FACULTY OF EUROPEAN STUDIES BABES-BOLYAI UNIVERSITY RESEARCH REPORT Coordinator: PhD. Candidate: Conf. Univ. Dr. Habil. Valentin Naumescu Ioana… [625212]

FACULTY OF EUROPEAN STUDIES BABES-BOLYAI UNIVERSITY RESEARCH REPORT Coordinator: PhD. Candidate: Conf. Univ. Dr. Habil. Valentin Naumescu Ioana Constantin-Bercean Cluj-Napoca 2019

2 THE GREAT POWERS’ NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY TOWARD IRAN 2003-2015 From the “Great Bargain” to the JCPOA

3 CONTENT 1. Research Interest ……………………………………………………………………………………… 4 2. Research Questions ………………………………………………………………………………… 10 3. Methodology …………………………………………………………………………………………. 10 4. The Structure of the Thesis ……………………………………………………………………… 11 5. Progress Status ………………………………………………………………………………………. 11 BIBLIOGRAPHY (provisional) ………………………………………………………………….. 14 Appendix 1: PUBLICATIONS ……………………………………………………………………. 23 Appendix 2: CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS …………………………………….. 25

4 1. Research Interest Diplomatic efforts by the E3/EU+3, known also as P5+1 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United States, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), and Iran to reach a comprehensive and long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, resulted in the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (UN resolution 2232/2015) on July 14, 2015. The actors involved in JCPOA welcomed this historic treaty, which was meant to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful, and it was also the corner stone for a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. The Great Powers have unanimously agreed when signing the JCPOA that the full implementation of it will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. The Implementation Day under the JCPOA was reached on January 16, 2016, when the Security Council received the report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirming that Iran has taken a series of nuclear-related actions specified in paragraphs 15.1 – 15. 11 of JCPOA Annex V. The Termination Day would occur ten years from Adoption Day. On February 16, 2026, all provisions of Resolution 2231/2015 shall be terminated and the Security Council will have concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue. Unquestionably, the JCPOA is far from being perfect and it could be hardly otherwise. All actors involved made compromises to come to an agreement and all sides moved further from their initial positions that they would have expected at the outset. On the one hand, security issues were at stake: preventing a nuclear-armed Iran and thus lessening the danger of conflict in the Middle East, reducing the loud Israeli rhetoric concerning the nuclear Iran threat, as well as the risk of further proliferation in an already-turbulent region. On the other hand, the limited duration of the agreement was its biggest shortcoming, and this issue provoked stridently attacks in certain US quarters. Interestingly, JCPOA’s critics have not, for the most part, argued that either the constraints on the program or the stringent monitoring requirements would be ineffective. Rather, they have first of all criticized the limited duration of the agreement, or the agreement itself for not imposing a total ban on all enrichment activities in Iran. Finally, critics have argued that the JCPOA failed to deal with other contentious issues in relations with Iran, such as human rights! It is easy to assess that there are some risks. The West does not trust the Iranians, and the Iranians do not trust the West. This would be, as this research proposes, the diplomacy of mistrust. But arms-control or nuclear-limitation agreements are not concluded between friends and allies, but between adversaries. At this point, Iran remains more adversary than partner.

