if the operations in Afghanistan –ISAF, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq NTMI – are known and mostcriticized, we must not forget other missions in developing the air-liftmissions for the UN and EU missions Darfur, the anti-piracy mission off theSomali coast, the latest mission with participation of NATO vessels up toNATO’s naval visits required by Asian countries in Southeast Asia until theFar East, vessels accompanying missions on African Eastern Coast East andthe Meditaranean, anti-terrorist mission Active Endeavor – OAE – off thecoast of North Africa. All these give a real sense of global relevance ofNATO operations and the Alliance itself. In fact naturally the capabilities140 Iulian CHIFU

deficit was covered by cooperation with “global partners“, whose relations
with the Alliance will be streamlined and institutionally integrated in thefuture to sustainably create this type of cooperation.
Globalization and the principle of global governance, especially in the area
of security announces a natural development, organic NATO a global playerby position. Even if future “global partners“ are not actual members, theStates in question and the principles of cooperation show that the choice isnot determined by strategic needs and capabilities to cover the deficit butcontains the in-deepth principle of common values, as specified in Article35 of the Final Declaration of the Bucharest Summit and the list of statescovered by those policies, all “actors belonging to the West“ by liberaldemocracy and free market economy, but also lifestyle and the Protectionprinciples in the preamble of the Washington Treaty , “They are determined
to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of theirpeoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and therule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the NorthAtlantic area“. And the best proof is the posting of “global pateners“ of
Euro-Atlantic states, NATO and Ukraine, the Mediteranean Dialogue andthe Istanbul Initiative in the Gulf area. A full debate on this issue was madein the margin of the Riga summit.
An alliance based on common values and an effective protection
mechanism for its members
From this point of view, it is clear that NATO remains an Alliance clearly
based on common values and an effective tool to defend its members. If inboth cases approved programming documents are clear, the only place todecide a way of conduct is in the expansion Chaper. Here the themes arevery clear in terms of values, but the idea suffers from interpretation of“value added“ to the common defense of NATO members from newmembers, and here the subject has to be approached in a broader discussion.
Returning to the programming documents, the Treaty of Washington states
in its preamble states’ determination to safeguard freedom, commonheritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles ofdemocracy, individual freedoms and the rule of law “, as well as “ the unionNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 141

for mutual defense efforts, maintenance of peace and stability. Article 5 is
one of strength and solidarity, “an attack against one member is interpretedas an attack on the Alliance“, and the chapter reaction, with no explicitbinding participation“ by any means “(as the solidarity clause included inTreaty of Lisbon), “each or jointly exercise their right of self-defensereferred to in Article 51 of UN Charter“ and “will assist in containing andcountering attacks.
Article 10 of the Treaty is relevant in connection with the extension, that
states that “the parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any otherEuropean State to become a member“ if “to further strengthen the principlesof the Treaty and accede to the new member contributes to security NorthAtlantic region. So are the founding principles are specifically maintained,but also a condition of “contribution to the security of the North Atlanticregion“ is further developed in forms and documents that deserves a fulldebate.
The final statement of the last summit of NATO at the Bucharest
mentioned, even in Article 1 ‘commitment to a shared vision and shareddemocratic values’ included in the Washington Treaty. And in terms of newmembers invited to the fundamental principles mentioned in Article 2,namely that “The accession of new members will strengthen security for theentire Euro-Atlantic area and bring us closer to“ our goal of achieving awhole, free and at peace Europe“. It is clear that inviting Croatia andAlbania is not explicitly judged in the light “level of democracy and respectfor values“, but only for “contributing to Euro-Atlantic security“and“ awhole and free Europe“. Democratic principles seem to become a less strictcriteria for admission, but become an important criteria in promotingcommon values in Europe combined.
The only relevant point in keeping the idea that in the space member
countries the principles and values are the results from the MAP assessmentreports of the two candidate countries (IPAP and MAP and the others) andthe clear separation of “global partner“ gives other types of partnerships,which keeps in the area nearest the alliance democratic countries andWestern cultures, wherever they may be found in the world.142 Iulian CHIFU

The current Strategic concept, adopted in Washington in 1999, also
mentions the freedom and independence of States and the principle ofcommon defense with related instruments, but does not refer to commonvalues that would have to defend the Member States, mentioned in thefounding documents and the free and whole Europe formula does not coveran “export of Alliance“ values. Still in Article 10, the security componentspecifies as mandatory the “growth of democratic institutions andcommitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes“. This explanationretains the general formula of checking candidate states’ degree ofdemocracy, more specifically sustainability and irreversibility of democraticinstitutions.
Therefore, under programmatic documents, we can say that, formally,
NATO remains an organization based on its original values, that it expandsbut in accordance with keeping the “added value“ to the common defenseand the existence of stable democratic institutions in new Member States,and that it sees at any point, explicitly, the need for “exporting democracy“,while the interpretation of actual values to new countries invited is ratherloose and based on a political impact, not based on strict criteria.Practical issues show an inclination to maintain values, but see as close theprocess of giving up “exporting“ the criteria outside the Alliance and thecriteria used are not as stringent as the first expansion values.
The contribution of new members to the common defense “North Atlantic
area remains to be discussed. It is clear according to the final Declaration ofthe Bucharest summit, that the signatory states – in this case all – recognizethat receiving new members – Croatia and Albania – has lead to “increasedsecurity“ in the North Atlantic area. In fact, the unstable situation in Kosovoand the fact that Macedonia was not invited raises big questions inparticular because they lack timing of receipt of Albania and Macedoniainto NATO, especially because for the later the reason was a symbolic oneand not concerning the background and, moreover, raised the position ofveto by a single state, Greece, an unprecedented situation and costlesssituation for the Alliance.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 143

Then the actual debate on the contribution of each of the new members, but
also a debate on the contributions of older members, that meanwhileentered the EU, could help us realize that, once entered the EU, states haveover looked commitments and the investment in their capabilities, but alsocontributions to international missions of the Alliance, and how difficult itis to achieve practical validation of this goal, receiving only net contributorsand, on the long term, the Euro-Atlantic security and defense policy.
Secondly, there is an entire discussion on what it means to contribute to “the
Euro-Atlantic security“. According to the strategic concept in place, sinceRome, understanding security after the school in Copenhagen led to afundamental reinterpretation. Thus, the Strategic Concept in Washington andthe content of the declaration of the Bucharest summit covers the securitycomponent with 5 dimensions, thus opening new perspectives for discussionon added value. Thus, as energy security is already a subject in the finalstatement it is very clear that the added value to the security of the NorthAtlantic that a state can bring could also include energy security, in this respectGeorgia being able to be simply interpreted as an added value, for example.
Moreover, the idea of added value is judged by multiple readings: first an
immediate one, when validating the invitation. Then one perspective, thesustainability of the added value. Finally, a prospective, medium and longterm, which would show that if a particular state is not invited, security on acertain dimension, for example the energy in the medium and long, wouldhave to loose. It is clear that even this step is not sufficient, because one testis involved, the Common Defense. And here the problem of defense costsfor a possible outpost that can be deducted from the value added to thesecurity of the North Atlantic area comes into place.
Consequently, the area of reading, interpretation and evaluation is
sufficiently broad to allow each Member State its own evaluation of defenseinterests in relation to a potential candidate. Weightlessness comes from thelack of requirement to respond, even in an activation of Article 5, but alsobroader security needs of the North Atlantic area and nuancedinterpretations of different perception of risks, threats and vulnerabilities onbehalf of each state. We consider it an endless story with no possibility of a clarification of the more stringent criteria and that the range ofinterpretations and arguments reduce any expdansion process to a afundamentally political exercise of behalf of the Alliance members.144 Iulian CHIFU

What does NATO mean to the US today?
The debate on the U.S. relationship with NATO has several distinct and
crucial components that link together and on the way the U.S. (and Europe)see the transatlantic relationship (as shown above) in general, its role as acatalyst for a global force of modeling and change, but some factualevidence as well:
– What is the role we want for the U.S. in NATO – leader, member of a
transatlantic couple or one of the members
– What is NATO for the U.S.: an instrument of foreign policy, among
many others (including, preferably, a predominant bilateral relationshipwith any NATO partner), a structure of legitimacy of their foreign andsecurity policy or a catalyst for joint decisions on transatlantic issues
– How to make decisions / should decisions be made in NATO: U.S.
preeminence, jams of non-consensus, real European consensus counter-weight to U.S. decisions. Obviously this area is judged and effec-tiveness of the Alliance with the negative aspects-voluntarism, orpositive-speed response.
– Sharing responsibilities: Leaving European security to the Europeans or
maintaining U.S. involvement in Europe on security and defense. Thereare also the debates on the budgets, capabilities in operations, costsharing, commitment to NATO operations, the ratio between defenseplanning and expeditionary forces.
– How each of the alliance members sees the expansion and future of the
Alliance and Article 5 (subject discussed in a chapter below).
Obviously, all these are inextricably linked to the perceived threats, risks
and vulnerabilities of the various Allied countries and their citizens, and theperception of the idea of security for each of them. Let us take in turn:
– The US Role and place in NATO: The U.S. is, naturally, a leader in
NATO, not only the first peer, but even a leader of authority anddecision, as long as we talk about a defense of the military-politicalalliance, with a tendency to turn into a political-military alliance, withthe same defensive purpose. But there are variants of the proposedarchitecture, which limit this position: either create a counterweight to“Europea“, and drawing two components transatlantic NATO, whichwould balance a little more, if not military report, even politics, but theNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 145

result would be the polarization of the Alliance, whose effect would be
a split / its disappearance or blocking decision would make the tooluseless. There is a possibility that favors a position of “equals“ betweenthe U.S’s 26. Side effects of a “democratization“ of the Alliance wouldbe loss of interest of the U.S. for the Alliance and its withdrawal, andthat of the U.S. leadership and its capabilities, which would make theAlliance unnecessary or amorphous.
The debate is even more radical, when we talk about too much or too little
US involvement in NATO: some states / political leaders are talking abouttoo much U.S. in NATO, seeing leadership as a way to use NATO toendorse U.S. policies or design its external. Moreover, the idea ofsupporting a European component, the debate about budgets andcapabilities is interpreted to be a “burden sharing“, a “selective approach tosecurity,“ “a bilateral alliance according to U.S. interests “.
We all must agree to the following principles (already accepted by all
Member States, as proven by NATO documents, although disputed by somepoliticians):– The role of U.S. in European security and defense is extremely
important and we must keep the U.S. engaged in Europe (there are anumber of states that see their existence depending on the U.S. securitycommitment to Europe).
– NATO exists and has a direction of development under the current
method of decision making (which will probably remain the same in
the foreseeable future) as long as there is a leadership in agreement withother allies, a sense of development that it is useful to humanity ingeneral, for the Allies, and especially for contributors (the U.S. beingthe largest). U.S. leadership in NATO does not imply any waiver of its
sovereignty, no “atlanticisation“ of European policies, any support /enforcement of U.S. policy or a white sheet over its policies. That iswhy U.S. leadership is required, must be accepted, and interwoven withrational arguments and balanced contributions to NATO operationswhich lead to increased importance of European voices and Europeaninterests in the matter, as long as the U.S. remains engaged in Europeansecurity and European states involved in global policies, balancing U.S.policies and keeping Europe involved in major decisions.146 Iulian CHIFU

–The attempt to bipolarise is unrealistic for the European states (which
still have separate positions), moreover the European pillar could createmajor problems in the functionality Alliance wither by making theAlliance uneffective due to US withdrawal or disporportional – withreduced legitimacy of an important role and voices global policies.
– We have to accept as legitimate that NATO is an instrument of foreign
policy for each allied state, the more so for the U.S., which thereforeremains committed to Europe. It becomes necessary then for Europeanstates to direct themselves towards an effective and balancedcontribution to the mission and demonstrate an integrative nature, anddivide the costs and benefits in proportion to the contributions, andwith strategic size and profile of each state.
– The U.S. and other countries have the right to pursue policies which
relate to all allies and other dimensions, and using other tools. So theU.S. are allowed to apply bilateral instruments (to limit the decisionformula and formulas involving unilateral application of force that canbe clearly agreed in the Alliance, and the current leadership is inclinedto the U.S.) when EU or other states are not interested, and the EU mayhave its own operations in acting with the support or infrastructurecapabilities of NATO or independently.
– Coverage of legality and legitimacy is reciprocal, and can be agreed
upon through the Alliance’s system decision making system, to definethreats and define areas of the Alliance. The problem of capabilities (atTransatlantic level) is also mutual, and as the US has militarycapabilities needed by the EU, and the United States needs capabilitiesthat are European. Thus, in the spirit of multilateralism pursued by theEuropean Security Strategy, the EU needs to keep the U.S. engaged inEurope and to participate in operations outside Europe (when it comesto transactions pertaining to the defense of Europe and North Atlanticsecurity zone perceived as common).
– The report between a separate action or other instruments (possibly ad
hoc coalition of the willing) that U.S. and EU and NATO joint actionmust fall towards zero, while transatlantic perception matching risksand threats, but also capabilities and involvement in third spaces, mustbecome more compatible.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 147

These principles are able to give solution for the following issues, solution
that will befit all those involved:
For the US NATO is obviously a tool of foreign policy, among many others
but the deep involvement of the Alliance in other directions showinginterest on other planes can bring almost all of these issues on thediscussion board within NATO, NATO’s involvement as a whole, withincreased security and strategic profile and the EU, and minimizing (tozero) U.S. actions outside the station. The “global partner“ approach inNATO goes along the same lines and debate issues of defense and securityin the formula equal to the Alliance, and not in another setting (notexcluding here the UN Security Council). No one will discuss these issuesoutside of the Alliance if all these problems are “insider“ problems ofinterest to all.
The formula can indeed bring legitimacy to U.S. policies, but it can also
influence them and all European states and allies in operations anddecisions and then fear of legitimizing a “unilateral policies“ of the U.S.decreases exponentially because it is much less expensive for Washingtonto engage the Alliance in steady action, with cost sharing than a unilateralor random formula, which may result in higher costs, especially withdecreasing levers that keep temporary U.S. allies close. Equally thisapproach is less costly for European states, than the formulas involvingindifference and carelessness on specific issues, with time effects or theresponse after a unilateral action that may affect the interests of Europeanstates allied in a third area , the more you spend on taking away credibilityfrom the US or delegitimising its actions. Moreover, a problem of thismagnitude in a sufficiently efficiency and speedy bureaucracy to keep itattractive, is more interesting for the United States and any allies to balancethe actual policies. NATO may thus be a true catalyst for joint decisions ontransatlantic decisions regarding security and defense issues.
Concerning the decision making process in NATO, the de facto acceptance
of U.S. rule is less harmful and realistic, even in the necessary leadership inthe Alliance than the loss of interest or commitment in Europe and the U.S.decision to move outside the Alliance. Here are some important bottleneckslimiting the consensus by the themes ambitions minor or purely symbolic,148 Iulian CHIFU

and real consensus obtained through discussion of arguments and tactical
failure to achieve the strategic objective of all employment decisions withinthe Alliance, and avoid excessive forms of obvious to a Europeancounterweight to any position or draft decision of the United States, thedirect effect of polarization.
Obviously the effectiveness of the Alliance with the negative-voluntary or
positive-speed response aspects are being judged here. When bothdimensions are covered, it is natural to maintain joint decisions andoperational effects and efficacy in cases that require prompt responses.
Here is the place to debate a subject that is accused of being a proof of
safety division and that the U.S. responds only where it has interests inEurope, on a bilateral basis. We believe that this assertion is fundamentallyflawed and is evidenced of a lack of strategic defense planning.
The fundamental mistake comes from a lack of interest in the subject of
missle defense in Europe, a subject that is costly and unpopular. In fact,here we deal with an added value that the U.S. has brought to othercountries by locating an additional defensive tool, for a threat that is notshared by all states. Here we can add numerous technical elements thatshow that the allied targets are not covered by exemption from theimmediate holding capabilities, moreover, is already negotiating with theRussian Federation submition of an additional shield. Who made thisassertion denies lack of obligation to the American tax-payer to fund onlyelement of the defense of Europe and the location of a European defensevalues plus a state-funded sophistical may be interpreted as an obligation ofthat State to produce the same type of defense for all the Allies, at theirexpense. However this interpretation as a “divisibility of defense“ forNATO states is at least laughable.
We will not conclude this section without addressing the idea of common
principles to broadening the Alliance. Even accepting that the U.S. looksupon the NATO expansion as an opportunity to influence policy in the east,the same can happen with all the Allies, for all of them are involved in thesedecisions. Moreover, the formula proposes greater involvement andincreased interest of all allies for a much broader category of issues subjectNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 149

to change “expansion of political influence in the east“ of an actor in
“Eastern enlargement of NATO’s political influence, all allies, including ofthe Europeans and the EU as such. Obviously, each step comes with costsand benefits for security, but we do not believe it is true that it increases thedirect cost of territorial defense only because the new geographical area ismuch higher. Instead, each new Member State shall be received as an addedvalue of transatlantic security and defense of the region and the comoninterface front with non-member States that can be seen as threats isrelatively constant.
What do founding members think about NATO? What do new
members think about?
We will attempt to briefly state what the main vision of foreign policy
pursued by Member States of the European Union against U.S. power andto identify, therefore, certain reactions, trends and preferences expressed
by European “voices“ in a context of transatlantic relations.
Distinct echoes of European “voices“ were caught with greater clarity on
the background of the fracture occurred in the transatlantic partnership as aresult of U.S. military intervention in Iraq. Of course, reporting how thecontroversial decision of European foreign policy of the Bush admi-nistration in that particular context can be interpreted in terms of limitsinduced by circumstancel. However, this episode generating dilemmas andtransatlantic divides had impressive effects on the academic efforts toexamine the seriousness of the crisis (temporary divergence or theconsequence of structural differences in addressing international issues), toidentify and understand the causes of this crisis and, not least all, to proposevarious scenarios of a solution to this impasse.
Generally speaking the literature on “transatlantic crisis“ oscillates, on the
one hand, proEuropean visions of those defenders of multilateralism andAmerican unilateralism in dealing with attorneys’ global issues. On theother hand, it is easy to see the current trend of most theorists of inter-national relations going to extremes, stressing that strategic convergence isan element that provides a “Transatlantic optimism“ – a fact largelycontradicted by actual developments on the global scene – or those divisive150 Iulian CHIFU

elements seeking to anticipate a worst-case pathscenario of transatlantic
relations – scenario also contradicted by the recent rather encouragingtransatlantic cooperation dynamic.
We will take as benchmark a neutral and balanced contribution, which is
noted in the vast literature of transatlantic relations for the lucidity withwhich it dissects, at the interface between politics and theory, the division ofthe Western world. Using theoretical scales offered by three schools ofthought – realism, liberalism and constructivism – the authors of the volume“Divided West. European Security and the Transatlantic Relationship
divided the continent into five customized profiles based on strategicoptions as a proportion of U.S. foreign policy vision: “ Atlantic Europe“,
“Core Europe“, “New Europe“, “Non-aligned Europe ‘and’ PeripheryEurope.
The UK is the best illustration of the “Atlantic Europe“ and examining
“special relationship“ between the U.S. and the UK brings to the forefrontan Atlanticist position which, while expressing concerns about the trends ofAmerican hegemony unilateraliste, defends the US foreign policy approachand support the inefficiency of the Gaullist French and German approachesat the level of their impact on the administration in Washington. By aligningitself to U.S. policy and choosing a direction opposite to that taken by“Core Europe“ (“Old Europe“), the United Kingdom reiterated itstraditional role of transatlantic broker, an increasingly ambiguous anddifficult role.
A similar point of view on the role of Britain as a “bridge“ in transatlanic
relations, but perhaps far too optimistic in terms of vision related toregeneration of transatlantismului is suggested by Timothy Garton Ash.Timothy Garton Ash does not necessarily advocate the idea of transatlanticbalance, but tries to investigate alternatives that could restore that balanceor that would alleviate, at least, the impact of critical elements that markedthe transatlantic relations in recent years. The key for euroatlanticistconsolidation is also British. Beyond bilateral relations between Europeanstates and the U.S., Britain must assume the role of binder and “performer“in the relationship between EU and U.S. “Great Britain links with Europeand America are so strong and vital that the choice between Europe andNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 151

America would be like choosing to shoot your right foot or left foot.
Therefore, we must try with all our forces to push Europe towards Americaand America towards Europe”.
Redefining transatlantic relations depends on the strength of strategic
“euroatlanticist“ visions struggle between two European ways ofattempting to deal with the U.S. partner: “neo-Gaullisme“ and “neo-churchillism. As Europe, guided by the vision of French, will adopt anincreasingly neo-Gaullist view, fostering EU-US opposition, the U.S.unilateralism will become stronger. On the other hand, the United Kingdomshould avoid extreme neo-churchillism, allying the U.S. unconditionallywhenever the need to choose between the two, so as not to compromise theneutrality and the role of binder and its position as a member of the Union.Obviously, any evidence of multilateralism in the U.S. would helpEuropean euroatlanticism.
The “Core Europe“ ( “Old Europe“) vision in relation to the U.S. is best
expressed, in the opinion of Forsberg and Herd, by Germany, particularlysince it expressed its view against U.S. military intervention in Iraq beforeFrance, giving, as Maria Wagrowski, states, “the tone of relations betweenthe EU and the U.S. at that time“. However, immediately after the U.S.invasion in Iraq, including the vast U.S. initiative on the “global war onterrorism“, the German position was reactive rather than proactive to thesubsequent “global war on terrorism“, proving the absence of internalpolitical will to place national Foreign Policy in a European context.
“New Europe’s “ position – a concept that means a group of new EU
Member States – is built on a realistic approach to transatlantic division,which supports the idea of U.S. prevalence in the international arena,focusing on the historical argument to support U.S. dependence rather thanthe fear generated by American global hegemony. However, the force of thenew Member States’ Atlanticist attitude is questionable in terms of thepromoters of this theoretical scale, since, although it seems unlikely that“New Europe“ states will ever take up an open hostile position onWashington, their view on international relations does not differ radicallyfrom the old Member States. The interests and ambitions of these countries152 Iulian CHIFU

outline a European profile visible in time, especially by engaging in the
development of CFSP and ESDP, which will contribute to “New Europe’s“critical attitude of towards developments in U.S. policy on global security .
“Non-aligned Europe“ includes those EU countries not members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Sweden, Ireland, Austria and Finland.True to the principle of military neutrality, non-aligned states, althoughgenerally adopt an equidistant policy between “Core Europe“ and “AtlanticEurope“, do not share the same strategic thinking and do not act as acompact block when they relate to the U.S. The neutrality policy of thisgroup of countries can be supported, Forsberg and Herd’s believe, to theextent that the strategic dissonance between “Core Europe“ and “AtlanticEurope in the transatlantic relationship, NATO and the future role andfunctioning relationship between NATO and the European security anddefense persists. In the event of a scenario of strategic convergence betweenthe views of the two blocks, the field of maneuvering of the countriespromoting the principle of military neutrality will be limited and theirforeign policy option will be more difficult to support.
The impact of the ‘Periphery Europe’ vision on the heterogeneous spectrum
of strategic positioning of EU Member States against the United States isextremely important, especially as Russia, the exponent of the concept of“peripheral Europe“, has a potential to become an actor of disagreementboth at the Union’s level and at the transatlantic relations plan. But it isunlikely that Russia would opt – in a systematic manner and based on arealistic calculation – for a policy of operating transatlantic disagreements,because its interest are to address a constructive relationship with NATO,and consequently with the U.S. and the European Union.
1. NATO Secretary General
In his speeches as representative of NATO, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer sought to clarify the importance of NATO in collective securityand prevent potential threats from emerging. NATO’s official representativesees NATO as “the collective effort of many in order to ensure the securityand more“, which emphasizes maintaining the security of NATO membersand partners NATO’s leading role.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 153

Also, concerning the future of NATO, the Secretary General’s statements
we can substrat the idea of NATO training and involvement in preventionand resolution of threats that are not neccessarily classic but newchallenges such as terrorist cyber attacks, WMD proliferationor loss ofenergy resources. It is clear that the future NATO perspective involvesdiscussing emerging risks, an analysis of threats that may affect the safetyand security of future generations and ensuring an effective response tothese threats by developing their capabilities and making partnerships.
Thus, at the Bucharest Summit, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer insisted on the 4
main themes, which refer to the role and evolution of NATO:1. reaffirming NATO operations as a vital security element- indicating
here the importance of involving NATO in Afghanistan (to prevent thereturn of extremist camps, building a democratic and stable areas) andin Kosovo, but also undertaking joint action with the UN, EU and othermajor international organizations;
2. strengthening European space – opening NATO to the countries of SE
Europe, Ukraine and Georgia, and by strengthening relations withcountries in the Balkans (Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina and evenSerbia)
3. extension of NATO’s partnerships across the Euro-Atlantic area – since
it is an era of globalization and NATO partnerships must reflect this;
4. addressing new risks and threats.
Finally, NATO’s Secretary General believes that NATO needs to ensure its
relevance and effectiveness concerning long-term actions, to show moreclearly the public role and importance of NATO, and to consider theanswers to various problems that only arise temporary and to bear in mindthat permanent changes are necessary, sometimes even radical approachesto NATO. In the near future, NATO will continue to deal with strengtheningits relationship with the EU, enlargement of the alliance, stabilizing the“failing states“, the integration of new players (India, China) in the overallsystem, and combat threats like climate change, migration , proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, etc.154 Iulian CHIFU

2. Founding members
BELGIUMBelgium’s position on NATO’s future was underlined by HRH Prince Philip
of Belgium in a speech delivered at the NATO headquarters in Brussels.HRH appreciates in a positive direction the alliance’s leadership onenlargement, the renewing of its political and military structures, itsrenewed strategies and new missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan.Belgium has always agreed to assume responsibility as a founding memberbut also as the host nation of this organization; it also accepted andencouraged the integration of the seven countries in NATO that have provedto share the same vision. Belgium is in favor of as closer partnership withthe Russian Federation as part of the objectives pursued by NATO: peaceand security.
Belgium considers that real protection is gained through solidarity,
alliances, unions, partnerships, a society that is built together, a communitythat shares the same values. Belgium promotes “building bridges“ betweennations to increase security and promote integration to strengthens and openmulticultural societies promoted by NATO countries. These are theprinciples that guide Belgium within the organization.
According to Belgium NATO is a real European and Atlantic organization,
which is what makes the organization unique and powerful. U.S. support isessential for Europeans. Belgium needs and fully supports a transformedNATO, an alliance of determined and well equipped members to meet newglobal challenges. After concluding a meeting with his Ukrainiancounterpart, Yulia Tymoshenko, Prime Minister of Belgium said thatUkraine is not ready yet to join the North Atlantic Alliance as not all theprerequisites for accession have been met.
CANADA
In the Canadian view, NATO is the pillar of the relationship between
Canada and Europe. Canadian participation in NATO included exercisesconducted with allies and includes a high-level voice on matters of securityand stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 155

Canada is involved in many operations under the aegis of NATO in the
Balkans, in Iraq (since 2004 mainly in training security forces), in Africaand Afghanistan. The Afghanistan chapter is a priority for the Canadiangovernment. ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) proves thepractical role that NATO has in ensuring peace and security beyond theEuro-Atlantic area. Providing a stable, democratic and secure Afghanistanis a top priority of NATO and Canada. Canada strongly supports NATOleadership in Afghanistan and currently has about 2,500 people belonging toCanadian Forces in Afghanistan (Kandahar). Canada is proud to fight forachieving the ideals of NATO. The Canadian public opinion has voicedsolidarity for the allies’ in the mission in Kandahar.
FRANCE
France’s attachement for the transatlantic relation is a sustainable and
traditional one. France maintains that no coalition can replace the Alliance,that NATO must adapt to the new context and that the main asset of theorganization in the future will be to strengthen Europe and defense. Franceadvocates a continuous dialogue and respect between partners, and makespublic their absolute solidarity for Turkey if it were threatened. NATOenlargement is a salutary decision since the alliance is in a widergeographical framework and a more consistent one at that. France supportsthe establishment of a NATO reaction force. The greatest asset of NATOwill strengthen European security and defense policy who does not want acompetitor but an alliance partner. In view of the French in the future theAlliance must take into account several issues: continuing efforts tomaintain stability on the European continent, refurbishing its militarystructures, supported by strong upgraded European relations between allcountries kept through of consultation and cooperation.
In the French vision the future of NATO largely depends on the future of
the EU and the ESDP French commitment to NATO is a strong oneconsidering the fact that France is one of the first countries that contributeto the alliance’s budget and French troops have been engaged in NATOoperations under UN mandate for 15 years. The fact that 21 EU countriesare also NATO members shows in the French view within NATO we findthe same values, same culture, same history. At present we can only speakof NATO and the EU together for defense, security and peace. France has156 Iulian CHIFU

proposed four measures to promote NATO’s transparency and cooperation
between the alliance and the EU. Among the priorities of the French is theassociation of non EU NATO members to the ESDP.
Concerning the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO, France has
encouraged this, and noted that the two have the vocation to be members ofthe alliance, but stating that accession is a matter that has a timetable.However, at the December meeting in Brussels the French Minister forEuropean Affairs Jean-Pierre Jouyet said: “The accession of Ukraine andGeorgia is not current, nor are the interests of Europe or its relations withRussia“; at the Bucharest summit Prime Minister Francois Fillon claimedthat France opposes the accession of Ukraine and Georgia because he thinks“ it is not the right answer for the balance of power in Europe and betweenEurope and Russia and we want to conduct a dialogue with Russia on thisissue.“
France is more skeptical with regard to NATO’s cooperation with other
countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, etc.
ITALY
Italian Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero stated in one of his speeches that
NATO’s role is to ensure stability and peace. He also mentioned that NATOhas proved the most successful alliance in history and still associates it withthe success the Alliance had in defending the West and the fight againstcommunism.
In his view NATO countries had to switch to an active employment policy,
not only for the security service but also for international peace andstability. NATO is also influenced by two seemingly contradictory factors:continuity and change.
In continuing his speech the ambassador wanted to add that NATO has
always been unique in combining North America and Europe – with thesetwo common links (cultural, economic and political). As he furtheremphasizes the Transatlantic Alliance is a framework that allows allcountries regardless of the statute to be heard, to seek solutions based onconsensus and to train and support military forces in action. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 157

LUXEMBURG
Luxembourg’s Defense Minister, Luc Frieden, says that NATO is an
indispensable tool for international security. In his view this organizationwill need to ensure stability in the world at least for the next 20 years.NATO is a unique institutional platform where international security issuesbetween Europe and America are discussed. NATO’s future must take intoaccount these two coordinates: the existence of a very effective militaryalliance and a firm commitment from all members.Foreign Minister of Luxembourg Jean Asselborn stressed that NATO’sdecisions have had a major influence on neighbours – including Russia.
THE NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands is one of the main participants in the NATO mission in
Afghanistan. Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende highlights the need for theEU and U.S. to work together. Following a visit to the White House thefoundation of cooperation between the two countries as NATO allies tocombat AIDS / HIV in Africa, were put into place. FGBAD (Future GroundBased Air Defense) is related to interoperability with other NATO airdefense systems. The Dutch Parliament approved the extension of themission in Afghanistan until 2010. Future vision of the Dutch alliancedepends on success in Afghanistan.
NORWAY
If after the Cold War NATO was looking for new tasks in the future the
challenge will be to choose tasks according to the resources owned andavoid spending them inefficiently. The future development of theorganization should be based on a common political basis. Norwaywelcomed the improving political climate in the bosom of NATO once thenew orientation of the U.S. (Bush’s second term) came into being. Thechallenge for NATO’s future remains to solve the problem of Afghanistan.NATO is vital for the future of an exemplary coordination among allies.Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Store, has proposed severalpropositions in order to improve coherence and international involvementof allies: the UN must take command of its international efforts inAfghanistan, we must improve cooperation and dialogue between capitalsand headquarters of international organizations.158 Iulian CHIFU

In terms of the NATO – Russia cooperation this is an important point that
involves a multitude of demands. It is easy to see that the NRC has notevolved at the level expected when it was founded, not when it comes topolitical dialogue nor when it comes to practical cooperation. Norwayhopes for a greater involvement by the Russian Federation. Working in theNRC is characterized by routine and lack of dynamism, issues on whichNorway wants to have a word to say. Norway supports NATO cooperationwith other countries like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea. InNorway’s view NATO needs global partners but must not become a globalorganization. Perhaps the biggest challenge that NATO has to face is tosupport the population of member countries for the actions they carry out.
PORTUGAL
Portugal’s contribution to the alliance has increased significantly over the
last decade in particular by participating in the IFOR in Bosnia. NorthAtlantic allies are still having a key role in European collective security andparticipation is essential for security and stabiliaty in Europe asdemonstrated by the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Portugal supportsFrance’s policy to strengthen the foundation of the European pillar withinNATO. In view of the Portuguese NATO has to reform and develop bystrictly pragmatic principles. Portugal supports cooperation with countriesof the Mediterranean basin, Africa and South America
DENMARK
Denmark is in the process of transforming its armed forces, which will
allow them to double capacity to participate in NATO missions. NATOmust transform itself to remain a relevant organization, according to newthreats: terrorism, failed-states and the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction. NATO’s future must take into account a major transformationin the armed forces made by transforming its national armynationale. TheDanish Minister of Defense sees in the future of NATO the need to givecredibility to this organization in the eyes of public opinion. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 159

The US
In his speech at the Bucharest summit, the U.S. President expressed, on
behalf of his country, his desire to see a united Europe in which all statesmust benefit equally from freedom and stability. He welcomed the NATOexpansion, which in his opinion annulled the division of Europe and saidthe purpose of this summit is to expand alliance.
The U.S. is, according to its president, willing to expand the alliance
towards countries that want to be part of it, considering that this would bevery much to their benefit and to that of NATO in general, the extensionmust be made, in his opinion, based on merit rather than subjectiveconsiderations.
In fact, the leader in Washington stressed that even Georgia and Ukraine, as
well as any European democracy that can fulfill the responsibilities thatNATO membership may join in future.
America says that the foundation of NATO lies not only need a security
policy of the U.S. and Europe, but also a common civilization, whosevalues should be protected and promoted together so they must act inconcert against major threats like international terrorism, threatening thecivilization.
The values it wants NATO to promote are the values promoted by the
United States for a long time, namely freedom, democracy and humanrights, and an optimal tool to ensure the triumph of these issues worldwidewould be NATO, as demonstrated, says George W Bush, in Afghanistan andIraq.
However, the alliance is designed to protect all innocents, possible targets
of groups hostile to the values expressed above, and NATO is thereforeespecially important because it is the means by which each person can feelmore secure. 160 Iulian CHIFU

Bush has argued that unless you fight against enemies on their territory we
will have to fight them on our territory which would increase risksenormously. In other words, to preserve the safety of citizens of the allianceit is better to work remotely wherever necessary.
North-atlantic troops ensure stability, necessary security for new
democracies such as Afghanistan and Iraq. For reconstructing areas wherebuilding a democratic state is at its beginning the U.S. launches new troopsin those areas, to fight alongside the democratic forces against localextremists and to improve living conditions and safety.
NATO is therefore in the view of the American President, according to his
speech in Bucharest, a coalition the U.S. has the honor of being a memberof, with the aim of serving the values of open society and will continue topromote the same policies in the future, which is closely related to itsnature, its reason to be. Victorious NATO operations are seen by Bush as ademonstration to the world that the international situation is not under thecontrol of terrorist factions, but under that of the forces supporting thevalues present in the U.S. and Europe.
In the future, President Bush says that NATO must meet the growing
challenges, fueled by technological developments; to this purpose hestresses the importance of anti-missle shields in Eastern Europe and thePacific, for defense against potential missle threats from states whosecapacity to produce them increases, such as Iran or North Korea. So theU.S. believes that 21
stcentury NATO must pass from the simple philosophy
of intervention to that of prevention, deterrence, evoking the raised shieldsand victories in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq as good ways todiscourage threats.
In other words U.S. leadership sees a continued evolution of NATO, which
is an adaptable structure that can always change the philosophy andmethods to deal with new realities: the Cold War alliance was intended onlyto protect Western Europe from the USSR, without there ever being anNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 161

operation to this end during this period, then, after the end of this era it was
an open organization, in which countries from the, now defunct, communistspace could enter, it reached intervention in unstable areas, so in a morepolitical active role, to a much more obvious and more important presenceso that in future NATO efforts will prevent possible tensions and tragedies.
3. New members
Regarding the position of the States of Central Europe towards NATO and
the future of the alliance, it is to support its initiatives.
– After the Bucharest Summit the Member States of the Visegrad Group
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic made a joint statementexpressing their support for Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO
– These countries from Central Europe believe that the U.S. has a major
role in the alliance and therefore their position is to work to determinethe U.S. to realize that their support for the alliance is indispensable,better said the U.S. commitment to Western European states extends tothe states in Central Europe and therefore the U.S. security commitmentis indispensable
– Members from of Central Europe consider that NATO is the only
military alliance capable of ensuring security in view of the that the EUhas not yet developed a security policy dimension that will be able toreplace NATO forces in the defense of Europe
POLAND
Poland’s security strategy sees in NATO a military alliance that should
strengthen its role in Central Europe and should focus on strengthenedregional cooperation . To become a “coalition of subcoalitions“. AlsoPoland’s NATO membership offers greater security and is an additionalsecurity guarantee to Poland’s domestic and international development. It isin the interest of Poland that NATO remains a military alliance whosepurpose is to ensure the security of Member States. Strengthening162 Iulian CHIFU

capabilities and strengthening relations between allies is a priority for
Poland’s external security policy. Also Poland is aware that the NATOmilitary alliance must be able to cope with new threats to internationalsecurity such as the assymetric conflcit , proliferation of weapons of massdestruction.
Poland is in favor of NATO’s continuing military transformation, and it
supports the idea of designing a new NATO strategy corresponding to aredefinition of the role in preserving the security of alliance members.
Poland is in favor of a reapprochement between NATO and EU considering
the two as complementary and not competing.
THE CZECH REPUBLIC
It considers that its main security threat is represented by states, non state
organisation which do not respect the rules of international law and thereforesupports the emergence of a new strategic concept of NATO to provideleadership in promoting democratic values and imposing peace and stability.The Czech Republic believes that the danger of spreading weapons of massdestruction requires specific methods in terms of preventing their spread andemphasizes that this requires some specific equipment of NATO’s militaryforces which should play a role in preventing such a situation
The role of NATO is to remain a military alliance able to cope with new
type of security threats and to cope with the tasks of peace enforcement andpeacekeeping.
UNGARIA
Hungary considers NATO presence on European soil as a guarantee of its
security on an international level.Participating with troops to NATO missions is a problem for Hungary as thepopulation does not agree with some of NATO’s actions. Also because of thelack of capabilities and due to budget cuts for defense the danger is that Hungarywill not able to meet obligations arising from membership of the alliance.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 163

ROMANIA
The access of the first three East European states to NATO in 1999 was
followed by the biggest wave of NATO enlargement in its history in 2004when 7 states were admitted into the alliance. The NATO leaders reaffirmedeven at the Istanbul Summit that the Alliance doors will remain open todemocratic countries in Europe that are willing to assume responsibilitiesand obligations of membership, under Article X of the Washington Treaty.
The summit in Bucharest was a milestone in establishing new lines of
action for NATO and the transformation of the Alliance into one that canmore easily adapt to security requirements. As NATO Secretary GeneralJaap de Hoop Scheffer said, NATO’s main objectives in the coming periodare to significantly accelerate the transformation of the organization,continue to provide support for Afghanistan to become a democratic nationand governed properly, but that the Alliance must retain its strategic andmilitary advantage which is why all Member States should continue toinvest in military capabilities to make them more flexible and to ensure theright equipment.
Romania, for example, is one of the new states which supports the
Alliance’s enlargement policy and wishes to broaden the areas of policybeyond the Black Sea region, to countries like Georgia or Ukraine, andenhanced partnerships with Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan. As thenewcomer in the Alliance, Romania strongly supports NATO policy both interms of political transformation and expansion of partnerships, as well asthe promotion of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction andfighting terrorism. On the one hand, Romania wish to join NATO wasunable to determine a particular foreign policy line located in line withNATO needs to show the availability and necessity for Romania, in termsstrategico-military. We must not forget that Romania has access to the BlackSea area of great strategic importance which managed to capture, lately, theattention of the international community. Romanian President TraianBãsescu, wished to reaffirm the support therefore will provide the strategicobjectives during the formal NATO Summit in Bucharest.
Romania’s main interest remains the Black Sea, which is why the
Romanian delegation headed efforts to bring to the forefront the importance164 Iulian CHIFU

of this area especially since the recent conflict in Georgia have increased
the visibility of this region. It is very important to solve existing frozenconflicts in the Black Sea area, especially since the area is considered notinfrequently a buffer zone between Russia and the European Union. Effortsby the EU to support regional cooperation in the Black Sea region havedoubled after the conflict in August this year, involving Russia and Georgia,said Friday, November 1
st, 2008, Leonard Orban.
We must not forget that Romania has been a EU member since 2007. One
of the debates that has recently animated the international community is theextent to which the existence of NATO and the ESDP, in the context of thelatter transformation and the strengthening cooperation between EUMember States on EU’s own security policies are redundant given the factthat both cover the same area: that of security. Romania supports thestrategic partnership between NATO and the EU since it realised the needfor cooperation between the two organizations especially as the solutions tonew security threats require the joint action of states and internationalorganizations.
All these European issues concerning transatlantic relations make it almost
impossible to find elements of compatibility and incompatibility betweenthe U.S. and the European Union from an angle of analysis directed solelyby diplomatic Washington-Brussels axis. Theoretical scales given by thegreat schools of thought in international relations can explain to someextent the stability elements defining transatlantic relations and thefluctuation of vision and foreign policy decisions that led this partnershiptowards a decline after 2003.
Will NATO and Article 5 become less and less relevant for EU members
in terms of hard security?
This topic will be approached from two complementary points of view:
first, a process of myth busting concerning Article 5 as a direct defense andsecurity instrument and its real interpretation as an instrument for willinglydiscouraging and showing solidarity. The second point of view refers to thecontent, credibility and relevance of Article 5 for EU member states. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 165

What we can say clearly, by looking at all NATO documents, the
Washington Treaty, the Final Declaration of the Bucharest Summit or thelatest is that Article 5 does not warant an ally’s obligation to react in case
of an attack, by virtue of the legal effects of the documents.Yes. Every ally considers himself attacked, and this limits the actions andrelations with the aggressor but does not assume “ immediate reaction,
with all the means available, to eliminate the threat and defend the allyunder attack” as it happens on international level with the state under
attack. Because there is no constraint everyone can act through diplomaticor any other means to counter the attack. The North Atlantic Treaty onlyvalidates every states’ right to consider himself under attack a fight
back in a legitimate way , as Article 51 of the UN Charter states.
From this point of view it is self evident for every lawyer of expert working
with this document that the reasons why the Allies react directly aredifferent, based on the interpretation of the state under attack: self interests,interest regarding the Alliance, its credibility, direct threat to its owndefense, the need to resort to reciprocical situation etc. Still the Allianceworked cedibly with Article 5 as a fundamental instrument fordiscouraging any attack, for the simple fact that it maintains the threat
of a concrete and credible legitimate massive reaction on behalf of allthe Allies.
Until proven otherwise – a case of using Article 5 (possibly unprecedented
by the consultations mentioned in article 4), not followed by operations oractions of the Alliance – the compelling power of Article 5 remains
fundamentally credible and an extremely solid security warranty for allAllies. And let us not forget that one of the major arguments over the
credibility of the warranty is given by the way the Allies look towards
Article 5 themselves as a credible warranty. Thus the relevance and
credibility of Article 5 for European state is given by the way they
themselves look at the content of this warranty.
On a secondary level, a large number of European countries members of
NATO, but also a large number of non-member states of NATO, and EU(which resumed in solidarity clause of Article 5 as a shaded) look at Article5 as a defense and security component essential for their citizens.166 Iulian CHIFU

Moreover, the effect of undermining the credibility and guarantee of
security to of Article 5 within the Alliance, can lead to major effects onwho shall subvert the symbolic value of Article 5, for security lies mostly incredibility, perception and symbolic images. Building credibility and imagetook a major part of the Cold War and almost 20 years of post-war and maybe torn down easily and in no time, but could be replaced with somethingequivalent up to the effective implementation of Article 5.
Now, if we were to discuss NATO enlargement and the inevitable link with
Article 5 of the Alliance, we believe that there are important arguments toshow that the causal link is absent, while respecting the principles ofextension referred to in Article 10 of the Treaty. The validity and credibilityor Article 5, as well as its applicability is not less true for Turkey andGreece in the 60’s and 70’s that it is for future new members such asGeorgia or Ukraine in 2012 year of 2014.
The idea of entering an area of influence of another superpower or regional
power cannot be discussed now, unless NATO changes its current approachto the principles of international relations, other than the UN Charter rules.No NATO member state will be asked to go to war to defend a non-NATOmember state such as Georgia and the defense Georgia defense really needsis the defense of any NATO member before a direct attack of the RussianFederation. Here lies in fact the credibility and force art. 5: the clearassertion clear, without doubt or ambiguity, the decision of Member States’action in defense of any NATO ally, even if the abuser is the RussianFederation.
If Russia receives such a concrete and coherent and consistent message in
responses to each action, then the need to resort to force to protect ourselvesas an Alliance would be throughly reduced. On the contrary, suspicions,obvious differences and disputes, questioning the credibility of Article 5.only lead to a closer need to respond in the defense on an ally. Who canafford such an option, these costs and undermining the Alliance itself toNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 167

much higher costs? How credible would the solidarity clause be if the same
signatories did not respect and even undermine the solidarity of NATO.
A sufficient length of time, reform of power structures of future candidate
countries, accurate and specific criteria for accession, all may not lead to theconfirmation of the added value of NATO membership. And drawing redlines on the map is not credible in a post-modern world.168 Iulian CHIFU

Chapter II
The ESDP-NATO Relation
Iulian Chifu
There are several topics that have to be addressed when discussing the way
we look at and try to solve the problems related to the relation andcooperation between NATO and the EU. Firstly we have different ways ofviewing security, defining risks and threats but also planning reactions,capabilities to be used and ways to react in case of security issues. Secondlywe have different approaches and types of formal cooperation between thetwo institutions. Not less important is the conjugated force of trans-formation that the two have in case of new and future members but also inthe case of their neighbours and neighbourhood, necessary reforms for newmembers to join, these being consistent and complementary and leading tothe institutional and functional modernisation of those states.
We have to realise that Europe has become, from several points of view a
narrower place from a geopolitical perspective: whether we like it or not theEU core is moving; it moved towards the west during and after the SecondWorld War and towards the East after the Cold War ended. Also Europe isricher in history, based on rivalries and competition between states. Duringthe last 15 years we have not had a lot of conflict, more rivalries andcompetition, politics and policies whose “legacy” we have enherited tobring into the 21
stcentury. Europe’s second element of richness is its
experience in institutional construction – it is probably the most crowdedplace on earth in terms of institutions.
The fundamental issue today is that more and more of Europe’s problems
are avoided and circumvented from a normal and frontal approach which ofcourse takes these problems further away from finding a solution for theinstitutions we have created. So the problems that experts and practitionersfeel are fundamental to Europe are outside the institutional mechanism thatwe have created.
The most shocking issue for anyone assesing Europe is that it is still rich in
a special and strange sense, with acute forms of insecurity, compared to anyNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 169

part of the world. We are still the continent where issues relating to security
are high on the agenda and that adds to the sense of insecurity in Europe –even if someone would say that the sum of security problems comes fromthe high degree of rationalising and identifying them, their perception isforemost a mechanism tied to responsability. Moreover politicians basetheir answers and decisions on this syndrome that does not always complywith reality.
Another issue is the fact that Europe has an important legacy when it comes
to postponing a critical decision that concerns it and acting according todecisions taken by others. Finally we cannot ignore the fact that we areprobably at the best point in the last 20 years for Europe to develop a morecorrect, effective and efficient relation between its institutions.
A few of Europe’s fundamental problems obviously relate to the scaffolding
effect on its security and of course the relation between NATO and theESDP. We will underline a couple of these issues as open questions.
First of all who should take inititative for generating a real, correct and
fruitfull cooperation between NATO and the EU? Experts talks always turninto a classical debate over who came first: the egg or the chicken? Thus thefirst dilemma is whether states or institutions should take initiative. Ofcourse there is no right answer to this question. No cooperation can befundamentally improved unless states realise and come to an agreementover what they want from this cooperation. On the other hand states willnever reach a right solution unless they are helped by national decisionmakers with the unique expertise that both NATO and the EU have so thatthey will understand how these enourmous, complex and extremellysofisticated institutions work.
The second question is of course why should these institutions cooperate?
International debate brings us a series of answers: Christophe Cornu arguesthe fact that cooperation is neccessary because you would have aconvergence between policies, in the economic field, in issue of militarystrategy and because it is only natural for them to do so. Other experts statethat there are a number of other essential conditions, challenges andpossibilities that are open and enlarge the area of cooperation further than170 Iulian CHIFU

ever before. Nicole Taillefer also maintains that cooperation is natural in the
case of the institutional construction process of both organisations and thatwhat NATO does through its transformation process is to give a larger areaof cooperation. Why they should cooperate is proven by the series ofarguments relating to the good results already provided by this cooperation,as arguments for pursuing this road further and extending cooperation andconvergence. Good results in critical regions are extremely important forthe process to continue.
The third fundamental question is why would we want to deepen
cooperation, what is the purpose and meaning of this? And here we have anumber of answers:first cooperation is neccessary to fill the hole in the newsecurity paradigm and to answer new challenges and threats that the changein the international security environment. A second answer would be thatwe need to strengthen cooperation because we need to strengthen thetransatlantic bond as it is of the outmost importance for Europe’s securityand defense today and in the future. The third answer would be related tocrisis management, and the purpose of this colaboration is that NATO andthe EU become more important and valuable institutions for Europeans. Ithas already been admited that European institutions have a certaincredibility deficit in the eyes of European citizens and so strenghtheningcooperation will determine a shift towards an heightened level ofcredibility. Finally another answer would be that there is a special agendathat can be achieved only if the cooperation between NATO and the EUwould grow further.
The next question is what means do we posses to determine a better
cooperation between NATO and the ESDP? We have a number of indicatorsand arguments which are relevant to formulating a complete answer to thisquestion: first we have a great deal of political instruments and resources interms of political thinking as well as political actions. Then we have theeconomic resources and means at our disposal which help to build any kindof cooperation, and can also help the institutional rationalising process toavoid duplicating capabilities and bringing efficiency to said actions. Wehave to use our resources to make both institutions more effective andefficient as cooperation leads to both institutions better serving theirpurpose. And through this cooperation Europe is brought closer to itsdreams and goals but also closer to its citizens’ expectations. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 171

So this strengthening is not a mere exercise of improving institutions nor is
it a simple exercise to make policies more effective but is fundamentally anexercise meant to make Europe capable to overview its own growth anddevelopment and reach its objectives, reflected both in the NATO and theEU objectives.
Keeping the strategic euro-atlantic partnership alive could provide security
in several ways and levels, not just from a military and defensive point ofview. The economic dimension as well as other dimension which we canfind in both organisation cannot develop separately from the twoorganisations.
NATO and the EU are what we can call a “promise to get married”. The
problem with any marriage is the way decisions are made inside a couple.This is exactly the problem: who takes the the important decisions and whotakes the less important ones. In any case this marriage is a planned, willhappen, and moreover will last if a proper decision making system isapproved, based on common or complementary mechanism of applying thedecisions made, in order to respect the independence of both organisations.
Divergences in approaching security between EU and NATO
The main debate concerning the NATO and EU/ESDP relation is
determined by the differences in approaching several topics, conditions andways of actions for safegurading security for the member states orapproaching conflictual or delicate situations in different places in the worldin particular. These include: 1. Using legitimate/authorised force in major international conflicts2. The war or fight against terrorism with means of approaching organised
crime
3. Pre-emptive versus preventive action4. Different typologies for missions assumed by NATO and EU/ESDP
There are a series of bilateral accords for using NATO capabilities by the
EU in missions lead by the EU, based on the Berlin plus agreements. Butperhaps the most interesting are the innovations brought by the EU in terms172 Iulian CHIFU

of security, Constitutional Treaty and later the Lisbon Treaty. These are the
elements that shape the EU as a regional security actor, at least in itsintensions and the analysis can be used later on to bring answers concerningthe present and future relation between the two policies.
The most cumbersome element was the transatlantic tear, which came after
the war in Iraq. It was explained, broadly, by the differences in Europeanand American vews concerning risks and threats, or by the anwersneccessary to counterthese threas. Between 9/11
thand 2008 the security
doctrines of both the US and the EU and actions outside of counterstrikingthis phenomenon evolved towards a certain degree of convergenceneccessary to effectively approach this asymetric threat multilaterally.
Multilateral security arangements and authorised use of force
If we refer to global security in a context of multilateral cooperation with a
universal vocation, the set of normes that circumscribe the limits of usinglegitimate force is present in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. At this level,the Security Council is the only UN structure abilitated to interpret the law,“to acknowledge the existence of a threat to peace, breach of peace or an actof aggression and to reccommend or decide the measures to be taken,according to articles 41 and 42, to maintain or establish peace andinternational security.”
Getting involved in actions that have to do with security through
multilateral arangements are restrictive, but offer certain benefits such as:the legitimacy of military actions both national and international; thepossiblity to share responsabilities both in times of conflict and of post-conflict; facilities concerning access to the battlefield or access toinformation. All these benefits of multilateral cooperation in security arerecognized, at least theoretically, even by the US administration, which stillmanifest a scepticism obivoulsy tied to the UN Security Council’s ability toact quickly and effectivelly when pro and con arguments have to be blancedagainst using force (in the case of Iraq).
In this kind of situation where multilateral administration of secruity is
perceived as obstructive towards US national interest, reorientation towardsa unilaterla approach is immediatelly justified by poiting out the costs ofNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 173

multilateralism: the risk of giving away decision making abilities and
sometimes even control over US military operations to states that do nothave the same priorities and strategy as the US; the risks associated topostponing actions concerning international security that, in view ofAmerican officials, are urgent; the costs associated to information leaks dueto multilateral cooperation commitments; excesivelly policising warstrategies and distorting military objectives etc.
These are but a few of the arguments exposed by American analysts
tempted to raise some of the problems of inconclusive interpretation of theCharter, of procedural or decisional slowness of the UN Security Counciland present these as evidence for the irrelenvance of this multilateralorganisation. The most frequent method of justification in terms of provingthe inefficiency of multilateralism in international security is reducing itssignificance to a military dimension. Still authorising armed interventions isonly one of the components included in the multilateral taxonomy appliedin the area of global security. Multilateral cooperation in security issues,including in the larger context given by the UN system, ismultidimensional, starting – as it is stated in the extenso of Chaper VII ofthe Charter – from the actions meant to evaluate risks (information,analysis, identifying threats) or those of intermediation for solving disputespeacefully. It also implies humanitarian assitance before, after and duringarmed conflicts, applying economic, political or military sanctions. And lastbut not least another component of multilateral cooperation regardingsecurity is supporting post-conflict reconstruction.
All these responsabilities complementary to authorised military intervention
are meant to maintain peace and international security and are part of theglobal project for multilateralism for security. In these missions apart fromdifferent structures part of the UN different regional organisations, ad-hocstate alliances participate towards a collective approach of problemsbelonging to the security concept. An attempt to defend the UN’s relevanceas a fundamental actor in administrating global security an start from a briefsuccint analysis of different military conflict: East Timor, Kosovo and thewar in Iraq. The interpretation is meant to counter the “UN’s failure” in thetwo cases of using force without the authorisation of the Security Council,Kosovo and Iraq.174 Iulian CHIFU

In East Timor the military intervention was authorised, supported and lead
by the UN, this being a clear example of multilateral cooperation within theUN system. In the case of Kosovo, using force was not authorised by theUN, but the intervention was lead in a non-UN multilateral context, underthe command of NATO. The US invasion in Iraq in 2003 was not authorisedby the UN Security Council and did not take place under NATO support butwas lead by an ad-hoc coalition of states under the leadership of the US.The last two episodes were considered by experts in international law ascases of formal violation of the UN Charter, although there were post-factum arguments in favour of the legitimacy of the two actions. Thecomission assigned to investigate the legal status of the intervention inKosovo reached the conclusion that it had an “illegal but legitimate” status,based on the standard criteria that justify a humanitarian intervention,doubled by the argument of mobilising international support. Moreover themilitary intervention took place in a multilateral context, under thecommand of a regional security organisation, based on normes concerningcollective security. Both in East Timor and in Kosovo, the UN authorisedand supported actions of post-conflict reconstruction and supported localadministration to deal with problems of post-intervention internalrehabilitation problems.
The Iraq issue is probably the most analysed case in unilateral military
intervention, given the division it produced amidst the internationalcommunity, the strong oposition expressed by most of the members of theUN Security Council and the absence of a multilateral umbrella given by asecurity alliance different that the UN. Still straight after the start of themilitary campaign in Iraq and the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime,there was an attempt by the UN to legalise the British-American actions byadopting a series of resolutions in favour of recognising the status of Britishand American troops as forces of occupation authorised by internationallaw. The quick decision to open a civilian mission in Baghdad was followedby its bombing in august 2003 which determined the immediate withdrawalof UN officials from Iraq and coming back a few months later. Afterwardsthe UN’s role was a bit more active in monitoring the elections in 2004 and2005 and the surveilance of the process of power transfer from theAmerican-British forces to the new Iraqi leadership. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 175

Starting from the particularities of the three military interventions, two of
which took place under multilateral umbrella (UN and NATO) the mainargument in favour of the relevance of the UN as a key organisation foradministrating global security comes from the multifunctional character ofsecurity multilateralism. International security does not only depend uponthe decision to resort to force or make its use more efficient in counter-acting against a threat, especially if it is a transnational one, which cannotbe traced of defeted by a unilateral approach such as global terrorism.Multilateral cooperation implies the entire sprectrum of preventativemeasure – negociations, sanctions, development aid, monitoring humanrights violations as well as collective involvememnt in post-conflictreconstruction and peace-keeping actions.
In all these soft components of multilateralism, involving the UN is
neccessary and according to recent studies, much more effective thanAmerican involvement, based primarily on fighting threats by militarymeans. In this dimension of international security through multilateralcooperation, the contribution of the European Union is also extremelyimportant, given the tipically European view of using soft instruments forpeace keeping and security issues at a global level. The common elementbetween the UN and the EU as multilateral actos concerning security is theso-called absence of human resources and military capabilities, both ofwhich depend on the staff, capacity, budgets of member states. Theseconstraints explain the reticence of both actors to fight threats by armedcombat, as well as the doctrine similarities that value the soft approach.
Global war against terrorism: pre-emptive or preventive war?
Initial gaps between American and European perceptions regarding the
terrorist threat were minimised, especially after the London and Madridevents drew Europe’s attention on the magnitude of this internationalphenomenon. Both the US National Security Strategy and the EuropeanSecurity Strategy identify and place the terrorist threat among the majorsecurity risks on the international stage, alongside weapons of massdestruction proliferation, failed states or organised crime. Still the Americanview concerning terrorist threats – as it transpired from the successivesecurity strategies of 2002 to 2006 – is focused in the first phrase in thisdocument: “ America is at war. This is a National Security Strategy for a176 Iulian CHIFU

period of war imposed by the serios challenge which we are facing – the
magnitude of the terrorist phenomenon, fueled by an agressive hate andcrime ideology that the American people witnessed on the 11
thof
September 2001.” For the American administration the terrorist threat isperceived first of all as a national security risk, which justifies – within thelogic of such a doctrine – the unilateral decision of confronting internationalterrorism, with or without the UN or NATO umbrella.
The New National Sercurity Strategy of the US “in times of war” was
presented by G. W. Bush at West Point in June 2002. The new documentmarked the end of the old American policy to border and discourage USrivals from the Cold war. Another type of threat, assymetric, that ofinternational terrorism, implied launching a different kind of war than thatfought in the bipolar era. To reach these goals of fighting assymetric threatsat a world scale the US president introduced a new type of concept, pre-
emptive war which differs from preventive war through the imminence of
the attack from the other side. The semantic difference comes from thedifference between and prevention: if the preemptive war pushes back andcounterstrikes and imminent attack the preventive one eliminates a potentialthreat before it appears. Pre-emptive action is forced by circumstanceswhile preventive actions forces the circumstance, by transposing thepossible to the present.
The two types of confruntation can easily by placed inside different
typologies of defense and aggression wars. Thus according to Article 51 ofthe UN Charter pre-emptive war can be considered legal, as it is similar todefensive wars, its legality depending on the degree of clarity, reality andimminence attributed to the aggression. Opinions related to the pre-emptiveor preventive nature of the latest conflict in Iraq side towards interpretingthe episode as a preventive action, hard to place in traditional philosophiesof confruntations and exposed to the leap beyond the limits of internationallaw. Z. Brzezinski, the former American council for National Security,states, by a rahter critical view, the risks of confusion between pre-emptiveand preventive action, confusion that leads to an interchangability betweenthe two concept in chapter 5 of the US National Security Strategy:“The distinction between pre-emption and prevention is important to theworld order and should not be overlooked (…) Pre-emption can be justifiedNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 177

by national interests threatened imminently and thus, is unilateral. Great
deal of information is neccessary to argue (at least retroactively) such anarbitrary act. On the other side, prevention should be preceded as much aspossible by mobilisation of political pressure (including at an internationallevel) to avoid the innevitable from happening; force should only be usedall other options have been eliminated and discouraging is no longer acredible alternative. If discrimination arise, especially from the super-powerthat is supposed to have the most means of discouragement – then a plagueof preventive unilateral wars that pretend to be pre-emptive can occur.”
The American Strategist signals and extremly sensitive aspect in the
unilateral approach of an assymetric threat such as inernational terrorism:setting a precedent. Terrorism continues to be a notion that has nouniversally accepted definion in international academic or political circles.Prevention of such a threat with military means can induce the illussion ofmorality, if not legitimacy of any unilateral military intervention careinvoque the imminent presence of danger, whether it is real, pretended orframed. Closer to the present, at a US Senate hearing on February the 1
st
2007 Zbignew Brezinski takes the issue of unilateral armed combat risks,but also a fake pre-emptive character and present the scenario of a possibleinvasion of Iran by the US, starting from a similar pattern to that of theprevious conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Brzezinski’s speech of February 2007 is, at times, controversial and betrays
willfull ambiguity. This later started comments relating to the possibleintention of the former US councilor for defense to reiterate in an officialsetting the credibility – from his point of view – of conspiracy speculationstied to the framed origines of the 9/11
thattacks. His vision on the best ways
to counteract to international terrorist threats is closer to the Europeanvision, that manifest scepticism concerning the long term efficiency ofradical military measures to fight terrorism and stresses the essentialimportance of investigating and treating the causes of this phenomenon.
In the EU measure against international terrorism started to be analysed
more carefully and subsequently formalised in June 2004 , at the EuropeanConcil. As a result of presenting a report on the implementation of theDeclaration on the fight against terrorism, the Political and Security178 Iulian CHIFU

