Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung [611434]
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Borderline
EU Border Surveillance Initiatives
An Assessment of the Costs and Its Impact on Fundamental Rights
A research paper written by
Dr. Ben Hayes
Mathias Vermeulen
Berlin, May 2012,
B O R D E R L I N E
EU Border Surveillance Initiatives
An Assessment of the Costs and Its Impact on Fundamental Rights
A research paper written by
Dr. Ben Hayes
Mathias Vermeulen
May 2012
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Contents
Abbreviations ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. ……….. 4
Preface ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………….. 5
Executive Summary ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. .. 8
1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 12
2 Towards “smart borders” in the European Union? …………………………………………………….. 13
2.1 EUROSUR: European External Border Surveillance System ………………………………………….. 13
2.1.1 The EUROSUR roadmap ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 16
2.1.2 The draft EUROSUR Regulation ……………………………………………………………………………….. 18
2.1.3 Beyond border control: integrated maritime surveillance …………………………………………… 20
2.2 The EU “smart borders” initiative …………………………………………………………………………….. 26
2.2.1 Entry‐exit system …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 28
2.2.2 EES relationship to existing EU systems: VIS and SIS II ………………………………………………… 30
2.2.3 Registered Traveller Programme ……………………………………………………………………………… 32
3 The fundamental rights impact of the EUROSUR and EU “smart border” initiatives ……….. 35
3.1 The right to privacy and the protection of personal data …………………………………………….. 36
3.1.1 EUROSUR ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 36
3.1.1.1 The need for safeguards …………………………………………………………………………………………. 39
3.1.2 Smart borders ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 41
3.1.2.1 The need for safeguards …………………………………………………………………………………………. 42
3.2 Interference with the right to asylum ……………………………………………………………………….. 44
3.2.1 EUROSUR ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 44
3.2.2 Entry‐exit system …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 46
4 Cost, necessity, and effectiveness ……………………………………………………………………………. 47
4.1 Feasibility studies and cost estimates ……………………………………………………………………….. 47
4.1.1 EUROSUR ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 48
4.1.2 Entry‐Exit System and Registered Traveller Programme ……………………………………………… 51
4.2 Border security and the European Security Research Programme ……………………………….. 53
4.2.1 EU funded R&D projects supporting EUROSUR ………………………………………………………….. 56
4.2.2 Space‐based border surveillance and the Common Information Sharing Environment …… 61
4.2.3 EU funded R&D projects supporting smart borders ……………………………………………………. 63
4.3 Funding the implementation of EUROSUR and smart borders …………………………………….. 64
4.3.1 The EU External Borders Fund …………………………………………………………………………………. 64
4.3.2 The Development Cooperation Instrument ………………………………………………………………. 65
4.3.3 The Internal Security Fund ………………………………………………………………………………………. 66
4.4 The United States’ experience: SBI‐net and US VISIT ………………………………………………….. 67
5 Conclusions …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 68
5.1 EUROSUR ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 69
5.2 Smart borders ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 72
6 Recommendations …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 74
6.1 The broader EU migration policy framework …………………………………………………………….. 74
6.2 EUROSUR ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 74
6.3 Entry‐Exit System and Registered Traveller Programme ……………………………………………… 75
Authors ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. ………………. 77
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List of Figures and Boxes
Figure 1: EUROSUR in action ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 17
Figure 2: “Operational nodes” in the Common Pre‐Frontier Intelligence Picture ………………………….. 20
Figure 3: EUROSUR and the Common Information Sharing Environment…………………………………….. 21
Figure 4: “Policy options” for funding EUROSUR ………………………………………………………………………. 50
Figure 5: Estimated EUROSUR costs: National Coordination Centres and FRONTEX ……………………… 50
Figure 6: Estimated costs of the RTP and EES systems by the Commission ………………………………….. 52
Figure 7: Achieving border security in the EU …………………………………………………………………………… 55
Figure 8: Cost of establishing, upgrading, and maintaining NCCs 2011–2026 ………………………………. 65
Figure 9: Questioning the EUROSUR cost estimates …………………………………………………………………. 71
Box 1: The EUROSUR roadmap ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 16
Box 2: EUROSUR – A system of systems ………………………………………………………………………………….. 23
Box 3: The Visa Information System and the Schengen Information System/SIS II ……………………….. 31
Box 4: EU security research projects supporting EUROSUR ……………………………………………………….. 57
Box 5: GMES projects supporting EUROSUR …………………………………………………………………………….. 61
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Abbreviations
AIS Automatic Identification Systems
CISE Common Information Sharing Environment
EBF External Borders Fund
ECPN European Coastal Patrol Network
EDPS European Data Protection Supervisor
EES Entry‐Exit System
EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency
ESRP European Security Research Programme
EUROSUR European External Border Surveillance System
FRONTEX European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
FSC FRONTEX Situation Centre
GMES Global Monitoring for Environment and Security
ISF Internal Security Fund
LRIT Long Range Identification and Tracking
NCC National Coordination Centre
RTP Registered Traveller Programme
SBI‐net Secure Border Initiative
SIS Schengen Information System
TCN Third‐country National
VIS Visa Information System
VMS Vessel Monitoring Systems
VDS Vessel Detection System
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Preface
The upheavals in North Africa have lead to a short‐term rise of refugees to Europe, yet,
demonstrably, there has been no wave of refugees heading for Europe. By far most refugees have
found shelter in neighbouring Arab countries. Nevertheless, in June 2011, the EU’s heads of state
precipitately passed a resolution with far‐reaching consequences, one that will result in new border
policies “protecting” the Union against migration. In addition to new rules and the re‐introduction of
border controls within the Schengen Area, the heads of state also insisted on upgrading the EU’s
external borders using state‐of‐art surveillance technology, thus turning the EU into an electronic
fortress.
The resolution passed by the representatives of EU governments aims to quickly put into place the
European surveillance system EUROSUR. This is meant to enhance co‐operation between Europe’s
border control agencies and promote the surveillance of the EU’s external borders by FRONTEX, the
Union’s agency for the protection of its external borders, using state‐of‐the‐art surveillance
technologies. To achieve this, there are even plans to deploy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over
the Mediterranean and the coasts of North Africa. Such high‐tech missions have the aim to spot and
stop refugee vessels even before they reach Europe’s borders. A EUROSUR bill has been drafted and
is presently being discussed in the European Council and in the European Parliament.
Member states also want to introduce so‐called “smart borders” to achieve total control over all
cross‐border movements. Following the US model, the plan is to introduce a massive database that
will store information, including fingerprints, of all non‐EU citizens leaving or entering the Union. The
aim is to identify so‐called “over‐stayers,” that is, third‐country nationals who have overstayed their
limited resident permits. In the United States, a similar system has been a failure and nationwide
exit checks were never introduced. Still, the EU’s heads of state and its government representatives
persist – whatever the cost (the EU Commission estimates it will be up to 1.1 billion dollars). Under
pressure from member states, it is trying to introduce the smart borders bill during the summer of
2012.
EUROSUR and “smart borders” represent the EU’s cynical response to the Arab Spring. Both are new
forms of European border controls – new external border protection policies to shut down the influx
of refugees and migrants (supplemented by internal controls within the Schengen Area); to achieve
this, the home secretaries of some countries are even willing to accept an infringement of
fundamental rights.
The present study by Ben Hayes and Mathias Vermeulen demonstrates that EUROSUR fosters EU
policies that undermine the rights to asylum and protection. For some time, FRONTEX has been
criticised for its “push back” operations during which refugee vessels are being intercepted and
escorted back to their ports of origin. In February 2012, the European Court of Human Rights
condemned Italy for carrying out such operations, arguing that Italian border guards had returned all
refugees found on an intercepted vessel back to Libya – including those with a right to asylum and
international protection. As envisioned by EUROSUR, the surveillance of the Mediterranean using
UAVs, satellites, and shipboard monitoring systems will make it much easier to spot such vessels. It is
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to be feared, that co‐operation with third countries, especially in North Africa, as envisioned as part
of EUROSUR, will lead to an increase of “push back” operations.
Nevertheless, the EU’s announcement of EUROSUR sounds upbeat: The planned surveillance of the
Mediterranean, we are being told, using UAVs, satellites, and shipboard monitoring systems, will aid
in the rescue of refugees shipwrecked on the open seas. The present study reveals to what extent
such statements cover up a lack of substance. Maritime rescue services are not part of EUROSUR
and border guards do not share information with them, however vital this may be. Only just
recently, the Council of Europe issued a report on the death of 63 migrants that starved and
perished on an unseaworthy vessel, concluding that the key problem had not been to locate the
vessel but ill‐defined responsibilities within Europe. No one came to the aid of the refugees – and
that in spite of the fact that the vessel’s position had been known.
In reaction to the Arab Spring, EU member countries are not only promoting a total surveillance of
the Mediterranean, they are also pushing for an electronic upgrading of border controls. This means
that ordinary travellers, too, will come into the focus of border guards in what one may well call a
data juggernaut. Through its “smart borders” programme the EU would create one of the world’s
largest databases for finger prints – not with the aim to fight terrorism or stem cross‐border crime
(even that would be a questionable endeavour), but solely in order to identify individuals that have
overstayed their limited residency permits.
One of the fundamental findings of the study is that the EU’s new border regime would not only
infringe fundamental rights, it would also, in spite of its questionable benefits, cost billions – and
that against the background of pervasive budget cuts and austerity measures. Above all, this would
profit Europe’s defence contractors, as they would receive EU funding for “smart gates,” UAVs, and
other surveillance technologies. The technological upgrading of the EU’s external borders will
obviously open up new markets to European security and armament companies. What we witness is
a convergence of business interests and the aims of political hardliners who view migration as a
threat to the EU’s homeland security.
The EU’s new border control programmes not only represent a novel technological upgrade, they
also show that the EU is unable to deal with migration and refugees. Of the 500,000 refugees fleeing
the turmoil in North Africa, less than 5% ended up in Europe. Rather, the problem is that most
refugees are concentrated in only a very few places. It is not that the EU is overtaxed by the
problem; it is local structures on Lampedusa, in Greece’s Evros region, and on Malta that have to
bear the brunt of the burden. This can hardly be resolved by labelling migration as a novel threat and
using military surveillance technology to seal borders. For years, instead of receiving refugees, the
German government along with other EU countries has blocked a review of the Dublin Regulation in
the European Council. For the foreseeable future, refugees and migrants are to remain in the
countries that are their first point of entry into the Union.
Within the EU, the hostile stance against migrants has reached levels that threaten the rescue of
shipwrecked refugees. During FRONTEX operations, shipwrecked refugees will not be brought to the
nearest port – although this is what international law stipulates – instead they will be landed in a
port of the member country that is in charge of the operation. This reflects a “nimby” attitude – not
in my backyard. This is precisely the reason for the lack of responsibility in European maritime rescue
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operations pointed out by the Council of Europe. As long as member states are unwilling to show
more solidarity and greater humanity, EUROSUR will do nothing to change the status quo.
The way forward would be to introduce improved, Europe‐wide standards for the granting of
asylum. The relevant EU guidelines are presently under review, albeit with the proviso that the cost
of new regulations may not exceed the cost of those in place – and that they may not cause a
relative rise in the number of asylum requests. In a rather cynical move, the EU’s heads of
government introduced this proviso in exactly the same resolution that calls for the rapid
introduction of new surveillance measures costing billions. Correspondingly, the budget of the
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) is small – only a ninth what goes towards FRONTEX.
Unable to tackle the root of the problem, the member states are upgrading the Union’s external
borders. Such a highly parochial approach taken to a massive scale threatens some of the EU’s
fundamental values – under the pretence that one’s own interests are at stake. Such an approach
borders on the inhumane.
Berlin/Brussels, May 2012
Barbara Unmüßig Ska Keller
Executive Board
Heinrich‐Böll‐Stiftung Member of the European Parliament
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Executive Summary
The research paper “Borderline” examines three new EU border surveillance initiatives: the creation
of a European External Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR); the establishment of an Entry‐Exit
System (EES); and the creation of a Registered Traveller Programme (RTP). EUROSUR promises
increased surveillance of the EU’s sea and land borders using a vast array of new technologies,
including drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), off‐shore sensors, and satellite tracking systems. The
EES would record the movement of people into and out of the Schengen area and extend biometric
ID checks to all non‐EU nationals (including those not currently subject to EU visa requirements) with
the aim of helping border guards identify “overstayers”. With the proposed RTP, third‐country
nationals who have been pre‐vetted and deemed not to pose a security risk to the EU would benefit
from faster entry into the Schengen area. This would rely on the use of automated border gates
already installed in some European airports. EU policy‐makers and the manufacturers of these gates
hope that this will lead to the roll‐out of so‐called smart borders across the EU.
The EU’s proposals were presented as a response to a perceived “migration crisis” that accompanied
the so‐called Arab Spring of 2011 and the arrival of thousands of Tunisians in France. But in reality
the policies have been under development for more than four years. They are now entering a
decisive phase. The European Parliament has just started negotiating the legislative proposal for the
EUROSUR system, and within months the Commission is expected to issue formal proposals for
smart borders and the establishment of an EES and RTP.
Taken together, the EUROSUR and smart borders package could cost in the order of €2 billion or
more. They would result in the gathering of biometric data on millions of travellers, longer waiting
lines at the EU’s external borders, and the establishment of costly new border surveillance systems
in the member states and at FRONTEX, the EU border agency. The European Commission has
produced several impact assessments but, according to the report, these have failed to demonstrate
a pressing social need for the new systems. The Commission’s financial estimates have a wide
margin of error. EU institutions have failed to take into account the insurmountable difficulties that
the United States has faced in introducing comparable systems (US VISIT, which is still unable to
record the exit of travellers from the United States; and SBINET, a border surveillance system along
the Mexican border that was scrapped after technological problems and exploding costs).
The authors call for a proper public debate about both the need for yet more expensive EU‐wide
databases and surveillance systems in an era of crippling austerity. They also argue that a high‐tech
upgrade to the “Fortress Europe” approach to migration control is a questionable response to what
is largely a humanitarian crisis, with thousands of migrants and refugees dying at sea every year.
The report is also critical of the decision‐making process. Whereas the decision to establish
comparable EU systems such as EUROPOL and FRONTEX were at least discussed in the European and
national parliaments, and by civil society, in the case of EUROSUR – and to a lesser extent the smart
borders initiative – this method has been substituted for a technocratic process that has allowed for
the development of the system and substantial public expenditure to occur well in advance of the
legislation now on the table. Following five years of technical development, the European
Commission expects to adopt the legal framework and have the EUROSUR system up and running
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(albeit in beta form) in the same year (2013), presenting the European Parliament with an effective
fait accomplit.
The EUROSUR system
The stated purpose of EUROSUR is to improve the “situational awareness” and reaction capability of
the member states and FRONTEX to prevent irregular migration and cross‐border crime at the EU’s
external land and maritime borders. In practical terms, the Regulation would extend the obligations
on Schengen states to conducting comprehensive “24/7” surveillance of land and sea borders
designated as high‐risk – in terms of unauthorised migration – and mandate FRONTEX to carry out
surveillance of the Open Seas beyond EU territory and the coasts and ports of northern Africa. The
Commission has repeatedly stressed EUROSUR’s future role in “protecting and saving lives of
migrants”, but nowhere in the proposed Regulation and numerous assessments, studies, and R&D
projects is it defined how exactly this will be done, nor are there any procedures laid out for what
should be done with the “rescued”. In this context, and despite the humanitarian crisis in the
Mediterranean among migrants and refugees bound for Europe, EUROSUR is more likely to be used
alongside the long‐standing European policy of preventing these people reaching EU territory
(including so‐called push back operations, where migrant boats are taken back to the state of
departure) rather than as a genuine life‐saving tool.
The EUROSUR system relies on a host of new surveillance technologies and the interlinking of 24
different national surveillance systems and coordination centres, bilaterally and through FRONTEX.
Despite the high‐tech claims, however, the planned EUROSUR system has not been subject to a
proper technological risk assessment. The development of new technologies and the process of
interlinking 24 different national surveillance systems and coordination centres – bilaterally and
through FRONTEX – is both extremely complex and extremely costly, yet the only people who have
been asked if they think it will work are FRONTEX and the companies selling the hardware and
software. The European Commission estimates that EUROSUR will cost €338 million, but its methods
do not stand up to scrutiny. Based on recent expenditure from the EU External Borders Fund, the
framework research programme, and indicative budgets for the planned Internal Security Fund
(which will support the implementation of the EU’s Internal Security Strategy from 2014–2020), it
appears that EUROSUR could easily end up costing two or three times more: as much as €874
million. Without a cap on what can be spent attached to the draft EUROSUR or Internal Security
Fund legislation, the European Parliament will be powerless to prevent any cost overruns. There is
no single mechanism for financial accountability beyond the periodic reports submitted by the
Commission and FRONTEX, and since the project is being funded from various EU budget lines, it is
already very difficult to monitor what has actually been spent.
In its legislative proposal, the European Commission argues that EUROSUR will only process personal
data on an “exceptional” basis, with the result that minimal attention is being paid to privacy and
data protection issues. The report argues that the use of drones and high‐resolution cameras means
that much more personal data is likely to be collected and processed than is being claimed. Detailed
data protection safeguards are needed, particularly since EUROSUR will form a part of the EU’s wider
Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE), under which information may be shared with a
whole range of third actors, including police agencies and defence forces. They also call for proper
supervision of EUROSUR, with national data protection authorities checking the processing of
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personal data by the EUROSUR National Coordination Centres, and the processing of personal data
by FRONTEX, subject to review by the European Data Protection Supervisor. EUROSUR also
envisages the exchange of information with “neighbouring third countries” on the basis of bilateral
or multilateral agreements with member states, but the draft legislation expressly precludes such
exchanges where third countries could use this information to identify persons or groups who are at
risk of being subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, or other fundamental rights
violations. The authors argue that it will be impossible to uphold this provision without the logging
of all such data exchanges and the establishment of a proper supervisory system.
Smart borders
Whereas the EUROSUR system focusses on unauthorised border crossings, the smart borders
proposals are supposed to enhance checks on third‐country nationals coming to the EU. Specifically,
the proposed Entry‐Exit System is supposed to identify and prevent overstayers, that is, persons who
entered the EU legally with a valid travel document and/or visa, but who became “illegal migrants”
when their legal entitlement to stay expired. According to the European Commission, this category
of migrants constitutes the largest group of “illegal immigrants” in the EU. The EES would work by
registering the time and place of entry and exit of third‐country nationals in order to verify their exit
and/or identify them if they have “overstayed”. In this case, an alert would automatically be sent to
relevant national authorities. The ESS plans the creation of a centralised European database that
would include biometric data such as fingerprints and facial images from all third‐country nationals
entering the Schengen area. Data gathering on such a large scale is only legal and legitimate if there
are compelling reasons that concern public safety or public order. The authors argue that the
European Commission has failed to demonstrate the necessity of such data gathering.
The authors also argue that since there are many perfectly legal explanations as to why people
overstay, an EES alert could never result in automatic sanctions. An alert could only constitute a
presumption of illegal residence, and a follow‐up (administrative) procedure would always be
needed to determine whether a person has the right to stay legally in the EU or not. Thus, at best,
the EES could only ever assist border guards in carrying out passenger checks; current claims that the
EES would lead to an increase in the detection and return of “illegal immigrants” are unfounded.
There is also a lack of reliable evidence supporting the effectiveness and the efficiency of entry‐exit
systems at the national level and outside the EU.
An EU EES would also result in significantly increased waiting times for third‐country nationals
wanting to enter the Schengen area. Whereas third‐country nationals subject to a visa requirement
are already required to provide biometric data on entry, those on the so‐called white list, who do
not require an advance visa, are exempt from this requirement. Extrapolating from border‐crossing
statistics collected during a comprehensive monitoring exercise in 2009, this could result in the
annual fingerprinting of an additional 57 million “white list” third‐country nationals. An earlier
impact assessment stated that, on average, 15 seconds were added to entry procedures in the
United States when biometrics were introduced to its US VISIT programme. If the EU were able to
achieve this target with regard to 57 million third‐country nationals, this would still add the
equivalent of 27 years of queuing time per year at EU borders! The Commission proposes to “offset”
these additional constraints on cross‐border travel by establishing a Registered Traveller Programme
that enables pre‐vetted individuals to cross borders much faster than their unregistered
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counterparts. However, the Commission has also estimated that only 4 to 5 million travellers per
year might actually use an EU RTP, out of an estimated 100 million third‐country nationals entering
the Schengen area every year. While it would almost certainly make life easier for business
travellers, an EU RTP would clearly not facilitate travel for the vast majority of travellers or relieve
existing pressure at Schengen’s external borders.
According to the European Commission, the cost of developing the central EES and RTP could be in
the order of €400 million, plus annual operating costs of €190 million per year for the first five years.
Despite the absence of any draft legislation, or even an agreement in principle on introducing smart
borders in the EU, the Commission has already allocated €1.1 billion to the development of an EES
and RTP from the proposed EU Internal Security Fund (2013–2020). The authors of the study argue
that it is unwise that the EU is even considering embarking on another large‐scale IT system before
the Visa Information System and Schengen Information System II have been successfully
implemented. Assuming that the effectiveness of these two systems can be demonstrated, the
Commission will still have a long way to go to demonstrate the need for smarter borders.
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1 Introduction
The European Union’s 500 million citizens inhabit a territory delineated by 7,400 km of land borders
and 57,800 km of coastline (“maritime borders”).1 Some 300 million people – just under half of them
non‐EU citizens – are estimated to enter and leave the EU every year.2 All but a tiny fraction do so
completely legitimately. The arrival in Italy in early 2011 of around 25,000 Tunisians fleeing the
turmoil that accompanied the so‐called Arab Spring – 3,500 of whom travelled on to France after
being granted temporary residence permits – galvanised the European Union into action on three
ambitious proposals to prevent unauthorised migration and residence.3 These are (i) the creation of
a European External Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR); (ii) the establishment of an Entry‐Exit
System (EES) to record the movement of people into and out of the Schengen area and help identify
visa “overstayers”; and (iii) the establishment of a Registered Traveller Programme (RTP), under
which third‐country nationals (TCNs) who have been pre‐vetted and deemed not to pose a security
risk to the EU may benefit from faster entry into the Schengen area. Whether this represents a
proportionate response to the relatively small number of refugees from North Africa who made their
way to Europe during the recent political crises is something of a moot point;4 the proposals were
conceived long ago and have been under active consideration for more than four years, though it is
only recently that the EU institutions have begun working on formal legislation.