5 However, negotiations are the essential tools of diplomacy, as weapons are of war. The concluded Iran deal represents a major diplomatic achievement arrived at by long and patient negotiation. Its significance is likely to go far beyond the terms of the accord itself and must be judged in a broader diplomatic and strategic context. The Iran nuclear deal is important first and foremost for the stringent limits it places on Iran’s nuclear program – the principal goal of the negotiations. The former US President Barack Obama and the ex-Secretary of State John Kerry have been quick to deny that expectations of broader détente were in any way the premise for the negotiation. But the agreement does, in fact, have the potential to open up the frozen dialogue between the West (especially the US) and Iran, and permit a broader discussion of urgent regional issues. This potential unblocking of those relationships could be one of the agreement’s great rewards1. This research aims to be an exhaustive examination of the negotiations over Iran’s controversial nuclear program and it seeks to provide a detailed knowledge of this protracted process and to foresee what it will come in the next years. A significant breakthrough was achieved in Geneva in November 2013, after several years of inconclusive rounds of negotiations – in Vienna, Geneva, Istanbul, Baghdad, Moscow and Almaty – between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1 countries. One of the most important questions surrounding these negotiations was about the connection between Iran’s nuclear policy and both, Iran’s foreign policy or national security. Since the signing of the JCPOA, Iran’s policy makers have increasingly given the public impression that the nuclear deal is part of a broader foreign policy rethinking, aimed at ending Iran’s international isolationism. The sanctions from international community had a deep negative impact on Iran’s domestic infrastructure and economy, especially during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, when the Iranian former president took a real hostile stance towards the West. That particular policy not only endangered enmity at global level but also established a negative opinion and opposition within the state, which ultimately led to the victory of the reformist candidate in the 14th presidential election of 2013. Hassan Rouhani’s victory represented a cornerstone that shifted Tehran’s nuclear diplomacy in favor of a new flexible and pragmatic approach that was comparatively more amenable to striking a deal at the negotiations table. The early signs of such a development emerged during the 2013 presidential debate, between Saeed Jalili, Hassan Rouhani and Ali Akbar Velayati. Both, Rouhani and Velayati, accused the former for failing to cause a breakthrough in the ongoing (at that time) nuclear negotiations, from his position of Iran’s chief 1 Avis Bohlen (2015), “Iran: An Opening for Diplomacy?”, Survival, 57:5, 59-66. Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2015.1090127. [February 10, 2017].

6 nuclear negotiator. Promising to bring “good nuclear news”2 during his first one hundred days of his presidency, the than-candidate Rouhani openly critiqued the Mahmud Ahmadinejad-led nuclear policy, as being basically and economic disaster caused by the comprehensive international sanctions. Inheriting an economic crisis, president Hassan Rouhani intended to overpass it as soon as possible, but in order to do so, he had to do something about the sanctions imposed by almost the entire international community to Islamic Republic of Iran. With intent to deliver as quickly as possible his campaign promises, president Rouhani arranged to transfer the nuclear file from the Supreme National Security Council to the Foreign Ministry, now led by the US-educated Mohammad Javad Zarif. He had formerly been Iran’s envoy to the United Nations (UN) and had played an instrumental role in brokering the deal for the post-Taliban order in Afghanistan. The Western media coined his approach as Iran’s “new charm diplomacy”3 and he managed, only in two rounds of nuclear negotiations in Geneva, a deal that had been eluded his predecessors during the previous nine years. This was preceded by a high-profile visit of president Hassan Rouhani to attend the annual UN gathering in September 2013, which resulted in one unprecedented “telephone diplomacy”4 between the Iranian president and his US counterpart, president Barack Obama, thus breaking the past taboo of direct communication between the two sides. Saddled with a new mission to end the “unnecessary nuclear crisis”5 that had cast a spell on Iran’s economic growth, the Rouhani administration boasted of having complete control of the nuclear policy and was prepared to take on the heat of Iran’s hardliners who questioned the president’s resolve to defend Iran’s nuclear rights. In dealing with the nuclear challenge posed by Iran it was necessary more than a policy shift. A paradigm change was required. Within Iran, a deep-seated popular frustration over deteriorating economic conditions, social and political restrictions, has not evolved into an organized opposition. Therefore there was no coherent challenge to the system and the Iranian population seemed to be trapped by revolutionary fatigue and political cynicism, the products of their historical disappointments, first in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and then by the failure of the Mohammad Khatami-era reform movement. In addition, the specter of insecurity, associated with political instability in Iran’s proximity (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon) is only further damped Iranians’ interest in revolutionary risk taking. 2 Nader Entessar, Kaveh L. Afrasiabi (2018), Iran Nuclear Accord and the Remaking of the Middle East, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 5. 3 Suzzane Maloney (2013), “It’s Official: Washington’s Favorite Iranian Takes On The Nuclear File”, Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2013/09/05/its-official-washingtons-favorite-iranian-takes-on-the-nuclear-file/. [October 25, 2017]. 4 Trita Parsi (2017), Losing an Enemy. Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy, New Heaven & London: Yale University Press, pp. 204-205. 5 Ibid.

