Euroscepticismul

1. Introduction

Europe is a fascinating place, the cradle of civilisation and the source of many of World's doctrines. It is in Europe, in ancient Greece, to be more precise, that abstract concepts such as politics and democracy were born, gradually refined and turned into viable and efficient tools that have nowadays become a standard in the modern world. The term "scepticism" has its origin in Greece, after the death of Alexander the Great the Hellenist world witnessed a revival of the freedom of speech and expression and a new school emerged, founded by Pyrrho, a former soldier of Alexander. His followers were named skeptikoi (singular skeptikos); they were literate people, having studied the logic of Aristotle and other Greek philosophers. They attempted to prove inconstencies and contradictions of others. The sceptics believed that people can not reach the truth based on their senses, as senses are an unreliable and misleading source (Leconte, 2010, p. 5).

In European politics, the term "scepticism" was first used in rather recent decades. In a recent work on this topic (Leconte, 2010), it is revealed that, while in France in the mid-sixties the term "Eurocrat" has emerged to emphasize the gap between the upper class and ordinary people, the "Eurosceptic" term itself was first used in an article in The Times in 1985 to brand the "anti-marketeers" opposing the common market in the United Kingdom. At the time, Britain was suspicious regarding a European Union tilted around the German axis. According to other authors (Hooghe & Marks, 2007), the term first surfaced in 1992 in an article in The Economist to refer to the discontent of German public opinion over the requirement to amend the country's 'purity rules on beer' in order to comply with EU regulations.

Hence, the first question arises: is Euroscepticism a British fact, or it is rather a wider phenomenon? Actually, as it will turn out from this paper, each EU member country has its own share of Euroscepticism; however this term has a subtly different meaning in each country as it refers to what really is of concern for citizens of that particular country. For example, Euroscepticism in the North is much different from Euroscepticism in Southern Europe as locals perceive the benefits and disadvantages of being part of the EU based on their specific needs and goals. On the other hand, Euroscepticism is not an ideology in itself, but rather a notion that can be used across the entire political range from extreme left to extreme right, same as populism (Leconte, 2010), in order to serve as a tool conveying reluctance in a way or another towards the EU.

2. Euroscepticism – Theoretical Background

2.1 Defining Euroscepticism

In order to understand Euroscepticism one needs to take a closer look at the past. Back in the '50s, '60s, '70s, '80s and even early '90s, European integration was regarded as a positive thing by most of the European citizens. As more countries joined the Union in seven successive waves of enlargement, the accession criteria became more and more strict, both economically and politically. Particularly after the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and the rejection by France and Netherlands of the Treaty establishing a EU Constitution in local referenda (2005), the EU has become more of a "polity", a complex structure with the economic factor playing an ever growing role, with a major impact upon the political factor (Leconte, 2010). The implementation of integration measures has impacted a larger group of citizens. Identity and cultural sensitivities were affected by an alleged transfer of national sovereignty which also affected the views on issues such as ecology or migration. In other words, the start of the EU fit all options. Elites first became converted to Europe as an ideal. However, as this has progressed, the tunnel has narrowed. Utilitarian and political Euroscepticism was incorporated in the approach to Brussels and concerns have appeared on one side or the other. For instance, the right wing parties are concerned with issues related to identity and sovereignty while the left is more concerned with issues related to globalization and markets (Torreblanca, 2014). The process of opposition in Europe that shifts from the permissive consensus to constraining dissensus (Hooghe & Marks, 2009) opens the prospect of contestation which is no longer latent, but a sheer translation of a fracture in political identity, which is potentially disruptive, between elites and ordinary people.

2.2. Euroscepticism and national identity

In the absence of a European sense of identity, many parties are nostalgic for a national identity allegedly backward, a sentiment that has permeated citizens, fuelled by the global economic crisis. In this sense, the link between nationalism and Euroscepticism is evident, even more clearly in the far-right parties. Some radical right parties have experienced a remarkable ascent with a populist discourse that identifies the crisis with the inability of European technocracy to revive the economy, invoking some protectionist measures that have very little to do with the European spirit. These parties propose a closed, uniform and cohesive society, rejecting multiculturalism with a discourse of fear and hatred – sometimes very well built – that has caught more than expected. This is the case of the United Kingdom Independence Party, French National Front, Austrian Freedom Party, Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands or Jobbik in Hungary, to give just a few examples. On the other hand, another case would be regional nationalist parties such as the Catalans, Basques, Scots or Corsicans. For this type of movements, Europe is not an enemy but an ally who can give legal shelter and even allow them to remain in economic, monetary and trade online, bypassing the authority of the state. From the point of view of culture and identity, they are facing inwards, but want to continue having a supranational entity, which – in the absence of the nation state – can protect them.