Commmittee was assigned to find the conceptual framework for identifying
the ESDP’s contribution to the fight against terrorism, including its pre-emptive dimension. The document is based on the following principles:solidarity among states; voluntary contribution by said states to the clearunderstanding of the terrorist threat by elaborating and facilitating access torisk analyses; coordonation between pillars for achieving EU objectives inthe fight against terrorism; partnership cooperation; understanding thecomplementary nature of ESDP and fully respecting member statesresponsability in the fight against terrorism.
Through the ESDP member states can be part of civilian and military crisis
management operations with four directives according to the European
Strategy on Terrorism: prevention (mobilising all resources, including
military and, given the assymetric nature of this threat, facilitating access toinformation and information exchange); protection (durting crisismanagement operations, for reducing human resources and materialvulnerability in case of a terrorist attack) responding/managingconsequences (for which military means can have a direct role or asupportive one); supporting third party countries in the fight againstterrorism within different ESDP missions. Subsequently, through a Councildecision of February 2007, the specific Prevention, preparedness and
consequence management of terrorism programme for 2007-2013 was
launched .Also within the multilateral fight against terrorism project, the
EU signed an agreement with the US government concerning the security ofclassified information through which the two partners will cooperate bymeans of classified information exchange and concerning consolidatingmultiple protection mechanism which will ensure the neccessary degree ofsecurity.
European multilateralism and managing global security
European ambitions concerning showing a credible profile in foreign policy,
especially European Security and Defense Policy, were initially en-countered with great reserves both by the US and the governments of themembers states. Their reservations towards increasing their spending forEuropean defense budget is self-evident, which combined with theintergovernmental character of this area of politics which complicates thedecision making process a great deal further makes the military dimensionNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 179

of ESDP a recent development but with a fast evolution. Since setting its
objectives concernining minimal endowment for tasks included in thePetersberg Missions triad at the official launch of ESDP at the Helsinki
European Council and the later agreement Headline Goal on the neccessary
capabilities for supporting operations within ESDP (reaction force of 60000 people to be mobilised within 60 days) the EU capacity to involve itsefin different military operations, for stabilisation or reconstruction hasevolved a great deal.
Starting with 2003 the EU has participated in, through military and civilian
forces for different missions and operations outside its geographical area –the Western Balkans, South Caucasus, SE Asia, the Middle East and Africa– first by taking over NATO mission and then continuing them in theBalkan area (ALTHEA mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina).
The EU is one of UN’s main partners in managing crisis and conflict
prevention, by having the full scale of neccessary instruments for fullfillingmissions in this area of governing global security: political dialogue,mediation, cooperation agreements, comercial policy instruments,development aid, economic and social policy, humanitarian or emergencyaid, support for reabilitation and reconstruction as well as coertion measuresuch as political and economic sanctions or military force. Amongst thepolitical recomendations that target consolidating this cooperation on amultilateral level presented in specialised studies were mentioned thefollowing main ideas: the need to establish priorities concerning conflictprevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction with theUN; multilateralising peace operations; consolidating the neccessarymechanism for information exchange; strenghthening the EU’s visibility atUN level and consolidating the EU’s legal status.
Innovations for the Reform Treaty on European security and defense issues
In the event that the Lisbon Treaty will be ratified it will include a number
of innovations with fundamental implications on strengthening foreign andsecurity policy. The document confirms the first single legal personality ofthe European Union. Creating a single legal entity will provide a betterrepresentation of the Union at international level and will also help tostrengthen the role of the European Union as a global player. A Union180 Iulian CHIFU

equipped with a single legal personality may negotiate and conclude
international agreements, with the possibility of joining the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights. The Union will be able to join internationalorganizations and may act in a more coherently and effectively on the worldstage.
The Treaty states that the CFSP is subject to rules and procedures. It
establishes, in fact, the particularity of the CFSP area that still remainssubject to the intergovernmental method of decision-making and,predominantly, by unanimous vote. However, the new Treaty introduces anew provision (Bridge Clause) which allows the European Council todecide, by voting unanimously to extend qualified majority voting in CFSPfor a future date. Decisions military or defense implications will require theunanimous vote. Decisions on the CFSP also have a special character, asthey are not, with some notable exceptions, subject to review by the Courtof Justice of the European Union.
Creating the post of High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy is another institutional innovation introduced by the Treaty ofLisbon. The High Representative will be appointed by the EuropeanCouncil and the post will include the two current positions withresponsibility for foreign policy (the position of High Representative forCFSP and Commissioner for Foreign Affairs). The High Representative willoccupy a central position in the European institutional framework and willbe able to give the EU a stronger voice in international affairs. The LisbonTreaty gives a double role to the High Representative. He will ensure on theone hand the Council Presidency for its Foreign Affairs configuration andon the other he will be vice-president of the European Commission. Amonghis tasks are also the right of initiative in CFSP and representing the Unionin meeting third parties and intergovernmental organizations andconferences (including the Security Council and the UN).
The High Representative will be assisted in his activity by the European
External Action Service. It would be composed of officials of relevantdepartments of the Secretariat of the Council and Commission, as well asnational diplomats seconded by Member States. Service composition aimsfor convergence of Member States’ foreign policies, and creating a commonNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 181

culture in foreign policy. EEAS organization and operation will be a
Council decision, a decision to be adopted after the ratification of the Treatyof Lisbon, based on a proposal from the High Representative afterconsulting the European Parliament and after approval by the EuropeanCommission.
The Lisbon Treaty also introduces for the first time a mutual defense clause
that states that if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on itsterritory, the other Member States are obliged to give aid and assistance byall means available. Another element crucial for reforming andstrengthening multilateral cooperation in the intergovernmental CFSP andESDP is to introduce a simplified method for strengthening suchcooperation, namely the permanent structured cooperation, which allowsMembers willing to advance in this field. The real “defense Schengen“,permanent structured cooperation is more flexible than conventionalreinforced cooperation and thus allow the Union to move forward in thisarea.
What deserves mentioning is that in both the EU and NATO the views on
the strengthening of multilateralism in the area of security cooperationscenarios are focused on differentiated scenarios, “à la carte” alternativesthat allow players to opt for involvement in certain projects for collectivesecurity, adapted to resources, capabilities and interests. At the Europeanlevel the innovation of the permanent structured cooperation in defense andsecurity is part of the wider reform of the Union starting with the idea ofrecovering credibility differentiated integration, which allows the creationof preferential alliances in different areas both within the framework oftreaties and within the Initial informal basis, as well as outside theframework provided by the acquis.
Among the models of flexible integration within the Treaties, the most
analysed options of flexibility:
1. the pre-determined flexibility model (option possible at the primary
legislation level in which the treaty itself provides the premises of suchflexible arrangements), such as eg EMU, Schengen (after Amsterdam)or, as we were saying, permanent structured cooperation between182 Iulian CHIFU

Member States which are willing and have the needed military
capabilities to subscribe to higher demands in this area;
2.micro-flexibility (based on the instrument of constructive abstainment
constructive ) which gives Member States the option not to participate in
a decision or action, while still allowing other countries to progress inthat area
3. enhanced co-operation – the most investigated instrument of
implementing flexibility, introduced in 1997 by the Treaty ofAmsterdam (under the name of closer co-operation) and subsequentlyrevised by the Nice Treaty, which made famous its name of enhancedcooperation .
The idea of developing scenarios of “à la carte” multilateralism, particu-
larly in the transatlantic sphere of regional security has increasinglynumerous followers, especially in the context of recent efforts to reformpatterns of institutionalized multilateralism as well as those of the EuropeanUnion and NATO. Both reform processes are designed, in essence, so thatorganizations will adapt to meet their expansion requirements, but also tomeet new challenges on the global scene.
NATO option for “à la carte” multilateralism
After the Cold War ended, NATO’s transformation followed two distinct
dimensions: foreign and domestic. Reform requirements arose from theneed to redefine relations with old organization’s rivals, to review thesecurity environment and, therefore, to review the principles of internalorganization, structure, policies and security strategies. Concerning foreignrelations, NATO has established cooperative partnerships with countries inCentral and Eastern Europe, thus opening its doors to the states in theregion. In 1994 the Partnerships for Peace programme was launched, whichcreated the premises for deepening cooperation and consultation with thecountries of Central and Eastern Europe. Three years later, in 1997, thethree countries of the former Communist bloc (Czech Republic, Hungaryand Poland) were invited to join the Alliance, with the Membership ActionPlan for other states interested to join NATO to be established in 1999. InMarch 2004 seven of them joined the Alliance. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 183

Internally, after the disappearance of the common Soviet threat that helped
preserve the interests of the Member States of the Alliance converge, reformefforts aimed to turn the organization into a more flexible one, to harmonizedifferences in vision and resources of the allies. The NATO summit inBrussels in 1994, was devoted to a new concept of Combined Joint TaskForce (CJTF), which had in view the preparation of multifunctional,multinational military structures, easily movable and adapted to militarymissions with a greater degree specialization. In 1996 the EuropeanSecurity and Defense Identity (ESDI) was approved within NATO whichallowed the EU to access Alliance resources for self-employment inmilitary action under the European umbrella. In 1999, at the NATO Summitin Washington, NATO launched its defense capabilities initiative forequipping allied forces for new tasks in the sphere of intervention and crisismanagement. Another element associated with the road towards a suppleand institutional functionality was the opening of the NATO ResponseForce in 2003, based on a common pool of troops and military equipmentwith a greater degree of flexibility, interoperability and mobilized on aglobal scale.
In the internal reform plans internals NATO’s response to uncoordinated
development of strategic visions of the Member States, in shapingperceptions and changing different spectrum of current threats and definingpriorities and interests separate part was that of institutional and structuralflexibility. Literature devoted to multilateralism security institutions tries tofind the extent to which such a differentiated approach to collective securitycooperation affects or weakens the foundations of multilateral securityalliances and, in particular NATO. Frank Schimmelfenning considers that astructure and an internal organisation that is less multilateral than NATOdoes not neccessarily lead to a less multilateral attitude from members ofthe alliance. A relatively close vision is that of Seyom Brown in a 2006report of the Institue for Strategic Studies of the US Army War College. Thefact that NATO’s viability and the consolidation of the transatlanticpartnership depend on the Alliances’ reorientation towards a “coalition ofcoalitions” based on elaborating a legitimising structure, decision makingprocesses and internal routines with a modular character is suggested in thepaper. 184 Iulian CHIFU

However, while Schimmelfenning’s approach focuses rather on defending
the flexibility of NATO’s multilateralism as an independent factorassessment of multilateralism inclinations manifested by the transatlanticcommunity actors, Brown built his whole approach on decentralization anddemonolithization of the Alliance in order to maximize American flexibility,particularly freedom of action in the sphere of use of force.
To understand where the red line between the solidarity of multilateralism
cooperation within NATO and the multilateral solidarity of member statesavailability is, one must notice that the force of moving multilateralismresides, as proved by a few recent episodes of conflict, in the nature andtarget of threat . If the threat is common and targets space, values and basicrules of the liberal transatlantic community (human rights violations andethnic cleansing in the Balkans), multilateralism is strong. When the mainpurpose of collective intervention in the sphere of security is mainly that ofEuro-Atlantic region’s defense or to protect liberal values of community,the resources of multilateral cooperation of NATO allies are lower ( the warin Iraq).
Reforming NATO under the principle of flexibility relates primarily to
rethinking those rules and internal arrangements that would enable MemberStates to vary in degrees of participation and engagement in theorganization’s operations. The scenario is not essentially revolutionary, aselements à la carte multilateralism may be identified during the Cold Warwhen France was able to withdraw from the eighth formal militaryintegration project (in 1966) but remained a member of NATO and optedfor a la carte cooperation with supreme command of the Alliance. And otherMember States opted for some special arrangements in NATO in terms of,for example, stationary appearance of nuclear weapons on their territory.
Subsequently, the concept of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) allowed
the mobilization of various forces of the organization “according tocircumstances, the establishment of ad hoc command centres, staffmembers and partners in helping a specific mission“ as necessary, based ona modular approach, to satisfy that mission. The very creation of theEuropean Security and Defense Identity within NATO, which allowed theEuropean Union to access its resources for coordinated operationsNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 185

exclusively in Europe was based on the same principle – separate but not
separated – which did not exclude non-involvement by the U.S. from certainoperations conducted under the umbrella of the Alliance. Moreover,NATO’s evolution towards a more flexible security organization engagingin certain transactions with some Member States, without requiring theinvolvement of all allies.
Participating to NATO missions is also open to non-member, partner or
non-partner states. NATO partner states have a series of partnershiparangements that cover a wide spectrum of activities relating to security,some of which refer to strictly military actions: defense planning, armscontrol, peace keeping, fight against terrorism, planning a managingcivilian emergenices, fighting natural and technological disasters etc. Fromthis list of potential cooperation areas partner states can choose thosedomains and the level of involvement in collective actions that will fit theirtraining level and skills as well as comply with NATO political andtechnical requirements.
Thus from the prevaling exclusivist organisation that set out to provide
mutual security assistance for a restricted group of states, NATO hasevolved towards being a multilateral actor engaged in both keeping regionalsecurity as well as a priori approaching global issues of security. Although
not all states have an obligation to participate to military operations underNATO command, the priviledge of security guarantees is nondiscriminatory. On the background of an institutional redesigning processmainly focused on flexibility, the internal pulse of internal multilateralismwithin the alliance can be tested through consensula avalabilities of memberstates to cooperate or remains outside certain projects that target collectivesecurity. The variables that NATO multilateralism depends on are tied bothwith resource and capabilities gap, the nature of the threats that must befought and the sometimes diverging interests of the allies, given the absenceof a common threat.
In the military field , U.S. supremacy is evident at all levels of employment
in a possible military mission, leading to frequent expressions ofdissatisfaction of the U.S. partner on low European involvement in certainactions by NATO. This is largely a consequence of the mentality of186 Iulian CHIFU

“protected“ European countries to retain the reflex to be ranked as a safety
consumer, assumed during the Cold War and demonstrating ambivalentreactions against the senior status of the U.S. . Thus, unilateralist oldEurope states criticizes U.S. foreign policy that favors the use ofinstruments of force to counter threats and claims the right to be consultedand involved even though they are much less willing and able to confirmtheir credibility by participating in military actions for global securitygovernance.
In this context, the US administration’s desire to adopt a transatlantic policy
by which it can maintain those neccessary reserves of multilateralism thatcan provide legitimacy for international foreign policy decisions, and on theother hand can diminish as much as possible the multilateral constraintsregarding the use of force. S. Brown’s recommendations concerningAmerican strategy are for keeping multilateralism to counter security risks,given the fact that in the current international context promoting a coercitivediplomacy needs global support, authorisation and legitimacy throughmultilateral cooperation and a framework for dividing tasks and costs.
Still in the event that such an authorisation from the UN or NATO does not
exist the US must protect its national security interest (in accordance withArticle 51 of the UN Charter that admits the right to self defense, be itindividual or collective when the Security Council is unable to act). Thesolution thought out by Brown is adopting a modular way for engaging incollective operations. The possibility of involvement in the security fieldassumes certain efforts from the US to institutionalise and legitimate aflexible array of political structures, communication systems, controlprocedures and military command and certain arangements to facilitatecooperation between different categories of actors who are capable andwilling to commit to fighting security threats.
Opinions and expectation from new EU and NATO members for NATO
and ESDP
New Member States of EU and NATO do not have an equal and consistent
position towards NATO and the ESDP. In principle, there are governmentalformulas that look from one or another angle and doctrine and from theirown perspective, the relations with NATO and the EU, but also relationsNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 187

with the Russian Federation. There are a couple of principles that they will
not go over easily:
– Guarantees of a perfectly obvious solidarity in security and defense,
both at NATO and EU level in the event that they are possible and willbe credible.
– U.S. presence in European security scaffolding advice for the
transatlantic relationship. For some countries that have emerged fromthe limited sovereignty space of socialism and the Soviet state, the U.S.image, credibility and proven capabilities are very present in publicview, and in the outlook of the leaders, even if there is enough realismand responsibility to understand the limits capabilities and interests ofthe United States but also the costs that each member must assume forthe benefit of Washington’s constant presence in European defense andsecurity
– Lack of contradictions between the U.S. and major European partners,
but also coherence of EU actions on security and defense
– Avoiding duplication of resources available to Member States in both
organizations.
– Consistency and effectiveness of NATO and EU actions for European
defense and security
– A reduction of unnecessary red tape in European institutions. – A transfer of expertise, planning and capabilities from NATO to the EU
on dimensions that are missing from the EU.
– An consistent agreement sharing of responsibilities between the
organizations.
– Unification of standards of training, weapons and calibres, procedures
and types of reactions between the capabilities available to theinternational operations of both organizations.
– Settlement of blocked relations between the EU and NATO in the
Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle
– Elimination of singular veto statements to major Alliance decisions
such as the Greece’s position in relation to Macedonia.188 Iulian CHIFU

There are unprecedented cooperation formulas that can further develop the
relationship between NATO and ESDP, which come the scrutiny EU andNATO Member States especially concerning further developing relationswith new border and contiguous neighbouring states for the twoorganizations, in the East. The need for convergence of standards,institutions and rules, including security and defense, arise from theconjecture which claims that where there are discrepancies at the borderthere is room conflicts and, where there is increased compatibility violentconflicts cannot occur and problems can be solved peacefully, on the basisof the UN Charter principles or OSCE documents.
Concerning the EU as a security actor, it is one of the aspects of the
international security system that relies on the adjusting of the added valueof this new security actor. In this respect for the new European countriesmembership for their Western Balkans or Eastern neighbours is not asimportant as is getting closer to these states and bringing them closer toEurope through institututional, normative and substantial reforms – beliefs,mentalities – a change that has to take place on the basis of dual relationsboth with NATO – IPAP, MAP, Security Sector Reform – as well as withthe EU. In this respect an important role is given to the new proposal, theEastern Partnership or the drafting of the second generation ofNeighbourhood Action Plans Policy, the Association Agreements, with theproposed content:
The most consistent policy so far, lasting for almost 5 years is the
European Neighbourhood Program. It aims to harmonize the status, rules
and institutions of the EU neighbouring states by guaranteeing access to
the EU internal market gradually . Now we are witnessing the birth of the
second generation of Action Plans, the Association Agreements . The one
negotiated with Ukraine gives us a hint on the content of such agreements: – The enhanced / Expanded Free Trade , opening the way for gradual
adoption of principles and rules of a common market, as soon as thesecountries can adapt to rules, norms and will be able to build theneccessary functional institutions and assuming the correspondingduties. The proposal also contains elements of regulatory andinstitutional convergence, appart from common market elements. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 189

– The agreement to facilitate access to visas, going as far as the
liberalization of visa regime and to the free movement, to the extent
that countries concerned will be able to take responsibility for eachstage will be able to meet institutional and political costs (through theconditions to the third parties) and will be able to build functioninginstitutions that can face the side effects of necessary conditions to bemet.
– The Energy Community, based on a type of Energy Charter plus, an
agreement on adjusting the rules by transit states, with EU states,including here the policies of the EU energy security strategy andenforcement of EU competition rules for transit countries, accessingenergy transport infrastructure, within which costs they can afford
– Involvement of EU / ESDP in frozen conflicts – it is already the case
with EUBAM between Ukraine and Moldova and the EU MonitoringMission ESDP – in Georgia. This type of involvement could beextended to all frozen conflicts, as long as those states require suchinvolvement. EU Entry in serious security issues in the frozen conflictsis an opportunity that the EU must take in order to become a relevantactor in this area, especially if its presence is agreed upon by theremaining players in the region as opposed to the NATO presence.
As we have seen, all elements contained in such agreement are made to
strengthen rules, to extend EU rules to neighbours, to bring these statescloser to the Union and manage modernization and transition affordably andon a sustainable basis. Particularly concerned are the transit states –Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova – plus Azerbaijan – provided a rapid accessionto the WTO and a review of the democracy. Belarus is also in the forefrontof attention once right conditions will allow the jump. Armenia is also insight, even if it still has major problems – internal-leadership credibility,presidential elections in a bloodbath – external – blocked the border conflictwith Azerbaijan and Turkey – but also the way the solution Security forYerevan was chosen.
So energy security, secure routes and alternative energy sources – the EU
and NATO instruments, including the provisions adopted at the NATOsummit in Bucharest, involving protection of critical infrastructure on landand under water – are concerns of new members of both the EU and NATOfor their own energy security but also for freedom of choice of Europeanand NATO states in terms of foreign security and defense policy. 190 Iulian CHIFU

Concerns for a possible repetition of oil and gas supply disruptions to
Europe is in the foreground, and concern about Russia’s lack of resources tomeet its commitments to the EU, for a possible cartel of carriers that couldplay between the quasi-monopolistic producer and the European consumeror a formula by which the quasi-monopolistic producer for the region wouldtake over the transport infrastructure of other countries or would cartelbetween manufacturers and carriers succeed, all of these are fundamentalsecurity concerns for EU and NATO Member States.Justified or not, citizens of member states and new EU members and NATOincreasingly perceive the Russian Federation as a potential source of threatto the security of states concerned, to NATO and the EU as a whole, so thatthese countries expect to see in the renewed EU security strategy and wantmeans, resources and capabilities to meet this perceived threat. Bothhistorical experience and memory play an important role, and recentRussian actions in Georgia, and threats, aggression and violence oflanguage from leaders in Moscow does not reduce these fears but has anoposite effect.
What are the military capabilities that we must share and how?
What should be the strategic directions of weapons development?
The principles of cooperation the informal NATO-EU working groupIn order to answer this question we would have to come back to the
fundamentals and first look at the NATO ESDP relation from this point ofview. Thus the six principles of the common NATO EU declaration of 2002include the partnership (for example “mutual reinforcement” of crisismanagement activities), bilateral efficient consultations for cooperation,equality and the neccessary attention to “interests and decision autonoum”both in NATO and the EU, “a coherent development and mutualreinforcement of common capabilities for both organisations”.
In institutional terms the partnership is reflected under the Berlin plus
agreements of March 2003, that authorise the EU to use NATO structures,mechanisms and capacities to plan, lead and command a military operationthat is not part of the Alliance’s area of interest. Moreover an agreement onNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 191

information exchange was signed between the EU and NATO and EU
linking cells were installed at SHAPe and at the Command for IntegratedNATO Forces in Neapole.
There is a phrase often used to describe the relation between EU and NATOforces: “separable but not separate”. The same forces and capabilities willform the basis of both EU and NATO capabilities but certain fragments ofthese can be allocated to the EU if neccessary. Concerning the missionsthere is “a right to say no first”: only if NATO refuses to act in a threat canthe EU decide to do so on its own.
Another mandatory point, in order to have the neccessary capabilities for
NATO and ESDP operations is keeping the level of defense spending atleast 2% of the GDP, according to NATO standards. There is also anunwritten but accepted rule – the 3D: no duplicating what NATO alreadydoes effectivelly and with increased efficiency. No decoupling from the USand NATO and no discrimination of non EU NATO countries like Turkey.
What is lacking is a solid network and covering links between NATO and
the European Union for security relations, so that, together, states oftransatlantic community can be able and effective in combating the threats,risks and challenges both horizontally – that pass through areas of differentcompetencies, with distinct regional and national interests – as well asvertically – those involving an enhanced communication, consultation,coordination, collaboration and transactions between different internationalinstruments, governments, civil society and citizens alike. One way is tostrengthen the effectiveness of the Informal NATO-EU Summit group.
Successive transformations of NATO and EU today led to the common
conclusion that they cannot be achieved without a deeper cooperationbetween them. Complementarity became the key concept that defines therelationship between NATO and the EU. This was reaffirmed at the NATOsummit in Bucharest, by NATO leaders and spokesman and the symbol ofESDP reform, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, holder of the rotating EUpresidency in the second half of 2008.
This was the reason why strenghthening the political NATO EU dialogue
both informally and formally, was absolutely neccessary and had an192 Iulian CHIFU

immediate coordonated evaluation of the international and regional security
environment as an aftereffect. The French presidency’s initiative was tostart informal working groups, at a high level between NATO and the EU.This structure could allow both NATO and EU to better coordinate theiractions in areas where they have common interest. This group hardens theeffectiveness of both organisations by coordinating positions and actionswhich will become more consistent. Within this group consultation on theevolution of current operations will take place and when faced with a crisisthe group will trade opinions before launching any new operation. Thisspace can be the proper forum to promote synergy between the twoorganisations and avoid incoherence.
The civil dimension of crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction
Another direction for developing the mutual relations and capabilities is the
field of civil crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. Since thecapabilities the angle of approach used by NATO is somewhat titledtowards this dimension and new member states have a deficit in this field,and thus so does the organisation, and here we have an oportunity and aspace where the ESDP can bring added value. In any case the field ofcivlian crisis management is a relatively new one for NATO but for the EUas well although it has proven extremely useful in contemporary operations,as complementary elemens for strictly military operations. And concerningpost-conflict reconstruction the concept is still insufficiently developed andrequires a wider and more comprehensive approach. Nations and societiesteared after violent conflicts are at the forefront of contemporary concernsand there are still debates amongst experts towards finding the simplest,smoothest solution for reconstruction and development of social governingtools.
The main areas of interest are given by the reasons a nation or the
international community would get involved in a post-conflictreconstruction operation and how they could plan and prepare areconstruction mission to maximize its effects. Obviously, planning andconducting post-conflict reconstruction requires specialized knowledge invarious fields such as public governance, security, economy and civilsociety. Experiences and lessons learned have already showed the need fortraining those who participate in these operations but also in decisionNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 193

making and planning. Three are three main areas where capabilities must be
developed:1. Creating and maintaining a secure environment for the nation that went
throguh a distructive and violent conflict but also for the reconstructionmission teams;
2. Planning and implementing measures of building public institutions and
organising political, social and economic life for the nation
3. Building adequate capacities and implementing good governance
principles as key elements of the reconstruction process
The European Union has, at its disposal, at the Comission’s level, the
European Training Group, for specific areas of civilian crisis management.
Arms aquisition
Military equipment aquisition has to be based on three capabilities:
1. Every state’s ability to defend itself for a short period of time. From this
point of view it is obvious why the argument “I do not need as theirdefense capabilities, according to Article 5, NATO troops will defendmy country“ is a great error. Moreover (see Annex 1), the self-defenseclause is also present in the ESDP as is the solidarity clause in theTreaty of Lisbon.
2. The ability to receive components of expeditionary NATO/EU forces to
work with the national forces on their territory. It also requires adequatespace for barracks, command and control and capacity planning, butalso elements of interoperability. Hence the need for infrastructurecompatibility (done in NATO). This is why the construction andprotection of critical infrastructure of highways, airports, ports is asecurity objective.
3. The ability to work with expeditionary NATO and EU forces in the
field but also in the air. Usually compatibility and interoperability ofweapons is extremely important because F16 fly with F16, Gripen flieswith Gripen, the Eurofighter flies with the Eurofighter. Therefore itbecomes extremely important for procurement of weapons to take intoaccount existing armaments for both partners and allies as well as theduration of said armaments. Otherwise, a purchase of Gripen devicestoday could mean that only countries like the Czech Republic andHungary, along, of course, of Sweden could support you. 194 Iulian CHIFU

This is the reason why arms aquisition must not only be political but also
strategic and defensive, therefore a military decision.
If it were to make a summary of categories of weapons which are in service
with armies of NATO and EU states in Europe, we will reach an enormousnumber of types and categories, all bringing major maintenance costs,purchasing of spare parts, etc. Streamlining this explosion of types ofweapons is absolutely necessary as is more cohesion and a common at thetransatlantic level. Here is another area of discussion between NATO andthe EU.
We definetly have to accept mandatory elements of:
1. The relevance of NATO and EU security
2. Relevance, armed and credible forces at least in NATO3. Identifying the niche of capabilities and added value of the EU to
Europe’s security
4. Proper formulas for co-decision making5. Colaboration, dialogue and common or complementary capabilties in
the field of energy security, with a special attention to critical energyinfrastructure.
What are the implications of NATO expansion on the EU? Does NATO
expansions mean a EU expansion (Ukraine and Georgia)?
In approaching this issue we must start from the real meaning of NATO and
EU enlargement. Both mean the consolidation of democratic gains of theMembers in question but also a substantial content transformation anddemocratic change of the states in their immediate vicinity, the regulatoryand institutional modernization of the state. Therefore these processes -considered the most effective polticies of both organizations, through theirtransforming and modernizing effects – bring not only security but alsostrengthen the democratic reforms of the typology of Western democracyand avoid typologies “original“ of “sovereign democracy“. Since the war inGeorgia has proved beyond any doubt the Russian Federation’s option notto join this type of democracy, the process becomes even more important. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 195

We accept the need to respect the values and standards of both
organizations as well as “fatigue“ of both institutions. However the processitself must not stop, even if this means NATO Bucharest SummitDeclarations on Georgia and Ukraine commitment type or Salonic typecommitments for near eastern states while states that are energy carriers toEurope and States fall in the New Association Agreements.
From this perspective, we believe that the answer to the question whether
there are implications of NATO enlargement on EU enlargement is no. Thetwo are not determined by each other, but NATO and EU policies in theirneighbourhood contiguous Europe are interdependent and this road isrequired. The combined power of change brought by NATO and the EUleads to mutual self-enhancement and delivers major results for the borderstates.
Obviously the issue that NATO, not so liked in the region by the other big
player, Russia, will make room for the EU “between“ the border NATO /EU and Russia. Again, planning steps raises some major problems. Theymaintain the stability and sustainability of democratic change to this day.
Previous experience has shown that the extensions were made in succession
NATO-EU, in particular the need to provide a security solution for the newMember State, to give impetus to investors to come and support changes inmarket and institutional reforms and deepening democracy. A paradigmchange may raise significant security issues.
Thus, a state where the security sector is not reformed, coming from
totalitarian and repressive logic could lead to important elements of concernin terms of reversibility of democratic reforms and market area. Indeed, asecurity system that is not reformat, whith reflexes from the previous sovietsystem, can ever overthrow, practically overnight, rules and democraticinstitutions and market sytems that were build. Moreover, not reformingthis sector can cause problems and delays, even harsh reactions of oldinstitutions, supported by such a system and functioning institutionalrelations above. Without an urgent security sytem reform majorimpediments for reforms and institutional stability will make themselvesknown, leaving the way open for the reversibility of the aforementionedreforms. 196 Iulian CHIFU

This does not necessarily mean that earlier system and previous succession
of forms should be maintained. Flexibility is a rule that must allow us tofind ingenious solutions. Thus the EU can fullfil an even bigger role inchanging and consolidating reforms, but this cannot be achieved without areform of the security sector. The essential problem here is whether or notthe EU has the neccessary capabilities to achieve security sector reform andwhether it need NATO logistic support for this.
The first step would be, creating a rule by which candidate EU countries
should start by reforming the security sector. Some experts have suggestedformulas for introducing the security sector reform in the criteria for askingthe EU to open negociations for joining the Union (the Copenhagencriteria). This way, or maybe through a different solution – this conditionshould be added to the formal criteria for joining the EU.
The second problem is obvioulsy that of capabilities. Who? How? With
what means? And here the debate is particularly important and goes fromenhancing and developing EU capabilities in the field – which is open tocriticism because of duplicitary criteria and effectiveness once NATOalready has these capabilities – or a contractual form of effective NATOinvolvement, or a Berlin plus – like formula that will allow the EU to useNATO capabilities as needed.
At the level of the European Council we already have a few thougths
trailing in this direction as unexpected as it might seem. From this point ofview it is clear that in terms of Security Sector Reform one must thinkabout financing ESDP and lessons learned, best practices, a space where theEU has a well known deficit. Obviously the evaluation lead to capabilities,not only military but also civilian, especially concerning judges and prisonguards, where the EU has had a deficit. And the capabilities of a civiliananswer to security sector reform are very important.
How should the relation with the Russian Federation be like?
The relationship with the Russian Federation is a key pillar of cohesion of
Europe and transatlantic cohesion. There have been numerous studies inwhich European states were categorized and split according to the nuancesNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 197

of the relationship with Russia. From “old“ and “new“ Europe, a rather
coarse way of categorization, similar to the transatlantic “Americans arefrom Mars, Europeans from Venus“, was moved to categories such as“condescending“ and “retractile“ with shades “benevolent pragmatism“ and“pragmatic retractile“ in relations with Russia.
The Russian-Georgian war closed, we believe, this issue: everyone has
realized that the Russian Federation has no interest in the near future underthe current leadership to go towards a democratic system, as we understandit. Also, the latest statement – the attack on Georgia, recognition ofAbkhazia and South Ossetia, the location of missile threats in Kaliningrad,the resumption of strategic flights across the Pacific and Atlantic, theexpedition for taking control of the North Pole, requesting a conference torewrite European,even global, security etc. – all showed a revisionistRussia, in returning to the scene and with an already asserted political willto regain positions considered unjustly lost in international scaffolding.
Obviously the relationship with the Russian Federation should not be one of
isolation, but one of engaging Russia. But any return to “business as usual“should not be made too quickly, fully and without conditions, once there isnot a real peace prospect in Georgia, nor Sarkozy ceasefire plan, with itsimperfections and awkwardness is not met. Balance and pragmatism shouldbe the defining paradigm shift given by the lack of prospects for Russia tobecome a member of the European democratic community in the nearpredictable future.
The need for Russia has to be balanced by the nature and mode of action of
Russia. It is a necessary and compulsory partner but is not a “member of theClub“ or future member of the same club. The Russian Federation hasgotten closer to the status the Soviet Union had before the Perestroika.
Obviously, as an alternative, the EU and Member States must maintain
capabilities ready to use immediately for any window of opportunity for asustainable change in the Russian Federation.
Another reality is how some European countries look at the Russian
Federation after the Russian-Georgian war. A number of countries sent their198 Iulian CHIFU

leaders to support legitimate democratically elected President of the
independent and sovereign state of Georgia, even during the war. VladimirPutin during the meeting with French President Sarkozy threaten that hewill execut Saakaashvili in a public market, possibly hanging from one partof his anatomy. These states are entitled to see Russia and part of itsexternal actions, including military doctrine and foreign policy made byPresident Medvedev after the brief Russian-Georgian war as a threat to statesecurity. The reality is that there are European citizens, and not a few, buttheir political leaders perceive the sum of these acts and gestures as threatsand wish to see NATO and the EU react to them by including them in thespace of real threats, planning and budgeting accordingly, to fight theperceived threat.
EU Member States have different approaches to relations with the Russian
Federation. There are practical ways of addressing the issue, two angles ofdifferent security solutions, including energy security: – Russia’s approach, interdependence as a solution
– Punishing Russia, isolating it and block all relations except the
economic ones.
The purely cooperative approach is too simplistic, to schematical and does
not provide enough tools to deal with Russia. That is why some expertssuggest a more refined approach: – Cooperation in the vast majority of relations with the Russian
Federation, not only in economy and trade, but also security issues suchas terrorism, non / proliferation, etc.
– Competition in certain economic matters , especially in the states of
the European Neighbourhood Policy in democratization and human
rights , issues of values
– Confrontation in several directions
The refined approach to the Russian Federation may bring a set of
instruments prepared for every topic, in any area of cooperation,competition or confrontation it might be. With the sum of these toolsavailable, both the European Union, as well as each of the member state,and NATO itself, approaching Russia could prove to be more effective.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 199

ANNEX
The convergence of reforms for NATO
and EU membership
We set out below to show that NATO and the European Union are closely
linked both by high number of states that are members of bothorganizations, as well as for general security options and solutions that bothinstitutions generate. Consequently, we believe it is useful to reviewNATO’s role over time for security and stability, then evaluate theconvergence of reforms for EU membership in NATO and, finally, weremember the political and economical character of NATO, to emphasizethat beyond the common values, common tools, methodologies, commonsecurity, NATO and the EU are consistent, have a perfect convergence, butalso cover both areas wider than those which are concerned with strictstatus in a complete symbiosis.
In this part we will test the compatibility between EU and NATO and will
show EU concerns as an organisation, in terms of creating and developing,with the help of NATO, its own Common Foreign Security Policy – CFSPand within it the development of the European Security and Defense Policy– ESDP. These policies are supported by NATO, compatible with NATOand support defense and security policies of the Alliance to further addvalue to the EU’s own capabilities, a gesture complementary with theNATO Berlin Plus agreements providing tools and capabilities for securityand defense policies of EU areas in which NATO has no direct interest.
Moreover, France’s announcement at the NATO summit in Bucharest of its
the return in full duties and commitments in NATO military structures andthe priorities that Paris, as the holder of the rotating six-monthly Presidencyof the European Union has set – one for the second half of 2008, thestrengthening of the ESDP, but also the creation of rules, methodologies andcriteria of compatibility – if not the acquis in the future – for Foreign Policy,Security and Defense, all show that there can be no compatibility between amember/candidate EU country and a state that solves its security problemsthrough guarantees offered by the Russian Federation.200 Iulian CHIFU

1. NATO’s role in European security architecture
Since the end of the second world war, the U.S. role in a Europe destroyed
by war was of primary importance. First, the U.S. funded, through theMarshall Plan, the economical reconstruction of Western Europe after thewar. Then the U.S. supported the creation of United Europe, later on theEuropean Union. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and the transatlanticlink were the pillars of Western European security. Through NATO,established in 1949, U.S. guaranteed security and managed the commondefense of the Alliance.
Relevant to see the role of NATO in European security and stability are a
couple of historical components, that changed Europe from the sum ofNATO allies to the idea of a complete, democratic and free Europe,launched at the NATO summit in Prague. Then it is interesting to see thechange NATO went through after the fall of the outer empire, thetransformation and the adaptation of the military alliance of values and theconcept of partnership, expansion and receiving new members. Moreover atthe NATO summit in Rome, 1991, we can see another major proof ofcoherence and consistence concerning common values and ideas in the filedof security between NATO and the EU, modifying the Strategic Conceptand adopting a definition of security promoted by the European school inCopenhagen, which is 5 dimensional security: political, military,economical, social and environmental.
Then we wil return to the first expanded NATO summit and new strategic
concept of the Alliance of Washington in 1999, 50 years of NATO, since itis recorded as the first expansion of the Alliance with former socialistcountries, then taking the whole European security as an indispensableelement of security of NATO Member States, but also appeared in thepremiere of operations “out of area“, outside the Allies. The Balkans, butalso the European post-Soviet space are areas of direct interest to NATOand spaces whose security and stability depends on the security of NATOmember states.
The relationship with Russia is another component of the strategy for
fulfilling the role of NATO in European security and stability. Relations areestablished with the Russian Federation in Rome in 2002 are reviewed, asNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 201

are the trends before and after the creation of NATO-Russia Council. The
evolution of this relationship but also European security after September11
this recorded in the last document of the Alliance, at the NATO summit in
Bucharest. Here NATO and Europe see their security achieved through aglobal component and arrangements that include global partners, UNoperations on other continents but also to prevent the war on terror fromtaking place on European soil.
Finally, to sum up NATO’s role in European security and stability, we will
briefly review the Alliance’s operations conducted on the Europeancontinent, especially those made with the European Union or transferred toit for the reconstruction and institutional implementation of values.
1. NATO history in post-cold war Europe
Euro-Atlantic partnership and cooperation is seen today as one of the main
objectives of NATO. The process was launched in 1990, when Allianceleaders launched a process of reconstruction of trust, friendship andpartnership over the line East-West division of Europe, established duringthe the Cold War. Then a formula proposed cooperative relations withCentral and Eastern European states and Soviet republics. Thus NorthAtlantic Cooperation Council – NACC was created in December 1991 as aforum for East-West consultations in Europe.
The essential step came forward in 1994 however, with the launch of the
Partnership for Peace-PfP, a major program of practical bilateralcooperation between NATO and individual partners of ex-socialist andformer Soviet space. The program promoted transparency in planningdefense and budgeting, democratic control of military forces and jointparticipation in peacekeeping missions of NATO, as tools for building trustamong European countries.
The invitation to join the Partnership for Peace was accepted by 30 central
Eastern European and former Soviet countries. Of these, 10 have alreadybecome members of the Alliance and the other 3 were already invited to theAlliance at the NATO summit in Bucharest, next being the stages ofratification or pre-settlement phase of a symbolic dispute with a member ofthe Alliance for Macedonia. 202 Iulian CHIFU

Consultations on issues of security and defense of the 26 allies and 20
partner states shall take place within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council– EAPC institution that has succeeded NACC in 1997. The military forcesof the Alliance and partner countries frequently interact and conductexercises together on the basis of the agreed bilateral programs. Moreover,up to 9,000 soldiers in the partner countries participating in NATOpeacekeeping operations in the Balkans, with a Russian contribution thatwas more important than that of any other state. All these are firm andindisputable evidence, universally recognized, concerning the role of NATOin European security and stability.
2. Rome 1991 – Europe of cooperation, peace and prosperity
The NATO summit in Rome in 1991 Statement is one of the relevant
documents relating to how the Alliance planned its contribution to thefuture of European security and stability, the foundation for cooperation,peace and prosperity among European states on both sides of the the IronCurtain.
Thus, the NATO summit in Rome adopted the Alliance’s transformation
formulas in the context of collapse of Eastern Europe, the democraticrevolutions and launching reforms, the disappearance of the Warsaw Pactand final months of the Soviet Union. On this occasion, NATO has provenresilience and the ability to identifying the role of the new Europe, whichhelped it survive the Cold War with a new agenda, in which Europeansecurity was in the foreground.
Thus, the main transformation was easy to identify because of the way in
which NATO was created as an alliance for common defense of itsmembers, based on a core of shared values, values that were proposed to allMember States as goals for future missions, based on the democratic theorythat “democratic and prosperous states do not wage wars one againstanother, but resolve their differences through diplomatic and legal means,through negotiations.” So NATO’s role was drafted in Rome in 1991, that ofpromoting the common European values. Article 2 of the CommonDeclaration of Rome noted “the world has changed dramatically. TheNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 203

Alliance has been instrumental to this change. The peoples of North
America and across Europe are to join a community of values based onfreedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law. As an agent of change, astable and guaranteed source of essential security for its members, ourAlliance will continue to play a key role for building a lasting order ofpeace in Europe: a Europe of cooperation and prosperity.
The Alliance recognized that in the environment of uncertainty and
unpredictable change, NATO and the transatlantic relationship had shownthat significant presence of American forces in Europe remains a long-termvalue for security and stability further. All functions and capabilities of theAlliance were still required to achieve security and stability in a changingEurope in the broad sense discussed by the strategic concept of Rome, theEuropean definition of security, referred to in Article 4 of the FinalDeclaration of Rome “a concept that contains political, economical, socialand environmental aspects alongside the military dimension of security.The document emphasizes that never untill then had NATO hoped to securethe objectives of security and stability in Europe through exclusive politicalmeans, and the new European definition of security targets and new featureswill allow enlargement of the Alliance for a Sustainable stabilization ofEurope’s view. Basically Alliance security policy could be based on threepillars, dialogue, cooperation and maintaining common defense capabilities,to the prevention and management of crisis affecting security.
In fact, the final document of Rome stated the Alliance military dimension
as a key factor in the context of broader definition of security. Thedocument stated without doubt “that the Alliance maintain its purelydefensive character, its collective arrangements based on the integratedmilitary structure and arrangements for cooperation and coordination andfor the time predictable maintenance strategy based on two dimensions,Nuclear and Conventional as indissoluble elements of deterrence ability.For new targets the need to reduce the size of conventional forces andtransforming them into more flexible one by increasing their mobility inorder to react in a number of cases and assignments, being prepared bothfor defense and for intervention in case of conflicts. 204 Iulian CHIFU

NATO’s nuclear forces (of the Member States but transferred to the
Alliance, for reasons of capacity for negotiation and joint capabilities) werereduced, 80% of the stock of sub-strategic missile (small and medium-rangeaction) was destroyed based on the conclusions on nuclear defense planningfrom Taormina. The fundamental aim of these forces was one eminentlypolitical: preserving peace and preventing war or any other form ofcoercion on the Member States. Basically the summit in Rome was the lastto mention in its documents nuclear forces.
And developing a European defense identity was launched at the time in
question, also in NATO, when the European Union was just starting to bebuilt under the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, by merging the three Europeancommunities and the creation of political, institutional and joint decisionmaking mechanisms.
Thus, the final declaration stated that, based on the consensus expressed at
the meeting of foreign ministers of NATO member States in Copenhagen,NATO supports “the development of a security identity and role in defenseof this identity, reflected by strengthening and stronger European pillarwithin the Alliance, which would strengthen the integrity and effectivenessof the Atlantic Alliance. Enhancing the role and responsibilities of EUmembers is an important basis of the transformation of the Alliance. Thesetwo processes reinforce each other. At the same time strengthening thetransatlantic link is mentioned for ensuring strategic unity and indivisibilityof security for all NATO members.
Moreover, the allies pledged that “as the process of building the CFSP and
ESDP will evolve, to develop practical arrangements to ensure transparencyand complementarity“ between the European identity, the WesternEuropean Union and NATO. The evaluations and changes in relations withthe Soviet Union and former socialist countries in Central and EasternEurope are also interesting. The document provides “a qualitative stepforward“ in bilateral relations over the Cold War front line in Articles 9.11of the final Declaration of Rome.
Thus, based on common values assumed by the Alliance since its
establishment and the new role of promoter of these values, identified byNATO after the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the Alliance hasassumed “the encouragement of the democratic development of the SovietNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 205

Union and Central and Eastern Europe as the countries themselves pledge
to make economic reforms and reject commnist totalitarism, as a form ofgoverning states”.
The alliance pledges “to support all steps of Central and Eastern European
states within the meaning of reform and is committed to providing practicalassistance to help them succeed in this difficult transition”. Moreover thedocument mentioned in Article 9 that “the support and assistance (financialundertaken by Member States of the Alliance) is based on the belief that thesecurity of Member States of the Alliance is inseparable from security ofother countries in Europe.
So the Alliance assumed transition and security of Central and Eastern
Europe precisely because its own security was directly related to thesecurity of all states in Europe. Moreover, these phrases show very clearlythe concerns of the Alliance in all areas of processing and value, but alsoeconomic, not only in military and security. The myth of the militaristic andbellicose NATO of the Cold War was thus losing ground, even on thepropaganda level.
Article 10 of the document explicitly states desire for a complete and free
Europe, and mentiones how NATO supports this goal: strengthening theperception of security and confidence of European countries by supportingskills to meet the commitments of the CSCE and ensuring democratizationis irreversible. They add a program to exchange views on security andrelated to military exchanges and contacts, to be walking towards increasedconfidence and security concerns of these countries.
On this basis the relationship between NATO and non-European states was
built. In parallel with the emergence and development of democraticinstitutions in these countries, an increase in the need for cooperationbetween all European states, to the desire of these countries to have closerrelations, consistent and comprehensive alliance, hence the need for aqualitatively new level of cooperation. And the solution was to create arelationship commitment institutionalized consultation and cooperation inthe political and security (article 11 of the Final Declaration of the NATOsummit in Rome), where Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia,206 Iulian CHIFU

Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Soviet Union were invited to
the effort of developing the institutional framework.
The proposal was to launch mutual diplomatic relations NATO-European
countries, the opening of embassies, as well as a serious and structuredagenda of meetings: – Annual North Atlantic Council at ministerial level in the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council
– Regular, at ambassadorial level in the North Atlantic Council – Extraordinary ministerial or ambassadorial level, in cases requiring
such meetings
– Regular meetings at intervals of stability in NATO committees
including the political, economic and military, but also at other levels ofthe military institutions of NATO framework
Basically, NATO opened its activities in a transparent way for all European
countries, also offering the legal basis for cooperation as the CSCEprovided by all States concerned and comforting documents for MemberStates. Agenda meetings will be based on security and related issues. TheAllies were to offer his experience and expertise in various fields such asdefense planning, democratic concepts establishing civil-military relations,civil-military coordination of air traffic management, conversion of militarycomplexes in civilian companies. In addition, all European countries wereinvited into the alliance programs of scientific and environmental research,and were included in a comprehensive program of information on NATOthrough diplomatic channels and embassies. Resources would be providedby allies.
3. The Strategic Concept adopted in Rome 1991 – a new definition for
European security
Openness, transparency, involvement of NATO in European security of its
allies and of all states, the indivisibility of European security, were allrecorded in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept that recorded thinking,policies, instruments and capabilities of NATO defense of Europe andEuropean security.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 207

It is interesting to see in the strategic concept, first, the assessment of the
new strategic environment and security. NATO sees the profound politicalchanges that took place in 1989 as a radical improvement of the securityenvironment in that “former Soviet satellites have regained fullsovereignty“, thus emphasizing Western thought that the Brezhnev doctrineof limited sovereignty that could not be reversed as acustomed in theEastern Bloc before the democratic revolutions that have broken barriersbetween east-west borders.
Another point which limits sovereignty and independence, and whose
resolution paves the way for NATO colaboration was the withdrawal ofSoviet troops from Eastern Europe. Thus, the document noted that the threeBaltic republics regained their independence, while the Soviet forceswithdrew from Hungary and Czechoslovakia and have to completewithdrawal from Germany and Poland until 1994. These former enemies ofthe Alliance decided the abolition of the Warsaw Pact and rejectedideological war with the West for good.
Moreover, the new objectives of the Member states freed from communism
are amongst others the implementation of policies for the creation of apluralist democracy, rule of law, human rights and market economy,practically core values we and NATO share. Hence the conclusion thatbecause the ideological division of Europe ended these countries weregetting close naturally, through values, the foundations of cooperationwithin NATO, while the source of military confrontation of the Cold War nolonger existed.
In fact in the chapter reserved for Alliance objectives principles of the
Founding act were restated including the defense of freedom and security ofits members by any political and military means, under the principles of theUN Charter. NATO also fights for a just and lasting peace in Europe, on thebasis of democracy, human rights and rule of law.
The document reaffirms in Article 16, the transatlantic link and reiterates
that “the security of North America is permanently and inextricably linkedto the whole European security, a commitment to involve and justify theneed to support the security of all European countries. On the practical208 Iulian CHIFU

level, this principle translates into the need for collective and effective
effort of all members to defend common interests.
Among the tasks put in place by NATO instruments were:
– NATO’s security policy is to preserve peace with the presence of
military instruments and capabilities sufficient to prevent war and aneffective defense
– A sufficient capability to successfully manage crisis affecting the
security of its members
– The pursuit of political efforts of privileged dialogue with other nations
that want a cooperative approach to European security, including in theareas of arms control and disarmament.
The fundamental objective of the Alliance, mentioned in the strategic
concept in Article 20, is to “provide one of the indispensable foundationsfor a security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democraticinstitutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in whichno country can intimidate or coerce any European nation on or imposehegemony through the threat and use of force”. A description of actualfreedom and independence of any European state.
Moreover, the strategic concept has a chapter reserved, starting with Article
23, for protecting peace in the new Europe. The article mentions that theAlliance does not limit the options and that despite sufficient militarycapabilities and reserves the option to use military means and the need fordefense and resolution of crisis, believes that its objectives – to defend thesecurity and territorial integrity of its members and establishing a just anddurable peace in Europe – have been achieved primarily through peacefulmeans. Tools of dialogue, cooperation, crisis management and conflictprevention are essential.
4. Washington 1999 – “Out of area” operations. European security
after 50 years of NATO
At 50 years after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO member
states gathered to celebrate the jubilee in Washington. On this occasion, thefinal declaration and adoption of a new strategic concept was to validate theNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 209

new transformation of Europe and the Alliance, with the same security
concern throughout Europe. This time, however, NATO had already enteredthe enlargement process, while its operations were not strictly confined tothe territory of Member States, but globalization and regional threats inEurope have led to the need for operations across Europe, “Out of area”wherever there is a crisis that affects the security of Alliance members. Thisfinal step confirms the commitment NATO towards responsibility forsecurity throughout Europe, which directly affects the security of Europeanmembers of the Alliance.
This time, NATO was preparing to become an Alliance for the 21
stcentury,
based on the same package of principles of democracy, individual liberty,rule of law and collective defense, based on the transatlantic relationship,the unique and indivisible partnership for Defense and Security linkingEurope to North America.
The new Alliance was already announced to be broader, more capable and
flexible, committed to collective defense and able to take over other taskssuch as contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging activelyin crisis management and crisis response operations. The basic objectivewas, this time away from 8 years’ cooperation with nations andorganizations to promote and increase security, prosperity and democracyacross the transatlantic region. Moreover, the first step of expansion hadalready been made, as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland becamenew members of the Alliance, a living proof of overcoming the divisioninside Europe.
21
stcentury NATO retained the power and advantages of the past in the
context of new missions, new members and new partners. On that occasion,in Washington: – A new Strategic Concept was adopted, – The commitment for the Alliance’s expansion process was reaffirmed– The Membership Action Plan was aproved for states wishing to join
NATO
– The Berlin decision was completed – the so-called Berlin plus
agreements between NATO and the EU – for building the EuropeanSecurity and Defense Identity within the Alliance which led to thegrowth of the efficiency of the Alliance’s European component.210 Iulian CHIFU

5. The Strategic Concept of 1999 – the Petersberg missions, the
relation with the WEU and with the EU
The essential component of the Strategic Concept adopted in Washington
was, as already emphasized, the “out of area“ NATO operations, withNATO exiting the territory of the Member States to ensure their security,but also for the entire Europe. But, as dramatic as this change was, itremains the most relevant change noted on relations between NATO andEU cooperation and NATO support for operations which they planindependently, providing capabilities for Petersberg – type missions andbuilding European identity within NATO in parallel with the EuropeanSecurity and Defense Policy. This construction shows the symbiosisbetween EU and NATO, NATO’s contribution to the building component ofthe EU security and defense capabilities and the complementary effect onEU capabilities by providing NATO capabilities.
The concept notes that NATO has successfully ensured the freedom of its
members and prevented war in Europe in the 40 years of Cold War, then,combining defense with dialogue, played an indispensable role in endingthe East-West confrontation in Europe. But political and security changeswere more profound in the adoption of the last strategic concept in 1991,hence the necessity of a new assessment and adjustment of strategies andcapabilities.
If the strategic perspective has proved most promising in Europe after the
Cold War, it has proved to be the bearer of new challenges. New Europe,with a greater degree of integration has appeared, but with a Euro-Atlanticsecurity structure in which NATO plays a central role. It is about efforts toestablish new patterns of cooperation and mutual understanding in Euro-Atlantic region and commitment to new activities essential for greaterstability. It is NATO’s commitment to stop the enormous human sufferingoccurring in the conflict in the Balkans.
Another important development has proved to be that of arms control.
Contribution to the Alliance’s commitment was both in these directions butalso towards adapting the definition and understanding of security andNATO procedures and structures to this new reality. Furthermore,NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 211

identifying new and complex risks arising in the first decade after the Cold
War to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic, oppression, ethnic conflict,collapse of economies, the collapse of political order, proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction were identified. NATO was alreadydemonstrating that it has stored in its regulatory scaffolding concepts ofweak state and failed state, and instrumentation control and limit these risksand effects on European Alliance members and partners.
The experience of the Balkan wars, of ethnic conflict and separatism in the
post-Soviet space, the effects of proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and illegal nuclear arming of states, are found in the newstrategic concept which reaffirms the fundamental objective of long termdefense of freedom and security of its members by political or militarymeans, based on common values, but also on a strategic objective to“secure a just and durable peace in Europe“. What is new is that the conceptacknowledges that the achievements of the Alliance and the strategicobjective may be endangered by crisis and conflicts that affect Euro-Atlantic area, so (according to Article 6 of the Strategic Concept of NATOin Washington) “the alliance not only ensures the defense of its ownmembers, but contributes to peace and stability in the region. It is theargumentative, normative and theoretical basis of “out of area“ operations,beyond the Member of the Alliance, but also in Europe.
In assessing developments in the strategic environment, Article 12 states
that “the EU has taken important decisions and provided impetus for greaterefforts to strengthen its security and defense dimension”, a process withimplications for the entire Alliance, and “all European Allies should beinvolved in these efforts, building on arrangements developed by NATO-WEU Western European Union”. The EU has already adopted the Treaty ofAmsterdam to mark the establishment of the Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy – CFSP with an important component of shaping a common defensepolicy ESDP. According to the document, this policy was compatible withthe common security and defense of NATO and the steps incorporating thePetersberg tasks of the WEU in the new EU Treaty, such as thedevelopment of close institutional relations of the EU with the WEU.
In the same context, of support for European security and defense-ESDIwithin the Alliance, within the Alliance forces and capabilities for WEU-led212 Iulian CHIFU

missions have been available, based on the final declaration of the NATO
Summit in 1994 and the Berlin Plus agreements in 1996. A very closerelationship to strengthen peace and stability in Europe by increasing itsmilitary capabilities of European allies of NATO has developed betweenNATO and the WEU. Increased responsibilities and capacity of Europeanallies was considered an added value to security and defense of Europe anduseful for strengthening the Alliance’s security environment.
Between risks and security threats on NATO, the Strategic Concept stated
that, despite positive developments in the strategic environment and the factthat conventional large-scale military aggression against the Alliance werenot likely, there is still the possibility of such long-term threats. Theforeseeable increase of Russia’s capabilities and readiness and willingnessto recover the strategic position it once had was already foreseen, thoughnot stated.
Between military and non-military risks against the alliance, with a multi-
face nature and difficult to predict, the following were included:
– Uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area – The possibility of regional crisis at the periphery of the Alliance to
evolve rapidly (Kosovo was in full blast and threatened to turn into abloody crisis)
– Economic and social difficulties of some countries in the Euro-Atlantic
region and around it
– Ethnic and religious rivalries – Territorial disputes – Inadequate or missed reform efforts – Abuse of human rights – State dissolution – Local and regional instability capacity spreading through influence on
contact.
Obviously, all these crisis could directly affect the Alliance and particularly
European allies, which is where the concerns of NATO to prevent crisis,armed conflicts and human suffering arrises from. The domino effect onneighbouring countries, including NATO member states, was taken intoaccount, as were the formulas through which ither European countries wereNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 213

affected. These concerns were followed, of course, by evaluation, planning
and taking preventive tasks and eliminating their direct contribution tosecurity throughout Europe.In the chapter reserved for the 21
stcentury Alliance model, the
5 dimensions of security are reiterated understanding, according to theCopenhagen school, but also the commitment and objective to increaseefforts to develop effective cooperation with the UN and other Europeanand Euro-Atlantic – a new formula, encountered for the first time in NATOdocuments, which stresses cooperation with the Alliance of EU and WEU.The purpose of cooperation is “building the European security architecturein which the Alliance’s contribution to Euro-Atlantic security and stabilityin the region and the contribution of these international organizations arecomplementary and reinforce each other, so strengthening Euro-Atlanticrelations between countries as well as crisis management.
6. The relation with Russia: Creating the NATO-Russia Council,
Rome 2002
The NATO-Russia relationship through the way it was built by the
Institutional Alliance was always one relevant for European security. And inthis area, ever since the collapse of the outer empire, NATO invited theSoviet Union in the North Atlantic Consultative Council – NACC and thenRussia, like other post-Soviet states, to the Partnership for Peace – PfP andNATO-led peacekeeping missions in Europe.
The bigger the Russia’s formal growth was, but also the more NATO
borders extended even within the post-Soviet (Baltics), the more care had tobe shown in the institutional approach to relations with Russia to buildconfidence, to mark transparency necessary to engage Russia at the level ofvisibility that it wanted for it for the sake of the domestic market. So inRome in 2002, the NATO-Russia Council – NRC was launched, whichaimed to bring together allies and Russia “to identify and use opportunitiesfor joint action“ (19 1).
The gesture was also a response to how admirably Moscow behaved duringthe events on 9/11
th, when the emergence of a common enemy of both
NATO and Russia, global terrorism, was seen. Thus, the Council was the214 Iulian CHIFU

setting where NATO and Russia would work together as equal partners in
areas of common interest to defend against common threats and risks tosecurity.
The events of 9/11
thgave rise to the need for integrated and coordinated
action to address common threats. Terrorism suddenly came to the forefrontof the NATO agenda, a place where it was not to be found – at the finalstatements and strategic concepts of the beginning of the millennium.
Based on the objectives and principles of the 1997 Founding Act, which
enshrines the NATO-Russia relations, the new Nato-Russia Council wascreated as a mechanism for consultation, consensus, cooperation anddecision making and actions. The principle of consensus and equal status ofthe Allies and Russia in the Council – and not an alleged parity betweenMoscow and the Alliance as a whole, but with the opportunity to discussany matter concerned with the parties, but with decisions only by consensusand agreement of all the allies and Russia – the new Council promotedcontinuous dialogue on security issues for identifying emerging problems,determining common approaches and appropriate actions.
The Council presidency was provided by NATO’s Secretary General and
there were at least monthly meetings at ambassadorial and military level,twice a year at the level of foreign ministers, defense and the Chiefs ofStaff. Occasional meetings were held with Heads of State. Areas ofcommon interest were: – the fight against terrorism– crisis management– proliferation – arms control – measures of trust – missile defense – search and rescue missions at sea– military cooperation – cooperation in case civil emergencies
To strengthen cooperation, Russia’s NATO mission was established onMarch 18
th, 1998, and on February 20th, 2001 a NATO information center
was inaugurated in Moscow. On the 5thAnniversary of the Founding Act onNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 215

