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The International Spectator
Italian Journal of International Affairs
ISSN: 0393-2729 (Print) 1751-9721 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rspe20
From Kosovo to Crimea
Vladimir Baranovsky
To cite this article: Vladimir Baranovsky (2015) From Kosovo to Crimea, The International
Spectator, 50:4, 275-281, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2015.1092677
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2015.1092677
Published online: 26 Jan 2016.
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Rejoinder, 15 Years Later
From Kosovo to Crimea
Vladimir Baranovsky
The International Spectator published my article in 2000. As the title clearly sug-
gests, the aim was to consider how the phenomenon of Kosovo affected Russia ’s
foreign policy. My present comments focus exactly upon this theme. They pretendto address neither the overall issue of Russia ’s international behaviour nor the situa-
tion in the Balkans, and even less the policy of the West therein. They onlyrepresent a modest attempt to draw the line between what happened fifteen years
ago and what is taking place nowadays –in terms of Russia-related aspects of
international developments.
The continuity within this timeframe seems remarkable. The cases of South
Ossetia (2008), the Crimea (2014) and Southeastern Ukraine (2014-15) look likethey are logically inscribed in a certain trend which began much earlier. Retrospec-tively, there are many reasons to believe that the trend crystallised at the time andin the context of the crisis around Kosovo. But the track has not been either linearor unidimensional. When considering how Russia ’s reaction to the developments
in and around Kosovo evolved into its Crimean/Ukrainian course, one can see sig-nificant similarities between the two cases, but also some indicative differences.
Both sets of parameters deserve attention.
The crisis in Kosovo was not the first post-Cold War situation that put Russia
and the West on different sides of the barricade. Their mutual alienation hadstarted much earlier, with the first round of debate on NATO enlargement. But it
was the Western countries ’military operations against Serbia to which the ‘new
Russia ’, for the first time during its post-Soviet existence, reacted with a clear,
official anti-Western position.
Fifteen years later, anti-Westernism has almost become Moscow ’so fficial policy
line, both ideologically and in practical terms. All denials thereof notwithstanding,Russia currently positions itself and operates as an opponent and antagonist ofWestern countries. Without debating here the sources and the driving forces of thisphenomenon, one has to recognise its full- fledged existence today, almost three
Since the original article was written, the author has served as Deputy Director of the Institute of World
Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (until 2014) and
is currently a member of the board at IMEMO and Director of the Centre for Situation Analysis, Russian
Academy of Sciences. Email: [anonimizat]
The International Spectator, Vol. 50, No. 4, December 2015, 275 –281 ISSN 0393-2729 print/ISSN 1751-9721 online
/C2112016 Istituto Affari Internazionali http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2015.1092677
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decades after the end of the Cold War. It is a noisy, conspiracy-oriented and
assertive phenomenon. What was a tentative, hesitating and cautious ‘deviation ’
from the mainstream in the Kosovo times, has now become the mainstream itself.
Regrettably, the cautious diagnosis set out in the article of 2000 has proved to
be correct –although one could now think that it should, perhaps, have been
presented more dramatically and in a future-oriented form as the most probablescenario of forthcoming developments. But what could have been more spectacu-lar at the time than the famous ‘U-turn ’of Evgeniy Primakov over the Atlantic
in March 1999? “Russia will not follow you when it disagrees with what you do ”
was the message addressed to the West with respect to Kosovo. By the time ofthe Crimean crisis, it had been transformed into another formula: “Russia will do
what it considers necessary, despite any of your disagreements, objections andprotests ”.
Noteworthy, however, was that Primakov always stressed the idea of cooperative
relations with the West, even when initiating or supporting Russia ’sfirm stand in
opposition to it. This was both prior to, and in the course of his prime-minister-ship during the Kosovo crisis –and later, until his very last days, scarred by the
Crimean and Ukrainian developments. Maintaining a delicate balance betweenconfrontation against, and cooperation with the West was a formidable challengeto Russia ’s policy at the time of Kosovo and seems considerably more dif ficult
today. In the view of some in fluential factions in the elites that have become over-
enthusiastic about the newly developed anti-Westernism, such a balance is not evennecessary.
Certain components of this phenomenon inherited from the Kosovo times
remain the same. Then, Russia argued that its position was not taken into accountby Western countries, which monopolised decision-making on international issues.Today, such complaints have re-emerged almost word for word: the proponents ofKiev ’s drift westward are blamed for disregarding Moscow ’s legitimate concerns on
the matter.