2.3. Euroscepticism versus Euro-optimism.

In time, there have been numerous attempts to classify the different types of attitudes towards the EU. It is by no means an easy job, due to the wide array of views from the extreme left to the extreme right of the political spectrum. Paul Taggart was among the first scholars to try to map the term 'Euroscepticism'. His influential definition of Euroscepticism has been used in most of the literature dealing with this concept: "Euroscepticism is an encompassing term that expresses the idea of contingent, or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration" (Taggart, 1998, p. 366). Together with Aleks Szczerbiak, he identified two types of Euroscepticism: soft and hard. According to the two scholars, hard Euroscepticism involves a rejection of the European political and economic integration process and pleads for leaving the EU or not joining the EU, if the country is not yet a member thereof (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004), while soft Euroscepticism involves "contingent or qualified opposition to European integration" (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004, p. 4). This conceptualisation of the various forms of Euroscepticism lacks precision and can lead to misinterpretation. For example, soft Euroscepticism is defined too broadly so that each disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be taken into account (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002). Also, it is unclear what are the criteria used to link and separate the two types of Euroscepticism and, last but not least, it is difficult to define the various subtle concepts such as EU integration on the basis of the above terminology (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002). For this reason, the two scholars proposed an alternative method of defining the different types of Euroscepticism based on the relation to "other party positions on Europe" which provides a more clear definition of Euroscepticism. Also, they make a distinction between 'diffuse' and 'specific' support for EU integration. While 'diffuse' support means "support for the general ideas of European integration", 'specific' support means "support for the general practice of European integration" (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p. 300). The above-mentioned two dimensions can serve as a basis of discussing European integration. The first dimension, i.e. "Support for the general ideas of European integration" separates Europhiles and Europhobes. The former support the main ideas of integration regardless of how it is actually carried out. The best examples of Europhiles are the 'founding fathers of the EU' such as Jean Monet and Robert Schuman. Also, despite the fact that she addressed Euroscepticism in a different tone, Margaret Thatcher can be regarded as a Europhile, though she was more concerned of economic issues than her predecessors. In contrast with Europhiles, Europhobes do not support the concepts of European integration, they are sometimes even hostile to it. Part of their reluctance to accept European integration is the fact that they consider the EU a nonsense due to its diversity (hence: 'incompatibility') of the European states. They belong to various political backgrounds, such as socialists, nationalists or isolationists (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002). The second dimension, i.e. "support for the general practice of European integration" draws a line between EU-optimists and EU-pessimists. The EU-optimists are supportive towards the EU, either because they are content with its current performance or are confident in future developments. The above-mentioned two dimensions helped Kopecky and Mudde come up with a diagram that illustrates the four 'ideal-type categories' of parties in Europe.

(Source: Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p. 303).

Euroenthusiasts are supportive of the EU integration project and policies and are happy about the EU policies and current state of being. Europragmatics are groups that despite the fact that they fail to support the EU integration project, they support the EU for utilitarian reasons, as they deem it is profitable for their country. Eurosceptics generally support the EU, however they are pessimistic about the EU's current/future status. Finally, the Eurorejects, located on the right bottom corner of the table, combine EU-pessimist and Europhobe ideas and do not support neither the EU integration project nor EU ideas (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002).

2.4. Contemporary expression of Euroscepticism

Today, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of scepticism, a strong one that rejects the very idea of ​​the European Union and pleads for disintegration of the EU, such as United Kingdom Independence Party, led by Nigel Farage, and a mild or moderate one, accepting the EU, but not the integration project. Among these moderate Eurosceptic parties, there is a wide range of parties such as the United Left and the British Conservative Party, who have proposed alternatives to the current EU options, but do not reject its existence. As many authors point out, Euroscepticism might not necessarily mean hostility towards the European Union, but rather "submitting the issue of European integration to a sceptical examination: support for European integration should not derive from any theoretical or normative belief (for instance, the belief that an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe is necessarily a good thing) but must be assessed on the basis of practical cost/gains analysis and according to its respect of national (political, cultural, normative) diversities" (Leconte, 2010, p. 5).

3. Euroscepticism in practice

3.1. Euroscepticism became an essential issue on public agenda of the European Union and on the agenda of every member state, since early 1990s, once the Union started "deepening and widening at the same time" (Weßels, 2007, p. 287). The social current of Euroscepticism developed during the recent period through two main directions. Firstly, Euroscepticism was associated with the European Union's enlargement across the 'iron curtain' (Weßels, 2007, p. 287), an area represented by ten new member states in Central and Eastern Europe. Secondly, Euroscepticism was associated with the idea of an European constitution. If until the 2004 European Parliament, Euroscepticism was regarded as a potential alarming issue, since then it gained momentum and has developed into a much more serious issue with a powerful impact upon the European project.

According to the traditional classification of "hard" and "soft" Euroscepticism, the contemporary forms of Euroscepticism can be conceptualized as "Euroenthusiasts" versus "Eurorejects", as well as "Europrgamatists" versus "Eurosceptics" (Vasilopoulou, 2009, p. 3).