May 27th, 2002, the NATO military mission in Moscow was established, to
increase transparency, the development of practical military cooperationand cooperation with the Russian Defense Minister.
Practically, the most successful mission was in the Balkans. NATO and
Russian soldiers fought together for 6 years for peacekeeping in theBalkans, the IFOR and SFOR, in Bosnia, and Russia helped to end theconflict in Kosovo, while its troops were part of KFOR.
NATO and Russia have participated in joint military exercises of air defense
and peace support operations, testing the interoperability of equipment andprocesses in areas such as transport and air supply. In the area ofcooperation in defense, a NATO training, information and consultationcentre was built in March 2002 and added to the cooperation in preventionand response to disasters, planning for civil emergencies, cooperationrescuing soldiers from the submarine Kursk, cooperation in science,research and environment.
Another relevant area was the fight against new security threats, based on
regular consultations between NATO and Russia on new securitychallenges, threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction, nuclear, biological and chemical, and also the spread of ballisticmissile technology, bearers of these weapons.
This serious, broad, institutionalized cooperation with Russia is also an
important pillar of activity and a strong argument to highlight thecontribution of NATO for European security.
7. The NATO summit in Bucharest – the present and the future of
European security
The NATO summit in Bucharest on April 2–4
th, 2008 was the last summit
meeting of Heads of State and Government of Member States of NATO. Onthis occasion there were a series of provisions and commitments relating tosecurity in Europe. This, however, has to do with different dimensions,related to NATO’s actions in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, operationswith global partners, since, through globalization, threats have becomeglobalized , as shown by 9/11
th.216 Iulian CHIFU

And documents from the NATO summit in Bucharest Alliance stress the
consistency and continuity of policies to ensure the security of Europe, butalso the policies of openness and transparency towards Russia, while itsbehaviour and statements prove that Moscow has changed, its ambitionshave increased and the actor allowed itself to leave the international rules.
Already the language in the final declaration of the NATO summit use a
completely different tone. Thus, expansion and strengthening capacity toconfront current and emerging threats of the 21
stcentury is the objective
cited at the beginning statement, just before reiterating the principles andfundamental values of the Alliance. Then the presence of therepresentatives of European and global partner organizations – UN, EU,global partners is welcomed to Bucharest. Thus the transition from theEuro-Atlantic security and Europe’s need for global action because “today’ssecurity challenges cannot be successfully confronted by NATO alone“towards “a wider partnership of the international community“ as part of abroad approach based on transparency and openness on cooperation anddetermination of all concerned is made.
With regard to NATO-EU relations, Article 14 refers to a wide range of
common interests related to security, defense, crisis management,combating terrorism, development capabilities and strengthen their mutualconsistency. The successful operations in the Balkans but also the EUoperation Althea, conducted with NATO capabilities under Berlin plusagreements are reiterated. Under common values and interests of EU andNATO, the two institutions work together in crisis management operations.
NATO recognizes the added value that a stronger and more capable
European defense represents by bringing new capabilities to counter thechallenges facing both NATO and EU as well. The Alliance continues tosupport strengthening European capabilities, to improve NATO-EUstrategic relationship for greater efficiency and avoid duplication of effortsand costs in the spirit of transparency, while respecting the autonomy of thetwo organisations. But this does not imply an independent solution to theEU for European security, independent of NATO, but complementary andadditional to the security capabilities provided by the Alliance, based oncommon principles and values.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 217

The final Declaration of the NATO Summit sanctioned the self-suspending
of Russia from the revised Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe andempowers the U.S. on behalf of NATO, to negotiate the matter bilateralywith Moscow in the interests of safety in Europe. Other direct contributionsto European security are NATO enlargement with Croatia, Albania andMacedonia’s decision on that step for stabilizing the Western Balkans, butalso reaffirming the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity ofMoldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Not at least, the support for thewithdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova is reaffirmed.Energy security and interest in the Black Sea region appear in the finaldocument as a contribution to European security. Also the launch andopening of the Cyber Defense Center in Tallinn is part of the same sphere ofarguments for NATO’s role in security across Europe.
8. Peacekeeping operations in Europe
We cannot conclude the arguments relating to the role of NATO in
European security without a review of the Alliance operations in theEuropean territory. We are talking about the SFOR – Stabilization Force inBosnia-Herzegovina, the KFOR operation in Kosovo, and the operations inMacedonia: Allied Harmony, Amber Fox and Essential Harvest.
SFOR Bosnia and Herzegovina was an operation carried out between
December 1996 and December 2004 where the NATO led the StabilizationForce in Bosnia Herzegovina, in order to maintain the security situation andfacilitate reconstruction of the state, after the war 1992–1995. NATOcontinues to maintain a troop headquarters in Sarajevo in order to assist theGovernment in reforming the security structures.
The role of SFOR was to prevent and hinder the restart of hostilities, to
promote the climate of the peace process and provide selective support tocivil organizations involved in the process. Basically, the activities werethose of patrolling and providing security zones up to supporting defensereform and overseeing mining operations, arresting war criminals andassisting the return of refugees.218 Iulian CHIFU

The European Union has conducted a force in Bosnia-Herzegovina through
Operation Althea, resuming the peace stabilization role of NATO. Underagreements between the two organizations, NATO is providing planning,logistics and command support for EU-led operation, under the Berlin Plusagreements.
NATO operations in Kosovo cover peacekeeping operation in Kosovo that
began in June 1999 and still continue. KFOR was held after a 78-daycampaign of air strikes launched by the alliance in March 1999, in order tostop and prevent the humanitarian catastrophe in the region. KFOR remainsin Kosovo under Resolution 1244 of UN Security Council, cooperating withpeople of the region, the European Union and the United Nations and withother international actors, to develop a stable, democratic, multiethnic andpeaceful Kosovo.
NATO operations in Macedonia:
Essential Harvest was the first of held operations held by NATO inMacedonia, and lasted between August 22
thand September 23th, 2001. It
involved sending a 3500 NATO military personel, logistics support, todisarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their weapons. The soledeployment condition was a dialogue between different parties and a finalsolution construction.Operation Amber Fox followed the September 23
th, 2001 and December
15th, 2002 operations and is in response to another request of Macedonian
authorities. The specific mandate was to help protect international monitorswho were suppose to oversee implementation of the peace plan in theformer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Mission was developed withthe participation of 700 NATO troops under German command with 300troops already in country. The duration was 3 months with the possibility tobe extended if necessary, depending on the situation in the country.
Finally, Operation Allied Harmony lasted from December 16
th, 2002 to
March 31th, 2003 and was created at the request of the President of
Macedonia, Trajkovski, and was a classic peacekeeping operation in theformer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, following the ethnic conflictsoccurring in Macedonia. The purpose was to avoid the risk ofdestabilization.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 219

NATO presence had two dimensions: operational support efforts for
international monitors of the peace agreement and advisory elements toassist the government in bringing security throughout the country. OnMarch 17
th, 2003, the operation was handed over to the European Union,
but the Alliance remained committed to supporting Macedonia Macedonia’sNATO entry reason for which a civilian and a military special presence inNATO headquarters in Skopje remained, which continues to support thedevelopment of security sector reform and adaptation to NATO standards.
2. Reforms for NATO and EU accession
We proposed, in this part, to show that joining the European Union andNATO are equivalent in terms of necessary reforms. For this,complementary to those presented in the previous chapter, we demonstratethat the requirements of European Union documents look at NATOprerequisites as a mandatory part for the security of our continent, but alsothat the reforms required by both organizations coincide. Then we try to seeif there are elements in the reform for NATO membership that do notexplicitly appear in the EU accession Treaty – and here we mean the criteriafor security sector reform, in particular – and how do Member States of theEU look upon the accession of a virtual state which is not a member ofNATO, especially that part of the acquis communitaire which France wantsto introduce to cover security sector reform. Finally, the whole effort is toprepare the way for an analysis of the CFSP and ESDP and to see in thenext chapter, to what extent the two European policies are now compatiblewith solving the problem of security by guarantees of the RussianFederation as a candidate country.
1. ESDP and NATO
In the following part we will see how the European Security and Defense –
ESDP, part of the CFSP started, and how the European documents talkabout the EU’s relationship with NATO. ESDP was European Presidency’spriorities over 2 years, in 1999-2001, and is an integral part of theconstruction of European institutions and EU responsibilities assumed infront of the international community.220 Iulian CHIFU

The Cologne European Council of June 1999 declarations mention that the
EU seeks cooperation, consultation and transparency in relations withNATO, thus bringing added vitality to the transformed Alliance. The finaldocument of the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999,underlined the need to create a force for rapid intervention in order tomanage the crisis. The Council determined the precise role of the MemberStates of EU and NATO members and candidate countries, members ofNATO. This symbiosis is relevant and shows the interdependence betweenconsistent policies of the two organizations.
The European Council of Feira in June 2000, completed the missing link of
collaborating with NATO member states and EU members. Thus, thirdparties in this category may participate in EU-led military operations,moreover, already at that time these states were listed in the document:Norway, Turkey, Poland, Czech Republic. At this European Council thebasis of consultations with NATO on military issues were established,underlining that “the EU and NATO are organizations of different nature interms of crisis management capability”.
Under the provisions of the Nice European Council, “the EU will be able to
intervene through military actions in operations such as those forhumanitarian operations, peacekeeping and crisis management – the famousPetersberg missions – although the EU has not proposed to have its ownarmy. The Council also mentioned that “NATO remains the basis of the EUDefense, while the ESDP only adds more vitality to the Alliance.
After the events of 9/11
th, the fight against terrorism has become one of the
most important objectives of both NATO and EU as well, along with thecreation of rapid intervention forces, improving management and crisisdecision making and strengthening cooperation between the information ofthe Member States. Hence the need for the ESDP to become operative assoon as possible.
The Laeken European Council of December 2001, decided the final shape
and the effective and efficient European defense policy. On December 6
th,
2001, we had the NATO-EU ministerial meeting reconfirm the closerelationship between the two organizations and good cooperation. In factNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 221

everything here has stressed that EU enlargement may cause the
strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership through proper distributionof duties and power in the European area. Furthermore, future EU membersshould be given a greater degree of inclusion in ESDP and the EU shouldestablish mechanisms for consultation and cooperation, allowing countriesto participate in debates on European defense and security architecture andto participate effectively in decisions to shape it.
Given that the specific objectives of NATO and the EU match it was very
useful for all countries participating in NATO and EU enlargement after thefall of communism in Europe, combining the two processes in sizing reformefforts. Moreover, there is no precedent for a state to enter the EU withoutjoining NATO and solving security problems. Without a priori excludingsuch a possibility, we look further at how the EU take on a neutral, non-NATO state, and finally, the extent to which the ESDP should be compatiblewith receiving a State that manages security through guarantees providedby a non-EU, non-NATO member with strong issues with the twoorganizations.
ESDP issues are included in the negotiation chapter “Common Foreign and
Security Policy“ and refer to the transposition of the acquis communitaire inthe national law, concerning the CFSP, but also the acquisition and theimplementation of CFSP objectives after EU membership is achieved.Among the commitments made by States that became members in theearlier stages are: – solving all problems with their neighbours based on international law – to support the EU (and NATO) integration of the former Yugoslavia
states in the prevailing system of values in Europe
– to modernize and increase the effectiveness of the capacity of Defense,
through a broad reform process of the Army
– Active participation in cooperative agreements with third parties and
EU security policy and defense
– to support non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons – to take full EU objectives set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European
Union (affirming EU identity on the international scene, in particular byimplementing a common foreign and security policy) 222 Iulian CHIFU

– to take over and implement the objectives of the CFSP, as they are
stipulated in the provisions of Title V of the TEU (we return to analyzeCFSP and ESDP in a later chapter)
The EU-NATO ministerial meeting in December 2001 noted clearly that
“the processes of internal and external adaptation of NATO and the EU,including in terms of extending the two organizations are complementaryand reinforce each other“. This was reflected by the provisions of theassessments made by both institutions in the case of states that joined boththe EU and NATO as basically political provisions are similar, while theeconomic provisions, although developed for the European Union, had thesame conditionality in NATO’s case (we will later see the economicprovisions of the package of NATO integration), while safety issues forNATO integration package is found in EU observations.
Concerning political aspects in the integration wave of 2004-2007 for the
EU and 2002 for NATO the same priorities can be found:– Fighting corruption– The situation of foster children – The situation of the Roma minority – Judicial reform – Public administration reform
In the economic aspects of the provisions of the same states for NATO and
the EU integration we find:– Economic restructuring– Sustainable economic growth– Business climate– Legal framework for foreign investments
Thus, improving the overall situation in the areas mentioned – with detailed
development titles, institutions and legislation, in particular the EU -supported by government action and coherent legislative reformsparameters of performance targets for both NATO and the Partnership asAccession to the European Union were included. The criteria for inclusionin the two organizations are converging and mutually reinforcing, not onlyat the level of joint declarations, but also the requirements for joining theNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 223

two organizations. The economic development of countries aspiring to
NATO integration is a fundamental process that can meet the requirementsof Army modernization and the participation of a state according to theneeds of the Alliance.
2. The common package of values and reforms
Concerning the political criteria for EU and NATO accession, internal
performance parameters for membership in both organizations mostlycoincide. Thus, by satisfying the political criteria for accession to theEuropean Union, included in the Copenhagen criteria which allowaddressing the theme, entitlement and opportunities for application for EUmembership, a country ensures policy requirements on the internaldimension of NATO. Thus:a. The grounds of democracy, rule of law and protection of children
through the following elements:
– improving civil and political rights of citizens including the
freedom of association and assembly
– the restitution of property, – in matters of judicial reform court proceedings and the application
of judicial decisions
– judicial independence by the rules of the Supreme Council of
Magistracy and the Code of Conduct for the judiciary
– the criminal justice system reform through the introduction of
probation and accountability of law enforcement agencies
– fighting trafficking through regulatory measures, institutional
plans and concrete actions
b. The criteria for protection of minorities includes provisions such as:
– Representation in national and local representative structures – Broad rights for national minorities to preserve language and culture
for self-administration in compact living quarters
– Adoption of general anti-discrimination legislation – The practical application of the Directive on equal traitment prin-
ciple to people regardless of ethnic origin or race – managing ethnicconflicts, reducing their number and integration of minorities innational political and administrative life224 Iulian CHIFU

c. criteria related to child protection provided by both institutions, a series
of common provisions:
– Management of the foster children protection – To promote the best interests of the children in taking measures that
concern them
– Community responsibility for vulnerable groups of children – Strengthening social protection of children in difficulty or in
situations of risk
– Interdisciplinary and intersectorial approach to child protection,
both in the context of social policies, family and educationalpolicies
d. Justice and Home Affairs criteria
– Visa policy – Border control – Control of migration – The establishment of foreigners law with common standards – Adopting the European system of extradition law – New types of passports, with high security to prevent forgerries – Facilities and appropriate upgrading of border points– Adoption scheme movement of persons under rules negotiated with
the EU
– Border security through information exchange agreements with
neighbours
– Integrated border management
e. The criteria relating to the fight against corruption contains:
– Substantial reduction in tax evasion – fighting widespread smuggling – Creating appropriate institutions and mechanisms against money
laundering
– Diminishing underground economy
Concerning economic criteria necessary for a state to face integration into
the European Union and NATO we also find common provisions.– Strengthening economic stabilization – Strengthening sustainable economic development
– Reducing the inflation rate and maintaining it at a low level NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 225

– A growth in the volume of exports and a decrease in the balance of
payments deficit
– Improving the banking sector – Improving budgetary performance, in particular the budget collections– Significant increase of the Central Bank’s international reserve – Increasing trade integration with the EU – Stimulating the development of SMEs and strengthening the middle
class
– Structural reforms and industrial giants’ privatisation – Economic decentralization – the adoption criteria of a market economy
between state and private sectors
– The adoption of equal competition rules and fair competition – Tthe return of industrial property to former owners – A stable legal framework for the investment climate – Bureacracy reduction – Reducing the number of permits and paperwork neccessary – Equal access to licenses– Building a functioning market economy – Industrial development – Improving transport infrastructure
In all the cases of states that joined the EU and NATO after the collapse of
communism in Europe, preparations for joining the two institutions weresimilar and complementary, they boosted each other and have beeninstrumental in speeding up economic and social reforms, stability, welfareand modernization in each state.
3. Lessons learned from the accession of Eastern European states to
the EU and NATO
To reveal the more pregnant coincidence criteria for joining NATO and the
EU, we will look briefly at Romania’s Preparation Plan for joining NATO,established in Bucharest in April 10
th, 2002. We will see here the areas in
which preparation for admission into NATO and chapter topics includedpolitical, economic, rule of law, the elements contained in the acquiscommunitaire, then we will examine the extent to which the provisions of amilitary nature and reform of defense institutions coincided with theaccession preparation for admission into the EU and the specific differencesfor joining NATO.226 Iulian CHIFU

The Membership Action Plan contains areas such as reform of the military
body, improving planning by linking resources with objectives,transparency of economic reform, fighting corruption and humantrafficking, protection of classified information and operation of specialservices, children’s rights and national minorities. Although, apparently,some problems are not directly related to NATO enlargement, they werepart of the reform package required for admission to the Alliance because ofthe compatibility criteria of Romania with the system of rules and valuesNATO.
The Membership Action Plan is prepared on the annual plan of reforms in
the MAP, and thus fully reflects the requirements of the framework ofaccession negotiations with NATO but also the commitments of Romania inthe negotiations to join NATO.
The Preparation Plan chapters mostly coincide with those relating to
European Union accession criteria. We will thus focus on the other, thesecond part, to see which are the common elements which are thedifferentiating elements between NATO and the EU. The four specific areasare: – Reform of military organizations– Improving planning – Protection of classified information – The operation of special services
The criteria related to military reform and improving the planning body are:
– Generating real and effective military capabilities to ensure national
security needs as well as actively contributing to NATO’s militarystructure. Noteworthy here is that the criteria needs to ensure itsnational security and foreign missions of the EU and criteria of the EUpackage.
– Building a modern military force, reliable, properly structured internal
needs and external missions, better trained and equipped , interoperablewith NATO (EU criteria)
– Defense budget at least 2% of GDP. (Romania pledged to 2.38%) –
reduction of forces acting in time of peace (EU criteria)
– Military career management NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 227

– Improving command and control system
– Creating a transmission system compatible with that of NATO (criteria
in EU missions )
– Providing aerial surveillance operation Operational Center (EU criteria
Chapters JHA and ESDP)
– Implementation the planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation
system
– Enhancing capacity to participate in crisis management operations (EU
criteria, ESDP)
– Improving Air transport (EU priority and the ESDP, the EU as a whole) – Facilities and air bases capable of providing transit and transport plus
storage for Allied missions.
– Ports to ensure the port and shipping capacity– The size and structure of forces under the categories of forces
negotiated with NATO
– Adopting the military career guide – Compliance with the pyramid of functions and degrees, the staff use
their skills in the right position
– Prepare NCOs and increased powers in the Army. – Training and learning English
A brief analysis shows that the criteria for admission into NATO either or
coincide with those for admission to the EU or are essential criteria for anyarmy and ensure any state’s security. Noteworthy here is that generating realand effective military capability to ensure national security needs as well asactively contributing to NATO’s military structure or peacekeepingoperations and crisis management, where the EU are mandatory criteria, aresine qua non criteria for any member of the EU and NATO. It is true thatany state can alter the National Security Strategy and eliminate traditionalthreats to its security, but it becomes a vulnerability not credible for theEuropean Union.
Also, the wording is quite clear that each state must have sufficient forces to
safeguard its own territory and population, interests, not through NATO/EUsupport or capabilities or through that of another state. EU criteria does notdirectly discuss the idea of neutrality, but in any case, has the requirementcategories of troops necessary to ensure its own security and contributionsto foreign missions.228 Iulian CHIFU

The main criteria related to information security and intelligence services
(other than those related to political criteria) are:
– Matching classified information protection authority with NATO
standards (existing critetiu for the EU as well)
– The reform of special services (existing criteria implicit in the EU,
although no formula developed to track points)
– Launch cooperation with partner services or allied state (criteria EU) – Exercise democratic control over special services authority by special
parliamentary commission (EU criteria)
– Adapt organizational structures and operational developments of
predictable security environment
– Strengthening public confidence about the role and activities of special
services
– Contacts with media to create a real perception of the authority of
special services
– Drafting instructions and internal procedures to protect classified
information and related legal acts. (EU criteria)
– Developing unique procedures in industrial safety – Training security officials – Develop mechanisms and procedures for electronic exchange of
classified documents
– Adapt the objectives, tasks and missions of special services to meet the
standards of a democratic society
– Balance between the principle of transparency, the activity of special
services and providing classified information
– The establishment of procedures for the review of government officials
with access to classified information
With regard to these criteria, they are either EU criteria as well or
absolutely essential to consistent and reliable development of specialservices in a democratic society – they come from EU political criteria andof human rights or are nonformal criteria of the EU, which did notoriginally develop military capabilities, but officially permitted anyMember State’s and EU Member States’ essential security.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 229

3. Formal relations between the EU and NATO
Formalized relations between the EU and NATO came into being in January
2001, and formal development, design and their relations grew rapidly afterthe EU-NATO declaration of December 16
th, 2002 on European Security
and Defense Policy – ESDP / ESDP. The Joint Declaration reaffirmed EUaccess to NATO planning capabilities for its military operations andintroduced the following principles of cooperation:
– Effective mutual consultation – Equality and respect for the autonomous decisions of the EU and
NATO
– Respect for the interests of EU Member States and NATO – Respect for the principles of UN Charter – To develop a joint consistent, transparent package of demands on the
capabilities of both organizations, that would help and support themutual strengthening of these capabilities
The package of documents adopted by both organizations in March 2003
contained the NATO-EU Agreement on Security of Information and BerlinPlus Agreement, which include:
– A NATO-EU Security Agreement (which covered the exchange of
classified information based on common rules for the protection ofsecurity)
– Providing access and use by the EU to NATO planning capabilities for
planning military operations of EU crisis management
– Use of NATO’s military capabilities and communications units and the
operations headquarters for EU – led crisis management.
– Procedures for acquisition, monitoring, return and recall of NATO
capabilities and assets to the EU, in its own operations
– Terms of reference at deputy SACEUR (NATO commander in Europe),
who will command, in principle, EU operations carried out under theBerlin Plus arrangements (a person who is European) and EuropeanCommand Options for NATO. 230 Iulian CHIFU

– The EU – NATO bilateral arrangements and consultations in the context
of EU crisis management operations using NATO capabilities andassets
– Incorporate in the NATO planning system established long-term needs
and capabilities that may be necessary for EU-led operations, to ensureavailability of trained forces and equipped for both the NATO-ledoperations as well as the EU.
NATO-EU cooperation in Macedonia, taking over NATO operations by the
EU’s Operation Concordia (based on the Berlin Plus agreements), or inBosnia Herzegovina, which took over the command of SFOR EU andKosovo, where KFOR (NATO) and EULEX (EU) have transferred somepowers from first to second and further cooperate in the field.
NATO and EU are both based on common values and institutions and are
considered “the most integrated and near community in the world”. At thesame time it is a “security community”. The two organizations share acommon collective identity, Euro-Atlantic, Western, etc. We share the sameeconomic interdependence and mutual benefit created significant interestother organizations. We use the same type of institutions to managedomestic affairs and international relations. We share common values,perceptions and counter the same threats, share the same forces, capabilitiesand resources to address these threats. Since 19 states are in bothorganizations this makes the two organically linked. NATO cannot survivewithout the EU and EU cannot survive without NATO. The specifics ofeach one reinforces and brings powe to the otherr, are complementary andsymbiotic in all.
4. Compatibility issues between CSFP, ESDP, Russia
In this part we will try to answer a few of the questions that set the degreethat political options set by the state in the National Security Strategy arelogically consistent, practical and strategic and are not contradictory. Moreover, given the security options discussed in chapter 2 we want to seeexactly what is the possiblity that a non-NATO member can become amember of the EU, while it is neutral, or its security is guaranteed by a thirdparty, non-NATO and non-EU. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 231

1. The EU as a security actor
We propose to asses the EU’s qualities as a security actors. During the first
faze we will not refer to essential elements that are usually considered insuch a case, the CFSP and the ESDP.
We will subsequently demonstrate, leaving from the European definition of
security in the broader sens that the EU is a type of security actor whosemain characteristics are developing political and administrative capabilities,which allows it to successfully cover the “soft” elements of security, and isa successful actor in economic, social, political and environmental securityas we shall see further on its characteristics concerning “hard security”,mainly military security and defense institutions.
It is certainly true that EU member states do not have this component
covered but we must see how much of it is due to belonging to NATO, howmuch is because of individual national developments and how much is dueto EU policies.
Basically the EU’s political and administrative capability overimposes on
the criteria that we studied in the previous chapter for NATO memberstates, that of planning, programming, budgetting and evaluation capacity.Moreover the EU behaves like an actor whose security is covered byNATO, who is only interested that member state have the capabilities toassure their own security (without having the instruments to check thisother than by results and democratic rules, but without being able to checkthe security sectors’ reform through indicators) – and here they interact withNATO who has the necessary capabilities to integrate force systems – andto contribute to external missions.
Here is where the difference between NATO and the EU intervenes, where
the EU wishes to have its own capabilities, both civilian and military, formissions that are not NATO missions. Here again capabilities aretaken/borrowed from the Alliance, according to Berlin plus agreements. TheEU looks like an actors with assured security who wants to havecapabilities for its own missions and thus creates security instruments onceit has come accross security problems that NATO cannot solve. This waythe Energy Security Strategy is explained as are its police, justice, order232 Iulian CHIFU

civilian capabilities, instruments that the EU uses admirably for the
administrative-political component for state reconstructions, its added valueto the notion of security.
The EU’s quality as a post-modern actor is given precisely by its multi-level
capacity, with administrative structures on different levels – sub-national,national, regional, European – with decisions being made at different levelsaccording to the level that decision affects and specific attributes andsometimes with codecision formulas between the Comission, the Counciland the member state – even foreign, security, defense policy. Unlike thismodel NATO is a pure intergovernmental institution, where decisions aremade exclusively by consensus and where participation is voluntary, withthe exception of the imperative solidarity “hard” guarantee of Article 5 ofthe Washington Treaty, exception which gives the orgnisation itsparticularity.
Thus there is no point in discussing the importance of administrative
capacity as a component of security, precisely because many of the securitythreats come from not having this capacity. The experience from the EU instrenghtheninig comunity cohesion but also between pillars two and threebut most especially from the capacity, expertise and ability to transformduring the expansion process, the ability to integrate new members andtransform actors within the neighbourhood, the attractiveness of theEuropean model for neighbouring states, all are concrete elements of asecurity and capability that only the EU (and not NATO) has and areindispensable for 21
stcentury security.
In the new forms of development and defining security we talk about an
actors capabilities to be there and generate policies and promote interest ascomponents of security capabilities. It is about the oportunity – presence –internal capability trinoma which validates actiopns. Then it is obvious wehave to evaluate the thirds trinoma, action – effectiveness- efficiency inattaining ones goals and promoting ones interests. From this point of viewthe EU is truly a relevant, major actor with worthwhile capabilities,although it rarely feels the absence of some categories of instruments thatcome after having its own credible, solid military and “hard” capability. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 233

For the EU we can evaluate 4 types of administrative skills which are
relevant for its quality as a security actor:
a. The first type of skill is that of rights and authority. They usually come
from formal rules, are protected, interpreted by a structure of norms andinstitutions. Exercising a valid authority of institutions and politicalculture is absolutely neccessary for legitimicy and recognition, andthose who exercise the authority are thus validated, acknowledged andmandated.
b. The second type of skill comes from the need for resources. It is about
the elements that allow you to do certain things or make others duecertain things. It is about money, properties, time, information, facilities,equipment are both individual and institutional capabilities.
c. The third type of skill is given by competences and know-how.
Individuals store competences through education, expertise, experience.Institutions gather know-how through traditions and rules.
d. None of the aforementioned skills would have any relevance if there
were not a fourth type, the organisational skills. It is important becauseit allows the use of rights, authority, resources and competences, and theskill comes from the effectivenss and efficiency of using the afore-mentioned skills.
It is obvious that the differences between types of skills especially appear
from the limited character of others – money, properties. So if we estimatethe aforementioned characteristics, the EU is a post-modern security actorwith special instruments but with a limited and low-budget military/forceinstrument – something which it feels but compensated by leaving classicalsecurity to the states and to NATO.
2. CSFP, ESDP for states with no armed forces?
In order to answer this and the following questions we will have to choose a
few elements from EU documents. The most important one is the EuropeanSecurity Strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, compiled by JavierSolana and adopted by the European Council in December 2003, it is thefirst document of this kind elaborated at EU level. It start by assuming thatthe “EU is a global actor”. Consequently “it should be ready to assume234 Iulian CHIFU

responsabilities in the area of global security”. According to the document,
the creation and the development of the EU are central elements towardsmoving the new security environment. The Strategy highlights theimportance of policies based on credible military capabilities, for protectingEuropean interests in the world and counterstriking the new risks onsecurity, first and foremost concerning international terrorism.
The document mentions the primordial interest towards the new challenges
on European security that the EU can stabilise, both directly and indirectly,because the risks of a traditional military confrontation on the Europeancontinent have diminished significantly. It is obvious that the latestdevelopments could bring serious reappraisals of the document, and that thecapabilities for self defense and conflict prevention may indeed becompletely different.
But coming back to the standing Security Strategy the document considers
that the explanation comes from two aspects: • current security interests and objectives of European states do not
generate conflicts, quite the contrary they favour cooperation andsolidarity;
• the international security enviroment is positively influenced by
European and Euro-atlantic integration processes, in fact by theexpansion of the community of states that share and promore democraticand free market values, in the context of deepening regionalcooperation.
Faced with the new threats on security the EU can respond through three
strategic objectives: a. ensuring stability and good governance in its neighbourhood. This will
imply extending the security area around Europe and will insure thatstates in this area (Eastern Europe, Western Balkans, Mediteraneanstates) are well governed. This objective will also imply continuing anddeveloping Europe’s involvement in solving the arab-israeli conflict;
b. creating an international order based on effective multilateralism. In a
world characterised by globalisation (global threats, global markets,global mass media) security and prosperity depend on the existence ofan effective multilateral system (this is clearly influence by events of theNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 235

time in Iraq and certain European states’ discontent with American
“unilateralism”). This is why one of the EU’s objective must be,according to the Stratgy, developing a powerful international society,characterised by the existence of efficient international institutions, aswell as by the existence of world order based on respecting laws, firstand foremost those written in the UN Charter (Here we could mentionthe failure of these requisites after the failure to reform the UN, the dropin credibility and effectiveness of the UN Security council, blocages andthe fall of the OSCE rule system etc).
The quality of the international society depends on the quality of the
governments that make it up. The best defense for European security isgiven by the existence of a world formed by well lead democratic states.This is why spreading good governance practices, fighting corruptionand power abuse, brinign rule of law and protecting human rights arethe best means of strenghthening the world order.
The European Security Strategy states, unequivocally, that the link with
NATO and the Alliances’ role in European security: “In this context animportant element of this new world order is considered to betransatlantic cooperation within NATO”;
c. preparing a response to the new kind of threats. This response include
the anti-terrorist measure package adopted after 9/11
th, supporting
measures to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation andassisting stats with weak or unstable structures in the Balkans,Afghanistan, East Timopr and Africa (The Democratic Republic ofcongo). Identifying answers to the new threats must start from the factthat these often come from far away, are more dynamic and morecomplex.
This is why the defense line will have to be abroad for most of the time.
The dynamic character will make it neccessary to shift stress towards crisisand threat prevention. The complex character will require solutions tomatch it which will include export control, economic, political or evenmilitary pressure. The EU has all the instruments for adopting such complexsolutions. 236 Iulian CHIFU

The document mentions the need and the effectiveness criteria of the
security policy – as the EU does with all its policies. Thus if the EU securityand defense policy is to become more effective, the Strategy sets asneccessary a more active pursuit of its objectives through civilian ormilitary objectives, a more coherent union of effort and command duringtimes of crisis, more skilled by alloting more resources, avoidingduplications, better coordination of existing resources. Here it is stated thatin an form admisible to member states at the time of the drafting of thedocument, in 2003, the role of the US in the security and defense of Europeby mentioning the fact that “in achieving its security and defense objectivesthe EU will have to bear in mind maintaing privileged relations with the US”.
Among the political implications for the EU determined by these objectives
and imperatives from the Security Strategy, the document states that the EUmust become:– more active: a strategic culture which can ensure fast, robust and timely
intervention using political, diplomatic, military, civilian andcommercial instruments/actions;
– more capable: the new European Defense Agency has a major role in
developing defense capabilities;
– more coherent: the ESDP and CFSP strong point is the belief that “we
are strong when we act together”; the current challenge is in puttingtogether and making different instruments and capabilities work.
Interestingly enough, for our evaluation, is the perspective determined by
the Union concerning its prospects in the military and security objectivecalled “Headline Goal 2010“. The document was adopted at the DefenseMinisters meeting in May 17
th, 2004 and is the result of adapting the HG
2003 (Helsinki, December 1999) to the new EU security strategy and themain objective set by the union’s decision makers: by 2010, the EU will beable to respond to crisis anywhere in the world. According to the document,the EU must be able to decide to launch a crisis management operationwithin 5 days from concept approval by the Council, and deployment oftroops in theatre must be done 10 days since the decision to intervene.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 237

In this context, one of the most important developments is the initiation and
operationalisation of a tactical battle group concept, as a solid repre-sentation of the European rapid reaction force. In this context, the new“Headline Goal 2010“ moves the focus from quantitative aspects of the oldHelsinki Headline Goal on the qualitative elements, consisting in efficiencyrise of forces and hence their utility (interoperability, sustainability,mobility and speed of deployment in theatre). At the Ministerial Conferenceof employment of military capabilities on November 22
th, 2004, a total of
22 Member States and Norway, a third party, pledged to carry and makeavailable to the EU, 13 battle groups.
We must also note the fact that the EU is not new to the crisis management
operations world, but has lead military operations in theathers. Bycompiling a short summary of its intervention so far, the EU has managedto deploy two crisis management operations (CONCORDIA, in 2003, inMacedonia and ARTEMIS, in summer 2003 in Congo), adding to thatALTHEA, its most important operations so far, by taking over SFOR fromNATO at the end of 2004. CONCORDIA and ALTHEA were organisedwith access to NATO means and capabilities as part of the Berlin PlusArrangemments, while ARTEMIS was a EU operation within a framingcountry, represented by France.
The facts mentioned above allow us to formulate a clear answer to the
question of whether a country may be a member of the EU without armedforces. The answer is clearly NO, because it would not meet the twomandatory requirements of the ESDP: ensuring self defense and securityand contributing to EU battle groups and peacekeeping operations.
3. CFSP, ESDP and neutral states at the border?
If we go further and refine the content of the question, thus exploring the
solutions Moldovan authorities have tried for their safety and the packageof policy options adopted by a majority in Parliament, we shouldinvestigate what would, according to EU documents, formulate minimumsecurity and military capabilities for a Member State.
CFSP and ESDP do not explicitly talk about the possibility of a neutral state
to become a member, if the conditions of its military forces are sufficient to238 Iulian CHIFU

ensure their own security and contribute to the capabilities of the Union.
Obviously, in this context we should talk about a more important andextensive topic – what is a neutral state in the 21st century, at the frontier ofEurope?
The negative answer to this question comes if we consider the provisions of
the Constitutional Treaty on this topic. But as the Constitutional Treaty wasnot adopted, nor the revised – with the same provisions – someone mightobject that we refer to documents that are not in force.
The draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, presented by
European Convention President, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, to the EuropeanCouncil in Thessaloniki (June 20
th, 2003) and in Rome, the Italian
Presidency of the EU ( July 18th, 2003) all refer to the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy(PSAC), as part of CFSP.
In the European Constitution project PSAC (Common Security and Defense
Policy, CSDP) shall, therefore, replace both the old concept of ESDP and itsextended option PESAC. The Draft of the European Constitution containsseparate provisions on EU external action (Title V). The latter include anumber of interrelated elements, including:– Common commercial policy;– Common foreign policy;– Common security and defense policy;– Developing cooperation;– Humanitarian aid.
Within everyone of these components, the main objectives of the EU’s
external actions respect these two fundamental principles:– external actions have to rely of principles that governed the creation,
development and enlargement of the EU;
– external action have to follow maximising cooperation between member
states on all level of international relations.
Regarding the first principle, we should mention the principles that governed
the creation, development and enlargement process of the EU, because onlybased on these will we find solutions and directions within ESDP.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 239

These principles are:
1. democracy;2. rule of law;3. universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental
freedoms
4. respecting human dignity;5. equality and solidarity;6. respecting international law according to the UN Charter
The EU’s external objectives concerning common policies and actions
target: a. safeguarding European Union’s common value, its fundamental interest,
its security, independance and integrity;
b. consolidating and supporting democracy, rule of law, human right and
international law;
c. maintaining peace, conflict prevention, strenghthening of international
security according to the principles of the UN Charter;
d. supporting sustainable development from an economic, social and
environmental point of view in developing countries towardseliminating poverty;
e. encouraging the integration of all countries in global economy,
including through banishing restriction in international trade;
f. promoting international measures meant to maintain and improve
enviromental quality and sustainable management of natural resourcesfor a sustainable devlopment;
g. assisting populations, countries and regions that face natural or man
made disasters;
h. promoting an interntional system based on multilateral cooperation and
good governance at a global scale.
The ability to work in a Union of 27 or more states, will depend a great deal
on the ability of the political leadership to define its strategic goals andboost their implementation in current policy. From this point of view, theEuropean Constitutional Treaty shows true progress by implementing thePresident of the European Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs ofthe Union posts. The President of the European Council will be electededby the Heads of State and Government by a qualified majority, for a period240 Iulian CHIFU

of 2 years and half, renewable once. Thus we leave behind the practice of 6
months rotational presidency. The role of president will be to chair anddrive forward the workings of the Council, ensure its smooth running andcontinuity and to ensure, at his level, the European Union’s externalrepresentation. The new function will provide continuity, visibility andconsistency for EU representation both externally and internally.
Also, the foreign policy profile has been boosted with the statutory office of
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of theUnion will be one of the Vice presidents of the European Commission andthereby a member of the Comission’s College. He will lead the CommonForeign and Security Policy, will be responsible for external relations andfor coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action, includingchairing the Council of Foreign Affairs, as a structure of Ministers Council.
Concerning the ESDP the European Constitutional project, and the Lisbon
treaty afterwards, reiterates the fact that this will include progressivelybuilding a common defense policy for the EU, that will lead to a commondefense when the European Council shall decide it unanimoulsy. PSACshall to overcome the particularities in security and defense policies of themember state, shall have to comply with obligations imposed to NATOmember states and ensure its compatibility with NATO security and defensepolicy.
The draft of the European Constitution brings five important innovations in
the sphere of security policy and defense policy:– Extension of Petersberg tasks – setting up a European agency concerning Armaments Research and
military capabilities.
– Application of structured cooperation in international missions – the opportunity for closer cooperation of EU Members for mutual
defense and
– Introducing a solidarity clause in cases of occurrence of terrorist attacks
and natural or man made disasters;NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 241

Among these provisions, some are incompatible with the principle of
neutrality in the sense imagined by the Moldovan authorities, traditionalneutrality Middle Ages, which is internationally recognized:– The existence of a foreign minister with the role of decision in foreign
policy, security and defense
– The expansion of EU missions involving the use of armed force in
missions other than the strict peacekeeping, with respect, clearly, theprinciples of EU
– Solidarity clause
This is the time to subject to a debate this formula which copies Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty, the founding document of NATO. Unlike NATO,which makes a distinction between cases of armed aggression and terroristattacks (on September 12
th, 2001 the North Atlantic Alliance activated for
the first time in its history Article V concerning collective defense anddeclared war on terrorism), the European Union Lisbon Treaty makes thisdifference.
Tighter cooperation for defense issues is applied in cases of armed
agression and is binded by Article 51 in the UN Charter while the solidarityclause becomes operational in the case of terrorist attacks and natural orman made disasters. More specifically, the solidarity clause impliesmobilising all EU resources, including military ones, for: – Preventing terrorist threats on EU territory– Protecting the populations and the institutions from terrorist attacks and – Giving assitance to member states on whose territory a terrorist attack
or a disaster took place.
Under this clause, no EU member state can be neutral, it is an ally of other
European Union countries and it must react based on the solidarity clause,with all the tools available to support other EU countries.
The only real compatibility is that which is explicitly mentioned, NATO.
But let us consider a debate where only documents that have are alreadybeing applied are taken into consideration, not those that have not beenratified or those which will be adopted. This implies a debate on whatneutrality means in the 21
stcentury but also the place for a neutral state at
the borders of the EU frontier. 242 Iulian CHIFU

Neutrality, in its classic meaning, implies not using force and not joining an
organisation that implies taking sides, as an ally. From this point of view,neutrality is incompatible with membership of the European Union, once itimplies adopting one side, that of the EU, according to the EuropeanSecurity Strategy. The ESS mentions the principles, interests, means ofaction, including military, to promote those interests, and this document isnot optional for Member States.
Finally, let us assume the meaning of neutrality would be an exclusively
military neutrality, that is not to contribute troops in action against anotherstate or non-state actors. Without the solidarity clause and the adoption ofthe Lisbon Treaty, this provision should be compatible with EUmembership and even with the ESS once participating in EU operations isvoluntary, so that every country can choose the operations it gets involvedin. Here however we face other incompatibilities. How can you be neutraland contribute troops to the battle group document ESDP – which impliesthat these capabilities can be used as a rapid reaction force in every locationdetermined by the Council!
Let us suppose, further, that Moldova is negotiating with the EU an opt-out
from these operations, or to choose its missions. Obviously the Memberstate must compensate the costs otherwise and we do not know if this isfeasible. But if here we can accept that such a negotiation is possible, wehave to take into account the fact that the Member State is responsible forits defense and security – under the ESDP.
From this perspective, Moldova should prove that it has the possibility and
the forces to ensure its security and defense. It is obvious that this cannothappen by altering the National Security Strategy and excluding certaintypes of risks and threats from the evaluation, which would mean that thereis no need for some categories of forces to defend the territory. In this case,the candidate country would not be credible. The only option it would haveleft would be for another Member state or member states to guarantee itssecurity. Without taking into account the costs of such an option thesituation would be incompatible with military neutrality. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 243

A last argument comes from another pillar of European scaffolding, Justice
and Home Affairs. JHA provisions for a state at the EU border aresufficiently detailed and involve categories of non-military forces andcivilian capabilities to protect state security and the European Union in theface of external threats and risks within the “cold war“ or realpolitikassessment, a situation that contradicts the idea of neutrality
4. CFSP, ESDP and the compatibility with Russia
We have to ask ourselves, given the particular conditions of the Republic of
Moldova, with Russian troops on its territory, but also the theoretical optionof having security ensured by the Russian Federation and having EUmembership – are the two elements compatible?
Things are very simple and have already been discussed previously; the
only situation where this would work would be if Russia were already anEU member! Otherwise, as we have seen, the security solution compatiblewith membership in the European Union excludes security neutrality orsecurity guarantees by a third party.
5. UE-Russia – competition or bordering conflict?
The last part of this chapter refers to the European Union’s prospects, to the
degree of convergence or competition towards Russia and, in those areaswhere competition is clear, the likelihood that it may turn into conflict. Thislast appraisal is needed to clearly determine a neutral state’s chance ofkeeping its neutrality and having alliance-like relations – the EU and theCIS – with both players competing. The logical and obvious answer wouldbe NO, and the arguments are similar to those treated in Chapter 3, whenwe looked at the options for security of the Republic of Moldova,concerning Russia and NATO. But further on we wish to demonstrate thatincreasingly more, Russia and the EU are in conflict on a number of issuesincreasingly more connected with security.We will discuss two areas where increased EU involvement increasinglyaffects and challenges Russian interests, who is prepared to defend thoseinterests violently already creating a state of conflict with the EU. First ofall we must mention EU efforts to diversify energy transit and transportroutes, which is not only competing with Russian projects, but also withRussian interests to keep direct control over all categories of transit of these244 Iulian CHIFU

resources to Western consumers. The European Union has acknowledged
the incompatibility between EU and Russian interests on the matter, butalso the reactions that betray Moscow’s standpoint on this issue asopposing the EU. The lack of cohesion and different interests haveprevented, until now, the development of an EU Energy Policy, but such aproject is underway.
Secondly we have to look at the European Union growing urge to assert its
interest in being involved in all processes of conflict resolution in theextended Black Sea region, primarily in the case of frozen conflicts. This iscontrary to the Russian-American arrangements of 1994, that left Russiathis important lever of control on non-slavonic countries in former Sovietspace and is contrary to the interests of maintaining the current status quo inthe area of frozen conflicts, which, conflicts which, as we have seen, Russiacan “warm up“ as it pleases. In this area, the European Union is left torecognize that its interests are opposite to those of Russia – it has not yetdone so but may choose to after the recent Russian-Georgian war in SouthOssetia.
It is obvious that because it has blended interests to engage itself in the
conflict resolution processes in the Black Sea extended area and because itwants to reach its goals of promoting a stable, secure and democraticneighbourhood the EU finds that it is becoming increasingly difficult topromote its interest in the region while remaining passive to Russianpolicies in the area, which have adverse effects.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 245

SECTION II
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
C.P. 1
Getting right security in NATO’s wider neighbourhood:
does this still matter?
The future of NATO’s partnership network.
A special focus on the Balkans and Wider Black-Sea
Caspian region
Cãtãlin Predoiu
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
I would like to welcome you all to this workshop on NATO’s future
strategic directions and the prospects of Alliance’s partnership network.
Many thanks to the Center for Early Warning and Conflict Prevention and
to the Public Diplomacy Division of NATO, which along with the Ministryof Foreign Affairs of Romania contributed to the organization of thisseminar. Undoubtedly, NATO’s 60-year anniversary represents the right time for theAlliance to define its future objectives, taking into account the new types ofthreats and the dynamics of the security environment.
NATO’s future posture depends on the way the members of the Alliance
will harmonize the common strategic goals of the Alliance with theirindividual interests and respond to the new realities and challenges, havingin mind the need to find a common ground and a unique voice of theAlliance in relation to these developments.

With the aim of strengthening security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, the
Declaration on Alliance Security, adopted in Strasbourg-Kehl, triggered theprocess of renewal of the NATO’s Strategic Concept.
As we speak, the discussions on updating the Alliance’s Strategic Concept
have already begun in many Allied capitals.
These events, including our today’s workshop, are designed to stimulate
ideas and approaches on Alliance’s trends and to provide a valuableconceptual basis for the experts responsible for drafting the preliminaryversion of the New Strategic Concept.
Our goal is to engage in debates representatives of the diplomatic
establishment in Bucharest, well-known political analysts, experts fromgovernmental and academic circles. Once again, I would like to commendthe Center for Early Warning and Conflict Prevention for the initiative oforganizing, this fall, a series of seminars in Romania, in close cooperationwith the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.
This will provide us a framework to draw round a broad and innovative
perspective on the security challenges of the 21
stCentury with special
focuses on NATO’s wide neighbourhood.
The New Strategic Concept will be a document with substantial political
weight, at the disposal of NATO leaders, officials and academics in the fieldof security policies.
In general, the post-Cold War historical changes generated a revision in the
strategic thinking of the Alliance. This revision was done by keeping aconstant core of basic values, such as collective defense, solidarity, supportfor democracy, individual freedom, rule of law and a global but dynamicperspective, related to the evolving security environment.
Therefore, the development of the Strategic Concept should not be a
process of re-invention, but one of refinement and adaptation to the newsecurity challenges.
It will not affect the basic principles and functions of the Alliance –
collective defense, transatlantic link, the indivisibility of security, Alliedsolidarity – as settled by the Washington Treaty. 248 Iulian CHIFU

Our basic philosophy for NATO in the future is a strong and sustainable
transatlantic Alliance with both political powers and military “muscles”,able to properly deal with the challenges of the 21
stCentury.
Expanding and strengthening NATO’s partnership network, including the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership is part of this vision. NATO’s ability to projectcoherent demarches and a proper image in the extended neighbourhood ofthe Alliance helps in finding solutions – for example in the Western Balkans– to the “unfinished business” that still carries potential for generatinginstability.
Major stakes pursued by Romania with respect to the strategic thinking on
NATO’s wider neighbourhood refer inter alia to the preservation of values,principles and commitments as basis for NATO’s cooperation withpartners. They also refer to the continuation of the “open door” policy withemphasis on compliance with membership criteria. Also to strengtheningNATO’s partnerships and cooperation with the EU, UN, and the OSCE andto specific contributions to the building of defense and security institutionsof states and/or organizations.
Reality shows that no one can act alone in the new security environment.
That is why, the New Strategic Concept will have to determine the mannerthe Alliance will interact and cooperate with other actors and the wayNATO will adjust its ideas, processes and, very important, capabilities to becompatible with other organizations.
In April 2009, Romania gladly celebrated five years of NATO full membership.
As a general assessment, we could say that Romania shaped the profile of a
consensus-generating Ally with balanced approaches, interested in drawingthe attention of the Alliance on developments in its immediate vicinity,particularly in the Western Balkans and the wider Black Sea region.
We believe that NATO should continue to improve and demonstrate more
clearly its ability to meet emerging challenges on and beyond Allianceterritory, including at the borders of the Organization.
NATO enlargement to countries of Central and Eastern Europe was a
remarkable success for the transatlantic Alliance. It proved to be a verypowerful tool to stabilize regions, encourage reforms and consolidateEurope. Due to this process, NATO continues to play a special role inNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 249

unifying a continent divided for nearly half a century. And that is why
NATO should continue to promote tailored partnerships to foster greaterstability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.
We believe that the problem of “global NATO versus regional NATO“ is
only a false dilemma. In terms of geography, the main security challengesfor NATO originate from its wide neighbourhood, from the former Sovietspace to the Western Balkans, the Mediterranean and the broader MiddleEast. And that makes peace and stability in the wider Black Sea region andthe Western Balkans essentials to the entire Euro-Atlantic security.
The Black Sea region is part of the European project of consolidating
stability throughout Europe through democracy, cooperation andintegration. It is an indispensable component of the Euro-Atlanticcommunity of security, democracy and prosperity. It is also important interms of diversification of energy sources and transport routes.Furthermore, it has also an important stake for the new approach on missiledefense.
Substantiating Alliance’s added value in managing new challenges (energy
security, maritime security, arms control, terrorism, proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, missile defense) means also a more secureand stable Black Sea area, and an increased security in the Euro-Atlanticenvironment.
Romania has no interest in remaining the Eastern border of the West.
Instead, we are determined to act as a catalyst of regional cooperation andEuro-Atlantic engagement in this region. Our goal is to have a secure,democratic and prosperous Wider Black Sea Area at our borders.
We believe that such a perspective is of regional and European interest and
that it is something worth striving for.
Let me conclude by underlining that the process of upgrading NATO’s
Strategic Concept provides an opportunity for underscoring the profile ofNATO’s partnerships and for highlighting the need for NATO to contributemore to strengthening security in its neighbourhood – the Western Balkans,Eastern Europe, the wider Black Sea-Caspian region, Central Asia,Mediterranean and others. 250 Iulian CHIFU

This is the reason why we will adopt – during the upcoming debates – an
active and balanced stance, a creative and consensus-building posture,which will reflect Romania’s specific interests, including those related tothe security of its immediate neighbourhood. We intend to play aconstructive role in the conceptual debates on the future role of the Alliancedue to a special expertise resulting from our location at the Alliance borderswith the Western Balkans and the Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian regions.
Romania strongly supports a consistent policy of strengthening and
developing NATO partnerships, with a special emphasis on the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, while encouraging NATO’s proficient involvement inthe Western Balkans and the wider Black Sea-Caspian region. Beyond theattention given to NATO-Russia relations, we are also interested insubstantiating the distinctive partnerships with Georgia and Ukraine, as wellas the relationships with interested countries of the former Soviet space andthe Western Balkans. Consideration should be given as well to NATO’srelationship with the Republic of Moldova.
We are convinced that the Alliance will continue to pay right and proper
attention to its wide neighbourhood and Romania will make every effort tosupport this strategic process. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 251

C.P. 2
Opening remarks
Military General Staff
It is with distinct honour and pleasure that I welcome all the participants to
this workshop hosted here at National Defense Ministry. I would also like toaddress a warm welcome to our distinguished guest from the NATO HQ inBrussels, Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola, Chairman of NATO’s MilitaryCommittee, who is going to join us in a few minutes via Video TeleConference (VTC).
We are going to look, today, at a challenging subject: “ Protecting the
Alliance security at the strategic distance or closer to home: correctestimations and false dilemmas” . I strongly encourage you to take the
opportunity provided by this joint project of Center for Conflict Preventionand Early Warning and the NATO Public Diplomacy Division with supportof Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affaires to have anin-deepth and open debate on this topic of high interest for Romania and forNATO, as well as for our friends and neighbours of the Euro-Atlantic area.
For six decades, NATO has successfully adapted to evolutions and managed
to steer the allied energies in a constructive way and in a positive direction.After the end of the Cold War, NATO has become a global player,conducting missions away from the allied territory and projecting securityin its neighbourhood. The security environment changed and NATO built upthe common, allied approach to those evolutions that affected membercountries. Working around the consensus principle helped the Alliance togenerate cohesion. Thus, the 2009 Anniversary Summit has a specialsymbolic value, conveying a strong message on the unity of the Alliance infront of an increasingly provoking strategic environment.
With the aim of strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic area, the
Declaration on Alliance Security, document adopted in Strasbourg-Kehl,started the process of renewing NATO’s Strategic Concept.
As we speak, the discussions on “upgrading” the Alliance Strategic Concept
have already begun in many Allied capitals as well as within NATOHeadquarter in Brussels. The need for a new concept is obvious for all of252 Iulian CHIFU

us. NATO has consistently updated its functions and tools at hand in facing
the new realities of the strategic environment. This reality has to bereflected in the content of the strategic concept that guides allied actions.
At the same time, NATO needs to determine the role it should assume in the
3
rdMillennium in order to efficiently set its vision, level of ambition, as
well as necessary structures and instruments.
The process of upgrading the Strategic Concept will be a major exercise.
We support the prospective of a clear and precise document, which will beeasily understood by populations of all NATO states, bearing in mind thatthe Alliance cannot work without the support of the public and parliamentsof the Member States.
For Romania, the process of drafting the New Strategic Concept is as
important as the final result. That is why – today and during the upcomingdebates – we should adopt an active and balanced stance, a creative andconsensus-building attitude in reflecting Romania’s specific vision andinterests, including those related to the subject discussed today: protecting
the Alliance security at the strategic distance or closer to home.
The New Strategic Concept will be approved by the Heads of State and
Government at the Allied Summit in Portugal, 2010, and until then we wantto be as involved as possible in the process of drawing it.
Let me conclude by underlying the significance, for the Ministry of
National Defense and for Romania, in general, of this process of multipleconsultations and debates on the content of the strategic concept. Not onlythat we clarify our position and find the best way of promoting it, but wealso learn about the concept, about other nations’ perspective on the issueand about the value of fostering wide consultations within the system forsupporting NATO’s core values and objectives.
I am sure that this session will be successful and I am looking forward to
learning about the findings and conclusions of the seminar. I am convincedthat these findings will turn out to be valuable not only for writing thestrategic concept, but also for MoD’s activity in general. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 253

C.P. 3
Talking points for the seminar
on the review of NATO’s Strategic Concept
Mihaela Matei,
advisor to the director of Romanian Intelligence Service
My short remarks will refer to two main issues on the agenda for the future
NATO Strategic Concept: political consultations within the Alliance and thedevelopment of NATO’s capability toolbox.
••First issue : What is the main trigger for revising the Alliance
Strategic Concept? Most common answers mention as primary cause
the changes in risks and threats to Euro-Atlantic security, althoughequally important is the evolution of NATO’s political and militaryobjectives.
Since the end of the Cold War there is no international organization, NATO
included, that has not seek, persistently, to extend its responsibilities to copewith emerging security problems. It goes without saying that each of theseorganizations has followed a specific political orientation – either on humansecurity problems like UN, or democratization like OSCE, development ofcrisis management capabilities like EU or improvement of out-of-areadeployable forces like NATO. However, in the midst of these almostpermanent transformations, the idea of partnerships amongst differentinternational institutions, to deal with complex situations has emerged onlyquite recently, mostly catalyzed by the evolutions in Afghanistan.
This is why, beside future risk assessments, the definition of political
objectives of the Alliance , commonly understood and supported by all
Allies is critical: what are the main NATO missions, what should be
considered as secondary or better covered by other organizations or even bynations, themselves? It is mainly a political decision, not a decision simplybased on an objective academic risk assessment.
It goes without saying that the current non-conventional risks to NATO
countries are not covered by Article 5. NATO’s collective defense, as it isright now, cannot deal with issues of climate change, energy shortages,254 Iulian CHIFU

economic crisis or in some cases, not even with terrorist threats coming
from second or third generation of immigrants in Europe. NATO cannotrespond militarily to all security risks and it has little other-than-militarymeans or mechanisms to react to a crisis as an organization. Should wedefine collective security by building new instruments for Article 5? But let
us face it: Article 5 is not a universal panacea . Moreover, our day-to-day
challenges do not come in the shape of an Article 5 situation – it actually
happened only once in the last 20 years.
What NATO can do is to think about re-interpreting the Article 4
provisions of the Washington Treaty to offer a better cooperation and
understanding on common security interests at stake and the military andnon-military common responses to them. NATO should forge better
forms of political consultations and search for solutions when thedifferent interests of its members are threatened . It can provide a forum
for coordination and support , including technical one if possible, in cases
of civil emergencies – which it already did – or in case of cyber attacks orrisks to energy supplies. Also, NATO can and should develop extensive
partnerships with global or regional organizations to ensure that a
common approach could be developed in relation to all its old or newfunctions: be it deterrence, prevention, response or post-conflictintervention. It is not enough to held high level discussions amongstdifferent Secretary Generals of different organizations – what might beneeded is joint task-forces or expert cells for in-depth discussions toimprove NATO’s comprehensive stance vis-à-vis other internationalinstitutions.
••This leads me to the second issue I would like to raise : Some years
ago, there were two apparently conflicting paradigms under debate inrelation to the role of the Alliance: on one hand, NATO as a toolbox
available for different coalitions of willing, on the other, NATO as apolitical forum for consultations . But those two are not necessarily
conflicting; instead they can be developed as a two-faced approach:NATO is both a political forum and a toolbox – there might be only a
need to better match them , to ensure that the right capabilities are
developed for the missions that everyone agrees with. In my opinion, itis also a false dichotomy to put in opposition the capabilities for out
of area missions and the ones for territorial defense , since allNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 255

capabilities should be flexible and usable enough to be offered, once
any of the two types of operations is decided . There should not be an
army for Europe and an army for Afghanistan, but an army that can bedeployed wherever necessary when our interests are threatened. Weshould also broaden our perspective on contingency planning andenhance the collective political input or contribution to this process :
most of the crisis that occurred recently at NATO borders, have beenpolitically triggered and their consequences were also political with animpact not only on NATO security, but mostly on out partners’ one. So
contingency planning is and should be a matter of political debateand consultations.
How can NATO pursue and deepen both its political function and its
military “footprint”? In the first case, we should start to ask ourselves
genuinely what is the meaning of NATO’s global security objectives rightnow? What are the main priorities: are there related to the Near Abroad, arethere oriented towards regions of risk and what are those regions – CentralAsia, the Middle East, the North Africa? Here one of the problems today isthat NATO itself has little input in its decision-making processes from areasof national expertise such as the academic world or the intelligenceservices. With the exception of military component, the intelligence is not
integrated into the mechanisms that activate a debate on securitypriorities at NATO . We cannot speak about NATO’s role in counter-
terrorism or prevention of cross-border threats without building andbringing more expertise in these areas.
Enhancing cooperation in this field will also contribute to the use of the
future NATO’s Strategic Concept as a vehicle or a catalyst for acceleratingthe reform of current NATO committees and structures.
Second, how the NATO toolbox should be developed? Military planning
has successively been adapted to face the new requirements for capabilities.However, there are many assets that can be used in the future and theComprehensive Political Guidance has reflected this evolution: a complexoperation requires civil expertise, intelligence, military forces for bothwarfare and peace building, humanitarian aid, NGOs workers and so on.We need an integrated system of management for the capabilitiesrequired in a certain operation that should be developed – or at leastforeseen – before a NATO operation starts : what NATO has, what EU or256 Iulian CHIFU

other organization can and are willing to bring, what capabilities and
expertise NATO partners can add to the Alliance. Partnerships have in manycases been perceived as a tool for spreading confidence and stability – there
should be somehow integrated into the broad picture of NATO’stransformation as security and military resources , and not only as
“shows of good will” amongst nations. For example, if NATO wants to playa role in energy security, it should develop mechanisms together with itspartners from Central Asia, Caucasus and Eastern Europe.
The Comprehensive Political Guidance has been a bottom-up approach
generated by the operational pressure from Afghanistan. We now need a
matching top-down approach that will clear up some critical questionsfor the future of the Alliance. We need both the political “sense-making” –
what is the extent of NATO’s role today and what are its limits? – and thecapabilities to match it.
NATO is the most efficient coalition of willing that ever existed. We should
not loose the willing, nor alter this coalition. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 257

