Gs 3401 231 242 [612277]

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The Nagorno-Karabakh unsettled conflict.
Between ethnic and geopolitical issues.
Luca Zarrilli
Dipartimento di Analisi delle Dinamiche Territoriali e Ambientali,
Universita degli Studi di Napoli »Federico II«, Via L. Rodino 22,
1-80138 Napoli, Italy
Abstract
The Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian populated autonomous province of the former
Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, has been the theater of a violent conflict
(1991-1994) between the Azeri army and Armenian secessionists. The conflict is
still unsettled, and the disputed territory remains under the control of the self-
proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. The aim of this paper is to analyze the
origins of the conflict, the development of the peace negotiations and the role of
the international powers in the context of their geopolitical and geoeconomic inter-
ests, with special regard to the exploitation of the Caspian basin oil fields.
Keywords: Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Caspian Sea, pipelines.

Introduction
Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the hotspots in the »geography of crisis«
created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Between 1991 – 1994 the former
autonomous province, with an Armenian ethnic majority within the Soviet So-
cialist Republic (SSR) of Azerbaijan, became the theater for a bitter military
conflict between the Azeri army and the Armenian secessionists. The interna-
tional media recently returned its attention to the unsettled conflict, since it has
been somehow linked to the terrorist attack on the Armenian Parliament on
27 October 1999, in which the prime minister Vazgen Sarkissian, the speaker
Karen Dermirchian, a minister and five members of parliament were assassi-
nated by a group of extreme nationalists. Of the various explanations that have
been put forward, the greatest credence has been given to those linking the
Yerevan massacre with the question of Nagorno-Karabakh. This article exam-
ines in detail the territorial conflict that is still a long way from being settled and
is contributing to an increase of tensions, which in the geopolitical context of
the Caucasus already run high.
Despite its marginal position in political and geographical terms, Nagorno-
Karabakh occupies a central geopolitical and geographical position in relation
to the so-called »Great Game« over Caspian oil, this involves a conflict of
interests between Russia and western countries, with particular regards to the
United States. The major western oil companies are actively involved in ex-
ploiting the fields in the Caspian Sea and building a complex of pipelines for
transporting the Azeri crude to European markets through Turkey. Conse-
quently, the aim is to integrate the political and economic systems in the three
republics of the southern Caucasus into the western sphere of influence (and
here interests are political as well as economic, thus involving governments).
Russia is committed to maintaining its ancient hegemony in relation to the
exploitation and conveyance of Caspian oil and reasserting its influence over
former Soviet Transcaucasia through the consolidation of its political, eco-
nomic and military relations with Armenia. Clearly the system of oil pipelines
running west rather than north, as desired by Washington but opposed by
Moscow, would be further assisted by regional stability.1
' An OSCE summit held in Istanbul took a significant step towards achieving this aim on 18 November
1999. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey entered into an agreement to build a 1,700-km-long pipeline
joining Baku and Ceyhan through Tbilisi, at a cost of 2.5 billion US dollars. It is designed to carry
one million barrels of Azeri oil every day.

Armenia, although not officially involved in the armed conflict, has a fun-
damental role to play as one of the principal parties supporting the Armenian
secessionists at the negotiating table.2 The considerable effects of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the Armenian economy, politics and public
opinion must also be taken into account. Let us not forget that since 1989,
Azerbaijan and later Turkey have been imposing a stifling economic blockade
on Armenia. The first president of the republic, Levon Ter-Petrossian, was
recently forced to resign for having adopted a smoother approach to the Na-
gorno-Karabakh question. I have personally witnessed the substantial emo-
tional involvement of Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh situation and the
fate of their fellow countrymen, and this sometimes spills over into extreme
nationalism.
The social and geographic context of the disputed area
Nagorno-Karabakh is an enclave of around 4,400 square kilometers in
southwestern Azerbaijan. This predominantly mountainous territory covers the
southeastern section of the Small Caucasus, which is made up of mountains,
plateau and hill country. In 1989, the population was 189,000, over half of
which was rural. This number was made up of 146,000 Armenians (77 percent),
40,000 Azeris (21 percent) and 3,000 Kurds and other minorities (2 percent),
but now that the Azeris have fled, the total population has been reduced to
approximately 150,000.3 Therefore, it is a rather small and sparsely populated
territory devoid of natural and energy resources of any strategic significance.
There is little industry and the area is mainly engaged in grazing, agriculture
and mining. The entire region, with the exception of its eastern rim, has been
under the control of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (RNK),
the capital of which is Stepanakert, since the end of the conflict that caused
around 20,000 deaths and produced over a million between refugees and
' Baku argues that the victory of the 150,000 Armenian secessionists against a country of over seven
million inhabitants was only possible thanks to the massive strategic, logistical and military assis-
tance from Armenia, which was in turn assisted by Russia, given the close political and military
links between the two countries. The authorities in Yerevan and Stepanakert deny any armed par-
ticipation on the part of Armenia and claim that the later support has essentially been of an eco-
nomic, political, diplomatic and moral nature.
3 Source: USSR Population Census for 1989.