The recent developments in European Union's politics confirmed the significance of Euroscepticism, affecting different dimensions of the European integration. Euroscepticism became mostly visible starting with the EU's institutional reform, aiming to improve the decision-making ability, in order to provide a coherent strategy for all state members. The repeated rejection of Constitutional Treaty in 2005 through Dutch and French referenda, as well as the Irish rejection of Lisbon Treaty in 2008 highlighted the presence of Euroscepticism among European citizens, determining European authorities to reconsider their positions (Leconte, 2010). In addition to the historic moments mentioned, Euroscepticism was expressed as electing attitude in several state members. For instance, in 2009 in the Czech Republic, eurosceptic politicians and organizations managed to create the context of then incumbent government's fall. Across the European Union, Eurosceptic parties attracted large sections of the electorate, such as "roughly a third of voters in Austria and the Netherlands, a quarter in the UK (without including the Tories) and a fifth in France" (Leconte, 2010, p. 2).

In addition to the political effervescence pointed, the European institutions themselves managed to stir even more the impact of Euroscepticism in public life. For instance, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) attracted waves of criticism debuting in 2009, as several rulings on market legislation were disconsidered by trade unions in European Union, since they were allegedly undermining workers' and unions' rights. In this case, following the German Constitutional Court's decision to reject the Treaty of Lisbon on allegations that the Treaty is unconstitutional, the European Commision, expected to be shape European Union's interests, was put in difficulty, and it was after long debates that Germany finally ratified the Treaty of Lisbon in September 2009 (Leconte, 2010).

The European Elections of 2004 highlighted the emergence of Eurosceptic parties in Central and Eastern Europe, generating a debate upon the effective democratic transformation of this area (Weßels, 2007, p. 287). In addition to the Euroscepticism's ascension in Central and East Europe, traditional member state as France and the Netherlands expressed their intention to reject the concept of European Constitution. This attitude was compared by Tony Blair with "a pause for reflection" (Weßels, 2007, p. 288), while the general attitude denoted a potential distrust in the efficiency of an European constitution. A third factor filling the emergence of contemporary Euroscepticism was the "deep crisis" (Weßels, 2007, p. 288), affecting the budget of European Union as presented by Jean Claude Juncker, then prime minister of Luxembourg, during a EU summit meeting in Brussels in 2005. The budget of EU was blocked, marking the decline of public support for European integration since the moment of the Maastricht Treaty's adoption in 1992. Nowadays, Euroscepticism endangers the European integration, both in terms of political and citizen's support. In addition the enlargement of European Union, politicians and people express their doubts related to the existence of an European Constitution (Weßels, 2007, p. 288).

Within a national Eurosceptic wave, supporters of Euroscepticism might develop different attitude, varying from mild rejection to a harsh level, "eurocynism" (Krouwel & Koen, 2007, p. 252) or even alienation. Euroscepticism can be analyzed on two dimensions, in order to point its effects. Generally, the first dimensions relies on attitudes towards authorities, political regime or community, while the second dimensions focuses on the degree of reflexivity and negativism manifested by eurosceptics (Krouwel & Koen, 2007). Similarly to Hobeika & Villeneuve (2013), Krouwel & Koen (2007) consider that the emerging populism attitudes in European Union are able to transform Euroscepticism into a "a more diffuse discontent like Eurocynism" (Krouwel & Koen, 2007, p. 252), threatening the very existence of European Union.

Euroscepticism can be justified through several explanations. A potential justification might be the different costs of integration policies, as state members with improved results of economic globalization are likely to be more supportive of European Union enlargement, while member states on the opposite direction focus on a more restrictive enlargement. A second explanation originated in the "citizen's feeling of national identity" (Krouwel & Koen, 2007, p. 253), perceiving the progressive enlargement as a potential cultural threat or immigration issue, developing less supportive attitudes related to European enlargement. A third justification denotes Euroscepticism as the "evaluation of domestic governments and national democracy" (Krouwel & Koen, 2007, p. 253). Practically, the more citizens are dissatisfied with their national authorities, the more likely they are to display negative attitudes related to European enlargement.

As Krouwel & Koen (2007) pointed out, Euroscepticism cannot be perceived as a unitary social and political phenomenon, since it might be incorrectly analyzed. As consequence, for a rightful analysis, Euroscepticism should be divided into two main levels: critical and negative attitude related to Europe and dissatisfaction related to the efficiency of European integration or the reliability of European Union's institutions, the policies adopted by European Union or the activity of European politicians. The current wave of Euroscepticism can be justified through the an increasing decline of trust in democratic institutions, marked by "an increased mobilization of all kinds of cultural, economic and political discontent by populist entrepreneurs" (Krouwel & Koen, 2007, p. 253). The contemporary development of European Union favoured several of the themes issued by populist leaders associated with Euroscepticism, such as anti-immigrant policies and anti-European integration, leading to a potential replacement of "system trust with personal trust in the populist leader" (Krouwel & Koen, 2007, p. 253).

Euroscepticism, as an antagonistic attitude to Europhile feeling, is supported by politicians, analysts or journalists, as a movement of opposition to the concept of European construction. Eurosceptics can be perceived as citizens or politicians with critical perspectives related to their national sovereignty, in terms of European Union's expansion (Report A Guide to Information Sources on Euroscepticism, 2013, p. 2).