C.P. 4
Remarks at the Conference “NATO and the New Strategic
Concept. Romania’s priorities ”
Milea Constantin
Cyber Intelligence Center, Romanian Intelligence Service
It is a great opportunity for me to address such a distinguish audience. My
short remarks will approach several issues regarding cyber security, as amore and more important topic on the Alliance agenda for the near future. Of course, the primary near-term security concern for our countries hasbeen the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications. But theeconomy is global mainly because of its reliance on informationinfrastructure. And we already know that the information infrastructure,including telecommunications and computer networks and systems iscritical to virtually every aspect of our modern life. As all government,private sector, and even individual activities continue to move to networkedprocesses, these types of threats will continue to grow.The rising connectivity between information systems, the Internet, andother infrastructures creates opportunities for attackers to disrupttelecommunications, electrical power, on-line public services, air trafficcontrol, and other critical infrastructures. Over the past several years wehave seen different cyber attacks against critical infrastructures and we havealso seen combined conventional military operations and cyber attacks usedsimultaneously. It is general accepted the fact that a successful cyber attackagainst a major financial service provider could severely impact thenational economy, while cyber attacks against physical infrastructurecomputer systems such as those that belong to the military have thepotential to raise major challenges for our defense capabilities. This couldhave a dramatic effect on losing or winning a war, whether it isconventional or informational, with real or virtual world consequences.So cyberspace is real. And so are the threats that come with it. We couldclearly assess now that cyberspace is one of the great strategic assets of ourtime. It is also a question that will deeply put under question the efficiencyof current legal systems that protects our citizens and nations.258 Iulian CHIFU

Over the past years, the use of cyberspace has developed to become much
more sophisticated and targeted. And we expect these trends to continue inthe coming year. Our estimate is that threats to information technologyinfrastructure are a matter of public safety and national security across theEuro-Atlantic community. We expect disruptive cyber activities to turn intothe standard scenario for future conflicts. Cyber security and cybercrime, including massive and coordinated attacksagainst countries critical information infrastructure, and terrorist operationsusing the Internet, are threats of critical concern to our global society.Terrorists are now more adaptive and innovative in their actions and timelyinformation plays a significant role in increasing the effectiveness of theiroperations. By exploiting the global information infrastructure and itsunderlying technologies, terrorists can operate in a virtual electronic worldthat provides them with a huge advantage for communication andcoordination. They may use such a resource on a vast scale triggeringunexpected consequences such as civil population intimidation, socialunrest in weak or failed states or even economic crisis. Terrorists may useinformation infrastructure for electronic attacks, and most likely both inconjunction with physical attacks to increase their effectiveness in deadlyoperations against our societies and our citizens.When referring to a massively coordinated digital assault on a governmentby another, or by a sizeable group of individuals, than we are speakingabout cyber warfare. The information warfare has moved beyond themilitary dimension. Information warfare is now a societal issue. Today, theterms information war and cyber war are used to explore a range of conflicttypes covering political, economic, criminal, security, civilian, and militarydimensions. And dealing with these topics becomes a major priority ofnational and international security.From the strategic perspective we have to assume that technologicaladvantage is a must for information superiority that has become one of themain priorities in all security organizations or structures. It is now clear thiscyber threat could turn into one of the most serious challenges we are allfacing as an Organization. It is also clear that we are not as prepared as weshould be, from the conceptual and methodological points of view.Significant work remains to be done in order to protect, defend, andrespond to the cyber threat in a manner that should obviously improve theoverall security of our nations as its main end goal.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 259

The new strategy that NATO is defining for the near future should start
from the first decade of the 21stcentury realities: human society is
dependent, both in the military and civil domain, on energy, on people andon goods transportation, money transfer etc., all based on communicationsand information technology systems, to an extent that this is enough todestabilize a nation. In this respect, progressively the security focus ismoving from conventional war theatres in the physical space, towards newconfrontation theaters placed rather in virtual or cyberspace.My key points are:•Any attempt to deal with cyber security as individual nation is doomed
to fail. If tackled in a broader multi-national context, cyber security willenable better understanding and response, and consequently a greaterchance for success.
•It is necessary for NATO to develop a comprehensive strategy to secure
our countries’ infrastructures and integrated information and commu-nications networks. It is essential to adopt clear milestones andperformances metrics that will measure progress in implementing thisnew security frame. Further, this strategy must be fully connected withthe new Strategic Concept of the Alliance.
•Work with all key players, governments and the private sector is
required to ensure an organized and unified response to future cyberincidents. It is not sufficient to simply strengthen our defense after acyber incident or attack occurs. The same development that has beenused in NATO’s response to disasters and civil emergencies should be undertaken: we have to have plans for sharing information,standardizing warnings and ensuring a coordinated response. Aproactive defense posture needs to anticipate future attacks. In thiscontext, cyber security specialists need to design the tools and know-how that will enable prevention and response to any attack on thenetwork or any hardware component.
•Strengthening public-private partnerships is critical to this endeavor.
We should start from the assumption that vast majority of our criticalinformation infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector.One of the main challenges will be to issue a set of common standardsand regulations from the various practices and procedures that arealready on the market.
•Further, it is necessary to build together a cooperation concept for
developing national cyber defense systems by deploying adequate260 Iulian CHIFU

technologies, and jointly define common platforms for staff training.
We also have to integrate these systems at a level able to ensure realtime coordination in the field of operations.
•It is also important to identify the financing mechanisms of such an
expensive enterprise as the security of information infrastructure,according to financial management principles within NATO.
•All previous issues should be consistently supported by an integrated
campaign to promote cyber security awareness as a typical componentof the NATO’s security culture. NATO should develop and conduct acoherent dialogue on cybersecurity, both with public and privatesectors, focusing to develop more public awareness of the cyber threats,as well as with other international organization that might providesupport and expertise in this area. NATO-EU dialogue should be aprerequisite of further endeavors for defining the Alliance cybersecuritystrategy, as the critical information infrastructure that needs protectionis actually pretty much the same for both organizations on ourcontinent.
From our perspective, developing a cyber defense system must be based oncooperation, starting with detection and analysis, and continuing withtaking proactive and reactive measures in order to limit or cancel cyberattacks effects. To support the development of such a system, starting withthe mid of 2008, the Romanian Intelligence Service, as national authority incyber-intelligence field, has developed a number of activities designed tobuild a trusted, collaborative environment, by promoting cooperation withvarious public institutions, private companies and academic partners.In this context, taking advantage of the European Commission CIPSprogram, the Romanian Intelligence Service started a nationwide project todevelop a pilot demonstrator for an Integrated European CybersecuritySystem. This project, designed in a public-private partnership framework, isaiming to create, with demonstration purposes, a national prevention,identification and coordination defense system against isolated or massivecyber attacks, addressing national critical information infrastructures, and inthe future, possibly broader European networks.
I believe such an approach, although still in a project stage, might be of usewhen the debates on the future of NATO cybersecurity capabilities will takeshape.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 261

C.P. 5
Adapting NATO to the 21stCentury: One Eye on Europe and
the Other on the World
Ambassador David J. Smith
Director, Georgian Security Analysis Center,
Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, Tbilisi
NATO’s first Strategic Concept was DC 6/1, written behind closed doors
and forwarded with a simple note: “The enclosed report is a revision of DC 6 as approved by the North Atlantic Defense Committee at its meetingon 1
thDecember 1949. C.H. Donnelly, Col, USA, Secretary.”
Today, writing NATO Strategic Concept number seven – or 7.5, if you
count the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance approved at the RigaSummit – will likely not be so simple. But a new concept is needed,nonetheless.
Indeed, since 1999:
•NATO has enlarged twice, accepting twelve new post-Cold War
members;
•New York and Washington were attacked on 9/11
th2001, prompting
NATO’s first invocation of Article V;
•Public transportation in Madrid and London was attacked in March
2004 and July 2005;
•NATO has been waging an apparently intractable war in Afghanistan;
•Russia conducted a cyber attack against NATO ally Estonia in the
spring of 2007;
•Russia has several times engaged in energy coercion;
•A Russian cyber attack on Georgia during the summer of 2008 was
followed by a massive invasion; and
•Russia remains in flagrant violation of the August 12th, 2008 European
Union-brokered Six Point Ceasefire Agreement, and it continues tooccupy Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Akhalgori and Perevi Village.262 Iulian CHIFU

Threats – and I mean threats, not challenges or risks – are far and near, new
and old, unfamiliar and all too familiar. NATO needs a new StrategicConcept to deal with them all.
That said, the 1999 Strategic Concept and the 2006 CPG form a good
foundation. These documents maintain collective defense as the alliance’score function, however, at the same time, they say that NATO must faceemerging global asymmetric threats. To meet both challenges, the alliancemust build readiness for the full range of missions, wherever they emerge,and however unforeseen they may be.
The drafters of the new concept must take care not to use the 1999 Concept
and the CPG as a foundation upon which to rest, but as one upon which tobuild.
The process – process, because words are not the objective here – must
force the allies to:
•Confront tough issues;
•Resolve differences of approach; and
•Sustain concrete commitments;
all to adapt the most successful alliance in human history to the realities of
the 21
stCentury.
Although there are 28 NATO member states and, therefore, at least 84
opinions, they coalesce into three schools of thought:
•Territorial defense idealists;
•Territorial defense realists; and
•Globalists.
Of course, these are schools of thought, focuses or emphases. They are not
mutually exclusive categories.
First, let us address the territorial defense idealists. There are some,
including some big names, who would emphasize the core mission ofterritorial defense, and then define out of existence any threat of attack inEurope.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 263

Were the territorial defense idealists to prevail in NATO, such thinking
would render the alliance into a post-historical security discussion forum,concentrating on:
•Interoperability – although there would be little point in it;
•Coupling America to European security – although America’s interest
in NATO would quickly wane; and
•discussing the European balance of power with Russia.
There is the real rub. If there is a balance of power in Europe, then NATO
would be a post-historical organization living in still a very historical worldbecause balances of power are the stuff of history.
Indeed, any notions of European post-history perished beneath the treads of
Russian tanks trundling through the Roki Tunnel into Georgia on August7
th, 2008.
Some try to escape this inconvenient fact by saying that Georgia is not a
democracy; or that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili started the war;or that Georgia is not in NATO, and Article V will surely protect NATOmembers.
Say what you will, but you cannot hide!Say what you will, but Georgia is a fledgling democracy – and that is part
of the problem. If Georgia were a malleable tin-horn dictatorship, Russiawould never have attacked. Georgia faces many challenges, but it is ademocracy, and reform such as the introduction of jury trials – to name justone area – is proceeding.Analyze, if you will, Saakashvili’s every move on August 7
thand 8th.
Whatever you find, you must also recognize that the Russian attack waswell and long-prepared, starting with the declaration of Kosovanindependence and intensified after NATO’s April 2
th–4thBucharest Summit
failed to grant Membership Action Plans to Georgia and Ukraine.
Take comfort, if you will, in Article V , but recall that NATO preserved
peace throughout the Cold War by making clear that it was prepared to back264 Iulian CHIFU

up Article V . Today, NATO’s deterrent posture is a shadow of its former
self. If we consider:
•The west’s flaccid response to the Russian invasion of Georgia;
•Its continued disregard for Moscow’s violation of the EU-brokered
Ceasefire Agreement; and
•Under-resourced and under-exercised plans for NATO territorial
defense – indeed, denial by some NATO and NATO country leadersthat such NATO planning is even necessary;
Vladimir Putin may not be deterred.Such directness has become politically incorrect and, therefore, uncommon
in the west, which tells us something in itself. No one – least Georgia; leastthe post-Cold War NATO members – wants a confrontation with Russia, butdenial to the point of refusing to call things by their proper names is thesurest route to just such confrontation
NATO’s core function must remain territorial defense, but well grounded in
reality. So the point goes to the territorial defense realists, but this far isfrom end the game. The territorial defense realists must join hands with theglobalists.
Now, some globalists – although not all – ignore traditional threats at home,
just as the idealists do, but in favor of fighting terrorists as far away aspossible. This is as dangerous as idealistically defining European threats outof existence.NATO must first defend its own territory, however – make no mistake – itmust also build upon the global outlook that it assumed at the end of theCold War, which is reflected in the 1999 Concept and the CPG.
Daunting as the world of 1949 seemed – and no doubt was – the 21
st
Century is far more complex. Today, in addition to good, old-fashioned
tanks, we face:•Cyber attacks;
•Energy coercion;
•Terrorism;NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 265

•Proliferation of WMD;
•Trafficking of
– Nuclear materials,– Guns,– Drugs, and– Human beings;
•Climate change – and there are serious security implications to climate
change; and even
•Disputes over water or food.
NATO should not plunge into all of these entirely, or even in part. But the
world for which we are writing the next Strategic Concept will be verydifferent from that of 1949, even that of 1999. The alliance must take onsome of these challenges—in whole or in part—coordinate with otherorganizations how to handle the remainder, and generally prepare to operatein a very complex global environment.
However, let us be clear that NATO remains the North Atlantic Community’s
primary security organization. To adapt it to the 21
stCentury, the Strategic
Concept must establish that the alliance has the lead role whenever anystate or significant non-state actor takes hostile action against a memberintended to compel the member to fulfill the attacker’s will, includingattempts to limit a member’s territorial integrity or sovereignty.
For example, just as we now accept that a terrorist attack by a non-state
actor could be an Article V event, the new Strategic Concept must leadmembers to see cyber attacks as possible Article V events. Moreover, anArticle V response may be military, but it may also be deployment of abattalion of computer experts rerouting Internet traffic through alternativefile servers – or both.
If such intellectual consensus can be achieved, many other things will fall
into place. An alliance with such a contemporary and global view willnaturally consolidate its democratic European base. This will:•Promote democratic development;
•Mitigate back-sliding and gaps, for example, in the western Balkans;
•Detter attacks on Europe’s periphery, for example, in Georgia; and
•Strengthen NATO’s gaze and reach to the south and east.266 Iulian CHIFU

To avoid any misinterpretation: NATO must continue to enlarge now, with
an even-handed approach to the western Balkans and the Black Sea region.As Romanian Interim Foreign Minister Catalin Predoiu said on October15
th, “Romania has no interest to remain the Eastern border of the Western
world.” That is quite right. Romania should be NATO’s window on a calmEuropean lake, not its last outpost on a stormy sea. And – make no mistake– that means NATO must reach across the Black Sea now because history isnot waiting.
A NATO so reinvigorated would prepare for out-of-area, indeed out-of-
Europe operations, accept that such operations could be Article Voperations, and forge partnerships with appropriate non-member like-minded nations in and out of Europe.
So, that is all that the new Strategic Concept must do: forge agreement
among 28 member states and lay the intellectual foundation for realisticterritorial defense and global security.
Perhaps the drafters could put a very simple cover note, as in 1949, on a
very complex achievement. It will be hard, but it must be done. NATOmust keep one eye on Europe and the other on the world.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 267

C.P. 6
NATO and the New Strategic Concept.
A Military Approach
Mr. John Seamon
Introduction
Madame Albright, in her opening remarks at the first Conference on the
New NATO Strategic Concept last week in Luxembourg, stated very clearlythat the “value of a revised strategic concept will not be found in itstheoretical brilliance, but in whether it provides practical answers to someinescapable questions,” one of which she outlined as, “does [the newStrategic Concept] ensure that NATO’s resources are sufficient to meetNATO’s responsibilities?” What I would like to do today is to offer a few“ideas” for consideration by the Group of Experts, as well for worthwhilediscussion and reflection amongst us here today.
Capabilities
In considering NATO’s need to provide for collective/territorial defense but
also maintain “effectiveness at strategic distance,” what sorts of capabilitiesare really required by the Alliance? In the not-to-distant past, two types of
NATO operations were generally considered: territorial (for Article 5) andout-of-area (for CROs), which carried distinctly different burdens forAllies’ force structures – the need to operate “in place” versus the need tobe able to deploy. That distinction has been replaced by the generally-accepted call for all Allied capabilities to be “expeditionary.”
But a recent, increased call for Alliance effort to be devoted solely to
defense of the European homeland, to include increasing in-place forcesand development of specific Article 5 Contingency Plans for Allied nations,has recently gained some popularity. Some claim that “if NATO cannotprotect, it cannot project,” ( Alliance Reborn , p26). If this argument is
valid, then it needs to be considered in the drafting of the new StrategicConcept… but before we do that, let us define what we mean byexpeditionary .268 Iulian CHIFU

Expeditionary forces need to be: rapidly deployable; generally capable of
full-spectrum operations; self-sustaining; and capable of operating atstrategic distance, in extreme climatic environments, in locations withremote/austere infrastructure situations, and as a total force.
But, just within Alliance territory we have:1. Strategic distances, for instance between London and Ankara, Lisbon
and Tallin, Oslo and Athens to name just a few.
2. Extreme climatic conditions, to include high altitude, mountainous
areas; hot, arid desert conditions; cold, wet polar conditions; etc.
3. Remote and/or austere infrastructure situations that exist – or can be
caused to exist – to include:
a. A/SPOD airfields and harbors not being available and/or ”clean”b. Communications systems that might be down and/or compromisedc. National health-care infrastructure and systems that might be
overwhelmed
d. Energy grids that might be overwhelmed and/or knocked-oute. And many other examples, to include the fact that even if
everything mentioned above was 100% available, it still might notbe politically viable to “militarize” these (largely) civil capabilitiesand systems!
In addressing the issue of having to be able to “protect to project” (which is
basically a political statement recognizing the linkage between publicsupport for expeditionary CROs and the feeling of security NATO providesto Allies), I would offer that, in a truly operational assessment of requiredAlliance capability, “if NATO cannot project, it cannot protect.” Therefore,
expeditionary capabilities and forces should explicitly be called for withinthe new Strategic Concept.
But how to do that? One former U.S. Ambassador to NATO used to state
that “capabilities are too ‘wonky’ for HoS/G and Ministers to consider indetail.” So, we should not spend long periods of time debating what text isappropriate for Heads to use in discussing capabilities. But amazingly, theAlliance already has a comprehensive, political document, public in natureand endorsed by HoS/G, that outlines the need for these types ofNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 269

capabilities – the aptly-named Comprehensive Political Guidance, or CPG.
I would offer that, as a start point, the entire Capabilities Section of theCPG could be pasted in its entirety into the first draft of the new StrategicConcept.
Discussion could then follow over which parts to REMOVE as
inappropriate or outdated, rather than trying to create acceptable, fresh textfor inclusion in the new Strategic Concept. (This, by the way, was theoriginal idea for the CPG when it was being drafted – it would initially“live” between the 1999 Strategic Concept and Ministerial Guidance 2006,but then be subsumed into the next Strategic Concept, once it was to bedrafted.)
Transition: Expeditionary Capabilities →→Resources.
The Chairman of the Military Committee, Admiral Di Paola, made the
following remarks during an address at the NATO Defense College on 25
th
September 2009: “… threats in a globalised world put a particular emphasison capabilities that are expeditionary in nature. Ultimately, whilst theMilitary can define the resources needed to achieve the desired capabilities,it is only the Politicians that can ensure that those capabilities areadequately resourced. In other words, the New Strategic Concept must beresource aware… If this is not the case, then it would be little more that a“fairytale exercise”.
Resources
By all accounts, NATO, and broader Alliance defense, is, speaking
collectively, woefully and critically underfunded. This is the fault of Allies– specifically, the failure of present and past senior political leadership atthe national level to direct adequate defense expenditure, and to thenexpend it efficiently. As Admiral Di Paola stated, it is an issue that demandsconsideration in the new Strategic Concept. I offer this: in order to give new
impetus to spurring Alliance and public sphere debate over nations’ defenseexpenditures, HoS/G ought to adopt a new measure of performance andtask their Ministers (Defense, Foreign, and Finance) with development of an appropriate range of acceptable levels of performance for Allies against it.270 Iulian CHIFU

I am quite sure most of you are thinking: “Exactly what NATO does not
need – another metric!” But despite the ubiquitous nature of the mantra of“spending 2% of GDP on defense,” that figure has never been formallyagreed and just does not work ! The new Strategic Concept should take the
opportunity to establish a metric closer to those in government responsiblefor establishing national budgets and determining the allocation of nationalresources.
But what do I mean by “closer?” HoS/G and their Finance Ministers do not
“own” their nations’ GDP. But they do “own” their nations’ budgets, andare directly responsible for its allocation on a yearly basis. Actually, HoS/Gown the discretionary portion of their nations’ annual budgets – that partwhich is not committed to such areas as debt servicing, pensions,healthcare, etc. – of which defense is a portion.
So perhaps a percentage of annual discretionary spending is a better, more
tangible way to express to HoS/G and their publics what their slice of theAlliance defense burden ought to represent, in real, understandable terms.A new metric will not spur increased defense spending in and of itself, but itcould reinvigorate and refocus the debate over levels, responsibilities, and
relative costs in the public sphere, and that would be a good thing.
In fact, we already have such a precedent for using a new metric to
reinvigorate and refocus debate within NATO on a specific area, namelyAllies’ national force structures: Usability. What I propose is a similarundertaking, only with respect to Resources. Determining what the properlevel ought to be, however, along with any potential enforcementmechanisms, is a debate for another day entirely.
NATO Command Structure
To prepare for a refocused, reinvigorated debate in the public sphere over
defense resources and capabilities, and efficiencies in delivering in bothareas, the Alliance ought to clean its own house first. And that house, so tospeak, is the NATO Command Structure.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 271

Madame Albright offered that, “… we must recognize that a strategic
concept is, by definition, a forward looking document… We must askourselves what NATO should look like and how it should be operating fiveor ten years from now.” This mandate applies in the most literal sense tothe NATO Command Structure.
The Command Structure ought to be the outward, collective expression of
the Alliance’s operational functionality and commitment to providing forthe security of the Euro-Atlantic region. It ought to represent – and set thestandard for – the provision of effective capability and efficient use ofresources at the highest levels. Instead, it has come to represent just theopposite: inefficiency, stagnation, and the line of first defense by nationsseeking to protect their own narrow national interests rather than agreeingto reform for the greater good.
NATO’ s HoS/G ought to, at the same time they unveil the new Strategic
Concept, therefore, task a “blue sky” review of the Command Structure.
Such a wholesale restructuring ought to be done without concern for the
current geographic locations, manpower ceilings, or flags-to-postsallocations, and without regard for the current “wiring diagram,” which stillretains legacy relationships that do not serve the functional concerns oftoday.
The Chairman of the Military Committee, in that same address to the NATO
Defense College, made the following remarks about capabilities: “We needCredible, Adaptable and Flexible Capabilities, and further MilitaryTransformation… At the same time, we also need to develop more flexibleand cost-effective capabilities, which can be adapted to face new threats androles.”
I wholeheartedly agree, and further expect that the publics of Allied nations
should demand, before they are asked to commit more treasure to Alliancedefense, that the NATO Command Structure represent the preeminentexample of a credible, adaptable, flexible, cost-efficient capability in theAlliance.272 Iulian CHIFU

Conclusion
Early in my presentation, I suggested that the issues of resources and
capabilities are inextricably linked, but the provision of them to the Alliancewas too far removed from the very people who could bring the necessaryinfluence to bear in Allied capitals – namely Heads of State andGovernment. I then offered a few suggestions about how to bring theprovision of capabilities and resources closer to these individuals, namelyby:
1. Reflecting appropriate portions of the CPG in the new Strategic
Concept, namely those dealing with capability requirements;
2. Finding a more appropriate metric for measuring the provision of
national resources to defense to replace the legacy “spending 2% ofGDP”;
3. Tasking a “blue sky” restructuring of the NATO Command Structure as
a necessary reflection of the seriousness with which the new StrategicConcept holds the provision of resources and capabilities.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 273

C.P. 7
New Threats: Energy Security, Cyber Defense, Critical
Infrastructure protection
Cãlin Stoica
Director General for Strategic Affairs
We have recently embarked upon what I believe it is an ambitious, but
necessary endeavor – updating the current NATO Strategic Concept, withthe aim of providing the framework for continuing the process of adaptingthe Alliance to the new strategic environment.
Some of what we now call “new risks and challenges” were included in the
1999 Strategic Concept. This is the case with terrorism, organized crime ordisruption of flow of vital resources. But the danger these risks pose to oursecurity has dramatically increased during the past ten years.
Some other risks we are facing today, such as the cyber-attacks, piracy,
climate change and energy security have become more proeminent after theadoption of the current Strategic Concept, and the Alliance should beprepared to deal with them.
All these risks are fundamentally affecting both our security and our way of
life and we need to tackle them in an efficient manner. And NATO’s role inthese particular areas is definitely one of the issues that have to beaddressed more in-deepth, as an area where significant evolutions havetaken place since the Washington Summit, in 1999.
What role for NATO? NATO definitely does not have either all the
answers, or all the instruments needed in order to face this kind ofchallenges.
However, Romania strongly believes, and other allies share this view, that
NATO has unique tools that allow this organization to play an useful role,complementary to the efforts of other actors in these fields. In my view, weneed a two-fold approach: first, to identify the specific means that NATO274 Iulian CHIFU

can use, and, second, to find a functional relationship, to establish the
appropriate division of labor with other organizations, in order to ensurethat these challenges are being addressed in a truly comprehensive manner.
Energy security is today a top priority on the international agenda. This is
no longer exclusively a national competence, nor is it uniquely an economicissue. Energy security is an issue that requires a multifaceted approach, agreat deal of cooperation and coordination among national governments andinternational organizations, a strong partnership between public and privateactors.
Energy security is a highly relevant and topical issue for NATO as well. It is extremely relevant because energy security is obviously an issue
playing an ever growing role in the security of our countries and ininternational security, in general. As security is NATO’s core business,energy security becomes a legitimate topic of debate for the allied states andit would be unusual to be otherwise.
It is also highly topical because at the 2008 NATO Summit, in Bucharest,
the heads of state and government agreed upon a number of guidingprinciples for NATO’s role in energy security, as well as a number ofspecific areas for possible NATO involvement. These are: information andintelligence fusion, projecting stability, advancing international and regionalcooperation, supporting consequence management and supporting theprotection of critical infrastructure. In these fields, NATO has a clear value added to offer and a number ofpractical programs both within the Alliance and with NATO’s PartnerCountries are ongoing.
Subsequently, in Strasbourg – Kehl, our heads of state and government
underlined that the issues of a stable and reliable energy supply, diversi-fication of routes, suppliers and energy sources, and the interconnectivity ofenergy networks, remain of critical importance, and declared continuingsupport for efforts aimed at promoting energy infrastructure security. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 275

Romania has been one of the Allies actively advocating for a more
proeminent and more active role for NATO in the field of energy security,with the conviction that through its experience and capabilities, the Alliancehas, together with other relevant actors, an important word to say.
Romania believes that the main areas where NATO can usefully play a role
are: assessing the risks to energy security, protecting the critical energyinfrastructure, and supporting regional cooperation.
Allow me to dwell a bit more on each of them. First, assessing the risks. NATO has today an impressive network of
partners and one can easily see that this network of cooperation, which goesfrom the Mediterranean basin to Black Sea and Caspian regions andcontinues in the Middle East, covers producers, consumers and transit routecountries. The Alliance can therefore serve as a platform for consultationand cooperation on energy security issues among Allies and with partnersThese consultations play an important part in the overall assessment of therisks to energy security, while NATO’s expertise in defense and securitysector reform, crisis management and civil emergency planning can be usedto provide assistance and know-how to interested partner countries.
Second , protecting the energy infrastructure. Through the operation Active
Endeavour, for instance, NATO has been maintaining security for keyresource routes in the Mediterranean. How can we make best use of theexperience acquired until now? Romania does see a role for NATO insupporting the national capacities and regional initiatives in order to ensureprotection of energy infrastructure and sea lines of communication.
Last, but not least , the support for regional cooperation. This process is a
two-fold one. On the one hand, due to current security concerns,cooperative activities with Partner countries often impact on energy securityissues. (Areas such as defense reform, critical infrastructure protection,counter-terrorism cooperation and environmental protection may all impacton resource security). On the other hand, cooperating with partners onenergy security issues is a necessary component of an up-to-date, relevant,cooperative approach of NATO towards the Euro-Atlantic security.276 Iulian CHIFU

These considerations are of particular relevance for the Black Sea region ,
which, by its position at the crossroads of Europe, Central Asia and the
Middle East, is a hub for trade, energy and transportation links.
The dialogue and cooperation in this area can only be mutually beneficial.
We are in favour of bringing it a step forward, by practical, focusedcooperation activities, including at experts’ level, to discuss common risksand ways to protect critical energy infrastructure.
Along with ministerial and high level commitments, we also need public-
private partnerships and the connection of existing networks ofstakeholders: political actors, the business sector, civil society, internationalinstitutions. These remain the basic principles of all our regional initiatives,whether they address energy security, environmental protection and climatechange or regional research partnerships.
Following the decisions our heads of state and government took in
Bucharest, NATO has started to engage dialogue with the private sector,through formal (sessions of NATO relevant committees meetings) orinformal contacts (conferences, seminars and workshops), with a view todiscuss risks and ways to protect critical energy infrastructure. Bearing inmind NATO’s role and specific contribution in the area of energy security, itis important to know the perceptions of the private actors with regard to theenergy security threats, and also to share views and experiences on themodalities to ensure better protection of the energy infrastructure and toexchange lessons learned on security practices. I hope that our conferencewill provide us with more relevant ideas in this respect.
The evolutions in the energy field of the last few years have increased the
interest and the attention devoted to this area.
The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2009, which severely affected
a number of Allied and Partner countries, illustrated the serious effects of adisruption in the flow of natural resources. These events have also provedonce more that the issues of a stable and reliable energy supply, diversi-fication of routes, suppliers and energy sources, and the interconnectivity ofenergy networks, remain of critical importance.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 277

Romania has constantly promoted, at the top of our foreign policy agenda,
the realization of the Nabucco pipeline, the backbone of the Southern GasCorridor and the most important EU-backed gas project in the Black Searegion. The Nabucco ceremony this July in Ankara re-confirmed thepolitical support of all partner states through the signing of the NabuccoInterstate Agreement, an essential element for taking Nabucco closer tocompletion.
In the oil sector, as part of our diversification option, we support the
development of the PEOP (Constanta – Trieste) pipeline project. We alsopromote short and medium term energy projects, such as the construction ofan LNG terminal in Constanta harbor, the development of underground gasstorage facilities, and the interconnection of our national energy systemswith those of the neighbouring countries.
In the field of renewable energies, we aim at capitalizing on Romania’s
potential, especially with regard to hydro and wind power. In the latter case,it is worth pointing out to the recent ambitious project initiated inDobrogea. We underline the significance of tackling the effects of climatechange and we also hope in a significant progress in the context of theCopenhagen Conference, being aware of its importance for the security offuture generations.All the above mentioned demarches are important when it comes to theassessment of Romania’ s involvement in energy security, but they are notthe only ones.
In this respect, I would firstly commend the US proposal to establish an
EU–US Energy Council, an initiative that we consider a great opportunityto deepen the trans -Atlantic energy dialogue. As an EU member state andstrategic partner of the US, we intend to actively support the materializationof this Council.
Secondly, I would mention the accelerated development of our energy
cooperation with Central Asian and Caucasus countries. Their involvementin energy projects such as Nabucco represents both the way forward to apredictable answer to European energy security, but also a geopoliticalinsurance policy for consolidating the political and economic independenceof Central Asia.278 Iulian CHIFU

Thirdly, the successful approach of global and regional energy challenges
also needs trust-based and mutually respectful cooperation with the RussianFederation and Ukraine, actors of high importance in the Black Sea energyframework. Romania, as well as the EU and NATO, has a particular interesttowards these countries.
The Russian Federation is Romania’s traditional energy partner with whom
we need to further develop pragmatic economic and energy relations,future-oriented and focused on shared opportunities. Regarding Ukraine, wesupport the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian gas transit network, in accor-dance with the objectives established on the occasion of the EU–UkraineConference in March this year.
I have chosen to focus only on one of the new risks that need to be
addressed more in deepth in the future NATO Strategic Concept, namelyenergy security.
I am convinced that these discussions that we are having today will result in
concrete ideas that will constitute an important and useful contribution tothe ongoing work of updating NATO’s Strategic Concept.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 279

C.P. 8
Cyber War, Cyber Defense
Khatuna Mshvidobadze
Senior Associate, Georgian Security Analysis Center,
Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, Tbilisi
Today, we discuss what should be in NATO’s new Strategic Concept, what
should be considered real threats to the Alliance, how to prevent andrespond to those threats and how to sustain stability and securityaccordingly.
In the 21
stCentury, we face new threats that are the 21stCentury equivalent
of armed attacks as conceived in 1949, and these might be as detrimental toour security as terrorism.
In the summer of 2008, Georgia was attacked by its northern neighbour not
only conventionally by air, land and sea, but also via cyber space.
Cyber attacks are a form of warfare in the early 21
stCentury. High
technology and online skills are now available for rent to malevolentgovernments, organized crime and terrorist organizations, and can poten-tially destabilize a country’s economy and crucial security infrastructure.
The Russian invasion of Georgia was to some extent preceded by a series of
cyber attacks that developed into an integral part of the armed attack, fullyready as Russian tanks rolled into Georgia on August 7
th.
This is the stark reality:•Russia fully coordinated its cyber attack with its land, sea and air attack
– the wireheads were fully prepared as Russian tanks trundled intoGeorgia on August 7
th.
•The cyber attack was an integral part of the armed attack.
•Indeed, the cyber attack performed some missions that would heretofore
have been assigned to aircraft or artillery.280 Iulian CHIFU

•Analysis by the US Cyber Consequences Unit – an independent research
institute – indicates that all the preparatory work was accomplishedbefore the war – obviously the cyber war coordinators, in other words,the Russian government, were fully aware of the impending attack uponGeorgia and its timing.
•The cyber attacks against Georgia represented improvements over the
techniques used against Estonia in the spring of 2007.
Most of the attacks were of a type called Distributed Denial of Service
attacks – DDOS. Cyber criminals take over bits of perhaps thousands ofprivately owned computer and lash them together into so-called botnets that
then blast information at a target website. Imagine downloading the entireWindows XP operating system every 6 seconds! The target site is renderedunable to perform its intended service.
Most of the botnets used against Georgia had already been used for criminal
activities. The Russian government was in cahoots with Russian organizedcrime!
Cyber attacks can be used to:
•Debilitate certain specific defense computers
•Create a sense of panic or demoralization among the population, and
•Prevent effective communication by the government
Another tool used was web postings of instructions to individuals with
limited computer skills who could contribute to the cyber attack efforts. Theweb-site postings were so productive that forty-three targeted websites wereeffectively shut down or defaced, in addition to the eleven targeted by thebotnets associated with organized crime.
Here is how it worked. The real ringleaders operate from a distance. Therewas a hierarchy to the agents involved:•At the top, “soldiers” – professional planners, computer scientists and
engineers. Experts and commentators have directly accused Moscow ofsponsoring the attacks as their magnitude required the resources only astate-sponsor can provide.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 281

•Next, “mercenaries”– criminal organizations paid to carry out certain
elements of the attacks – there were strong signs implicating the RussianBusiness Network, a now defunct or disappeared criminal organization.
•Finally, there were “volunteers” – individuals with PC’s who were
recruited through social networks to augment the attacks.
Make no mistake – many of the cyber attacks were so close in time to the
corresponding military operations that there had to have been closecoordination between people in the Russian military and the civilian cyberattackers.
When the cyber attacks began, they did not involve any mapping stage, but
jumped to the sort of packets that were best suited to jamming websitesunder attack. This indicates that the attack script had to have been written inadvance. Registering new domains and new websites were accomplishedso soon that all the steps had to have been prepared in advance.
The Cyber attacks disrupted the Georgian Government’s information and
communication efforts, financial transactions, Internet and cellular tele-phone connections for several days.
The era of cyber warfare has begun.When the NATO Alliance was formed, cyber war was a thing for books or
the cinema, but the Russian attack on Georgia now demonstrates that we arefacing it in reality.
To be relevant to the new reality, NATO and its partner countries should
concentrate more on establishing prevention mechanisms against cyberwarfare.
NATO must now act.
The new NATO Strategic Concept must not only treat cyber warfarecomprehensively, it must recognize that this form of warfare can be anintegral part of armed warfare, indeed it can substitute for artillery and airinterdiction. Consequently, the Strategic Concept must recognize cyberwarfare as a potential Article V event.282 Iulian CHIFU

It follows that NATO must gather relevant intelligence, devise counter-
measures and defenses, develop plans and programs and conduct exercises.
Finally, there must be greater funding, participation and support for the
Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, including theparticipation of partner states such as Georgia that can contribute positivelyto the alliance’s efforts on cyber defense.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 283

C.P. 9
Managing challenges and opportunities in NATO’s
wider neighbourhood.
The need to build circles of stability:
the case of the Mediterranean region
Fatima LAHNAIT
The Mediterranean region is a region of enormous cultural, religious,
political and economic diversity. Three continents meet there. More than 20states border the Mediterranean sea.
This diversity gives all sense to speak about Mediterranean security :
European and Mediterranean security are indeed linked .
Over the last decade, debate about Mediterranean security concerns has
intensified. The European Union’s Barcelona process and NATO’sMediterranean dialogue have given these discussion a substantive character.
Economic interaction, expanded reach of modern military and information
systems, political spillovers are producing a significant area of problems(from Kurdistan to Western Sahara) that are neither strictly European norMiddle Eastern.
The Mediterranean issues are imposing new intellectual and policy
challenges on both sides of the Atlantic and on both shores of theMediterranean
1.
Beside that, the adaptation of the alliance in term of missions reinforces the
importance of the South. The idea of doing more in and around theMediterranean is part of the consensus within NATO.
1Societies on both sides of the basin share a growing perception of declining personal
security. In Europe, the concern about spillovers of political violence from crisis across theMediterranean compels the attention of political leadership and public opinion.284 Iulian CHIFU

The Mediterranean Dialogue
To address these concerns, NATO opened, in December 1994, a dialogue on
security with several Mediterranean non-European countries : Morocco,Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypte, Israel and Jordan (each of them linkedin a different way to the alliance).
Its purpose was to send a signal to the southern neighbours of NATO’s will
of engagement and partnership.
From the outset, the Mediterranean dialogue was designed to evolve, and it
has. Over the years it has deepened. NATO provided assistance in areaswhere its expertise offered a comparative advantage.
Political discussions have become more frequent and more intense. The
number of activities
2has grown: the objective is to increase transparency
and promote better mutual understanding between the Alliance and itsMediterranean partners.
The American approach in the Mediterranean dialogue has favoured
military training, exercises and other pragmatic aspects of cooperation(crisis management, emergency planning) over political dialogue. Today,almost 85% of NATO’s Mediterranean programme concern military issues.
Other practical activities also aim at building confidence through
cooperation in areas of mutual interest. It includes courses, seminars andother activities in the fields of civil emergency planning, crisismanagement, science and the environment, defense policy and strategy, inaddition to a programme of military cooperation activities.
The 2004 NATO’s Istanbul Summit gave a new dynamic to the cooperation
by transforming it to a partnership and by promoting the political aspect of
the Mediterranean dialogue. Since then, there has been periodical contactbetween NATO and its Mediterranean partners.
2They include, above all, information activities.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 285

Now, as NATO recasts its strategic concept, looking towards the Lisbon
Summit, it is likely that many of the new concepts and contingencies underdiscussion will emanate from the European periphery, from the Maghreb tothe Levant, with the objective of building a reinforced partnership for peaceand security.
The recent shifts on missile defense in Europe have made the
Mediterranean basin the centre of gravity for the key aspect of transatlanticdefense policy.
The convergence of American and European interest looking South, and the
fact that both the United States and Europe can act with almost equal effectaround the region, make cooperation on security and development in theMediterranean a key near-term test of improved transatlantic relations.
But, from the perspective of the Mediterranean dialogue states, it implies
the uncomfortable idea that new risks are emanating from the South, but italso suggests more active western involvement in addressing the South’sinternal and regional problems. Therefore, it is difficult to southern states toaccept this approach without reservation, with the exception of Israel.
Why should the Mediterranean Dialogue still matter for NATO ?
The first reason is the region’s potential for instability . The Mediter-
ranean provides some important cases where conventional clashes overresources and territory are possible (examples include the Western Saharadispute, “the cold conflict of the desert”). The threat is not a crusade ofIslam against Europe, but the revival of nationalism in the basin.
The second reason is terrorism . It is likely to remain a leading functional
concern for the Alliance around the Mediterranean and a leading issue forcooperation with the Mediterranean dialogue partner countries. This issueprovides a tangible context for counter-terrorism discussions within NATOand within the Mediterranean dialogue.286 Iulian CHIFU

Third reason, proliferation risks are a shared challenge in North-South
terms . Since a decade major Southern European population centers are
within range of ballistic missiles that could be deployed around theMediterranean basin and in the Middle East.
3
Proliferation risks and the debate on addressing them are now permanentlyoperating factors in the Mediterrranean environment
4.
Economic disparities and their close connection to migration are the
fourth reason why the Mediterranean region matters to NATO.
Their effects are obvious: high unemployment rates, particularly among a
politically frustrated younger generation, and consequently migration.
Immigration remains a highly politicized issue in europe and discussion on
that issue remains central to relations between the North and the South inthe Mediterranean. But it is difficult and inappropriate for NATO to take upthis issue with dialogue partners, except for addressing the control ofhuman flows..
The Mediterranean is an energy “entrepôt”, so the fifth reason is
energy security . About 65% of Western Europe’s oil and natural gas
imports pass through the Mediterranean. Some 3000 ships cross the areaevery day. Europe has become dependent on North Africa for some 25% ofits gas requirements, with far higher levels of dependence in France andSouthern Europe (Spain and Portugal).
This fact is likely to increase as gas continues to be a fuel of choice and as
new pipelines are developed. Most of this supply reaches Europe throughthe Trans-Med line linking Italy and Libya, and the Trans-Maghreb pipelinesupplying Algerian gas to Spain and Portugal, as well as France, Germanyand Belgium, via Morocco.
3Turkey being already exposed to ballistic missile risks from its Middle Eastern
neighbours.
4Cooperation for arms control remains an important aspect in conflict prevention and
conflict avoidance.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 287

And unlike oil, the gas market remains regional rather than global, with
much fixed infrastructure and far less flexibility to respond to supplyinterruptions
5.
Furthermore, the expansion of oil and gas pipelines is creating new
opportunities for cooperation and conflict, with implications for the securityand prosperity of North and South.
So, as NATO’s Mediterranean initiative evolves, energy security becomes a
rising item of the Mediterranean dialogue: the Alliance being a partialguarantor of the physical security of energy transport around the region.
The last reason why the Mediterranean dialogue matters is because it
encompasses the Middle East
Developments in the Middle East peace process continue to influence the
overall security environment in the Mediterranean and have traditionallyinhibited progress on all Mediterranean initiatives
6.
Therefore, the fate of existing regional initiatives, including NATO’s
Mediterranean dialogue, will be strongly affected by developments in theArab-Israeli conflict. The current crisis exacerbates longstanding Arabsuspicions regarding Western security institutions and makes an effectivemultilateral dialogue North-South lines difficult.
Other contentious issues include the control of the maritime routes, drug
trafficking, debt, cultural tensions, information security, environment andclimate change, and all the challenges of the global economic crisis.
5Algeria and Libya are playing the key role in this issue. NATO should consider the
difficulty of bringing Libya into the dialogue.
6As it is the case of the Union for the Mediterranean launched in july 2008 by the French
president Nicolas Sarkozy. The Israeli attacks on Gaza in December 2008 and January2009 have frozen the Union’s projects.288 Iulian CHIFU

What more can be done to achieve the objective of improving and
enhancing the Mediterranean dialogue ?
The dialogue has not met its full potential
In the first place, the Mediterranean is not a homogeneous region. There is
no common definition of security among the Alliance’s partners and NATOhas to take this diversity into account: its partners have different needs andambitions regarding their relationship with the Alliance.
Furthermore, NATO’s members have a different perception of the region :
there is a need for a common approach and a recognition by ALL themembers of the importance of the issue.
Secondly, the playing field is crowded, with many institutions involved in
the Mediterranean initiatives. NATO should avoid duplicating what otherorganizations are doing.
Thirdly, NATO should continue to play to its strength, which is military
cooperation and assume a role in creating military confidence andcooperation among the partners rather than creating potential enemies.Meanwhile, the Alliance should encourage more cooperation and activitiesthrough the NATO Science For Peace Programme
Fourthly, NATO has to be sensitive to how changes may be perceived by
dialogue countries and to take into consideration their public opinion.
Finally, the main security problems in the region have deep economic,
social and political roots : NATO is not well suited to deal with thesechallenges, even if the Alliance can encourage South-South cooperation. Inmost instances, the European Union should take the lead in longer-termstrategy.
If it is fashionable to see the Mediterranean as part of an “arc of crisis”, it
might more accurately be described as “an arc of change”.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 289

C.P. 10
Abstract for the conference on
“A NATO New Strategic Concept and Romania ”
by Oleksiy Kolomiyets
President of Centre for European and Transatlantic Studies,Kyiv, Ukraine
For now, nobody can ever predict: “Will a drafting of a new Strategic
Concept end with a success?” In the meantime, if this work is rathersucceeding, a Concept will be a paper only, but strategic. The allies shoulddetermine: ‘What NATO’s ‘unique’ is for today and will be for the future?’But this ‘unique’ has to be based on an own transformational development.And a real transformed unique should deserve a praiseworthy.
It is a political algorithm, which does require a common strategic thinking
and approach. They do not exist for today and hardly will emerge in thenear future. Drafting a new Strategic Concept will be the key, possibly final,testing for NATO on a political integrity and credibility.
A new geo-strategic realism has emerged: “The Trans-Atlanticism Vision of
the past may no be longer possible in the future”. Many European membersboth of the EU and NATO have to concede this fact. Neglecting it candeteriorate the situation in NATO further.
This year, almost clear, can be decisive and critical for NATO. False and
strange illusions of many European NATO-members that the transatlanticpolicy of the Obama’s administration will be upturned, in fact, appeared asillusions. Instead ‘a hard unilateralism’, as Robert Kagan wrote, ‘a softunilateralism’ is dawning with the clear features of enhancing strategicirrelevance and retreat.
The strategic situation in Afghanistan for NATO is becoming almost
critical. For ‘a unity’ of the Alliance such tendency is reaching to a criticalpoint, to its own Rubicon – behind it, either a step-by-step vanishing orRenaissance, that may be followed by emerging of an another organization.290 Iulian CHIFU

In the front of the relationships between Ukraine and NATO there were
raised the next key questions:–Will the Ukrainian vision of security and defense coincide with the
corresponding vision of NATO for a long-term perspective?
–How to reach a coincidence between the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of
Ukraine and the strategic vision of the Alliance’ s future?
–How to correct the Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic strategy in correspondence
with the NATO’ s strategic goals and to explain proper this correction inpublic?
Ukraine has become ‘a strategic orphan of Europe’ with unpredictable
consequences in the short- and mid-term perspectives. There will be usefulto see what does such ‘a strategic orphan’ reflects about the key stones lyingon the road ahead a future of the Alliance.
Speaking at the ‘Launching NATO’s New Strategic Concept’ conference on
July 7
th, 2009 General James Mattis stressed: ‘Clarity is needed by
everyone looking at NATO today, whether from inside or outside NATO’. Iwould like to add the one additional word is ‘flexibility’
–Article 5 of the W ashington T reaty. Possibly, the transatlantic allies must
proceed with one of the difficult choice in the Organization’s history –either to delete Article 5 from the Treaty’s text, or amend it with theclear obligation for the member-states to take part in military actions.Obligations in
Alliance should be obliged, but not to be a choice of
wishing .
–The r ule of consensus. The 21stcentury’s realities simply does not allow
for the Organization to function in the framework of consensus-ruledprinciple. Deletion of the algorithm, leading to strategic and operationalparalysis of the Alliance, will be the second very difficult choice.
–A
continuation of the enlar gement policy .Blocking the Alliance’s future
enlargement will also deteriorate the NATO’s rationale with an acuteperception that the NATO’s enlargement strategy should be re-writtenand based on strict rules and conditions There need to be invented theso-called ‘Atlantic acquis’, which have to be fulfilled by new futureNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 291

entrants with an undisputed continuation of the NATO’s ‘open door’
policy.
–The principle of indir ect militar y deter rence. The Alliance must has at
the own disposal such military capabilities, those level of developmentwill make simply meaningless for any potential adversary to conduct apolicy of threat or intimidation.
–The pr
oblem of nuclear weapons development. “Might the Alliance
overcome as mistaken as well as primitive dreams of the world freefrom nuclear weapons?” – the question is more than strategic. And thesecond one is ‘May NATO develop such nuclear deterrence potential,which will be ready to defend among the Organization’s member alsoher partners?’
–The NA
TO – EU question. Eventually, the EU should abandon from,
mainly paper ESDP and transfer all of its own prototype militarystructures under the united command of the Alliance. The EU shouldremain for itself exclusively civil and reconstruction and buildingfunctions.
–The budget of the Nor
th-Atlantic Alliance. There must be deleting an
‘unfairness formula’ for the NATO’s budget making up and conductingof operations. The Alliance is desperately needed for a common budgetfor financing of its missions.
–A
Free W orld and Russian challenge. When after the Russian invasion
the existed framework of, unknown why, strategic relationshipsbetween NATO and Russia have fallen apart, then that empty spaceemerged, which must have been emerged. There need to brush asidedoubts and illusions and to launch a wide-scale preparation of ‘TheFreedom Strategy’ for Russia: opening radio broadcastings, TV-channels, Internet-portals, books printing and public engagement.Appeasement policy towards Russia will only made a situation insideNATO more unstable and suspicion. An unfocused deterrence can beregarded as a crucial cornerstone for NATO responding to theMedvedev-Putin’s Russian regime.292 Iulian CHIFU

NATO is the product and the tool of a freedom simultaneously. But the
strategy of successful development of this tool is exclusively in its member-states’ hands and intentions. There should be extremely clear that NATOdoes not create common interests and common perception. Concepts, evenideally written, might be retained absolutely usefulness, if allies are nothaving the common vision for sake of they are uniting.
The most successful in the history Alliance had come through its own a
‘point of no return’. But inertia of the brightest past does influenceunprecedented on the today and the future. Alas, it is guessed that an inertiaperiod for NATO is already squeezed for a catastrophic small. For Ukraine,fortunately or unfortunately, it is an ‘almost strategic coincidence’ as well. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 293

C.P. 11
NATO and the New Strategic Concept. Romania’s Priorities
byMr. Kristaq Birbo
Secretary Executive of the Atlantic Council of Albania
Let me start by saying that it is both a pleasure and a friendly obligation to
participate in such important activities organized by the Conflict PreventionCenter and Euro-Atlantic Council of Romania.
As a new NATO country, Albania will be active in the process of
development of the new strategic concept of the Alliance. Albanian politicaland military leadership are aware of the task of the Summit at Strasbourg&Kehl. We are committed to provide the best expertise we have to supportthe Expert Group led by Mrs. Allbright.
In my opinion, political masters of our countries will have their crucial
voice in formulation of the new strategic concept, especially when it comesto the level of ambition of the NATO Alliance in the future securityenvironment. In this context, we will be driven by their common approach.
Our people are already aware that international terrorism is the main
security threat, and the NATO is evolving to be the key instrument in thefight against terrorism. NATO involvement in the Balkans at the end of thelast century, in few words could be said that changed radically our region.
Now the situation in Balkans is much better in all directions. But, the
complacency would be unwise. Conditions could emerge that couldincrease the terrorist threat in the future. The stability of the region, lawenforcement and other public institutions are not so strong. Some terroristsnow fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere may decide to redeploy toother regions, including the Balkans, in the future.
Albania adopted a national action plan against terrorism in 2002 and has
expelled suspected Islamic extremists and terrorists. Albania has also294 Iulian CHIFU

cooperated extensively to block financial and other assets of persons and
groups operating in Albania with suspected links to terrorists. Albania frozethe accounts and assets of some Saudi suspected businessman who isthought to support Al Qaeda and have links with terrorist groups who wasextradited from Albania.
In June 2003, the Albanian Parliament passed a strong money-laundering
law that included antiterrorist financing provisions, bringing Albania’slegislation into compliance with international standards. In 2004, theGovernment froze the assets of terrorist financiers, curtailed the activities ofsuspect Islamic NGOs, and detained or expelled individuals suspected ofhaving links to terrorism. Later, Parliament passed legislation to implementasset freezes against persons designated as terrorists or terrorist financiersby the United Nations. Albania has ratified all 12 UN internationalconventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
Other challenges being faced with are the continuation of the un-
compromised fight against organized crime and illicit trafficking of anytypes, corruption and informality and the further consolidation of the publicadministration capacities. A lot has been done in this area, but consideringthe proper eradication of these phenomena is a long-term goal, that fightremains a permanent priority goal of Albania.
Since 1996, Albanian Armed Forces, play an important role in the fight
against the terrorism being engaged in various contributions to peacesupport operations. This active engagement in international operation isconstantly appreciated by all international factors we are together inoperations.
With the NATO integration, and later on EU integration, it is natural that the
engagements and contributions to international operations will not be anylonger based upon voluntary basis of a partner country, but based upon theobligation as a member country of the Alliance, and based also upon thesituations, possibilities, methodology, risks and advantages, benefits andcontributions that our country will share and exchange with internationalsecurity and defense structures. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 295

Albania is the first and, I do not know exactly but I think so, the sole
country in the world which has successfully eliminated all its chemicalweapons, stocks acquired by the Communist regime during the 1970s. Inthis framework it will be a very great success if we can create an regionclear from the chemical weapons. At my opinion this must be one of theNATO contribution for the future in Balkans.
One other problem in our region is the huge quantity of the old ammunition,
a big part of witch is instable because it is made 60 or 50 years ago. Albaniacontinues is effort to destroy all this kind of ammunition. In this field Ithink all our countries are involved and it is on the benefit of our the entireregion to accelerate the rhythm of their destruction.
In the fight against the terrorism and other threats to our population it is
important to improve and reinforce the service secret and intelligent servicein order to discover in time illegal activities and to avoid the risk, let say, ofan overestimation of these threats and the creation of the idea that theterrorist groups are everywhere.
It is a clear need to make the general public, in all our countries, better
aware of what NATO is for these days. People understand what NATOdoes but they do not understand how this relates to its fundamental purposeor even their immediate security interests, what it offers that otherorganizations or security frameworks do not. And in so doing, a newConcept will help us to elicit the public support that is essential to NATO’scontinued success.
One very important point in the fight against the terrorism is the harmony
between all the religions in our region. A significant Muslim populationlives in the Balkans. The reality, throughout all these years, showed thattheir opposition to terrorism has been strong and they have very goodcooperation with the United States and the international institutions in theGlobal War on Terrorism.
The Albanian nation, with three religions and four religious communities
offers to the world the rare example of inter-religious harmony, dialogue,peace and coexistence. Our nation, although with three religions, an ideal296 Iulian CHIFU

premise for conflicts and divisions, has never known religious conflicts
throughout his history. We offer this positive reality as an example to enrichour common experience and efforts for tolerance and understanding, formodesty and wisdom in the relations among faiths – an important elementof civilization.
The last decision of EU for visa liberalization with Montenegro, Macedonia
and Serbia is a great success for our region. But meantime, this decision hascreated some dissatisfaction for our people. This because three countriesthat for the moment are out this decision are Albania, B&H, and Kosovo,populations of which are majority or near-majority Muslims. There is notother explanation when Albania for example has fulfilled all democraticconditions to be member of NATO but no for visa liberalization. In myopinion this situation must be repaired and not to create a hotbed toextremist elements.
A new set of non-traditional challenges are ahead for the countries of the
Alliance. All of them and other unpredicted ones, will require newresponses, new capabilities, new doctrines and tactics, new equipment, andlast new education and training. So, a transformation mindset is veryimportant to be developed to handle this set of dramatic changes.
I think the new strategic concept should confirm again the statement of the
previous strategic concept that “…the doors of the Alliance remain open…”for all the other Balkan Countries. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 297

C.P. 12
Managing challenges and opportunities in the wider NATO
neighbourhood. The partnership network as an investment
in the trans-Atlantic and international security. The
relevance of the critical NATO neighbourhood:
The Balkan and the wider Black Sea Region
H.E. Mr. Ljupco Arsovski
Ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia to Romania
The Republic of Macedonia welcomes the approach of wider consultations
through exchange of opinions and through involvement of relevantinstitutions, experts and country representatives regardless whether fromfully fledged members or Alliance partner countries, engaging them in anexchange on a topic which will essentially determine the futuredevelopment of the new NATO strategic concept in response to the modernsecurity challenges, and which will also impact the overall functioning ofthe Alliance.
We believe that such a transparent approach will enable qualitative
advancement of the strategic goals that the Alliance is to define under thenew Strategic concept.
It is a fact that after the 9/11
thterrorist attacks the landscape and under-
standing of global security and peace are no longer the same and havesignificantly changed. This has imposed the need to redefine the positionsof the Alliance and its role globally and in the Euro-Atlantic area. Thedevelopment of a new strategy (which will replace the strategy adopted in1999 at the Washington Summit), will enable the Alliance to counter thenew security challenges, such as the non-conventional threats and energysecurity.
Furthermore, we strongly believe in the fundamental postulates of the
Alliance – as a relevant transatlantic forum for consultations amongcountries, the main goal of which is to defend and promote the sharedvalues, based on principles of democracy, individual freedoms and the ruleof law, through a consensus decision making principle. The Alliance open298 Iulian CHIFU

door policy is of essential importance for its development and for the
purpose producing individual and regional security.
A segment of no lesser importance is investing in one’s own development
and in building societies prepared to share common values andresponsibilities, and capable of contributing to regional and global security.
And indeed the Republic of Macedonia has been making such investments
in the last 11 years. The main strategic priority is fully fledged membershipof NATO and the country’s development as a responsible and dedicatedmember of the international community, able to contribute to the overallinternational activities aimed at accomplishing the major priorities at theinternational agenda.
We are fully aware of the importance of regional cooperation. We consider
regional cooperation to be our top foreign policy priority. The Republic ofMacedonia and the countries of the immediate neighbourhood shareidentical strategic foreign policy commitments, which have resulted indeepening the cooperation in the process of integration into the Europeanand Euro-Atlantic organizations, regardless of the fact that the level offulfillment of the aspirations in this respect varies among the countries inthe Region. The established regional initiatives and forums are of course areflection of this cooperation which can always be advanced and deepened.
We strongly believe in the individual readiness of countries to contribute to
NATO-led operations, within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, as acontribution to global peace and security.
The Republic of Macedonia provides significant logistic support to the
NATO/KFOR troops in Kosovo. The Coordination KFOR Support Center(KFOR-HNSCC) will continue providing logistic support to the NATOoperation in Kosovo – KFOR by facilitating the accommodation, stay andfurther movement of the KFOR, then by ensuring healthcare services, fuelsupply, escort, customs certification, protection of troops and securing themajor communication lines in the Republic of Macedonia through theCoordination KFOR Support Center (KFOR-HNSCC) and support to airsurveillance operations. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 299