Figure 1. Nagorno-Karabagh
Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs)4. Some azeri districts surrounding Nagorno-
Karabakh are currently occupied by Armenian secessionists, who will release
them in case of agreement. On the contrary, the RNK is determined to exer-
cise some form of sovereignty over the »Lachin corridor«, a strip of land that
connects Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, currently under RNK control. The so-
called »road of life« runs along this strip. This is a road, constructed only re-
cently, between Goris (an Armenian border town) and Stepanakert. It repre-
sents the only line of communication with Armenia and therefore with the rest
of the world.
Entering Nagorno-Karabakh along the modern »road of life«, funded by
the Armenian Diaspora, creates false expectations of prosperity. The 150,000
4 The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh is not officially recognised by any country, not even Armenia.
However, for brevity, the acronym RNK will be used to indicate the Armenians' self-governing po-
litical entity in Nagorno-Karabakh, while accepting that, from the point of view of international law,
the self- proclaimed republic has no legal status in the absence of a consensual resolution of the
conflict and a formal recognition of independence by the international community.

inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh are still living in an almost critical situation.
There Is not a single effective infrastructure in the region. Many towns have
been completely destroyed. Others, including Stepanakert, are seriously dam-
aged and reconstruction is proceeding slowly. The sides of the roads are lit-
tered with abandoned armored cars. The social fabric is highly militarized and
at the same time suffering degradation. The standard of living is extremely low
and consumer goods are difficult to find.
The origins of the conflict
The basis of the current conflict was consolidated under the Soviet re-
gime. In 1921, the Nagorno-Karabakh region with its Armenian majority was
annexed by the Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) of Azerbaijan. In 1923, it ac-
quired the status of an autonomous province. The discontent of the Armenians
of Nagorno-Karabakh, prompted by the regrettable linguistic, cultural and eco-
nomic discrimination from the Azeri leadership along with a demographic pol-
icy aimed at reducing the percentage of Armenian population, could only be
openly expressed in the Gorbachov era through petitions and popular demon-
strations in both Armenia and Karabakh. In February 1988, the Provincial So-
viet of Nagorno-Karabakh voted almost unanimously for a demand to be an-
nexed by Armenia, an unprecedented act in Soviet history. A crucial event in
the development of the crisis occurred at the end of that month with the anti-
Armenian program in Sumgait (an industrial suburb of Baku), in which accord-
ing to the official figures, 32 people lost their lives, the great majority being
Armenian. According to Armenian sources, on the other hand, there were
several hundred victims, and the massacres took place under the noses of an
unconcerned police and army. There followed a three-year period of height-
ened tension that witnessed the exodus of Armenians from Azerbaijan and
Azeris from Armenia, demonstrations, reprisals and violence from both sides.
This situation then developed into a genuine conflict. During the same period,
there was a frenzied institutional struggle over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh
that culminated in the self-proclaimed RNK's declaration of independence from
Azerbaijan in September 1991.