The global financial crisis emerging in 2008 determined a tremendous fall of trust in the European Union, particularly in the countries that were traditionally perceived as pro-European. For instance, in France public trust in the efficiency of European Union has decreased from +10 to -22%, in Germany from +20 to -29% and in Italy from +30 to -22%, while Spain faced the most dramatic level of discourage from +42% to -52% (Report A Guide to Information Sources on Euroscepticism, 2013, p. 3). Greece's public acknowledgement of its debt issue in 2010 deepened the economic crisis across European Union, particularly in the case of monetary union project (Bârgăoanu, Radu & Negrea-Busuioc, 2014). In addition to the distrust issued by citizens in the efficiency of European Union, politicians and authorities started to implement a suite of austerity measures meant "to overcome the negative effects of the crisis and over the solutions to save the Eurozone" (Bârgăoanu, Radu & Negrea-Busuioc, 2014, p. 9), in order to avoid as possible the collapse of the European Union itself, paradoxically running the "major risk of disintegration precisely because it cannot disintegrate" (Krastev, 2012, in Bârgăoanu, Radu & Negrea-Busuioc, 2014, p. 9). The salvation of European Union was associated with the need of re-design its project, according to the existing political, economic and social realities (Bârgăoanu, Radu & Negrea-Busuioc, 2014).

The financial and economic crisis that started in 2008 exacerbated the major achievements of the European Union such as the completion of the internal market and the enlargement in Eastern Europe. For instance, in France the preservation of jobs in a crisis period was associated with the need of directing state aid to the automobile sector and other economic sectors affected by the turbulent economic chain starting with 2008 (Report Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses, 2009, 50). In UK, workers in multiple areas demonstrated against the temporary transfer of Italian workers to local plants, creating the context of a wide social conflict including also workers from the recent state members of Eastern Europe. (Report Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses, 2009, 50). Completing the effects on labor market and economic chain, surveys developed in the majority of state members denoted the public attitude related to recent enlargements: "while a large majority of citizens welcomed the resulting increased mobility within the enlarged EU, 56% thought that the enlargement had contributed to job losses in their country, and 50 per cent thought it had increased feelings of insecurity" (Leconte, 2010, p. 2). From the general attitude related to foreigner workers, Cécile Leconte (2012) mentions the xenophobic reactions against Romanian residents in Italy, notably in 2008, and in Ireland, in 2009. The public reaction, as well as the ambiguous attitude of authorities endangered the principle of the free movement of persons in the European Union, one of the key concepts forming the European project. Italian and Irish examples reminded of French concerns related to a "potential <invasion> of Polish service providers (the notorious <Polish plumber> during the 2005 referendum campaign on the EU Constitutional Treaty" (Leconte, 2010, p. 3).

On the contrary, there are state members as Sweden or potential members as Iceland favoured by the existence of the financial and economic crisis. For instance, in Sweden the crisis is a positive factor, supporting the pro-European politicians and organizations, considering that the country should join the Eurozone (Leconte, 2010). Despite its essential impact on the enhancement of current Euroscepticism, the movement to surpass the economical collapse, regarding a deep change of European Union's strategies of communicating with member states and citizens. According to an important proportion of pro-European experts, Europe has to start public debates related to its objectives, reaching a critical point of its evolution, raising two potential scenarios: Does European Union support excessive integration? Does European Union provide an insufficient integration process? To each perspective, arguments and counter arguments can support the existence or the denial, additionally stressing the importance of debating the current structure of European Union and the potential development (Report A Guide to Information Sources on Euroscepticism, 2013, p. 4).

Euroscepticism is represented across Europe by multiple organizations and associations, such as TEAM (The European Alliance of EU-critical movements), reuniting associations from 18 member states that consider that the expansion of European Union as super-state, displaying a massive centralisation and federalisation of decision-making, will eventually weaken the importance of nation-state. UK's perspective, the major supporter of Euroscepticism, is represented by The Freedom Association formed in 1975, as an organization advocating for individual freedom and responsibility, limited government policies, improved national defence and free market economy. The slogan of this organization is "Better Off Out" (Report A Guide to Information Sources on Euroscepticism, 2013, p. 7), suggesting the potential withdrawal of UK from European Union. Similar British organizations are The National Platform EU Research and Informtion Centre, Open Europe, Bruges Group or European Foundation. In Germany, Centrum für Europäische Politik encourages an open European domestic market, as opposing to the centralisation of European decision making process. Inside the European Parliament, Europe of Freedom and Democracy unites the effort of 32 conservative, right-wing, regionalist and eurosceptic directions, criticising European integration and the associated European bureaucracy. Another representative of Euroscepticism in European Parliament is European Conservative and Reformists Group, focusing on free trade, local government strategy and the support of competition, as factors of further European integration (Report A Guide to Information Sources on Euroscepticism, 2013, p. 8).

3.2. Perspectives on Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism is a global social and political attitude towards the European Union, individually expressed in every member state. For instance, in France the party Front National displays a Eurosceptic attitude, attracting impressive scores, raising a question related to French people's desire to support the European enlargement or the implementation of European Constitution (Hobeika & Villeneuve, 2013). The Front National is only the expression of a political rejection of the "Maastricht Europe" (Grunber in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 38), altering the French party system. The election in the spring of 2002, both presidential and legislative, pointed out that Euroscepticism is currently an essential element of French society, determining a great success for Eurosceptic parties.