The reaction to Kosovo re flected Russia ’s dissatisfaction with the emerging inter-
national order, perceived as dominated by a ‘nucleus ’of states to which Russia did
not belong. Russia felt relegated to the sidelines of world developments. Thisperception of the world, as well as the eventual algorithms of actions amounted toa straightforward formula: a unipolar international system dominated by onesuperpower is unacceptable and has to be destroyed. This line continued in thepost-Kosovo context: a few years later, speaking at the Munich security conference(2007), Putin formulated his discontent in an open and outright form. Furtherdevelopment of Russia ’s policy translated words into deeds.
Even more disturbing seems another ‘continuity ’. In 1999, Russia ’s public
opinion reacted to the beginning of air strikes against Yugoslavia in an extremelyenergetic way –it was the first example of vast indignation against the West276 V. Baranovsky
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emerging spontaneously ‘from below ’rather than being imposed ‘from above ’
(as had been the case with the campaign against the enlargement of NATO). Thephenomenon of ‘sincere anti-Westernism ’has considerably expanded since Kosovo
–to become overwhelming and sometimes hysterical ‘after Crimea ’. This line is
actively promoted by of ficial propaganda and pro-governmental media, but has
mostly been met with sympathy and support by the general public. The fertileground for this touchy consensus was set at the time of Kosovo. Indeed, it was aturning point which buried the ‘presumption of a positive attitude ’to the West –
the peculiar romantic mind-set of the early post-Soviet period.
Russia ’so fficial negativism and public indignation remain to a very considerable
extent NATO-focused. The case of Kosovo consolidated Russia ’s anti-NATO
stance more than the entire earlier campaign against the enlargement of the alli-ance; the thesis on its ‘aggressive character ’ceased to look like pure propaganda or
something inherited from the Cold War era. The image of NATO on the point ofestablishing control over the Balkans and aimed at encircling Russia by involvingUkraine, Georgia, Moldova (who else?) was promoted in the years that followed –
sometimes in parallel with sporadic efforts at partnership building –and has gradu-
ally become a kind of routinely perceived landscape. By the time the most recentcrisis broke out, the scenario of Crimea becoming a NATO stronghold, with anaval base in the ‘city of Russia ’s glory ’, Sebastopol, became an existential element
of the overall Ukraine-related geopolitical warnings.
Russia ’s sensitivity towards Crimea and Ukraine is considerably higher now than
it was towards Kosovo at the end of the 1990s. Indeed, the Balkans were certainlyattractive in Russian eyes –for both strategic and historic reasons. But they were
by no means an apple of discord with the West, nor were they considered (orperceived as) an area of Russia ’s vital interests. The Crimea/Ukraine, instead, do
constitute a part of such an area, which embraces, in Moscow ’s view, all former
constituent republics of the USSR (with the exception of the Baltic states). There,Russia believes that its serious concerns about the appearance of competinginfluences are absolutely legitimate.
Two other aspects of the Kosovo case set important precedents for the future of
Russian policy. They have become instrumental both in terms of substance and forideological/propagandistic coverage.
The first is the problem of secession and Russia ’s attitude to it. To a consider-
able extent, Russia ’s basic position with respect to Kosovo was built upon a deeply
negative attitude towards this phenomenon which contradicted the ‘ideal ’image of
a strong, viable, sustainable state. There were still fresh traumatic memories of dis-integration of the Soviet Union. But the most signi ficant factor at that time was
the war in Chechnya, perceived as a serious threat to Russia ’s territorial integrity –
especially the eventuality of a multiplication effect, which was to be excluded atany price.From Kosovo to Crimea 277
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This was relevant when the article was published. But 15 years later, tailoring
secessionist demands to Russia ’s internal reality is no longer necessary –Chechnya
has been settled by granting all power to one of the local clans in exchange for its
manifest loyalty to Moscow, whereas all other regional authorities are under effec-
tive control from the centre. Putin ’s‘vertical power ’has been built at the expense
of political pluralism, but it minimizes the domestic risks of disintegration and hasmade it possible to back (and even promote) secession/separatism elsewhere with-out feeling vulnerable inside the country. In addition, recent legislation in Russiahas criminalized any discussions that undermine the country ’s territorial integrity –
thus providing additional guarantees against ‘importing destabilisation ’.
Within this logic –which looks like a complete reversal of the one that was
professed at the time of the Kosovo crisis –Crimea ’s secession from Ukraine has
been enthusiastically supported as a manifestation of the people ’s right to
self-determination. What the legal and political prerequisites are for expressingthis right becomes a minor question compared to the overwhelming supportfrom the population of the province –again in contrast to Russia ’s position on
Kosovo. And there is one more obvious difference: the position of the countryfrom which the secessionist territory aspires to withdraw. The consent of the‘mainland ’was clearly absent in both cases (and would predictably be impossible
in any case), but for Moscow, what was a serious obstacle for the secession ofKosovo became a negligible factor in the case of Crimea.