Understanding the needs of our Allies and aware of the need to share the
responsibilities, as of 2002 we have been contributing troops to the NATO,EU and UN operations outside our Region. Currently, we contribute slightlyless than 4% of our land forces to international operations. Furthermore, by2010 we plan to increase our participation in the ISAF mission inAfghanistan by 50% (or about 250 troops of the Army of the Republic ofMacedonia).
As a Partner country and as a country at the doorstep of fully-fledged
Alliance membership, the Republic of Macedonia is fully prepared to giveall the possible contribution to advancing the work of the Alliance, sharingwith NATO member-states and Partners the common responsibilities andvalues, contributing thus to regional and global peace and security, as well.
At the and, I would like to underline that with above mentioned facts as a
real proves, my country, The Republic of Macedonia is already in the NewStrategic concept. 300 Iulian CHIFU

C.P. 13
Estonia and the New Strategic Concept
Ott Laido
Policy Planning Department Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Conventional threats persist. Hence, despite the recent changes in the
security environment – and as the matter of fact in NATO itself – themeaning of Article V has not changed and must be understood asunchanged.
A new Strategic Concept (SC) has to assure the validity of the Alliance ’s
collective defense both to its members and non-members. Regrettably thereis hesitation amongst the allies, thereby weakening NATO’s politicalcohesion. A new SC needs to eliminate these doubts by assuring that NATOis a collective defense organisation, regardless the fact that it has developedbeyond the initial concept of being a territorial defense organisation.
However, there are also unconventional adversaries and challenges that
make robust conventional responses irrelevant or inappropriate. TheAlliance may face adversaries differing from states, non-state actors to evenprivate companies.
Though such a “new attack” against an Ally may not be automatically
defined as an armed attack, thereby launching the collective defensemechanism under Article V , it still requires a collective response that can beapplied through Article IV .
Estonia does not support the idea of making a list of threats that apply under
Article V and those which do not. In short, Article V must not be diluted.Giving no such list, we would also leave some space for the “bigunexpected” – potential threats that are unknown at the time being.
However, regarding the impacts of so-called new threats – such as energy
security, cyber security and climate change – these should not be taken asthreats that require response through Article V . Herewith we raise theimportance of Article IV .
Article IV is both broad and strong enough to enforce a collective response
for dealing threats in cyber space, for example.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 301

C.P. 14
Importance of the (Western) Balkans for NATO:
Lessons Learned
Adel Abusara
Research Fellow at the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade
Presentation, connected to topics from Panel 2 of the conference was
focused on two important issues/strategies that stemmed from NATOinvolvement in the ex-Yu conflict, thus helping NATO to understand its newrole in changed, post-Cold war world.
NATO and the EU have undergone long way from initial “fencing” the
Balkans off and applying the, so-called “quarantine strategy” to extendingthe European zone of peace into that region, and creation of, whatacademics call “post-1999 European order”. One of the strategies to achievethis evolutionary transformation was to acquire socializing centrality for theBalkans. It means that both the EU and NATO have managed to startcreating somewhat predictable, credible security communities, bysocializing domestic elites. This led to creating standards of predictability inthe region, thus excluding the possibility of new conflicts for theforeseeable future. This kind of security-creation influence could beimplemented elsewhere, not just on the Balkans.
Second lesson learned from the involvement in the region of the Balkans is
connected to the EU-NATO relation – it is actually firm and fruitful co-operation that NATO has with the Union, unlike anywhere else in the world.New Strategic Concept can and should emphasize the need for enhancingthis co-operation, despite all the problems connected to it and to make it arole-model for future handling of conflict and post-conflict areas. On theother hand, there is a need to emphasize the laggings of this co-operation:the problems like “NATO primacy” in the relations incarnated in NATO“right of first refusal” have to be overcome. Two partners should deal on theequal level in the areas which they can manage the best. Many of the302 Iulian CHIFU

obstacles to this co-operation have been already lifted (hesitations about
ESDP, France’s non integration into the Alliance), which makes it necessaryto work on.
Finally, the influence of Russia in the Balkan region should not be
underestimated, although it is hard to take for granted speculations thatRussia intends through its close relations with Serbia to come back militaryin the region. Still, its strengthened economic influence should be closelyobserved by NATO as well.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 303

C.P. 15
New strategic concept and the outside powers
Florentina Marin
NATO has been able to keep his role as a provider of security due to his
strategic situations. The new strategic era was opened by the interpretationof the USA of the 9/11
thattacks, so his role on the global derived from the
confrontation with an irregular and unconventional enemy.
Despite the jihad phenomena, new risk factors were seen at the horizon: the
return of Russia demanding her superpower status power. Particularly, to allthis we can add new elements: nuclear proliferations in North Korea andIran, the revitalized China and the rise of a new concept, populism.
NATO is also threatened from inside. We do not have to forget that it is
build on national states, which now are trying to preserve their interest notthe interests of the Alliance. (See Germany outside Europe Alliance,negotiating with Russia concerning gas supplies)
Russia:
In august 2008, Russia showed the world that it passed over its
paralyzed phase and occupied her centered place in the European strategicarena. 14 acts of intimidation since 2005 show the dangerous comeback ofRussia. Its strength lies in her confidence in being the only superpower thatdominates the gas and petroleum sector.
Since USA was busy in Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia adopted a new
strategy. Russia is not using only its traditional sphere influence, but itsadopting a strategy confrontation. To achieve it, Moscow resorted forgingties with countries likes Venezuela or Iran, consolidating her militarycapability and giving a new approach to the gas era.
Iran:
Since USA try to moderate Iran behavior, it became much more
aggressive and radical. The development of extremist national projects liesin its nuclear program. This situation has a great impact on the strategicmap. 304 Iulian CHIFU

Three possible actions were discussed to deal with this nuclear program:
1. Sanctions- were seen as a pattern to develop connections with other
nuclear countries and which in a second phase will have affected othercountries depending on Iran, for example Turkey dependent on Iran’soil supplies.
2. Intervention – it would have transformed the world in an opened field
for nuclear weapons
3. Incentives – the sticks and carrots strategy was lost on the way; the
carrots offered by USA were inappropriate. This is why Iran should stayon the political agenda of NATO.
If international efforts fail, because they cannot find actions which deal with
the nuclear path of Iran, NATO can be used to build a comprehensivestrategy to contain Iran. His past behavior and his new behavior demon-strate that this country will not make any concession without political andmilitary pressure.
Policy consultation and co-ordination in NATO would increase incentives
for Iran to reach an agreement, as only the US can offer what Iran is mostinterested in, namely security guarantees and international recognition.
T
errorism: Since the 9/11thattacks the western realized that terrorism is a
small part in a globalize world. The phenomena called Islamic radicalismhave much more intensity. In this sense, the power of NATO has to bespread all over the world. NATO’s strategy against terrorism is the result ofconsensus between the various positions of its member countries.
Maintaining international cohesion in the fight against terror and the
specific need for these actions appear to suggest that if this kind ofoperation is approved they should be accompanied by major efforts toexplain to the public why they are needed.
Pr
oliferation: North Korea, India, Pakistan have already became nuclear
powers. The problem is the security pressure felt by some regions which aretrying to preserve security by acquiring nuclear capabilities. Thisconsequence stays in the regional dynamics which is amplifying the risk ofinstability. Now, NATO missions will have its routes in theaters ofoperations. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 305

Security and r ecession: It is a proven fact that EU is not investing in the
defense sector. (The result lays in the recent technology Conference).Because there is not a perceived threat, NATO members are concentratednow on resolving the economic crisis situation. They are not concentratingon the existing power breach and they are not seeking the salvation in thedefense sector.
An essential way to take in account NATO today is to develop and
transform its perceived culture. The national rejection to suffer casualtiesand continuous necessity of peace has become a real obsession for thesociety. People do not believe anymore in the power of the institutions todeal with threats.
The culture of zero losses is now determining the actions of NATO. New
strategic concept has to adapt to the new strategic culture of Europe, whichis now rejecting war. There is a public fatigue in regard of using war as aprimer solution to resolving conflicts and a rejection of using their ownnational forces. 306 Iulian CHIFU

C.P. 16
NATO’s New Strategic Concept
LTC. Doina MUREăAN PhD.
NATO is likely to begin a review of its strategic Concepts following the
April 2009 Summit in Strasbourg-Kehl that marked the sixtieth anniversaryof the Alliance. A new Strategic Concept will be ready for 2010 or 2011depending on the level of political ambition and the pace of negotiation.The current Strategic Concept is ten years old since the Alliance haschanged considerably, both politically and militarily. We provide anoverview of the political and military issues that will shape the newstrategic concept and we make three arguments: the Strategic Conceptcodifies past decisions and presents them to the public as a coherent whole:indeed, codification and public diplomacy are its core functions. Anotherargument is that a new Strategic Concept must balance the push and pull oftwo competing visions of NATO and their political implementation. A finalargument concerns the future: The NATO will continue down the path ofglobal engagement.
What is NATO’s Strategic Concepts? We can say it is the Alliance’s
operational and dynamic view of its founding treaty. Iulian Chifu, Directorof the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center Bucharest stressed thatthe new strategic concept is a programme document, its content includingthe new directions of development for the Alliance. Each NATO memberstate comes up with own suggestions for the drawing up of this newconcept, he says. In order to prepare a new Strategic Concept, NATOmembers must first understand and agree what the Alliance represents todayand how it needs to develop its military capabilities in order to function inline with what NATO represents. All Allies, from the largest to the smallest,are actively consulted and involved. Moreover, the process is engagingpartners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the MediterraneanDialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as partners all overthe globe. The new Strategic Concept will therefore be not only ananalytical document. It also will have to give specific guidance to NATOgovernments on how they need to further transform the Alliance and theirown national defense structures and capabilities so that successfully meetNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 307

NATO’s core tasks in the 21stcentury. The Strategic Concept is the core
NATO document that establishes and reflects this transatlantic consensus.Clearly, because the security environment that NATO has to deal withchanges, the Alliance’s Strategic Concept has to be periodically updated.The current Concept dates from 1999, a time when NATO had 19 membersin comparison with the 28 it has today and when NATO’s focus was verymuch on challenges within Europe or on Europe’s periphery. The newConcept is to be ready for approval by the NATO Summit in 2010. InBrussels, the consensus exists already on the fact that the 1999 concept isno longer adequate to meet the risks and threats of our times. It belonged tothe last century. The security environment has changed, with threatsassuming a transnational and global character. NATO has enlarged. Itspolitical and military capabilities have evolved. The conclusion was thatNATO should have a mission statement pertinent to the challenges currentlyfaced.
Since the inception of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949, the transatlantic
security organization has produced six bona fide Strategic Concepts.
1The
Strategic Concept that NATO will agree in 2010 or 2011 will be third post-Cold War Strategic Concept. But what will the new Strategic Conceptcontain, and what kind of NATO will it envisage? The former positionstressed the continuity between alliance of the past and future; the latterstressed the transformation of NATO from a traditional alliance to a “hubaf security relationships that is destined to manage global problems, as oneofficial put it”.
2NATO must now define its identity and place in a new,
rapidly changing world. If security is a global matter, then the new strategicconcept should reach out to a worldwide audience.
Romania considers that the process of elaborating a new NATO Strategic
Concept must be a NATO domestic study, and an opportunity to inform thepublic about the future role of NATO. The transparence and inclusion in thisprocess of some large categories: congressmen, mass-media, representativesof the academic and non-governmental, represent some very important
1The six Strategic Concepts are DC 6/1 (1949), MC 3/5 (1952), MC 14/2 (1957), MC 14/3
(1962), the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept (1991) and the Alliance’s New StrategicConcept (1999).
2Interview at NATO headquarters, October 30, 2008. 308 Iulian CHIFU

elements, said Cãtãlin Marian Predoiu, interim ministry of Foreign Affairs.
From Romania’s perspective, the elaboration process of the new StrategicConcept is as important as the final result. Within the elaboration process,Romania will plead for reaffirmation of collective defense Article 5 as theprimary responsibilities of NATO, for the actualization and consolidation ofthe main tasks of the Alliance within the current Strategic Concept (security,discouragement, consultation, crisis and partnership management), to whichis added the answer to the new challenges, emphasizing the energeticsecurity and proliferation of missile technologies. Romania wishes the Art.5 re-affirmation. In order to support this functional role, the concept notedthat the NATO forces should maintain the ability to respond to Article 5 andnon-Article 5 crisis. Perhaps the most significant part of the debate was onthe NATO-EU relationship. Most participants underlined the necessity forNATO to work together and to interface with the United Nations, otherinternational organizations and regional groupings with a securitydimension.Another field in which Romanian side seems to be interested in is energysecurity. There was also discussion about NATO relative to such subjects asterrorism, piracy, humanitarian activities, climate change and food security.
Never in its entire history, the North Atlantic Alliance remained tied to
principles and concepts that had stopped corresponding to reality. Since thebeginning, NATO did not prove only power and solidarity, but also a greatadaptability, realism and flexibility, acting like a true security organization.On fact, the Strategic Concept must give public opinion in the Alliancecountries and beyond a clear sense of why NATO still matters and how inmany ways it is helping to make them more secure.
* Lieutenant-colonel senior lecturer, Doina MURESAN PhD. is Deputy Director of the
National Defense College and Associate Professor in the National Defense University“Carol I” in Bucharest, Romania. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 309

C.P. 17
Cyber defense
Tatiana Busuncian
Director of Pro Marshall Center of the Republic of Moldova
I would like to inform you that recently the Pro Marshall Center of the
Republic of Moldova in cooperation with the NATO Centre of ExcellenceDefense Against Terrorism (NATO COE DAT), the NATO InternationalStaff/ Defense Policy and Planning Division (NATO IS) and with thesupport of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programmeorganised the Training on Cyber Terrorism – a 21
stCentury Challenge for
State Security.
The training provided an opportunity to sustain initiatives in examination of
basic belief about cybercrime, which certainly must be analyzed withingovernment, academia, defense sector and industry. The project represents afirst step in providing a new understanding of cyber-security, where thetraining proceedings will serve educational purposes. The project alsohighlights the importance and strengthens the educational background ofkey institution representatives in the field of state security. The participantstrained on effective decision making and strategies’ elaboration, encouragethe cross-disciplinary sharing of information that could help nationalsecurity leaders’ create complementary defensive solutions, build on sharedexpertise and innovation.
The contribution of the training enforced the cohesion and the common
understanding of the instability risks that could affect state cyber-securityand the beginning of a new stability dimensions for the regional andEuropean space.
Cybercrime is a growing and serious threat to individuals, business and
government. It is a problem that will continue to escalate as technologychanges. The very strength of cyber crime is the very weakness of ourefforts to control it: being able to cross international lines. A click of abutton can digitally transport thieves and terrorists 5 000 miles and across310 Iulian CHIFU

20 borders. Attempting to monitor and prosecute these type of criminals is
possible but requires cooperation across those borders, cooperation that thecriminal need not acquire. A system needs to be developed that will allownation victims of cyber crime to swiftly prosecute these criminals withoutstepping on the toes of another nation’s sovereignty.
After 9/11
ththe world changed and we should be aware that terrorism is
bound to be with us for the foreseeable future. The outcome of the measuresapplied in preventing and combating terrorism is helpful only when apolitical will from all engaged parties exists. A serious engagement in thecollaboration process is significant in elaborating a well-defined strategyand fostering a win-win situation in fight against terrorists’ acts.
In conclusion I would like to mention that the best protection on new Cyber
threats is regional and international cooperation which represents a viablesolution only in case when both the theoretical and practical approach isconsidered. This link represents a global requirement for an internationalinterdependency at national, regional and international level, to which thecooperation and integration must be best fitted to. Nations must have inplace their own domestic cyber laws but must also have a system thatallows for collaboration with other countries. Many systems have emergedglobally and many of the big pieces may already be in place to harmonizecyber law worldwide.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 311

C.P. 18
Protejarea securitãții Alianței la distanțã strategicã sau mai
aproape de casã: estimãri corecte și dileme false
General de brigadã dr. Valeriu NICUȚ
La Summit-ul NATO de la Strasbourg/Kehl din Aprilie 2009, dupã discuții
consistente, națiunile au fost de acord cu faptul cã se impune proiectarea șielaborarea unui Nou Concept Strategic, care sã-l înlocuiascã, pe cel din1999, valabil încã și care sã asigure Alianței un set de precizãri strategicepentru, cel puțin, urmãtoarea decadã..
Salutãm, susținem și ne racordãm la mesajele [reprezentantului] Ministrului
Apãrãrii Naționale și al Președintelui Comitetului Militar NATO, AmiralGiampaolo Di Paola privind importanța și implicațiile Noului Concept Stra-tegic, a rolului și sarcinilor fundamentale ale Alianței, a definirii priori-tãților între numeroasele exigențe care sunt formulate – și care vor fi, fãrãnicio îndoialã, formulate în continuare – fațã de NATO, precum și aidentificãrii resurselor necesare pentru a le putea satisface.
Dupã cum previzionãm la nivelul Statului Major General, Noul Concept
Strategic va diferi de cel actual, nu numai din perspectiva conținutului sãudar, mai ales, în ceea ce privește modalitatea originalã și modernã în careeste conceput, precum și a destinatarilor prevederilor sale.
Dupã cum probabil cunoașteți, un numãr de națiuni membre și-au pus
întrebarea dacã abordarea publicã, largã a proiectãrii fizionomiei NouluiConcept Strategic nu va afecta imaginea Alianței, nu va deconspira dinpreocupãrile sale de nivel strategic și nu va fi un efort contraproductiv. Separe însã cã lucrurile nu stau deloc așa, iar pentru perioada pe care oparcurgem, pentru provocãrile noi cu care ne confruntãm nu ne rãmânedecât sã identificãm și aplicãm soluții noi, iar modalitatea de lucrutransparentã și interactivã afișatã de NATO reprezintã una dintre ele.
O altã dovadã o reprezintã însuși seminarul pe care îl desfãșurãm azi, cu
participarea nu numai a structurilor specifice Sistemului Național de312 Iulian CHIFU

Apãrare dar și a altor agenții și organizații, cu preocupãri în sfera
intelectualã. Dorim deci sã discutãm și sã obținem o înțelegere comunã aproblematicii generate de viitoarea fizionomie a Noului Concept Strategic șisã cristalizãm puncte de vedere pentru a contribui la consolidarea uneipoziții naționale în acest domeniu.
Cu prilejul aceluiași Summit din Aprilie 2009, Secretarul General NATO a
fost împuternicit sã formeze și sã coordoneze un grup de experți care sãînceapã proiectarea Noului Concept Strategic. Acest grup de politicieni șidiplomați unanimi recunoscuți pe plan internațional, în strânsã conlucrarecu Consiliul Nord Atlantic și sub conducerea Secretarului General NATO ausarcina de a creiona arhitectura Noului Concept Strategic. În etapa în caresuntem în prezent, acest grup sau numai câțiva membri, vor vizita națiunilemembre pentru a le prelua și înțelege punctele de vedere naționale și vortrebui sã construiascã, sã menținã și sã susținã consensul general în ceea ceprivește conținutul conceptului, prin prisma regãsirii pozițiilor naționalerespective.
În prezent, la nivel ideologic, NATO se confruntã cu douã curente de opinii.
Primul este reprezentat de faptul cã în ultimele douã decenii a trebuit sãadopte o serie de mãsuri și responsabilitãți care nu fuseserã inițialprevizionate, corespunzãtor contextului geostrategic din acea perioadã,respectiv autodeterminarea și autoapãrare împotriva amenințãrii sovietice.Acest lucru, care a generat evoluția Alianței de la o organizație de apãrarecolectivã concentratã în Europa la una care contribuie la securitateamondialã, a avut drept consecințã difuzia masivã a graniței dintre nevoilenațiunilor privind securitatea, apãrarea sau stabilitatea. Drept urmare esteimperios sã definim rolul NATO în actualul mediu internațional desecuritate.
Al doilea curent de opinie se referã la nivelul relativ scãzut de apreciere
mondialã de care se bucurã NATO, deși Alianța traverseazã perioada ceamai activã din întreaga sa istorie. Angajarea publicului în înțelegerea șisusținerea politicilor de securitate este, în mod tradițional, limitatã, astfelfiind dificil de obținut și menținut sprijinul politic pentru asigurarearesurselor necesare susținerii operațiilor. Dacã coroborãm acest lucru culimitãrile și restricțiile generate de actuala crizã economico-financiarã și cuNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 313

reducerea eforturilor în a explica cetãțeanului de ce NATO are nevoie sã
acționeze în afara granițelor teritoriilor membrilor, observãm nivelul deangajare al NATO în Afganistan. Astfel, legitim, putem sã ne întrebãm decare parte a balanței, care are pe un taler estimãri corecte iar pe celãlaltdileme false, se situeazã “ Protejarea securitãții Alianței. La distanțã
strategicã sau mai aproape de casã? ”. NATO, în noul sãu concept strategic
va trebui sã ia în calcul și se evidențieze ambele probleme: atât rolul sãu câtși promovarea propriei existențe.
Rolul NATO poate fi astfel privit prin prisma noilor amenințãrilor existente
dar și a celor previzionate cu rezultat direct, implicit în remodelarea unorsarcini și misiuni prezente sau asumarea și implementarea altora noi. Dinaceastã perspectivã, înțelegerea comunã a implicațiilor existenței șiinvocãrii articolului 5 din Tratat devine o necesitate stringentã. Articolul 5este în strânsã legãturã cu identificarea și definirea amenințãrilor, pe careNATO va trebui sã le facã fațã: terorismul, proliferarea armelor dedistrugere în masã, asigurarea securitatea energeticã, schimbãrile climatice,protecția spațiului virtual, siguranța infrastructurii de interes transfrontalier.
Înțelegerea comunã a implicațiilor Art. 5 necesitã obținerea de clarificãri și
a unui consens asupra unor probleme pe care Alianța ar trebui sã le rezolveprin intermediul Noului Concept Strategic, și anume: semnificația apãrãriicomune în fața noilor tipuri de amenințãri; rolul NATO în apãrareacolectivã (Art. 5) corelatã cu securitatea (operații expediționare, misiuni derãspuns la crize, etc); cum se menține credibilitatea Art. 5 și când se aplicãprevederile acestuia?
Prioritizarea sarcinilor este un aspect care acum a dobândit o importanțã
covârșitoare. Multe dintre documentele de planificare ale Alianței suntconcepute pe un anumit “standard” privitor la resurse, și anume: elaborareaunui maxim de nevoi operaționale pentru a putea face fațã tuturor situațiilorposibil a se întâmpla. În condițiile actuale de limitãri drastice ale resurselor,devine aproape inevitabilã o prioritizare a acestor sarcini. Aceastã situațiepoate fi agravatã dacã îl corelãm cu prelungirea estimatã a actualei crize.
Din aceastã perspectivã, pentru a alinia nevoile cu resursele de toate
categoriile aflate la dispoziție, apreciem cã Noul Concept Strategic trebuie314 Iulian CHIFU

sã stabileascã o ierarhizare a prioritãților și, implicit, a sarcinilor Alianței. În
pofida faptului cã o ierarhizare a prioritãților implicã riscul unor “alegeri”greșite, acest lucru poate fi apreciat ca un jalon important în evaluareaperformanței membrilor NATO, precum și în împãrțirea echitabilã aresponsabilitãților între națiuni.
În strânsã legãturã cu rolul NATO în ceea ce privește apãrarea membrilor și
securitatea Alianței se situeazã problema relațiilor cu Rusia. Acest aspect aconstituit o preocupare majorã a tuturor eșaloanelor de conducere aliate, darși a celor naționale. Avem în acest caz parte de încã o dilemã, pe care NoulConcept Strategic este solicitat sã o clarifice.
Pe de-o parte NATO s-a angajat într-un parteneriat unic cu Rusia, având ca
vârf de lance Consiliul NATO-Rusia, la nivel de ambasadori, iar pe de altãparte numeroși aliați (ca sã avem în vedere numai istoria și localizareaacestora) “asimileazã” menirea Art. 5 ca fiind direct asociatã Rusiei.Întreruperea relațiilor cauzate de conflictul ruso-georgian din vara 2008, aînrãutãțit și mai mult situația.
În prezent suntem nevoiți sã obținem clarificãri privind unele aspecte ale
acestei relații cu Rusia, clarificãri pe care Noul Concept Strategic va trebuisã le aibã în vedere, și anume: sunt relațiile NATO-Rusia bazate, înprincipal, pe valori sau pe interese comune?; cum abordãm aceastã relațieprin prisma faptului cã, unii aliați, prevãd în planurilor lor o posibilãagresiune din partea Rusiei?; care este gradul de implicare a Rusiei înprocesul NATO de luare a deciziilor?
Proiectarea Noului Concept Strategic se aflã la început, în faza de reflecție,
marcatã de o serie seminarii și ateliere de lucru, în care statele aliate vorîncerca sã-și cristalizeze o poziție naționalã și sã propunã modalitãți desoluționare la unele teme importante aflate în dezbatere: sarcinilefundamentale ale NATO în domeniul securitãții; angajamentele NATO înera globalizãrii; coeziunea transatlanticã NATO – UE; parteneriatele;transformarea: structuri, forțe și capabilitãți.
În contextul multidimensional al schimbãrilor masive în peisajul
geostrategic internațional, în special din ultimii zece ani, națiunile așteaptãNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 315

ca Noul Concept Strategic sã sintetizeze acele elemente care ar trebui nu
numai sã înglobeze și sã reprezinte interesele aliaților dar sã și precizeze, întermeni suficient de flexibili, conduita de acțiune a NATO, în spectrulmilitar, diplomatic, de comunicare, etc, pentru cel puțin urmãtoarea decadã.
Statul Major General este direct interesat de rezultatele discuțiilor și
dezbaterilor pe care le vom avea astãzi dar și în zilele urmãtoare pemarginea acestor subiecte vizând construcția și consolidarea unei pozițiinaționale privind fizionomia Noul Concept Strategic, având în vedere cãdupã elaborarea și publicarea conceptului, sistemul militar în ansamblulsãu, trebuie sã transpunã în fapt cele prevãzute în document (planificareoperaționalã, planificare resurse, elaborare strategii, etc).
Vã urez sã fructificãm acest prilej prin abordarea realistã și sincerã a
problematicii care ne preocupã asociatã Noului Concept Strategic alAlianței. Suntem conștienți de efortul masiv, multidisciplinar care urmeazãa fi depus pentru a finaliza aceastã “Constituție” a Alianței, și tocmai deaceea trebuie sã ne aducem aportul la acest lucru pentru a putea abordamai bine provocãrile de azi, de a întrezãri riscurile de mâine și de aprevedea modalitatea posibilã de acțiune de poimâine, toate în scopulprotejãrii populației, teritoriului și intereselor naționale.316 Iulian CHIFU

C.P. 19
Protejarea securitãții Alianței la distanțã strategicã sau mai
aproape de casã: estimãri corecte și dileme false – aspecte
politico-militare și militare ale Noului Concept Strategic
(NCS)
General de brigadã dr. Virgil BÃLÃCEANU
Actualul Concept Strategic al NATO dateazã din 1999, când Alianța numãra
16 membri, iar azi sunt 28, având la bazã experiența implicãrii organizațieiîn soluționarea crizei din BALCANI. În acest context, misiunile, pentruprima datã în istoria Alianței, au avut un caracter ofensiv, în afara zonei saletradiționale de acțiune și fãrã a fi invocat Articolul 5 al Tratatului de laWASHINGTON.
Numeroase aspecte ale acestuia rãmân bineînțeles pertinente și valabile.
Prin prisma situației geopolitice internaționale actuale, este necesar ca acestconcept sã se racordeze nu numai la evenimentele politice și situațiile desecuritate majore survenite în acest început de secol XXI (ca sã amintimaici numai de atacul terorist din America (9/11) și angajarea NATO în AFG)dar și la rezultatele capacitãții Alianței de a se transforma și adapta sau de apreviziona unele provocãri pe care le-am putea face fațã în viitor. Înconsecințã, dupã cum sublinia fostul Secretar General NATO Jaap de HoopScheffer, conceptul actual nu reflectã imensa transformare suferitã de
organizație, care a trecut de la o alianțã “eurocentricã” la una caretrateazã chestiuni de securitate ce depãșesc cu mult frontierele Europei .
Ne este tuturor clarã necesitatea în ceea ce privește elaborarea unui Nou
Concept Strategic la nivelul Alianței. De altfel, acest lucru a și fost agreatde națiuni cu prilejul Summit-ului NATO de la Strasbourg/Kehl, din acestan. Din perspectiva abordãrii militare a premiselor de proiectare a NouluiConcept Strategic, noi, cei prezenți, trebuie sã fim în mãsurã sã cristalizãmunele aspecte militare care vizeazã problematica. Generic, așa cum este definit de Alianțã, conceptul strategic reprezintãmodul de acțiune adoptat în urma analizei unei situații strategice. Cu altecuvinte, este enunțarea a ceea ce trebuie fãcut, în termeni suficient deNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 317

flexibili încât sã permitã dezvoltarea nu numai a conduitei de acțiune
militarã, dar și a celor diplomatice, economice, de comunicare, etc saualtele asociate acestora.
Definiția în sine a conceptului strategic NATO este atât de largã, încât poate
induce, chiar și pentru o mare parte a militarilor o anumitã stare deconfuzie ,nefiin foarte clar ce ar trebui sã conținã acesta și care ar trebui sã
fie aria sa de cuprindere. În acest palier ar trebui sã intervenim noi, în esențãRomânia, pentru a putea milita pentru inserarea în Noul Concept Strategic areferințelor care vizeazã interesele naționale, coroborate însã cu cele aleAlianței.
Nu trebuie omis, de asemenea, cã necesitatea elaborãrii Noului Concept
Strategic trebuie sã ținã cont și de perceperea rolului NATO în noul contextde securitate, atât din perspectiva opiniilor populației țãrilor aliate dar și ațãrilor non-NATO, cât și perceperea NATO de cãtre media, nu ca pe un
polițist mondial, ci ca pe un observator, care trebuie sã previnã și nu sãacționeze.
În decursul istoriei sale, NATO s-a adaptat și remodelat continuu, fãcând
fațã cu succes schimbãrilor mediului global de securitate, care, dintr-oanalizã rapidã și obiectivã conduce la creionarea a cel puțin trei premisefundamentale care trebuie luate în calcul pentru procesul de transformare: – noile tipuri de amenințãri și implicit noi tipuri de misiuni care sã le facã
fațã;
– aceste misiuni impun reproiectarea capabilitãților existente sau crearea
altora noi, dupã caz;
– iar misiunile și capabilitãțile necesitã un cadru nou, adecvat, de
cooperare, noi relații, noi concepte doctrinare, noi soluții, inclusiv înspectrul resurselor de toate categoriile.
Astfel, de la înființarea sa, Alianța și-a adaptat fundamental doctrina în
câteva rânduri, ca rãspuns la amenințãrile specifice. Numai în ultimii zeceani, NATO a suferit o transformare profundã, evoluând de la o structurã alcãrei rol era de descurajare, preponderent în plan militar (fãrã, însã, a aveaun trecut activ în plan operațional, acțional) la o organizație cu rol deimpunere a pãcii, prin angajarea forței.318 Iulian CHIFU

În prezent, având în vedere schimbãrile pe plan mondial în domeniul
amenințãrilor la adresa securitãții, sunt vehiculate opinii privindtransformarea NATO dintr-o structurã “ cu responsabilitãți nelimitate într-un
spațiu delimitat ”, într-o structurã “ cu responsabilitãți limitate într-un spațiu
nedeterminat ”. Pe acest fond, trebuie sã facem referire la:
– relațiile transatlantice, – la echilibrul între planificarea strategicã pentru apãrarea naționalã și
operațiile expediționare ale Alianței,
– la eliminarea birocrației excesive având drept vârf de lance o formulã
nuanțatã a consensului în cazul deciziilor,
– la participarea echilibratã în operații de interes general pentru membrii
NATO
– nu în ultimul rând la rãspunsul colectiv împotriva terorismul, a
proliferãrii armelor de distrugere în masã
– la acțiunile privind protecția spațiului virtual, asigurarea securitãții
energetice, a siguranței infrastructurii de interes transfrontalier și laschimbãrile climaterice.
Cum sã facem apãrarea colectivã mai eficientã în sec. al XXI-lea
Analiza contextului geostrategic internațional relevã clar cã, în prezent,
NATO este angajatã în operații fãcând fațã unor amenințãri care nu s-auputut prevedea în momentul elaborãrii actualului concept strategic (care afost elaborat în 1999).
Încã din 1949, conceptul apãrãrii colective a constituit liantul esențial al
NATO și a reflectat natura pur defensivã a Alianței, cu accent pe prevenirearãzboiului și importanța solidaritãții membrilor. [Notã: Strategia naționalã
de apãrar e a țãrii menționeazã, în cap. 2.1, cã ”apãrar ea colectivã tr ebuie
sã rãmânã misiunea centralã a NA TO?]
Inițial, NATO a stabilit o strategie de operații la scarã largã, concentratepreponderent pe apãrarea teritorialã. În continuare, strategiile NATO au fostadaptate la riscurile și amenințãrile specifice diferitelor perioade istorice,constând în diferite tipuri de abordare: de la politica represaliilor masive,apoi la riposta flexibilã, pânã la strategiile actuale, bazate pe securitate,consultare, descurajare și apãrare, gestionarea crizelor și parteneriat.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 319

Totodatã NATO este o alianțã pentru apãrare care asigurã securitatea
membrilor sãi, iar apãrarea colectivã este sarcina fundamentalã a acesteia,astfel operațiile non articol 5 de rãspuns la crize vor influența într-o mãsurãrelativ micã Noul Concept Strategic dar mai ales Structura de forțe NATO(NFS).
Declarația de Securitate a Alianței pune accent pe funcția de bazã a acesteia
– apãrarea colectivã – care se bazeazã pe indivizibilitatea unei securitãțialiate. Ca urmare, apãrarea colectivã trebuie sã rãmânã misiunea de bazã aAlianței și componenta principalã a procesului de planificare operaționalã,în timp ce angajarea militarã în operațiile de rãspuns la crizã sã se facã înlimita forțelor la dispoziție și când situația de securitate o impune.
Noțiunea de apãrare colectivã în acest nou mediu de securitate, trebuie
analizatã și înțeleasã coroborat cu provocãrile specifice sec. al XXI-lea,cum ar fi atacurile cibernetice și întreruperile aprovizionãrii cu energie, carepot destabiliza profund o țarã fãrã sã se fi recurs, în sensul clasic, lamijloace militare. Aceste provocãri nu atrag automat rãspunsuri militare,totuși, acestea trebuie sã fie însã colective.
Consider așadar esențial sã contribuim la întãrirea conceptului, inclusiv prin
intermediul Noului Concept Strategic, prin care sã se poatã oferi tuturormembrilor asigurarea cã nu vor fi obligați sã facã fațã singuri acestorprovocãri.
Pentru ca NATO sã continue sa își menținã relevanța în actualul mediu de
securitate, este nevoie de o noua înțelegere a Articolului 5. Se impuneredefinirea mai clarã, in termeni actuali, a cerințelor pentru apãrareacolectivã, într-o lume în care provocãrile sunt globale, iar riscurile șiamenințãrile nu au granițe. Astãzi, mai mult decât apãrare colectivã, statele membre au nevoie desecuritate colectivã pentru apãrarea valorilor si intereselor noastre comune.Noul Concept Strategic va trebui sã dovedeascã faptul ca aliații acordãimportanța cuvenitã apãrãrii colective, din cel puțin douã perspectivemajore referitoare la modalitãțile de implementare a Articolului 5. 320 Iulian CHIFU

O primã perspectivã impune reafirmarea principiului împãrțirii echitabile a
eforturilor, prin alocare concretã a resurselor pentru crearea capabilitãțilornecesare, de fiecare stat membru.
A doua direcție majorã va viza perspectiva viitoare, în care apãrarea
colectivã sã asigure capacitatea de rãspuns împotriva actualelor riscuri siamenințãri la adresa securitãții.
Apreciem și militãm pentru menținerea conceptului de apãrare colectivã ca
pilon fundamental pe care se sprijinã Alianța. Experiența a evidențiat faptulcã națiunile trebuie sã reconfigureze permanent balanța de forțe necesareatât apãrãrii naționale cât și desfãșurãrii acestor forțe în zone de crizãîndepãrtate în cadrul operațiilor NATO.
Apreciem cã acest lucru reprezintã un motiv suplimentar pentru
configurarea nevoilor reale și a celor sui generis de forțe și capabilitãți
necesare pentru toatã gama de operații militare, atât pe teritoriul național câtși în afara acestuia, de la menținerea pãcii pânã la acțiuni combatante.
Apãrarea colectivã este și trebuie sã rãmânã misiunea de bazã a Alianței și
componenta principalã a procesului de planificare operaționalã, în timp ceangajarea militarã în operațiile de rãspuns la crizã se face când situația desecuritate o impune și în limita forțelor la dispoziție.
Ca urmare Noul Concept Strategic trebuie sã stabileascã cu claritate scopul,
obiectivele și funcțiile Alianței, sã defineascã provocãrile și amenințãrile laadresa securitãții acesteia și sã indice mijloacele și capabilitãțile necesareconfruntãrii cu aceste amenințãri, dar sã și defineascã mãsurile deinstituționalizare a Art. 5, sã stabileascã regulile de angajare și principiilerealizãrii apãrãrii colective și cooperãrii în cadrul acesteia.
Utilizarea și înțelegerea conceptului de solidaritate al aliaților, apreciat cel
puțin prin prisma conceptului apãrãrii colective și a rapiditãții evoluțieimediului de securitate, trebuie întãrit cu o atitudine corespunzãtoare,tradusã prin participarea cu forțe și capabilitãți la toate operațiile NATO, fieacestea combatante sau nu. Aceastã atitudine a națiunilor trebuie înțeleasãNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 321

doar din perspectiva dificultãților generate de actuala crizã mondialã, care,
cel puțin pe termen scurt, genereazã reduceri financiare masive și reținere apoliticului de a aproba trimiterea personalului peste hotare.
Cum aminteam mai devreme, Noul Concept Strategic trebuie sã reliefeze
distinct faptul cã în lupta împotriva acestor provocãri națiunile nu suntobligate sã le facã singure fațã. De asemenea, trebuie realizatã armonizareaprioritãților strategice naționale, din perspectiva efortului sistemului militar,cu cele a Alianței.
Variante de planificare pentru noii membri
Dupã cum cunoașteți, sistemul NATO de planificare a apãrãrii (NDPP) este
în curs de tranziție cãtre noul model, recent adoptat. Debutul primului ciclucomplet, dupã noul model, va fi marcat de elaborarea noului ConceptStrategic (NCS), pe baza cãruia va fi realizatã Directiva de planificare.
În prezent, la nivelul NATO HQ se considerã cã documentul
“Compresensive Political Guidance ”, aprobat la summit-ul de la Riga, este
încã valid și, prin urmare, aspectele esențiale pot fi preluate în NoulConcept Strategic, în pãrțile ce vor face referire la planificarea apãrãrii.
Din aceastã perspectivã, este de așteptat ca Noul Concept Strategic sã nu
includã un nivel de ambiție formulat explicit, cantitativ și calitativ. Acestaar trebui, conform noului model al planificãrii apãrãrii, sã fie formulat înDirectiva de planificare, document ce va fi aprobat la nivelul miniștrilorapãrãrii. Considerãm cã România ar trebui sã militeze pentru prezentareaechilibratã, în Noul Concept Strategic, a celor douã obiective strategice:implicarea în gestionarea crizelor actuale și transformarea capabilitãților, însensul adaptãrii la cerințele mediului de securitate previzionat.
Folosirea eficientã a resurselor în procesul de dezvoltare a capabilitãților –
care, în opinia noastrã, se extinde dincolo de planificarea apãrãrii – este,pentru multe state Aliate, influențatã și de evoluțiile cerințelor decapabilitãți specifice UE. Considerãm astfel, cã se impune o mai clarãexprimare a dorinței NATO de colaborare, cel puțin în domeniul planificãriiapãrãrii, cu UE.322 Iulian CHIFU

Dupã cum știți, la nivelul NATO existã în prezent un numãr de planuri de
contingențã pentru apãrarea colectivã a teritoriului unor națiuni de lafrontierele Alianței, cât și un numãr de planuri de contingențã generice
1
pentru diferite tipuri de misiuni, cum ar fi combaterea terorismului și aarmelor de distrugere în masã, operații de rãspuns la crizã, menținere apãcii, evacuare non-combatanți, embargo, managementul consecințelor, etc,toate rezultate prin prisma aplicãrii actualului concept strategic al NATO.
Deși, așa dupã cum am subliniat, apãrarea colectivã este și va rãmâne
pentru mulți ani pilonul principal pe care este constituitã Alianța Nord-Atlanticã, totuși, inițierea elaborãrii unor noi planuri de contingențã de tiparticol 5 “clasice”, pentru apãrarea teritoriului unor state NATO, inclusiv aRomâniei, ar putea determina apariția unor sensibilitãți la nivel politic, maiales în relațiile cu vecinii Alianței.
Acest fapt nu trebuie însã sã conducã la ideea cã planificarea militarã
prudentã pentru apãrarea colectivã a teritoriului nu-și are locul mai departe,doar cã aceasta trebuie reorientatã, pentru a rãspunde noilor tipuri deamenințãri. Astfel, din perspectivã naționalã, considerãm necesarãpromovarea unei viziuni echilibrate, unificate, de la Marea Balticã laMarea Neagrã , privind securitatea omogenã la granița de est a Alianței și
apãrarea colectivã a noilor membrii NATO.
Gestionarea unor operații tip Afganistan
Evaluarea influenței lecțiilor învãțate în urma pregãtirii, dar mai ales a
desfãșurãrii operațiilor NATO, în special cea din Afganistan, asupra Noului Concept Strategic poate fi prospectatã, deocamdatã, din perspectiva rolului
NATO , așa cum a fost acesta prefigurat pânã în prezent – NATO fiind unul
din principalii actori în participarea la managementul global al crizelorcivile și militare.
Abordarea comprehensivã / multidimensionalã bazatã pe efecte reprezintã
conceptul de unificare a eforturilor majoritãții actorilor reuniți sub același
1Generic Contingency Plans – GENCONPLAN s, care pot fi dezvoltate mai departe pentru
îndeplinirea diferitelor tipuri de misiuni și care vor facilita adaptarea rapidã la situațiaconcretã de pe timpul apariției și dezvoltãrii unei crize. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 323

obiectiv pe timpul implicãrii într-un conflict sau crizã. Acest concept are
înțelesuri multiple și este puțin probabil ca pe termen scurt și mediu sã fieagreatã o definiție comunã pentru toți actorii implicați într-un conflict.
Rezultã cã din aceastã perspectivã modul de abordare al unei crize va
evolua atât în cadrul Alianței, dar și mai ales în cadrul comunitãțiiinternaționale, NATO trebuind sã-și coordoneze acțiunile cu aceastãcomunitate într-o crizã non-articol 5 privind:– unitatea de efort și asigurarea planificãrii și evaluãrii integrate a
proceselor, fãrã restricții de oferire a informațiilor;
– integrarea activitãților militare cu actori multipli și realizarea
sincronizãrii și lucrului în colaborare;
– asigurarea direcționãrilor esențiale și a unei strategii coerente.
Operațiile ISAF au la bazã acțiunile “ Clear, Hold, Build
2” specifice
doctrinei contra-insurgente. Într-o operație de contra-insurgențã are o maimicã importanțã câți insurgenți sunt eliminați sau capturați într-o anumitãperioadã de timp.
Sfârșitul acțiunilor militare va fi determinat de cãtre populația localã.
Aceștia vor decide dacã pot avea încredere în propriul guvern, legitimitateaacestuia decurgând din capacitatea lui de asigurare a securitãții și serviciiloresențiale. Din pãcate, un guvern dependent în totalitate de donațiilecomunitãții internaționale are șanse mici de a se legitima în fața proprieipopulații.
Actuala strategie militarã în Afganistan este focalizatã în exclusivitate în
domeniile securitãții și economic și nu acordã importanțã posibilitãților de a capitaliza succesul într-un posibil progres în domeniul cultural, care poatesprijini eforturile de protejare a populației prin izolarea talibanilor. ÎnAfganistan doi din cei trei piloni
3fundamentali ai participãrii unui
contingent la o misiune în afara granițelor țãrii/ factori determinanți propriioricãrei operații de contra-insurgențã au devenit fragili: credibilitatea forței
internaționale în fața voinței insurgenților și sprijinul / încrederea
populației.
2Neutralizarea insurgenței din zona de operații, Menținerea securitãții în zonã, Dezvoltarea
socio–economicã.
3(1) voința / determinarea trupelor proprii pentru îndeplinirea misiunii, (2) necesitatea unei
credibilitãți reale în fața inamicului, (3) sprijinul / încrederea populației locale.324 Iulian CHIFU

Pentru consolidarea pilonilor afectați sunt în dezvoltare acțiuni vizând
câștigarea sprijinului / încrederii populației, simultan cu neutralizareainsurgenților. Recenta evaluare a COMISAF solicitã îndreptarea atențieicãtre populația localã, dar strategia propusã se bazeazã tot pe alocarea deresurse importante suplimentare.
Un fapt deseori considerat adiacent acțiunilor militare îl reprezintã
comunicarea strategicã/relația cu mass-media. În prezent populația afganã afost mobilizatã/intimidatã de cãtre insurgenți în special prin transmitereaeficientã a mesajelor de propagandã.
Acestea sunt numai câtva aspecte legate de planificarea, organizarea și, mai
ales desfãșurarea operațiilor militare conduse de NATO, dintre care cea mairelevantã este ISAF, iar toate acestea se pot regãsi într-o adecvat înconținutul Noului Concept Strategic.
Echilibrul dintre apãrarea teritorialã și operațiile “out of area”
Angajarea în operații în afara zonei de responsabilitate, impuse de
necesitatea combaterii amenințãrilor, a determinat modificarea profilului deorganizare și planificare a operațiilor strategice. Dar atenție! Acest fapt nutrebuie sã inducã statelor mici ale Alianței percepția adâncirii unor tendințede marginalizare a propriilor interese naționale în domeniul securitãții.
Rolul apãrãrii antirachetã
4în noua concepție strategicã
În mediul strategic contemporan, dezvoltarea și proliferarea rachetelor
balistice, inclusiv a celor cu posibilitãți de folosire a încãrcãturilor denimicire în masã, constituie o amenințare semnificativã la adresa teritoriuluiși populației statelor NATO. Aceastã amenințare este amplificatã deeforturile tot mai susținute ale unor națiuni de a-și dezvolta arme denimicire în masã și capacitãți de transport la țintã cu razã tot mai mare deacțiune. Programul NATO de apãrare antirachetã a fost conceput tocmaipentru a asigura protecția teritoriului, populației și a forțelor (inclusiv acelor desfãșurate în teatrele de operații) împotriva acestor tipuri de arme.
4Nivelul ridicat de clasificare a informațiilor privind apãrarea antirachetã (NATO
SECRET) restrânge semnificativ posibilitatea abordãrii aspectelor pur militare ale acestuisubiect. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 325

Participarea României în cadrul inițiativei MD NATO are la bazã interesul
pentru conectarea la eforturile aliate, dezvoltarea unui sistem antirachetãaliat și asigurarea acoperirii întregului teritoriu național. PoziționareaRomâniei se fundamenteazã pe douã principii esențiale: indivizibilitateasecuritãții în cadrul NATO și solidaritatea colectivã fațã de țãrile vulnerabilela atacuri cu rachete.
România susține continuarea dialogului privind implicațiile de securitate ale
sistemelor antirachetã, atât în cadrul consultãrilor cu alți aliați, cât și custatele partenere. În particular, în ceea ce privește relația cu Rusia, ne putempronunța în favoarea promovãrii unui dialog deschis pe acest subiect,precum și identificarea unor modalitãți concrete de cooperare în funcție deevoluția proiectului aliat, precum și a interesului Rusiei în acest sens,plecând de la realitatea cã securitatea Mãrii Negre nu este posibilã fãrã unangajament solid al acestei țãri.
Definirea unui rol al NATO în securitatea maritimã
Securitatea maritimã reprezintã un element cheie al securitãții și stabilitãții
globale datoritã faptului cã oceanele și mãrile lumii au devenit un mediu dince în ce mai accesibil și folosit pentru activitãțile infracționale și acțiunilepotențial ostile la adresa securitãții și stabilitãții Alianței. Importanțã strategicã pentru Alianțã a liniilor de comunicații maritime este dat de însãșivaloarea de circa 90% din totalul volumului comerțului mondial.Întreruperea liniilor de comunicații maritime ar avea consecințe grave maiales asupra sectorului energetic și ar crea cadrul necesar pentru proliferareaactivitãților ilegale, a terorismului, proliferãrii și migrației în masã, etc.
NATO reprezintã o alianțã compusã din națiuni cu porțiuni extinse de
coastã, vechi tradiții maritime, mari capabilitãți navale și puternice interesecomerciale, fapt ce impune și presupune ca NATO sã se preocupe și sãjoace un rol important în asigurarea și menținerea securitãții maritime aliatãși internaționalã. Rolul NATO în securitatea maritimã ar trebui sã fiecomplementar fațã de funcțiile îndeplinite de agențiile naționale șiinternaționale civile de impunere a legii și de autoritãțile maritime.
Noul Concept Strategic va trebui sã defineascã clar care sunt tipurile demisiuni în domeniul maritim ce necesitã un rãspuns colectiv din partea326 Iulian CHIFU

Alianței, care va fi rolul forțelor navale ale națiunilor, distribuirea
responsabilitãților între națiuni, sã defineascã granițele dintre apãrare șisecuritate, limitele de participare în cazul activitãților de susținere aautoritãților responsabile pentru impunerea legii .
Putem identifica, astfel, interesele strategice ale Alianței din perspectiva
securitãții maritime:
– protecția integritãții teritoriale și spațiului maritim costier a țãrilor
membre;
– asigurarea protecției populației, a instalațiilor, bunurilor și infrastructurii
din zona maritimã;
– prevenirea proliferãrii armelor de nimicire în masã;– protecția infrastructurii critice și a celei energetice;– asigurarea libertãții navigație și a accesului la resurse (de suprafațã sau
subacvatice);
Riscurile și amenințãrile, identificate sau previzionate, la adresa Alianței din
domeniul maritim se pot încadra în douã categorii: amenințãri curente(atacuri împotriva navelor, folosirea navelor încãrcate cu materiale chimicesau radiologice pe post de armã, transportul armelor de nimicire în masã(WMD), etc), precum și amenințãri viitoare (amenințãri la stabilitatea șisecuritatea zonei Arctice, migrația datoratã creșterii nivelului mãrilor șioceanelor, dezastrele naturale, lipsa resurselor, creșterea competiției pentruresursele naturale, etc).
Succesul în asigurarea și menținerea securitãții maritime depinde în mare
mãsurã de buna cooperare în domeniul schimbului de informații cuagențiile civile de impunere a legii, cu organizații internaționale (ONU, UE,IMO), ONG-uri, etc. Concluzionãm acest aspect afirmând cã asigurarea șimenținerea securitãții maritime se poate planifica și realiza în cel maieficient mod prin cooperare.
Elemente militare care ar trebui incluse în noul concept strategic al NATO
Dinamica accentuatã a scenei politico-militare internaționale, precum și
perfecționarea continuã a tacticilor și procedurilor de operare aleorganizațiilor teroriste și ale grupurilor insurgente, corelat cu interesele desecuritate și economice ale membrilor Alianței, impun permanent ca NATONATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 327

sã adopte o nouã linie doctrinarã, mai flexibilã și cu aplicabilitate imediatã,
atât la nivelul politico-strategic, cât și la cel operativ-tactic.
În accepțiunea noastrã, Noul Concept Strategic al Alianței trebuie sã
rãspundã la cel puțin douã obiective majore: întãrirea securitãții colective, șirespectiv, inițierea transformãrii NATO din punct de vedere al planificãrii,înzestrãrii și executãrii integrate a viitoarelor misiuni expediționare. În acestsens, apreciem cã trebuie finalizatã o formã viabilã a unei forțe de reacțierapidã, expediționarã, corelatã cu cerințele strategiei de securitate a UE.Mai mult, pentru a evita duplicãrile de efort și costuri, se impunecoordonarea nu numai a procesului de transformare dar și a sistemului depregãtire și instruire (prin sistemul de educație și exerciții comune).
Apreciem cã principala temã pe care dorim sã o dezbatem, dar pe care
trebuie sã o avem stringent în atenția noastrã, se poate defini astfel: noi
amenințãri – noi prioritãți – noi sarcini . Va trebui sã încercãm sã
identificãm soluții posibile, dar în același timp și fezabile la câtevaîntrebãri:– Care sunt cele mai probabile amenințãri potențial îndreptate împotriva
Alianței, pentru cel puțin urmãtoarea decadã?
– Care sunt prioritãțile NATO privind amenințãrile deja identificate,
precum: terorismul, proliferarea ANM, statele neguvernate, atacurilecibernetice, securitatea energeticã, pirateria, și de ce nu, schimbãrileclimatice;
– Care sunt caracteristicile unui posibil atac asupra unui membru, pentru
care se invocã Art. 5?
Rezolvarea, fie și parțialã a acestor probleme conduce la concluzia cã
Alianța este și va fi nu numai un exportator de securitate mondialã dar se
constituie și într-un “ constructor ” al acesteia.
Dezbaterile privind Noul Concept strategic al NATO survin pe fondul
intensificãrii unor critici interne privind neîndeplinirea obiectivelor asumateîn cadrul Summit-ului de la RIGA (2006), fapt concretizat prin reticențaunor state membre de a pune la dispoziția NATO personal și forțe, înprincipal în sprijinul operației ISAF. De asemenea, au apãrut unele opiniiprivind orientarea echilibratã nu numai cãtre amenințãrile asimetrice, dar și328 Iulian CHIFU

cãtre cele clasice și obținerea implicãrii NATO în zone cu relevanțã
economicã strategicã deosebitã, de perspectivã, cum ar fi cea arcticã.
Deși Alianța a reușit ca dupã sfârșitul Rãzboiului Rece sã dea dovadã de o
mare capacitate de adaptare, prin admiterea de noi membri, reorganizareastructurii de comandã și reconfigurarea misiunilor, ceea ce a permisdislocarea de forțe dincolo de zona tradiționalã de acțiune, o serie de factoriau indus obstacole suplimentare pentru dezvoltarea și implementarea uneistrategii coerente a Alianței, nu atât în formularea acesteia, cât, în special înaplicarea practicã a ei – a se vedea operația ISAF , unde evaluarea noului
COMISAF a relevat accentuat acest lucru . Acești factori se referã, în
special la lipsa unei percepții comune asupra riscurilor și amenințãrilor; laincapacitatea aliaților europeni de a aloca suficiente resurse pentruoperațiile în derulare; și la relativa dezangajare a SUA fațã de problemelesecuritãții europene;
Urmare a unui dialog intens și permanent cu națiunile, autoritãțile militare
NATO, au recomandat principalele linii de dezvoltare și domenii în care artrebui sã se concentreze elaborarea Noul Concept Strategic, astfel:operațional; capabilitãți și transformare; și parteneriate. Astfel, la nivelulStatului Major General, cu implicarea structurilor din compunere șisubordine, s-a derulat și continuã un proces complex de analizã a acestordomenii. Din perspectiva abordãrii militare a problematicii se desprindeconcluzia cã unele componente, pe care le apreciem a fi foarte importante,sunt necesare a face parte din structura Noului Concept Strategic.
Pentru domeniul operațional
rezumãm principalele direcții de acțiune:
reanalizarea Art. 5 prin prisma înțelegerii comune a configurației unuiposibil viitor atac; clarificarea relației dintre apãrarea colectivã șisecuritatea colectivã (avem aici în vedere securitatea energeticã, apãrareaciberneticã, reducerea criminalitãții internaționale); asigurarea uneipercepții unice privind asumarea riscurilor comune în ducerea operațiilor,respectiv participarea cu trupe și/sau cu compensarea financiarã a costuriloracestora; menținerea echilibrului între misiunile specifice Art. 5 și cele non-Art. 5.
Pentru domeniul capabilitãților și a transformãrii
avem în vedere:
dezvoltarea unor programe de transformare și/sau realizare a acelorNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 329

capabilitãți cu care Alianța va trebui sã rãspundã riscurilor și amenințãrilor
previzionate; configurarea capabilitãților pentru asigurarea unui rãspunsrapid în situații de crizã; pregãtirea operațiilor pentru a fi desfãșurateîmpreunã cu alte organizații / actori internaționali; dezvoltarea comunicãriistrategice pentru asigurarea unui mesaj politic convingãtor; armonizarea lanivelul Alianței a operaționalizãrii structurilor de comandã și de forțe caresã ținã seama inclusiv de costuri; asigurarea din fondul comun a deficiteloractuale; coordonarea procesului de realizare a unei forțe de reacție rapidãcare sã fie corelatã cu cerințele UE și sistemul de pregãtire și instruireNATO.
Pentru domeniul parteneriatelor
ținem cont de: amplificarea interacțiunii cu
actorii internaționali: ONU, UE, OSCE; (re)stabilirea relațiilor de cooperarecu F. Rusã; continuarea programelor de parteneriat (PfP, MD, ICI); sporireainteracțiunii cu țãrile care nu sunt membre NATO și cu alți actoriinternaționali pentru a crea oportunitãți de extindere a rolului Alianței înasigurarea securitãții și stabilitãții dincolo de zonele tradiționale deangajare; dezvoltarea relației cu UE, pentru o mai bunã cooperare încondiții de complementaritate, având drept argumente: pachetul de forțeeste același pentru ambele organizații, procedurile și tehnicile trebuie sã fieidentice fiind vorba de aceeași militari, iar prioritãțile trebuie armonizateavând aceleași tipuri de deficite.
Principalul scop al Conceptului Strategic din 1999, așa cum este menționat
și în Tratat, de a apãra libertatea și securitatea membrilor prim mijloacepolitice și militare, trebuie menținut și întãrit ca element fundamental și înNoul Concept Strategic. Noul Concept Strategic va fi documentulfundamental dupã care Alianța se va ghida pentru cel puțin urmãtoruldeceniu, iar acesta trebuie sã fie “într-un limbaj clar”, explicit dinperspectiva valorilor Alianței și sã exprime modalitãțile de contracarare atuturor riscurilor și amenințãrilor cu care NATO se va angaja pe viitor.
Proiectarea și elaborarea Noului Concept Strategic, așa cum a reieșit și din
prezentãrile și discuțiile anterioare, presupune și adoptarea de soluții laproblemele legate de riscurile și amenințãrile neconvenționale și asimetrice,la modul de implicare în promovarea democrației, de recurgere la coaliții devoințã și nu în ultimul rând de dezvoltarea relațiilor dintre NATO și UE îndomeniile securitãții și apãrãrii.330 Iulian CHIFU

Alianța este perceputã ca o organizație cu resurse considerabile. În
contextul extinderii spectrului de riscuri și al creșterii complexitãțiimediului de securitate global, problema capabilitãților va deveni unul dintrefactorii decisivi care vor influența credibilitatea Alianței. Aici ne referim nunumai la existența și menținerea acestor capabilitãți, dar mai ales la modulși gradul de angajare al acestora.
Transformarea Alianței ar putea avea în vedere armonizarea eforturilor din
domeniul militar, atât pentru contracararea amenințãrilor asimetrice, cât și acelor clasice, nuanțarea sau o nouã formulã care sã dea mai multãflexibilitate deciziei prin consens, refacerea, consolidarea relațiilortransatlantice și implicarea în noile amenințãri existente (securitateaenergeticã, schimbãri climaterice, etc). Este evident cã ritmul și capacitateade adaptare al Alianței la mediul internațional (politic, militar, de securitate,economic, etc) trebuie menținut și susținut. Alianța va trebui sã îșidefineascã noile prioritãți într-un mediu de securitate aflat înschimbare. Revizuirea Conceptului Strategic nu presupune schimbãriradicale de politicã, el va trebui sã reflecte faptul cã NATO își completeazãși actualizeazã transformarea militarã cu o profundã transformare politicã,în scopul realizãrii unei mai bune coordonãri a aliaților cu partenerii șiorganizațiile internaționale, pe baza împãrțirii echitabile aresponsabilitãților.
Odatã cu procesul de dezvoltare a Noul Concept Strategic, statele membre
trebuie sã considere rolul Alianței ca întreg, din punct de vedere nu numaisimbolic dar și funcțional. La momentul actual existã douã viziuni vis-a-visde viitorul rol al NATO. Una considerã cã Alianța ar trebui sã rãmânãancoratã regional, axându-se în principal pe misiuni de apãrare colectivã(tip Art. 5), în timp ce cealaltã pune accentul pe întãrirea rolului global alNATO, subliniind cã ignorarea dimensiunii globale ar reprezenta sfârșitulAlianței. Existã suprapuneri între aceste douã poziții, în sensul cã misiunilede apãrare colectivã ocupã un loc central pe agenda susținãtorilorglobalizãrii NATO, în timp ce problemele globale figureazã pe cea asusținãtorilor dimensiunii regionale.
Am abordat câteva aspecte relevante privind unele propuneri de configurare
a Noului Concept Strategic. Acestea, dupã asimilarea și dezbaterea lor, potconstitui o etapã importantã pentru consolidarea unei poziții naționaleprivind caracteristicile și viitoarea fizionomie a Noului Concept Strategic. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 331