7 Iran has striven to acquire the know-how to harness nuclear capabilities and has been scientifically successful. However, the foremost world’s Great Powers for doing so sanctioned it. Nevertheless, the internal dynamics within Iran combined with the regional geopolitical shifts, presented new opportunity for the West’s nonproliferation strategy. Despite the fact that the first attempt of cooperation between Washington and Tehran, occurred in 2003 – when former Secretary of State Colin Powell considered to enlist Iran, then a bitter enemy of Iraq, in Operation Iraqi Freedom – found itself impeded in the entanglement of the post-revolutionary cold relations between Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, once in office, president Barack Obama made it clear that he is willing to solve the Iranian nuclear puzzle. It took years of on-and-off international diplomatic efforts, involving seven nations, including longtime adversaries, to reach an agreement. On July 14, 2015, the negotiators from US, France, UK, Germany, China, Russia and Iran secured the JCPOA, designed to verifiably block Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons development and guard against a clandestine program in exchange for sanctions relief. The purpose of this research is to analyze how the Iranian nuclear file came about, how it became a global issue, how it was resolved and who will benefit from its resolutions. Also, this research aims to portray how the influence of money, technology, partisan politics, a growing disregard for truth and globalization has complicated the making of foreign policy, especially when the issue is controversial. This research is designed to review the antecedents, to present the JCPOA, to study the international community’s position and the Great Powers’ diplomatic efforts, to analyze the outcomes and to make some predictions and few recommendations. Therefore, the study’s methodology is most of it analytical, but the empirical research and few interviews with scholars and diplomats, who either studied the field of nuclear negotiations or were directly involved in the process, are meant to complete and enhance the quality of this research. However, when dealing with a new phenomenon, or more, with an event whose consequences and outcomes are still unfolding and subject of debates, one is facing the challenge of not having sufficient material in order to respond all the questions. About Iran’s nuclear deal hundreds of article have been written, numerous academic papers, as well as few dozens of books. The shortcomings of this writing are due to the semi-public access to the behind door of nuclear negotiations. It certainly cannot be claim privileged knowledge to such confidential information; therefore the picture that emerged with regard to the negotiations process between Iran and the Great Powers is an incomplete one, with some pieces of puzzle still missing from the public eye. Still, in spite of such scarcity of information, dictated by the tightly guarded process, it is possible to rely on the vast pool of available ones, open sources intelligence, and also on the openess of some people to discuss such a sensitive matter. All of those resources will

8 be put together in order to create a narrative that objectively aims to present the nuclear diplomacy of the Great Powers toward Iran. Also, given the time when this research started – October 2017 – and its aim to predict some outcomes for 2026, it might appear to be an exotic attempt. Yet, is all the previous analyzes and researches were risk-free, perhaps the field of International Relations (IR) would have been much poorer. Therefore, underneath the disorder dominating nowadays the international stage, one of the tasks of this research is to look for the order and to stress the benefits of long-term diplomacy. Analyzing over a decade of negotiations, in combination with a forecast for the next decade is not quite an impossible mission, even it is a challenging one. The research interest is not coincidental. Islamic Republic of Iran and its nuclear ambitions kept the front page of the Great Powers’ agenda during the last couple of decades. The nuclear issue portrayed Iran into a state with hegemonic intentions, perceived in apocalyptic terms, placing Tehran on the so call “axis of evil”. Also, the institutional dualism and the mix of religion in the political field, combined with the Shiite revolutionary ideology, built a reputation of an actor that can only be handled in terms of hard power, meaning offensive military action, although, the Tehran’s action during almost the last four decades indicates a rational actor, looking for defensive ways to preserve its national interests. The nuclear program was the ultimately resort of a regime who led the country thru a eight years war with the neighboring Iraq, and then appealed to any mean to put Iran on the global and regional map. The nuclear agreement is a consequence of Iranian political realism of returning on the international stage and overcoming the status of a rogue state in the international system. Also, the debates over the nuclear deal demonstrate that are a number of things that affect foreign policy more profoundly today than in the past and these means have a great weight on decision-making process. The will and interest to study in depth the whole process behind the signing of the JCPOA grew rapidly and soon became a doctoral project. Both, the negotiation history and the features of the nuclear agreement are part of this research, with an enhanced interest toward the behavior and motifs that prompted the P5 group not to abandon this vexing project. At the time of JCPOA’s signing, which put to rest an over decade-old nuclear crisis, the Middle East was traumatized by a number of other crises, such as the protracted civil war in Syria, the emergence of so-called Islamic State (ISIS), also referred as Daesh, who’s branches extended to a number of other countries, including the already tormented Afghanistan. There were also conflicts and tensions in other parts of the wider region, notably in Bahrain, Yemen and Libya, or the unresolved dispute between Israel and the Palestinians. All these issues influenced, in a way or another, the already complicated process of negotiations between the Great Powers and Iran. In this highly turbulent environment, the JCPOA was a unique