Other nuances that differ in these two cases are also telling. Russian media did
not pay much attention to the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which was at the centreof public attention in the West. With respect to Crimea (and Ukraine in general),discrimination on ethnic grounds (above all, use of the Russian language) became avery important subject. Russia ’s sensitivity towards this issue is obvious, but what
is equally obvious is that the issue was overdramatised in flagrant disproportion to
what actually took place. In reality, practically nothing took place, and all specula-
tions on the subject were about possible discrimination which was upgraded almost
to the level of genocide.
With such a ‘broad ’interpretation of the problem, genocide smoothly evolves
into a humanitarian catastrophe. Here again we see a striking contrast with theKosovo case. In Kosovo, Moscow saw mention of this by separatists and Westernobservers as an attempt to find grounds for intervention –to which Moscow ener-
getically objected. In Crimea, on the other hand, alleged humanitarian ‘complica-
tions ’(any stronger term would be inappropriate) became a justi fication for even
thepreventive use of force ( ‘without waiting until it would be too late ’).
One more nuance has to be mentioned. The article of the year 2000 pointed
out that ethno-religious solidarity with the Serbs played almost no role in theRussian reaction to the Kosovo crisis. Since then, however, the confessional factorhas become more prominent in the country ’s political development –to the point278 V. Baranovsky
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of being present in Moscow ’s external affairs (as a reserve argument for justifying
Russia ’s international actions or consolidating domestic support to them).
Noteworthy, when explaining the grounds for the incorporation of Crimea, was
Vladimir Putin ’s reference to the “sacred character ”of Khersones, one of the
ancient localities on the peninsula, where in the 10thcentury the Great Prince of
the time was allegedly baptised to adopt Christianity for Russia.
However, it seems obvious that all these differences do not necessarily point to
the direction in which Russian policy has evolved with respect to secessions. Onthe contrary, they tell us something about its ‘adaptability ’to circumstances,
depending on what Russia considers its pragmatic interests to be. In fact, the policyline could be forged along various imperatives: (i) Secession is unacceptable when itaffects Russia ’s territory –as was the case in Chechnya. (ii) It may be a bargaining
chip when various interests and considerations are at stake –as in Kosovo. (iii) It
could be useful in providing leverage for in fluencing partners suffering from
domestic turmoil or involved in con flict with their neighbours –as in the post-
Soviet space. (iv) And, finally, secession is possible when a valuable prize is at stake
–as in the Crimean case.
Success would depend on a number of factors. First, on one ’s own resoluteness
and energy. Secondly, on the reaction of other actors. Thirdly, on readiness to payfor the result achieved. The price, as Russia seems to be experiencing today, couldbe rather high.
Cynicism or pragmatism? Unprincipled policy or political realism? In any case,
Russia does not have a monopoly on such dichotomies. The international commu-nity is slowly (and often inconsistently) moving towards overcoming them; how-ever, this imperative does not seem to be universally accepted. When the countryis moving in the opposite direction, some Russians may have an uncomfortablefeeling that it is violating norms and tacitly respected behavioural standards. How-ever, opponents (and they constitute a considerable majority) would respond: butothers do the same! If supporting separatism in Kosovo is ‘allowed ’by the West –
then, Russia has the right to support Crimean secessionism as well.
This comes together with a broader issue of ethics in international politics.
Interestingly enough, in 2000 my article pointed to the moral aspects present inRussia ’s position and the attitudes of public opinion: there was much sympathy for
Serbia, regarded as the victim of aggression and pressure from powerful nationsimposing their will on a weaker one, but a lack of sensitivity towards Kosovar suffer-ings (including ethnic cleansing). Few saw the selectivity of such ethical considera-tions –whereas NATO air strikes destroying houses and killing innocent victims
were regarded by most Russians as a flagrant manifestation of hypocrisy and
immorality. Various conclusions could follow from this, and one of them has beenan excuse for not focusing too much on moral aspects in future con flicts –insofar
as the West does the same. During the crisis in relations with Ukraine in 2014-15,From Kosovo to Crimea 279
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Russia ’s self-perception as a stronger state shaded its policy with arrogance and
assertiveness, rather than with tolerance, compassion and indulgence towards asmaller one. Indirectly, this was also a consequence of the ‘Kosovo lessons ’.