We have been asked to assess whether the three aforementioned proposals comply with the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights and consider the merits of the proposals as compared to their likely
cost, impact, and effectiveness. In attempting to address these questions, it is important to state
that, whereas the legislation establishing EUROSUR was published in December 2011, the legislation
establishing the EES and RTP, which was expected before the summer of 2012, will be delayed until
later in the year, requiring us to examine earlier “feasibility studies” and interpret deliberations
within the EU institutions. Another major challenge facing this study is that – under the terms of a
“roadmap” issued by the European Commission in February 2008 – the development of EUROSUR is
already well underway. This means it is not just a case of analysing the legislation but examining how
the system is being implemented.
Section 2 of the report examines the development of the proposed EUROSUR System, Entry‐Exit
System, and Registered Traveller Programme. Section 3 assesses the compliance of the three
proposed systems with the most relevant aspects of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Section 4
examines the EU investments already made in EUROSUR and smart borders and the envisaged costs
of implementing the proposals. Sections 5 and 6 provide conclusions and recommendations,
respectively.
1 Council doc. 18666/11 ADD 1, p. 7.
2 “EU unveils plans for biometric border controls”, EUobserver, 13 Feb. 2008, available at:
http://euobserver.com/22/25650.
3 See EU Council Conclusions of 11 and 12 Apr. 2011, and 9 and 10 June 2011.
4 In June 2011 the UNHCR estimated that around 1 million people had fled to border countries, including
Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Niger, and Chad. UNHCR, Update n° 29, “Humanitarian situation in Libya and the
neigbouring countries”, UNHCR 15 June 2011, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/4df9cde49.html.
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2 Towards “smart borders” in the European Union?
The idea of “smart borders” gained credibility in the EU when the European Commission launched
what came to be known as its “smart borders” initiative in February 2008. The proposals, which
consisted of automated ID checks, border gates, increased pre‐screening measures, and new
databases, were accompanied by a second Communication containing a roadmap for the
development of the European Border Surveillance System. “This package designs a completely new
way of controlling our borders” announced Commissioner Franco Frattini. The underlying
assumption is that smart borders using new technologies both improve security – by (automatically)
identifying threats and risks – while simultaneously increasing efficiency, by reducing human input or
the time that travellers spend queuing to have their documents checked at passport control, for
example. “We don’t have an alternative”, stated Commissioner Frattini. “It’s because of terrorist
threats, criminality, paedophile networks. We cannot have them using better technology than
police.”5
We are concerned from the outset that core assumptions about necessity and effectiveness have
not been subject to rigorous, impartial scrutiny. We also have reservations about the sheer ambition
and potential scope of the EUROSUR and smart borders proposals, which, taken together, would
result in increased surveillance of EU border areas and the open waters beyond, and the gathering of
personal data on millions of people. We also harbour serious doubts about the technical viability of
the plans and the prospects of successfully aligning the information systems of numerous EU
agencies with a vast array of national and international surveillance systems to the requisite
operational standards across up to 30 different national‐state immigration and border control
systems.
2.1 EUROSUR: European External Border Surveillance System
The development of the EUROSUR system should be seen as part of a long‐term policy‐making
process. The entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 provided greater powers for the EU
over national border controls, immigration, and asylum policies, and a new role for the European
Commission in developing EU legislation. In terms of new EU policy initiatives, however, it was the
member states who set an ambitious agenda with calls for an EU border police and a “global
approach to migration”6 – the former premised on the need to police the Mediterranean to prevent
the arrival of irregular migrants and refugees, the latter premised on the externalisation and
imposition of EU controls in states of origin and transit. The proposed EUROSUR system is essentially
the product of this twin‐track approach. The proposals discussed below should also be seen in
relation to the European Commission’s 2002 Communication on “integrated border management”,
which set out plans for a common “Schengen Borders Code” , a practical handbook for border
guards, and the creation of an “External Borders Fund” to strengthen controls in member states.7
5 “EU unveils plans”, EUobserver.
6 Council doc. 13147/01.
7 COM (2002) 233 final. See also the Hague Programme 2004. The Borders Code was adopted in 2006
(Regulation 2006/562/EC) and €1.82 billion was allocated to the EU External Borders Fund 2007–2013.
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Although not formally adopted until 2005, the EU’s Global Approach to Migration dates back to 1997
and the arrival in Italy and Greece of thousands of Kurdish refugees from Iraq, who had travelled by
sea from Turkey. This prompted the EU to draft a 46‐point Action Plan to ensure that this kind of
“mass influx” did not recur.8 The Iraq plan was followed by an Austrian Presidency strategy paper on
migration, which suggested explicitly that a:
[M]odel of concentric circles of migration policy could replace that of “fortress Europe” … the
Schengen states currently lay down the most intensive control measures. Their neighbours should
gradually be linked into a similar system … particularly with regard to visa control and readmission
policies. A third circle of states (CIS area, Turkey, and North Africa) will then concentrate primarily on
transit checks and combating facilitator networks, and a fourth circle (Middle East, China, black Africa)
on eliminating push factors.9
The Austrian strategy paper was widely condemned by migrant and refugee organisations and
disowned by the EU,10 but the principles it contained were embodied in a 2002 EU Action Plan on
illegal immigration.11 The plan provided for EU funding for migration controls in countries of origin of
migrants and refugees, including border management equipment and expertise, asylum‐processing
infrastructures, public registration structures (i.e. biometrics/databases), reception centres for illegal
immigrants in transit countries, and “awareness ‐raising campaigns” for would be “illegal” émigrés.
The Action Plan also called for the introduction of “migration management” clauses in EU
agreements with third states, using the “levers” of aid‐and‐trade to ensure cooperation. The
European Commission began funding “preparatory actions on cooperation with third countries in
the field of migration” from the EC development budget (see section 4).12
In December 2005, following a special EU migration summit, the “global approach” was formally
extended to include for the first time a “surveillance system covering the whole southern border of
the EU and the Mediterranean Sea.”13 The European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), now
formally up‐and‐running,14 was requested to conduct the feasibility study. FRONTEX was also
requested to conduct a second feasibility study on a “Mediterranean Coastal Patrols Network
involving EU Member States and North African countries.” FRONTEX produced the two feasibility
studies with the assistance of experts from the member states and the EU’s Joint Research Centre.
The “MEDSEA” feasibility study on the Mediterranean Coastal Patrols Network was presented to the
member states in July 2006 and subsequently published.15 The “BORTEC” study on the EU Border
Surveillance System was presented to the member states in January 2007, but it is classified as
confidential and has not been published. The MEDSEA study recommended the creation of a
permanent organisational structure to ensure “control and surveillance” of the entire length of the
8 Council doc. 5573/98.
9 Council doc. 9809/98.
10 “EU Migration plan side‐lined and resurrected”, Statewatch Bulletin 8(6) (Nov.–Dec. 1998).
11 Council doc. 6621/1/02.
12 This programme evolved into the AENEAS budget line – a five‐year, €250 million programme to improve
migration controls in countries of origin and transit of migrants and refugees that began in 2004. Now called
the Thematic Programme for Cooperation with Third countries in the Areas of Migration and Asylum, the
programme has an annual budget of around €75 million.
13 EU Presidency conclusions of 15‐16 Dec. 2005 [emphasis added]. See also COM (2005) 621 final.
14 Regulation 2007/2004/EC.
15 Council doc. 12049/06 EXT 1.
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EU’s southern maritime borders. Each participating member state would establish a National
Coordination Centre (NCC) to work with FRONTEX, the other member states, and, where
appropriate, third countries. In December 2006 the European Council invited FRONTEX to establish a
permanent European Coastal Patrol Network (ECPN) as soon as possible “to combat illegal
immigration along the southern maritime borders.”16 The joint patrols of border guards,
coastguards, and naval forces initially focussed on the Canary Islands and the area south of the
Iberian Peninsula (led by Portugal and Spain), the northern Mediterranean (France), and the north
Adriatic (Italy and Slovenia). Ten Mediterranean countries are now participating in the ECPN but
there has been no external review of how it has been working to date.17
The BORTEC study analysed the coastal surveillance assets of seven member states18 and
recommended the establishment of what would later be called EUROSUR, based on increased
coastal surveillance by the ECPN’s National Coordination Centres and data sharing/fusion among
them and with FRONTEX. It also recommended that “serious consideration” be given to the “further
development of sensors, airborne and space borne unmanned means” to detect any vessel “of any
size and material and an estimation of its speed and tack “in all weather conditions/sea state, day
and night.”19 Surveillance would take place along all EU coastal waters up to a range of 30 nautical
miles as well as in “wide sea bands close to third countries’ coastal waters … Along the southern part
of the Mediterranean starting from the Straits of Gibraltar up to Cyprus including the Aegean Sea as
well as part of the Adriatic [and] Along the western coast of African countries.”20
In addition to the Coastal Patrols Network and EUROSUR taken forward by FRONTEX, the European
Commission is pursuing an “Integrated Maritime Policy for the EU” launched in October 2007. This
policy implies that EUROSUR will ultimately be part of a “more interoperable surveillance system to
bring together existing monitoring and tracking systems used for maritime safety and security,
protection of the marine environment, fisheries control, control of external borders and other law
enforcement activities.”21 A maritime surveillance network for the defence community is also being
developed under the auspices of the European Defence Agency.22 Both of these initiatives could
have significant implications for the way the proposed EUROSUR system is developed and used in
practice.
16 European Council Conclusions, 14–15 Dec. 2006. See also EU Press Release on ECPN, MEMO/07/203, 24
May 2007.
17 The participating countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Romania, and
Slovenia.
18 Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain.
19 BORTEC Study, p. 105.
20 BORTEC Study, pp. 98–99.
21 COM (2007) 575 final.
22 See “Maritime surveillance”, European Defence Agency, available at:
http://www.eda.europa.eu/othera ctivities/maritimesurveillance.
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2.1.1 The EUROSUR roadmap
In February 2008 the European Commission produced a Communication on EUROSUR in which it
announced that it was to begin developing the EUROSUR system, rendering somewhat hollow its
invitation to the European Parliament to “discuss the recommendations put forward in the
Communication.”23 Eight specific steps were envisaged within these three phases (see Box 1). In
addition, the Commission announced its intention to produce a Technical Study to design the system
architecture and estimate the approximate financial costs. This has resulted in the European and
national parliaments being presented with something of a fait accompli , insofar as being asked what
kind of new border surveillance systems (if any) should be introduced at the European level.
Box 1: The EUROSUR roadmap24
PHASE 1: Upgrade and extend national border surveillance systems and interlinking national
infrastructures in a communication network
Step 1: Establish National Coordination Centres in the member states with “the capacity
to provide situational awareness of conditions and activities along the external borders as
well as all the necessary tools to react accordingly.”
Step 2: Set up a secure computerised communication network to “exchange data 24
hours a day in real‐time between centres in Member States as well as with FRONTEX.”
Step 3: Increase EU financial and logistical support for neighbouring third countries for
the setting up of border surveillance infrastructure.
PHASE 2: Develop and implement common tools and applications for border surveillance at EU
level
Step 4: Conduct research and development to improve the performance of surveillance
tools, in particular earth observation satellites and UAVs.
Step 5: Development of shared surveillance tools, with FRONTEX acting as a facilitator.
Step 6: Develop surveillance systems covering the open seas to provide a “Common pre‐
frontier intelligence picture.”
PHASE 3: Create a common monitoring and information sharing environment for the EU
maritime domain that allows all relevant data from national surveillance, new surveillance tools,
European and international reporting systems and intelligence sources to be gathered, analysed,
and disseminated in a structured manner between the relevant national authorities.
Step 7: Establish an integrated network of reporting and surveillance systems for border
control and internal security purposes covering the Mediterranean Sea, the southern
Atlantic Ocean (Canary Islands), and the Black Sea; common pre‐frontier intelligence
pictures could be developed to combine intelligence information with that obtained from
surveillance tools.
Step 8: Create an integrated network of all European maritime reporting and surveillance
systems covering all maritime activities, including safety, protection of the marine
environment, fisheries control, and law enforcement.
23 COM (2008) 68 final.
24 Idem.
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Figure 1: EUROSUR in action25
25 Source: GLOBE project presentation, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=5119.
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2.1.2 The draft EUROSUR Regulation
The draft EUROSUR Regulation was published by the European Commission in December 2011.26 It
certainly could have been produced much sooner after the Lisbon Treaty had entered into force,
allowing for a proper debate to have taken place ahead of the substantial steps taken to implement
the EUROSUR roadmap (these are discussed further in section 4).
The purpose of EUROSUR is – as described in the impact assessment and reflected in Article 1 of the
proposal – “to improve the situational awareness and reaction capability of Member States and the
Agency when preventing irregular migration and cross‐border crime at the external land and
maritime borders.” The preamble of the proposal states that the EUROSUR also has the purpose of
“protecting and saving lives of migrants”,27 but this is not explicitly provided for in the legislative
provisions beyond a general reference to compliance with fundamental rights and “prioritising” the
needs of vulnerable groups, including those in distress at sea.28 The provisions on surveillance, on
the other hand, are detailed, wide‐ranging, and defined in the broadest possible terms.29
In practical terms, as well as establishing a comprehensive European Border Surveillance System
based on a complex “system‐of‐systems” approach,30 the Regulation would extend the obligations of
Schengen states – conducting border checks and surveillance to detect criminal activity and prevent
unauthorised migration – with a much stronger requirement to conduct comprehensive “24/7”
surveillance of those land and sea borders that FRONTEX designates as high‐risk in terms of
unauthorised migration. The draft Regulation would also significantly expand the current role and
powers of FRONTEX – from conducting such risk assessments and coordinating joint operations to
performing surveillance of the seas beyond EU territory through a “Common pre‐frontier intelligence
picture” based on the sharing of information and intelligence. The Regulation would also oblige all
participating states – not just those deemed to have high risk or vulnerable borders – to make a
26 COM (2011) 873 final, 12 Dec. 2011.
27 Recital 1.
28 Article 2(3).
29 According to Article 3: (a) “situational awareness” means the ability to monitor, detect, identify, track and
understand cross‐border activities in order to find reasoned grounds for control measures on the basis of
combining new information with existing knowledge ; (b) “reaction capability” means the ability to perform
actions aimed at countering illegal crossborder movements , including the means and timelines to react
adequately to unusual circumstances; (c) “situational picture” means a graphical interface to present real‐time
data, information and intelligence received from different authorities, sensors, platforms and other sources,
which is shared across communication and information channels with other authorities in order to achieve
situational awareness and support the reaction capability along the external borders and the pre‐frontier area ;
(d) “cross‐border crime” means any serious or organised crime committed at the external borders of Member
States, such as trafficking in human beings, smuggling of drugs and other illicit activities; (e) “external border
section” means the whole or a part of the external land or sea border of a Member State as defined by national
legislation or as determined by the national coordination centre or any other responsible national authority ; (f)
“pre‐frontier area” means the geographical area beyond the external border of Member States, which is not
covered by a national border surveillance system [emphasis added].
30 See Box 2 on p. 14 for a detailed overview. The European Defence Agency describes a “system of systems”
as a set or arrangement of systems that, for reasons of physical distance or of different primary
responsibilities, do not lend themselves to fusion into a single system. “A commonality in procedures,
databases used, or overall objectives, advise and allow a certain pooling of resources with synergetic effect,
without losing physical and organisational independence. This pooling of resources can be made in a centrally
organised way, or by an association of peers.” Wise Pen Team, “Maritime surveillance in support of CSDP: The
Wise Pen Team Final Report to EDA Steering Board”, Apr. 2010, p. 48.
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substantial investment in the alignment of their own border control systems with EUROSUR’s
standards and requirements.
The EUROSUR system will link the member states to FRONTEX via a network of National
Coordination Centres. The NCCs will be obliged to maintain a National Situational Picture that covers
their coastlines and territorial waters “in order to provide all authorities with responsibilities in
border surveillance at national level with effective, accurate and timely information which is relevant
for the prevention of irregular migration and cross‐border crime.”31 The draft Regulation then sets
out in some detail how the National Situational Picture is to be organised into three specific events,
operational and analytical “layers”, each with three or four “sub‐layers”. At a later date it is planned
to link the landlocked member states into the EUROSUR system. The NCCs will be responsible for
coordinating the national responses to any threats to security identified by FRONTEX/EUROSUR,
effectively extending the mandate of the existing network of NCCs established by those member
states who participate in the European Coastal Patrol Network established in 2006.32 “Voluntary”
guidelines for NCCs drawn up by FRONTEX were adopted in 200933 and subsequently incorporated
into the Schengen catalogue on External Border Control,34 obliging Schengen states to adopt a
national Border Management Strategy, establish an NCC, and develop the surveillance infrastructure
enabling participation in EUROSUR. By the end of 2011, 16 out of the 18 member states located at
the southern and eastern Schengen external borders had established their NCCs, with the majority
of them having become operational in 2011.35
The counterpart for the NCCs is the FRONTEX Situation Centre (FSC), which was established in
2008.36 Information is exchanged between the FSC and NCCs via a secure computerised
communication network. This allows FRONTEX to combine the “national situational pictures” into a
multi‐layered European Situational Picture, which shall also include “information collected … from
other relevant European and international organisations [and] other sources.”37 FRONTEX shall also
be responsible for maintaining the Common Pre‐Frontier Intelligence Picture, which basically
amounts to the surveillance of non‐territorial waters and the territories of third states. The Common
Pre‐Frontier Intelligence Picture shall be comprised of data provided by NCCs, immigration liaison
officers in third countries, other relevant European and international organisations, third countries,
and any other sources . FRONTEX will also be responsible for the “common application of surveillance
tools” including satellites, ship reporting systems, vessel monitoring systems, and “sensors mounted
on any platforms, including manned and unmanned aerial vehicles.”38
31 Article 9. The National Situational Picture “shall be composed of” information fed from a myriad of existing
surveillance systems: national border surveillance systems; stationary and mobile sensors operated by national
authorities (radars etc.); patrols on border surveillance and other monitoring missions; local, regional, and
other coordination centres; other relevant national authorities and systems; the Agency; National
Coordination Centres in other member states and in third countries; regional networks with neighbouring third
countries; ship‐reporting systems, such as the AIS and the VMS; and any other sources.
32 Article 5.
33 FRONTEX decision of 10 Mar. 2009, revised 23 Nov. 2010.
34 Council doc. 7864/09.
35 SEC (2011) 1536 final, 12 Dec. 2011, pp. 15–16.
36 See “FRONTEX one stop shop”, FRONTEX, available at: https://foss.frontex.europa.eu/.
37 Article 10, draft Regulation [emphasis added].
38 Article 12.
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Finally, the Explanatory Memorandum states that “cooperation with neighbouring third countries is
crucial for the success of EUROSUR.” This is reflected in the draft Regulation, which provides for
third‐state participation in the EUROSUR Communication Network along with EUROPOL, the
Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre–Narcotics and the Centre de Coordination pour la lutte
antidrogue en Méditerranée, the European Maritime Safety Agency, the European Fisheries Control
Agency, and other EU agencies and international organisations.39 We are concerned that a
potentially limitless amount of third parties – coupled with the lack of meaningful oversight on the
sharing of data between these parties – implies that “function creep” will be built into the EUROSUR
system from the outset.
Figure 2: “Operational nodes” in the Common Pre‐Frontier Intelligence Picture40
2.1.3 Beyond border control: integrated maritime surveillance
In October 2009 the European Commission produced a follow‐up to its earlier Communication on an
“integrated maritime policy”, with another entitled “Towards the integration of maritime
surveillance: A Common Information Sharing Environment [CISE] for the EU maritime domain.”41 This
was followed a year later by a “Draft Roadmap towards establishing [CISE] for the surveillance of the
EU maritime domain.”42 These two documents propose that EUROSUR is ultimately integrated into a
broader system at the disposal of a host of national and international agencies, including those
responsible for “Maritime Safety (including Search and Rescue), Maritime Security and prevention of
pollution caused by ships; Fisheries control; Marine pollution preparedness and response; Marine
environment; Customs; Border control; General law enforcement; Defence.”
39 Article 17.
40 Source: ESG, “EUROSUR Technical Study – Subproject 3 Final Report – Common Pre‐frontier Intelligence
Picture”, Jan. 2010, p. 59.
41 COM (2009) 538 final, 15 Oct. 2009.
42 COM (2010) 584 final.
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Figure 3: EUROSUR and the Common Information Sharing Environment43
While a full analysis of the potential components of the Common Information Sharing Environment
is beyond the scope of this report, Box 2, describes some of the main “information layers” and
stakeholders that are likely to be integrated into EUROSUR/CISE.
According to the draft CISE roadmap, the “common needs to most of the [maritime surveillance]
User Communities are to obtain an enhanced basic maritime situation awareness picture … This
picture may be composed by data stemming from a combination of systems and sensors detecting
cooperative and non‐cooperative targets of any size.”44 This is essentially the rationale for EUROSUR
as set out in FRONTEX’s BORTEC study. It is also clear that the European Commission envisages
EUROSUR providing this capacity to a wide CISE user community, describing the European Border
Surveillance System as “Integrating the needs and tools of all aspects of maritime surveillance in one
common information sharing environment along the lines set out in this [CISE] Communication.”45
As to the purpose of the new Common Information Sharing Environment, the draft roadmap states
that it will be used:
(a) To obtain data as regards illegal activities and threats impacting on both internal and external EU
security, and involving any type of vessel . Such information is gathered essentially by coast guards,
border guards, police services, and defence forces .
(b) To obtain specific catch information, combining it with position information of fishing vessels to
fight against illegal fishing .
43 COM (2010) 584, p. 5.
44 Emphasis added.
45 SEC (2009) 1341 final, p. 3.
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(c) To obtain advanced electronic data concerning all goods entering and leaving the EU customs
territory in order to enable a pre‐assessment of the safety and security of goods.46
Insofar as the European Commission clearly envisages the use of EUROSUR for the purposes of
fisheries control and for customs enforcement, as well as by national military forces, this extended
scope and purpose should have been set out in the draft legislation, not least because of its
potential impact on fundamental rights. Instead, as noted above, the proposal simply provides for an
open‐ended list of datasets and agencies to be integrated into the system. There may or may not be
very good reasons for using EUROSUR for the above purposes, but these should be clarified from the
outset. It is otherwise difficult to see how the legislation establishing the EUROSUR system can be
adopted in the knowledge that the system’s scope and purpose could be much wider than those to
which the EU legislature is being asked to consent.