9 achievement in terms of crisis management, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly confirmed that Iran has faithfully fulfilled its obligations under the accord. The research topic is definitely current, given the fluid nature of the actual International Relations development and the changes into the Western administrations. The JCPOA has been an issue at the beginning of the 21st century, and continues to be so nowadays. Moreover, the 2016 shift of administration at the White House brought the US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement, gesture that caused a real international dispute. President Donald Trump’s decision triggered anxiety and even some concerns not only on the part of Iran, but also European Union (EU), China, and even Japan. After May 8, 2018, when president Trump announced that the US would no longer participate in the JCPOA and would re-impose sanctions that had been suspended pursuant to the agreement, the other powers that negotiated the accord with Iran – Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany – opposed the US decision and have been meeting with Iranian officials to continue implementing the JCPOA. Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani has pledged to continue implementing the accord, provided Iran continues to receive the economic benefits of the agreement. Given all these circumstances, the JCPOA topic looks like it will fill up the international agenda for the coming years. European leaders do share many of the concerns of the US with regard to Iran. But they take a strikingly different approach from the Trump administration to dealing with Iran. The ramifications of the US policy go beyond damaging the non-proliferation architecture Europe has had build. It could lead to even greater instability in the Middle East and severely limit diplomacy with Iran to resolve regional issues. Direct or indirect confrontation between American and Iranian-backed forces across the Middle East will further fuel the regional conflicts, particularly in Iraq and Syria, that have already imposed heavy costs on Europe. The debate over the JCPOA tends to grow as the new waves of the US sanctions enter into force. From all the ongoing international issues, the Iranian file seems to keep its top position within the Great Powers agenda. Whether or not is considered to be saved, the JCPOA became a reason for debate not only between the EU and the US, but also has attracted other actors, regionals or not, into this debate. Those advocating against the JCPOA might argue that this would be conceding too much to a regime that fails to fulfill its obligations, yet, it is a small price to pay for a chance which might lead to a deterioration of relations beyond the point of no return. The main objective of the nuclear deal with Iran was to address one area of disagreement between Iran and the West diplomatically, which could open the door for further diplomacy. If the deal collapses, the Europeans – and as well the US – would be left with no options other than confrontation.

10 2. Research Questions • What were the reasons for each actor involved in the negotiations and which was the common factor that led to the signing of the agreement? • How reliable is the JCPOA and how it will change the international and regional security architecture? • What are the inflection points that could lead to the to the resumption of the nuclear program and what would be the reaction of the Great Powers on this issue? (based on predictions, interviews with officials, simulations). 3. Methodology Drawing on primary documents and interviews, and as well on secondary sources such as previous academic writings on this topic, this research will analyze negotiation behavior and strategies, and their tools of statecrafts. To that end, disclosed diplomatic cables from the US State Department on open sources such as wikileaks.org and cablegatesearch.net, The Telegraph, The New York Times, The Guardian and other outlets can provide extensive information on both determinants and processes of implementing either conflict resolution initiatives or punitive measures by all parties involved. For the diplomatic approach and analyze, the writings of G. R. Berridge, Robert D. Putnam, Harold Nicholson, Henry Kissinger, William Zartman and Valentin Naumescu were extremely valuable and helpful. Regarding the relations between the US, EU, Russian Federation, China and Iran, lots of academic writings, such as books, scientific journals and articles built the base of this study. Among them, authors such as Bernd Kaussler, Robert Axelrod, Richard Haas, Ofira Seliktar, Ali Ansari, Gareth Porter, Chris Patten, Mohamed El Baradei, Farideh Farhi, Anoush Estehami or Mahjoob Zweiri provided an in depth view on the approach subject. The news items are primarily from English-language sources as well as from Iranian newspapers written in Persian. For the analysis of the nuclear negotiations, it will be used the negotiation analytic approach together with an analytical graphical framework developed by James Sebenius and Michael Singh for their own analysis of the nuclear negotiations with Iran. Their analysis was written in 2012, before the occurrence of rapid and significant developments in Iran – the West ratcheting up one of the toughest sanctions regimes crippling Iran’s economy and its crucial oil sector, the election of a moderate, Hassan Rouhani, as President after a campaign of reaching out to the West, the intensification of talks and finally, signing a breakthrough interim deal. These