The military conflict
The real military conflict between Azerbaijan and the separatist forces
started in 1991 and continued until the armistice of 12 May 1994, which is still
in force. The conflict, in which atrocities were committed by both sides, under-
went changing fortunes and concluded with the secessionist forces in the
stronger position. The Azeris besieged Stepanakert for a long time and in the
summer of 1992 they controlled over half of the disputed territory. The Arme-
nian counter-offensive gained the upper hand during the spring of that year
and continued throughout 1993, with the capture of Shushi and many other
towns, the opening of the »Lachin corridor«, and the occupation of Azeri dis-
tricts that surround the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The final Azeri offen-
sive, launched in December 1993, failed to reverse the direction of the conflict.
To date, the parties have respected the undertaking made at the signing of the
armistice, despite frequent and even recent skirmishes along the »cease-fire
line« that divides the two armies.
The peace process
The proposals to resolve the conflict have been rejected by both sides,
given that they contravene either the principle of self-determination of peoples
invoked by the Armenians, or the principle of the territorial integrity of states
invoked by the Azeris. However, negotiations often ignore the principles of
international law and favor the laws of the »Realpolitik«. In the case of Na-
gorno-Karabakh, the troubled peace process is showing signs of international
dynamics and power games that go beyond the specific context.
The peace process, which commenced in March 1992, was organized
under the aegis of the OSCE (then the CSCE) through a group of eleven
countries known as the »Minsk Group«5. The first concrete result of negotiat-
ing activity was a Russian initiative that promoted the signing of the armistice
in May 1994. Following the early phase, when the OSCE's negotiating efforts
were intermittent and not very effective, attempts at mediation became more
intense as the western countries in general and the United States in particular
took an increasing interest and became more committed economically to the
5 The United States, Russia, France, Germany, Finland, Sweden, Italy, Belarus, Turkey, Azerbaijan
and Armenia.

oil and natural gas fields in the Caspian Sea. Washington, which up untill then
had remained rather detached, started to perceive the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a question closely linked to its national interests.
A key stage in the peace process came with the OSCE Lisbon summit in
December 1996. On that occasion, the »Minsk Group« with Baku's support put
forward a proposal that contained general principles on which to base the
resolution of the conflict. These principles involved upholding of the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the realization of the rights of the people
of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination through provisions for the highest
degree of autonomy within Azerbaijan as well as the guarantee of security for
all the parties concerned. The proposal was brusquely rejected by Armenia,
which exercised its right of veto and prevented Its inclusion in the summit's
final communiqués. According to Yerevan, ratifying the principle of the territo-
rial integrity of Azerbaijan would amount to predetermining the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh, given that it excluded a priori the prospect of its independ-
ence from Baku.
Throughout the following year, the »Minsk Group« pursued its negotia-
tions despite the hardening Armenian position, by submitting new proposals for
an agreement based on a step-by-step approach. This approach included the
withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the occupied districts; dispatch of a
multinational force made up of Russian, American and French troops; cessa-
tion of the economic blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey, definition of the
status of Nagorno-Karabakh while respecting Azerbaijan territorial integrity,
and the right of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh to effective self-government
as well as the need to establish a multinational society in the region (which
implied the repatriation of the Azeris).
The draft agreement was greeted favorably in Baku but with reservations
in Yerevan. Stepanakert blocked the proposal, given that a precondition was
the principle of Azerbaijan territorial integrity, but above all because the Arme-
nian troops were to be withdrawn before a clear decision was made on the
status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Stepanakert's rejection was motivated by the fear
that if they handed over the occupied districts, this would have allowed the
Azeris to sabotage the negotiations on the question of »status«, declare the
agreement void and threaten Nagorno-Karabakh's territorial security from the
districts in question. In this impasse, the only shift came from the Armenian
president Levon Ter-Petrossian, who during a press conference on 26 Sep-
tember 1997 expressed his support for the negotiation proposals put forward
by the »Minsk Group«, on the grounds that the international community would