46 COM (2010) 584, p. 4 [emphasis added].
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Box 2: EUROSUR – A system of systems
International Maritime Organisation requirements: AIS and LRIT
The International Maritime Organisation requires cargo and passenger ships to transmit data that
can be read by coastal authorities using radar and satellite. Automatic Identification Systems (AIS)
broadcast information from ship‐borne transponders, including the identification, position, speed,
course, and basic information about the ship and its cargo.47 Long Range Identification and Tracking
(LRIT) requires the periodic transmission of data concerning the identity and position of vessels via
satellite. The data is picked up by LRIT Data Centres, although the International Maritime
Organisation stipulates that only the flag state, the contracting (port) state of the ship's destination,
and coastal states within a distance of 1,000 nautical miles have access to the data.48 AIS and LRIT
data is to be incorporated into the EUROSUR system.
EU fisheries control and Vessel Monitoring and Detection Systems (VMS/VDS)
Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) were created as part of the EU Common Fisheries Policy.
Legislation requires each member state to establish a satellite‐based VMS to monitor the position
and movement of fishing vessels.49 VMS provide reports on the location of a vessel at regular
intervals and can be used to provide information on its speed and course. Monitoring authorities
use VMS data to police access to fishing zones and verify that vessels hold the necessary licences
and quotas to fish in the relevant area. In 2009 the Fisheries Control legislation was amended so
that the Vessel Monitoring System became the Vessel Detection System (VDS) and that VMS, VDS,
and AIS data collected for fisheries control can be transmitted to Commission agencies and other
public authorities of the member states “engaged in surveillance operations for the purpose of
maritime safety and security, border control, protection of the marine environment and general
law enforcement.”50
SAFESEANET
SAFESEANET is a vessel traffic monitoring and information system run by the European Maritime
Safety Agency (EMSA), which enables the EU member states plus Norway and Iceland to provide
and receive information on ships, ship movements, and hazardous cargoes in order to prevent
marine pollution, police the transport of hazardous materials, and detect health and safety
breaches.51 SAFESEANET includes a dedicated EU Vessel Traffic Monitoring and Information System
that combines AIS position reports and data supplied in accordance with other EU Directives, such
as those relating to port reception facilities for ship waste control inspections. According to EMSA,
SAFESEANET tracks 12,000 ships in EU waters every day and records 100 million AIS positions every
month. SAFESEANET was established as a Central Index System that functions like a telephone
switchboard insofar as it stores only references to the data locations and not the actual data itself.
In 2010 EMSA added a dedicated ship‐tracking module to the SAFESEANET information
system. The
SAFESEANET Tracking Information and Exchange System combines information from Port
Notification messages, Ship Notification messages (based on AIS data), Hazardous Materials
Notification messages, and Incident Reports. According to EMSA Executive Director Willem de
Ruiter, “This approach will give Member State users a whole range of important new capabilities to
47 AIS became mandatory for all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages,
all cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards, and all passenger ships irrespective of size on 31 Dec. 2004.
48 LRIT became mandatory for passenger and cargo ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards on international
voyages and mobile offshore drilling units on 31 Dec. 2008.
49 Directive 2002/59/EC. Since 1 January 2005 all Community vessels exceeding 15 metres overall length are
subject to VMS, excluding those that are used exclusively for aquaculture and operating exclusively inside the
baselines of member states. Third‐country vessels subject to VMS are obliged to have an operational satellite
tracking device installed on board when they are in Community waters.
50 Articles 11 and 12, Directive 2009/17/EC.
51 Directive 2002/59/EC (as amended by Directive 2009/17/EC) on the establishment of a Community vessel
traffic monitoring and information system. See also “SafeSeaNet”, European Maritime Safety Agency, available
at: http://www.emsa.europa.eu/operations/maritime ‐surveillance/safeseanet/113 ‐safeseanet.html.
Page | 24
work with … Instead of just accessing a database, they will be able to see the whole near‐real‐time
situation for the EU displayed on a map right in front of them, and to select all ships, ports, sea
areas and many other elements at the click of a button. Much better still, we will soon be in a
position to offer an integrated display system which will be able to identify and locate ships
anywhere in the world and also show the EU pollution and accident pictures. The user base is
expanding all the time, with port state control officers being among the latest to join the system.”
In 2010 a pilot project on merging data from the EU’s VMS and SAFESEANET information system
was launched in the Western Mediterranean. The project is led by EMSA with participation from
Spain, France, Italy, FRONTEX, and the Community Fisheries Control Agency. The Commission has
stated it intends to amend the Directive governing the use of SAFESEANET in 2013 to allow its
incorporation into EUROSUR.
e‐Maritime
The EU’s e‐Maritime initiative aims to foster the use of advanced information technologies in the
maritime transport sector by funding the development and take‐up of the latest enabling ICT
technologies for the improvement of maritime transport services. Ports in particular use a variety of
automated information systems for the recording of information regarding ships, cargo, crew, and
so forth. “The EU e‐Maritime envisages promoting interoperability in its broader sense. It aims to
stimulate coherent, transparent, efficient and simplified solutions in support of cooperation,
interoperability and consistency between Member States and transport operators.”52
e‐Customs
The EU’s “electronic customs” project aims to replace paper format customs procedures with EU‐
wide electronic ones in order to enhance security at the EU’s external borders and to facilitate
trade. It should therefore benefit both businesses and citizens.53 Customs Information Systems
include the dedicated EU Customs Information Systems, a new Computerised Transit System, an
Automated Export System, and an Economic Operators’ Registration and Identification System.
Counter drug trafficking and maritime piracy initiatives
Two operational task forces have been established by the member states to combat drug trafficking
by sea. The Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre–Narcotics was established in 2007 by Spain,
France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom to “enhance criminal
intelligence and coordinate police action on the high seas, with a view to intercepting vessels
carrying cocaine and cannabis,” and naval and law‐enforcement bodies (police, customs)
collaborate with it.54 The Centre de Coordination pour la Lutte Anti‐Drogue en Méditerranée is a
law enforcement initiative to curb drug smuggling in the Western Mediterranean and was launched
under the French Presidency in 2008 – it is open to all EU member states and North African
countries in the region for bilateral intelligence ‐sharing to combat drug trafficking.55 Both
organisations are mentioned in the draft EUROSUR Regulation.56 The European Commission has
also suggested that EUROSUR’s “situational picture” could be used for counter‐piracy initiatives.
The EU’s Critical Maritime Routes programme was launched in 2010 with pilot projects in the Gulf
of Aden and Bab El Mandeb Straits as well as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. It envisages
support for surveillance and protection measures for Community vessels sailing through areas
prone to piracy.57
52 See “e‐Maritime”, European Commission, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/maritime/e ‐
maritime_en.htm.
53 See “Electronic customs”, European Commission, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/taxati on_customs/customs/policy_issues/electro nic_customs_initiative/index_en.htm.
54 See “Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre–Narcotics”, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug
Addiction, available at: http://www.emcdda.europa. eu/about/partners/maoc.
55 SEC (2009) 1341 final, p. 5.
56 Article 17, draft Regulation.
57 See “Building regional maritime capacities”, European Union External Action Service, available at:
http://eeas.europa.eu/piracy/regio nal_maritime_capacities_en.htm.
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National and EDPS military operations
The European Defence Agency launched its Maritime Surveillance project in 2006 with the aim of
creating “a network using existing naval and maritime information exchange systems” in order “to
avoid duplication of effort and the use of available technologies, data and information; to enhance
cooperation in a simple, efficient and low‐cost solution for civil‐military cooperation; and to
support safety and security.”58 A Maritime Surveillance project working group on maritime
surveillance networking that was established in 2006 is developing “naval maritime interoperability
by developing agreed standards and protocols using gateways and existing systems rather than a
dedicated new system.” In 2009 the European Defence Agency contracted a Wise Pen Team,
comprising five retired three‐star admirals from five EU naval states to make the case for Maritime
Surveillance in Support of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy.59 As the military takes on
more and more policing roles – such as countering drug trafficking, piracy and even counter‐
terrorism – its demand for access to EU maritime surveillance assets such as EUROSUR is likely to
increase.
58 “Maritime surveillance”, European Defence Agency, available at:
http://www.eda.europa.eu/othera ctivities/maritimesurveillance.
59 Wise Pen Team, “Maritime surveillance”; see also Wise Pen Team, “Maritime surveillance in support of
CSDP: The Wise Pen Team Progress Report”, Dec. 2010.
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2.2 The EU “smart borders” initiative
In contrast to EUROSUR, there are as yet no legislative proposals on the EU’s smart borders
initiative. This makes an assessment of this initiative difficult, because there is no detailed
description of the exact set‐up, functions, or modalities of an Entry‐Exit System or Registered
Traveller Programme.
The idea of a European Exit‐Entry System, loosely modelled on the US‐VISIT system, was first floated
in December 2004, when the European Policy Evaluation Consortium presented its extended impact
assessment of a (then) future Visa Information System (VIS).60 The EES was described as a
computerised system that would allow the monitoring of the movements of all visa holders – from
the visa application stage through to their arrival at the external border and ultimate departure from
the Schengen area. The identity of all third‐country nationals would be checked, but biometric data
would only be required from nationals of countries subject to EU visa requirements. This data would
be gathered at the consular posts and verified when the visa holder arrived at an EU entry point; it
would then be checked as to whether they were the same person who received the visa, and
whether there was any information about their involvement in terrorism or crime. Upon leaving the
country, the visitor would be required to confirm their departure at the exit points, which would
demonstrate their compliance with immigration requirements, facilitate their future travels, but also
identify people who overstay their visas (“overstayers”). At this stage there was no link between the
EES and the RTP. The 2004 impact assessment noted that the creation of such a system would be
very costly, have a significant human rights impact, and go “far beyond the objective of improving
the implementation of Common Visa Policy through better exchange of information between
Member States and indeed other objectives set by the Council for a VIS.”61
Having agreed on the creation of a biometric Visa Information System, the idea of an EES remained
on the backburner – not least, according to the Commission, because the “internal security and
intelligence communities” saw some shortcomings related to VIS: it only dealt with TCNs on the so‐
called blacklist of countries that require an advance visa; there was no similar mechanism to control
the identity or the legality of the entry of other categories of TCNs, such as holders of long‐stay visas
or residence permits, or TCNs that are not subject to a visa requirement (those on the so‐called
white list).62 VIS was also unable to monitor the entry of TCN visa holders or verify whether they had
departed before the expiry of their right to stay.63 Later in 2005 the Commission suggested that an
EES could also be used as a register of temporary (seasonal) workers from third countries, which
could keep track of those TCNs that had left the EU at the expiration of their temporary
residence/work permit and those who had “overstayed.”64 It was also becoming clear, however, that
collecting biometric data from all TCNs entering the Schengen area would result in longer waiting
lines at the borders. The “long‐term scenario” of an EES was, in turn, linked to the introduction of a
60 European Policy Evaluation Consortium, “Study for the extended impact assessment of Visa Information
System”, Dec. 2004.
61 Idem, pp. 31–37.
62 The “black list” and “white list” countries are set out in Regulation 539/2011/EC (as amended).
63 COM (2005) 597 final, p. 6. In 2006 the Commission stressed that SIS II would also not be a sufficient tool to
replace the need for an EES, since the alerts registered in respect of third‐country nationals in SIS II “only
concern persons to be refused entry into the Schengen area, which is a very limited number compared to
those required to be registered by an entry‐exit system”, COM (2006) 402 final, p. 6.
64 COM (2005) 669 final, pp. 10–11.
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border‐crossing facilitation scheme for frequent border crossers. At the end of 2006, the European
Council invited the Commission to report before the end of 2007 on “how to improve access control,
including on the feasibility of establishing a generalized and automated entry‐exit system for this
purpose” in order to enhance border control and to allow persons to be identified reliably.65
In February 2008 the Commission produced its “smart borders” communication, outlining three
potential measures to meet the dual objectives of enhancing security of the EU and facilitating travel
for third‐country nationals: (1) the creation of a Registered Traveller Programme to facilitate the
travels for “bona fide” registered travellers, (2) the introduction of an Entry‐Exit System, and (3) the
introduction of a European Electronic System of Travel Authorisation.66 Together with the
accompanying impact assessment, these documents are the most detailed public records that
explain the use and potential functionalities of the system. The French and Czech presidencies of the
EU treated the creation of an EES as a priority and the proposals were received enthusiastically by
the EU Council Working Party on Frontiers.67 In 2009 the Commission stated that it was in the
process of conducting another impact assessment for both the EES and the RTP and announced that
it would present a legislative proposal “by mid‐2011” with a view to the systems becoming
operational in 2015.68 “Proposals for an entry/exit system” alongside a fast‐track registered traveller
programme were also included in the Stockholm Programme, with a view to the systems becoming
operational “as soon as possible”.69
Despite these commitments, it is clear that the appetite among the member states to create another
large‐scale information management system in the area of Justice and Home Affairs has been
decreasing since 2005. The ongoing financial crisis has placed increased pressure on national and EU
budgets. The failure to
implement the Schengen Information System II (see Box 3), which has proved
much more expensive than initially envisaged, has compounded this problem. Some – but certainly
not all – member states have also been concerned from the outset that systems of the magnitude of
EES and RTP require strict data protection standards, and they understand that this is a sensitive
issue for the European Parliament. All of this was acknowledged at an informal meeting of the EU
Justice and Home Affairs Council in July 2011 in Sopot, Poland, where ministers stated that “before
embarking on new projects of this kind, the Commission and the Member States must first ensure
there is a shared understanding and a strong commitment and ownership towards working together
65 Council doc. 16879/06, p. 9. During the Portuguese Presidency in 2007, the use of new technologies for
enhancing the EU’s border management was further discussed at the Informal Strategic Committee on
Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum on 4–5 Sep. 2007 and the Informal Justice and Home Affairs Council on 1–2
Oct. 2007.
66 COM (2008) 69 final, pp. 4–5. Initially it was suggested that a European ESTA would only apply to TCNs who
are not subject to the visa requirement. They would be requested to make an electronic application, thereby
supplying, in advance of travelling, data identifying the traveller and specifying the passport and travel details.
67 The Working Party on Frontiers discussed the proposals during 2008 and 2009. Finland, Hungary, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, and Slovakia presented their national EES or RTP in the Working Group,
and two questionnaires were circulated among the members of the Working Group, first to assess their
opinions on the need an functions for an EES for TCNs in the Schengen area, and secondly to gather some
relevant statistical information. Between 31 Aug. and 6 Sep. 2009 a “data collection exercise” was held in
order to gather comparable data on entries and exits of different categories of travellers at different types of
external borders in order to help the Commission to submit a legislative proposal by early 2010.
68 SEC (2010) 1480 final, p. 13.
69 Council doc. 16484/09, p. 55.
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to deliver on commonly agreed objectives. Therefore Ministers are invited to express their views on
the justification for the system, notably the added value in light of the technological implications
(including in relation to data protection) and the cost.”70 The Commission was then invited to
present another Communication that would “reflect” these discussions.
In its October 2011 Communication on smart borders, the European Commission set out several
options for further consideration, while stating that it did not intend to “prejudge any future specific
proposals”, which would be accompanied by a full impact assessment in due course. Two things
were clear, however. Firstly, the new EU Agency for Large‐scale IT Systems would be responsible for
the development and operational management of the systems in order “to limit possible risks such
as those which have arisen during the development of the SIS II and the VIS.”71 Secondly, the
European Electronic System of Travel Authorisation for visa‐exempted third‐country nationals was
no longer under consideration (and is not discussed further in this paper), since its potential
contribution to enhancing the security of the member states “would neither justify the collection of
personal data at such a scale nor the financial cost and the impact on international relations.”72
Finally, in February 2012, the Danish Presidency hosted a conference on “Innovation Border
Management”, which was intended to provide input to the Commission, which was now expecting
to deliver its legislative proposal on smart borders in June 2012. At the time of writing, it seems
unlikely that the proposal will be presented before the summer.
2.2.1 Entry‐exit system
The general purpose of the EES would be to identify overstayers, that is, persons who enter the EU
legally with a valid travel document and/or visa, but who become illegal migrants when their legal
entitlement to stay expires. This category of overstayers is said to constitute “the biggest category of
illegal immigrants in the EU”.73 In its “border package” of 2008, the Commission had suggested that
the EES would automatically register the time and place of entry and exit of third‐country nationals
who are admitted for a short stay (up to three months) in order to verify their exit and identify them
if they overstayed.74 In this case, an alert would automatically be sent to relevant national
authorities if a person’s stay expires and no exit data is captured by the EES.75 This would allow
national authorities to take unspecified “appropriate measures”, which could include fines or issuing
70 Conclusions of the Informal Meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Sopot, 18–19 July 2011, p.
2.
71 COM (2011) 680 final, p. 13.
72 Idem, p. 7.
73 COM (2008) 69 final, p. 5. According to the Commission, reliable data on the number of irregular
immigrants within the EU is not available, but conservative estimates from 2008 vary between 1.9 and 3.8
million. COM (2011) 680 final, p. 4.
74 Currently the stamping of the travel document is the sole instrument indicating the dates of entry and exit
at the disposal of border guards and immigration authorities. These stamps are said to be “often difficult to
interpret” and “may be illegible or the target of counterfeiting”. SEC (2008) 153 final, p. 10.
75 COM (2008) 69 final, p. 7. In 2011 the Commission stressed that the electronic recording of the entry and
exit information ideally would have to take place at central level instead of at the national level. “Recording
the entry and exit information at national level first would necessitate the replication of this information in 27+
other national systems in order to keep them all updated with matching entry and exit records. This might be
burdensome and time‐consuming when persons enter and leave Schengen via different Member States”, COM
(2011) 680 final, p. 8.
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an expulsion order. The Commission argued that the EES would deter TCNs from overstaying and
also provide information “for operational purposes” on patterns of overstaying (e.g., travel route,
fraudulent sponsors, country of origin, and reasons for travelling) as well as data on migration flows
and overstayers for visa policy purposes.76
At this point in time, it is not clear yet which data would be collected by a potential EES. To reach its
goals of identifying overstayers, the system would at least need to record and store the following
information in order to track and calculate the time spent in a given area and identify the overstayer:
(a) border‐crossing point of entry and exit; (b) date and time of event; (c) type of travel document(s),
including number of document and issuing country; (d) the traveller’s personal details extracted
directly from the travel credential, including name, sex, and date of birth.
In its last Communication on smart borders, in 2011, the Commission suggested that the “best way
forward” would be to establish the EES in stages and begin by recording only alphanumeric data
(e.g., name, nationality, and passport number) and introducing biometric identifiers (fingerprints and
a digital image of the face) at a later date.77 However, a majority of member states “expressing a
position” on the issue at a Council Meeting in December 2011 had wished to introduce biometrics
into the EES from the outset.78 It is unclear how long the data would be retained, but it is likely that
the VIS standard of five years’ retention will be adopted.79 In 2008 the Commission further envisaged
“an automated housekeeping procedure which cleans up aged records according to the retention
times”.80 It is far from clear what will happen with data from a TCN who has entered and left the
territory in accordance with the rules, despite the data no longer being needed for the purposes for
which it was collected.
The Commission states explicitly that “the data generated by the entry/exit system would be used by
the competent immigration authorities.”81 In the accompanying impact assessment, however, the
Commission envisages the possibility of other authorities having access to the overstayers database:
“various authorities may, according to an agreed legal framework and when necessary, access and
use the information on the different target groups that is available in the database.” The
Commission stipulates that this should only apply “in exceptional circumstances where duly
authorised law enforcement authorities seek with good cause, evidence on the travel histories of
named individuals.”82 Eleven member states are currently implementing national entry/exit systems
and at least seven of them – Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland – seem
to provide law enforcement authorities with routine access; they see any EU system as serving the
same purpose.83 Were the EES to be given an explicit internal security function, those same states
are also likely to demand the inclusion of data similar to that held in the Visa Information System,84
76 COM (2008) 69 final, p. 8.
77 COM (2011) 680 final, p. 9.
78 Council Doc. 17706/11, p. 2.
79 See Article 23 of Regulation 767/2008/EC.
80 SEC (2008) 153 final, p. 25.
81 Idem, p. 57, further specifies that this includes “immigration and border control” authorities.
82 Idem, p. 27
83 According to the Commission, 11 member states are currently implementing a national EES (Finland,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Portugal) COM(2011) 690
final, p. 6.
84 Article 9, VIS Regulation.
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such as the address of the accommodation provider or place of residence, the final destination, and
the purpose of the trip or stay.85
2.2.2 EES relationship to existing EU systems: VIS and SIS II
The explicit objective and purpose of the EES has significant implications for the architecture of the
system and its relationship with other EU law enforcement and migration control databases,
particularly the Visa Information System and the Schengen Information System (SIS), which the
member states and the Commission have been working on upgrading (into SIS II) for more than a
decade (see Box 3).
Since an EES will cover the entry and exit data of all third‐country nationals, it is logical that data
related to TCNs who are subject to a visa requirement will be interoperable with the VIS system. 86
Indeed, the Commission has suggested that a fully operational and developed VIS is “a prerequisite
for the implementation of a Smart Borders system.”87 If the sole purpose of an EES is to detect
overstayers, the most likely scenario would be that a dedicated EES database that is interoperable
with VIS and SIS (II) and has its own central architecture will be developed. The biometric features of
the EES will be integrated into the VIS‐SIS II architecture via the European Union Biometric Matching
System, since the Commission envisages that the Biometric Matching System will be the “central
biometric identity assurance tool” for all of its pan‐European applications enabling the biometric
data held in the VIS database to be checked against fingerprints at points of entry (and potentially
exit).88
In addition to fingerprint verification in applications like VIS, the Biometric Matching System will also
offer fingerprint identification, allowing the searching of large datasets. In this case, only the entry
and exit dates and places would have to be collected for third‐country nationals under a visa
obligation, without the need to reproduce the information stored in the VIS. The personal data of
TCNs who are not under a visa obligation would be stored in this separate database, together with
their entry‐exit information.89 An explicit link with VIS could also work in another way. If a person
has been flagged as an overstayer in the EES, one of the results could be that a person will not be
able to get a visa the next time s/he wants to enter the Schengen area – implying that not being
flagged as an overstayer would become a pre‐condition for visa approvals.