11 developments make their conclusions outdated and call for an update. Their article and mainly the framework have served as an important basis for my own thesis, however, I depart from their analysis in the different input assumptions of the parties’ interests and alternatives to a negotiated agreement and also in the slightly adjusted graphical framework to better represent the current negotiations. 4. The Structure of the Thesis This research is structured in seven main sections, each of them containing several chapters dedicated to particular issues and specific concepts. The first section is dedicated to introductory notions, with chapters dedicated to the general objectives of this research, specific objectives and research methods, and also to the general theoretic framework. Second section presents Iran’s nuclear ambitions, rather as in introduction into the negotiations process, than as an exhaustive approach of Iranian nuclear program. The third section describes the US-Iran relationships, while the fourth one is dedicated to the EU-Iran engagement. The fifth section is introducing the eastern member states (non-Western powers) of the P5 +1 group – Russia and China – and their relations with Tehran. The sixth section is dedicated to the JCPOA, and the exhaustive presentation of the process leading to the conclusion of this historic agreement. The last section comprises an exhaustive set of conclusions and personal findings, but will also deal with couple of comparative scenarios regarding the world powers’ nuclear diplomacy and Iran’s nuclear ambitions under the light of the latest developments regarding the JCPOA and the E3 / EU capability, along with Russia and China, to keep the Iranian nuclear agreement alive. 5. Progress Status So far the first two section of the thesis has been written, and the third one is in progress. Section I comprises introductory notions, literature review, methodological landmarks and the theoretical framework. Regarding the research hypothesis, it is based on the following premise: if it had not been a common ground of interest for the actors involved, the agreement would not have been signed, and without understanding the specific mechanisms of negotiations, for both, Tehran and Western governments, then neither the long-term strategies of Iran and P5+1 states can not be anticipated. In order to validate or reject the research hypothesis, I have resorted to:

12 • The analysis of the relationship between religion and politics, as Shi’a has taken on Iranian political leadership. However, it should also be emphasized that Shiite Islam is not the cause of the differences between Tehran and the Western Chancelleries of the world but must be analyzed from the perspective of how it is politically contextualized in order to obtain its own benefits, including in the nuclear file. • A comparison between offensive realism and defensive realism, in order to understand Iran’s nuclear ambitions; • The assessment of Iranian foreign policy through the ideological filter, the social specificity and the mobilization of the various political-religious groups, in order to seize the political, economic and military power; • Mapping the differences between Iranian and Western strategic thinking in the nuclear field in order to understand the short, medium and long-term Iranian interests of developing a dual-use nuclear program, given that a nuclear Iran would generate incremental disputes at regional and global level, on the one hand, and for the clear identification of Western interests, on the other hand; • Application of Putnam's “two-tier” model in the negotiations between Iran and the international community between 2013 and 2015 to demonstrate that Tehran's foreign policy decisions are the result of simultaneous computation of domestic and international implications. In its attempt to identify the specifics of relations between the West and the Islamic Republic of Iran and to shed some light over the emergent effects of conflict resolution in the international nuclear diplomatic arena, this research aims as specific objectives: • Presenting and analyzing the provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; • Analysis of the features of the nuclear negotiations process; • Analysis of the geopolitical interests of the actors involved; • Presentation of the current situation of relations between Islamic Republic of Iran and Western governments after the US withdrawal from JCPOA; • Findings regarding the future of JCPOA; • Recommendations on addressing a new type of diplomatic relationship between Iran's nuclear potential (in the absence of agreement) and Western governments. Against this background, this thesis is looking to answer to the following research questions: • Is a nuclear Iran a threat to the regional and international security? • What were the individual interests of each actor involved in the JCPOA negotiations?