3.2.1. The question of European integration generated debates in the French public sphere, since 1950s, the period of the political conception of the European Community, yet the intensity of the public discourses was moderate, since European themes were mostly treated by technocrats and government officials. Comparing with other state members, French citizens weren't consulted through a public referendum related to the adherence to the European Community or the possibility of European integration, with the exception of the 1972 Referendum on the enlargement of European Economic Community based on the inclusion of UK, Denmark, and Ireland (Grunber in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008). The 1984 elections, marked by the success of the National Front headed by Jean-Marie Le Pen, obtaining 11 per cent of the vote, constituted an essential challenge to the French party system, traditionally based on left-right wings division. The emerging party declare itself adept of "nationalism-cosmopolitanism" (Grunber in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 39), focusing on national themes and anti-immigrant policy. Previously to that moment, the French political system was divided between the Gaullist party UDR, later RPR, the centre-moderate party UDF and the Socialist Party, each of them supporting through its leaders, François Mitterand (Socialist Party) and Jacques Chirac (RPR), the process of European integration, leading to the acceptance of the Treaty on European Union in 1992. (Grunber in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008). The Eurosceptic themes existing in the that period were neutralized into the national political debate, each leader being interested to obtain advantages of the formation of a single market, as well as other European strategies.

Currently, Euroscepticism in France is expressed through two potential dimensions: Euroscepticism promoted by old parties, and Euroscepticism issued by new parties. In the first catgetory, the Trotskyite parties, the Communist Party, the Front National or the National Republican Movement developed hostility towards the concept of European integration, based on anti-capitalism. Europe is the symbolic place of capitalists, potentially affecting the national economy. However, due to the pressure of national and international factors as the majority formed by legislative elections or the expectations of European Union in the case of a traditional member as France, the anti-European themes were moderated by political leaders as Lionel Jospin, representing the Communist Party, accepting the Treaty of Amsterdam during his mandate as Prime Minister. In the case of old parties opposing European integration, their Euroscepticism is associated with the potential "dilution of French nation into a cosmopolitan whole" (Grunber in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 43), focusing on law and order or immigration themes.

In the case of new eurosceptic parties, the second category of political organizations supporting Euroscepticism in France, the rejection attitude was favoured by the very issue of European integration, in opposition "to the federal dynamic that to their minds characterized the direction taken in the building of the Europe Union" (Grunber in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 43). Structurally, the new eurosceptic parties, calling themselves "sovereignist" (Grunber in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 43), are formed by members of the three major political organizations as the Socialists, the Gaullists (RPR) and the center-liberal (UDF), starting with the 1992 Referendum moment, when 49 per cent of French responded No to the adoption of Maastricht Treaty. In 1992, the Mouvement des Cityoens (Citizens's Movement – MDC) was formed by a group of former members of the Socialist Party, supporting the idea that France should defend its sovereignty, against the European integration, favoring regional interests, instead of national ones. The Majority For A Different Europe, formed by anti-Maastricht members of UDF, claimed that France should not accept the single currency into its economic system. In addition to political organizations formed by ex-members of political parties, France includes a particular example of Eurosceptic organization, Chasse Pêche Nature Traditions (Hunting Fishing Traditions – CPNT), created to defend French identity, as well as its rural way of life (Grunber in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

Based on Taggart and Szczerbiak's (2004) distinction between soft and hard Euroscepticism, French extreme-left and extreme-right parties can be considered absolutely hostile to European Union's concepts as Maastricht or Amsterdam Treaties, as well as the adoption of euro. On the other hand, the Communist party and the CPNT adopted a more tolerant position, being representative of soft Euroscepticism. The positions of hard or soft Euroscepticism are mostly interchangeable, according to the rise to power. For instance, the Communist Party criticized the Maastricht Treaty, but when they returned to power from 1997 to 2002, their attitude was similar to a soft form of Euroscepticism (Grunber in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

Additional to the analysis of politicians' perception on European Union's importance for France development, citizens' attitude was pointed by Eurobarometer 58 (2002), highlighting that 52 per cent of French people consider that their country's membership is a positive issue, while an impressive proportion of 32 per cent of respondents are neutral to this fact. As the French election survey in 2002 showed, 78 per cent of the hard eurosceptic voters supported eurosceptic candidates, suggesting a strong correlation between the degree of Euroscepticism in France and the votes directed to eurosceptic parties (Grunber in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

3.2.2. Germany's case of Euroscepticism is paradoxically, since "German political elites' commitment to European integration proved much more robust" (Leconte, 2010, p. 1) than any Eurosceptic theory as Henry Kissinger's prediction on the disappearance of European Union due to Germany's attitude, completed by Soviet political pressure. Germany highlighted that twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the social, economic or political context of European integration is a constantly changing reality. For instance, the ruling of the German Constitutional Court in June 2009, stating that the Lisbon Treaty was compatible with German Basic Law, suggested that Germany was prepared for an essential swift related to European integration, influencing the scenario of a similar perception among other member states. One of European Union's pillars, Germany expressed its potential distrust in European integration, reminding of British Euroscepticism towards European Union as a super-state. The German Constitutional Court explicitly considered "the possibility of Germany's withdrawal from the EU, if the EU were to develop into a federal state without reaching a corresponding level of democratic legitimacy" (Leconte, 2010, p. 1). Germany's example can be analyzed as an essential change towards the concept of the European Union, occurring in many other state members starting with the 1990s, reaching a climax in the 2000s.