85 Council Doc 13267/1/09 REV 1.
86 The member states also appear to favour this option. Council Doc. 17706/11, p. 2.
87 COM (2011) 680 final, p. 7.
88 In 2009 the Commission mentioned the EES in its information management overivew, stating that “based
on biometric data verification“, an EES would deploy the same biometric matching system and operational
equipment as that used by SIS II and VIS. See “European Union – Biometric Matching System” factsheet,
available at: http://www.nws ‐sa.com/biometrics/EU_Matching_CS.pdf.
89 Purpose limitation restrictions would not allow the VIS to store data on visa‐exempt TCNs.
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Box 3: The Visa Information System and the Schengen Information System/SIS II
VISA Information System
The VIS has been operational since 11 October 2011. The central VIS database keeps data from visa
applications (including those that are refused) for a period of five years. This includes 10
fingerprints and a digital photograph from persons applying for a visa for the first time, for instance
at a consulate of a Schengen state. The first consular posts to be connected to the system were
those in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, followed by Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, and Syria. At the Schengen area’s external borders, the visa holder’s fingerprints are
checked in order to verify the identity of the visa holder. After a transitional period, the new EU
Agency for Large‐scale IT Systems (which will formally become operational in the autumn of 2012)
will take over the operational management of VIS. Eventually, the central database is expected to
include as many as 80 million visa applications. In addition to the Schengen states’ authorities
responsible for visa applications, asylum authorities – and in specific cases EUROPOL and national
law enforcement agencies – may request access to VIS data for the purposes of preventing,
detecting, and investigating terrorist and criminal offences. The Commission acknowledged that it
would be sensible to await the “complete and successful rollout” of the VIS to all consular posts and
border‐crossing points before the EES is implemented in practice.
Schengen Information System
The SIS has been operational since 1995 and has now been implemented in all EU member states
except Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland. Under the 1990
Schengen Convention, participating states issue “alerts”: on people wanted for arrest (art. 95) or in
connection with police investigations (art. 99) or criminal proceedings (art. 98); on “aliens” to be
refused entry to the entire Schengen area (art. 96); and on lost or stolen vehicles, firearms, identity
documents, and bank notes (art. 100). Alerts on persons are held in the SIS for a maximum of 10
years, though they must be reviewed by the issuing state every three years.90 Border guards and
immigration officials then check entrants to the Schengen area against the alerts in the SIS (this is
the system against which travel documents are checked upon entry into the Schengen area). Police
officers across the Schengen area also have access to the SIS in order to check whether the people
they suspect are wanted by other member states (it is up to the member states to decide which
national agency can have (partial) access to SIS alerts). Data entered into the SIS includes names
and aliases, physical characteristics, place and date of birth, nationality, and whether an individual
is armed and violent. An alert specifies which action should be taken against the person; the vast
majority of wanted persons consist of third‐country nationals who should be denied entry to the
Schengen area. Searches in SIS produce a “hit” when the details of a person or object sought match
those of an existing alert. There were more than 91,000 hits in 2010, out of a total 35.69 million
records. Between 1997 and 2010, a total of 253,640 TCNs were denied entry to EU territory
because of SIS data.
SIS II
Development and implementation of the “second generation” Schengen Information System (SIS II)
has been beset with problems. It is supposed to enhance the capacity and functions of SIS by
including more data categories and biometric data such as fingerprints. SIS II will share the
Biometric Matching System used by VIS. The first formal tests of the central SIS II system began in
May 2011, but it is still unclear when the EU member states will be connected to the new system. In
January 2012, the Commission reported that the total budgetary commitments made by the
Commission for the central SIS II architecture amounted to more than €135 million. There is also
substantial concern about the spiralling costs of upgrading national SIS systems.
90 This is with the exception of the Article 99 surveillance alerts, which must be reviewed annually. Data
relating to identity documents issued and to registered bank notes for a maximum of five years and those
relating to motor vehicles, trailers, and caravans for a maximum of three years (Articles 112–113, Schengen
Convention).
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The relationship between SIS/SIS II and the proposed EES should also be clarified. If the EES
automatically issues an alert to member state authorities on persons whose visas have expired and
whose exit has not been confirmed, the Schengen Information System – which effectively allows
routine computer checks by police in Schengen states to query international alerts issued by other
participating states – is the logical system through which to do this. Without an automated link
between EES and SIS/SIS II, the only point at which overstayers (especially those who move to
another member state) could conceivably be detected, is when they attempt to leave the Schengen
area, which strongly undermines the policing rationale for the EES system. However, issuing
automatic alerts on overstayers via the SIS/SIS II and enabling routine police checks to identify them
would be unlawful unless substantial changes to the legal framework governing that system were to
be made. Article 24 of Regulation No 1987/2006 on SIS II states clearly that “files issued for the
purposes of refusing entry or stay must be entered on the basis of a national alert resulting from a
decision taken by the competent administrative authorities or courts , based on a threat to public
policy or public security or to national security.” Therefore, unless the SIS Regulation is amended,
overstays could not be entered into the SIS (only the resulting expulsion orders when accompanied
by a deportation order).91
2.2.3 Registered Traveller Programme
The voluntary EU RTP would seek to reduce the time spent at the border‐crossing points for “bona
fide travellers”. Members of such a programme would benefit from a “simplified and automated”
border check after having gone through an extensive pre‐screening process. The Commission
estimates that an RTP would “speed up the border crossings of 4‐5 million travellers per year and lay
the basis for enhanced investments in automated border control technologies at major border
crossing points.”92 For those registered passengers, the average time for border‐crossings could be
cut “from the current 1‐2 minutes to below 30 seconds.”93
Any voluntary Registered Travellers Programme must provide pre‐authorised travellers with fast
entry to be of any use to those who are interested in applying to the programme; automated gates
are seen as the only way of achieving this. At these gates, a document reader would electronically
read the biometrics included in the travel documents, or stored in a system or database, and
compare them against the biometrics (fingerprints and facial image) of the passengers. The
Commission has argued that an RTP system would result in a more “efficient use” of border guards
since the automated gates would need little to no supervision by border guards. In its
Communication of 2008, the Commission suggested that one border guard should be able to
oversee up to 10 automatic border gates in operation.94 An RTP programme would therefore allow,
at least in theory, for the redeployment of existing border guards, enabling them to focus their
91 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Dec. 2008 on common
standards and procedures in member states for returning illegally staying TCNs [emphasis added].
92 COM (2011) 680 final, p. 12.
93 Idem.
94 At the same time, the Commission notes that it is “extremely difficult” to estimate the impact of the EES
and the RTP in practice on the number of border guards and on the travellers’ waiting time “as these depend
almost entirely on the individual border crossing point and the fact if the Registered Traveller Programme or
Automated Border Control system is used at that specific border crossing point or not”, SEC (2008) 153 final, p.
34.
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attention on more “risky” passengers who are not members of the RTP programme. This would
create a de facto division between high‐risk and low‐risk passengers. While any third‐country
national would be able to apply for this programme at any consulate of any member state, the
relaxation of border controls would only apply to low‐risk or bona fide travellers who are not
deemed to pose a threat to the security of the member states.
In 2008 the Commission listed some factors that could be used to determine which travellers could
be determined as “low risk”. A traveller was seen as bona fide when s/he travels frequently to the
Schengen area for legitimate reasons (for instance travelling on business), has a reliable travel
history (the person respects the conditions for their length of stay on each occasion),95 has proof of
sufficient means of subsistence, and holds a biometric passport.96 The passengers are checked
against a number of watch lists to make sure that they are not considered to be a threat to public
policy, internal security, public health, or international relations of any of the member states.97
According to the Commission “other criteria may be imposed.”98 In its 2011 Communication the
Commission provided far less information about the pre‐screening process, simply stating that this
will need to be “sufficiently thorough to compensate for alleviating the border check process.”99 At
its informal Council in July 2011, the Council hinted that the vetting criteria could be aligned with the
criteria for multiple‐entry visa holders.100
The Commission and the member states prefer to have a central EU RTP database for TCN nationals,
rather than having 27 decentralised interoperable systems.101 In its 2011 Communication, the
Commission outlined three options for storing the necessary data of registered travellers, which
would allow for an automated verification of the identity of the traveller: (1) storing the
alphanumeric and biometric data in a central database, (2) storing the data on a token issued to the
traveller, (3) a combination of a central data base with a token containing only a unique identifier
(i.e. application number) to be issued to the Registered Traveller.102 The third option is arguably the
best – from a data protection/security perspective – but it is more expensive to develop than the
option of a centralised register alone (costs are discussed further in section 4). A majority of the
member states have indicated their preference for the centralised storage of data, though some do
prefer a combination of a central database with a token.103
Currently there are only four operational RTP programmes in major airport and transfer hubs in the
EU; three of them (ABG in Germany, Iris in the United Kingdom, and Privium in the Netherlands) use
iris scans, while Parafes in France uses fingerprints. There are three further automatic border gate
systems in operation that work independently of any RTP system. These are RAPID in Portugal and
the Automated Border Control system in the United Kingdom and Spain. All three work on the basis
95 Note that this condtion would assume that there is a functioning EES system in place (cf. infra).
96 COM (2008) 69 final, p. 6.
97 The Commission foresees that also EU citizens could benefit from such automated gates when crossing the
external borders, “except that only random checks of the SIS and national databases can be carried out in
accordance with the Schengen Borders Code”, COM (2008) 69 final, p. 7.
98 SEC (2008) 153 final, p. 62.
99 COM (2011) 680 final, p. 11.
100 Conclusions of Informal Meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Sopot, 18–19 July 2011, p. 3.
101 COM (2011) 680 final, p. 8.
102 Idem, pp. 8–9.
103 Council doc. 17706/11, p. 2.
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of facial recognition. Most of these systems use only one biometric marker, whereas a future EU RTP
is likely to include both facial and fingerprint recognition. Membership of RTPs in the national
programmes is generally limited to EU/EEA citizens, and they are not interoperable. Given their high
cost and limited value for countries with relatively small numbers of travellers, it is clear that many
member states clearly harbour reservations about the need for an EU‐wide Registered Traveller
Programme.
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3 The fundamental rights impact of the EUROSUR and EU “smart border”
initiatives
In analysing the impact of the smart borders initiative and EUROSUR proposal on fundamental rights,
it is again important to stress that while there is already a legislative proposal for EUROSUR,
including a detailed impact assessment, the Commission is still contemplating the exact set‐up and
modalities of the smart borders package.
EUROSUR will be based on Article 77(2)(d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
on the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders. Whereas
the development of EUROSUR is well underway, the Commission has emphasised that no work will
be done on the development of the EES and the RTP “until the European Parliament and the Council
have adopted the legal basis for the systems setting out clearly their specifications.”104 The smart
borders initiative will also be based on Article 77 of the Treaty, but it is more likely to be based on
Article 77(2)(b), which allows for the adoption of measures concerning the checks to which persons
crossing external borders are subject. Any draft legislation must be agreed jointly by the European
Parliament and the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure.
The European Commission is required to ensure that all its proposals comply with the Charter of
Fundamental Rights.
105 The member states must also implement regulations in accordance with the
Charter.106 From a fundamental rights perspective, there are significant data protection concerns
attached to both proposals. The smart borders initiative is likely to entail the creation of at least one
centralised EU database containing biometric data, to which a currently unknown number of actors
could have access. The EUROSUR proposal, on the other hand, claims that data protection concerns
are minimal because the system will not gather large amounts of personal or biometric data or
include a central database. Nevertheless, the inclusion of at least some personal information in
EUROSUR and the broader Common Information Sharing Environment as well as the potential
sharing of personal data with third states and agencies raise significant concerns. Both initiatives can
also have an impact on the right to asylum. Last but not least, the EUROSUR proposal further has an
explicit human rights aim, insofar as it aims to reduce the loss of lives at sea – though as noted
above this needs to be strengthened.
104 COM (2011) 680 final, p. 13.
105 See COM (2005) 172 final, p. 3.
106 See also Preamble 6 of the proposed EUROSUR Regulation.
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3.1 The right to privacy and the protection of personal data
Interference by a public authority with individuals’ non‐derogable rights may be necessary in the
interest of national security, public safety, and the prevention of crime. The jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights establishes three conditions under which such restrictions may be
justified: if it is lawful, if it pursues a legitimate aim, and if it is necessary in a democratic society.107
The smart borders initiative and the creation of EUROSUR interfere with the right to privacy and the
protection of personal data to different degrees. The collection and processing of personal data,
including biometrics, is a central feature of the smart borders initiative, while it is considered as only
a marginal issue in the set‐up of EUROSUR. However, EUROSUR also raises particular privacy and
data protection concerns – especially regarding the foreseen use of drones and other means of
aerial surveillance, which are currently not properly addressed in the current legislative proposal.
3.1.1 EUROSUR
The Commission stresses that EUROSUR is not intended as a system to regulate the collection,
storage, or cross‐border exchange of personal data.108 Instead, EUROSUR focusses on the
surveillance of specific geographical areas (borders) and specific activities (illegal border crossings).
According to the Commission, “the situational pictures will as a general rule not involve personal
data but rather the exchange of information on incidents and depersonalised objects, such as the
detection and tracking of vessels.”109 Article 8 of the proposed Regulation also suggests that the
situational pictures from both FRONTEX and the National Coordination Centres primarily concern
incidents, cross‐border crime, crisis situations, the position of national (border security) assets, and
strategic and environmental information.
However, currently nine National Coordination Centres – in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark,
Estonia, Spain, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia – are allowed to process personal data , and this
information can be included in their national situational picture.110 The description of the different
“layers” of the national situation picture further suggests that personal data could be included in a
range of scenarios. The required reporting on incidents concerning the illegal border crossings of
migrants, trafficking in human beings, or smuggling of drugs in the “events layer”111 could for
instance include personal data on both criminals and victims. When a suspicious vessel is being
tracked, data about the ownership of the vessel, its operators, passengers, crew, agents, etc., is
highly likely to be processed. The draft Regulation also states quite ambiguously that the events
layer can contain information on “unidentified and suspect (…) persons present at or nearby the
external borders of the Member State concerned.”112 The operational layer of the national
situational picture might also involve information on the border authorities involved in an
107 The interpretation of Directive 95/46/EC and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 must depend partly on relevant
case law from the European Court of Human Rights; see for instance European Court of Justice,
Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others (Joined Cases C‐ 465/00, C‐138/01 and C‐139/01, Judgment of 20 May
2003, Full Court, (2003) ECR I‐4989).
108 COM (2011) 873 final, p. 3.
109 Article 2, draft Regulation.
110 SEC (2011) 1538 final, pp. 31–32.
111 Article 9.3.a, draft Regulation.
112 Article 9.3.d [emphasis added].
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operation.113 The analysis layer of the national situational picture can consist of an intelligence
picture sub‐layer, which can contain undefined “migrant profiles”114 and an “imagery and geo‐data
sub‐layer, which shall contain reference imagery, background maps, intelligence validation
assessments, change analysis (earth observation imagery) as well as change detection, geo‐
referenced data and border permeability maps.”115 It is as yet unclear whether such images could
include images of identifiable persons, but this seems almost certain.
The NCCs can send this information to FRONTEX to create the European Situational Picture,116 but it
is unclear whether FRONTEX can use such personal data in its European Situational Picture. The
FRONTEX Regulation specifies that FRONTEX can “use” personal data in the context of joint
operations, pilot projects, and rapid interventions for the preparation of risk analyses, but in the
results of the risk‐analyses, “data shall be depersonalized”.117 It could be argued that the European
Situational Picture is similar to such a risk‐analysis, especially the “analytical sub‐layer”, which
presents risk‐rating trends. The explanatory memorandum of the EUROSUR proposal specifies that
in “exceptional cases”, personal data may be shared by the member states with FRONTEX, and if
such data can be found in a national situational picture, it “may be exchanged between neighbouring
Member States only.”118 There is no similar language for the situation when FRONTEX includes
personal data in its European Situational Picture, for instance in the “events” and “operational”
layers. The extent to which EUROSUR will actually process personal data – and Article 10 of the draft
proposal in particular – needs urgent clarification.
Finally, FRONTEX can use information from satellite imagery and drones119 within the “common
applications of surveillance tools” in order to supply the national coordination centres and itself with
surveillance information on the external borders and on the pre‐frontier area.120 This capability
raises a whole range of potential privacy and data protection concerns that are currently not
addressed in the Regulation. Firstly, there is the question over which territory these drones will be
flying. The draft Regulation does not clearly define an “external border”, but its definition of an
“external border section” suggests that this will be the external land or sea border of a member
state as defined by national legislation.121 The “pre‐frontier area” is broadly defined as the
geographical area beyond the external border of member states, which is not covered by a national
border surveillance system. The impact assessment offers only a negative explanation: The territory
of EU member states and associated countries is outside the scope of EUROSUR.122
Besides monitoring the external land borders and the pre‐frontier area, two more operational
scenarios in which drones could be used have been identified in the context of the European
113 Article 9.5.b.
114 Article 9.6.c.
115 Article 9.6.d.
116 Article 10.2.d indicates that FRONTEX can receive further information from “other sources”; this info
might include personal data as well.
117 Article 11c.3.b.
118 COM (2011) 873 final, p. 2.
119 Article 12.3.
120 Article 12.1.
121 The Schengen Border Code states that “external borders ” means the member states’ land borders,
including river and lake borders, sea borders, and their airports, river ports, sea ports, and lake ports, provided
that they are not internal borders.
122 SEC (2011) 1538 final, p. 24.
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initiative for Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): the tracking of vessels on the
high seas and the monitoring of selected neighbouring third‐country ports and coasts.123 The
monitoring of a port could be done in order to determine if/when a specific vessel has departed.
Coasts “with a distance of more than 40 nautical miles from the coasts of EU Member States
(beyond the reach of coastal radar stations)” could be monitored by drones in order to recognise
“preparatory activities” that might indicate illegal immigration “such as the erection of tents, huts,
the gathering of vehicles or boats placed on the beach.”124 GMES also contemplates the use of UAVs
“for the detection, classification and identification of at least 80% of all vessels within a pre‐
designated area (for instance in times of crisis).” The explanatory memorandum to the EUROSUR
proposal states the common application of surveillance tools “could be implemented with the
support of relevant European space programmes, including the operational Global Monitoring for
Environment and Security” (see section 4).125
Secondly, it is not known whether drones used within the EUROSUR framework will have the
capability to recognise persons or processes and store personal data. While FRONTEX has
demonstrated a great amount of interest in the use of drones, it remains to be seen whether the
agency will purchase its own UAVs. According to the 2012 FRONTEX Work Programme, the agency’s
Research and Development Unit is currently engaged in a nine‐month study to “identify more cost‐
efficient and operational effective solutions for aerial border surveillance in particular Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) with Optional Piloted Vehicles (OPV) that could be used in FRONTEX Joint
Operations (sea and land).”126 It states further that the “Common Surveillance Tools Project” will
develop and test a FRONTEX capability for a combined use of satellite imagery and ship‐reporting
systems for border surveillance in order to provide surveillance ‐based information to the EUROSUR
network. Again “this is to be done using GMES measures (…) and by working in close conjunction to
EUSC and EMSA.”127 The GMES document suggests that these drones are likely to come with VHR
optical satellite imagery, which can zoom into 50 cm.128 This capacity would certainly allow for the
identification of individuals.
The lack of clarity regarding the processing of personal data is even more inappropriate given
EUROSUR will perform the “border control” function of the EU’s wider Common Information Sharing
Environment.129 As noted in section 2.1.3, the CISE will be based on a decentralised information
exchange framework interlinking relevant user communities. This is, in turn, based on a principle of
“sharing on a need‐to‐know and responsibility ‐to‐share basis.”130 While most of the data that will be
123 SEC (2011) 145 final, p. 8. The European initiative for GMES is coordinated and managed by the European
Commission. This GMES document is preceded by a disclaimer that states that the document does not
represent the views of either FRONTEX or the European Commission and “by no means should (…) be
interpreted as the draft or final specifications for future operational services.”
124 GMES CONOPS doc. version 1.4, 7 July 2011, p. 11.
125 COM (2011) 873 final, p. 2. The Commission mentions GMES as a “relevant programme” for the service for
the common application of surveillance tools. COM(2011) 873 final, p. 35.
126 Council doc. 6514/12, p. 97.
127 Idem, p. 99.
128 GMES CONOPS doc. version 1.4, 7 July 2011, p. 22.
129 COM(2010) 584 final, p. 6.
130 EU Council Conclusions, 23 May 2011, p. 2.
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shared is likely to consist of information about the identity and course of boats and ships, it is also
possible that personal information related to crews and passengers will be shared.
The Commission has acknowledged the need for a clear legal framework for the exchange of
information, “defining at least the nature of the data involved, the capability and the right of the
data providers and recipients to exchange the data, the purposes (and the methods) of the exchange
as well as incorporating the necessary safeguards with regard to the confidentiality and security of
(certain) data and the protection of personal data, where this may be relevant.”131 However,
according to the CISE roadmap, this will not be addressed until all the other steps towards
establishing CISE have been taken, at which point “obstacles to the exchange of the data present in
EU legislation must be identified and solutions to overcome them should be explored.”132 This is
regrettable, since CISE raises substantial data protection concerns because of the sheer potential
scope of its “user community”, which includes customs, border control, law enforcement agencies,
and defence forces. Data protection concerns should therefore be addressed from the outset and
integrated into the design of the system.133 The Commission stresses that “these layers are managed
by the respective owners of the related information at Member States and EU level based on the
applicable legal instruments. The competences of national authorities, as well as the mandates of EU
Agencies set out in these legal instruments will thus be fully respected.”134 This implies that
EUROSUR information could be used, for example, by international law enforcement missions
carried out with military assets (for instance, anti‐piracy operations). Moreover, where naval forces
have assets dedicated to maritime surveillance and/or law enforcement missions, EUROSUR could
receive information from defence bodies as well.135 It is unfortunate to say the least that these
issues are not directly addressed in the EUROSUR proposal.
3.1.1.1 The need for safeguards
The Commission’s EUROSUR proposal only refers to the data protection framework in relation to the
exchange of personal data using the EUROSUR communication network in the preamble, and even
then does not explicitly mention the collection of personal data, which will clearly take place on
some levels within EUROSUR.136 The (amended) FRONTEX Regulation is the lex specialis that applies
to FRONTEX activities in this context. Where the FRONTEX Regulation does not provide a “full data
protection regime”, other data protection provisions of Directive 95/46/EC and Regulation (EC) No
45/2001 apply and – in the framework of police and judicial cooperation – the Council Framework
Decision 2008/977/JHA 27 November 2008.