C.P. 20
NATO as a threat to Russia
Giorgi Kandelaki
Russia being a faithful part of common European space of security and
inter-dependency in everybody’s interests, including of course and perhapsfirst of all of Georgia’s. Democratic and free Russia that respects itsneighbours and engages in mutually beneficial activities with them willsimply make Europe and the world a much better and safer place to live.But we have to show courage and accept the fact that democracy andwestern values is not exactly how the future is seen not only in Moscow. Connecting to the title of our seminar, I would argue that if NATO wants tohave a pragmatic and realistic outlook towards Russia, it has to accept threefacts and make judgment accordingly:First, what Russia is really afraid of, is more freedom and more
democracy at its borders. Few remember that Russia’s hostility towards
Georgia was there before: Reactionary elements in the Russian governmentand the Army sponsored and orchestrated a mass ethnic cleansing inAbkhazia in 1993, which deprived that beautiful Black Sea province 75%of its entire pre-war population. Occasional bombings of the Georgianterritory started in 2001, two years before President Mikhail Saakashvilicame to power. Still, the turning year was 2004, when the ambitiousreforms started in Georgia. The tragic paradox is that the more reformsdelivered – true, with mistakes and failures – the more frustrated people inthe Kremlin were getting. In another words NATO is openly seen as
threat not because it poses military threat to Russia – they know verywell that it does not – but because it advances political and economicsystem that is seen as representing existential threat to the regime in theKremlin and therefore, in this interpretation, to the Russian state itself.This is a fact declared in the mainstream Russian discourse and notaccepting it would be disservice to NATO. Second, and perhaps rather provocative to say, there is a concerted policyemerging from Russia aimed at de facto undermining of Article 5. Anxiety
on part of some allies on this matter, exaggerated or not, is there. AndRussia’s effort to undermine the value of Article 5 in European political
discourse and public opinion is there as well. We need to face this reality.332 Iulian CHIFU

Third, it is very much in that context that Russia seeks more European
energy dependence on it. It is perhaps not a co-incidence that tens of bombsfell in the vicinity of Baku-Supsa oil pipeline. If Russia regains control overGeorgia and, yes, what they call “regime change” is also a declared policy,than all alternative energy transportation projects such as Nabucco andWhite Stream will be off the agenda. Therefore, important issues of energysecurity should be prominently featured in the new strategic concept. To sum up, prominent place in the new strategic thinking of NATO shouldbe devoted to improving communication with the Russians, to making surethat this or that move is interpreted as it is and not as they wish. Perhapsbest example of this is what happened in this building slightly more than ayear ago. The decision of the Bucharest NATO summit was interpreted inRussia as victory and as window of opportunity—an invitation foraggression. Again, this was very much declared and mainstream discoursewhich was largely neglected in the west and by NATO. Finally, it is in this context that I think that NATO should make sure that thefuture MAP for Montenegro should not be seen in Moscow as green lightfor anything. This is something very important for us. It is of crucial importance that we do not repeat mistakes of the last yearand send as clear messages as possible to Russia that it must respectsovereignty of its neighbours, that open, high-level discourse essentiallytreating that very sovereignty as anomaly is an unacceptable relic of thepast; that occupation of Georgian territories should end, that the ethniccleansing Russia carried out should be reversed, that Russia should stopdistributing passports in Crimea, abandon public questioning of Ukraine asa state, resume oil supplies to Lithuania and so on.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 333

C.P. 21
CyberCrime Prevention. CERT-RO
PhD Mireille Rãdoi,
Senior Lecturer – National Defense College
Cyberspace1- A global domain within the information environment
consisting of the interdependent network of information technologyinfrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks,computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.
With the emergence of Internet came a heavy dependence of modern
societies on computer network enabled capabilities.
Moreover, globalization made the world an increasingly interconnected
place. Just about everything that happens in the real world is reflected incyber space.
„Cyberspace is real, and so is the risk that comes with
it.“
2– remarks by President Barack OBAMA on securing
cyber infrastructure. May 29th, 2009 .
Electronic communication networks and information systems are now an
essential part of the daily lives of citizens and are fundamental to thesuccess of world’s economy.
Networks and information systems are converging and becoming
increasingly interconnected.
Despite the multitude of benefits, it has also generated a series of threats,
namely intentional attacks against these information systems.
1Definition according to Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
2Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-
on-Securing-Our-Nations-Cyber-Infrastructure/.334 Iulian CHIFU

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNET3
•anetwork of networks that consists of millions of private and public,
academic, business, and government networks of local to global scopethat are linked together by different technologies
•comprised of many voluntarily interconnected autonomous networks
•accessed almost anywhere by numerous means
•operates without a central governing body
•maze-like architecture that offers users a high degree of anonymity
•great capacity to multiply and extend information
VULNERABILITIESVulnerability is a weakness which allows an attacker to breach a system’s
security.
Vulnerability is the junction of three aspects:
1.Susceptibility or flaw presented by a system
2.Access to the flaw
3.Capability to exploit the flaw
To exploit the vulnerability it is necessary for an alleged attacker to have
just one tool or technique that enables him to connect to a system’sweakness.
Internet design allows hackers to stealthily access, read, modify, delete
data stored on or traveling between computers.
Each month, there are approximately 100 additions to the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database.
Constantly evolving malicious code move far more quickly and build more
paths into networks than system administrators can prevent, similar to thepattern of criminals and law enforcement.
3http://www.livinginternet.com/i/iw_arch.htm.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 335

More importantly, as opposed to warfare, the cyber attack may be elegantly
launched from in front of a computer, from a remote location at a fraction
of the cost and risk for the perpetrator .
Security strategists must be and many of them already are aware of the fact
that more and more political and military conflict will move to cyberspace.
Unlike the intensely studied classical warfare, the ubiquity and
unpredictability of the Internet makes it ever more complicated to preventand protect from cyber threats.
„Security is always excessive until it is not enough“. Robbie Sinclair, Head
of Security Country Energy, NSW, Australia
Cyberwarfare tactics
4
ƒCyber espionage : The act of obtaining sensitive, property or classified
information from individuals, competitors, governments.
ƒWeb vandalism : Defacing a web page or the practice of denial-of-
service.
ƒGathering data : Intercepting or modifying classified information,
which paves the way for espionage.
ƒDenial-of-Service Attacks : One person controls several computers,
launching a DoS attack against systems.
ƒEquipment disruption : Intercepting or replacing orders and
communications that use computers, satellites.
ƒAttacking critical infrastructure : Power, water, communications, fuel,
commercial, transportation.
ƒCompromised Counterfeit Hardware :Hardware that has malicious
software concealed inside the software, firmware or microprocessors.
ƒPropaganda : Spreading political messages through or to anyone with
access to the internet or any device that receives digital transmissionsfrom the Internet.
4http://www.scmagazineus.com/cyberspace-and-the-changing-nature-of-warfare/
article/115929/.336 Iulian CHIFU

EU – ENISA
•established in 2004 by EU Regulation No 460/2004
•fully operational since September 1st, 2005
•carries out a very specific technical, scientific or management task
within the „Community domain“ („first pillar“) of the EU
Objectives:
•seeks to develop a culture of Network and Information Security for the
benefit of citizens, consumers, business and public sector organizationsin the EU
•helps the European Commission, the Member States and the business
community to address, respond and especially to prevent Network andInformation Security problems
•assists the European Commission in the technical preparatory work for
updating and developing Community legislation in the field of Networkand Information Security
Martin Selmayr , spokesperson for EU Information
Society Commissioner Viviane Reding
5: „We need a
rapid reaction force. What ENISA is doing now is sittingaround a table and drafting reports. They are very accuratebut this is not enough. We need a body that operationallydeals with the security ”
CYBER DEFENSE ON NATO’S AGENDA•Cyber defense first appears on NATO’s agenda at the 2002 Prague
Summit
•Confirmed as a priority at the Riga Summit of November 2006
A major cyber attack on Estonian public and private institutions in April
and May 2007 prompted NATO to take a harder look at its cyber defense. •At their meeting on 14
thJune 2007 Allied Defense Ministers agree that
urgent work is needed in this area
5http://www.euractiv.com/en/infosociety/commission-eyes-common-cyber-defenses/
article-171476.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 337

•NATO conducts a comprehensive assessment of its approach to cyber
defense, which results in a report to Allied Defense Ministers inOctober 2007
•Report recommends the development of a NATO cyber defense policy
•The policy is agreed in early 2008.
“NATO remains committed to strengthening key Alliance information
systems against cyber attacks. We have recently adopted a Policy on CyberDefense, and are developing the structures and authorities to carry it out.Our Policy on Cyber Defense emphasizes the need for NATO and nations toprotect key information systems in accordance with their respectiveresponsibilities; share best practices; and provide a capability to assistAllied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack. We look forward tocontinuing the development of NATO’s cyber defense capabilities andstrengthening the linkages between NATO and national authorities.”Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued April 3
th, 2008
NATO Bodies with a responsibility in cyber-defense
•North Atlantic Council – has overall control over NATO’s policies and
activities with regard to cyber defense
•NATO’s Consultation, Control and Command Agency (NC3A) and the
NATO Military Authorities (NMA) – responsibility for theimplementation of the new policy
•NATO’s Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) – key role in
responding to any cyber aggression against the Alliance
Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves took a strong
stand on countering cyber attacks by invoking the use ofArticle 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: „Weapons should
not matter. If you blow up a hospital or an electricityplant the threat is the same. But there is no symmetricalresponse. What is the response after the attack?“
6
•Despite pressures, the competencies of the new authority will fall
exclusively on Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty for now: membermay consult in case of a cyber attack, but will not be bound to assist
each other as foreseen in Article 5.
6Idem.338 Iulian CHIFU

•Instead, NATO is considering courses of action that involve coordi-
nation in a political and technical response.
Computer Emergency Response Team – CERT
Aims to detect and prevent security incidents.CERT teams are spread all over the world:•Austria – ACOnet-CERT works within the Austrian Academic
Computer Network which is administered by the Vienna UniversityComputer Center
•Switzerland – SWITCH-CERT works in the field of education and
research within the Swiss Education & Research Network
•Estonia – CERT EE works with security incidents within Estonian
networks, that originate in Estonian networks or which are reported bycitizens or institutions from Estonia or abroad
•Finland – CERT-FI is a governmental team which works within the
Finnish National Authority which regulates communications, FICORA
•France – Cert-IST, CERTA, CERT-Renater
•Germany – CERT-Bund is a governmental team that works within the
Federal Bureau for Information Security (BSI); CERTCOM- provides
services for businesses
•Great Britain – BTCERTCC (British Telecommunications CERT Co-
ordination Centre); CPNI; JANET CSIRT.
USA
1.US-CERT – a partnership between the Department of Homeland
Security and the public and private sectorsUS-CERT is responsible for the protection of national Internetinfrastructure.
How it works
•Operates a security operations permanent center
•Informs through a website
•Develops and takes part in national, regional and international exercises
•Offers expertise for investigations
•Supports governmental agencies that have been affected by the use of
malware software
•Offers behavioral techniques for static and dynamic analysesNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 339

•Administrates detection and collection software
•Warns against cyber threats
•Administrates the National Cyber Alert System
•Writes analyses on the current and future status
•Provides on- site response capabilities for federal and state agencies
•Coordinates federal programs for CERT teams regarding best practices
and other information security data
•Collaborates with other CERT/ CSIRT bodies from home and abroad.
2.CERT/CC
CERT/CC (Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center)works within the Software Engineering Institute, a federal researchcenter that pertains to Carnegie Mellon University.CERT/CC is the first CERT organization in the world. It is also anexpertise center on Internet security.
What it does
•Constitutes the contact point for Internet security emergencies response
•Promotes communication between experts in the field
•Identifies vulnerabilities of computer systems
•Develops partnerships with technology producers in view of solving
vulnerabilities
•Facilitates the creation of other such response teams
•Organizes activities aimed at raising awareness on information and
computer security
•Collaborates with research organizations
•Research activities that seek to create new methods and instruments for
the protection of computer networks
Each country established a center responsible with CyberInt.
In Romania, 2008 marked the moment when the Romanian IntelligenceService (SRI) was named the national authority that deals with suchmilitary missions. 340 Iulian CHIFU

CERT-RO, a project long overdue
In 2009, important steps were taken in order to institutionalize a govern-
mental CERT in Romania. Many public institutions (MoD, STS, SIE etc) as well as private ones(banks, companies etc.) have their own CERT.
The principle is that the problem should be addressed in the network it
emerged.
However, in order to increase efficiency:
•Civil and Military
•Public and Private
•National and International
structures should engage in a joint effort to combat cyber criminality. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 341

SECTION III
NGO DEBATE
D. 1
NATO – The New Strategic Concept
Narciz Bãlãșoiu
Any sort of reflection regarding the future of NATO must begin with an
evaluation of the commitment and devotion degree that the member stateshave toward the organization, because these values will be strengthenedonly if the alliance will respond to the necessities of the states. On anabstract level, NATO has numerous advantages that are not sufficientlytranslated into action, needing two major commitments to remedy thisdeficiency. On one hand all the member states and the organization itself, must sustainthe military stabilization effort outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and on theother hand they must turn once again the organization in the main strategicentity of the West. At the same time, NATO must become once again thecenter point for strategy coordination and security policies on both sides ofthe Atlantic, needing to revitalize the concept of “the West“ as a globalplayer and NATO as a symbol of cohesion and cooperation of Westerncountries. Facing the challenges of globalization is not possible outside ofthe transatlantic cooperation, the major premise remaining convergence ofinterests, mutual understanding, cultural affinity and tradition ofcooperation in the last 50 years. NATO adaptation consisted in the globalization of It is mandate – “out ofarea” operations such as Afghanistan, becoming frequent. A first

consequence is the fact that the organization is no longer required to prevail
in conventional conflicts, instead the future of NATO is to become theprovider of stabilization forces. The real challenge NATO is facing is the lack of political transatlanticconsensus on the world we live in. NATO failed to recognize the complexnature of the wave of democratization that began after the Cold War and itsimpact on the security dilemmas that both Europe and the U.S. is facing.The North Atlantic Alliance neglected security threats arising from thetransformation of democratic regimes of some member states of thealliance. The new wave of democratization is global and coincides with the end ofthe Cold War, global spread of market economy and the fall of colonizationwhich has resulted in the proliferation of the weak states. The politicizationof religious or cultural identities is a destructive feature of the new populistconditions. The disagreement between liberal constitutionalism anddemocratic principles of majority is a distinctive feature of this new waveof democratization, which in many parts of the world takes the form ofpopulist revolution. In this new context, NATO must overcome majorchallenges: to regain public support of member states, to prevent themalfunctions in the decision-making process resulting in the appearance ofpopulist governments, to develop a common agenda that draws attention tosecurity, and promotes democracy. Answers regarding the architecture ofthe new NATO strategic concept will occur naturally once differences ofview, existing between the U.S. and NATO members in Europe, will besolved. Both the attacks of September 11
thas well as the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan have made it in such a way that on the transatlantic lineappeared inadvertences concerning the place and the role that NATO has totake on the geopolitical and military map of the world. The attacks in NewYork and Washington on September 11
th, 2001, revealed a gap in the
perception of terrorist threat and raised the political importance of Islam inthe relationship between Europe and USA. This inconsistency regarding thethreat perception was appreciated by political and military analysts as amajor risk for the Alliance’s ability to respond to threats and internationalterrorism risks. Paradoxically, strengthening perceptions of the imminentrisk that terrorism presents, did not lead to an unconditional support for thestrengthening of NATO. This is due to how the two poles on the axis of344 Iulian CHIFU

power perceive the danger of radicalization of Islam, that is to say an
external threat to the United States and an internal one to Europe. Asfollows the European community has responded to the threat of terrorismby requiring a more active role for EU in the local security and globalaffairs, maintaining a critical posture towards the U.S. war against terror.
The capability issue was the center of the transatlantic debate even beforethe attacks on September 11
th, 2001. The U.S. army felt under-equipped in
comparasation with the European armies endowments. Both in Iraq andAfghanistan, U.S. leaders have found the cost of acting alone, thus,showing that high tech weapons are not enough, and that ground troops areabsolutely indispensable. 2003 marked the highest point in Europe’sambitions to position itself as a counterbalance of the hiperpower that is theU.S. at the same time of the emergence in Europe of the “common foreignand security policy“. Analysts have become extremely concerned aboutNATO-EU rivalry in relation to each one’s importance in making thedecisions regarding the main military operations. First USA has shown itslimits in Iraq, in relation to its ground troops, and second Europe wasunable to withstand the Russian Federation, the latest developments in thepost Soviet area demonstrating this. Also, the U.S. has an enormous powerwhen it comes to the ability of destroying an enemy, but was not soeffective when it came to exercise territorial control and guide thereconstruction of a nation. As for Europe, the recent political developmentsin Ukraine have shown that the transformative power of the EU isdependent on how ready it is to provide a place under its tutelage.In view of many, the great transatlantic debate over Iraq has emanated froma big misunderstanding of the phrase ‘world order’. In this debate U.S.favors the unipolar world in which there is a benevolent hegemon, whileEurope sustains a multipolar world and the supremacy of international law,denying the sustainability of U.S. hegemony.In very pragmatic terms the organization faces a number of challenges thatclaim necessity for resource correlation to the tasks and objectives whichwill be assumed by the organization. Budgetary constraints do not allowpreparing for “full range of missions”, the current priority requiring aresizing of the efforts and capabilities to ensure a climate of stability.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 345

Defining NATO’s purpose is an essential element in the process of
reflection on the new strategic concept. In this sense the main directions ofapproach are based on the need to redefine NATO’s role, and establish newpriorities of the Alliance. While most “old“ NATO states admit its role inglobal stability and involvement in missions beyond the boundaries ofmember states, the “new“ states focus on Article 5 of the WashingtonTreaty, the main accent falling on the territorial defense missions. Althoughmost members of the Alliance highlight NATO’s role in confronting newchallenges such as energy or the climate change problem, they cannotoutline the specific role of NATO in combating these problems. However,there was a consensus that the new role must be defined according to thecommon perception of threats and challenges NATO will confront in thefuture. Regarding priorities, lack of financial resources in all NATOcountries will inevitably lead to the need for prioritizing tasks and theeconomic crisis will certainly worsen this problem.
In this respect the Alliance will have to prioritize the requests for appli-cations to order to adapt the requests to the resources. Any prioritizationinvolves the risk of bad choices, so the strategy is based on identificationand risk management with a clear emphasis on shared responsibility. A verysensitive issue is a controversy born around Article 5 of the WashingtonTreaty. As a political and military organization, NATO’s main purpose isproviding security and collective defense for its members, and Article 5incorporates this duality by stating the law to protect the population,security interests and the territories of the member states. Contrary toappearances Article 5 is not a guarantee in itself of security, by not requiringNATO states to defend at once military allies. Today, the meaning of Article 5 is more difficult to define, due to the necessity of answering these questions: How can NATO’s role be balanced between self-defense(Article 5) and security (expeditionary operations, stabilization missions)?Can NATO’s mission in Afghanistan be regarded as an Article 5 in remoteplaces? Is NATO currently able to defend its territory at any time? How canArticle 5’s credibility can be preserved? When to apply Article 5?One aspect that should not be left out of sight in the founding process of thenew NATO strategic concept, refers to the fact that in the light of newtechnology, the adversary attacks will aim weaknesses of the alliance, usingunprecedented methods, therefore the reconsideration of methods used in346 Iulian CHIFU

military operations is imposed. The continuing evolution of risk and threats
to the vital interests of NATO, will put the solidarity within the Alliance tothe test, as well the common understanding of what is Article 5. Anotherdirection of approach refers to the need to develop relations with non-NATO actors (non-member states and international organizations alike) toenhance the Alliance’s ability to ensure security and stability beyond thetraditional areas of commitment. NATO’s growing interaction with inter-national actors will allow Alliance to influence positively and prophylactic,the vision and values in a world of ideas in the full process of globalization.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 347

D. 2
NATO at crossroads: in search of a renewed
Transatlantic solidarity
Monica Oproiu
The new Secretary General’s initiative of launching a process of reflection
over the future of NATO, which would ultimately bring a redefinition of theAlliance’s strategic concept (hopefully next year), has given the opportunityof introspection and wide consultation among experts, decision-makers andpractitioners in this field. Romania has had its share of debates and willcontinue to address this issue during the next months, but one of the mostinteresting, yet predictable topics was that of making the Alliance regain itsrole as the main political consultation forum for the allies and elicit theadequate public support for its future orientation and self-assumed tasks.This is not (only) about getting member states and the public opinionacquiesce into sending more troops to Afghanistan or other Afghanistan-likeplaces that NATO might involve itself in later on. This should be aboutassessing the meaning of transatlantic solidarity today and the currentperception of what used to be called “shared values”.But how do we do this? And how can we use the results of this kind ofevaluation in order to make a significant contribution to the Alliance’sfuture, or at least to the redefining of its strategic concept? There is no doubt about NATO’s relevance today; 20 years after the fall ofthe Berlin Wall, nobody in Europe questions the Alliance’s role inreunifying and defending the continent in the last two decades (with thecollective defense provisions of the Washington Treaty being the maindeterrent during the Cold War). Nevertheless, the increasing variety ofthreats to which there is not only one answer and the myriad of perceptionswhen it comes to current security challenges, which add to the selfish (andeternal) promotion of national interest (even within alliances) raise thequestion whether the Alliance is still solid and worthy of all the hopesinvested in it. One must think that what lies beyond Article 5 and theroutine of calling one another “ally” for some decades now is a true feelingof belonging to the same community of shared (democratic) values and astrong commitment for partnership and joint problem solving through348 Iulian CHIFU

political consultation in the first place. And this has to be as accurate as
possible to both decision-making and public opinion level.Designed to “keep the Germans down, the Americans in and the Russiansout” – that is limited in scope and focused on collective defense of bothsides of the Atlantic – NATO has evolved spectacularly into an almostglobal policeman with security interests well beyond the initial Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, it has contributed to the democratization of itsmember states (Portugal, for example) and even to the appeasement ofhistorical quarrels among them (the case of Turkey and Greece). Thequestion today is not whether it will endure for another 60 years, but how tomake sure this will happen, starting with the future Strategic Concept inorder to provide renewed security guarantees as well as a redefinition of itsgoals. Moreover, this opportunity should be used for reaffirming themember states’ resolve to promote NATO membership as a vehicle fordemocracy and raise awareness of public mood towards it.There is no NATO equivalent for the Eurobarometer and one may argue thatit really is not necessary; nevertheless, one should pay attention to the latestTransatlantic Trends 2009 survey by the German Marshall Fund of the USas some very interesting trends in public opinion were unfolded. One of thekey discoveries of the GMF team was that of an increasingly evident riftbetween Western and Central/Eastern Europe when it comes to severalissues, including NATO.First of all, the Alliance seems to be enjoying much more support in thewestern part of the continent than in the eastern one, which might be a littlepuzzling if one takes into consideration the “battle for NATO” each of thestates here impatiently fought during the 90’s in order to get membership.Only 53% of East Europeans, compared to 63% of West Europeans,consider NATO to be “essential”. What made the central- and easternEuropeans get over their vivid enthusiasm so soon is an issue worth furtherexploring. Is this disappointment with the Alliance’s transformation or justweariness of the hardships of membership?At the same time, only 28% of the former would envisage trading-off someNATO policies (such as future enlargements) for securing oil and energysupply from Russia, while 41 % of the latter would be willing to do so. Onemight conclude that the above figures contradict each other or that energysecurity is less important for the East Europeans. My opinion is thatEasterners are more reluctant to appease Russia (to put it mildly) than theirNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 349

Western counterparts and, even though they do not treasure NATO like they
used to (when it seemed intangible), they refuse to concede anything totheir eternal nemesis – Moscow – and still share a conflictual paradigm oftheir relations with it. This is an element of crucial importance; someonesaid during the debates in Bucharest that the closer you are to Russia, themore you perceive it as a threat and the further you are, the more you seeMoscow as a potential partner. There is no doubt that NATO must continueto engage Russia in one way or another, but all that talk about a new“pragmatic approach” towards it actually proves that there is still nounanimous perception of Moscow’s intentions and “pragmatism” is due tosubstitute for a common assessment of member states.What is really worrying is the dramatic plunge of Turkish support for theAlliance, from 53% in 2004 to only 35% in 2009. Although the Iraq warexplains in part this huge drift, it may also be connected with Turkey’s newfound sense of self-importance and renewed ambitions of regional (andWest-spiteful) leadership.Although the moment of “Old Europe versus New Europe” has come andgone (see the Iraq war debate) and nowadays the Alliance seems as unitedas ever, these findings of public mood show that the rift is actually there andthat some confidence-building should take place urgently, especially in thecase of Turkey (which by the way feels alienated from not only Europe, butalso the USA, with only 34% of those surveyed considering that Turkeyshares Western values!).That is why I firmly believe that the new Strategic Concept, both throughthe process of elaborating/developing it and as a final result, ought toreinforce the transatlantic solidarity and common credo (in democraticvalues and worthiness of collective self-defense) which made the Alliancereach its 60
thbirthday. Throughout the debate, each member state will
provide its own input of priorities, threat perceptions and envisagedsolutions to current challenges; there are already some who fear that nothaving one national representative in the group of experts undermines thechances of making its voice heard (and its concerns be taken inconsideration). Consequently, NATO officials will have to make seriousefforts in order to alleviate these fears and ensure that all voices will beheard, all substance and wording of the Strategic Concept will be decided incommon and that all national inputs will be granted equal value.350 Iulian CHIFU

It is neither possible, nor desirable to subject the debate concerning the
future Strategic Concept to swings of public mood; but within an alliance ofdemocracies, public opinion should have its say and that is why dueattention should be paid to surveys like Transatlantic Trends. After all, thefuture of NATO means, inter alia, the future of its armed forces (in terms of
capabilities, strategic outlook, global outreach) which further triggers someinevitable loss of life and other types of sacrifice. As a result, this documentshould clearly state the enduring meaning of “shared values” and“solidarity” among allies and encompass viable ways of upholding it in the21
stcentury.
Because what sets NATO in motion is a joint commitment for mutualsecurity and freedom from fear on both sides of the Atlantic, now more thanever, with the reintroduction of conventional warfare in Europe (theRussian-Georgian war in August 2008), the ever present threat of a nuclear-armed Iran and the proliferation of non-conventional threats also (cyberattacks, energy shortages, etc). In the end, if the Alliance does not yet (or nolonger) cater perfectly to the member states’ security concerns, itnevertheless remains the best that they have achieved so far and they mustfurther build upon it.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 351

D. 3
New Alliance for New times
Bogdan Nedea
Overview of 60 years
As NATO celebrates its 60thanniversary, it is in grater demand than ever
before. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is at the heart of a vast andever-expanding network of partnerships with countries from across theglobe and it is developing closer cooperation with key civilian institutions.And the Alliance’s enlargement process remains a strong incentive foraspirant countries to get their house in order.In its symbolic role, NATO represents the agreement of twenty-sixcountries in North America and Europe “that an armed attack against one ormore of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attackagainst them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attackoccurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, willassist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually andin concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of theNorth Atlantic area.” It is, by its nature, the very meaning of deterrence, aconcept that shaped the global environment throughout the Cold War.Its functional role is to “safeguard the freedom and security of all itsmembers by political and military means.” To do so, the Alliance identifiedin the 1999 Strategic Concept ways in which it could operate in anenvironment of “continuing change.” It recognized the importance ofmaintaining an open dialogue with Ukraine, Russia, and Mediterraneancountries, the continued process of enlargement, the problems of nuclearproliferation, and a commitment of conflict prevention and crisismanagement. In order to support this functional role, the concept noted thatthe NATO forces should maintain the ability to respond to Article V andnon-Article V crisis. However, as a consensus-based decision-makingorganization, the Alliance became strained as threat perceptions diverged,especially with regards to the current operations in Afghanistan, where theU.S. sees itself as fighting a war and its European counterparts seethemselves as being confronted with a humanitarian crisis.352 Iulian CHIFU

Since 1999, some have argued that the attacks of September 11th; the
ongoing war in Afghanistan; the U.S. invasion in Iraq and subsequentreconstruction effort; and terrorist attacks in London, Madrid and Mumbaieach respectively changed everything. For NATO, this means that it is notonly necessary to define its symbolic purpose in the new internationalsecurity environment as it develops a new Strategic Concept, but itsfunctional purpose as well. Adapting to new perceptions and a newphysical environment has proven to be extremely difficult for theconsensus-based organization, mainly a result of the historicalrepresentation that NATO encompasses and the general differences betweenAlliance members.In short, at age 60, NATO has become such an important and influentialpart of the international security environment that it is hard to imagine theways history managed without it. And yet, the same history, gave the youngalliance a short life expectancy upon its birth. The initial duration of the1949 Washington Treaty was modestly set at 20 years, by which time, it wasassumed, the post-war recovery of Western Europe would have beencompleted and the transatlantic defense pact become obsolete. Few of thepeople who were present at NATO’s creation would have dared to hope thatthis Alliance would not only outlast the Cold War conditions that brought itinto being, but indeed thrive in a radically different security environment.
New Strategic Concept
A sound transatlantic consensus on NATO’s roles and missions and on itsstrategy to deal with security challenges is essential if NATO is to functionoptimally. The Strategic Concept is the core NATO document thatestablishes and reflects this transatlantic consensus. Clearly, as the securityenvironment that NATO has to deal with changes, so the Alliance’sStrategic Concept has to be periodically updated. The current Conceptdates from 1999, a time when NATO had 19 members compared to the 28 ithas today and when NATO’s focus was very much on challenges withinEurope or on Europe’s periphery.
In order to implement a new Strategic Concept, NATO members must firstunderstand and agree on what the Alliance represents today and how itneeds to develop its military capabilities to function in line with whatNATO represents. There is no better example as to where interests andunderstandings of NATO’s symbolic purpose and its capabilities divergeNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 353

more than the current mission in Afghanistan. Here, the U.S. has clearly
stated that it not only finds the mission in Afghanistan to be of criticalimportance for the war on terror, but it also links the security of Afghanistanto its own. In Europe, where the conflict in Afghanistan is mainlyconsidered a humanitarian crisis and not as closely linked to Europeansecurity, differs greatly with its general perception of the war. In turn, thenational governments have not aptly defined how NATO should function inthis war or humanitarian crisis, as they cannot agree on basics of the crisis.The New Strategic Concept must be the new law for NATO’s actualproblems and a stepping stone for any future challenges. At the momentNATO’s priorities are mainly focused on Afghanistan. But even as thealliance confronts this immediate challenge, it must also open a searchingdebate about three over-the-horizon issues that it can no longer afford topush off: its relationship to Russia; its decision-making rules; and the scopeof its global ambitionsOn all three issues, NATO members should be guided by realism andsobriety.With Russia , NATO must seek to avert the continuation of zero-sum
competition, instead mapping out a practical vision of programmaticcooperation. The young NATO-Russia Council must be used as a leveragein future cooperation modules between the two. An “open-door policytowards Russia may benefit the international climate, no doubt, but theprice of Kremlin is much too high even for NATO. To invite Russia as anequal partner is one thing but to allow it deep in the decision makingstructures and also give it the right to vote is another. On decision-making , NATO must acknowledge that its growing
membership makes reliance on consensus ever more unwieldy,necessitating adoption of a more flexible approach to governance. The newEuropean act may be set as a good example of reliable decision-makingsystem. A majority instead of a consensus may also be a wild card that maycause discontent among the members but it will surely speed the decision-making system.As for its global aspirations , NATO must withhold them, realizing that
efforts to turn the body into a worldwide alliance of democracies promise tospeed its demise, not its renewal. Global aspirations for a military alliancemay not be welcomed with great joy by its people and it would certainly notbring peace. There will always be challenges and those to rise andchallenge.354 Iulian CHIFU

2009: New Challenges, New Leadership, New View
Leadership
2009 brings changes at the highest level for NATO. First of all the electionof the new US president Barak Obama of which there are high expectationsall around. He has been seen as the last stand in world full of turmoil. TheEU relies on the him to remake the US-EU relations, and all around he isexpected to quell if not settle for good the ongoing conflict of the formerBush administration. The NATO summit in Strasbourg-Kehl was the firstfor president Obama and he is just being introduced to the ways of thestructure. Even so there is no time to waste as the problems that NATO andthe US are facing are urgent.A new figure on the NATO board is the Secretary General. Once with JavierSolana’s end of mandate everybody thought that it would be difficult toreplace the expertise and knowledge. General Anders Fogh Rasmussen theDanish PM was elected unanimously by the NATO Council on the 4
thof
April. Fogh Rasmussen’s task will not be an easy one as he assumesleadership of the Alliance at a difficult time. Afghanistan is on the firstorder of business followed closely by the relationship with Russia. Thetasks at hand are not easy and it will take a lot of skill in resolving them.
Challenges
In 1999, terrorism barely warranted a mention, NATO had not evenconceived of an out-of-area mission as ambitious as Afghanistan, and theenlargement process was only beginning. But by 2001, the Alliance hadinvoked Article 5 for the first time, in response to the terrorist attacks of 11
th
September. By 2003, it had embarked on its most challenging out-of-areamission in Afghanistan. NATO has gone on to admit ten new members,create new structures, partnerships, and initiatives.Even with new members the old ways were kept and therefore no progressin decision-making or acting accordingly to the situation, was made. Themilitary branch alone is no longer an option. As much as it served in theCold War years shear military force is not a viable option for the future ofthe Alliance. NATO name will no longer be equivalent to peace-bringing,but war-bringing if along with the troops does not come a healthy post-conflict reconstruction investment. It appears to be a solid consensus thatthe strategic challenges faced must lend themselves to purely militaryNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 355

solutions. The best example for this is in Afghanistan, where military
aspects are a necessary but insufficient component of a comprehensivesolution. The new Strategic Concept should confirm the close link betweensecurity and development and draw the necessary consequences forplanning and deployment of Alliance armed forces. This link calls for theclosest possible cooperation between political and military authorities inplanning and execution of overseas missions. It also means encouragingcloser contacts and involvement with non-governmental organizations.Yet, ultimately, NATO is a political and military alliance, it should becarefully assessed what NATO’s role should be in addressing specificchallenges. International terrorism, the hottest problem on the table at themoment, is a major security concern – especially the potential for thecombination of extremist organizations and weapons of mass destruction. Itmust be clear, and therefore made clear, that NATO is the properorganization to address this threat not only by arms but by extending ahelping hand towards evolution and development, therefore maybepreventing a future threat of the same kind.The Russian issue is even more delicate because NATO is dealing with theone country on Earth that could match its military and pecuniarypossibilities. The use of force is out of the question, the development andaid are refused by Moscow, therefore the only way left is diplomacy troughwhich invite Kremlin to participate in creating a common plan that wouldserve both sides – maybe, a beginning for a form of allegiance. Whatever the merits of NATO enlargement – and they are many – theexpansion of the alliance has unquestionably come at the expense of itsrelationship with Russia. To be sure, Russians themselves bear primaryresponsibility for the recent backsliding on democracy as well as their boutsof foreign policy excess – the war in Georgia most notable among them.But the perception among Russia’s leadership and its public alike thatNATO’s eastward expansion impinges on their country’s security andprestige has certainly not helped matters. Appropriately, NATO seemsprepared to put on hold for now its commitment, agreed upon at last year’sBucharest summit, to offer membership to Georgia and Ukraine. But themere prospect of Ukrainian and Georgian membership continues to intrudein NATO’s dialogue with Russia.
The way out of this bind is to find a formula for encouraging Moscow tobecome a stakeholder in Europe’s security order, making Russia a356 Iulian CHIFU

participant in rather than an object of NATO’s evolution. The Cold War has
been over for more than 20 years and if the West understood that, for thesake of the collective security Kremlin must be assisted and aided tocomprehend the same thing. The alternative to that is a one –way dialogueand no solutions. Moscow may well decline the offer in favor ofestrangement with the West. But at least NATO will have done its best toavert that outcome.Also problematic will be NATO’s relationship with Georgia and Ukraine.Russia has made it clear that it opposes enlargement. But reaching out toGeorgia and Ukraine is worthwhile. Even though Europe needs to rebalanceits relationship with Russia, giving Moscow a veto over NATO’s decisionsis unlikely to encourage better behavior by the Kremlin. The outcome ofthat will surely not be the same as providing Georgia and Ukraine withMAP’s but there are not promises of improvement in any direction. NATOis being confronted with a difficult decision: a slight improvement in itsrelationship with Russia may mean putting of Ukraine and Georgia on holdfor an indefinite period. The risk analysis in this case may prove to be ahard one. The key is therefore to make sure the two commissions NATO hasestablished to help Ukraine and Georgia reform their defense structuresactually mean something. From experiences in the Balkans, it is clear thatoverseeing politically sensitive defense reforms is more difficult thantechnical assistance or just serving as an umbrella for allied reform assis-tance. It has to be different this time if NATO’s offer is to mean anything toKiev and Tbilisi (and Moscow).
Every decision taken amidst NATO regarding Russia was taken in the
interest of maintaining the bilateral relations in agreeable terms. So NATOdoes not consider Russia an enemy, but, does Russia see NATO as anenemy? What if all of NATO’s struggle to make this work is in vain, wouldthat be worth the lack of blame on its part when the time comes? “When thetime comes” is another way of saying a new Cold War or even a Hot War. Itis obvious that the old hatreds and suspicions have not dispersed and a goodexample for that are the Zapad (West) 2009 exercises. Zapad is the biggestmost complex military exercise since the fall of the USSR. More than60.000 Russian along with Belarusian soldiers, 1000 tanks, 600 airplanesNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 357

and artillery equipment were deployed during this exercise that simulated
the defense of Belarus from a very modern-equipped enemy army that wasattacking using the centric warfare network system, the same system usedby the NATO forces. So, in other words, the first major military exerciseorganized by Russia in 18 years was a simulation of fending off a NATOattack.
Recent findings of journalists from the Wprost magazine in Poland showthat as a part of the exercise (part that was not disclosed in the original pressreport) it was also simulated the invasion of Poland. The invasion of abeach in Poland was preceded by a rebellion of polish minority in Belarus.At the exercise took part almost 13.000 soldiers and the objectives weretaking out a gas pipeline and simulation of the launching of a nuclearmissile. All of this happened on the day on which Poland wascommemorating 70 years from the invasion of the Red Army as a result ofthe Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. If we take into consideration the facts abovewe can conclude two things: Russia is either really concerned about aNATO strike or is trying to send a violent message to the Alliance in orderto achieve its own agenda.The Zapad exercises were considered a threat by eastern countries likePoland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, countries that do not posses thenecessary capabilities to fend for themselves, thus relying on NATO. Theimmediate request of Poland (after the disclosure of the new fact aboutZapad) was a NATO base on its territory. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, arebound to organize a military exercise along with the U.S. in 2010 in theRussian buffer zone. These are just precautionary measures but they canonly make things worse as Moscow is known to respond to challenges andnever be intimidated.At this point, the immediate goal is not finding the precise formula forreaching out to Moscow, but beginning a strategic conversation that makesclear that NATO members are sincerely committed to anchoring Russiawithin the Euro-Atlantic community. The conversation can begin byexploring ways to make more of the NATO-Russia Council. NATOmembers should pick up on Moscow’s call for fresh thinking about a “newEuropean security architecture.” This dialogue must be backstopped withconcrete strategic cooperation on issues such as missile defense, access toAfghanistan, and diplomacy with Iran.358 Iulian CHIFU

New View
NATO finds itself at a turning point and making the right decision must notbe delayed. The EU-NATO relation was damaged during the years of theBush administration and many of the common goals were abandoned due toloss of trust. EU now expects a great deal from the new Obamaadministration and is confident about entering a new stage in the bilateralrelations. Until then the situation is still low-ranked. But it should bepossible to create a working-level basis for an EU/NATO rapprochement.One idea would be for the EU to take charge of reconstruction inAfghanistan’s largest cities, with NATO providing security inside and USforces operating in the provincial hinterland. The two organizations shouldconsider other areas for cooperation including in-theatre ISAF support toEUPOL (European Union Police Mission), joint training and pre-deployment preparation for PRT (Provincial reconstruction team) staff andjoined up civil-military exercises. Even better, a NATO/EU School on Post-Conflict could be set up where each organization can bring their respectivestrengths to bear to the benefit of missions where both are present. Changesin the way NATO missions are financed should also be explored, perhapsthrough a commonly financed NATO operations budget
Future Borders
Ongoing enlargement also forces the issue of the need to reform decision-making in an alliance that has 26 members and counting. As its ranks growin number and diversity, continued reliance on consensus may well becomea recipe for paralysis. Finally, members would be wise to begin addressingthe calls – coming primarily from American voices – to extend NATO’sreach beyond Europe and transform the body into a global alliance ofdemocracies. Recasting NATO’s relationship with Russia and reformingdecision-making require careful deliberation. The proposal for NATO to goglobal does not; it should be readily dismissed.NATO has its hands full in Afghanistan; indeed, its ability to prevailremains open to question. With the Afghan mission so straining NATO’sresources and cohesion, it is hard to imagine that the alliance is ready totake on additional commitments further ahead. NATO should by all meansforge strategic partnerships with countries and regional groupings willing tocontribute to the common cause; the help of non-members(like Georgia) inNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 359

Afghanistan is more than welcome. But making NATO the institution of
choice for dealing with conflicts around the world is a bridge too far.In the Balkans, Caucasus, and Europe’s far east – as well as in Afghanistan– NATO has much unfinished business. It had better focus on completingthese tasks before packing up for new missions in Kashmir or the Gazastrip. Moreover, extending NATO membership to the likes of Japan,Australia, and Israel would not only prove uniquely contentious for thealliance but also saddle it with commitments likely to go unmet.To be sure, NATO has an important role to play beyond Europe; it isalready developing linkages in the Mediterranean. But prudence requiresthat NATO focus primarily on helping others help themselves – providingassistance and training, serving as an institutional model, on occasionpartnering with local states in limited missions – all to the service ofstanding up other security organizations around the globe that can be assuccessful in their own regions as NATO has been in Europe.Even though the alliance is stretched almost at maximum, two long termchallenges for NATO are likely to emerge. The first is NATO’s potentialrole in any Israeli-Palestinian settlement, including peacekeeping tasks andassistance in building Palestine’s security institutions. The second, longerterm challenge is how to deal with Africa. It is believed that, despite theAU’s request to NATO to help build up the AU’s capabilities, the effortsmade have not yet been completely effective. In order to live up to thosetwo future tasks, reforms are also needed to improve both current and futureoperations, including adjustments to NATO’s command structures, so thatgreater authority can be delegated to military commanders and in-theatreintegration with partners like the United Nations (UN) can be improved. 360 Iulian CHIFU

D. 4
NATO’s new Strategic Concept.
The relation with Russian Federation
Adriana Sauliuc
Created in 1945, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was built to protect
the security of the member states and, without no doubt, the WashingtonTreaty was and remains a remarkably enduring agreement. Its core valueshave served NATO well, during the 60 years of existence, being just as truetoday, like they did in 1949.Today, we can say that the Alliance has successfully ensured the freedom ofits members and had an active role in preventing war in Europe, during the40 years of the Cold War. But when this was over, the question was if theorganization was still relevant and what NATO should do ? Created with the
main purpose to counter the threat of communist expansion after the WorldWar II was over, when the Soviet Union turned from ally to enemy, thecollapse of the soviet state in 1991, brought a new international landscape.The disappearance of the main enemy left NATO with no obvious purposeand in this situation, the Alliance understood that there was necessary arethinking of the strategy, and since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO wasundergone a process of transformation, a process ment to help theorganization to adapt to the transformations of the international landscape. For this, NATO agreed the first Strategic Concept on 8
thNovember 1991, at
the NATO Summit in Rome, and the years that followed, brought importantchanges for the Alliance, with the essential elements of this Concept:statements about instruments necessary for crisis prevention andmanagement, cooperation and partnership, demands for the transformationof armed forces towards flexibility, deployability, and sustainability etc. It iscertain that during the 90’s, when NATO engaged on military operations forthe first time, it was the proof that the Alliance shown itself and the entireworld, that the organization is able to adapt to an ever changing securitybackground. The mission in 1995, was the first ever peacekeeping missionfor the Alliance, and took place in Bosnia-Hertegovina, with a close workof the European Union and the United Nations, and NATO did its job verywell, with professionalism and devotament. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 361

The next Strategic Concept (25thApril 1999), adopted in the Washington
Summit, codified the developments and the decisions adopted in 1991.After the conduct of combat action in Yugoslavia without a UN SecurityCouncil mandate, when the air campaign brought to a halt the humancatastrophe unholding in Kosovo, the Strategic Concept emphasized thecentral role of the United Nations and its Security Council’s prerogative.The 1999 Strategic Concept, a satisfactory description of the Alliancepolicy and strategy, highlated that NATO learned from the previousexperiences (missions in 1995 and 1999) and realized that if the Alliancewants to remain relevant in the security field, it would have to be active andhave an important role in crisis management, crisis response operations andconflict preventions. So, the Strategic Concept adopted in the end of the90
th, declared NATO’s main functions: Security Consultation, Detterrence
and Defense, Partnership and Cooperation, Contribution to Prevention andCrisis Management, as the “core security tasks”. Looking back now, at the 60
thanniversary we can all approve that NATO
had a grate contribution at the European and global security, by respectingthe principles of the United Nations like democracy, individual liberty andthe rule of law. But today, at ten years after the 1999 Strategic Concept wasadopted, this seams to no longer reflect the NATO’s raison d’etre, in a
security landscape dramatically changed. In this present time, after eventslike 11
thSeptember 2001, intervention in Afganistan and Iraq and Russian –
Georgian War, during a period of the worst economic crisis since thedepression in the 1930s, rewritin a new Strategic Concept by the nextsummit in late 2010, is more then necessary, because it offers anopportunity that the members cannot miss, an opportunity to developstronger consensus across the NATO’s states and the Alliance challenges,ambitions, resources and partnerships. Because of the present altered strategic concept, NATO needs to reevaluateits strategy, goals and functions and the evolution of the new StrategicConcept involve in a certain way, three important factors: a major challengein the strategic environment, reaching a consensus within NATO as to thechanges that need to be made; and adapting to the possible “unintendedconsequences” of the previous concept, which was the result of a quiteconservative remit, and a product of many compromises. The preparation ofthe 2009 Strategic Concept, which generally is “the authoritative statementof the Alliance’s objectives and provide the highest level of guidance on the362 Iulian CHIFU

political and military means to be use in achieving them”, is the task of a
group of wise men. They have to pay attention to relevant subjects forNATO, in relation with Russia, energy, terrorism, humanitarian activities,piracy, food security and climat change.
NATO’s relationship with the Russian Federation and the new
Strategic Concept
Today, after the Russian – Georgian War (August 2008), considered by
many commentators a caesura comparable to the fall of the Berlin Wall,
and the terror attacks over the United States of America (2001), NATOmore then ever, have to create a new relation with the Russian Federation,so the Alliance to fit the former soviet territory into a pan-European securityframework. But, in the present time, there is no simply way to do it,because of Russia’s goals, its behaviour and the prospects for thecooperation or confrontation between NATO and Moscow. Russia is important for the Alliance, which need a reliable ally to count on,in many issues like: combating terrorism, confronting piracy, cooperation inAfganistan, countering missile and nuclear proliferation, or containingnarcotics trafficking. Even if NATO’s current attention is now, very muchon Afganistan, as well as it was a decade ago, on the Balkans area inEurope, Russian Federation remains an important actor that will alwayshave a hard word to say in the eastern Europe security, even if there is ageneral accepted idea that NATO cannot recognize a Russian sphere of“privileged interests” as well as will not recognize the independence of thebreackaway Georgian separatist republics: South Ossetia and Abkhazia.NATO also reaffirm the rights of all countries, including the ex-sovieticstates, Georgia and Ukraina, to choose their own position in foreign policy,as well as their partners or alliance. The current landscape with all its features, can only express that theAlliance must work harder with Russia, even if the two parts share similarconcern about border security, terrorism or nuclear threats. In this respect,cooperation with the Russian state is achievable in arms control andnonproliferation areas. For this, the USA and Russia are engaged innegociations for a new Strategic Arms Control Treaty (START) that willexpire at the end of this year (5 december). In the mean wile, there areserious nuclear discussions between USA and Russian Federation for amissile defense now, when state like Iran and North Korea are threateningNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 363

the world’s security. Russia’s participation at the international efforts for
resolution of the iranian nuclear issue is very important, an absence of theRussians is like to undermine this efforts and their effectiveness.But NATO’s cooperation with Russia means much more, because theAlliance needs Russian support in a number of other issues, from achievingan Israelian – Palestinian settlement, to cooperation in fighting in a quitenew threat – the piracy off the coast of Somalia. All this things are linked tothe world’s security and stability, that can only be achieved if NATO cancount on a reliable partner like Russia. For this, it is vital for Europe and theUnited States of America to agree on how to deal with Russia and to findthe answer to a very important question: should the Alliance build an
european security together with Russia, or with an eye on the Russianstate? Whatever the answer is, NATO needs Russia and vice versa, both
sides must desire a common way to solve the current problems of theinternational security, today, when conflicts have different forms:extremism, energy and ethnicity. A good relation with Russia is very important from the energy view, too.Russian state is the biggest gas supplier in the world in a time when most ofthe European countries depend on Russian gas. Energy security is verydifficult to achieve, even if we talk about big countries, like United Statesof America and China, or smaller states, like the countries in Europe. Forthe most part, oil and gas sources are located in political unstable parts ofthe planet, with a anti-Western view and resources are used as politicalweapon. The gas crisis in January 2009 (when European Union rather theAlliance had to handle the situation) has raised concerns about Russianenergy policy and the strategy to use the gas as weapon of economic andpolitical intimidation. In this context, NATO cannot avoid the energy issue,which seems to be more important every day. The new Strategic Concept isrequired to increase the Alliance’s role in the energy security especiallynow, when the organization tries to establish a closer cooperation withRussia, the biggest gas supplier in the world.Keeping the dialog channels open with Russia, and a revitalization of theNATO – Russia Council, can only bring a new era of cooperation withMoscow. The relationship with the Russian state was and remains a subjectof paramount importance for the Alliance. It is time to attempt a freshbeginning between NATO and Russia, whose geopolitical position continueto be a hybrid because, torn between East and West, we can say that Russia364 Iulian CHIFU

is certainly not an enemy anymore, but also not yet an ally. That is why, the
discussion about a new Strategic Concept should include and treat veryseriously the thorough reassessment of Russia’s policy and the trans-formation of the existing cooperation into an effective partnership NATO –Russia, as a possibility to defeat common threats and enhance commoninterests. Alliance expects from Russia to use the 21
st century currency, not
the 19thcentury methods, for the present international problems. NATO
hopes that Russia realize that a “zero-sum” thinking is outdated and must bedrop, and that one side can only gain security, for instance, with the otherpart’s help. For this, the Alliance needs a coherent Russian policy, and theStrategic Concept should bring a new relation between NATO and Russia,more confident and more productive.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 365

D. 5
NATO – The new strategic concept
Narciz Bãlãșoiu
According to the definition offered by NATO, the strategic concept is a set
of recommended measures following the analysis of a strategic scenario.This approach is based on the need for tracing the direction lines of military,diplomatic, psychological and economic sectors in accordance with securityneeds. The first document of this kind was adopted in the Alliance in 1952and since then, successive changes were made as a condition to meet thenew challenges. An important step in this direction was made in 1990 at theLondon runion, where Heads of State and Government agreed on the needto adapt the North Atlantic Alliance to new realities occurred due to fall ofthe Iron Curtain which also meant the end of the Cold War. It was a momentwhen the transformations of Europe had to put its mark on the long-termvision of what it means common security and defense policy. One of themain elements that mark the new NATO strategy, calls for thetransformation of the Alliance from an organization based on collectivedefense, to an entity able to guarantee Euro-Atlantic security anddemocratic values, both inside and outside its borders.At present NATO is faced with a number of challenges that need to beanalysed in order to get some answers on how the new strategic conceptshould look like. One key element is the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,which created a gap in the core of transatlantic axis. According to simplestdefinition, NATO is a political-military alliance that aims to providesecurity and collective defense for its members. Although Article 5 refers tothe binomial system of collective security and defense, its form does notsubmit an implied warranty, because it failes to compel its members toexpress an act immediately, in order to defend allied troops. Article 5 bindsto a series of questions that basically aim the need to find a balance betweenself-defense (Article 5) and security – such as expeditionary operations andstabilization missions.Another major issue on NATO’s agenda is Russia, which, on one handdeveloped a strategic partnership with the Alliance through NATO-RussiaCouncil,and on the other hand is considered by some members to be themain target of Article 5. In the relationship with the Russian Federation366 Iulian CHIFU

there are views that even though claim a strengthened partnership, the lack
of common democratic values can prevail in the face of common interests.Even though sustain efforts have been made in order to reset relations withRussia, the latest developments in the Balkans concurrent with increasinglydesire to reassert its power, have led to a deepening of the gap between thetwo power poles. Nuclear proliferation is an issue that has lately sharpenedmainly as a consequence of the Iranian Nuclear File developments. Alsoquestionable is NATO’s ability to cope with the requirements of non-proliferation in the 21
stcentury, and the need to strengthen commitments on
this in Europe.The economic crisis is also a challenge whose effects could not be evenquantify. Budget cuts create difficulties for NATO to susstain its com-mitements, so member states will have to take into account to prioritize inwhich missions and operations to engage. The risk of such an approachstems from the fact that not every country perceive the same types of risks,so the homogeneity of the security climate is put to the test. In pragmatic terms there are a few basic directions of approach that must beconsidered in the process of reflection on the new NATO strategic concept.
A major step is the need to adapt to increasingly complex challenges. Firstlyit is necessary to enhance the development of offensive and defensivestrategies to counteract the areas where poor governance creates a securityvacuum. In order to keep up with technological progress, the Alliance needsto encourage the development of a viable strategy, able to sustain innovativeindustries so that the time between invention and use of new technologieswill be reduced. The main objective is to enhance the acquisition ofsuperior capabilities in all areas where security risks are involved, andpossession of a technological advantage over adversaries. Also the Allianceneeds to encourage development of an ability to react quickly to threats thatare based on new technologies, and spread immediately to its members thecounter methods. In order to acomplish these tasks, besides strengtheningNATO’s inter-operational capabilities is required to develop advancedintegrated technologies of intelligence and monitoring. A second step is toincrease collaborative efforts with the external environment, concurrentwith the establishment of new institutions. The Alliance need to resizeinstitutioanal collaborations and exchange of experience with officers fromnon-NATO countries, and to adopt an active approach in relations withstates that have problems in maintaining a stable governance, and thusensuring a secure environment. A concrete measure is the implementationNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 367

of policies to mentor and advice indigenous forces. Another key element
that needs to gain more attention from NATO leaders, is the process ofconflict prevention and resolution, along with consequence management.This segment requires adapting both the authorities structures and decision-making process, and also improving NATO-EU partnership on non-proliferation and consequence management. In order to achieve such anobjective it is necessary that besides adapting NATO capabilities to respondto humanitarian challenges (cataclysms), to reform the alliance’s commandstructure for a prompt response and in close collaboration with othergovernment bodies such as EU and UN .As a prophylactic measure is necessary to intensify efforts to combatweapons proliferation. For an efficient development of these measures isrequired together with governmental and international organizations, toimprove the capacity to discover, track, identify and neutralize the subjectsinvolved in the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Distruction. In addition tothese measures is essential to increase human resource training withinNATO in order to assist national civil authorities.A problem that is becoming increasingly stringent refers to the need toconduct expeditionary forces in the most hostile and remote areas. Thisissue claim the need to review policies on defense and coordination ofoperational planning while maintaining the capacity to developconcurrently a whole range of operations and missions. In terms ofcapabilities must be provided the necessary means to move mobile forcesover large distances, on short notice, and in urban areas fast and efficientair transportation. Taking into account the cultural diversity of the areas where NATO forcesact, the issue of communication gains a critical role, so it is very importantto deliver consistent messages and strategies to engage in battle, so that thestrategic objectives reflect themselves in the fundamental values. Thisobjective should be supported by achieving high standards in education, inorder to create educated staff able to understand the cultural challenges indifferent areas in which they operate.Defining a new strategic concept will be a laborious process because itentails the adoption of complex solutions to address the new types ofunconventional and asymmetric risks and threats. Also this document willneed to refer to the way the Alliance will be involved in issues related topromoting democracy, reconstructing nations, along with developing EUrole in defense and security, and bringing relations between the EU andNATO at a higher level.368 Iulian CHIFU

D. 6
The new NATO strategic concept and the realities and the
new threats to the security environment
Mirela-Ancuța Samoilã
How will the Alliance respond to the new reality threats? Is a question from
which the Nato Stategic concept is answering. The answer to this questionis a definition of what will remain from NATO, what ways will it choose, isgoing to be a global instrument that answers all the promblems sendingmission where facto realityes demand it. In the context of constant changes in the security environment given by therussian-georgian war in august 2008, the financial crisis, also of thedeveloping PESA, weapons proliferation potentiating new threats. In thenew geo-political threats we must not disregard the old threats. Only theAlliance’s enemy, terrorism, which had as starting point the actions thatfollowed the 11
thSeptember actions, are no longer on the first place on a
priority scale of the priorities from the new context, but are the cybersecurity and energetic security.For old NATO threats owning instruments that reply in return for the newones does not have the instruments to respond. Now the question comes tomind: to what threats will NATO answer and with what priority. We mustnot forget the elements from the past, elements learned from missions in thepast, but only the elements that are depassed by the recent evolutions in thesecurity environment. The Georgian conflict, but also the existent classicmissions NATO underline once again that Nato had never given up fightingthreats in classic style, fact revealed by the proliferation of any kind.
A reevaluation of threats at NATO’s adress
Even when it comes to NATO adreesed threats we have the tendency to
look for threats outside the Alliance, but many times they are on the inside.In the category of these threatthat sprang grom the inside of the Alliance:populism, losing the support for the states, organized crime.Above all thisthere are: weapons proliferation, terrorism, totalitarist countryes, inter stateconflicts, global warming.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 369

The loss of support of the NATO’ s states members – In the context of the last
years, after the 11thSeptember 2001 attacks, numerous surveys have
indicated the fact that the support of the European states has dropped thesupport for NATO, unlike in US. Because people did not find themselves inthe fight launched by the US against the terrorism, due to the fact this didnot impact on the directly, the same situation after the subway attacks inLondon – UK, Madrid – Spain. So, the decline of citizens’s support for thefight against terrorism and for NATO. When it comes to threats to energysecurity, Europe’s biggest problem, support is higher, this is due to the conflicts at the NATO borders, Ucraine and Russia gas dispute fromJanuary 2009, when Russia stopped providing energy to Europe. NATO lostpopulation support from the states memebers of the Alliance with growingneccesities, and growing costs for Army support, specific to the USpopulation that realised the costs allocated for sustaining the Irak during theBush administration, fact proved when people stopped voting a newrepublican.
The proliferation of Mass destruction weapons – main subject of the UN
reunion in 2009, where US relaunched the fight against Iran nuclearproliferation. In Iran’s nuclear problem, Turkey, Nato member is the onlyone that sustains even presently the opinion that the nuclear theat does notcome from Iran’s side but from Israel’s side, a state that does not admit tothe fact that they own nuclear power weapons. And this support comes inthe context of public opinion support for approving any action of the AKPguvern (The justice and Development Party) agains Israel in the Gazaconfrontations.
The totalitarial states – where it does not exist a so called fight against
totalitarial sistems but more of an implementation process in the totalitarianstates of the elements specific to democracy, on a generical idea – twodemocratic states have less chances of declaring each other war. Theimplementation of democracy in Afganistan is a timetaking process, even ifelections took place, building the democracy and the reconstruction postconflict from this area will take some time, even if the civil mission PESA,EUPOL are trying the reconstruction of the democratic institutions andtraining the personal from these institutions, together with the NATOmission that is in charge of the security for that zone.370 Iulian CHIFU