The transformation of Germany from "Musterknabe (model boy) of the European Union" (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 16) into a vehement voice of Euroscepticism was marked by a tremendous national change, based on unification, completed by the country's recent level of unemployment. In order to offer a reliable solution to the requests of several groups of citizens, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) approached Eurosceptic groups in European Parliament, while the communist successor Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS or Left Party) preserved its critical attitude regarding integration process. Paradoxically, the Green Party existing in Germany, comparing with similar ecological political organizations, became pro-European, supporting the idea of European integration. In the case of right wing political organizations, the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) developed an ambiguous perspective on European integration and the necessity to implement community reforms in European Union, while the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) remained mainly pro-European. Regarded on a regional level, parties as Christina Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria display a resistance to the concept of European integration. The case of the regional party in Bavaria is remarkable, since Christina Social Union (CSU) developed cross-party alliances, to defend regional identity, including People's Party in Austria (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

Analyzing the results of September 2002 Bundestag elections, the critical perspective against European integration managed to draw the attention of 4 per cent of voting frequency, out of 7 per cent. PDS (Left Party) convinced the majority of Germans that European Union isn't correctly developing, yet despite its critical direction, the Germany party "does not mobilize around the kind of Hard Eurosceptic agenda found elsewhere in Europe" (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 17), more precisely PDS (Left Party) doesn't sustain a total rejection of the integration concept, but a reconsideration in terms of Germany's current interests. According to the results of a poll mentioned by Lees, the Eurosceptic agenda in Germany is a social, economic and political attitude developed by the "greater public awareness of the costs of German unification and a growing uneasiness at Germany's role as paymaster of the EU" (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 18). In the mid-1990s, public opinion in Germany was positive about the necessity of European integration, being one of the most stable as average in European Union, while at the debut of the 2000s, its level decreased to 5 to 10 per cent, suggesting an increasing distrust in the evolution of European Union (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

Generally, Germans are supportive of the following ideas: membership of their country is a good thing, Germany's implication in Foreign Policy, as well as Common Defence and Security Policy represents directions that have to be continued. On the other hand, only a minority of German public supports the idea that Germans should trust in the Commissiona, as well as the necessity for Germany to provide resources and knowledge in the case of European enlargement (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

Structurally analyzed, the political system in Germany provides arguments and contra-arguments regarding the Germany's role in European Union. As follows, the main political parties will be analyzed, highlighting their perspective related to the European Union theme.

The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS/Left Party) is considered the successor of the former Socialist Unity Party of East Germany, negatively labeled as fascist or representative of Eastern Germany. It entered Bundestag in 1994 as a protesting party, stirring the attention of the majority of voters in Berlin. The Left Party distinguishes itself as the continuer of German Democratic Republic, based on the need to reform Germany society, in order to avoid "westernalizaton and material and cultural dominance of capital" (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 21), as represented by Western Germany. The Left Party constantly criticized the principle of European Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the European Defence and Security Policy. The most popular attitude developed by this party in terms of Euroscepticism was its critical position in the case of Germany's military participation in Kosovo crisis, as well as European Union's support for US actions in Afghanistan (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

In terms of European Union's enlargement, the Left Party's position was mostly critical, with the exception of Eastern enlargement that was regarded as beneficial. In addition, European Union's implication in international projects were reckoned as being undemocratic and inefficient i n terms of costs. Analyzing the inner structure of the European Union, the Left Party considers the European Commission and similar EU institutions as essentially undemocratic, lacking transparency. In the case of the European Parliament, the party affirms that it should be supported by a structural reform, providing more influence in the decision-making process. Practically, the new role of the European Parliament would be supported by improved co-decision ability, as well as the right of policy initiation, additionally to the European Commission. Contradictorily to other European parties criticising the idea of European citizenship, the Left Party considers it important, in terms of national citizenship's primary function (Germans are firstly Germans and secondly European citizens), considering that the concept of European citizenship should be included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

As representative of a former Socialist party, the Left party sustains the idea of strong regional cooperation, including the countries of the former Soviet Union, in order to counterbalance the effects of globalization, the direction that should be followed by European Union should be the creation of a "Europe of democracy and solidarity" (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 22), in terms of socialism. Instead of the military intervention of European Union in certain missions to support peace, the Left Party focuses on civil implication, as the United Nations' model, also adopting the model of USA in the case of disarmament. Other key topics developed by the Left Party are the necessity to implement a reliable environmental reform in European Union, as well as to create an International Court of Justice (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