FRONTEX is allowed to process personal data collected by the member states during joint
operations, pilot projects, and rapid interventions of persons “who are suspected, by the relevant
authorities of Member States, on reasonable grounds of involvement in cross‐border criminal
activities, in facilitation of illegal migration activities or in human trafficking activities as defined in
131 COM (2010) 584 final, p. 14.
132 Idem, p. 5.
133 Idem, p. 10
134 Idem, p. 11.
135 See in general cooperation between CSDP actors and civilian actors of maritime surveillance: European
Defence Agency, Wise Pen Team Final Report of 26 Apr. 2010, pp. 23–27.
136 Recital 7, draft Regulation.
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Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of Council Directive 2002/90/EC.”137 This data can be used for the preparation
of risk analyses, but in the result of these risk‐analyses data shall be anonymised.138 This data can,
however, be sent “on a case by case basis” to EUROPOL or “other EU law enforcement agencies.”
After that the data will be deleted. FRONTEX can keep such data in any case for a maximum of three
months.139 It is not clear how the potential surveillance of specific third‐country ports and coasts by
FRONTEX drones could be squared with this provision, since drones, for example, are likely to be
able to process data on all persons who find themselves in such an area, including vulnerable groups
who might be in need of more protection because they are attempting to flee from persecution.
Moreover, as the Spring Conference of European Data Protection Authorities stated in 2008, “the
monitoring of travellers has to be well founded and can only be allowed in exceptional cases and for
justified and specific purposes. Any general surveillance poses unacceptable risks to the freedom of
individuals.”140
The EUROSUR Regulation should contain a specific provision that explicitly and exhaustively
enumerates the conditions under which personal data may be processed in EUROSUR.141 There is a
further need to clarify the provisions regarding the rights of the data subjects, include the right to
access personal data that might be collected. While it is encouraging to see a clear prohibition in the
proposal on the exchange of information with a third country that could use this information to
identify persons, or groups of persons, who are at serious risk of being subjected to torture,
inhuman and degrading treatment, punishment, or any other violation of fundamental rights,142 it
remains quite unclear how this provision will be upheld in practice. Since the exchange of EUROSUR
information with “neighbouring third countries” would take place on the basis of bilateral or
multilateral agreements between the member state(s) and third countries,143 it would be desirable
to mandate the logging of all such information exchanges in order to enable national supervisory
authorities to properly review the sending of information to third countries. The EUROSUR
Regulation should also explicitly include a system of layered supervision – with national data
protection authorities checking processing of personal data by the National Coordination Centres,
and the processing of personal data by FRONTEX, subject to review by the European Data Protection
Supervisor (EDPS). It is currently unclear whether this form of layered supervision is envisaged by the
draft Regulation.
137 Article 11.C.2, FRONTEX Regulation.
138 Article 11.C.3.b, FRONTEX Regulation.
139 Article 11.C.3.a, FRONTEX Regulation.
140 Spring Conference of European Data Protection Authorities, Rome 17–18 Apr. 2008.
141 See also EDPS comments on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing the European External Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) (COM (2011)873 final), 8 Feb. 2012,
p. 1.
142 Article 18.2, draft EUROSUR Regulation.
143 Article 18.1, draft EUROSUR Regulation.
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3.1.2 Smart borders
While the exact details of the smart borders initiative are not yet known, the data protection
concerns of both systems are relatively straightforward. Both the EES and RTP envisage the creation
of a centralised European database, which potentially includes highly sensitive biometric data such
as fingerprints and facial images. According to established case law of the European Court of Human
Rights, the mere storing of data amounts to an interference with the right to privacy. The Court has
made clear in the S. and Marper v UK case that fingerprints and photographs contain unique
information that is “capable of affecting the private life of an individual.” Retention of this
information without the consent of the individual concerned “cannot be regarded as neutral or
insignificant,” according to the Court.144
Persons who want to apply for the RTP would voluntarily enrol by providing immigration authorities
with information that goes over and above the information that is required to obtain a visa or enrol
as a third‐country national not requiring a visa.145 Persons who consent to have their data processed
for this vetting process will need to be informed precisely regarding the exact modalities of the
processing and retention of this data in order for them to give their properly informed consent.
Third‐country nationals who want to enter the EU would have no choice but to allow for the
processing of their personal data. The scale of data gathered would clearly need to demonstrate
compelling reasons of public safety or public order and should in any case be regulated by a legal
framework that includes sufficient safeguards to protect the right to privacy and personal data. At a
minimum, the relevant safeguards that are attached to similar databases such as VIS, SIS, and SIS II
would need to be applied to an EES/RTP system.
A key principle of data‐protection law is the purpose‐limitation principle: data can only be collected
and used in accordance with the specified and explicit objectives of an EES, and only those
authorities that can demonstrate a need to process the data to perform carefully defined duties
should have access to this data.146 According to the Commission, the “main purpose” of an EES
would be the monitoring of the “respect of the authorised stay of third country nationals (…) as an
essential part of first‐line risk assessment.” The system would also “contribute”, to "optimising
border check procedures and enhance the security at the moment of the crossing of the external
borders.147 The EES is thus primarily conceived as a migration control instrument that will "increase
the numbers of successful returns of irregularly staying third‐country nationals.”148 Access to the
Entry‐Exit System should therefore be limited to the staff of border control authorities to the extent
they require the data to perform clearly defined tasks.
Despite the purpose‐limitation principle, the policy development process has introduced a range of
other justifications for the EES, including the claim that it could be used to prevent threats against
the member states’ internal security, specifically for the prevention, detection, and investigation of
terrorist and serious organised crimes. This would open the door to the inclusion in the EES of a
whole range of data on TCNs not currently subject to a visa requirement that is similar to that
144 S. and Marper v the United Kingdom , Applications nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, Judgment, 4 Dec. 2008,
para. 84.
145 See also SEC (2008) 153 final, p. 57.
146 See Articles 6.1.b and 13 of Directive 95/46 and Article 3.2 of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.
147 COM (2011) 680 final, p. 4.
148 Idem, p. 11; see also Council doc. 16042/11, p. 27.
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collected by the Visa Information System, such as details on fellow travellers (if a person travels in a
group), the inclusion of the address of the accommodation provider or place of residence, the final
destination, and the purpose of the trip or stay.149 Some member states have even suggested
including information on the vehicles used by TCNs to enter the Schengen area by land, and report
on specific categories of objects they carry with them (such as weapons or banknotes). In this
instance, it is possible that the police and other internal security services; immigration services; a
ministry competent in the field of foreign affairs; authorities dealing with prevention, detection, or
prosecution of terrorist crimes; and other serious offences or provincial offices/local authorities that
have analogical competences could all be given access to the EES, raising further concerns about
data protection and security. Another justification put forward for the creation of the EES is that it
could be used to prevent abuses in the area of labour migration, in particular with regard to short
stays for work purposes, in which case government agencies dealing with employment and social
security might also obtain access to the EES. It is also suggested that the EES could also be used as an
anti‐corruption measure, as info derived from the EES could be able to identify the border controller
at an exact border crossing. This could be used to investigate how unusually large numbers of fake
passports get through specific border‐crossing points, for instance.
3.1.2.1 The need for safeguards
As the EES is predominantly an immigration control instrument, routine access for law enforcement
authorities to EES data would be unlawful. Firstly, the threshold for internal security authorities to
query databases that register “innocent” people should be much higher than the threshold for
querying criminal databases. Secondly, such routine access would imply that there is an undeniable
link between organised crime and third‐country nationals, including asylum applicants and irregular
immigrants. As one observer has pointed out: “where no such link has been shown and in the
absence of similar measures, including e.g. the centralized storage of sensitive personal information
on all EU‐citizens, the question remains whether further processing may not even be
discriminatory.”150
The need for access must be demonstrated on a case‐by‐case basis and show the impossibility – or
great difficulty – in obtaining the data by less intrusive means. To enable a review of this principle, a
log book could be used to log all uses of EES data by law enforcement authorities. The use of this
data must be defined explicitly and restrictively, and go beyond general statements such as
“necessary for the performance of their task.”
There would also need to be strong data protection provisions setting out the right to information
for both applicants to the RTP as well as all TCNs who enter the EU and who will see their data
processed in the EES. Information needs to be provided about the identity of the data controller; the
purposes for which the data will be processed; the categories of recipients of the data; the data
retention period and the existence of the right of access to data relating to them; and the right to
request that inaccurate data relating to them be corrected or that unlawfully processed data relating
to them be deleted, including the right to receive information on the procedures for exercising those
149 See Article 9, VIS Regulation.
150 Audelina Ahumada, “Border control and internal security in the European Union – information, technology
and human rights implications for third‐country nationals”, Detecter Deliverable 14(1) (Dec. 2008): p. 19,
available at: http://www.detecter.bham.ac.uk/D1 4.1BorderControlInternalSecurity ‐2.doc.
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rights and the contact details of the National Supervisory Authorities, which need to be able to hear
claims concerning the protection of personal data.151 The right to access and rectification would be a
crucial feature of an EES because there may be perfectly good legal reasons for a person to
“overstay”.152
A data subject has the right to be informed about the existence of remedies in case his/her
application for an RTP has been denied, or when he/she has been classified as an overstayer. There
must also be the possibility to appeal or request a review of such decisions, and to include the
possibility to obtain assistance from the data protection authority.153 Article 22 of the EU Data
Protection Directive states very clearly that “every person” has a right to a judicial remedy,
irrespective of his place of residence – this right applies to TCNs as well.
Stringent data quality requirements are also needed because EES data could be used for a range of
purposes that might be prejudicial to the interests of the data subject. The European Commission
has acknowledged that this is a “potential problem, as with any data of this type, that it could be
used inappropriately.”154 Legal provisions will need to be adopted that allow for third‐country
nationals to enter, even if they were not able to enrol in a programme that uses biometric data.155 As
the European Data Protection Supervisor pointed out in his Opinion on the Visa Information System,
this may happen due to various factors, such as illness, disability, wounds, and burns. According to
the EDPS:
It can also in some cases, be linked to ethnicity or occupation. In particular, it seems that a non‐trivial
number of agricultural and construction workers have fingerprints which are damaged to the point of
being unreadable. In other cases, the frequency of which is difficult to evaluate, it may happen that
refugees self‐mutilate, in order to avoid being fingerprinted.156
In his opinion on the amended EURODAC (European Dactyloscopy) proposal, the EDPS has also
argued that the temporary or permanent impossibility to provide usable fingerprints should not be
construed systematically as an attempt to fraud – resulting, for instance, in a refusal to examine an
asylum application or a withdrawal of assistance to the asylum seeker.157 Given the fallibility of
biometric identification systems, and the possibility of identity theft, “fall back” procedures will be
needed in order to safeguard the rights of persons who have been wrongly identified.158
151 See similarly Articles 37–38 of the VIS Regulation.
152 For instance should a national visa be granted due to flight cancellation, illness, or other humanitarian
reasons, or if a new entitlement to stay, such as a long‐term residence permit, is issued. SEC (2008) 153 final,
p. 25.
153 SEC (2008) 153 final, p. 58. See also article 40, VIS Regulation.
154 SEC (2008) 153 final, p. 57.
155 EDPS, VIS Opinion, OJ C 181/19.
156 EDPS, 2010 EURODAC Opinion, p. 4
157 Idem.
158 See also EDPS, SISII Opinion, OJ C 91/44.
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3.2 Interference with the right to asylum
Both the EES and EUROSUR can have a negative impact on refugees and potential applicants for
asylum. The EDPS has stressed the indirect effect of border‐control measures, stating that they “may
deter people to seek the protection they are entitled to in Europe under international rules of
protection of refugees.”159 Indeed, the demand for EUROSUR and smart borders builds on a longer‐
term trend in EU policy that makes it increasingly more difficult for refugees and others in need of
protection to reach EU territory. It is clear that the purpose of both systems is to extend EU border
surveillance further away from the EU’s actual territorial borders into the high seas and territories of
third countries (“the pre‐frontier area”). This trend can only be interpreted as a concerted attempt
by the members states to avoid responsibility for asylum claims. While neither system can legally
affect the obligations of member states under Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,160 specific safeguards must be included to
ensure that refugees bound for Europe can access a procedure.
3.2.1 EUROSUR
EUROSUR has an ambiguous relation with the right to asylum. The Commission’s proposal mentions
that within EUROSUR’s scope, member states and FRONTEX shall give special attention to “victims of
trafficking, persons in need of urgent medical assistance, persons in need of international
protection, persons in distress at sea and other persons in a particularly vulnerable situation.”161 In
its earlier Communications, the Commission has repeatedly stressed that one of the primary reasons
for the establishment of EUROSUR is that it would enable the saving of lives at sea. The early
detection of small, unseaworthy boats that are overcrowded and without any safety equipment or
illumination would enable an intervention by FRONTEX or a member state, which would prevent
lives lost at sea.162
EUROSUR is presented as reinforcing the search and rescue capabilities of member states to “ensure
that as many persons as possible are brought to safety.”163 The support to such search and rescue
missions is “without prejudice to the functions and tasks of the responsible Rescue Coordination
Centres.”164 The EU Fundamental Rights Agency has also argued that “best use should be made of
the live‐saving potential of the EUROSUR system,” which can provide early information on vessels or
persons threatened by grave and imminent danger requiring immediate assistance.165 While we
agree with the Fundamental Rights Agency, we are concerned that without specific rules on the
159 EDPS, 2008 Opinion prelim., p. 6.
160 Recital 16 to the draft EUROSUR Regulation explicitly states that “the implementation of this regulation
(…) does not affect obligations of Member States under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, the International Convention on Maritime Search
and Rescue, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its Protocol against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and other relevant international instruments.”
A similar clause would be needed in the EES proposal.
161 Article 2.3, draft EUROSUR Regulation.
162 See also (SEC (2011) 1536 final, p. 9, and Parliamentary Question, E‐006760/2011; answer given by Ms
Malmström on behalf of the Commission (28 July 2011).
163 Idem.
164 SEC (2011) 1536 final, p. 14.
165 Fundamental Rights Agency, The Stockholm Programme: A chance to put fundamental rights protection
right in the centre of the European Agenda, Vienna, 14 June 2009, p. 8.
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primacy of search and rescue functions, this potential may not be realised. EUROSUR could clearly
help to bring more people to “safety”, but nowhere in the proposal is it defined how exactly this will
be done, nor are there any procedures laid out for what to do with the “rescued”. These boats
typically contain irregular migrants and persons in need of international protection, but nothing is
said about the need to process a request for asylum of the latter group. Conversely, Article 2.2 of the
proposed Regulation states that the EUROSUR Regulation shall “not apply to operational, procedural
and legal measures taken after interception.” The impact assessment is even more explicit, stating
that “asylum, readmission, and return” are out of the scope of EUROSUR.166
If the EU harbours genuine ambitions to save lives at sea, it must at least specify how EUROSUR will
send information or alerts to the Rescue Coordination Centres of the country responsible for a
specific Search and Rescue Region. In this context it should be noted that the 2010 amendment of
the Schengen Border Code already includes such a provision in its non‐binding annex on “Guidelines
for search and rescue situations and for disembarkation in the context of sea border operations”.167
A more fundamental point needs to be stressed here as well. States cannot simply circumvent
refugee law and human rights requirements by equating interception measures on the high seas to
prevent migrants from reaching Europe’s borders (including them as Joint Operations under the
auspices of FRONTEX) with search and rescue measures ; they are clearly different kinds of
operations. Nor does the conflation of interception and search‐and‐rescue find any backing in
international law.
The Technical Study illustrates this dilemma with an example of the kind of “operational
information” EUROSUR’s Common Pre‐frontier Intelligence Picture will provide:
5th May 20XY: According to satellite imagery provided by XY, this morning around 5am 7 wooden
boats (length 12‐15m) with about 250 illegal migrants departed from the coast of the African country
Z next to the village K (coordinates xz East yw West) in harsh weather conditions (wind level 5
increasing). The type of boats used has typical speed of 7‐8 knots. Due to the current migration
trends, it is expected that the boats will head for MS A (70% probability) or for MS B (30%
probability). The authorities of country Z have been contacted by NCC A, which, despite the recently
delivered patrol boats, is not expected to take any action. NCC A is currently coordinating with NCC B
and FRONTEX (joint operation Karies) their patrolling activities for SAR and interception. FRONTEX is
currently redirecting satellites and two surveillance planes over the area TOMATO (route to MS A).168
Despite the “harsh weather conditions” and likelihood of overcrowding in the boats, it is far from
clear from this example that the goal of the alert and subsequent surveillance measures is a priori to
save lives, in spite of the obligation on holders of such information, stemming from the SOLAS
Convention to prioritise any such assistance that can be given. The current lack of detail on
EUROSUR’s aim of “rescuing lives at sea” in the draft EUROSUR Regulation – coupled with a high
166 SEC (2011)1538 final, p. 24.
167 Article 1.2 of this annex explicitly states that “when facing in the course of the border surveillance
operation a situation in which uncertainty or apprehension exists as to the safety of a ship or of any person on
board, the participating unit should forward as soon as possible all available information to the Rescue
Coordination Centre responsible for the search and rescue region where the situation is taking place.”
168 Subproject 3, Final report – Common Pre‐frontier Intelligence Picture, “Technical and management
concepts for the surveillance of land and maritime borders”, Technical Study for the European Commission
Directorate ‐General for Justice, Freedom and Security, Within the Framework of a European External Border
Surveillance System (EUROSUR), January 2010, p. 26.
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level of detail on the border‐control capacities of the system – means that it is essential to amend
the draft Regulation so that search and rescue obligations are both strengthened and read jointly
with the requirements of refugee law and human rights law.169
3.2.2 Entry‐exit system
Finally, in regard to the EES, further safeguards are needed because there may be justified reasons
for an “alien” to “overstay”, or instances where the system will wrongly identify people as having
done so. S/he may have started an asylum application or acquired an extended right of residence
and failed to exit in accordance with the original entry conditions. “Overstaying” can also be the
result of an action beyond a person’s control – a stay in hospital due to severe illness, an accident or
problem with their scheduled transport, etc. “Alerts” could also result from anomalies in the system:
a TCN may have exited and entered through external borders at a place where data has not been
collected; a crew member of a plane can cross the border as such, but leave as a normal passenger,
and so on.
It is therefore imperative that any future EES legislation stipulates that any “overstay” alert can only
ever constitute a presumption of illegal residence. Once an alert has been issued, a proper
procedure must be completed in order to determine whether the person has the right to stay legally
in EU territory. This procedure must give the traveller the chance to explain the circumstances of any
“overstay”. An EES alert alone can never be grounds to refuse entry or to deport a person and
should not therefore be included in the Schengen Information System.170 In fact, it is quite unclear
how any kind of automatic sanction could be attached to an EES alert. To confirm, the scope and
function of the EES must therefore be limited to border officers carrying out checks on passengers,
and files should only be kept in the EES after a person has exited the EU if the assumption of an
illegal stay is confirmed.
169 Violeta Moreno‐Lax, “Seeking asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a fragmentary reading of EU Member
States’ obligations accruing at sea”, International Journal of Refugee Law 23(2) (2011): p. 199. “Member states
and FRONTEX cannot intercept migrants as a means to reduce loss of life without considering the need to
avoid disembarkation in territories where the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well‐founded fear of
persecution or as a real risk of ill treatment may be put in jeopardy.”
170 The Returns Directive provides for sanctions in cases of illegal residence or overstayers, including a returns
decision (which includes a period for voluntary departure and a re‐entry ban) and coercive measures to carry
out the removal of a TCN.
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4 Cost, necessity, and effectiveness
The cost of implementing the EUROSUR system during the period 2011–2020 is estimated at €340
million. The European Commission has set aside a further €1.1 billion to fund the smart borders
initiative (Entry‐Exit System and Registered Traveller Programme) from the proposed Internal
Security Fund (ISF) 2014–2020. A full policy impact regarding the proposed EUROSUR and planned
EES and RTP is well beyond the scope of this report. Instead we make some observations about the
feasibility studies and cost estimates that have been produced during the EU policy‐making process.
We also examine EU‐funded research and development (R&D) in support of the three proposed
systems from the EU’s €53.2 billion Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological
Development (FP7, 2007–2013) and outline the way the EU’s External Borders Fund, Development
Cooperation Instrument, and ISF have been used, or will be used, to pay for the implementation of
EUROSUR, EES, and RTP in member states and third countries. Finally, we suggest that it might be
instructive for the European Commission to re‐assess its proposals in light of the United States’
experience in attempting to develop and implement similar systems.
4.1 Feasibility studies and cost estimates
The potential impact on the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection means the EUROSUR,
EES, and RTP proposals should be subject to a “necessity test”. The European Court of Human Rights
has held that interference with a right is seen as “necessary” if it answers a pressing social need, if it
is proportionate to the aim pursued, and if the reasons put forward by the public authority to justify
it are relevant and sufficient.171 New information management systems in particular need to be
accompanied by “clear proof of their necessity and proportionality”; such proof should be provided
by a privacy impact assessment based on “sufficient evidence”.172 As the European Commission has
acknowledged, “being useful is not sufficient to justify the implementation of systems like an EES
and a RTP.”173 Nevertheless, the European Data Protection Supervisor has criticised the
Commission’s general approach to impact assessments for failing to consider “concrete measures
and mechanisms which would ensure that both necessity and proportionality are respected and
practically implemented in all proposals having impact on individuals’ rights.”174 No meaningful
fundamental rights or privacy impact assessment was carried out for EUROSUR on the grounds that
personal data will not be routinely processed by the system, though the impact assessments did
171 Handyside v United Kingdom , (App. N° 5493/72), 7 Dec. 1976, § 48. The notion of necessity implies a
stricter burden of proof than just being “useful”. The European Court of Human Rights has held on numerous
occasions that while the adjective “necessary” is not synonymous with “indispensable”, it has neither the
flexibility of such expressions as “admissible”, “ordinary”, “useful”, “reasonable”, or “desirable”.
172 EDPS, July 2010, p. 7. These could either take the form of a separate privacy and data protection impact
assessment or be integrated into the general impact assessment. The current guidance on impact assessments
(European Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC(2009)92) does not foresee a separate impact
assessment for the impact on fundamental rights, such as data protection; these aspects are to be integrated
in the general impact assessment. In the meantime, following the Commission’s Communication on the
strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union (COM
(2010) 573), additional guidance has been prepared in the form of a Commission Staff Working Paper on
operational guidance on taking account of Fundamental Rights in Commission Impact Assessments (SEC (2011)
567).