The second ‘big’problem making it possible to draw a line from 1999 to
2014-15, concerns the transnational use of military force and decision-making.Until recently, Russia ’s traditional approach was in favour of non-violent means of
resolving disputes. Even more energetically, Moscow insisted that any cross-bordermilitary actions had to be endorsed by the UN Security Council. The case ofKosovo represented a violation of these two basic principles by the West and pro-voked intense criticism from Russia, which appealed to respect for internationallaw –something that looked convincing enough and strengthened Russia ’s
position.
However, the more recent trajectory –through South Ossetia in 2008 and up to
Crimea and Ukraine in 2014-15 –undermined and then totally eliminated this
argument. What had made Russia ’s policy consistent and coherent is now turning
into the strongest accusation against Moscow. The latter seems to be doing exactlywhat it blamed Western countries for doing in Kosovo: using military force andbypassing the UN Security Council. The fact that Moscow denies its directmilitary involvement does not change the peculiar ‘mirror image ’of the situation.
Indeed, here again we see the openly expressed or tacitly professed logic of ‘elimi-
nating double standards ’:“if you used force without the authorisation of the UN
Security Council in Kosovo (or Iraq, or elsewhere), why can ’t we do the same in
Crimea or Ukraine? ”
A rethinking of the use of force reveals noticeable links between the two cases
even in a broader context. The article in The International Spectator mentioned
training flights of heavy bombers towards North America in mid-1999 (something
that Moscow had deliberately avoided doing during the previous decade) inresponse to the developments in Kosovo –to send a signal recalling the existence
of Russia ’s nuclear strategic arsenal. In 2014, Putin ‘recalled ’its existence in an
even more blunt and challenging way, by considering whether to put nuclear deter-rent forces in combat readiness.
By and large, the fundamental assessment that was made in the publication of
2000 appears adequate and sustainable today: “the NATO military campaign in
the Balkans and Russia ’s hostile reaction to it seemed to set a new long-term
agenda for their future relations ”(272). One can also see a remarkable continuity
in some speci fic aspects of Russia ’s policy. Thus, it is worth mentioning Russia ’s
negative obsession with US policy, which is criticised, in particular, for aspiring toglobal dominance and aiming to downplay the Europeans. Another noticeable con-stant is the lack of ‘solidarity ’and support for Russia on the part of its allegedly
closest allies (those in the CIS at the time of the Kosovo crisis, a much narrowercircle now).280 V. Baranovsky
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A number of observations made 15 years ago would have to be reformulated in
a stronger way or differently. In comparison to the Kosovo crisis, the importanceof the domestic context for Russia ’s policy was considerably higher in the
Crimean/Ukrainian context (as an externalization of the internal challenges and
risks of the regime). There are also clear differences in the role of the personal fac-tor (even though the personality in question is the same in both cases): Putin in2000 was a neophyte expected to promote ‘a new start ’in relations with NATO
and the West in general, whereas in 2014-15 he is regarded as a veteran whoseprevious record is a burden rather than an asset for any eventual settlement.
Some future-oriented judgments have to be recognised as wrong. The most
disappointing one concerns the ‘much better prospects ’for Russia ’s rapprochement
with Europe which, in fact, has turned out to be wishful thinking. Indeed, Russiadid appear to be more focussed on Europe in the early post-Kosovo period, butthis trend did not create a solid ground for their relationship. Since the Crimean/Ukrainian crisis (i.e. now), the syndrome of mutual alienation and distrustdefinitely seems to prevail.
An easier (and more attractive) explanation of this discrepancy could attribute it
to the more assertive character of Russia ’s thought patterns and practical actions.
Indeed, the ‘golden rain ’of oil and gas revenues has made the country stronger and
more self-con fident. Furthermore, the dynamic of domestic developments has con-
siderably altered the political system, with decision-making more centralised andauthoritarian, and the accountability of the government signi ficantly diminished.
However, structural exogenous factors play a role as well. In the eyes of Russia,
the situation in and around Kosovo was one of the first deviations from ‘normal ’
post-Cold War developments (with the term ‘normal ’referring to cooperative,
morally acceptable and legally justi fied policy). What followed has proven that
deviations do matter. They create a fabric for a new reality. Kosovo-1999 and theCrimea/Ukraine-2014/15 certainly look different in terms of genesis, dynamics,international law and various other speci fic aspects. But in terms of Russia ’s
perceptions concerning challenges, options and imperatives of behaviour in theinternational arena, there seems to be a remarkable connection between the two.From Kosovo to Crimea 281
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