The German Greens can be considered the most successful ecological movement, starting with the 1990s, reaching 5 per cent of German electorate. The Greens can be considered the "lost children" (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 23) of the Social Democratic Party, since their program is essential similar to the left, libertarian values of the Social Democrats, marking a public supportive attitude to pro-European themes. The Greens joined Social Democrats' fight in the 2005 Budestag elections, against Gerhard Schröeder's critical attitude of European issues. The Greens consider Germany's membership as a beneficial feature of politic, economical or social life, rendering possible the intervention of their country in the support of international peace and cooperation, environmental protection, as well as the implementation of social justice. Despite their constant effort to sustain pro-European themes, the Greens found it unacceptable for European Union to lack democratic transparency in the case of some European institutions, as well as its failure to allow Turkey join the statues of candidate to European Union (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

Similarly to the Left Party, the Greens consider that the European Parliament's role should be reinforced, in order to provide solidarity across European Union, being the most adequate vehicle to implement democratic measures in every state member. In order to perform its enhanced role, the European Parliament should be able to elect the Commission President, a measure that was totally supported by the Greens. In addition to the reforming of the European Parliament, the Greens advanced the idea of a new European Union Constitution, voted through a European referendum in every state member. Similarly to the Left Party, the Greens criticized the European Union's military implication in conflicts as Kosovo or Afghanistan, pleading for a civil implication. In addition, it argued that the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force program will transform European Union into a military superpower, requested to interfere worldwide, when the historic mission of the European Union is to protect its own citizens (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008). In the case of Eastern enlargement of the European Union, the Greens adopted with a more reserved attitude, comparing with the Left Party, as an historic opportunity to unite Europe. The Greens considered that Turkey should be treated in a similar way as the Eastern new state members.

The Social Democratic Party (SDP) claims to be an historic party in Germany, rooting in the Revolution of 1848. Remobilizeed after Hitler's defeat, absorbed by German Communist Party, reborn after the division of Germany, the Social Democratic Party is one of the oldest and most important parties in Germany. In the early 1980-1990s, the Social Democratic Party presented a rather hostile attitude to the European integration idea, based on the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty ratification, as well as the potential interference of European Union in the case of a unified Germany. Under Helmut Schmidt as chancellor, the Social Democratic Party tended to develop pro-European themes, marking "Germany's rise to become the undisputed core country within the European communities" (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 25). Despite its constant acceptance of European Union's existence, the party developed a rather eurosceptic position in 1996, based on a poll related to the stability of European currency, stating that 80 per cent of Germans doubted about this idea. The Social Democratic Party asked for a delay up to five years, in order to prepare the Germans for the financial change (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

Similarly to the Left Party and the Greens, the Social Democratic Party sustains the idea of national interest, primarily to the European one through the following affirmation: "we belong to Europe and Europe belongs to us … Germany remains our homeland" (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 26). The objective displayed is materialized, since Germany returns the most members of European Parliament, granting itself a comfortable stability in the process of decision-making.

Germany's presence in European Union is considered as beneficial, in terms of mutual security and cooperation, marked by a national interests' discourse, in order to highlight Germany's objectives. Comparing with the Left Party or the Greens, the Social Democratic Party doesn't criticize the evolution of European institution, instead asks for efficiency. The party supports the idea of a European Constitution, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as the enhancement of powers associated with the European Parliament that can able to elect the Commission President (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

Unlike the Left Party or the Greens, the Social Democrats sustained the positive impact of the Eurozone, able to enhance the financial stability of the European Union, both in domestic level, as well as in business level. In addition, to the opposite direction adopted by the Greens, the Social Democrats considered that NATO should be the central key of Germany's foreign policy. In order to reinforce its security, the European Union could create a common European border to defend any illegal interference in European space, including crime or illegal immigration (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

The Eastern enlargement was perceived by the Social Democrats as a positive measure, able to facilitate European Union's entrance on bigger markets, as well as creating the opportunity of affordable workforce. Unlike the Greens, the Social Democrats requested the implementation of transition strategies, as a period of seven years constraint for the free movement of labour and services from European Union to the new members or viceversa, a measure that was intensively criticized in terms of human rights' respect (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

The Free Democratic Party represents the liberal party of the Federal Republic of Germany, developing a conflicting attitude related to European Union themes For instance, despite the ratification of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Free Democratic Party raised questions on the potential impact on Germany's national interests (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

Comparing with the parties analyzed so far, the Free Democratic Party is tributary to its regional dimension, creating tensions between the social and the national perspectives of German liberalism. The south-western dimensions represented by Hansa and Lower Saxony developed a national interest strategy, while the areas of North-Rhine Westphalia has reduced focus on the national politics (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

Germany's membership is perceived in a positive tone, yet the functioning of European institutions is intensively criticized. The Free Democrats consider that a new constitution should associate competences with different level of governance, for an improved political, social and economical experience inside the European Union. The new constitution should be designed on the basis of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and voted through referendum. Similarly to the other parties analyzed, the Free Democrats pleaded for more power granted to the European Parliament, but directed to the area of Justice and Home Affairds. Eurozone's impact is considered minimal by the Free Democrat Party, exclusively interested by the structural reforms of European Union, such as the correct functioning of its institutions. The military intervention of European Union is regarded as complementary to NATO, bringing closer the Free Democratic Party to the Social Democrat Party, yet the Free Democrats mainly focus on standardization of military equipment, improved research and development of military products (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