173 COM (2011) 680 final, p. 11.
174 EDPS 2010 opinion on overview of information management systems, p. 7
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recognise the need for fair and lawful processing for explicit and legitimate purposes.175 With regard
to EES, the European Commission has yet to explain how the “significant human rights impact”
identified in the 2004 impact assessment has been overcome.176
4.1.1 EUROSUR
Various studies and assessments were produced prior to the EUROSUR proposal of December 2011.
A feasibility study – the BORTEC study produced by FRONTEX – was completed in 2007. A roadmap
to implement the EUROSUR system was then produced by the European Commission in 2008,
accompanied by an impact assessment. A further Technical Study setting out the management
procedures for EUROSUR and the operational requirements for the Communication system and the
Common Pre‐Frontier Intelligence Picture was produced by a contractor in 2010, at a cost of €1.8
million. A second impact assessment was then produced by the Commission to accompany the 2011
legislative proposal. A EUROSUR Financial Study was commissioned to support the second impact
assessment. We are concerned that this process has not allowed for adequate democratic control or
impartial assessment of the merits of the EUROSUR proposal.
Feasibility studies are supposed to objectively and rationally uncover the strengths and weaknesses
of a proposed course of action, the risks it faces, and ultimately the prospects for success. The
BORTEC feasibility study, which was given the mandate of designing a basic framework for
EUROSUR, did not meet this standard. The decision to begin developing the system in 2008 then pre‐
judged any further impact assessment. As the Commission noted in its 2011 assessment, “While the
impact assessment presented in 2008 assessed the different components proposed in Steps 1 to 7 of
the EUROSUR roadmap, thereby identifying 'what' should be done, the current impact assessment
assesses 'how' these components should be implemented until 2013 on the basis of the works
carried out between 2008 and 2011.”177 Thus, whereas the 2008 impact assessment presented the
decision to establish EUROSUR as one of the necessities to achieve more effective border control
(this was essentially a choice between total border control, advanced/smart border control, or no
border control), the 2011 impact assessments simply offered three different policy options and cost
estimates for implementing the system. The sheer scale of deaths in the Mediterranean of migrants
and refugees bound for Europe alone178 provides an overwhelming case for establishing a system
capable of saving lives at sea. But as noted above, in the absence of detailed guidance on how lives
will actually be saved by EUROSUR (beyond identifying the vulnerable), it is difficult to assess its
potential.
We are also concerned that the prospects of EUROSUR achieving its key operational objective
(continuous surveillance of the wide areas of open seas in order to detect and track small vessels
from the point they depart the territorial waters of a third state) have not been subject to impartial
scrutiny or review. As the BORTEC study noted, “although it is theoretically possible to carry out the
surveillance of all areas of the Open Sea 24/7, it would need an unbearable amount of resources
175 SEC (2011) 1536 final, p. 32.
176 European Policy Evaluation Consortium, “Study for the extended impact assessment of Visa Information
System”, Dec. 2004, pp. 31–37.
177 SEC (2011) 1536 final, p. 5 [emphasis in original].
178 See “Death by policy: The fatal realities of ‘Fortress Europe’ – 15181 deaths”, available at:
http://www.unitedagainstracism.org /pages/campfatalrealities.htm.
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without really knowing the outcome of such endeavour.”179 Instead of clearly demonstrating the
technical capacity of the proposed EUROSUR system, the European Commission has simply drafted
the legislation broadly enough to encompass any solution that may be found, while outsourcing the
research and development to the European Security Research Programme (see section 4.2).
The EUROSUR Technical Study produced in 2010 by German defence contractor ESG and
subcontractors EADS, SELEX‐Finmeccanica, and Thales lists 11 types of “surveillance sensors” and 18
types of “maritime surveillance” systems that could be used for the surveillance of land and
maritime borders.180 These are among the 13 different sources of information that will contribute to
the national and European situational pictures. We are concerned that the sheer scope of the
planned system is a potential recipe for technical failures and cost overruns. It is also regrettable
that both the BORTEC and ESG studies have been withheld from the European and national
parliaments and wider public scrutiny.
Despite mandating the technical development of EUROSUR in 2008, the European Commission did
not begin to assess the potential costs until 2011, when it commissioned a “Technical Study
assessing the financial impact of establishing the European Border Surveillance System” to
consultants GHK, Unysis, and EUROCONSULT.181 The study was required to provide cost estimates
for three options for establishing EUROSUR over the period 2011–2020: (i) a decentralised approach
to EUROSUR based on interlinking member states only; (i) a partly centralised approach with some
data centralised at FRONTEX; or (iii) a fully centralised approach. The estimates, which do not
include annual operating costs, ranged from €318 million for a decentralised EUROSUR up to €913
million for a fully centralised system. The preferred option is the “partly‐centralised approach”,
estimated at €338.7 million (see Figure 4).182
The estimated costs were themselves based on earlier estimates provided by the EUROSUR
Technical Study, member state responses to a questionnaire, and actual projects supported by the
European Border Fund. A quarter of the member states failed to provide any financial data at all,
and among those that did, “the completeness and comparability of that data varied to a large
extent.”183 So in estimating the costs of upgrading the National Coordination Centres and integrating
FRONTEX into EUROSUR (see Figure 5), the contractors simply took one or two “reference states” for
each policy option and extrapolated a total figure based on national and FRONTEX estimates.184 The
European Commission should have acknowledged that the margin of error of such an approach
renders its estimates as purely speculative. Funding the development and implementation of
EUROSUR from the European Security Research Programme and External Border Funds, respectively,
will add to the already existing difficulties in monitoring expenditure and detecting cost overruns or
bad investments.
179 BORTEC Study, p. 98.
180 Subproject 1, “Technical and management concepts for the surveillance of land and maritime borders”,
Technical Study for the European Commission Directorate ‐General for Justice, Freedom and Security, Within
the Framework of a European External Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), January 2010.
181 Technical study assessing the financial impact of establishing the European External Border Surveillance
System (EUROSUR), Final Report, Directorate ‐General for Home Affairs, September 2011.
182 SEC (2011) 1536 final, p. 38–39.
183 SEC (2011) 1536 final, p. 36.
184 Belgium and France were used for Option 1, Slovakia and Cyprus for Option 2, and Finland for Option 3.
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Figure 4: “Policy options” for funding EUROSUR185
Figure 5: Estimated EUROSUR costs: National Coordination Centres and FRONTEX186
185 Source: SEC (2011) 1536 final, p. 39.
186 Idem, p. 31.
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4.1.2 Entry‐Exit System and Registered Traveller Programme
In 2008 the European Commission suggested that the “estimated costs of the centralised entry/exit
and Registered Traveller Programme system would be approximately 20 million euro, spread out
over 2‐3 years and the annual maintenance and operational costs approximately 6 million euro.”187 It
estimated that it would cost a further €35 million to implement the EES and RTP in the member
states, “but [this] could vary greatly depending on the number of automated gates that would be
implemented. One automated gate unit costs approximately 35,000 euro.”188 The Commission
justified its modest estimates on the grounds that neither system would be as expensive as the Visa
Information System, “since the technical design of both should allow for maximum synergies with
the VIS.”189 But as Peers noted, this estimate apparently failed to take into the account the cost of
using or upgrading VIS to record the exit of TCNs at external borders.190 When the Commission
revisited the potential costs of the EES and RTP in 2011, its estimates increased dramatically: The
development of the central EES and RTP could be in the order of €400 million, with annual operating
costs of €180 million per year for the first five years. If the EES and RTP were built on a single
technical platform, the Commission estimated a cost saving of up to 30 per cent.191 The Commission
has allocated €1.1 billion to the development and implementation of these systems from the
proposed EU ISF 2013–2020 (see section 4.3.3).
The substantial costs of developing the EES can only be justified on the basis of a clear
demonstration of their necessity and proportionality. With regard to the Entry‐Exit System, it has not
yet been demonstrated that it will prove useful in preventing and detecting people who overstay
their visas. As noted above, this objective might be met if EES overstays were linked to police alerts
via the SIS/SIS II, but this is currently unlawful (any amendment of the SIS rules would also require a
clear demonstration of proof of the necessity and effectiveness). The value of EES as a security
measure is even more doubtful. An EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism from 2006 included an
automated Entry‐Exit System among the border control measures that “could” be taken to prevent
terrorism,192 but the European Commission has already recognised that “the potential (of an EES)
with respect to reducing terrorism and serious crime is not significant”.193
187 The Commission would be responsible for acquisition and maintenance of the central database (the
centralised EES and RTP database), while member states would be responsible for arranging equipment such
as fingerprint readers, equipment to store the biometric identifiers, potential (semi‐) automated border
checks, separate lanes etc., as well any equipment/staff needed for enrolment of registered travellers as such.
SEC (2008) 153, pp. 27, 30.
188 SEC (2008) 154.
189 SEC (2008) 153, p. 20. In 2004 the question of setting up an automated EES at the external borders of the
EU was addressed in the framework for the Impact Assessment for setting up the VIS. In that context, the view
was taken that the EES would have been “too costly and disproportionate”, SEC (2008) 153, p. 24.
190 Peers notes that “in the absence of an obligation to use the current VIS on exit, it is possible that some
Member States may not install the infrastructure to use the VIS at some exit points. If that is the case, the
Commission’s assumed status quo would again fail to assess fully the costs of introducing an entry‐exit system,
since there would be an obligation upon Member States to install infrastructure at all exit points in order to
ensure the full functioning of the system.” Steve Peers, “Proposed new border control systems”, Briefing Paper
for the European Parliament, PE 408.296, 25 June 2008.
191 COM (2011) 680 final, p. 10 (based on a study carried out for the Commission in 2010).
192 Council doc. 5771, 27 Jan. 2006.
193 SEC (2008) 154 final. The Commission notes that “the majority of those refused entries are neither
terrorists nor serious criminals but those without the appropriate travel documents and suspected of being
prospective illegal immigrants”, SEC (2008) 153 final, p. 9. In theory the EES could provide travel histories of
TCNs who are not subject to a visa requirement, including those who are considered “suspects”. According to
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Figure 6: Estimated costs of the RTP and EES systems by the Commission194
It is also obvious that an EES could also result in significantly increased waiting lines for third‐country
nationals wanting to enter the Schengen area. Whereas TCNs subject to a visa requirement are
already required to provide biometric data on entry, those on the so‐called white lists, who do not
require an advance visa, are exempt from this requirement. Extrapolating from border‐crossing
statistics collected during a comprehensive monitoring exercise in 2009, this could result in the
fingerprinting of an additional 57 million “white list” TCNs. The VIS impact assessment of 2004 stated
that on average 15 seconds were added to entry procedures in the United States when biometrics
were collected for the United States’ US VISIT programme. If the EU were able to achieve this target
with regard to 57 million TCNs, it would add the equivalent 27 years of queuing time per year at the
EU borders. As noted above, adequate provision would also have to be taken for false positives,
failures to provide biometrics, and a range of other eventualities.
The European Commission has argued that the “substantial costs foreseen at this stage need to be
considered alongside the benefits: for example, together with automating a substantial share of all
border crossings, the RTP could reduce border control resources needed by around 40% (equivalent
to EUR 500 million/year). Even if the calculation is based on more modest savings of EUR 250
million/year, Member States could have net cost savings already after the second year of
operation.”195 No details are provided of how these cost savings are to be achieved beyond the
implied reduction in staff required because of the use of automated gates. Moreover, while a
voluntary EU‐wide RTP programme might enable registered travellers to cross borders much faster
than their unregistered counterparts, the Commission has estimated that only 4 to 5 million
the Commission, “such data on the movements of terrorists and serious criminal suspects could be of value in
locating them and in subsequent prosecutions.” As Peers notes, “if a person who entered the Schengen
territory subsequently was suspected of involvement in a terrorist offence, the entry‐exit system would
provide the limited facility of providing information as to whether (and if so, when and where) the suspect has
exited the Schengen area, if the suspect has exited that territory legally.” Peers, “Proposed new border control
systems”, p. 9.
194 Source: COM (2011) 680 final, p. 14.
195 COM (2011) 680 final, p. 10.
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travellers per year might actually use it.196 Estimates suggest that this amounts to no more than five
per cent of TCNs crossing external borders annually. Since the shorter queues at RTP gates seen to
date are the result of relatively few people being a part of such programmes (which typically charge
an annual fee of around €125), there must be significant doubts as to their capacity to relieve the
pressure on Schengen borders or facilitate travel for the vast majority.197 The gates might come into
their own if they became mandatory for all travellers, including EU citizens, but this would go far
beyond the scope of the envisaged proposals.
4.2 Border security and the European Security Research Programme
The increasing emphasis on the use of new technologies in support of EU border control policy has
correlated closely with new approaches to ‘border security’ being developed as part of the European
Security Research Programme (ESRP). The ESRP has the twin objectives of enhancing the security of
European citizens and supporting the development of a globally competitive security industry in
Europe.198 The European Commission has increasingly used the ESRP to fund projects in support of
the technological development of the EUROSUR system. Further projects have showcased the
technologies behind smart borders and the development of systems used for “profiling” the
travelling public.
Border security is one of ESRP’s five core “mission areas” and has been at the heart of the
programme since its inception. In October 2004, the European Commission held a workshop in
Ljubljana (Slovenia) on “Research and Technological challenges in the field of Border Control”,
bringing together EU policy‐makers, national border guards, and some of Europe’s largest defence
companies, including Finmeccanica, Thales, EADS, Sagem, and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries
Association of Europe (a lobby group representing Europe’s largest alliance of security and defence
contractors). These companies were also represented on the successive advisory groups established
by the European Commission to advise the EU on the ESRP, notably the “Group of Personalities” and
the European Security Research Advisory Board, whose joint chairs were the directors of Thales and
EADS.199 The Board’s final report of September 2006 set the priorities for the “security” component
of the FP7 programme.200
In the area of “border security”, these were defined as “detection, identification and authentication”
technologies, “situation awareness and assessment, including surveillance”, information
management, communication, training and exercises. Within these priority areas, five research
domains were identified: port security (including containers), sea borders surveillance, unregulated
land borders, checkpoints, and “extended smart borders”.201 Figure 7 from the Board’s report
provides an illustrative summary of the R&D priorities of the FP7’s “border security” component. A
third European Security Research Advisory Board, the “European Security Research and Innovation
Forum”, was established in early 2007, with a mandate to develop a 20‐year vision for the ESRP.
196 COM (2011) 680 final, p. 12.
197 SEC (2008) 153, p. 66.
198 Decision 1982/2006/EC, OJ L 412/26.
199 Hayes, Neoconopticon, “The EU security‐industrial complex”, TNI/Statewatch (2009): pp. 15–17.
200 “Meeting the challenge: the European Security Research Agenda – A report from the European Security
Research Advisory Board”, Brussels: European Commission, 2006.
201 European Security Research Advisory Board report, p. 25.
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European Security Research and Innovation Forum Working Group 3 focussed on “border
security”.202 It was chaired by Erik Berglund, then head of FRONTEX’s Research and Development
Unit, with Giovanni Barontini, then Vice President of Italian defence giant Finmeccanica’s civil
applications division, appointed as Rapporteur. The final European Security Research and Innovation
Forum report described the two key challenges for the ESRP in supporting the EU’s policy on
integrated border management and making the requisite technical equipment affordable enough to
be widely employed.
Eric Berglund, now FRONTEX’s Director of Capacity Building, has spoken frankly about the
importance of engaging with the ESRP. “We [FRONTEX] needed to occupy some ground in the
external world if we were to be effective. And the big opportunity at that time was to get into the EU
security research which had just restarted in earnest that year.” The FRONTEX Research and
Development Unit was soon participating in evaluation of FP7 research project proposals and found
itself represented on the end‐user advisory boards, “where it could exert useful influence on
[project] development”. The agency now holds seminars with technology suppliers at least twice a
year to ensure that the security industry sector is able to showcase its latest products while industry
representatives from selected projects regularly participate in the FRONTEX ‐chaired FP7
Implementation Group on maritime border surveillance.
Like other observers, we are concerned that the ESRP appears to have had the effect of
consolidating relations between the security and defence industries and those responsible for
developing and implementing border security policies at the EU level, while at the same time
marginalising those perspectives that are not convinced of the need for smart surveillance or smart
borders. 203 Indeed it often appears the EU’s current border security agenda is as much the result of
this confluence of political and economic relations as it is a rational and proportionate response to a
perceived migration crisis or terrorist threat.
202 “European security research and innovation forum”, Final Report, Brussels: European Commission, 2009.
203 “Review of security measures in the Research Framework Programme”, Brussels: European Parliament
Directorate General for Internal Policies, 2010; Bigo and Jeandesboz, “The EU and the European security
industry: Questioning the ‘Public‐Private Dialogue’”, INEX Policy Briefs no 5, CEPS, 2010; Burgess and Hanssen,
“Public‐private dialogue in security research”, Brussels: European Parliament, PE 393.286, 2008.
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Figure 7: Achieving border security in the EU
204
204 Source: European Security Research Advisory Board report, p. 26.
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4.2.1 EU funded R&D projects supporting EUROSUR
Research, development, and testing of EUROSUR components and shared surveillance tools has
been outsourced to the European Security Research Programme, which has been used to fund
studies, R&D, and demonstration projects on border surveillance and control. Draft EU legislation
establishing the Eighth Framework Programme on RTD (“Horizon 2020”, 2014–2020) would
formalise this process by including R&D in support of EUROSUR as an explicit priority of the ESRP.205
Horizon 2020 is “aimed at securing Europe’s global competitiveness”, “part of the drive to create
new growth and jobs in Europe” by creating an “Innovation Union”.206 Some may question, however,
whether this programme is the appropriate instrument from which to fund R&D into the
development of EU border controls.
Box 4 details 15 projects funded to date in the area of border security to which the EU has
contributed more than €170 million. More than half have provided indirect or direct input to the
development and implementation of EUROSUR. Before the current framework research comes to an
end in 2013, the results of two more calls for border surveillance proposals will be announced. In the
2011 call, the EU requested proposals on “Increasing trustworthiness of vessel reporting systems”
and the “Pre‐Operational Validation (POV) at EU level of common application of Surveillance
tools”.207 The forthcoming 2012 call will include the “Surveillance of wide zones: from detection to
alert”; “Pre Operational Validation on land borders”; “Sensor technology for under foliage
detection”; and “Mobile equipment at the land border crossing points”.208 If Horizon 2020 is used to
fund EUROSUR ‐related R&D at the current rate that the European Security Research Programme is
being used, then the investment between now and 2020 could be in the region of €300–400 million,
dwarfing the estimates provided by the Commission.
While it is logical for the EU to conduct R&D in support of its policy objectives, a separate budget line
for EUROSUR R&D with clear goals and objectives would provide for greater democratic control and
accountability. We are also concerned that the main recipients of this R&D funding to date have
been large defence and security companies that stand to profit if the member states or EU agencies
make subsequent investments in the border surveillance technologies they promote. Eleven out of
the 13 projects described below are/were led by defence contractors (see Box 4). All seven of the
projects detailed in the following sub‐section are/were also led by large defence companies. The
majority of the consortia participants are from the defence sector. The same names – whose
influence on the framework research programme is well‐documented – are omnipresent.
A potential conflict of interests hangs over the evident outsourcing of the design, development, and
implementation of the EUROSUR system to date (see Box 4). This process is also clearly encouraging
the transfer of applications developed in the military sector into the (traditionally) civilian realm of
border control and maritime surveillance, raising questions about the legitimacy of funding
apparently “dual use” research and impacting significantly on the way that migration is perceived
and policed. It is striking that whereas EUROSUR has the triple objectives of preventing illegal
migration, combating transnational crime, and saving lives at sea, the EU has neither funded nor
called for proposals geared solely towards safety or search and rescue. Finally, whereas all of this
205 EU Council doc. 17935/11, p. 81.
206 See Horizon 2020, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/index_en.cfm?pg=h2020.
207 FP7‐SEC‐2011‐1, 20 July 2010.
208 FP7‐SEC‐2012‐1 Orientation Paper, 17 Apr. 2012.
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R&D must be “state‐of‐the‐art” in order to qualify for EU research funds, there has been no
meaningful independent review of the results of the projects detailed below with regard to their
implications for the development of EUROSUR or the viability of specific technologies.
Box 4: EU security research projects supporting EUROSUR
Project name Objective Start
date Dur‐
ation Cost (EU
contrib
‐ution)
Led by
PERSEUS
(Protection of
European seas
and borders
through the
intelligent use
of
surveillance)209 (1) Showcase an “EU Maritime
Surveillance System of Systems”
incorporating “existing national systems
and platforms, enhancing them with
innovative capabilities and moving
beyond EUROSUR’s 2013 expectations”;
(2) support the development of the
member states’ NCC network and
incorporate both FRONTEX and the
surveillance systems of the European
Maritime Safety Association.
Includes applications to improve
“detection and identification of non
collaborative/suspicious small boats and
low flying aircraft”; “enhanced and
increasingly automated detection of
abnormal vessel behaviours”; and
“identification of threats and tracking of
reporting and non‐reporting vessels”.
Jan.
2011 4 years €43.7m
(€27.9m) Indra Sistemas
SEABILLA
(Sea Border
Surveillance)210 (1) Define the architecture for cost‐
effective European Sea Border
Surveillance systems, integrating space,
land, sea, and air assets, including legacy
systems; (2) apply advanced
technological solutions to increase
performances of surveillance functions;
(3) develop and demonstrate significant
improvements in detection, tracking,
identification, and automated behaviour
analysis of all vessels, including hard‐to‐
detect vessels, in open waters as well as
close to coast.
June
2010 45
months €15.6m
(€9.9m) SELEX
(Finmeccanica)
OPARUS
(Open
Architecture
for UAV‐based
Surveillance
System)211 (1) The integration of UAVs/drones into
EUROSUR by defining the “open
architecture for the operation of
unmanned air‐to‐ground wide area land
and sea border surveillance platforms in
Europe”, taking into account the draft
legislation for insertion of UAVs into Sept.