Inter-state conflicts , and the problematic states – The case of Georgia and
Russia is an evidence of the ethnic conflicts, for example making theAlliance temper their reactions. A problem was the consensus problem thatis delaying NATO’s actions in the field with a few weeks. In these 2examples the problem arrose who will intervene EU or NATO, who has thecompetency to solve this conflict. The inter-ethnic problem form Bosniaand Hertzegovina rebecame actual problems, so as a first example of postconflict NATO reconstruction, taken as an example for future EUreconstruction mechanisms, the PESA missions seems that did not have anysuccess at all. We can conclude that NATO due to its military capabilitiescan solve the actual interventions issue, military missions, for PESAremaining the post-conflict reconstruction part.
Populism – is a threat associated with the global model of democracy, that
comes in the context of the democratization process from Eeastern Europe’sside, and that is separating from the initial model of liberal democracy.Populism can lead to weakaning institutions power and efficiency of thekey institutions of democracy, law independency, media’s and armysindependence. Once the people gain confidence in the populist leader and adecreasing confidence in the political elites that constitutes an alternativefor governing that state, assuring the democratic mechanisms, encounterproblems in approaching external problems, security problems. Behind theactions in comunity’s service, for comunity’s wellfare, the state leader triesto lead without polical consensus, but by his own opignions. So, judging bythe defficiencies arosed in these new Eastern- democracies, will oly lead toan instability cauzed by the posibility of a populist revolution.
Organized crime – sustains the fear and insecurity and creates the
guidelines for the future terrorist actions, also for proliferating weaponstrade, even if the most threatened regions are the ones at NATO’s boarders,we cannot exclude the problems from inside NATO’s states, in EasternEurope. Organized crime together with the ilegal migration generate if notanihilated, violent identity themes and weaken the security.
Global warming – this implies recent clima changes – reprezent a more and
more discussed subject in the last year because these lead to increasing theconflicts generated by environment considerations, but even the crisisNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 371

generated by the natural disasters put under the question sign the efficiency
of the reactions coming both from national authorities and of theinternational ones. Another question rises – if in the future NATO will reactin these types of catastrophies.
Terrorism – the threat based on the 11
thSeptember 2009 attacks, the
geopolitical world has redefined their security strategy, but remains inNATO’s priority strategies. In this time there was a passing frominternational terrorism to internat terrorism more powerfull because of thedamage that can cause and the fact that these two collide together.
NATO PrioritiesEven if the threats are truly found on NATO’s list, they cannot be
annihilated because of the current capacities and because of the costsinvolved. That is why, depending on NATO’s interests, there is a number ofpriorities for which the Alliance has channeled its resources: energysecurity, cyber defense, terrorism, the defense of the individual.
Energy security . Energy security represents a problem more specific to
Europe because it depends on the energy that comes from outside itsborders, especially from Russia. It becomes a NATO problem when theviability of the energy treaties is questioned and because of the threats thatare related to the infrastructure that provides for the energy transport.Without a treaty regarding energy security between Russia and EU, theagreements between the two parts does not mean too much in the currentcontext. Looking for the first time at the Nabucco project, it has beenconsidered that this will solve all the energy security problems, but becauseother Russian energy supply projects have surfaced and adding to thatTurkey’s actions regarding Nabucco and White Stream projects, willunderline the interests that come to play and which can manage theinsecurity of the imported energy dependant countries as well as of theirrespective citizens.
Cyber defense . In the new security environment, criminal infractions are
correlated with cyber defense. The current strategy for cyber defense of themember countries is the instrument through which the combat against a372 Iulian CHIFU

cybernetic attack can be ensured from any NATO member country. The
screening against such attacks can resolve a conflict and by finding andstopping the enemy’s means of communications can prevent that conflict.
Terrorism . It is one of the NATO’s top priorities that is still current. The
future actions are reflected by the way NATO is handling the currentsituation in Afghanistan. Because of the mission’s costs in Afghanistan, thetrust in a future success is decreasing.
The defense of the individual . It is a new concept that seems to draw
NATO’s attention, once the re-evaluation of NATO’s threats is put underinvestigation and once a new strategic concept is designed. Balancingbetween a NATO as an unuiversal box tools or an Alliance that must reachits objective which was created, raises the question if NATO needs tochange its view on things and to look from the countries security point ofview or of the defense of the individual, of the citizen.
Along these NATO’s threats and priorities, the relations with the muslim
world, the frozen conflicts underline the need for an Alliance which cancount on its member’s advice to prevent conflicts, threats, to coordinate itsactions depending on the available resources, on the support from themember countries and the consensus in taking decisions regarding NATO’sintervention missions should not be an obstacle for resolving conflicts.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 373

D. 7
NATO, from Euro-Atlantic partnership
to Global Partnership
Radu Arghir
With the end of the cold war NATO’s strategic priorities had to change in
order to accommodate the new status quo that demanded more focus onsecurity rather than defense issues. A massive invasion in Europe becamean unlikely scenario but the collapse of the Soviet Union and thedesintegration of the Warsaw Treaty left behind what could be called “amess”. The East, South-East and Central European countries, includingSoviet Union successor, the Russian Federation, needed, above all, securityguarantees from what was then and still is the main Defense and Securityprovider in Europe: NATO.NATO took the necessary steps and established dialogue with formercommunist countries by means of bilateral talks and, more importantly,within the framework of what was then The North-Atlantic CooperationCouncil. As dialogue progressed new instruments were created to deal withnew requirements. Among them the Partnership for Peace (PfP), that dealtwith individual states, and allowed NATO to provide tailor made assistanceand the Mediterranean Dialogue were established in 1994. The nextimportant step was involving NATO’s partner countries in joint securityoperations. The opportunity came with the end of the Bosnian war and theDayton peace agreements. In the context of common operations in Bosnia,the Euro – Atlantic Partnership Council was created as a successor ofNorth-Atlantic Cooperation Council (EAPC) in order to enhancecooperation.Since then EAPC came a long way and saw some of its members joinNATO. Other achievements include Creation of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster
Response Coordination Centre and Disaster Response Unit, launching ofPartnership Action Plan against Terrorism (following 9/11
th) and Individual
Partnership action Plan(an enhanced version of PfP, 2002), and theestablishment of the PfP Trust Funds(following Ottawa convention,however its role expanded over the years from funding destruction of minesto destruction of small arms and other obsolete military equipment and
Supporting discharged personnel) to name just a few.374 Iulian CHIFU

This was NATO’s response to the security needs of Europe (and CIS
countries), however, with the new shift in NATO’s strategic concept EAPCand its instruments, can play a significant role in shaping NATO’s futureforeign actions. The biggest challenge facing NATO at the moment isAfghanistan, and despite difficulties there we cannot assume that similaroperations will not be conducted in the future. As NATO’s role becomesmore global it needs the right tools in order to successfully deal with thenew challenges that lie ahead. Classic military intervention has its limitationand is only a part of the peace building process. Of course, there are otherorganizations like the UN, or other regional organizations that own bettertools when in comes to peace building. Still NATO through EAPC and PfPhas managed to acquire a number of instruments that can be put to good usein the future. Peace building includes security sector reform, clearingminefields and reintegration of combatants, and NATO is already equippedwith the tools to make a difference in those areas. During a conference in Bucharest, where NATO’s new strategic conceptwas discussed, Daniel Korski (European Council of Foreign Relations)underlined the fact that NATO can and should become the most importantdefense sector reform provider (including reintegration of combatants) inthe world. This is indeed a way forward for NATO, but it can do more. Itcan become the driving force behind the implementation of the Ottawaconvention by extending the geographical area (and providing morefunding) where PfP Trust Funds can implement projects. Rather thanassisting only partner countries (PfP and Mediterranean Dialogue) it canassist any country in need, provided that it requested assistance. And thiscan apply to any other area where Trust Fund can help (like conversion of
military bases or destruction of small arms). Also, when it comes to (naturalor man made) disaster response NATO can organize joint exercises andprovide much needed expertise to countries all around the globe, and canassume a leading role in the process.This can be achieved by means of bilateral agreements with individualcountries or cooperation with regional organizations and either way willrequire closer coordination with the UN. It will not necessarily be easy andwill require diverting or allocating new funds as well as new mechanisms.Further more, the process will be a lengthy one and require political willand constant involvement before NATO can become a world wide drivingforce when it comes to defense reform, mine (and other military equipment)NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 375

disposal and disaster response. But it is a way forward for NATO that will
allow it to expand way beyond its traditional security building area. Also,the number of countries or regional organizations that are in need ofassistance in these particular three sectors in not likely to decline any timesoon. NATO is now known to be the most successful collective defenseorganization in Europe but it is time to went further than that and expand itssuccess to other areas in the brother concept of security. Collective defenseis still, an should be, at the heart of NATO’s priorities but in the light of 21
stcentury challenges it is imperative that it expands its leadership to other
areas of security.376 Iulian CHIFU

D. 8
The NATO-Russia Game
Roxana Ursu
Emerged from the need to counterbalance the soviet threat and maintaining
this main goal until the late 1980s, NATO had to make, after the end of theCold War, a “fundamental reorientation of the alliance’s overall strategy”and to rethink its goals and purpose according to the new reality of theinternational stage. The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 as well as thedevelopment of new types of threats determined NATO to focus more andmore on aspects of political security such as democracy, free markets andpolitical stability rather than military and territorial defense. But even if theStrategic Concepts (1991, 1999 and the 2009 work in progress) were meantto adapt the alliance both political and military to the complexity of theinternational stage, a thing still remains one of the main reasons for NATO’sexistence: Russia.Many people ask themselves why does an organization such as NATO isstill necessary today if the reason for which it was designed, to oppose theSoviet Union, is gone. The answer is clear, not only new threats to thesecurity of the member states have emerged, but Russia’s legacy, topromote anti-democracy, is the basis of one of the most important NATOpurposes.In what concerns Russia it looks upon NATO enlargement with worry eventhough officials on both sides say that Russia and NATO worked and willcontinue to work together as partners in different areas. It is true that NATOhas no territorial claims against Russia and scenarios regarding militaryconfrontations between the two are exaggerated. Facts such as theexpansion of NATO near to Russia’s borders, the disappearance of thebuffer zone, the inferiority of the Russian military forces and capabilitiescomparing to the ones of NATO show otherwise. The truth is that eventhough the military area seems to be the main reason for Russia’s worries,the element that really affects its Western value system and NATO’sgrowing capacity to promote it in the Russian neighbourhoods, outgrowingRussia’s influence in the area. So, what is the natural reaction for Russia?Of course that to act aggressive, finding reasons for disagreement to try tokeep the power of influence. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 377

Alexander Sharavin, director of the Moscow-based Institute of Political and
Military Analysis, stated his opinion to an independent radio that “NATO’sexpansion in itself does not present any threat… This organization cannotpresent a threat — it has multidirectional interests, because there are morethan two dozen states there” so Russia “should not be carried away by thisanti-NATO rhetoric.“ On the other hand, the Russian President DmitriMedvedev said in August 2008 that “NATO’s nothing to Russia” and inMarch 2009 he stated that Russia would rearm its military and boost itsnuclear forces because NATO is expanding towards its borders. Such statements show that different, even contradictory opinions regardingthe NATO-Russia relationship and the way the two actors define theirintentions towards each other arise even within the Russian community.Many Russian experts, like the case of Alexander Sharavin, agree thatRussia’s perception about the ‘NATO menace’ is exaggerated and peopleshould not get carried away by this aggressive rhetoric. It is perfectlynormal that NATO has multiple interests since it is an alliance that consistsof 28 independent member states, but the objectives of this organizationhave evolved: there is no more counteract the Soviet Union, but more ofreorienting its capabilities so it can deal with new types of security threatslike terrorism, failed states or weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, Russian officials, led by president Medvedev, seem toapprove and yet not the fact that Russia and NATO are not enemiesanymore and can work together for a strong partnership. At first sight wecould say that their way of expressing the situation, the fact that theyoscillate between the conviction that NATO cannot be a match for Russia’spower and the idea that NATO’s expansion is a threat to Russia’s nationalsecurity, is the result of a failed doctrine, a post-imperial pique, a woundednational pride. If we go further the approach of Medvedev and itssupporters it is partially justified because NATO, by the process ofenlargement, affects directly Russia’s ability to pursue an agenda which isnot focused on consolidating democracy. Offering NATO membership tocountries such Ukraine or Georgia coincides with diminishing the influenceof the Russian Federation in the area, and practically narrows thepossibilities to put into practice certain foreign, trade and economicpolicies. So, Russian leaders realize the danger of loosing power and tocountervail the situation they call on a deterrent strategy: the idea ofpartnership is not foreclosed, but when certain actions come against Russian378 Iulian CHIFU

interests they go for threatening statements and declarations which usually
brings Russia and NATO to talks and negotiations, and finally to the regainof balance of power.Critics often say that NATO’s enlargement it is the decisive factor in thedeterioration of the Russia-NATO relationship, but NATO supporters thinkthat Russia’s interests are not wounded by the close relations betweenNATO and Russia’s neighbours. Moreover, pro-NATO officials and expertsagree that NATO exerts a positive influence on Russia by eliminatingpolitical instability in the East. Both perspectives have their dose of truthand Russia as well as NATO realize that together with the fact theirrelationship is in transition and it needs to adapt to the new realities andchallenges of the international climate. Threats like terrorism, failure states,populism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destructionand others are reason for to work together, to build a strong partnershipwhich can allow them to face globalization. Although the new realityshould make them avoid the temptation of engaging into disagreements andtake the path of a positive evolution in their relationship, in the end thestory remains just a game with the motto “you are no match for me and yetI cannot manage without you”. Practically it is a game of two, NATO andRussia, in which the players compete against each other without everreaching the finish line.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 379

THIRD PART
Annexes

International Conference
NATO and the New Strategic Concept. Romania’s Priorities
22thOctober – 24thOctober 2009
Constantin Stere Hall, Palace of the Parliament,
13thSeptember, A1 Entrance
Program
Program Director: Iulian Chifu, CPCEW
Co-director of the Project: Mircea Mîndrescu, Romanian NationalDefense College
22
th October
Arrival of the foreign guests
20.00 – Welcome Dinner, Burebista Restaurant
23th October
7.00 – 9.00 – Breakfast for the foreign guests
9.00 – 9.30 – Registration – Palace of the Parliament
9.30. Introductory session
Welcome address
9.30-11.30
Panel 1: Adapting NATO ’s strategic concept in order to address the
21stcentury challenges. Is NATO capable of multi-tasking?
Focus points:

– Sharing security burden inside NATO while preserving trans-Atlantic
partnership and solidarity;
– The meaning of Article 5: balance between conventional and asym-
metric threats
– Balancing the collective defense, operations in the vicinity and the need
for actions at a strategic distance, providing collective defense whilepursuing “out of area” operations
– Terrorism and WMD proliferation: the role of missile defense,
disarmament and non-proliferation;
– Increasing NATO’s role in dealing with cross-border threats and
challenges
Moderator: Iulian Chifu, CPCEWMain speakers:
• Dr. Jamie Shea, Director for Policy Planning, NATO International Staff • Teodor Meleșcanu, Vice-president of the Romanian Senate, President of
the Defense, Public Order and National Security Committee
• Daniel Korski, European Council of Foreign Relations, UK
Discussants: 5-7
• Sergiu Medar, Former National Security Advisor, Romania• Oazu Nantoi, MP, Foreign Affairs Committee, Republic of Moldova• Col. Gheorghe Tibil, Defense Policy Directorate, Romanian MoND• Mihaela Matei, Advisor of Romanian Intelligence Services Director
Debate
11.30-12.00 Coffee break
12.00 – 13.30
Panel 2: T ackling challenges and finding opportunities in NATO’s
wider neighbourhood. Partnership network seen as aninvestment in Trans-Atlantic and international security. Therelevance of NATO’s critical neighbourhoods: the Balkansand the wider Black Sea region.
Focus points: 384 Iulian CHIFU

– The need to build circles of stability in the Balkans – Black Sea-
Caucasus – Central Asia; the Mediterranean region – Middle East –Afghanistan
– The role of neighbourhood/regional instability in the future Strategic
Concept;
– The right balance between NATO policies and instruments: partnerships,
enlargement; reforms; cooperation and dialogue;
– the role of partnerships in a broad sense (including partners across the
globe);
– relations with Russia in the 21
stcentury;
– relations with other organizations (UN, EU, UA, others);– relations with emerging powers (China, India);
NATO developing security capacities (the role of NATO’s partnerships withAfghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq)
Moderator: Sergiu Medar, Former National Security Advisor of the
presidentMain Speakers:
• Cãtãlin Predoiu, Minister of Foreign Affairs (message presented by the
Director General Cãlin Stoica)
• H.E. David Smith, US Ambassador to Georgia
Discussants: 5-7
• Cristian Diaconescu, former Romanian MFA• Zoran Vujic, Assistant of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, chief of the
General Directorate for NATO and Defense Policies, Serbia
• Georgi Kandelaki, Deputy Head of Committee of International
Relations of Georgian Parliament
• Brig Gen Alexandru Cotoara-Nicolae, Head of the Defense International
Cooperation Directorate, MoND
• Kristaq Birbo, EuroAtlantic Council, Albania• Fatima Lahnait, Mediterranean Dialogue senior Fellow, Morocco• E.S. Dl. Ljupco ARSOVSKI, Ambassador of Macedonia in Bucharest• Elkhan Mehdiyev – Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution,
Chairman, Azerbaijan
13.30 – 15.00 – LunchNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 385

15.00 – 16.30
Panel 3: Shifting NATO’s focus between collective/territorial defense
and the need to be effective at strategic distance
Focus points:
– Article 5 in the 21stcentury;
– Contingency planning for the new members;– The value of the NRF;– Striking the right balance between Article 5/Non Article 5 operations;
Capabilities and resource requirements
– Conceptualizing Afghanistan in the new strategic concept (NATO’s role
in stabilization and reconstruction missions).
Moderator: Mircea Mîndrescu, National Defense College
Main Speakers:
• John Seamon – Col (ret), former US military advisor of the US to
NATO
• Gen. Valeriu Nicuț, Romanian General Staff
Discussants: 5-7
• ătefan Tinca, Gen. Director, Planning and Analysis, Romanian MFA• Ott Laido, Secretary of State, Estonian MFA• Adel Abusara, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade• Dr. Daniel Nelson, Former Advisor to Defense and State Departments,
Johns Hopkins University, US
• Cornel Codițã, Director of Program, CPCEW• Hari Bucur Marcu, DCAF
16.30-17.00 Coffee break
17.00-19.00
Panel 4: New threats: En ergy Security, Cyber Defense, Critical
Infrastructure Protection
Focus points:
– Energy security: the right policies, instruments and partners; 386 Iulian CHIFU

– Critical infrastructure protection and NATO’s role
– Cyber-Defense;– NATO’s role in maritime security and protection of maritime lines of
communications
Moderator: Liviu Mureșan, Eurisc Foundation
Main Speakers:
• Milea Constantin, Cyber Intelligence Center, Romanian Intelligence
Service
• Cãlin Stoica, Director General, Security Policies, Romanian MFA• Mireille Rãdoi, National Defense College, Romania
Discussants: 5-7
• Tatiana Bosuncian, Pro Marshall Association, Republic of Moldova• Khatuna Mshvidobadze, senior associate of the Georgian Security
Analysis Centre
• Oleksiy Kolomiyets, President, Centre for European and Transatlantic
Studies, Ukraine
• Eng. ăerban Lungu, Director of Defense Integrated Planning
Directorate, MoND
• Daniel Ionițã, Director for Security Policies, Romanian MFA
19.30-21.00 Dinner, Capșa House24
th October 2009
7.00 – breakfast9.00-11.00 – meeting of Romanian representatives with partner countries
representatives – 20 representatives
11.00 – coffee break
Departure of the foreign participants
The international conference “NATO and the new strategic
concept. Romania’s priorities”
– Report of the proceedings -NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 387

The Centre for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning organized Friday the
23rdOctober, in the Constantin Stere hall of the Parliament Palace in
Bucharest the international conference “NATO and the New StrategicConcept“. The conference ended series of events meant to debate NATO’sNew Strategic Concept and Romania’s priorities concerning it, organizedwith the help of NATO Public Diplomacy Division, the East-East programadministered by the Soros foundation and the German Marshall Black SeaTrust Fund. The results of the debate that took place during Friday’sconference and during the four workshops organized at NGO level,academic level, political and military leader’s level will be structured as apolicy paper, reflecting Romania’s position towards the New StrategicConcept and will be presented to Romanian decision makers, who arepreparing Romania’s mandate concerning these negotiations, NATO’s groupof experts for the Strategic Concept as well as ambassadors of NATOmember states in Bucharest.The conference brought together governmental and civil societyrepresentatives from member states (the US, the UK, France, the SlovakRepublic, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain,Bulgaria, the Czech Republic), partner states (Georgia, Macedonia, theRepublic of Moldova, Serbia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Albania, Morocco), theacademic environment and the media, as well as NATO officials (theDirector for Political Planning Jamie Shea). Romania benefited fromrepresentation on a military, political, intelligence, academic and NGO levelbringing a substantial and multilayered contribution to the debateconcerning NATO’s future.A series of common elements could be found in the speakers’ interventions:the relevance, opportunity and complexity of the process of elaborating aNew Strategic Concept, reaffirming NATO’s core function, expressed inArticle 5 of the Washington Treaty and restoring trust in Euro Atlanticsolidarity, recalibrating the relationship with Russia on more pragmaticgrounds, consecrating the alliance as a forum for consultation on securityand using the mechanism offered by Article 4 to its utmost potential, havinga more efficient type of cooperation with other relevant actors( UN, EU,OSCE), rethinking/amplifying the partnership network with specialmentions for the Black Sea, the Balkans, the Caucasus and theMediterranean, the Gulf area or global partners and reiterating the idea that388 Iulian CHIFU

the future of NATO includes flexible and efficient expeditionary forces that
can be deployed at a strategic distance, keeping a continuity betweenterritorial defense an expeditionary forces, preparing in real fightingsituations for territorial defense and introducing the concept of transbordersecurity in the vicinity of the NATO border.A special thought was given to punctual matters such as energy security,cyber threats, expanding the Alliance and the open doors policy,cooperating in matters relating to intelligence and financing defense. On thelater, Teodor Meleșcanu, vice-president of the Romanian Senate andPresident of the Defense, Public Order and National Security Committee,former defense minister, put forward the idea of introducing an explicitparagraph towards regulating the percentage of the GDP allotted bymember states, or at least addressing firm commitments, in the NewStrategic Concept. He also reiterated the need for NATO to focus ontransborder security that can deal with a number of serious threats liketerrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation or illegal arms, drugs,persons trafficking, whose income often finances terrorist networks.It became clear from the beginning of the debate the fact that defining aNew Strategic Concept is not a simple intellectual or bureaucratic exercisemeant to foretell the future or bring paper changes to the Alliance’s tasks;there are multiple reasons for such a debate, but NATO will only trulyevolve by means of actions and operations and less through theoreticalrefinements. Jamie Shea believes that the Alliance needs to intensify consultations inorder to fully perceive the new threats to security (and embed them in theperceptions of all member states), to pass from reaction to prevention andanticipation (of crisis, conflicts), to coordinate priorities with existingresources and, above all, reinstate trust in the value of Article 5 (especiallyin Central and Eastern Europe). This idea was repeated by therepresentatives of member states found on both sides of the Atlantic,proving that the fears present in this part of Europe are taken into account atthe Alliance level and that solidarity exists and will be reflected in theevaluations put forward by the group of experts. But security will never be exclusively ensured by territorial defense,NATO’s involvement in theatres such as Afghanistan is becoming evermore necessary. Moreover an evaluation that was presented at theconference, put forward at least 20 situations with the potential to becomeNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 389

the next Afghanistan where the Alliance might have to intervene because of
risks to its safety. Thus NATO must own capable expeditionary forces,political will/consensus to take part in such operations and goodcoordination with the other actors involved in a thorough, integratedapproach, promoted by the Alliance. Also, it was stressed that the militaryassurance that Article 5 mentions has to be doubled by a political and apsychological one to reaffirm the Alliance’s core function – collectivedefense. If adopting the New Strategic Concept is about adapting NATO’s foundingprinciples to this era, at the same time we must avoid turning this debatedinto a win-lose situation, where some member states manage to includetheir priorities and some do not. From this point of view, Daniel Korski,from the Council for Foreign Relations underlined the fact that 4 distinctsecurity communities are distinguishable inside NATO, each with its onperceptions and interest:•the new conservatives – interested that NATO continues its involvement
in Afghanistan, develops its counter-insurgent capabilities and flexibleoperational platforms;
•the new cold warriors – preoccupied by eastern threats and the relevance
or Article 5
•those that follow NATO’ s force projection – they want to invest in it and
approach areas like energy security;
•anonymous – those who will not support expeditionary forces and seek to
“hide” behind an internal debate
Thus, in keeping up with the changing times, regarding our principles, thismust be doubled by an approach that reaches all four points of view so thatthe New Strategic Concept will be comprehensive and focused and willallow NATO to act outside the Euro Atlantic area.It was agreed that without a clear progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan andwithout proper investment for its objectives the Alliance will not be able toimpose its agenda at an international level; at the same time the debatetowards defining success in Afghanistan remains open.
Also, NATO needs to develop its ability to respond to negative implicationsof frozen conflicts and give special attention to border areas. For thisreason, the relationship with Russia was present in all speeches. It isgenerally accepted that it has to be a realist, pragmatic one but a consensusmust be reached (within the Alliance) regarding NATO’s expectations from390 Iulian CHIFU

its partnership with Russia. The idea that the partnership will engage Russia
but will not be able to change it and that the main difficulty is the fact thatMoscow seems to see NATO as a threat was mentioned many times; stillcommon interest abound and the partnership could work, but it needs clearboundaries and red lines for Russia to see and acknowledge.The partnership with the EU was discussed as one with a high potential fordevelopment, but taking into account defense spending, NATO and the EUcontinue to compete for the same resources belonging to member states. An alternative is making other partnerships more effective and getting themost out of regional cooperation. To this end the fact that the MediterraneanDialogue was not used as much as it could have been used (in an area that isbecoming increasingly important as a result of the plans for modifying theAmerican anti-missile shield and which deserves special attention anywaybecause of chronic regional instability, terrorism, illegal migration) wasstressed upon.Cooperation in the Balkans was also brought up, showing that in this casethe security equation was solved by carefully building trust over time andhelping local cooperation initiatives that have led to improvements. Still thespeakers mentioned President’s Medvedev recent visit to Belgrade and theaccord signed which could lead to a new deployment of Russian forces inthe region for the purpose of becoming a regional centre for deploying forcein case of civil emergencies. The perspective regarding the Caucasus is not so optimistic, as the RussianGeorgian conflict of 2008 significantly affected the perception of Alliancepartners in the area; thus they demand that NATO takes into account theirsecurity concerns and restrict cooperation with actors labeled as aggressors. The Alliance’s neighbourhood is essential to NATO but two things must beavoided: creating stability circles around the core represented by the northAtlantic community, which might lead to new separations in Europe and aprocess of excessive regionalization (because partnerships should engageNATO as a whole and equally interest all members of the Alliance, not justthe ones around the border) and, given NATO’s long term involvement inAfghanistan, the idea that only partners who offer hands on support will bevalued.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 391

Also, the fact that a state can have multiple identities has to be accepted, its
security option being non-exclusive; for example a state can be a NATO andEU member state and still have a good relationship with Russia. Romanian speakers paid special attention to the importance of the BlackSea Region and leading the republic of Moldova on the road to EuroAtlantic integration, reiterating their support for Georgia and Ukraine intheir effort to join the Alliance. Iulian Chifu, director of the Centre forConflict Prevention and Early Warning underlined the fact that NATOexpansion must continue, by applying the “open doors” policy, so oftenpresent in declarations. As for the republic of Moldova, it has to undergo atrue democratization process and a consistent reform of the security sectoras well as a substantial growth in terms of political stability. The conclusions reached during Friday’s debate, as well as previousreunions will be forwarded to the group of experts led by MadeleineAlbright, thus illustrating Bucharest’s views regarding an active parti-cipation in defining NATO’s New Strategic Concept by consultations withallies and partners and by promoting its own priorities. 392 Iulian CHIFU

Report of the debates
On the 23thOctober 2009, Romanian National Defense College and
Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Centre with the help of NATO PDDorganized the Conference “Regional perspectives on NATO’s New
Strategic Concept“ at the Parliament Palace. The conference lasted between
09.00 and 19.00.
The dynamics of the political-military international scene, the permanent
improvement of the tactics used by terrorist organizations and insurgentgroups and the security and economic interests of the Alliance memberstates demand that NATO should adopt a more flexible and feasible policy,both at political-strategic level and operational-tactical one.
By using suggested topics as a baseline for discussions, the following ideas
have been expressed:
Jamie Shea , Secretary of the Expert Committee, NATO HQ
NATO is in a phase of reflection. Now is the moment when acomprehensive image on NATO’s place and especially on what it has to doin the future is focused. A Romanian perspective on what it could be done isimportant. NATO is not able to wait as long as EU does. NATO’s option isfor action, it likes to act in each crisis accordingly; and it progresses basedon the lessons learned.There are several directions toward a “new strategy “:Despite the fact NATO has done important things in Afghanistan it has toreview what it can be done in order to enlarge the aria of action.The efforts may be concentrated on a collective way of action. NATO isexpecting bad things to happen. That is why anticipation and preventionare very expensive. The international environment must be regulated in thesame manner the finance are, UN has acted very much for establishing thegeneral image of the international environment.NATO must be transparent and open to the large public. This is the onlyway it can get public opinion’s support.The resources and capabilities must be brought in the front lineThe priorities must be established. NATO is skilled in adding some thingson the list without eliminating the less useful ones.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 393

NATO must become the main actor in action in the field of security. From
this point the confidence in NATO’s capacity could be restored. That is whya new strategy is needed. It is essential for NATO to become operable in thedistant areas where conflicts emerged.The allies must be re-assured that NATO is viable and any doubts they mayhave must be eliminated. NATO must be able to act out of area withexpeditionary forces.The Article 5 type actions must be re-discussed in the light of the memberstate’s proposals. The problem of re-assurance is a political, not a militaryone. Also the NATO-Russia position must be re-debated. NATO will not tryto transform Russia’s policy. NATO will act keeping the promises toGeorgia and Ukraine. As it concerns the NATO -Russia relations aconsensus must be reached within a ratio between agreement anddisagreement of about 90% to 10%.
We have not to think Afghanistan is a “product too far away for NATO“. Onthe contrary, we have to concentrate more on resources for this zone.Afghanistan has offered a series of lessons very well learned andunderstood by NATO specialists.
The capabilities must be improved. From statistic viewpoint only 18 of 28allies meet the defense expenses requirement of 2% of GDP.Until now NATO was concentrated more on operations, but it must be alsoconcentrated on some other problems, such as security of the environment,etc.The member countries are encouraged to bring new resources to NATO.EU and NATO doctrine must act complementarily but NATO must remainthe leader. NATO should be able to use EU capabilities because EU hasbigger military spending, but NATO remains the leader because NATO’srole is to be a leader in the field of security.NATO was concerned too much about Afghanistan and too little about theBalkans (too much talk and too little action). NATO’s activities regarding the enlargement were slowed, but this will notstop enlargement.
There are other threats whose resolution involves other countries that do not
contribute with troops in Afghanistan. NATO should take the mostprofitable advantage from the relation with each member. TheMediterranean area is an area with many possibilities where strategicopportunities will be also studied.394 Iulian CHIFU

Teodor Meleșcanu , Vice-president Romanian Senate, President of the
Defense, Public Order and National Security Committee
The present conference is an opportunity for Romania to offer information
and use the one being offered by teams of foreign specialists.
I admit Mr. Biden’s contribution regarding the serious manner NATO
approaches the problem of Russia and of South-East European states’security. The possibility Russia will become a NATO ally (member) is notexcluded. Even if we consider the problem of the anti-missile shield; wewill always respect the values of the neighbour states. Russia’s capabilitiesin case of anti-terrorist fight must be taken into consideration.
Daniel Korski , European Council of Foreign Relations, UK
There are two aspects to be taken into account:
– Counter-insurgency; – “New cold warriors“The states should define their priorities directly, not hiding them any morebehind debates on security. Because of the crisis the needed capabilities forAlliance cannot be provided. There are several small alliances acting underNATO’s umbrella. NATO must concentrate on operations in border areas.EU has many more soldiers, but they cannot be deployed abroad. Also EUspends more money “on defense”Russian President stated that in certain areas he can cooperate with NATO(for example the piracy) but referring to enlargement Russia has askedwhere it should stop.Article 5 types of problems, risks and threats should be discussed in NATOforum and this does not mean that NATO will become the global expert no. 1.NATO should be engaged in any type of missions, to develop capabilities,to lead and to be led to be involved and to cooperate with otherorganizations.NATO must become the main object of reform in the field of security. Thisimplies not the reform of the armed forces in each member country at once,but only by reforms NATO can be more operational, more effective out ofarea and in other domains.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 395

I think NATO must not be involved in all missions. There are other
organizations more efficient in solving certain kinds of missions.Even NATO desires its own progress, without a sound financial supportthere is nothing it can do. Consequently the problem of resources remainsthe essential one for any transformation process.NATO should be feared inside and should be understood outside.
Mihaela Matei , Advisor of the Director, Romanian Intelligence Services
NATO does not respond to the new risks. Article 5 is not a universal anddoes not comprise all types of missions. Article 4 is very important as itspecifies the help that could be given in certain emergency cases.NATO should have intense consultations and discussions with otherorganizations. NATO leaders do not pay the needed attention to thisproblem.The troops engaged in operations must be trained for any kind of mission.Intelligence is taken into consideration only in its military significance, butnot as a component as such of the NATO reform. There are moreapproaches determined by the mission in Afghanistan. There must not beany decisions generated by the missions, i.e. taken on the route.
Oazu Nantoi , MP, Foreign Affairs Committee, Republic of Moldova
Even if NATO’s neutrality regarding certain problems in Republic ofMoldavia has been declared, the problems themselves still exist.Speaking about the many problems in cooperating with NATO, the most ofthem are determined by the relation with Russia. Decisions taken byV oronin’s Government could affect the relations NATO – Republic ofMoldavia. Now Republic of Moldova is in the process of changing itsdecision-making power.
Col. Gheorghe Tibil
It is difficult to approach Article 5 type missions as long as this article haslost its credibility.The last events in Georgia have shown that sometime NATO’s interest cangenerate chain reactions.
The need to co-relate the national defense problems and the new threatsresults from the need for adaptation to the new international environment396 Iulian CHIFU

and to the new threats which are not all of them of military nature. A new
comprehensive approach of the new risks in the field of security must betaken into consideration.
Sergiu Medar , Former National Security Advisor, Romania
The most important thing is that NATO is a powerful organization. After theRiga Summit NATO assumed new missions so that NATO’s transformationhas to touch new domains. In NATO missions must be involved all intel-ligence services belonging to all countries because the risks and threats areextremely various.“Sharing capabilities“ is another aspect to be taken into account by allNATO members. NATO is underused. It should be involved in securitysector transformation, but this is a civil problem.I think NATO and EU should make a private partnership in security sector;otherwise mistakes can be made (Iraq)“Critical Strategic Infrastructure” protection is very important.
H.E. David Smith , US Ambassador to Georgia
It is nice to see how Romania pays attention to the Black Sea andsurrounding countries. NATO must be forced to address also the intellectual part of thetransformation. The new concept does not involve the destruction of the oldconcept. The 1999 concept must be the basis for the new one it must be thevector which solves the old disputes.Georgia is a democratic state in spite of others’ declaration and this bothersRussia. The Russian attack was intensely and lengthly discussed. GeorgianPresident has been forced to attack first. NATO will address other risks and threats. NATO must understand it is themain actor and it must remain as such. NATO enlargement must reach otherallies such as Georgia. NATO, in fact, is suffering from a lack of Public Relations because peopledo not understand what is with that 2% of GDP.
Zoran Vujic , Assistant of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, chief of the
General Directorate for NATO and Defense Policies, Serbia
Serbia defends and agrees with the independence of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which is in the interest of the Alliance and the EU.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 397

Fatima Lahnait , Mediterranean Dialogue senior Fellow, Morocco
Today, more than 50% of the activities within Mediterranean Dialogue areof military nature. It must be taken into account that the EU has becomedependent on Mediterranean countries from an economic (transportation),oil (gas), export and import (by sea) and shipping view points.Arabian suspicions regarding NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue have ledto tensions in the area. The New Security Concept must be clearly definedby NATO.Georgi KandelakiRussia aims at increasing the tendency to make the neighbouring countrieseconomically / energetically dependent on it.The key role of the New Strategic Concept should be the relation withRussia. Russia must be determined to understand and reconsider its standon former Soviet countries.
Kristag Birbo
Terrorism is the main threat
Hari Bucur (DCAF)
NATO has never discussed the issue of reserve forces but only that of theactive forces. If officials would consider the reserve forces then appropriateNATO military background can be ensured.
Otto Laido , Estonia, MFA
Estonia does not want to make a list of threats and risks against whichNATO can operate under Article 5.It must be clarified if the Article 5 is still valid or not. It can be invoked, butwe must discuss if it is good to do so or not.398 Iulian CHIFU

Media Report
On 23rdOctober the Palace of the Parliament hosted a Conference focused
on: NATO and the new strategic concept, managing challenges andopportunities in NATO’s wider neighbourhood, partnership network asinvestment in trans-atlantic and international security, the relevance ofNATO’s critical neighbourhood: the Balkans and the wider Black Searegion; balancing NATO’s focus between collective/territorial defense andthe need to be effective at strategic distance; new threats: Energy Security,Cyber Defense, Critical Infrastructure Protection. The activity was the lastpart of the project “NATO and the new strategic concept. Romania’spriorities”, organized by the Center for Conflict Prevention and EarlyWarning in partnership with the National Defense College, with the supportof NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Black Sea Trust of the GMF and theEast-East program of the Soros Foundation.
On the 21
stOctober, the Conference was announced on the site of the
Ministry of Defense in a press release:(http://www.mapn.ro/cpresa/13202_Conferinta-finala-pe-tema-noului-concept-strategic-al-NATO) .A special talk-show was dedicated on Monday,
19
thOctober at 21 hours on the public national television, TVR1, with the
participation of Iulian Chifu, director of the CPCEW and Cornel Codițã,Director of programs at the CPCEW. It lasted for one hour and hosted adebate on NATO’s new strategic concept.On the 21
stand 22ndof October the conference was advertised on the
national radio Radio Romania Actualitati, on 21stof October at 18.10 (for
20 minutes) and on 22ndof October at 21 hours, with live interviews of
Mr. Iulian Chifu. The same broadcast appeared on Realitatea FM on the22
ndof October. Also, on the 21stof October, it was advertised on B1
TV(for half an hour), beginning with 16 hours, and on the 22ndat 16 hours
on the news TV channel Antena 3 and at 19 hours on the news TV channelRealitatea TV . Mr. Iulian Chifu, Director of the CPCEW, was present in all previous radioand TV broadcasts.During the day of the Conference took place, it appeared in articles on thevarious news agencies, televisions stations, such as: NewsinNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 399

(http://www.newsin.ro/ministerul-apararii),
Tvr 1 (http://www.tvr.ro/jurnal.php?play=41203), a short movie was madeavailable on Armata TV: (http://www.mapn.ro/armatatv) and a photo galleryon the site of the Ministry of Defense(http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20091023). In that very evening, on nationalTV , Mircea Mîndrescu, director of the National Defense College gave aninterview.The day after the conference the journalists published articles in thefollowing newspapers: Ziua (http://www.ziua.ro/display.php?data=2009-10-24&id=260720), FINANCIARUL(http://www
.financiarul.ro/2009/10/24/romania-and-nato-new-strategic-
concept/ ) and on Moldavia’s radio, V ocea Basarabiei, in the news and on
the show “Mai aproape de Europa”: (http://voceabasarabiei.net/index.php/stiri/politica/5263-audio-d-dungaciu-j-shea-cr-diaconescu-i-chifu-o-nantoi-t-busuncian-v-spanu-g-scarlat-la-mai-aproape-de-europa), (http://voceabasarabiei.net/index.php/mai-aproape-de-europa-cu-stela-popa/5248-audiomai-aproape-de-europa–cu-stela-popa-24-octombrie-2009).During the following days the Conference was mentioned in other articles,such as: a Romanian military magazine, Observatorul Militar ( 28.10-3.11.2009)(http://www
.presamil.ro/OM/2009/42/Ziar%2042%20site.pdf ),
the site of the NATO in the Republic of Moldova(http://www.nato.md/content/view/1175/1/lang,en/) and the news agencyActMedia(http://www.actmedia.eu/top+story/romania+and+nato+new+strategic+concept+/23735).A show with the full coverage of the event, including some 14 interviews ofthe participants has been filmed during the conference by the NationalTelevision TVR1 for the debate show “From East to West”, which isspecialized in the debate of international themes and is aired every Saturdaystarting at 1 P.M. The full show will be aired after the presidential elections,but images and comments will be made available by TVR1 until then. Forthe images and video, an upload was made by the MFA on their web site,and another one by the national TV . Contacts will be sent to the NATOPDD.400 Iulian CHIFU

NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 401
Name Institution
Chifu Iulian CPCEW
Mîndrescu Mircea Romanian National Defense College
Bãsescu Traian President of Romania
Shea Jamie Expert Committee NATO
Codițã Cornel CPCEW
Fota Iulian National Security Advisor of the President
Korski Daniel European Council of Foreign Relations
Medar Sergiu Former National Security Advisor
Meleșcanu Teodor Vice-president of the Romanian Senate
Nantoi Oazu Foreign Affairs Committee, Republic of
Moldova
Aurescu Bogdan State Secretary, Romanian MFA
Tibil Gheorghe, Col. Defense Policy Directorate
Klimpush Ivanna Open Ukraine
Matei Mihaela Romanian Intelligence Services
Predoiu Cãtãlin Minister of Foreign Affaires
Smith David, Amb. USA-Georgia
Diaconescu Cristian Former Minister of Foreign Affaires
Smolar Eugeniusz Center for International Relations PolandVujic Zoran Chief of the General Directorate for NATO
and Defense Policies, Serbia
Cotoarcã Nicolae International Defense Cooperation
Alecsandru, Gen. brig
Mazuru Bogdan Secretary of State, Romanian MFALahnait Fatima Mediterranean Dialogue senior Fellow,
MoroccoLIST OF THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE CONFERENCE
Palace of the Parliament, Constantin Stere Hall

402 Iulian CHIFU
Secãreș Vasile President, NATO Studies Center, Bucharest
E.S. Dl. Ljupco Ambassador of Macedonia in Bucharest
Arsovski
Geoanã Mircea President, Romanian Senate
Kokoshinski Oleg Euroatlantic Committee Ukraine
Rãdoi Mireille National Defense CollegeSeamon John Former US military advisor of the US
to NATO
Oprea ătefan, Gen. Romanian General Staff
Nicuț, Gen. Romanian General Staff
Antonescu Crin Senate, PNL
Pangrac Martin MFA – NATO Department Slovakia
Oancea Viorel State Secretary, MoND
Tinca ătefan Romanian MFA
Nelson Daniel Johns Hopkins University, US
Marcu Hari Bucur DCAFAzimov Araz Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Azerbaijan
Constantin Milea Cyber Intelligence Center, Romanian
Intelligence Service
Kandelaki Giorgi Embassy of Georgia
Birbo Ktistaq Albania
Laido Ott MAE Estonia
Dragomir Radu UTIIonițã Daniel Director, Security for Security Policies,
Romanian MFA
Bosuncian Tatiana Pro Marshall Association,
Republic of Moldova
Mshvidobadze Khatuna Senior associate of Georgian Security
Analysis Centre
Kolomiyets Oleksiy Centre for European and Transatlantic
Studies, Ukraine

NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 403
Lungu ăerban General Military Staff
ăerban Alex Vice-president, ATA
Samoilã Mirela Ancuta CPCEW
Stamate Ana Maria CPCEW
Ursu Roxana CPCEW
Oproiu Monica CPCEW
Abdisa Seila CPCEW
Bãlãșoiu Narciz CPCEW
Arghir Radu CPCEW
Romer Walter CPCEW
Radu Gabriela CPCEW
Tarban Carmen CPCEW
Nedea Bogdan CPCEW
Sauliuc Adriana CPCEW
Pordea Alina CPCEW
Mitea (Marin) Florentina CPCEW
Secarã Sorina CPCEW
Platon Andreea CPCEW
ES Dashnor Dervishi Embassy of Albania
ES Leo D’Aes Embassy of Belgium
ES Valentin Radomirski Embassy of Bulgaria
ES Philippe Beaulne Embassy of Canada
ES Ivica Mastruko Embassy of Croatia
ES Petr Dokladal Embassy of the Czech Republic
ES Ulrik Helweg-Larsen Embassy of Denmark
ES Henri Paul Embassy of France
ES Andreas von Mettenheim Embassy of Germany
ES Georgios Poukamissas Embassy of Greece
ES Oszkar Laszlo Fuzes Embassy of Hungary
ES Mario Cospito Embassy of Italia
ES Vladimir Jarmolenko Embassy of Lithuania

404 Iulian CHIFU
ES Maria W.J. van Gool Embassy of Holland
ES Oystein Hovdkinn Embassy of Norway
ES Wojciech Zajaczkowski Embassy of Poland
ES Alexandre Vassalo Embassy of Portugal
ES Dagmar Repcekova Embassy of Slovakia
Elkhan Mehdiev Embassy of Georgia
ES Estanislao de Embassy of Spain
Grandes Pascual
ES Ayse Sinirlioglu Embassy of Turkey
ES Robin Barnett Embassy of Great Britain
ES Mark Gitenstein Embassy of SUA
Nikolai Nikolov Embassy of Bulgaria
Valentin Incev Embassy of Bulgaria
Jose de Pierpont Embassy of Belgium
Pauel Kobliska Embassy of Czech Republic
ES Dusan Crnogorcevici Embassy of Serbia
H.D. Gorgionici Embassy of Serbia
Arsovski Ljupco Embassy of Macedonia
Gurez Lilia InfoTAG
Posastiuc Cristina Open Source Center Bucharest
Iancu Cristian Open Source Center Bucharest
Cunningham Mark BST
Barabas Janos Embassy of Hungary
Harnagea Catalin Institutul pentru Libera Inițiativã
Brand-Jacobsen Denisa UNDP
Bouaru Sorin Senate
Ungureanu Adriana Special Telecommunications Service
Petrescu Ion MoND
Latea Cristi Daniel Romanian Presidency
Talpan Florin Costel MoNDătefan Laurențiu Embassy of SUA

NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 405
Epure Cãtãlin Shark Computers
Balica Bogdan Shark Computers
Moser Stefanie Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Nahoi Ovidiu Foreign Policy
Ilinoiu Anca Romanian Presidency
V oinea Georgeta Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Onișoru Gheorghe Spiru Haret University
Munteanu Cristian Irinel MAE
Repciuc Teodor MoND
Szechely Mihaela Government
Antonescu Mãdãlina Virginia MFA
Sãraru Ruxandra Radio Romania
Gombos Cãtãlin Radio Romania
Ciobanu-Dordea Aurel Government
Olaru Stejarel Government
Marincuș Ligia Embassy of Canada
Popescu Oana Cotidianul
Arsene Georgiana New York Magazine
Tarus Adriana NewsIn
Pãvãluca Luana NewsIn
Chelu Cãtãlina NewsIn
Captaru Vasile Radio Romania International
Guzun Eugenia Radio Romania
Stângaciu Laurențiu Radio Romania
Ciubotaru Rãzvan Cotidianul
Dragomir Gheorghe Romania in Lume Association
Micu Nicolae Eurisc
Roșioru Antuanela Prompt Media
Olteanu Karina Agerpres
V oica Sorina Laurenția Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Câmpeanu Cristian Romania Libera

406 Iulian CHIFU
Turculeț Diana RAO
Nițoi Ana Maria The Diplomat
Rãdulescu Bogdan Radio Romania Actualitati
Dincovici Nadia 9 o’clock
Lungescu Oana BBC World Service
Opriș Adrian Media NT
Singer Alexandru Hasefer
Rpdulescu Adelina NewsIn
Ivan Ionel Romanian Parliament
Obiziuc Stelian MFA
Cãmãrașan Cplin MFA
Zulean Marian Romanian Presidency
Moldovan Ovidiu Daniel Government
Ghișã Alexandru MFA
Blaj Mihai MFA
Cãlin Emanoil Ioan MoND
Bãrbieru Alexandru Government
Platona Pavel UNPR
Paturca Roxana MFA
Grãdinaru Beatrice Government
Intotero Natalia Elena MAE
Manolache Felicia Ministry of Finance
Popescu Alexandru Embassy of Republic of Moldova
Iancu Nicolae SRI
Andronic Cãtãlin MoND
Pavel Daniel Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Donea ătefan European Commission
Gorita Ion Ambassador
Puhace Ioan MAI
Stanciu Mihaela
Arhire Stela

NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 407
Lazãr Gilda JTI
Ficcarelli Giorgio European Commission
Cibotaru Viorel IESP
Pop Adrian SNSPA
Spiroiu Nicolae Eurisc
Spãtaru Andi MAI
Mureșan Liviu Eurisc
Simons Onno European Commission
Tudose Cornel University of Bucharest
Popescu Daniel Union International Center
Celac Sergiu NCSD
Munteanu Cristian University of Bucharest
Nedelea Cerasela University of Bucharest
Jose de Pierpont Secretary II Embassy of Bulgaria
Nikolov Nikolai Attaché Embassy of Bulgaria
Incev Valentin Advisor Embassy of Bulgaria
Covacs Atilo Secretary Embassy of Hungary
Stanciu Ruxandra MAE
Puscion Ewa Secretary I Embassy of Poland
Salameh Nawaf Alexandrion
Christoforidis George Alexandrion
Bãrbãtosu Mihaela University of Bucharest
Taraban Dragoș TVR
Lukacs Claudiu TVR
Ghiurco Monica TVR
Radu Motoc Program Director SOROS
Sergiu Panainte Program Coordinator SOROS
Matei Mihaela SRI
Milea Constantin SRI
Nițoi Mihai Costin SRI
Druga Florin SRI

408 Iulian CHIFU
Chirieac Bogdan TVR
Ghițã Virginia TVR
Milescu Dragos TVR
Ivãnescu Amilcar TVR
Cioabã Radu TVR
Chelaru Ioan TVR
Crețu Mihai TVR
3 November 2009 Director CPCEW
Iulian Chifu

First Workshop Report
Romania’s Priorities and NATO’s Strategic Concept
Casa Titulescu, 21stSeptember, NGO Debate
Director of Workshop: Iulian Chifu
Euro-Atlantic Council Romania facilities.Casa Titulescu, 40 participants
Romania’s priorities for NATO’s Strategic Concept
– NATO as a security provider in the 21
stcentury: facing the new threats,
missile defense, energy security and cyber security;
– Managing challenges and opportunities in the extended vicinity of the
Alliance. The role of the partnership network as an investment in thetrans-Atlantic and international security; the Balkans and the Black Sea-Caspian Sea regions;
– Balancing the colective-territorial defense, operations in the vicinity and
the need for actions at a strategic distance, rethinking the territorialdefense after the era of operations out of area.
Program
14.00-16.00 Agenda presentation:• Iulian Chifu, CPCEW – introductory remarks• Iulian Fota, National Security Adviser of the President – welcome
address
• Liviu Mureșan, Euro-Atlantic Council Romania – agenda of the debates
Debate
16.00-16.30 Coffee Break
16.30-18.30 Presentations and ideas• Alex ăerban, vice-president Atlantic Treaty Association• Iulian Chifu CPCEW – methodology of the study and steps for the
policy paper
Debate
19.00 Working dinner for the participants. Debates.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 409

Debate report
The debate “ Romania’ s priorities and the NATO Strategic Concept ”
represents a first step in a series of events with the purpose of definingRomania’s position inside NATO, and to bring a contribution, through theresults of debates held by a group of experts, to establishing a NewStrategic Concept of the North Atlantic Alliance.The Strategic Concept represents the second most important document afterthe Washington Treaty because it guides the activities of the Allianceregarding the goals and threats, so it needs to benefit of a wider debate.The Strategic Concept is seen as one with substance, in which balanceshould be the defining element. The clarification of the relations withRussia and a precise determination of the place and role of the new NATO –Russia partnership will have consequences on the EU – Russia relation, etc.The New Strategic Concept must find a solution for the situation in whichthe relations between the NATO member states can slow EU integration,such as the case of Turkey and Cyprus, and can have repercussions for theAlliance.The New Strategic Concept has to clarify the future relations with Russia,Even though Russia seems to be in a relative decline (negative demographictrend and low technological performance, problems with keeping inRussia’s sphere of influence states with historic bonds). The quality of thepartnership with Russia can represent a contribution to Europe’s stabilityand security, including energy security.Article 5 represents a key problem and must be analyzed according to thenew international context, one dominated by the world economic crisis,with costs for the Alliance and its member states.The new international context encourages the implementation of a newStrategic Concept: changes at the White House and in the US newadministration; the need for a dialogue with the states that challenge therules of the Alliance (Russia) and with the ones with growing influence(China); putting in question the Western influence in the states placedgeographically between NATO’s borders and Russia’s; the relation with theMuslim world; Iranian case etc.From the perspective of the interdependence between the major actors, US-Russia and US-NATO relations await for the new decisions of the USadministration. In the NATO-UE relation it is expected a mutual evaluation410 Iulian CHIFU

in order to determine the compatibility of approaches, and regarding the
NATO-Russia-EU triangle they expect the answers at Russia’s requests andthe relevance of NATO’s proposal for Russia.NATO is considered an expression of the Western security, a body whichfeels the need to cooperate and form new partnerships with the otherinternational players, an organization who needs a common political viewabout the future roles of the major actors .
There is the issue of avoiding a local/regional NATO, focused on Europe,on parts of it or of the Alliance, and of a global NATO, focused on themajor emerging powers. It is recalled the fact that a growth in domesticinstability can have an impact over the regional security as it is the case forCentral Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.In what concerns the partnerships, it is important the way in which theAlliance will conceive its relations with the partners, including thegovernmental organizations, as well as non-governmental and local actors. The participants underlined the need for EU-NATO cooperation, drawingattention over the fact that states with problems, such as Romania, canrepresent “the weak link” of EU’s and even NATO’s (political instability,corruption, lack of economical performance, incoherence in foreign policy).From the same perspective, the weak performance of the Romania-EUrelations can face the possibility of losing the representation in the EU andNATO.Regarding the Romania-Russia relations, Russia can become a partner ifthere are signs that could indicate a change of its attitude.In the Romania-NATO relation, Article 5 has a great importance, especiallyafter the August 2008 experience with Georgia. There were suggestions tokeep the present content of the Concept and final summit declarations, aswell as the flexibility through the development of the idea of defense, cyberdefense and protection of critical infrastructure. As far as the Afghanistan issue is concerned, the attention falls on the needof a common military perspective, as well as of a civilian approach.Afghanistan must be engaged in a regional context, using an integratedstrategy, which combines security, government, rule of law and economicdevelopment, at the same time with the development of this country’scapability to assume responsibility for its own destiny.The New Strategic Concept should take into consideration, first of all theneed to provide security for civilians, not only for states ( the 9/11
th,NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 411

Madrid, London cases), as well as the challenge of finding the proper
formula for a dialogue with the Muslim world, without neglecting the newsecurity problems such as the one in the space area. As an invitation to future debates, here are a series of questions to which theNew Strategic Concept should come with an answer:
– What kind of security environment will be in 2030?– How relevant will be the present NATO after two decades?– How relevant will be the present EU after two decades?– From a transatlantic NATO to a global NATO?– From a post Cold War NATO to a NATO as an answer to global
warming?
– Which are Romania’s expectations towards NATO in the next two
decades?
– Which are NATO’s expectations from Romania in the next two decades?– Which is the definition of the Strategic Concept for Romania in the next
10–20 years, taking into consideration that security becomes a more andmore complex issue?
– Which are the possible threats for Romania? Natural disasters?
Demography? Etc.
The consequences of canceling the anti missile shield and its implications
on the Black Sea security were also topics in the debate.
Ideas and statements
Iulian Fota
– The strategic concept lays down NATO’s direction and offers
information about threats and risks that require solving. We need astrategic concept that does not avoid existing realities. A new strategicconcept is a prerequisite for a new international context. Some expertsclaim that, with Russia’s attack on Georgia and the economic crisis, anew stage has emerged, shifts have occurred in the international system.Still, Russia is not of the same opinion. If in the past terrorism tookprecedence over other threats outlined in the strategic concept,nowadays, it ranks second, if not third.412 Iulian CHIFU

– Romania is uncomfortable with the notion of West, is unable to regard
itself as part of the West, even though after the EU accession it is part ofit. Even when Russia makes references, it talks about Europe andRomania. NATO is the expression of the Western World’s need forsecurity. In Foreign Affairs, Brzezinski raises the question of whetherNATO will be the organization that the West needs.
– It remains still unclear how the new US administration regards
international relations, new developments in the Iranian dossier and therelation with Russia. The new strategic concept must be defined by theUS in accordance with NATO’s agenda. Article 5 should provide adefinition of the role NATO should assume in Western Europe. But inorder to shed some light on the realities of the international arena, wemust compel Russia to disclose its own game.
– One of the measures that ought to stand at the core of the new strategic
concept is related to the reconfirmation of Article 5. Realisticallyspeaking, the issue of balance is very important, collective defense, thebalance between common threats and European threats, the balancebetween geographical regions (why the states surrounding the AdriaticSea are granted more importance than the ones around the Black Sea).
– Relations within the Alliance are just as significant for its strategic
concept. For instance, NATO’s relation with Germany has raised manyquestions, but, even more unexpected was France’s decision to return toNATO military structures.
– There are two divergent opinions when Europeans try finding a
workable European formula in terms of security. The European Rightregards Russia as an important state while the European Left considersthey should maintain relations with the US without spoiling the relationwith Russia. To conclude, Russia’s role is not yet clarified as there is nounitary view, which is also caused by a not so hopeful prediction aboutRussia’s future considering the demographic and economic plunge andabsence of a soft policy towards the states within its sphere of influence.The US accepts some of Russia’s claims, but, when the latter asks fortoo much, the US opposes. The West’s stand is to accept a prospectiveRussian accession to NATO, since that would solve security mattersbetween the two and generate a higher degree of overall security. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 413

– As far as the relation between Romania and Russia is concerned, it has
become clear that Romania should adopt a tougher stand towards Russiawhich would ensure a stronger partnership between the two than aflexible stand would.
Liviu Mureșanu
NATO in the context of change
Opinions from Karsten V oigtTopics on which NATO must adapt to the transformation of theinternational scene:– cooperation– vision over a common course of action– new partnerships– global power (USA) vs. global value/ aspiration/ideal (EU) – EU-NATO cooperation– partnership with Russia– common perspectives in Afghanistan– strategic consensus– human security– relationship with the Muslim world– new types of war– domestic instability– The partnership with Russia, cooperation with Russia enhances the
stability and security for Europe as a whole.
– Human security is NATO’s new priority, a European concept adopted by
NATO in order to go beyond state security towards individual security.
Sergiu Celac
The new strategic concept should be based on:
1. Strengthening the application of Article 5 2. Concern for a contribution on agency’s forum and priorities.3. Energy security. This confronts with infrastructure security idea that
can be solved by the viability of the Energy Charter. Medvedevreconfigured trough the energy policies the global energy strategy.
In what Romania’s energy security is concerned, it would be useful to havebackup plans for the energy sector, including nuclear power.The energy sector is a weak area of the economic, industrial transactions.414 Iulian CHIFU

NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 415
Energy security is an unresolved point between the EU and Russia.
Last week on the Valdai Discussion Club, experts presented a parallelbetween Russian interests and the interests of the United States from theRussian perspective that denote future policy lines of Russia, but also theirstrategic lines.EU is a weak player in terms of energy security, and this pleases Russiabecause it is easier to work, cooperate with separate parts than with thecommon interests of countries. From this presentation it is clear that Russia did not want to make it atactical move, but was an honest opinion, because the EU has not got achance to become stronger.
Iulian Chifu
What does NATO want to become?
An universal toolbox or an alliance that has some objectives and has topursue them? To create the new NATO’ strategic concept we must have aversion of flexibility which contains: – Expansion, and access to the issue of Article 5, and in addition to that
the optional use of it, two months would pass before a validatedreaction.
– The wording of Article 5 plus extending the strategic concept’s
adaptation of cyber defense.
The conflicts between countries that have hampered their integration in theEU as was the case of Turkey and Cyprus could have repercussions inNATO. NATO approach to solving problems by military means, which in factcould be resolved diplomatically.
Ambasador Ecobescu
He offered the counter of the NATO’s weaknesses by setting up a list ofmain points and priorities that must be pursued to reach theirimplementation.
Iulian Fota
Romania’s relationship with Russia is not vital, while the relationship withU.S. is very important. What is the comfort that Romania has as a NATO member?