13 • How reliable is JCPOA and how it will change the international and regional security architecture, in the context of US withdrawal from the agreement? • Does the zone of possible saving the agreement exists and how determined is the EU to engage in securing the deal with the risk of creating a conflict of interest with Washington? • Which might be the inflection points that could lead to the to the resumption of the Iranian nuclear program and what would be the reaction of the Western governments on this issue? (based on predictions, interviews with officials, simulations). How this resumption would impact the already fragile stability in the Middle East? This thesis aims to present in a complex and complete manner the matter of JCPOA negotiations, their outcome and the predictions based on ongoing events, and in this endeavor, a mix of methods, from the classical ones – qualitative and quantitative research – to innovative research models, including the thinking model, or analytical graphical framework, have been used. Section II presents Iran’s nuclear ambitions, rather as in introduction into the negotiations process, than as an exhaustive approach of Iranian nuclear program. Analysis of the international politics of the Middle East has long been polarized between IR specialists, usually realists, who insist that universal rules apply to all regions6, and specialists who defend the cultural uniqueness and consequent political exceptionalism of the Middle East7. There are some scholars who believe that Middle Eastern foreign policy is shaped by the way its leaders deal with the often conflicting pressure emanating from three conceptually distinct environments, at the domestic, regional and international level8. Thus, constructivists supply a universal theory that takes account of area-specific identity, yet they seem to understate the weight of the material factors stressed by realism. Also this section provides a brief presentation of Iran’s foreign policy after the Cold War, because the features developed during this period were decisive for the process of the negotiations that led to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. 6 Stephen Walt (1987), The Origin of Alliances, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 9. 7 Gerd Nonneman (2005), “Analyzing the foreign Policy of the Middle East and North Africa: A Conceptual Framework”, in Gerd Nonneman (ed.), Analyzing Middle Eastern Foreign Policy and the Relationship with Europe, London: Routledge, pp. 243-256. 8 Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (2002), The Foreign Policy of Middle East States, London: Lynne Rienner, p. 2.

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23 Appendix 1: PUBLICATIONS Books and publications in scientific journals: Ø Reinforcing Detterence on NATO's Eastern Flank, LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, Germany, 2017. Ø “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” in Doctrine de Securitate (Dan Dungaciu ed.), 2016, ISPRI, Bucharest, Romania. Ø “ISIS – The Consequence of the Religious Insurgence in the Middle East?”, Adrian Ivan, Cristian Gazdac, Claudiu Marian (eds.), Governance, Intelligence and Security in the 21st Century, Cluj-Napoca: CA Publishing, 2018, pp. 67-89. Ø “High Representative, High Expectations: Federica Mogherini’s Rational Behaviour on Iranian Nuclear Deal”, Melania-Gabriela Ciot (coordinator), New Researches in International Relations, Cluj- Napoca: Presa Universitara, 2018. Ø "Social Security – Operational and Conceptual Premises" in CS & Intelligence, online edition, pp. 24-36, https://www.strategiiaplicate.ro/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/diplomacy_intelligence_8/files/mobile/index.html#24. Ø “Ukraine: Russia's New Art of War” article in On-line Journal Modeling the New Europe, no. 21/December 2016, pp. 155-174, http://neweurope.centre.ubbcluj.ro/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Online-journal-No.-21-December-2016.pdf Ø “How to Strengthen Alliance Cohesion” available in Atlantic-Community.org http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/how-to-strengthen-alliance-cohesion Ø “Resurgența sunnită și alianțele șiite. Strategia Iranului în Orientul Mijlociu”, ISPRI, 2017 (IV), pp. 24-46. Ø “Impact of Iran on Azerbaijan: Means of Religious Influence”, in Studia Europaea, 4/2017, pp. 131-151, http://studia.ubbcluj.ro/download/pdf/1147.pdf. Ø “A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy: Iran and the (New) EU-US Sanctions Debate” in Modelling New Europe, pp. 182-205, http://neweurope.centre.ubbcluj.ro/?page_id=2006. Ø Entries on Middle East concepts, Dan Dungaciu (coordinator), Enciclopedia de diplomație, Bucuresti: RAO, 2019.