2010 18
months €14m
(€11.9m) Sagem
209 PERSEUS, available at: http://www.perseus ‐fp7.eu/.
210 SEABILLA, available at: http://www.seabilla.eu/cms/.
211 OPARUS, available at: http://www.oparus.eu/.
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civilian airspace currently being drafted
by the European Commission and
EUROCONTROL (the pan European Civil
Aerospace Association); (2) demonstrate
drone surveillance, secure datalinks,
communication networks, and a generic
ground control station.
I2C
(Integrated
System for
Interoperable
sensors and
Information
sources for
Common
abnormal
vessel
behaviour
detection and
Collaborative
identification
of threat)212 To combine radar and vessel‐tracking
systems together with new prototypes
and sensor technologies to create an “all
weather traffic surveillance” system that
it claims will be able to “track small
crafts” over a “wide maritime zone [of]
up to 200 nautical miles”. Will
incorporate data from “deployable
sensor platforms” including aircraft and
vessel patrols, unmanned submarine
vehicles (USVs), and “Zeppelin” airships,
which offer “absolute quiet flight with no
vibration for high resolution observation
quality and a payload of 2 tons for
sensors and communication devices.”
Promises EUROSUR a “common
intelligent operational traffic picture
appending to vessel tracks information
[sic] on performed activities, flags, sea
state conditions, regulations, etc”; the
capacity to “detect abnormal vessel
behaviours and issue automatically
alarms to operator for validation”.
Oct.
2010 4 years €16m
(€9.9m) DCNS (French
naval
contractor)
EFFISEC
(EFFicient
Integrated
SECurity
Checkpoints)
213
(1) To enhance the security and efficiency
of land and maritime checkpoints
through technology; (2) improve the
working conditions for border inspectors;
(3) increase flow of people crossing
borders. May
2009 4 years €16.3m
(€10m) Sagem
WIMAAS
(Wide
maritime area
airborne
surveillance)214
Provide the airborne building block of
maritime surveillance with the potential
for reduced cost of operation, more
autonomous and improved efficiency
through the introduction of air vehicles
with reduced or zero onboard crew
[drones] (…) You cannot control what you
do not patrol. Even if cooperation is
crucial, air assets are a unique capability
for wide‐area maritime surveillance
because they provide situation
awareness over extended areas
(endurance, speed, and long‐distance Dec.
2008 3 years €40m
(€27.4m) Thales
212 I2C project, # 242340.
213 EFFISEC, available at: http://www.effisec.eu/.
214 ARGUS 3D, available at: http://www.argus3d.eu/project.
Page | 59
detection), re‐direction to areas of
interest (threat) and flexible reaction
(inspection when needed). WiMA²S will
develop concepts and technologies for
better operational use at lower costs of
Maritime Surveillance Manned Airborne
Vehicle, and Maritime Surveillance
Optionally Piloted Vehicles because
regulations will not allow UAVs to fly
across European Airspace for years to
come.
ARGUS 3D
(AiR Guidance
and
Surveillance
3D)215
To improve the detection of manned and
unmanned platforms by exploiting the
treatment of more accurate information
of cooperative as well as non‐cooperative
flying objects, in order to identify
potentially [sic] threats (…) The final
objective of the research consists of
study, design and realisation of a simple
demonstrator of a low‐cost,
interoperable, radar‐based, system
Dec.
2009 3 years €49.4m
(€32.6m) SELEX
(Finmeccanica)
AMASS
(Autonomous
maritime
surveillance
system)216
To facilitate observation and security of
wide critical maritime areas in order to
reduce actual and potential illegal
immigration and the trafficking of drugs,
weapons, and illicit substances. The
surveillance system will consist of
autonomous, unmanned surveillance
buoys with active and passive sensors,
the key sensors being un‐cooled thermal
imagers connected as a network with
wideband radio.
Mar.
2008 42
months €5.5m
(€3.6m) Carl Zeiss
Optronics
SECTRONIC
(Security
system for
maritime
infrastructure,
ports and
coastal
zones)217
To develop “a 24h small area surveillance
system that is designed to be used on any
ship, platform, container/oil/gas terminal
or harbour” using “all accessible means
of observation (offshore, onshore, air,
space) (…) exchanged via an onshore
control center.” Feb.
2008 4 years €4.1m
(€2.8m) Marine &
Remote Sensing
Solutions Ltd
UNCOSS
(Underwater
Coastal Sea
Surveyor)218
To develop tools for the non‐destructive
inspection of underwater objects mainly
based on neutron sensors. Dec.
2008 4 years €4.1m
(€2.8m) French Atomic
Energy Agency
TALOS
(Transportable To field‐test “a mobile, modular, scalable,
autonomous and adaptive system for June
2008 4 years €19.9m
(€12.9m) PIAP
(Polish defence
215 ARGUS 3D, available at: http://www.argus3d.eu/project.
216 AMASS project, # 218290 .
217 SECTRONIC, available at: http://www.sectronic.eu/.
218 UNCOSS, available at: http://www.uncoss ‐project.org/.
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autonomous
patrol for land
border
surveillance)219 protecting European borders” that will
“take measures to stop the illegal action
almost autonomously with supervision of
border guard officers.” Uses drones and
unmanned land vehicles.
contractor)
CONTAIN
(Container
Security
Advanced
Information
Networking) To support transport security
stakeholders in managing container
security threats as part of an integrated
approach to the management of
transportation networks; provide a
coherent set of technology options for
screening and scanning, plus container ‐
integrated sensor, communication, and
security technologies to monitor
container movements and security‐
related parameters in real time; enable
ports to establish upgraded port
container security processes; and provide
information feeds to port community
systems and national and European
security databases.
Oct.
2010 42
months €15.6m
(€10m) TNO
(Swedish
Defence
Research
Institute)
GLOBE
(European
Global Border
Environment)
220 To provide a comprehensive framework
in which an integrated global border
management system must be developed
(…) moving throughout the four main
layers of border control (country of
origin, transit areas, regulated and
unregulated border lines, and internal
territory). Described as the “first phase”
in the EUROSUR demonstration project.
July
2008 12
months €15.6m
(€10m) Telvent
(Spanish IT
company)
OPERAMAR
(interoperable
approach to
the European
union
maritime
security
management)
221 To provide the foundations for pan‐
European Maritime Security Awareness
by addressing the insufficient
interoperability of European and national
assets with a view to generating unified
data models for seamless exchange and
contributing to address the discrepancies
of the behavioural, organisational, and
cultural issues.
Mar.
2008 15
months €0.7m
(€0.7m) Thales
STABORSEC
(Standards for
border
security
enhancement)
222 To produce an inventory of needed
standards for stand‐alone equipment
used for border security. Feb.
2007 18
months €0.7m
(€0.5m) Sagem
219 TALOS, available at: http://talos ‐border.eu/.
220 GLOBE project, # 218207.
221 OPERAMAR final report, available at: http://cordis.europa.eu/search/
index.cfm?fuseaction=result.docume nt&RS_LANG=EN&RS_RCN=11485692&q=.
222 STABORSEC flyer, available at: ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/s ecurity/docs/straborsec_en.pdf.
Page | 61
SOBCAH
(Surveillance
of Borders,
Coastlines and
Harbours)223 To identify the main threats relevant to
”green” and “blue” borders; elaborate
the most suitable architectural solutions
based on the most advanced existing
sensors and network technologies;
execute a proper modelling of the
established solution; carry out the
technology validation of the selected
solution, first in the laboratory and then
in the port of Genoa (Italy); elaborate a
consistent road map.
Feb.
2006 18
months €3m
(€2m) Galileo Avionica
(Finmeccanica)
4.2.2 Space‐based border surveillance and the Common Information Sharing Environment
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security is the EU’s programme for the establishment of a
European capacity for Earth observation. GMES is also funded from the FP7 budget, accounting for
approximately 85 per cent of the €1.4 billion space programme in FP7, which runs from 2007–2013.
When it was launched, GMES – then Global Monitoring for Environmental Security – was focussed
solely on environmental information, with no envisaged security or defence capacities, but like the
ESRP, it has increasingly been used to support the development and implementation of EUROSUR
and the Common Information Sharing Environment. As well as using GMES services, the Common
Application of Surveillance tools provided for in the draft Regulation will see FRONTEX purchase
satellite imagery from private providers through the EU Satellite Centre.
Box 5 details seven GMES projects that have directly or indirectly supported the development of
EUROSUR or the broader Common Information Sharing Environment. Total EU funding for these
projects is more than €36 million to date, yet a total budget of just over €60 million was provided for
in the EUROSUR Financial Study for the period 2011–2020. The total R&D investment for EUROSUR
has clearly been underestimated in the EUROSUR Financial Study and Commission Impact
Assessment. In addition to FP7‐funded R&D, the European Commission has also funded two pilot
projects to develop the Common Information Sharing Environment envisaged by its integrated
maritime surveillance policy. These are MARSUNO (focussing on the North Atlantic)224 and
BLUEMASSMED (focussing on the Mediterranean),225 which had a combined budget of more than €5
million.
Box 5: GMES projects supporting EUROSUR
Name Objective Start
date Dur‐
ation Cost (EU
contrib
‐ution)
Led by
223 SOCBAH flyer, available at: ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/security/docs/sobcah_en.pdf.
224 MARSUNO, available at: http://www.marsuno.eu/project/.
225 BLUEMASSMED, available at: http://www.bluemassmed.net/.
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MARISS
(MARitime
Security
Service) The integration of coastal radar
information, Vessel Detection
Systems, Vessel Traffic
Management Systems, and
Automatic Identification Systems,
with airborne and Earth
Observation data.
Nov.
2005 10
months n/a Telespazio
(Finmeccanica)
TANGO
(Telecomm ‐
unications
advanced
networks for
GMES
operations)226 To develop, integrate,
demonstrate, and promote new
satellite telecom services
dedicated to GMES. TANGO is the
first project under EC FP6
focussing on the use of satellite
telecom to serve the needs of the
whole GMES community. The
project addresses key
environment and security
applications.
Nov.
2006 36
months €9.3m
(€5.2m) EADS Astrium
LIMES (Land
and sea
integrated
monitoring for
European
security)227 To define and develop prototype
information services, based on
satellite technology, to support
security management at EU and
global level [for]: organisation and
distribution of humanitarian aid
and reconstruction; surveillance of
the EU borders (land and sea);
surveillance and protection of
maritime transport for sensitive
cargo; protection against
emerging security threats (e.g.
terrorism, illegal trafficking,
proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction).
Dec.
2006 42
months €21.2m
(€11.9m) Telespazio
(Finmeccanica)
GMOSAIC
(GMES services
for
management
of operations,
situation
awareness and
intelligence for
regional
crises)228 To identify and develop products,
methodologies, and pilot services
for the provision of geo‐spatial
information in support of EU
external relations policies and
demonstrate the sustainability of
GMES global security perspective. Jan.
2009 39
months €15.2m
(€9.6m) E‐GEOS Spa
(Telespazio ‐
Finmeccanica)
NEREIDS (New
Service
Capabilities for
Integrated and Enhanced EO capabilities by
combining different sensors with
innovative data‐fusion techniques;
a toolbox approach enabling the June
2011 36
months €6m
(€4m) GMV Defence
& Security
226 TANGO, available at: http://www.teladnetgo.eu/.
227 LIMES flyer, available at: http://www.fp6 ‐limes.eu/uploads/docs/LIMES ‐PRS.004‐
TPZ%20%5BInfosheet%5D.pdf.
228 GMOSIAC, available at: http://www.gmes ‐gmosaic.eu/.
Page | 63
Advanced
Maritime
Surveillance)229
sharing of data and supporting the
common maritime picture.
SIMTISYS
(Simulator for
Moving Target
Indicator
System)230
Maritime surveillance for safety
purposes as border surveillance,
traffic safety, fishery control, and
environmental protection and
monitoring; the tracking of small
vessels.
June
2011 30
months €2.5m
(€1.6m) Thales Alenia
DOLPHIN
(Development
of Pre‐
operational
Services for
Highly
Innovative
Maritime
Surveillance
Capabilities)231 To develop the key technological
and operational gap‐filling
innovations, leading in the mid‐
term to a full and sustainable
operational exploitation of Earth
Observation Satellite capabilities
in the EU and MS maritime
policies applications. DOLPHIN
aims at developing new tools
providing effective improvements
of state‐of‐the‐art capabilities in
maritime surveillance.
June
2011 30
months €7.1m
(€4m) E‐GEOS Spa
(Telespazio ‐
Finmeccanica)
4.2.3 EU funded R&D projects supporting smart borders
Whereas the EUROSUR system has supported the range of projects detailed above, the EU is only
just beginning to fund R&D for smart borders. The Total Airport Security System, for example, is a
four‐year, €15 million project that was launched in April 2010 and is being led by Israel’s Verint
Systems; the EU has contributed €9 million to the project thus far. The 2011 FP7‐Security Call for
Proposals called directly for projects supporting a Registered Traveller Programme and Automated
Border Control. One or two large‐scale demonstration projects are expected to be funded. It is
regrettable that the European Commission did not wait until the member states had agreed on the
general approach and the question of whether even to establish an EU RTP before committing
substantial EU funds towards R&D in support of that objective.
229 NEREIDS, available at: http://www.nereids ‐fp7.eu/.
230 SIMTISYS flyer, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/pol icies/space/files/ simitisys_en.pdf.
231 DOLPHIN, available at: http://www.gmes ‐dolphin.eu/.
Page | 64
4.3 Funding the implementation of EUROSUR and smart borders
In addition to using the EU’s research programme to fund its R&D into smart borders and EUROSUR,
the European Commission has used two generic funding programmes – the External Borders Fund
and the migration cooperation programme of the Development Cooperation Instrument – to fund
the implementation of the EUROSUR system in the member states and third countries. From 2013,
these programme instruments will be merged into the proposed €4.7 billion Internal Security Fund
2014–2020.
4.3.1 The EU External Borders Fund
Money from the External Borders Fund (EBF) has been available to the member states to establish or
modify their National Coordination Centres in order to participate in EUROSUR for the past four
years. In August 2007, the European Commission adopted strategic guidelines on the
implementation of the €1.8 billion External Borders Fund (EBF, 2007–2013) prioritising “support for
the development (…) of the national components of a European Surveillance System.”232 The
European Parliament was not consulted (the EUROSUR roadmap would not be proposed for another
six months).
Almost half of the total EBF for 2007–2013, some €800 million , is allocated to three priority areas:
the “improvement of [national] border surveillance capacities in terms of infrastructure and
equipment”; establishing/modifying National Coordination Centres; and “interlinking and integrating
the existing communication systems into one comprehensive surveillance system.”233
Insufficient information regarding the use of the EBF is available to assess how much has been spent
on EUROSUR to date, though the EUROSUR Financial Study estimated the costs of “setting‐up,
upgrading and maintaining” the National Coordination Centres at €194 million for the period 2011–
2016 (see Figure 8). The European Commission’s 2011 impact assessment, however, provided an
estimate of only €99.6 million for the NCCs for the period 2011–2020, with the same amount
envisaged for the FRONTEX Situation Centre. The draft EUROSUR Regulation, meanwhile, envisages
spending €112 million from the Internal Security Fund 2014–2020 on the NSCs and a further €132
million over the same period for the FRONTEX Situation Centre and Common Pre‐frontier
Intelligence Picture (approximately two‐thirds of which will come from the ISF).234
232 Decision 2007/599/EC (EBF strategic guidelines, priority 2); see further Decision 2008/456/EC on
implementing rules for EBF and Decision 2010/69/EU amending the 2008 rules to allow funding of national
infrastructure.
233 COM (2011) 857 final, p. 10.
234 COM (2011) 873 final, p. 35.
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Figure 8: Cost of establishing, upgrading, and maintaining NCCs 2011–2026235
4.3.2 The Development Cooperation Instrument
A key object of EUROSUR is to integrate existing regional surveillance systems for border
control/internal security purposes into the EUROSUR network. In particular, FRONTEX wishes to
integrate operational data from the SEAHORSE ATLANTIC,236 Baltic Sea Regional Border Control,237
and Black Sea Border Coordination238 networks into EUROSUR. Between 2007 and 2010 the cost of
upgrading and maintaining the technical infrastructure of these and a third regional cooperation
centre covering the Baltic States was €77 million.239
For the period 2011–2013, the European Commission has allocated “between 15 and 25 per cent” of
the €179 million “Thematic programme for cooperation with third countries in the areas of
migration and asylum”, part of the EUROPAID Development Cooperation Instrument, to “third
countries situated along the southern and south‐eastern maritime borders… which accept to
cooperate in the framework of EUROSUR.”240 This is substantially more than the €5 million the
Commission estimates it will cost to incorporate third countries and regional networks. In 2011 the
235 Source: SEC (2011) 1538 final, p. 35.
236 SEAHORSE ATLANTIC is a network between border control authorities in Spain, Portugal, Mauritania,
Morocco, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Cape Verde for exchanging information on “irregular migration
and criminal activities” along the coastlines of North and West Africa and the Canary Islands.
237 Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation is a network of Coordination Centres between Estonia,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, Norway, and Russia.
238 The Black Sea Border Information Center, located in Bourgas, Bulgaria, is an initiative of the Black Sea
Cooperation Forum comprising border guards from Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and Turkey.
239 Source: SEC (2011) 1538 final, p. 55.
240 Commission Decision OJ C 2011/2304, 7 Apr. 2011; see also SEC (2011) 1536 final, p. 17.
Page | 66
Spanish interior ministry submitted a proposal to establish SEAHORSE MEDITERRANEAN, modelled
on SEAHORSE ATLANTIC, using funds from the EUROPAID thematic programme.241 In addition to
concerns about the exchange of data with third countries that do not have equivalent human rights
standards, the use of the EU development budget to fund the implementation of EU security policies
is lamentable. As others have pointed out, it may also contribute to a restriction of the rights of
people to leave a country to seek asylum.242
4.3.3 The Internal Security Fund
The European Commission has proposed the allocation of €3.5 billion from the €4.7 billion Internal
Security Fund 2014–2020 to external borders and visas, including large‐scale IT systems.243 The
priorities for the fund are “[T]he further development of an integrated border management system
by improving, replacing, and upgrading equipment/infrastructure for visa and borders according to
new technological developments. This would in particular include enhancing the operational
capabilities of the member states within the framework of EUROSUR standards.” As noted above,
the Commission has indicated that €200 million could be made available to support the
development of the NCCs and FSC.
The ISF will also support “enhance[d] cooperation with third countries and to reinforce certain key
aspects of their border surveillance and management capabilities in areas which are of particular
interest and which have a direct impact in the EU. For example, in the framework of EUROSUR,
funding could be made available to link third countries’ systems and infrastructures to the EU’s in
order to allow for the regular exchange of information.”244
“Without prejudice to the future proposals from the Commission on the smart borders package and
the subsequent decision of the European Parliament and the Council,” the European Commission
has also allocated almost one‐third of the ISF to implementing those proposals.245 “The cost of
developing a central and national systems for EES and RTP has been estimated between about 1 and
1.3 billion EUR (…) On the basis of these assumptions and given that development would only start
as from 2015, it is proposed to set aside 1.1 billion EUR for these two systems under this
proposal.”246 It is regrettable that the implementation of the EUROSUR and smart borders proposals
is effectively outsourced to a generic funding instrument. At least in the case of the proposed EES
and RTP, the newly established EU Agency for Large‐scale IT Systems would be responsible for the
new projects. Where EUROSUR is concerned, the Agency has been expressly excluded from any role
on the grounds of political expediency. It is questionable to say the least whether FRONTEX and the
European Commission have the experience or expertise to implement such an ambitious proposal.
241 SEAHORSE presentation, available at: http://www.imp ‐med.eu/En/En/image.php?id=125.
242 “Analysis of the external dimension of the EU’s asylum and immigration policies – Summary and
recommendations for the European Parliament”, Brussels: European Parliament DG for External Policies of the
EU, PE 374.366 (2006), pp. 10–11.
243 COM(2011) 750 final, 15 Nov. 2011.
244 COM (2011) 749 final, 15 Nov. 2011, p. 8.
245 COM (2011) 750 final, p. 6.
246 Idem, p. 8.
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4.4 The United States’ experience: SBI‐net and US VISIT
It is also regrettable that the European Commission has not apparently considered the perceived
successes and failures with regard to comparable large‐scale border control initiatives in the United
States in its impact assessments of either EUROSUR, the Entry‐Exit System or Registered Traveller
Programme. The proposed EES is not unlike the US VISIT programme, which collects biometric data
from all entrants. But as Peers notes, “the Commission’s 2008 impact assessment does not indicate
how many persons are likely to be detected on the territory or refused entry at the border or
refused visas as a result of an entry‐exit system. Such estimates are crucial to assessing the added
value of such a scheme. As the EDPS has pointed out, the US system has led to 1300 refusals at the
border, at the cost of $1.5 billion. This amounts to a cost of over $1 million per refused entrant –
although it is possible that the US system has had other results as regards the objectives of
immigration control.”247
Any reflection on the United States’ experience with its $3.7 billion Secure Border Initiative (SBI‐net)
would have been equally sobering. Launched in 2006, SBI‐net was supposed to establish a complex
network of high‐tech surveillance equipment to police the entire northern border (with Canada) and
southern border (with Mexico), but in 2010 funding was frozen. Testifying before Congress, US
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano described the project as “plagued with troubles from
day one (…) It has never met a deadline, it hasn’t met its operational capacities, and it doesn’t give
us what we need to have.”248 While elements of the programme remain, it is also important to point
out that the governance framework of the United States allows for more searching audits of projects
like SBI‐net and US VISIT by impartial technology experts. The Government Accountability Office in
particular produces detailed reports that properly assess the achievements and failures of large‐
scale IT projects as against their cost and stated objectives.249 Should the EU decide to press ahead
with its own smart borders initiative, it is imperative that more stringent mechanisms for democratic
oversight and control are introduced, particularly with regard to EUROSUR.
247 Peers “Proposed new border control systems”, p. 9.
248 Defence Industry Daily , 16 Jan. 2011.
249 See, for example, GAO: “US‐VISIT has not fully met expectations and longstanding program management
challenges need to be addressed”, 16 Feb. 2007; “Key US‐VISIT components at varying stages of completion,
but integrated and reliable schedule needed”, Nov. 2009; “Technology deployment delays persist and the
impact of border fencing has not been assessed”, 9 Sep. 2009; “Despite progress, DHS continues to be
challenged in managing its multi‐billion dollar annual investment in large‐scale information technology
systems”, 15 Sep. 2011.