How would it have been if Romania was not a NATO country?
What is the prospect of Romania in NATO over 15 years? How will Romania follow its interests in the new strategic concept? Romania’s closeness to Russia is not favorable. Most wars have had of thecause of the fight for market reasons. What place is there for any interest formarket monopoly as long as there are no investments with a real strategicinterest? For Russia to keep their current position, it must create as many problemsto be noticed. It is better for us to join the Russians in projects, partnerships,organizations because they bring Europe safety, grace to the lack of tensionsin the relations in this area. NATO has as new priorities – cyber defense and energy security whichrepresent the interest and the need to adopt a new NATO’ strategic concept.NATO talks about common defense, not security. A new re-approach ofNATO’s concept. A defense must be understood not only as militarydefense.
Sergiu Celac
Russia and China want to transform the Shanghai Cooperation Organizationin an Asian NATO, to limit, stop NATO’s power in Asia. It is thereforedesirable for both to have a permanent collaboration. Aurel Preda Europe must decide for itself when it comes to security, and NATO to cometo another level. What follows the new anti-missile system in the relationship between theU.S. and Russia?
Conclusions
There are questions if Turkey and Russia will become NATO members, if
NATO will exist anymore, but what are scenarios for NATO in 2030?
Participants, 21stseptembrie 2009
1. Doru Frunzulicã – President of the “George C. Marshall” Association
Romania
2. Alexandru ăerban – Vice-president ATA /Atlantic Treaty Association416 Iulian CHIFU

3. Gen. (r) Nicolae Spiroiu – Executive Director, Euro-Atlantic Coucil
Romania
4. Sorin Encuțescu – President, “Manfred Worner” Association, founding
member CEAR
5. Rãzvan Ionescu, President, Association for Regional Cooperation and
Security “ALLIANCE”
6. Constantin Dudu Ionescu, President IDEA Foundation7. Lavinia Andrei8. Dorel ăandor9. Radu Tudor10. Sever V oinescu11. Sandra Prolong, President, Synergetica12. Viorel Mircescu, Executive Director, Center for Assistance to non-
Governmental Organisations
13. Radu Filipescu, President Board of Directors, Group for Social
Dialogue
14. Cristian Pârvulescu, President, Pro Democracy Association15. Mircea Toma, Director, Media Monitoring Agency “Cațavencu
Academy”
16. Ioana Avãdani, Executive Director, Center for Independent Journalism17. Ilona Mihaieș, President Foundation for an Open Society18. Alina Inayeh, Director, German Marshall Fund Romania19. Stelian Arion Vice-presidint ARTS20. Mircea Botescu Conf. Dr. University Bucharest21. Iulian Chifu, Director, Center for Conflict Prevention and Early
Warning
22. Septimiu Caceu, Director, Homeland Security Center – EURISC23. Teodor Minodor Chiricã, General Director, AMEC NUCLEAR RO24. Constantin Ciupagea, Director IEM25. Iulian Fota, Presidential Adviser, Presidential Administration26. Dumitru Mihu, Project Director, EURISC Foundation27. Mihai Moia, General Secretary, EURISC Foundation28. Ing. Doina Nițu29. Mihail Orzeata, Senior Research Fellow, EURISC Foundation 30. Dorin Prunariu, President, Romanian Space Agency Council31. Catrinel Reed Tibacu, Researcher, EURISC Foundation32. Teodor Repciuc, Proffesor Univ. Dr. Ecological UniversityNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 417

33. ătefan Roseanu, Senior Partner, Railway Club
34. Adrian Vâlciu Phd, Polytechnic University, Bucharest35. Rãsvan Roceanu, IHEDN Alumni Association36. Gen.(r) Mihaiu Mãrgãrit, Vice-president, Association of the Officers in
Reserves from Romania
37. Ciprian Dediu, EURISC Foundation38. Ambasador Nicolae Ecobescu39. Ambasador Nicolae Micu40. Vasile Cândea, President Academy of Science, Romania41. Ambasador Sergiu Celac, Senior Advisor, National Center for
Sustainable Development
42. Florin Pogonaru, Vice-president Aspen43. Vasile Ciulava44. Ion Nițu45. Radu Dop46. Cãtãlin Andronic418 Iulian CHIFU

Second Workshop Report
Strengthening NATO as a security provider in the 21st
century. Article 5 for the 21stcentury. The need to address
the new threats. A special focus on terrorism, missile defense,
energy security, cyber defense
National Defense College
Bucharest
The workshop at the academic level took place during the period 5-8th
October 2009
The Workshop had 2 parts: in-door debates and a conference
The main speakers have centered their discussions on the following topics:– Main threats and challenges defining NATO’s strategic environment– Contingency planning for the new members;– Applying Article 5: balance between conventional and asymetric threats– Increasing NATO’s role in dealing with cross-border threats and
challenges: terrorism, WMD proliferation, energy security, cybersecurity;
– The role of missile defense;– Sharing security burdens inside NATO while preserving trans-Atlantic
partnership and solidarity;
– Comprehensive approach and sharing security burdens outside NATO,
by working with other organizations (UN, EU, etc.): NATO’s place inthe European and Global Security Architecture.
Indoor debates:
5 October , National Defense College – 100 participants
Presentation: NATO Strategic Concept Agenda 15–16.30
Coffee break
17–19 Open DebateNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 419

Introductory remarks on NATO’ s origins and evolution. Comparative
analysis of the Alliance strategic concepts – Gen. Lt. Prof. Dr. Teodor
Frunzetti
Romania’ s integration process and her current role in NATO – Gen. Prof.
Cornel Codita
The topic addressed in the class regarded both the international context and
the institutional evolution of the Alliance. The successive changes of NATOstrategic concepts were analyzed depending on the features of the variousfactors embedded in each circumstance. Also, the Case of Romaniabenefitted of a particular focus in the debates.
6 October , National Defense College – 100 participants
Presentation: Where NATO goes: regional or global NATO. 15–16.30.
Coffee break. 17–19 Open DebateNATO’ s present operations and missions analysis – Col. Gheorghe Badea,
General Staff Representative
The Transatlantic relations and the relevance of “Berlin Plus” Agreement.
Enlargement trends – Col. Dr. George Tibil – Department of Defense Policy
and Planning Representative
Both main speakers are top level officers of the Romanian Army, with a
solid expertise of the issues they covered. They presented and delivered anin-deepth assessment of the current operations and missions of the Alliance,with a special focus on the Romanian contributions in the field. Therelationship between EU and NATO was largely discussed and generated avivid interest within the public.
7 October , National Defense College – 100 participants
Presentation: New threats: strategic distance, vicinity, at home.
15–16.30. 420 Iulian CHIFU

Coffee break.
17–19 DebateThe significance of the Bucharest (2008) and Strasbourg – Khel Summit
Declarations (2008) – Senior Lecturer PhD. Iulian Chifu, CPC-EW
NATO’ s current challenges and perspectives. The need for new capabilities
– Senior Lecturer PhD. Mireille Rãdoi, National Defense College
The relevance of the two Declarations was analyzed in the light of the New
Strategic Concept. The importance of each member state’s contribution wasanother interesting issue and the option of developing niche capabilitiesinstead of free ridding in the Alliance, in correlation with the new risks andthreats.
Main event:
8 October , National Defense College – 140 participants
CONFERENCE PROGRAME Strengthening NATO as a security provider in the 21
stcentury. Article 5
for the 21stcentury. The need to address the new threats. A special focus
on terrorism, missile defense, energy security, cyber defense
16.00: Arrival of the participants16.10: Welcome speech – col. Mircea MÎNDRESCU, Head of the
National Defense College
16.15: Overview of the NATO Project – Iulian CHIFU, Director of Conflict
Prevention and Early Warning Center
16.20: Opening address by Mr. Dragos GHERCIOIU – Director of
Defense Policy and Planning Department
16.30: NATO PDD official (through VCR) Antonio ORTIZ16.45: Q&A17.00: Senator Theodor MELEăCANU, President of the Defense,
Security and Public Order Commission of the Romanian SenateNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 421

17.15: H E Wojciech ZAJACZKOWSKI Polish Ambassador to
Romania – View from a country with similar challenges
17.45: col. Mircea MÎNDRESCU, Q&A Session18.00: Coffee Break18.10-19.00: Open Debate and Conclusions
On the 8
thof October 2009, the Workshop no. 2 on “Strengthening NATO
as a security provider in the 21stcentury. Article 5 for the 21stcentury. The
need to address the new threats. A special focus on terrorism, missiledefense, energy security, cyber defense” was held at the National DefenseCollege, under the aegis of Romanian National Defense College andConflict Prevention and Early Warning Centre and supervised by the NATOPDD. The workshop took place in the amphitheatre “Gen. Emanoillonescu“, between 16,00 and 19,00 h, with the participation of the followingguests:
1. H E Wojciech ZAJACZKOWSKI, Polish Ambassador to Romania;
2. Senator Theodor MELEăCANU, President Defense, Security and
Public Order Commission of the Romanian Senate;
3. Mr. Gabriel GHERCIOIU, General Director of the Planning and
Defense Policy Directorate, MoD;
4. Iulian CHIFU, Director of Conflict Prevention and Early Warning
Center;
5. Col. Mircea MÎNDRESCU, Head of the National Defense College;6. Mr. Antonio ORTIZ, counselor, Policy Planning Division, NATO PDD;
and other 86 participants from institutions and academic areas involved in
security and defense issues.
Based on the fact that the “New Strategic Concept” should be discussed and
agreed as soon as possible and in order to ensure maximum transparency,each NATO member should address the new strategy within the next year,at a time when the world faces its most challenging security environmentsince the end of the Second World War. The New Strategic Concept is to beadopted at the Lisbon Summit, at the end of 2010.422 Iulian CHIFU

The first working session started with Col. Mircea MÎNDRESCU as
moderator. He gave a welcome speech, introduced all speakers to theaudience and presented the agenda of the day.
Mr Iulian Chifu presented the project, highlighting that this was the second
WG within in, taking place at academic level soon to be followed by othersimilar ones.
All speakers centered their interventions on NATO’s role in the inter-
national and internal security environment, the relations with main actors onthe security stage and the need to address the new challenges.
NATO must be an Alliance that provides both immediate protection against
threats and an instrument to shape the strategic environment in a way that isconducive to the alliance’s interests and values.
Globalization will continue to change the security dynamics in many ways.
Climate change will put key resources like food, water and land underconsiderable stress. The global competition for energy and natural resourceswill re-define the relationship between security and economics. Informationtechnology will make the societies more vulnerable to cyber warfare.Proliferation of WMD technology and know-how raises the specter ofterrorist non-state actors acquiring means of mass destruction. At the sametime, collective defense, NATO’s core function, will and must remain aprecious commodity.
Article 5 remains the core of the Alliance’s purpose. The idea that providing
security outside NATO’s boundaries somehow competes with, or detractsfrom, our responsibilities in this respect is misguided. So we need to lookdeeper into the meaning of collective defense and Allied solidarity in thenew security environment, while the new Strategic Concept should be theopportunity for a broader discussion. Many of these new types ofchallenges (the recurrence of massive cyber attacks, global warming,competition for energy resources, terrorist activity and energy security) willnot trigger a classical military response. But they will require the Allies tosupport each other politically, economically, and perhaps also militarily.The discussions are not about the present, but the future. There is a need tolook at which additional capabilities the alliance will need in order toprotect countries against missile proliferation or threats to our criticalNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 423

424 Iulian CHIFU
energy infrastructure. What may currently look like the preoccupation of
only a few Allies may soon affect all of them. That is why debates about themeaning of collective defense and about Allied solidarity, has become notonly inevitable but also necessary.
A New Strategic Concept must firmly embed the logic of the so-called
Comprehensive Approach. In order to be successful, we must increasinglycoordinate with other civilian actors and other organisations involved insecurity and defense. This type of coordination without a clear frameworkruns up the risk to squander valuable time and resources. The need for astructured cooperation with the UN and the EU on the strategic level and tocoordinate much more closely on the tactical level as well, including withNGOs, is obvious. There is still a substantial gap between the military andthe civilian aspects of crisis management. As a result, risk duplication or,worse, working at cross-purposes may not be unavoidable. A new StrategicConcept should make this point squarely and forcefully: in today’s securityenvironment, NATO is no longer a solo-player. The Alliance works bestwhen it is working with others. It has neither the means nor the ambition totackle each and every challenge on its own.
In the new Strategic Concept it should be made clear that the alliance would
increasingly need to act with global partners, in a global partnership and notas a global policeman.
NATO’s mission of consolidating Europe must continue. The new Strategic
Concept will have to make clear how to put that open door principle intopractice, as Europe’s eastern most countries start knocking at NATO’s door.The Strategic Concept may also have to say something about the conditionsthat have to be met before more countries are admitted in the future.
As long as there is a gap between where countries are and where they want
to be, the unification of Europe will not be complete. This is as relevant forthe EU as it is for NATO.
As a political-military organisation, NATO must become more effective.
And a New Strategic Concept should be crystal clear about this. Given theincreasing demands upon NATO, all its activities must be less process-oriented and more results-oriented. Resources have to better match

priorities; and you cannot reconcile forever improved performance with a
zero-growth budget. NATO nations are soon going to have to increaseNATO’s budget, to match a growing list of responsibilities. Also a defenseplanning system is needed that is more responsive to nations’ needs.
Taking NATO reform seriously means also to look for more synergies with
the European Union. All allied countries have only one set of nationalmilitary forces and national defense budgets. So it is absolutely critical thatall of the capabilities that they are able to generate from this pool of forcesare equally available to both NATO and the EU. If they duplicate, or go offin different directions, both will fail. It is why a new Strategic Conceptshould be about the need for more NATO-EU cooperation and should takeinto account EU’s efforts to update its own European Security Strategy andvice versa. The scope of consultations on the New Strategic Concept mustdeepen and broaden. The challenges today are multi-faceted, interlinkedand can arise from anywhere in the world. NATO cannot be just reactive butproactive as well.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 425

426 Iulian CHIFU
LIST OF INVITED PERSONS
To the Workshop no. 2 organised at Romanian NDC
on 8thOctober, 2009
Rank Surname, Name PLACE OF WORK
Iulian FOTA Presidential Advisor
Georgeta GAVRILÃ General Secretary Ministry of
Defense
Lt.Gen. professor Teodor FRUNZETI Commander (Rector) National
PhD Defense University “Carol I“
Ioana TIMOFTE Dir.adj. DRIPR
Brig.Gen.PhD Floarea ăERBAN Head of Directorate for relations
with Parliament and legal
assistance
Brig.Gen. Dan GHICA-RADU Chief of Staff of Land Forces
Maj.Gen.PhD eng. Gheorghe SAVU General Director of the Directorate
General Information
Brig.Gen.PhD Visarion NEAGOE Chief Joint Operational Command
Maj.Gen. professor Cãtãlin ZISU Chief Joint Logistics
PhD Command
Col.PhD eng. Mihail Head of Internal Audit
CIUPERCEANU
Constantin DEGERATU State CounselorMaj.Gen.(ret.)
Mihail IONESCU Head of IDPSMH
Col.PhD eng. Adrian PÂRLOG Deputy Head of Operations for DIM
Maj.Gen. eng. Marcel OPRIă Director of Special
Telecommunications
Chestor de poliție Petre TOBÃ Inspector General of Police
Headquarters
Brig.Gen. Dan TUCAN GOVERNMENT OF ROMANIA
Col.assoc. prof. PhD Gheorghe Teodoru ANI
ăTEFAN
Brig.Gen.professor Toma GHEORGHE ANI
PhD
Gl.professor PhD Eugen BÃDÃLAN

NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 427
Maj.Gen. PhD Olimpiodor First Deputy Inspector General and
ANTONESCU Chief of Staff of the Romanian
Gendarmerie
Gl.(ret) Professor PhD Ion ANDREESCU
Chestor Professor PhD Costicã VOICU Police Academy “A.I.Cuza”Gl.(ret)
Professor PhD Mircea MUREăAN NDU
Costicã ȚENU NDU
Constantin NDU
MOăTOFLEI
Professor PhD Augustin FUEREA
Professor PhD Vasile CÂNDEA President of the Association of
Scientists
Sergiu MEDAR
Brig. Gen. (ret) Cornel CODIȚÃ NSAPS
Professor PhD
Vasile SECÃREă
Laurențiu ăTEFAN U.S. Embassy
Harry BUCUR
Col. Professor PhD Adrian FULEA University of BucharestProfessor
PhD
Adrian POP SNSPA
Col. NICOLAESCU Ioan Ministry of Defense, Military
Technical Academy
LTC ALMÃJAN Marian Ministry of Defense, National
Military Command Center, General
Staff
Cms. Pol. CRISTESCU Vladimir MINISTRY OF ADMINISTRATION
AND INTERIOR
Capt. PARASCHIV Guard and Protection Service
Marin
Insp. Pol. DAJBOG Monica MINISTRY OF ADMINISTRATION
AND INTERIOR
Subinsp. Pol. BUCUR Oana MINISTRY OF ADMINISTRATION
AND INTERIOR
Subinsp. Pol. ȚENE Rodica MINISTRY OF ADMINISTRATION
AND INTERIOR
P.C.C. ANCUȚ Mariana MApN, SMFT

428 Iulian CHIFU
BALANISCU RoNDC Student
Bogdan Radu
BOBARU Dan RoNDC Student
BURLEA ătefan RoNDC Student
CATANA Aida RoNDC Student
CHIȚESCU Bogdan RoNDC Student
CIORIIA Emil RoNDC Student
CIUPERCEANU Radu RoNDC Student
COMAN Dragoș RoNDC Student
CONSTANTIN Eugen RoNDC Student
CONSTANTIN Nicolae RoNDC Student
CORJAN Diana RoNDC Student
DIACONU Dumitru RoNDC Student
DRAGOMIR Gigi RoNDC Student
DRÃGUăIN Eduard RoNDC Student
DUMINICÃ Laurențiu RoNDC Student
DUMITREAN Crinuța RoNDC Student
DUMITRESCU RoNDC Student
Marilena
DUNA Adriana RoNDC Student
DUNCA Marius RoNDC Student
ENE-GAVRILÃ Elena RoNDC Student
EPURE Emilian RoNDC Student
GASPAR Istvan RoNDC Student
GEONEA Mihail RoNDC Student
GEORGESCU Adriana RoNDC Student
GHERGHINA RoNDC Student
Alexandru
GHERLAN Emilia RoNDC Student
GIANCOLA Marilena RoNDC Student
GRIGORESCU Andrei RoNDC Student
GUIDEA Andreea RoNDC Student
HACH Bogdan RoNDC Student
HELESTEANU Raluca RoNDC Student
IONIȚÃ Anca RoNDC Student

NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 429
IONIȚÃ Roxana RoNDC Student
ISTRATE Daniel RoNDC Student
JANTEA Ana Maria RoNDC Student
KALAPIS Frantz RoNDC Student
LASCU Gabriel RoNDC Student
LEAHU Gabriel RoNDC Student
LEăE Mihaela RoNDC Student
MALICIUC Ioan RoNDC Student
MÂNDRUȚ Oana RoNDC Student
MARIN Mihai Bogdan RoNDC Student
MATEESCU Ioana RoNDC Student
MURÃRESCU Bogdan RoNDC Student
NEDEA Camelia RoNDC Student
NEGRESCU Ionuț RoNDC Student
NICOLAE Andrei RoNDC Student
NOVAK Levante RoNDC Student
OVEJANU Ionuț RoNDC Student
PALEA Valentin RoNDC Student
PERDUM Ioan RoNDC Student
PERăA Alexandru RoNDC Student
PETRE Bogdan RoNDC Student
PLEăCAN Cosmin RoNDC Student
POPA Daniel RoNDC Student
POPA Flavius RoNDC Student
POPA Iulian RoNDC Student
POPESCU Camelia RoNDC Student
Johanna
PREDA Dragoș RoNDC Student
PREDOI Mãdãlina RoNDC Student
RADU Claudia RoNDC Student
RÃDUȚ Dragoș RoNDC Student
RUSU Mihaela RoNDC Student
SABIE Viorica RoNDC Student
SAFTA Andreea RoNDC Student
SAVA-GÃINÃ Adrian RoNDC Student

430 Iulian CHIFU
SIMA Ionuț RoNDC Student
STAN Aurel RoNDC Student
STEFÃNICÃ Virgina RoNDC Student
STOIAN Marinica RoNDC Student
STOICA Simona RoNDC Student
ăAMPEK Octavia RoNDC Student
TÃTARU Andrei RoNDC Student
TOLCIU Daniela RoNDC Student
TUFAN Cristian RoNDC Student
ȚUȚU Gabriel RoNDC Student
UDROIU Gabriel RoNDC Student
UNGUREANU Claudiu RoNDC Student
VASILONI Valentina RoNDC Student
VÃSÂI Nicoleta RoNDC Student
VELEA Silvia RoNDC Student
VINTILÃ Adina RoNDC Student
VLÃDUȚESCU Ionica RoNDC Student
VOICU Irina RoNDC Student
VOICULESCU Dana RoNDC Student
ZALINCA Iulian RoNDC Student
Researchers / Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center
Nr. Crt. Nume și prenume
1. URSU ROXANA
2. SAMOILÃ MIRELA-ANCUȚA
3. STAMATE ANA
4. RADU GABRIELA
5. SAULIUC ADRIANA
6. BÃLÃăOIU NARCIZ
7. ROMER WALTER
8. NEDEA BOGDAN
10. CSAKI ALEXANDRU
11. ABDISA SEILA
12. ARGHIR RADU
13. TARBAN CARMEN
14. MARIN FLORENTINA
15. OPROIU MONICA
16. PORDEA ALINA

Project
NATO AND THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT.
ROMANIA’S PRIORITIES
8 October 2009
Press Report
Director of Program: Iulian Chifu, CPCEW
Co-director of Project: Doina MUREăAN, Romanian National
Defense College
On the 8thOctober the National Defense College hosted the workshop
focused on “Straightening NATO’s capabilities in an energy supplier in the21
stcentury. The activity was part of the project “NATO and the new
strategic concept. Romania’s responsibilities”, organized by the NationalDefense College, Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center, NATOPDD Public Division and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On the 7
thOctober there was a press release that announced the event and
encouraged journalists to attend the workshop. It appeared in variousnewspapers and news portals, such as AMOSNEWS:
(http://amosnews.ro/Atelier_de_lucru_pentru_noul_concept_strategic_al_N
ATO_la_Colegiul_National_de_Aparare-289213),
stiri.ROl.ro (http://stiri.rol.ro/content/view/445380/3/),
ziarul Constanta: (http://www .ziuaconstanta.ro/categorie/ministerul-
apararii-nationale.html),
stiriazi.ro : http://magazinmilitar .blogspot.com/2009/10/atelier -de-lucru-
pentru-noul-concept.html , a Romanian military magazine:
http://magazinmilitar .blogspot.com/2009/10/atelier -de-lucru-pentru-noul-
concept.html and the site of the Ministry of Defense:
http://www .mapn.ro/cpresa/13190_Atelier -de-lucru-pentru-noul-concept-
strategic-al-NA TO-la-Colegiul-Na%C5%A3ional-de-Ap%C4%83rare
The day after the conference the journalists of MoND published an articleon the site of MoND, a photo gallery: http://www
.mapn.ro/fotodb/20091009
and a short movie released on armataTV:http://www
.mapn.ro/fotodb/20091009. NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 431

Third Workshop Report
“Getting security right in NATO’s wider neighbourhood:
does this still matter?
The future of NATO’s partnership network.
A special focus on the Balkans and Wider Black Sea-Caspian
region”
Program
9,30 -10.00: Registration of the participants
10.00-11.30: Session I “New perspectives on NATO’ s wider
neighbourhood” (media allowed)
• moderator Iulian Chifu, director of CPCEW
10.00-10.30: Opening Statement by Cãtãlin Predoiu, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Message of the NATO Deputy Secretary General,
Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero (transmited throughVTC)
10.30-11.30: Forward address of Mr. Iulian Fota, Presidential Advisor
for Security;
11.00-11.30: DebateT
opics:
– The role of the Eastern Partnership countries and of the Black Sea for
the Euro-Atlantic security; NATO’s role in the region;
– The hypothesis of a “win-win” approach of NATO-Russia relation;– NATO and the security in the vicinity of the Alliance: from the false
dilemma of regional instability to the transborder threat assesment andcountering.432 Iulian CHIFU

11.30: Coffee break
• The press is leaving the room
12.00 -13.30: S ession II: “The future of NATO’ s partnership network”
(closed-door debate, media not allowded)• moderator Bogdan Aurescu, State Secretary for Strategic
Affairs MFA
Positions:
• Ambassador Kim Traavik, Permanent Representantive of
Norway to NATO
• Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, Permanent Representantive
of Romania to NATO.
Topics for debate:
• Importance of regional stability;
• Defining the Partenerships (from EAPC to the
Mediteranean Dialogue and Global Partenerships);
• NATO’s enlargement policy
13.30 -13.45: Session III: Conclusions
• Presentation Iulian Chifu, director of CPCEW
Debates
1. On October the15th, 2009, the workshop “ Getting right security in
NATO’ s wider neighbourhood: does this still matter? The future ofNATO’ s partnership network. A special focus on the Balkans and WiderBlack Sea-Caspian region” took place at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, co-organized with the Center for Conflict Prevention and EarlyWarning. The workshop was part of the project “NATO and the NewStrategic Concept. Romania’s Priorities”, realized with the support ofNATO’s Public Diplomacy Division.
2. In the opening statement, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania,
H.E. Mr
. Cãtãlin Predoiu , highlighted the fact that the major stakes
pursued by Romania with respect to the strategic thinking on NATO’swider neighbourhood refer inter alia to the preservation of values,NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 433

principles and commitments as the basis for NATO’s cooperation with
partners. They also refer to the continuation of the “open door” policywith emphasis on compliance with membership criteria as well as tostrengthening NATO’s partnerships and cooperation with the EU, UN,and the OSCE and to specific contributions to the building of defenseand security institutions of states and/or organizations. The Ministerunderlined that Romania has no interest in remaining the Eastern borderof the Alliance.
He also stressed that the issue of “a global NATO versus a regional
NATO“ is only a false dilemma. In terms of geography, the mainsecurity challenges for NATO originate from its wide neighbourhood.
Under this logic, the wider Black Sea region is an integral part of the
European project of consolidating stability throughout Europe throughdemocracy, cooperation and integration. This region is an indispensablecomponent of the Euro-Atlantic community of security, democracy andprosperity. It is also important in terms of diversification of energysupply sources and transport routes. Furthermore, it has also animportant stake for the new approach on missile defense.
During a VTC link from NATO HQ in Brussels, Ambassador Claudio
Bisogniero , Deputy Secretary General of NATO, pointed out the need
for a new Strategic Concept, underlining both the internaltransformations of the Alliance and the changes in the strategicenvironment that occurred since the adoption of the current StrategicConcept. The involvement of the civil society in drafting the guidelinesof the new concept will bring added value in terms of legitimacy.
In terms of substance, the NSC will have to address the following
issues:
– the need to keep the right balance between Article 5 and non-Article
5 contingencies;
– the meaning of solidarity in an environment that allows countries to
be destabilized by non-conventional threats (e.g. cyber attacks,energy insecurity);
– the need for a comprehensive approach, including the cooperation
with other international organizations and the private sector;434 Iulian CHIFU

– the need for NATO to contribute to the general goal of a free and
stable Europe, through the continuation of the enlargement processand the strengthening of its partnerships;
– the relation with Russia will continue to be marked by controversies,
but it must not be kept hostage to them. It will have to be developedalong the lines of the common interests.
Mr. Iulian Fota , Presidential Advisor for National Security,
reminded that NATO has been and continues to be a factor thatdecisively contributes to the unification of Europe. NATO continuesto be a credo for a strong transatlantic relation. He expressed theopinion that the new Strategic Concept must also contribute to agreater goal: to help NATO “keep the West united”. In this respect,although the security environment has become more complicated, noone nation should be left alone in tackling the problems triggered bythe globalization process. The issue of complementarity of tasks isalso important: we should not expect a “global NATO”, but a “NATOwith global partners”.
At the end of the first session, the questions and comments of the
participants underlined that:
– NSC must cover the new meanings of “solidarity” concept, to
include the answer to new threats. Cyber attacks and energyinsecurity are most obvious, likely to paralyze a country withoutmoving a single soldier. The cooperation with other internationalorganizations is also of paramount importance.
– The issue of public support is very important, both in the member
states and in the partner countries. In this respect, the elaboration ofthe NSC is going to be one of the most inclusive processes in thehistory of the Alliance.
– NATO and the EU should both contribute in complementarity to the
stability and democracy in Europe and in the neighbourhood. Boththe competition and the overlaps would be counter-productive.Multidimensional and multi-layer partnerships can help the Allianceto better perform its tasks.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 435

3. The second session (with closed doors) was moderated by Mr. Bogdan
Aurescu, State Secretary for Strategic Affairs, Romanian MFA.
The presentations and the discussions underscored several main ideas:
– One of the important challenges of the Alliance is finding the right
balance between the security of the members’ territory and the out-of-area operations. NATO needs essentially the same capabilities forexpeditionary missions as those available to act on the territory ofthe Alliance.
– NATO’s core remains the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. – The partnerships proved their usefulness as instruments to project
stability outside the territory of the Alliance, as well as an importantcontribution to the fulfillment of NATO’s tasks. One shouldremember that 15 countries out of those contributing to ISAF are notNATO members. The principle of self-selection in partnershipsshould be maintained and strengthened.
– Inside NATO, it was mentioned, the interest for, and awareness of,
different geographical regions are uneven. Certain challenges arespecific to certain areas. Therefore the focus of some nations on theirregions of interest brings an important contribution to the generalsituational awareness of NATO, which is in the interest of all Allies.
– Despite persistent disagreements, NATO’s relation with Russia is
now on a positive trend. NATO should maintain its dual-trackapproach. In this respect, the relation should be focused both onpragmatic approach of common security threats and challenges andon upholding common values.
– Strategic partnerships with other organizations, such as the EU and
the UN, should be further developed. The participation of thepresident of the EU Commission and the UN Secretary General atthe Bucharest NATO Summit created a good political momentum inthis sense.436 Iulian CHIFU

4. Conclusions:
– The process of developing the New Strategic Concept should be both
a NATO internal exercise and an opportunity for better informing thepublic on NATO’s future role. It will have to determine the mannerin which the Alliance will interact and cooperate with other actorsand the way NATO will adjust its ideas, processes and capabilities, inorder to be compatible with other organizations.
– The process of upgrading NATO’s Strategic Concept provides an
opportunity for underscoring the profile of NATO’s partnerships andfor highlighting the need for NATO to contribute more tostrengthening security in its neighbourhood – the Western Balkans,Eastern Europe, the wider Black Sea-Caspian region, Central Asia,Mediterranean and others.
– The Black Sea region is part of the European project of consolidating
stability throughout Europe through democracy, cooperation andintegration . It is an indispensable component of the Euro-Atlantic
community of security, democracy and prosperity, also important interms of diversification of energy sources and transport routes andwith a special stake for the new approach on missile defense.
– NATO enlargement to countries of Central and Eastern Europe was a
remarkable success for the transatlantic Alliance. It proved to be avery powerful tool in stabilizing regions, encouraging reforms andconsolidating Europe. Due to this process, NATO continues to playa special role in unifying a continent divided for nearly half acentury. And that is why NATO should continue to promote tailoredpartnerships to foster greater stability throughout the Euro-Atlanticarea.
– The allied countries situated, in geographical terms, at the border of
the Alliance might be more aware of certain challenges. Theirregional focus on High North, Strategic South or the Black Sea areacontribute to a better answer of the Alliance to specific threats and, atthe same time, provide opportunities for strengthening cooperation inthose particular regions.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 437

– Security in the Black Sea region is part of the Euro-Atlantic security.
The area is not immune to new risks and their potential forproliferation. That is why due attention should be paid to reflectingnew challenges in this area, and NATO should continue to support,as appropriate, efforts based on regional priorities and dialogueamong the Black Sea states and with the Alliance.
17 octombrie 2009438 Iulian CHIFU

NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 439Project, 17 September 2009
Workshop “Getting right security in NATO’s wider neighbourhood: does this still matter?
The future of NATO’s partnership network.
A special focus on the Balkans and Wider Black Sea-Caspian region.”
Organised by the Center for Conflict Prevention
and Early Warning and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
15 October 2009
LIST OF ROMANIAN GUESTS
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS, NGO’s, ACADEMICS
NR. NAME POSITION INSTITUTION SITUATION CONTACT OBS.
CRT. PARTICI-
PATION
PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
1. IULIAN FOTA PRESIDENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL
Security Advisor ADMINISTRATION
2. ANCA ILINOIU PRESIDENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL
Foreign Policy ADMINISTRATION
Advisor
3. CONSTANTIN State counsellor PRESIDENTIAL
DEGERATU ADMINISTRATION

440 Iulian CHIFU4. V ALENTIN BUDÃU Expert, PRESIDENTIAL
Department ADMINISTRATIONInternational
Relations
GUVERNMENT
5. CÃTÃLIN VÃTAFU Personal GOVERNMENT
counsellor of the Prime Minister for Foreign
Policy
6. ăTEFANIA FERENCZ State Secretary GOVERNMENT
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
7. VIOREL OANCEA State Secretary MINISTRY OF
Department for DEFENSEDefense Policy and Planning, chief of the Direction for International Cooperation in the Defense
field
8. AUREL IONEL LASCU State secretary, MINISTRY
chief of Arms OF DEFENSEDepartament

NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 4419. DAN TÃTARU State secretary MINISTRY
Departament for OF DEFENSEthe relations with the Parliament and public
informations
10. DRAGOă GABRIEL General MINISTRY
GHERCIOIU Director OF DEFENSE
Departament for Defence Policy
and Planning
11. ELENA FRUNZETI Deputy Director MINISTRY
adjunct, Defense OF DEFENSEPolicies
Direction
12. Gen. brigadier ing. Chief MINISTRY
ALEXANDRU Directorate for OF DEFENSECOTOARÃ NICOLAE International
Cooperation for Defense
13. Gen. Lt. prof. univ. dr. Comandant National Defense
TEODOR FRUNZETI (Rector) NDU Universitaty "Carol I"
14. Col. MIRCEA Deputy Director National Defense
MÎNDRESCU National Universitaty "Carol I"
Defense College

442 Iulian CHIFU15. Gen. major (ret) dr. Director Institute for Political
MIHAIL IONESCU Studies, Defense and
Military History
16. Gen. brigadier VIRGIL Chief General Staff
BÃLÃCEANU Direction
Stategic
Planning
MINISTRY OF ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS
17. RADU STANCU State secretary MINISTRY OF
for the Relation ADMINISTRATIONwith the AND INTERNALParliament and AFFAIRS
European Affairs
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
18. General lt. Deputy FOREIGN
SILVIU PREDOIU Director FIS INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE
19. General brigadier First Deputy ROMANIAN
FLORIAN COLDEA Director RIS INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE
NGO REPRESENTATIVES, ACADEMIC COMMUNITY
20. Dr. DORU FRUZULICÃ PRESIDENT GEORGE C. MARSHALL
FOUNDATION ROMANIA

NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 44321. Prof. Univ. Dr. DIRECTOR ROMANIAN
VLAD NISTOR DIPLOMATIC
INSTITUTE
22 GEORGE POTRA DIRECTOR NICOLAE TITULESCU
FOUNDATION
23. Conf. Univ. Dr. ROMANIAN
DAN PETRE DIPLOMATIC
INSTITUTE
24. RADU DUDÃU ROMANIAN
DIPLOMATIC
INSTITUTE
25. CORNEL CODIȚÃ PROFESOR, REDACȚIA BURSA
POLITICAL
ANALIST
26. CRISTIAN PRESIDENT PRO – DEMOCRAȚIA
PÂRVULESCU ASSOCIATION
27. ALEXANDRU ăERBAN PRESIDENT EURO-ATLANTIC
COUNCIL ROMANIA
– CASA NATO
28. Prof. Univ. Dr. DIRECTOR EURO-ATLANTIC
CONSTANTIN BUăE STUDIES CENTER
BUCHAREST
UNIVERSITY
29. LILIANA POPESCU PRESIDENT FOUNDATION FOR
CIVIC EDUCATION AND ACADEMIC DEVELOPMENT

444 Iulian CHIFU30. SORIN ENCUȚESCU MANFRED WORNER
FOUNDATION
ROMANIA
31. LIVIU MUREăAN EXECUTIVE EURISC FOUNDATION
DIRECTOR
32. RADU TUDOR POLITIC
ANALIST
33. EMIL HUREZEANU POLITICAL
ANALIST
34. BOGDAN CHIRIAC POLITICAL
ANALIST
35. IULIAN CHIFU DIRECTOR CONFLICT
PREVENTION AND EARLY WARNING
CENTER
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
36. CRISTIAN Minister MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
DIACONESCU AFFAIRS
37. BOGDAN AURESCU State secretary MINISTRY OF
for Strategic FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Affairs
38. DORU COSTEA State secretary MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
for Global AFFAIRS EXTERNEAffairs

NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 44539. BOGDAN MAZURU State secretary MINISTRY OF
for European FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Affairs
40. NATALIA INTOTERO State secretary MINISTRY OF
for the Relation FOREIGN AFFAIRSwith the
Parliament
41. MIHNEA Ambassador MINISTRY OF
CONSTANTINESCU with special FOREIGN AFFAIRS
assignments,
General Director
42. ăTEFAN TINCA General Director MINISTRY OF
General FOREIGN AFFAIRSDirection for
Political Affairs
43. CÃLIN STOICA General Director MINISTRY OF
General FOREIGN AFFAIRSDirection
Strategic Affairs
44. GHEORGHE General Director MINISTRY OF
MAGHERU General FOREIGN
Direction AFFAIRSBilateral Relations

446 Iulian CHIFU45. IRINA ZIDARU General Director MINISTRY OF
General FOREIGNDirection for AFFAIRSRegional
Cooperation
46. OANA MARINESCU General Director MINISTRY OF
General FOREIGN Direction for AFFAIRSPublic
Diplomacy
MFA representatives involved in security matters (DPS, DAP, DPP)

NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 447Nr. Crt. COUNTRY NAME PARTICIPATION
1. Albania E.S. Dl. Dashnor Dervishi
2. Belgium E.S. Dl. Leo D’aes
3. Bulgaria E.S. Dl. Metodiev Radomirski
4. Canada E.S. Dl Philippe Beaulne
5. Croatia E.S. Dl. Ivica Maštruko
6. Czech Rep E.S. Dl. Petr Dokladal
7. Denmark E.S. Dl. Ulrik Helweg-Larsen
8. France E.S. Dl. Henri Paul
9. Germany E.S. Dl. Andreas von Mettenhein
10. Greece E.S. Dl. Georgios Poukamissas
11. Hungary E.S. Dl. Füzes Oszkár Lászlo
12. Italy E.S. Dl. Mario Cospito
13. Lithuania E.S Dl. Vladimir Jarmolenko
14. Netherlands E.S. Maria Wilhelmina Josepha Antonia van Gool
15. Norway E.S. Dl. Øystein Hovdkinn
16. Poland E.S. Dl. Wojciech Zajaczkowski
17. Portugal E.S. Dl. Alexandre Maria Lindim Vassalo
18. Slovakia E.S. Dna. Dagmar Repcekova
19. Slovenia E.S. Dl. Marcel Koprol
20. Spain E.S. Dl. Carlos Ruiz Gonzales
21. Turkey E.S. Dna. Ayse Sinirlioglu
22. United Kingdom E.S. Dl. Robin Barnett
23. United States E.S. Dl. Mark Henry GitensteinFOREIGN INVITEES FROM ROMANIA: NATO COUNTRIES AMBASSADORS

Fourth Workshop Report
“Protecting the Alliance’s security at strategic distance or
closer to home: right balance and false dilemmas“
Timeline: 19thof October 2009
Forth Workshop: Military Level
1.Participants : 62 (Defense policy experts, military personnel, veterans,
experts, military media).
2.Goal : Debates on political-military aspects of the future NATO
strategic concept and performing a substantial contribution to thenational effort oriented to strengthening the Romanian positionregarding the features of the new strategic concept.
3.Suggested topics :
– How to do collective defense effectively in the 21
stcentury?
(capabilities/resources);
– Contingency planning for the new members;– Managing Afghanistan – like operations: what lessons learnt for the
new strategic concept? ;
– Striking the balance between territorial defense and “out of area
operations“: doctrine, capabilities and resource requirements;
– The role of missile defense in the new strategic concept;– Defining a NATO role for maritime security.
4. The works were in the Romanian language , except for the
presentation by the Chief of NATO’s Military Committee, AdmiralGianpaolo di Paola.
5. The Program of the Workshop (project):INTRODUCTORY SESSION
14,00-14,05 Opening address by Viorel Oancea, State Secretary for
Defense Policy and Planning448 Iulian CHIFU

14,05-14,15 Presentation by Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola, Chairmen of
NATO Military Committee-VCR
14,15-14.25 Presentation by Brig. Gen. Valeriu Nicut, Deputy for
Operations and Training within the General Staff;
14,25-14.40 Discussions;14,40-14,50 Presentation by Mr. Iulian CHIFU, Director of the
Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning;
14,50-14,55 Remarks by the Head of the National Defense College
SESSION 1, dedicated to the political-military aspects of the Topics in
section 3 above. Political-military elements to be included in the futureNATO strategic concept
Moderator: Colonel Mircea MÎNDRESCU, Acting Head of the
National Defense College.
14,55-15,15 Presentation by Viorel Oancea, State Secretary for Defense
Policy and Planning;
15,15-15.35 Presentation by Brig.Gen. Ion Grosu, Romanian Intelligence
Service representative;
15,35-16,15 Debates;16,15-16.30 Coffee-break
SESSION 2, dedicated to military aspects of the Topics in section
3 above. Military elements to be included in the future NATO strategicconcept
Moderator: Bg.Gen Valeriu NICUT.16,30-16,50 Presentation by Brig.Gen. Virgil Bãlãceanu, Strategic
Planning Directorate (J5)/ General Staff;
16,50-17,10 Presentation by Brig.Gen. Dan Plãvițu, Chief of the Military
Inteligence Directorate;
17,10-17,50 Debates.
CONCLUSION
17,50-18,00 Concluding remarks by Dragoș Ghercioiu, General Director
for Defense Policy and Planning at the end of the works
On 19
thOctober 2009, the Workshop no. 4 on “ Protecting Alliance security
at strategic distance or closer to home: right balance and false,NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 449

dilemmas” was organized at the Ministry of National Defense, between
14.00 and 19.00. It was co-organized by the Romanian National DefenseCollege and the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Centre andsponsored by the NATO, with the participation of the following guests:– Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola, Chairman of NATO Military Committee-
(through VCR);
– Viorel Oancea, State Secretary for Defense Policy and Planning, MoD;– Dragoș Ghercioiu, General Director for Defense Policy and Planning;– Colonel Mircea MINDRESCU, Acting Head of National Defense
College;
– Mr. Iulian CHIFU, Director of the Center for Conflict Prevention and
Early Warning;
– Brig. Gen. Valeriu Nicut, Deputy for Operations and Training within
the General Staff
– Brig. Gen. Ion Grosu, Romanian Intelligence Service representative;– Brig. Gen. Virgil Bãlãceanu, Strategic Planning Directorate (J5)/
General Staff;
– Brig. Gen. Dan Plãvițu, Chief of the Military Inteligence Directorate
and other 57 participants from institutions and agencies involved insecurity and defense issues.
The dynamics of the politico-military international scene, the permanent
improvement of the tactics used by terrorist organizations and insurgentgroups and the security and economic interests of the Alliance memberstates demand that NATO adopt a more flexible and feasible policy, both atpolitical-strategic level and operational-tactical one.
Taking the suggested topics as baseline, the following ideas have been
expressed:
1. How to do collective defense effectively in the 21
stcentury?
(capabilities/resources)
The new strategic concept should accomplish at least two major objectives:
strengthening the common security and initiating NATO’s transformationregarding the planning, the acquisitions and the future expeditionarymissions. Therefore, a feasible, quick, expeditionary reaction force that450 Iulian CHIFU

meets the requirements of a new NATO security strategy will be needed.
Moreover, in order to avoid the replication of efforts and costs, thetransformation process and the training system (through the educationalprocess and common exercises) should be coordinated.
Romania appreciates and works for maintaining the concept of collective
defense as a fundamental pillar of the Alliance. Experience has shown thatnations must constantly reconfigure the balance of forces needed both fornational defense and for the deployment of these forces in remote areas ofcrisis in NATO operations. This is an additional reason for setting the realneeded forces and capabilities required for the full range of militaryoperations, both domestic and beyond, from peacekeeping to combatactions.
Collective defense is and must remain the basic mission of the Alliance and
the main component of the operational planning process, while engaging inmilitary operations in response to crisis will be done when the securitysituation requires and with the available forces. The new Strategic Conceptmust clearly establish the purpose, objectives and functions of the Alliance,define the challenges and threats to its security and indicate the means andcapabilities required for confrontation with these threats, but it must definealso measures of institutionalization of Article 5, establish rules ofengagement and the principles of achieving collective defense andcooperation within it.
2. Contingency planning for the new members
NATO defense planning system (NDPP) is in transition to the new model
recently adopted. The onset of the first full cycle taking into account thenew model will be marked by the development of the new StrategicConcept (SC), which will be taken directly to planning. Today at NATO HQis considered that the document “Comprehensive Political Guidance”,endorsed at the Riga summit, is still valid and, therefore, key issuesreferring to defense planning can be taken in the New Strategic Concept.
Romania must militate for a balanced presentation within the New Strategic
Concept of the two strategic objectives: involvement in actual crisisNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 451

management and transformation of capabilities, meaning to accustom
oneself to requirements of previewed security environment. The efficientuse of resources in the process of capabilities development, which in ouropinion is extended beyond defense planning, for many allied states is alsoinfluenced by the EU needs for specific capabilities evolution.Consequently a clearer expression of NATO`s desire for cooperation, atleast in the field of defense planning, is imperative.
3. Managing Afghanistan – like operations: what lessons learnt for the
new strategic concept?
Estimating the influence upon the New Strategic Concept of the lessons
learned following NATO operations in Afghanistan, NATO can be definedas one of the main actors’ participants to the global management of the civiland military crisis. A new approach is the concept on unification of themain actors’ efforts under the same goal during their involvement in aconflict or crisis. This concept has multiple meanings and a commondefinition is unlikely to be agreed on a short and medium term. NATO mustcoordinate its own actions with this community in non-Article 5 crisis, suchas:– unity of efforts, provision of integrated estimate and planning of the
processes without any restriction regarding the information exchange;
– military activity integration with multiple actors and achievement of
synchronic work in cooperation;
– provision of essential directions and of a coherent strategyThe present military strategy in Afghanistan is exclusively focused onsecurity and economy and pay attention to the possibility of capitalizingsuccess from a possible progress in the cultural domain able to support theefforts for population’s protection by Taliban’s` isolation. In Afghanistantwo of the three fundamental pillars of the participation by a contingent in amission out of own country’s borders (determining factors specific to anycounter-insurgency operation) have become fragile: international forcecredibility against the insurgents’ wish and the population’s support/confidence.
In order to consolidate the affected pillars some actions aiming at obtaining
the population’s support/trust simultaneously with insurgents’ neutralizationare in progress.452 Iulian CHIFU

4. Striking the balance between territorial defense and “out of area
operations“: doctrine, capabilities and resource requirements
Although the Alliance proved after the Cold War a great capacity for
adaptation, by admitting new members, reorganizing the command structureand the missions, which permitted the dislocation of forces beyond thetraditional area of responsibility, a range of factors have led to additionalobstacles in developing and implementing a coherent strategy of theAlliance. These factors are due mainly to the lack of a common perceptionof the risks and threats or the inability of the European Allies to allocateenough resources for the on-going missions.
Engagement in out of area operations as a consequence of the need to
combat the threats has determined a modification of the strategic operationsorganization and planning profile. This fact must not induce to the smallstates of the Alliance the perception of a deeper tendency to marginalizetheir own national interests in the field of security.
The debates concerning the new NATO strategic concept have as a
background the increase of a certain internal criticism regarding the non-fulfillment of the objectives assumed at the RIGA Summit (2006). This ledto the reluctance of certain member states to support NATO with forces,especially for the ISAF operations. Some others thinks that NATO shouldfocus not only on the asymmetrical threats but also on the classical ones.The next Strategic Concept must involve NATO in regions of greateconomical-strategic interest, like the Arctic region.
Following an intense and permanent dialogue with the nations, NATO
military authorities recommended the main development guidelines for theelaboration of the new strategic concept on different levels: operational;capabilities and transformation; partnerships. From the military point ofview one can conclude that some components regarded as highly importantneed to be part of the new strategic concept.
For the operational field the following can resume the main guidelines:
reanalyzing Article 5 through the common understanding of the con-figuration of a possible future attack; clarifying the relation betweenNATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 453

common defense and common security (here we can find energy security,
cyber defense, diminishment of the international criminality); ensuring aunique perspective about taking on common risks in the operations, whichmeans participating with troops and/or financial compensation of thosecosts; maintaining a balance between the missions under or beyond theincidence of Article 5.
For the field of capabilities and transformations : developing trans-
formation programs and/or building the capabilities the Alliance will needin order to respond to the estimated risks and threats: to reorganize thecapabilities in order to ensure a quick response in crisis situations; toprepare the operations carried out together with other organizations/international actors; to improve the strategic communication to deliver aconvincing political message; to harmonize inside the Alliance thecommand and forces structures that are responsible also for the costscovering the actual deficits from the common fund; to coordinate theconstruction of a quick reaction force that has to be correlated to the EUrequirements and to NATO training and instruction system.
For the field of partnerships the New Strategic Concept must take into
account: the intensification of the interaction with international actors: UN,EU, OSCE; (re) establishing cooperation relations with Russia; continuingthe partnership programs (PfP, MD, ICI); strengthening the relations withnon-NATO states and with other international actors in order to extendNATO’s role in ensuring security and stability beyond the traditionalregions of interest; developing the relation with the EU for a bettercooperation, as the two organizations are complementary: the forces are thesame for both organizations, the procedures and techniques has to beidentical, and the priorities should be harmonized as they have the sametype of deficits.
5. The role of missile defense in the new strategic concept
The background of Romania’s participation within NATO MD initiative
comprises the interest of being connected to the allied efforts, thedevelopment of an allied anti-missile system and the guarantee that it454 Iulian CHIFU

covers its whole national territory. Romania’s position is based on two
essential principles: the indivisibility of security within NATO andcollective solidarity towards the countries vulnerable to missile attacks.
The contemporary strategic environment, development and proliferation of
ballistic missiles, including the possibility of using loads capable of massdestruction constitutes a significant threat to NATO’s territory andpopulation. This threat is magnified by more sustained efforts of nations todevelop weapons of mass destruction and delivery capacities withincreasing range of action. NATO missile defense program was designedprecisely to protect the territory, population and forces (including thosedeployed in theaters of operations) against these types of weapons. NATO must continue dialogue on security implications of missile systems,both in consultations with other allies and with partner countries.In particular, when it comes to the relationship with Russia, NATO candecide in favor of promoting an open dialogue on this subject and identifyconcrete ways of cooperation depending on the evolution of the project, andRussia’s interest in this respect, starting with the idea that Black Seasecurity is impossible without a strong commitment of this country.
6. Defining a NATO role for maritime security
NATO represents an Alliance composed of nations with broad coastland,
old maritime traditions, great naval capabilities and strong commercialinterests, who supposes and imposes that NATO should play an active rolein ensuring and maintaining the Allies’ maritime security. NATO’s role inthe maritime security should be complementary to the tasks fulfilled bymaritime authorities and by civil national and international agenciesresponsible for imposing the law.
The new strategic concept will have to specify which are the maritime
missions that need to be taken into account by the Alliance, what will be therole of nations’ navy forces, the distribution of responsibilities between thenations, the definition of the borders between defense and security, thelimits of participation in case of supportive actions of the authoritiesresponsible for imposing the law.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 455

The strategic interests of the Alliance from the perspective of the maritime
security can be spotted out as follows:
– the protection of the territorial integrity and maritime coast of the
member states;
– ensuring the population, equipment and infrastructure protection in the
maritime area;
– preventing the proliferation of mass destruction arms;– protection of the critical and energy infrastructure;– ensuring the freedom of navigation and the access to resources (at the
surface or sub aquatic).
The identified or expected maritime risks and threats to the Alliance can be
included in two categories: current threats (attacks against ships, using shipscharged with chemical or radiological material as weapons, transportingWMD, etc), and future threats (threats to the stability and the security of theArctic region, migration due to the rise of seas’ and oceans’ level, naturalcalamities, lack of resources, intensification of the competition for naturalresources etc).
The success of ensuring and maintaining maritime security depends largely
on the good cooperation regarding the exchange of intelligence betweencivil agencies that impose the law, international organizations (UN, EU,IMO), NGOs, etc. The cooperation is thus the key for success.
In the context of multidimensional important changes of the international
geo-strategic environment, nations are waiting that the New StrategicConcept synthesize all elements which have not only to include and torepresent the Allies interests, but also to set, in enough flexible terms, theNATO way in the military, diplomatic, communication spectrum, at leastfor the next decade. The solution, even a partial one, leads to the conclusionthat the Alliance is and will be not only a global security exporter but also asecurity builder.456 Iulian CHIFU

LIST OF INVITED PERSONS
To the Workshop no. 4 of 19thOctober2009
organized at the Ministry of National Defense,
conference room 128, on:
“Protecting Alliance security at strategic distance or closer to home: right
balances and false dilemmas”
– Mihai STÃNIăOARÃ, Minister of National Defense (or his personal
representative):
– Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola (through VTC), Chief of NATO Military
Committee.
MoD Department for Defense Policy and Planning:
– Viorel OANCEA, Secretary of state for Defense Policy and Planning
(representative);
– Brig. Gen. Eng. Alexandru COTOARÃ-NICOLAE, Chief of
International Co-operation in the Field of Defense Directorate(representative) and a specialist;
– ăerban LUNGU, Director of the Integrated Planning Directorate
(representative) and a specialist;
– Mrs.Elena FRUNZETI, Deputy Director of Defense Policies
Directorate (representative) and a specialist.
MoD Department of Armaments
– Brig. Gen. Eng. Cãtãlin MORARU, Deputy Secretary of State for
Armaments and a specialist.
General Staff:
– Brig. Gen Valeriu NICUȚ, Deputy for Operations and Training;– Brig. Gen. Alexandru RUS PhD, Chief of J 3 Directorate and two
specialists;
– Brig. Gen. Virgil BÃLÃCEANU PhD, Chief of J 5 Directorate and two
specialists;
– Brig. Gen. Mihai CHIRIȚÃ, PhD, Chief of J 7 Directorate and two
specialists;NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 457

Land Forces Staff:
– Maj. Gen. Ion PALSOIU PhD, Deputy Chief of Staff (representative)
and a specialist.
Air Forces Staff:
– Air Flotilla Gen. Virgil RISTEA, Deputy Chief of Staff (representative)
and a specialist.
Navy Staff:
– Rear-Admiral Niculae V ALSAN Deputy Chief of Staff (representative)
and a specialist.
MoD Defense Intelligence General Directorate:
– Maj. Gen Ilie BOTOă PhD, Deputy General Director (representative);– Brig. Gen. Dan PLÃVIȚU, Chief of Military Intelligence Directorate
(representative) and two specialists;
– Col. Marian HAPAU, Chief of Counterintelligence and Military
Security Directorate (representative) and two specialists.
Military Mass-media:
– one representative of the MoD Information and Public Relations
Directorate:
– one representative of the General Staff Information and Public
Relations Section.
Institute for Defense Policy Studies and Military History:
– Maj. Gen. (R) Mihail IONESCU, Director of the Institute.
National Defense University ,,Carol I“:
– Lieutenant-General Teodor FRUNZETI. Commandant (Rector) of the
National Defense University ,,Carol I“ (representative);
– Colonel Prof. Constantin MOSTOFLEI PhD, Director of the Center for
Strategic, Defense and Security Studies.
National Defense College
– Colonel Mircea MÎNDRESCU, Acting Head of the National Defense
College.458 Iulian CHIFU

Romanian Intelligence Service:
– George Cristian MAIOR, Director of Romanian Intelligence Service (or
his Deputy) and 4-7 specialists.
Conflicts Prevention and Early Warning Center:
– Assoc. Prof. lulian CHIFU, Director of the Center and 4–7 specialists;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs :
– Cândea Ion, 2ndSecretary, Security Policy Directorate, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs:
– Ana Tinca, director, 1stSecretary, Security Policy Directorate, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 459

Summary
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
FIRST PART
NATO’s New Strategic Concept. Romanian Approach . . . . . . . . . 13
POLICY PAPER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Chapter I. Methodology, Premises and Background of the Study. . . 15
Chapter II. Themes and agenda for the debate on the New NATO
Strategic Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Chapter III. Romanian Security Interests and the new NATO
Strategic Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Chapter IV . Looking inside the box: a commitment oriented
approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Chapter V . Background on the New Strategic Concept NATO
official documents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
SECOND PART
Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
SECTION I. NATO AND THE BIG ISSUES OF THE NSC
Chapter I. Adapting NATO to the changing International System/
Arena. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Chapter II. The ESDP-NATO Relation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 461

SECTION II. CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
C.P . 1 Getting right security in NATO’s wider neighbourhood:
does this still matter? The future of NATO’s partnershipnetwork.A special focus on the Balkans and Wider Caspian Black-Sea region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
C.P. 2 Opening remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252C.P. 3 Talking points for the seminar on the review of NATO’s
Strategic Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
C.P. 4 Remarks at the Conference “NATO and the New Strategic
Concept. Romania’s priorities” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
C.P. 5 Adapting NATO to the 21
stCentury: One Eye on Europe and
the Other on the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
C.P. 6 NATO and the New Strategic Concept. A Military Approach 268C.P. 7 New Threats: Energy Security, Cyber Defense, Critical Infra-
structure protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
C.P. 8 Cyber War, Cyber Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280C.P . 9 Managing challenges and opportunities in NATO’s wider
neighbourhood. The need to build circles of stability: thecase of the Mediterranean region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
C.P. 10 Abstract for the conference on “A NATO New Strategic
Concept and Romania” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
C.P. 11 NATO and the New Strategic Concept. Romania’s Priorities 294C.P. 12 Managing challenges and opportunities in the wider NATO
neighbourhood. The partnership network as an investment inthe trans-Atlantic and international security. The relevanceof the critical NATO neighbourhood: The Balkan and thewider Black Sea Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
C.P. 13 Estonia and the New Strategic Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301C.P. 14 Importance of the (Western) Balkans for NATO: Lessons
Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
C.P. 15 New strategic concept and the outside powers . . . . . . . . . . . 304462 Iulian CHIFU

C.P. 16 NATO’s New Strategic Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
C.P. 17 Cyber defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310C.P. 18 Protejarea securitãții Alianței la distanțã strategicã sau mai
aproape de casã: estimãri corecte și dileme false . . . . . . . . . 312
C.P. 19 Protejarea securitãții Alianței la distanțã strategicã sau mai
aproape de casã: estimãri corecte și dileme false – aspectepolitico-militare și militare ale Noului Concept Strategic(NCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
C.P. 20 NATO as a threat to Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332C.P. 21 CyberCrime Prevention. CERT-RO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
SECTION III. NGO DEBATE
D. 1 NATO – The New Strategic Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343D. 2 NATO at crossroads: in search of a renewed Transatlantic
solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
D. 3 New Alliance for New times. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352D. 4 NATO’s new Strategic Concept. The relation with Russian
Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
D. 5 NATO – The new strategic concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366D. 6 The new NATO strategic concept and the realities and the new
threats to the security environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
D. 7 NATO, from Euro-Atlantic partnership to Global Partnership. . 374D. 8 The NATO-Russia Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
THIRD PART
Annexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
International Conference. NATO and the New Strategic Concept
Romania’s Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, ROMANIAN APPROACH 463

First Workshop Report – Romania’s Priorities and NATO’s
Strategic Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
Second Workshop Report – Strengthening NATO as a security
provider in the 21stcentury. Article 5 for the 21stcentury.
The need to address the new threats. A special focus on terrorism,missile defense, energy security, cyber defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
Third Workshop Report – Getting security right in NATO’s wider
neighbourhood: does this still matter? The future of NATO’s partnership network. A special focus on the Balkans and Wider Black Sea-Caspian region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
Fourth Workshop Report – Protecting the Alliance’s security at
strategic distance or closer to home: right balance and falsedilemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
Tipografia Curtea Veche Trading S.R.L .
Tel: 021-336.71.84 • Fax: 021.335.31.71464 Iulian CHIFU