24 Articles Ø "Turkey, the coup and what follows", article in BucharestHerald.ro http://www.bucharestherald.com/worldnews/43-worldnews/57871-turcia-loviturie-de-stat-i-ce-urmeaza. Ø "Syria and prudent rhetoric of the West" article in BucharestHerald.ro http://www.bucharestherald.com/politics/34-politics/57888-siria-i-retorica-prudent-a-occidentului. Ø "Turkey – Russia: History of a sinuous relationship", article in BucharestHerald.ro http://www.bucharestherald.com/worldnews/43-worldnews/57906-analiza-turcia-rusia-istoria-unei-relaii-sinuoase. Ø "Why do we care who will become the US president? Trump or Clinton?", article in BucharestHerald.ro http://www.bucharestherald.com/worldnews/43-worldnews/58069-analiza-de-ce-ne-intereseaz-pe-noi-cine-va-deveni-preedintele-sua-trump-sau-clinton- Ø "Geopolitical Diary: Between Washington and Moscow" (I) and (II), article in BucharestHerald.ro http://www.bucharestherald.com/politics/34-politics/58076-2016-10-15-22-49-57 (I) & http://www.bucharestherald.com/worldnews/43-worldnews/58114-2016-10-29-23-57-08 (II). Ø "Syria – Donald Trump's first foreign policy test", article in BucharestHerald.ro http://www.bucharestherald.com/worldnews/43-worldnews/58549-siria-primul-test-de-politic-extern-al-lui-donald-trump. Ø "Romania 100: The Impact of Woodrow Wilson's "14 Points" on the Romanian Unionist Case" article in Salajeanul.ro http://www.salajeanul.ro/romania-100-impactul-celor-14-puncte-ale-lui-woodrow-wilson-asupra-cauzei-unioniste-romanesti-17006. Ø "Romania's reversed theories", article in Salajeanul.ro http://www.salajeanul.ro/romania-teoriilor-inversate-17058. Ø "Ignoring the Future. The Prolonged Passivity of the Romanian Foreign Policy" article in Salajeanul.ro, http://www.salajeanul.ro/cu-spatele-la-viitor-pasivitatea-prelungita-a-politicii-externe-romanesti-17088. Ø “Profane of the sacred referendum”, editorial in EuroStiri, http://eurostiri.eu/profanul-referendumului-sacru/.

25 Appendix 2: CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS Ø 2017, 3-5 October – “Disintegration and Integration in East-Central Europe”, 4th edition, Cluj-Napoca. Ø 2018, 18-19 May – „EURINT. Reflecting on Europe’s (dis)order: scenarios for the EU’s future”, Iași. Presentation: “Global Europe between values and interests: The benefits of soft power. Challenges to the EU-US relations over the Iranian nuclear file”. Ø 2018, 28-29 May – „ACUNS. International Peace Studies Conference”, Diplomatische Akademie Wien https://www.da-vienna.ac.at/de/Die-Akademie/Diplomatische-Akademie-Wien. Presentation: „The Need for the Long Game: the Iranian Nuclear Deal Between Obama and Trump Administrations”. Ø 2018, 12-14 June – International Institute for Peace, Viena. Workshop: „Iran in the International System”. Ø 2018, 10-11 October, Yeditepe University Istanbul, International Migration in the 21th Century – III. Presentation: “Iraqi Refugees in the Aftermath of 2003 War”. Ø 2019, 16 March, Geopolitics for Business – Risk Analysis Workshop, Bucharest. Ø 2019, 21-22 March, DIECE Conference – Managing Diversity in the Process of European Integration, Faculty of European Studies, University Babes-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca. Presentation: “European Union between its wounded home front and a new geopolitical dilemma –Case Study: the Iranian Nuclear File”. Ø 2019, 28 March, Lancaster University, UK, SEPAD Conference – Sectarianism, Proxies and De-Sectarianism Across the Middle East. Presentation: “Iranian Shia Emergence in the Middle East After the After the Arab Spring”. Ø 2019, 20-22 June, Council for European Studies – Sovereignties in Contention: Nations, Regions and Citizens in Europe, Madrid, Spain. Presentation: “Assessing Transatlantic Fallout after US Withdrawal from the JCPOA”. Upcoming events: Ø 2019, 7-11 October, International Agency Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria – International Conference on Climate Change and the Role of Nuclear Power. Presentation: “Balancing risks: the benefits of long-term diplomacy in containing the nuclear threats”.

26 Ø 2019, 25-27 October, International Scientific Conference on Culture and Identities – University of Beograd, Serbia. Presentation: “Religious identity vs. Modernity in post-revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran”.