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5 Conclusions
More than four years have now passed since the European Commission published its 2008 smart
borders package. The European Parliament is about to start negotiating on the legislative proposal
for EUROSUR; within months the Commission is expected to publish legislative proposals on the
Entry‐Exit System and Registered Travellers Programme. We are concerned that – despite the
limited discussions that have taken place within the European Parliament and among the member
states in the EU Council – the likely cost, fundamental rights impact, and potential effectiveness of
the three systems has not been properly debated or thought through. The various impact
assessments produced by the Commission have failed to demonstrate the necessity of the planned
systems in terms of effectively controlling immigration, significantly enhancing the security of EU
citizens, or facilitating travels of third‐country nationals. In the absence of such justifications, the
proportionality of EUROSUR, EES, and RTP is strongly open to question.
In many respects, it is the wider EU policy context that is responsible for the most acute concerns
about the three proposed systems. The EU’s “Global Approach to Migration” seeks explicitly to
externalise EU migration controls by creating immigration “buffer zones” outside of EU territory and
cooperating with third countries to prevent the departure of migrants and refugees bound for
Europe. Human rights organisations have challenged the legitimacy of this policy, arguing that it
encourages “push back operations” that result in the circumvention of the EU’s obligations under
the Geneva Conventions and breaches of the non‐refoulement principle. EUROSUR’s draft legislation
is ominously silent on this point, though the European Commission and FRONTEX argue that
EUROSUR has the express aim of saving lives at sea – an objective that finds strong support in
international law. In practice it will be the way in which FRONTEX and the member states actually
prioritise search‐and‐rescue and asylum protection over surveillance, interception and so‐called
push back operations that will determine the legitimacy of EUROSUR in the eyes of many observers.
While certain safeguards may be added to the draft Regulation, these issues are likely to remain
largely beyond the scope of the draft legislation. It is, however, imperative that the tacit extension of
FRONTEX’s remit and powers envisaged by the EUROSUR legislation is accompanied by greater
democratic control and measures to ensure compliance with international law, including stricter
rules governing cooperation with third states and agencies, clearer procedures for joint operations
and clarification of the EU’s non‐refoulement obligations.
The EES and RTP proposals must also be seen in a broader policy context. The European Union has
already established three vast immigration databases: the Schengen Information System, to detect
and exclude “illegal” aliens and persons posing a threat to the security of the member states;
EURODAC, which houses the fingerprints of all asylum applicants; and the Visa Information System,
which is accompanied by some of the most stringent visa requirements in the world. The
introduction of “biometrics” (fingerprint data) into SIS II and the VIS, which share a biometric
matching system, will create the largest fingerprint database in the world. The proposed EES would
supplement these existing systems by recording the identity and movements of tens of millions of
third‐country nationals not currently subject to a visa requirement, and automatically flagging
potential overstayers. Just as EUROSUR is emblematic of a paradigm shift in the policing of the open
seas, the EES and RTP proposals symbolise the “next step” in the roll‐out of EU‐wide biometric
immigration systems. The proposals certainly appear to us as much a product of this political and
Page | 69
economic momentum than a rational, cost‐effective response to a perceived migration crisis. The
Registered Travellers Programme is conceived as a way of offsetting the inconvenience of more
stringent checks, but in practice it is only likely to be available to a small category of pre‐vetted
business travellers.
The proposals must also be considered in light of the ongoing financial crisis and the impact of
austerity measures. The European Commission has estimated that the three systems could cost at
least €1.5 billion. This is a massive investment in large‐scale IT systems, the need for which – and
potential effectiveness of – remains in serious doubt.
5.1 EUROSUR
The proposed European Border Surveillance System is an ambitious and costly project with
important implications for fundamental rights and the development of EU policy towards migrants
and refugees more generally. It is troubling that whereas comparable systems such as the Schengen
and EUROPOL Information Systems have been developed on the basis of “primary” (enabling) and
“secondary” (implementing) legislation – which was to a limited extent at least discussed in the
European and national parliaments, and by civil society – in the case of EUROSUR, this method has
been substituted with a technocratic process that has allowed for the development of the system
and substantial public expenditure to occur well in advance of the legislation now on the table.
Implementing the 2008 EUROSUR roadmap – before any proper debate or formal consultation
procedure could take place – has left little room for discussion of the necessity and proportionality
of the proposed system in light of the expected costs and potential fundamental rights implications.
Following five years of development, the European Commission expects to adopt the legal
framework and have the EUROSUR system up and running (albeit in beta form) in the same year
(2013), presenting the European Parliament with an effective fait accompli. While the Parliament is
simply expected to fine‐tune the proposal, it does have the opportunity to introduce some crucial
safeguards. The Parliament should also ensure that the legal and financial frameworks for future
initiatives, such as the Common Information Sharing Environment for EU maritime surveillance, EES,
and RTP, are adopted before the development of the proposed systems commences.
As noted above, the justification for EUROSUR rests on its potential to combat “illegal immigration”,
increase European security, and save lives at sea. These claims must be treated with caution. On the
one hand, they rely on the as yet unproven interoperability of new technologies; on the other, the
EUROSUR proposal fails to guarantee the primacy of search and rescue functions. Assuming the
technology works, EUROSUR could clearly help to bring more people to “safety”. There is, in fact, a
compelling case for a significant investment of financial and human resources in saving lives in the
Mediterranean, but nowhere in the proposed EUROSUR Regulation and numerous assessments,
studies, and R&D projects, is it defined how exactly this will be done, nor are there any procedures
laid out for what to do with the “rescued”. The boats that FRONTEX hopes to detect using EUROSUR
typically contain irregular migrants and persons in need of international protection, but nothing is
said about the requirement to process requests for asylum. If FRONTEX and the European
Commission are serious about EUROSUR’s proclaimed aim to save lives at sea, the draft Regulation
must be amended so that search and rescue obligations are prioritised and read jointly with the
requirements of refugee law and human rights law. At a minimum the proposal must specify how
Page | 70
EUROSUR will send information or alerts to the Rescue Coordination Centres of the country
responsible for a specific Search and Rescue Region. It must also be made clear to FRONTEX and the
member states that they cannot equate interception measures on the high seas to prevent migrants
from reaching Europe’s borders with search and rescue missions. The latter must be prioritised and
include the positive obligations stemming from the UN Convention on the Safety of Lives at Sea and
refugee laws spelt out by the European Coastal Patrols Network, regional cooperation networks such
as SEAHORSE, and any third states invited to participate in EUROSUR.
We are equally concerned about the technical viability of the proposal. Despite the high‐tech claims
about “continuous 24/7 surveillance”, “situational pictures”, and “pre‐frontier intelligence”, the
planned EUROSUR system has not been subject to a proper technological risk assessment. EUROSUR
relies on the implementation of a host of new technologies and the interlinking of 24 different
national coordination centres and surveillance systems – bilaterally and through FRONTEX. This
process will be both extremely complex and extremely costly, yet the only people who have been
asked if they think it will work are FRONTEX and the companies selling the technology. We see no
logical or justifiable reason for rushing the process of establishing EUROSUR or excluding bodies like
the new EU Agency for Large‐scale IT Systems. On the contrary, the results of the numerous R&D
projects funded by the European Commission now enable a fuller evaluation of the proposed
EUROSUR system and the prospects for success of a whole range of detection and communications
technologies to take place before further EU funds are committed.
As currently developed, the legislative and financial framework for EUROSUR appears to give a blank
cheque to FRONTEX and the European Commission to keep funding R&D from the EU budget until
they find something that works. EUROSUR itself has not been properly costed and, as shown in
Figure 9, the estimates provided by the European Commission do not stand up to even the minimal
scrutiny provided in this report. In opting to fund EUROSUR from different multi‐annual budget lines
– over which the European Commission and FRONTEX enjoy a large degree of discretion in regard to
the annual funding priorities – it appears a recipe for financial excess. Based on recent expenditure
and indicative budgets for the Internal Security Fund, it appears that EUROSUR could easily end up
costing two or three times the Commission’s estimate. Without a cap on what can be spent attached
to the draft EUROSUR, Horizon 2020, and Internal Security Fund legislation, the Parliament will be
powerless to prevent any such cost overruns. The Parliament should also seek clarification over the
extent to which the draft EUROSUR legislation envisages the purchase of “drones” and other
common surveillance tools by FRONTEX from EU funds, and ensure that this is subject to democratic
debate and appropriate controls with regard to public safety and civil liability.
It is also highly problematic that there is no single mechanism for financial accountability beyond the
periodic reports submitted by FRONTEX and the European Commission from October 2015. In the
continued absence of concise reports about EUROSUR ‐related expenditure within FRONTEX and
across the various EU budget lines, it is already extremely difficult to monitor what has actually been
spent on the project. By excluding the EU Agency for Large‐scale IT Systems, the broader prospects
for accountability around EUROSUR’s development are also greatly diminished. Finally, given that
EUROSUR seeks primarily to address “illegal migration” at sea, we see no need to introduce the
landlocked or northern European member states into EUROSUR from the outset. Given the financial
constraints of the current climate, it is surely advisable to develop EUROSUR more slowly – initially
as a communications network for the 10 member states that are part of the existing European
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Coastal Patrols Network, with new technologies and member states integrated into the network as,
and when, (i) a clear need arises and (ii) their inclusion can be justified.
Figure 9: Questioning the EUROSUR cost estimates
Cost Commission
estimate Our estimate Based on
National Coordination
Centres €99.6 million €227 million MS estimates of €105 million for 2011 –2013
(see Figure 8) plus €112 million indicative ISF
2014–2020 allocation in draft EUROSUR Reg.
FRONTEX Situational
Picture & Common
Pre‐Frontier
Intelligence Picture
€129.2
million €152 million FRONTEX estimate of €20 million for 2011 –
2013 (in Commission impact assessments),
plus €132 million indicative ISF 2014–2020
allocation in draft EUROSUR Reg.
Communication
network
€46.7 million €46.7 million
Common application of
surveillance tools €29.6 million €350 million Approximately €35 million per annum spent
on R&D projects in 2010–2012, extrapolated
over 10 years. EUROSUR included as an
explicit R&D priority in Horizon 2020.
Networks with third
countries €5.4 million €98 million Approximately €38 million allocated from DCI
Thematic programme on migration 2011–
2013, extrapolated over 10 years. Programme
to be incorporated into ISF from 2014.
Total €338.7
million €873.7
million
The EUROSUR Regulation lacks adequate data protection safeguards. While EUROSUR will not gather
a massive amount of personal or biometric data, or result in the establishment of a centralised
database that stores such information, personal data could be processed in a number of different
“layers” of the situational pictures. FRONTEX can use information from new surveillance systems,
including drones, within the “common applications of surveillance tools” in order to supply the
national coordination centres and itself with information on the external borders and on the pre‐
frontier area. EUROSUR will also perform the “border control” function of the EU’s wider Common
Information Sharing Environment, under which its information will be shared with a whole range of
third actors, including defence agencies. All these capabilities raise a whole range of potential
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privacy and data protection concerns that are not adequately addressed in the current draft
Regulation.
A specific provision that explicitly and exhaustively enumerates the conditions under which personal
data may be processed in EUROSUR and exchanged with external bodies and agencies must be
included in the legislation. Since the exchange of EUROSUR information with “neighbouring third
countries” would take place on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements between the
member state(s) and third countries, it is also crucial to mandate the logging of all such information
exchanges in order to enable national supervisory authorities to properly review the sending of
information to third countries and ensure that it does not lead to breaches of fundamental rights.
The EUROSUR Regulation should also explicitly include a system of layered supervision – with
national data protection authorities checking processing of personal data by the National
Coordination Centres, and the processing of personal data by FRONTEX, subject to review by the
European Data Protection Supervisor. It is currently unclear whether this form of layered supervision
is envisaged by the draft Regulation.
Finally, we suggest that there must be greater democratic control of the implementation of the
European Security Research Programme to mitigate against the corporate capture of the research
agenda and the influence of defence and security contactors over the annual calls for proposals. This
would ensure that EU‐funded research complies with fundamental rights obligations from the outset
while meeting a genuine need and providing value for money.
5.2 Smart borders
Both the EES and RTP envisage the creation of a centralised European database that will include
potentially highly sensitive biometric data such as fingerprints and facial images from millions of
people. All third‐country nationals who want to enter the Schengen area would have no choice but
to allow for the processing of their personal data. This scale of data‐gathering must clearly
demonstrate compelling grounds for public safety or public order in order to be considered a
proportional policy response. At present, the case for the pressing social need for either EES or RTP
has not been made.
The principle justification for the EES is that it would lead to a more credible EU immigration policy
by facilitating the return of visa overstayers. There are, however, major shortcomings with regard to
this claim. There are many legal reasons that can explain the overstay of a person and many
exceptions in the Schengen Border Code with regard to the registration of entry and exit, so an EES
alert alone cannot be considered as grounds for expulsion or deportation. An overstayers alert can
only ever constitute a presumption of illegal residence, and stringent follow‐up controls with regard
to the treatment of people identified as such will be needed to ensure that the EU respects its
human rights obligations. An administrative procedure must be completed in order to determine
whether the person has the right to stay legally in EU territory, and this procedure must give the
traveller the chance to explain the circumstances of any overstay. It is currently also lawfully
impossible to include an EES alert into the SIS/SIS II system, which only provides for the inclusion of
deportation orders issued by a court or other competent authority. Given that there can be no
immediate consequences for overstayers following an EES “hit”, the extent to which this will lead to
more efficient return operations is strongly open to question. Any attempt to automatically link EES
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alerts to the SIS/SIS II would also likely result in the stopping of an unacceptable number of perfectly
innocent travellers. It must also be recalled that border guards already check the passports of
departing visa holders for overstays; semi‐automating this process will not reduce their workload, it
will merely assist them in conducting such checks.
The EES will also surely result in longer queues for third‐country nationals wishing to enter the
Schengen area. Whereas TCNs subject to a visa requirement are already required to provide
biometric data on entry, those on the so‐called white lists who do not require an advance visa are
exempt from this requirement. Extrapolating from border‐crossing statistics collected during a
comprehensive monitoring exercise in 2009, this could result in the fingerprinting of an additional 57
million “white list” TCNs. The VIS impact assessment of 2004 stated that, on average, 15 seconds
were added to entry procedures in the United States when biometrics were collected for the US
VISIT programme. If the EU were able to achieve this target with regard to 57 million TCNs, it would
add the equivalent of 27 years of queuing time per year at the EU borders. Adequate provisions
would also have to be made for “false positives”, failures to provide biometrics, and a range of other
eventualities.
The Commission proposes to offset these additional constraints on cross‐border travel by
establishing a Registered Traveller Programme that would enable registered travellers to cross
borders much faster than their unregistered counterparts. The Commission has estimated that 4–5
million travellers might use RTP every year, yet 100 million TCNs are estimated to enter the
Schengen area every year. Shorter queues at RTP gates witnessed to date are clearly the result of
relatively fewer people being a part of such programmes (which typically charge an annual fee of
around €125). There must be significant doubts, therefore, as to the RTP’s capacity to relieve the
pressure on Schengen borders or facilitate travel for the vast majority.
According to the Commission, the development of the central EES and RTP could incur costs in the
order of €450 million, with annual operating costs of €190 million per year for the first five years.
The Commission has already allocated €1.1 billion to the development and implementation of these
systems from the proposed EU Internal Security Fund 2014–2020, but since it is quite unclear at this
stage whether these estimates assume that all Schengen states have fully implemented the Visa
Information System, the ultimate costs could end up being much higher. Given that the VIS is not yet
fully functional and the European Commission and its technology partners have not yet been able to
successfully implement SIS II, it seems preposterous that the EU could be about to embark on
another large‐scale IT project before the effectiveness of either of these two systems has even been
properly evaluated. Instead of creating a costly centralised RTP programme, it would surely be
better at this stage to focus on interoperability between those states that have already local or
national programmes and then assess the need for an EU‐wide system after that.
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6 Recommendations
We have been asked to provide recommendations for safeguards that could be introduced into the
draft EUROSUR Regulation and any future legislation establishing the EES and RTP. As noted above,
we harbour substantial concerns about the EUROSUR legislation as currently drafted, and are not
convinced of the need for either EES or RTP. We also harbour strong reservations about the current
trajectory of EU border control policy and the role that increased surveillance would play in this
context. We begin with some general recommendations about the EU migration policy framework
before specifically addressing the protection of fundamental rights and increased democratic control
with regard to the draft EUROSUR legislation and the expected EES and RTP proposals.
6.1 The broader EU migration policy framework
Mass surveillance and the treatment of all travellers as potential suspects is not a legitimate,
necessary, effective, or desirable cornerstone for EU migration policy. The EU should focus
instead on policy instruments that limit surveillance to those situations in which it is
absolutely necessary, preserve fundamental rights, and address migration control through
more appropriate and coherent policies.
The roll‐out of dual‐use technologies and practices such as drones, militarised perimeter
controls, and autonomous targeting systems is an iniquitous response to the humanitarian
crisis in the Mediterranean. The EU should reconsider this approach in the context of its
legal and moral responsibilities towards migrants and refugees.
The externalisation of European immigration controls and the use of aid and technical
assistance channels to create “buffer zones” in which migrants and refugees are policed and
detained by third countries according to the security demands of the EU, is incompatible
with the EU’s stated development and human rights policy objectives. The EU should
reorient its approach to relations with third countries in the field of migration around a
human security‐centred agenda.
The increasing role of the security and defence industries in developing and implementing
EU border control policies (which is concomitant to the exclusion of civil society and human
rights groups) is prone to serious conflicts of interests. The EU should reassess its apparently
ever‐closer partnership with the security industry in the context of obligations stemming
from the treaties to ensure that such risks are minimised while a balanced representation of
views contributes to the formulation of policy.
6.2 EUROSUR
Amend the draft EUROSUR Regulation to spell out the obligations of users of EUROSUR with
regard to search‐and‐rescue and refugee and human rights law. This should include a clear
articulation of the obligations stemming from the SOLAS Convention and a clear distinction
between “search and rescue” and “surveillance and interception” missions.
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Introduce a specific provision in the draft EUROSUR Regulation that explicitly and
exhaustively enumerates the conditions under which personal data may be processed in
EUROSUR and the conditions under which data can be provided to third actors, including
defence agencies.
Amend the draft EUROSUR Regulation to introduce a requirement for NCCs and FRONTEX to
keep a logbook that keeps track of all transactions with third countries in order to enable
national and/or European supervisory authorities to review the sending of information to
third countries. This should be sufficiently detailed to ensure compliance with the
prohibition in the draft legislative proposal on the exchange of information with a third
country that could use this information to identify persons or groups of persons who are at
serious risk of being subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, punishment, or
any other violation of fundamental rights.
Amend the draft EUROSUR Regulation to specify that there will be a system of layered
supervision where national data protection authorities check the processing of personal data
by the EUROSUR National Coordination Centres and the European Data Protection
Supervisor oversees the processing of personal data by FRONTEX.
Extend the provisions in the draft EUROSUR Regulation on financial accountability to require
FRONTEX and the European Commission to provide an annual report detailing all
expenditure on EUROSUR ‐related developments from all EU budget lines, including the
External Borders Fund, proposed Internal Security Fund, FP7 and Horizon 2020, and the
Development Cooperation Instrument.
The draft Horizon 2020 legislation should be amended to provide for European
Parliamentary control over the annual Call for Proposals. In the area of security and space
research, this process should ensure that calls for EU‐funded research address fundamental
rights concerns from the outset, meet a verifiable security need, and provide value for
money.
Request the European Parliament’s Science and Technology Options Assessment Panel to
conduct a technological risk assessment, review the R&D funded by the EU, and conduct a
privacy impact assessment of EUROSUR.
The European Parliament should request that the Fundamental Rights Agency prepare an
advisory report on how best to use the resources available to the EU to enhance the safety
at sea of migrants and refugees while ensuring the protection of fundamental rights.
6.3 Entry‐Exit System and Registered Traveller Programme
Any future EES legislation must start from the assumption that an “overstay” alert
constitutes a presumption of illegal residence only. Once an alert has been issued, a proper
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procedure must be completed in order to determine whether the person has the right to
stay legally in EU territory.
Any future EES must take into account all of the current exceptions in the Schengen Border
Code (especially in Annexes VI and VII) that exempt certain persons from entry or exit
stamps upon entering or leaving the Schengen area.
Any future EES should provide for situations where persons have not been registered on
entry or exit due to circumstances beyond their control. Such a situation may not lead to the
issuing of an overstay alert.
Any future EES should provide for the entry of third‐country nationals who were not able to
(physically) enrol in a programme that uses biometric data.
Any future EES should include stringent data protection safeguards, including the right to
information for both applicants to the RTP as well as all TCNs whose data is processed within
the EES. Information must be provided about:
o the identity of the data controller
o the purposes for which the data will be processed
o the categories of recipients of the data
o the data retention period
o the existence of the right of access to data relating to them, including:
the right to request that inaccurate data relating to them be corrected or
that unlawfully processed data relating to them be deleted
the right to receive information on the procedures for exercising those
rights and the contact details of the National Supervisory Authorities, which
need to be able to hear claims concerning the protection of personal data
Any future RTP and EES must provide for the applicant to be informed about the existence of
remedies in the event that an application for an RTP has been denied, or when s/he has
been classified as an overstayer. Both systems must include the possibility to appeal or
request a review of such decisions, and provide for assistance from data protection
authorities.
The need for access to the EES by law enforcement authorities, if any, must be
demonstrated on a case‐by‐case basis and show the impossibility – or great difficulty – in
obtaining the data by less intrusive means. To enable a review of this principle, a log book
must be used to log all uses of EES data by law enforcement authorities. The use of this data
must be defined explicitly and restrictively, and go beyond general statements such as
“necessary for the performance of their task.” In this context the exact relationship between
the EES, VIS, and SIS/SIS II needs to be specified in the legislative proposal.
Data from a third‐country national who has entered and left the territory in accordance with
the rules has to be deleted immediately after verifying the “exit”.
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Authors
Dr. Ben Hayes is the Project Director at the London‐based civil liberties organisation Statewatch,
where he has worked since 1996, specialising in EU justice and home affairs policy, policing, criminal
law, international relations, and international security. He is also a Fellow of the Transnational
Institute (TNI), based in Amsterdam.
Mathias Vermeulen is a Research Fellow at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, Italy,
and a part‐time researcher at the Research Group on Law, Science, Technology & Society (LSTS) at
the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium.
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