never accept Nagorno-Karabakh's unilateral demand for secession, and that
an agreement was now essential for Armenia's economic interests. Again in
November, Ter-Petrossian asserted that the international community could not
for long tolerate the situation created around Nagorno-Karabakh, because it
was threatening regional cooperation and security as well as the West's oil
interests.
In Armenia, not only the public and the opposition attacked the pragmatic
position of Ter-Petrossian, but also members of his government, including the
Armenian prime minister and former RNK president Robert Kocharian. The
political clash between the two opposing approaches to the Nagorno-Karabakh
question concluded in February 1998 with Ter-Petrossian's resignation and
Kocharian's appointment to the post of President of the Republic. The posi-
tions of Stepanakert and Yerevan, which had been growing progressively fur-
ther apart during 1997, suddenly came much closer together. The then wide-
spread fear that the predominance of a more intransigent and nationalistic
political climate in Yerevan would suspend the peace process, or even en-
courage a renewal of hostilities, proved unfounded. However, Kocharian's
firmer policy forced the »Minsk Group« to examine the crucial question of
status in a more realistic manner. In November 1998, a proposal was put for-
ward that for the first time confronted such a question at the preliminary stage.
More specifically, it was proposed that a »common state« of Azerbaijan and
Nagorno-Karabakh should be created in which the conflicting principles of
territorial integrity and self-determination of peoples can be combined. It was
an intentionally ambiguous formula that left room for many intermediate posi-
tions between simple autonomy and full independence, and that could be con-
strued as something like a confederation with a particularly high degree of
political and administrative decentralization.
Yerevan's reaction was extremely positive this time. Kocharian defined
the proposal as »a victory for common sense«. He added that a common state
does not imply that Karabakh is an integral part of Azerbaijan, but that Azer-
baijan and Karabakh agree to exist within certain borders, but with their own
laws and their own principles. For the first time, Stepanakert's reactions ap-
peared pragmatic. Baku, however, rejected the proposal, believing that it could
not accept a solution that created the premises for a de facto recognition of
Nagorno-Karabakh's independence.
During 1999, the negotiating climate became gradually more relaxed,
partly as a result of the efforts made by the »Minsk Group« to make the con-
cept of a common state more acceptable. The development of the negotiations

was also favored by the direct talks held between Kocharian and Aliev on a
fairly regular basis during 1999. The declarations issued on various occasions
by the parties were increasingly directed towards détente and justified the
feeling that a peace agreement was close. In particular, diplomatic efforts in-
tensified in October, especially on the part of the United States, so that the
parties could reach an informal agreement before the OSCE summit planned
for the following November in Istanbul. Unfortunately, acceleration in the nego-
tiations came to a sudden and dramatic end on 27 October with the massacre
in the Yerevan Parliament. It is significant that the massacre took place a few
hours after the American vice-secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, had left Ar-
menia for Moscow. He had arrived in the southern Caucasus to finalize the
negotiations aimed at smoothing the way to signing an agreement in Istanbul.
The terrorist attack has undoubtedly dealt a terrible blow to the peace process.
In the words of Kocharian himself, before proceeding with the signing of an
agreement, it will be necessary to wait for Armenia to recover its internal sta-
bility and full international authority, which are indispensable to the successful
conclusion of such delicate and crucial negotiations. As was foreseeable, the
Istanbul summit ended with a vague declaration that was disappointing in the
light of the genuine moves towards an agreement that had occurred in the
preceding months.
The International Context
Recent developments (middle 2000) in the Nagorno-Karabakh question
would be rather obscure and difficult to understand, if they were not examined
in the light of the various international interests involved. Both Armenia and
Azerbaijan had probably come to the realization that there was a lot to be
gained from signing a peace agreement. For Armenia, an agreement would
mean the end of the economic blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey, the re-
opening of its borders with these countries, and therefore the prospect to trade
in an east-west direction. Moreover, there would be the possibility of becoming
part of the »Great Game« over Caspian oil, by having the oil pipeline go
through its territory over an undoubtedly shorter and possibly cheaper route
than the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan line, with all the subsequent proceeds from tran-
sit charges. The agreement would also have favored a closer relationship with
the West, which is an increasingly overt aspiration in Armenian foreign policy,
even though it conflicts with the dominant pro-Russian stance. In short, it was

an opportunity for Armenia to give its economy a considerable boost and to
reduce its international isolation.
The end of the conflict would have allowed Azerbaijan to diversify the
routes for exporting oil, renew links with its Azeri exclave of Nakhichevan,
recover possession of the occupied districts and therefore return hundreds of
thousands of IDPs (internally displaced persons). But above all it would have
led to the repeal of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, a legislative
clause whereby the American Congress, in which there is a strong Armenian
lobby, prevents the American government from allocating financial aid to Azer-
baijan while the economic blockade is damaging Armenia.
In the United States, the Nagorno-Karabakh question has in the past cre-
ated conflict between the influential Armenian lobby, which is against any
resolution disadvantageous to its fellow countrymen in Karabakh, and the oil
lobby, which is obviously interested in supporting Azerbaijan. When it became
clear that a peaceful solution was subject to the definition of Nagorno-
Karabakh's status, the United States adopted a policy that somehow brought
agreement between the two factions, and that, at the same time, conformed to
America's strategic interests in the area. This policy involved supporting the
proposal for a common state, which is rather more favorable to the Armenians
but not unacceptable to the Azeris, and actively promoting peace negotiations
by putting strong pressure on both parties. Clearly, a peace agreement, par-
ticularly one achieved through American mediation, could give Washington a
leading role in stabilizing the entire region, and hence the United States would
gain greater political influence to the detriment of Russia. This would also
make the plan for a pipeline through Armenia more feasible, and many ana-
lysts believe this to be the quickest and cheapest way to transport Azeri oil to
the West.
On the other hand, Russia's position appears very controversial. Officially
Moscow has always shown itself ready to find a solution to the conflict and
ways to stabilize the region. In the context of the »Minsk Group«, however, its
persistent approach has been to counterbalance the influence of the western
and favored a pro-Azeri faction with a critical position that has often appeared
more interested in reaffirming its role in a region of the former Soviet Union
than in fostering peace. Its position has often been little more than support for
Armenian nationalism. The possibility of a second pipeline for Azeri oil would
further reduce its room for maneuver in relation to the »Great Game«, which
has been seriously undermined by the conflict in Chechnya. The »co-option«
of Armenia into a web of interests and relations arising from the West would

tend to dilute Russia's links with its traditional Transcaucasian ally. All this
would mean the entire region's gradual withdrawal from the Russian sphere of
influence. According to some, Russia has all the time been working behind the
scenes to foster instability in the region in order to prevent such a scenario. If
you accept the logic of this argument, then it could be concluded that the ter-
rorist outrage in Yerevan in October 1999 was favorable to Russia, as it pro-
vided a considerable obstacle to the prospect of a short-term agreement.6
Conclusion
Following the terrorist attack in Yerevan, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
has entered another period of stalemate. The evolution of the negotiations will
now depend on the relative strengths of the powers active in the region, and
on the political climate and diplomatic orientations that will prevail in Armenia
and Azerbaijan. It is difficult to say whether economic interests and integration
into the West will count for more than nationalism and, in the case of Armenia,
than its strategic dependence on Moscow. It is also difficult to know how long
this impasse will continue. It has often been argued that sooner or later the
unsettled question of Nagorno-Karabakh had to develop into an agreement
based on mutual concessions or a renewal of hostilities. The second possibility
is not very likely, since neither of the parties wishes to be involved in an armed
conflict against everybody's interest and another war would be too disruptive
for the difficult processes of political and economic development underway in
the region. To achieve the first scenario, which momentarily seemed a lot
closer than it really was we will have to wait for the regional balances to settle
down both in geopolitical and geoeconomic terms.
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Nerešeno vprašanje Gornjega Karabaha:
etnični in geopolitični problemi.
Povzetek
Gornji Karabah je območje Malega Kavkaza, ki so ga v Sovjetski socialistični
republiki Azarbejdžan poseljevali Azeri in Armenci. Le-ti so bili večinsko prebi-
valstvo (77%). V obdobju razpada sovjetskega imperija (1991 – 1994) je bilo to
območje prizorišče intenzivnih vojaških spopadov Azerbejdžanske armade in
armenskih borcev za neodvisnost (oziroma secesionistov). Uspešnejši so bili
slednji, ki poslej nadzorujejo to območje oziroma vladajo v samozvani Repub-
liki Gornji Karabah. Večina Azerskega prebivalstva je pobegnila. Prispevek
raziskuje vzroke medetničnega konflikta in opredeljuje območje tudi iz
geostrateškega in ekonomskega vidika. Konfliktu daje posebno dimenzijo
bližina naftnih nahajališč ob Kaspijskem jezeru.