In the case of the eastern enlargement, the Free Democrats positively appreciated the measure and insisted on the efficient implementation of Common Agricultural Policy, as well as the access to Structural funds, able to help new members align to the existing European standards. They also criticized the imposed restrictions on labour or services movement between old and new member states (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

The Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union are representatives of the national interest, operating as an unitary parliamentary group, being formed in the circumstance of the occupied Germany. The two parties are considered historic promoters of European integration, as consequence supporting pro-European themes, stressing that Germany should perform a more influent role in the European Union (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

The role of European Union is mostly positive, since it managed to create a united Europe in the twentieth century. The ambitious project of unity and diversity should be supported by an adequately financed strategy, according to the two parties. For instance, new states should be gradually allowed to access structural funds, in order to reduce the burden on German citizens, paying taxes to provide sufficient financial resources to the European Union's mechanism (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

In terms of correct functioning of European institutions, Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union consider that the European Council should share its budgetary abilities with the European Parliament. In addition, for a reliable representation of national interests, each member state's share of seats in the European Parliament should be performed in order to reflect the status of its population, a measure able to mostly increase Germany's influence in the European Parliament, but as well able to provide the necessary representation to new members. In order to help the integration of new members, the two parties proposed a recalculation of budget contributions associated with the recent state members, based on each state's GDP. Similarly to the parties analyzed so far, Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union supported the idea of a European constitution, yet based on clear, transparent and limited prerogatives, in order to stimulate solidarity and correct treatment between European Union and its state members. The Eastern enlargement of the European Union was treated in terms of national interest, focusing on the ethnic Germans in the new member states, including the expelled Germans from former German territories in the Second World War (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

Germany's right-wing parties as the Rule of Law State Offensive Party (PRO or Schill Party) are less visible presences on German political scene, focusing on the image of a populist leader. Ronald Schill, organizing the Rule of Law State Offensive Party, draw attention in the 1990s as a champion of zero tolerance to crime. Currently, the party mainly supports European integration, but subsumed to its national objectives. The Eurosceptic attitude of the Schill Party is expressed by the unfair treatment of European Union in the case of asylum seekers and refugees, mostly arriving in Germany, after Kosovo events. Another right-wing party is the Republican Party, formed by former members of Christian Social Union, focusing on imposing a limit to Germany's contribution to European Union's budget, the necessity to reduce European bureaucracy, as well as the potential Germany's withdrawal from the Eurozone, in order to reinstall the mark. The Republican Party opposed to the eastern enlargement, as well as to Turkey's intentions to become an European Union's member. Smaller right-wing parties as DVU (German People's Union) argued that European Union intended to dissolve Germany, demanded an urgent withdrawal from the Eurozone, as well as the reduction of Germany's contribution to European Union's budget. In addition, National Democratic Party (NPD), a party similar to DVU, criticized the eastern enlargement, the freedom of movement associated with new members, as well as the overwhelming contribution of Germany to the European Union's budget (Lees in Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008).

Analyzing the examples of Euroscepticism attitudes in France and Germany, one of the symbolical pillars of the EU, I consider that Euroscepticism, despite its critical approach, is an essential democratic tool, aimed to assure the correct functioning of the EU. For instance, political parties as Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union in the Germany raised questions related to the European institutions` ability to efficiently manage the budgets assigned, which is a natural gesture in a democracy, deeply required in the case of an expanded democracy as the European concept, as consequence I would consider their intentions as Euro-regulating acts, not precisely Eurosceptic acts. In the case of France, I noticed that hard Euroscepticism is a valuable attitude, while the political party is in opposition or attempts to become more visible, while it`s elected, its attitude becomes softer. French examples is a model of compromise, the members of the party might feel extremely critical to the existence of European Union, but once they have to collaborate with European institutions, for the interests of French, their position is substantially changed. Based on this assumption, I will expand my analysis, focusing on the results of the EP elections in the 201`4, on the level of soft versus hard Eurosceptic attitudes, as well as the change of political attitude after being elected in the EP.

4. Euroscepticism and the European elections in 2014

The competition for a major presence in the European Parliament is mostly essential, since the European institution represents a central pillar of European Union's structure, as described by Bache, Bulmer, George and Parker (2011). The European Parliament is associated with the legislative, budgetary and supervisory functions of the correct function of the European Union. As a legislative authority, the European Parliament is a co-legislator with the Council of Ministers, establishing the frames of EU legislation in the case of ordinary legislative procedure, applied according to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Similarly to the legislative prerogative, the European Parliament shares its budgetary authority with the Council of Ministers. In the case of the supervisory function, the function is fulfilled in cooperation with the Commission and the Council. As stated in the Maastricht Treaty, the European Parliament can approve the appointment of the President and members of the Commission, while the Treaty of Amsterdam strengthened the European Parliament's prerogative in the case of the President, being required its particular approval. The Treaty of Lisbon specified that the candidate for the presidency has to be chosen based on the results of the European Parliament elections. Additionally, the European Parliament can dismiss the Commission based on a vote of censure, but it can't target individual Commissioners. For the adoption of a motion of censure, an absolute majority of MEPs is required and two-thirds of the votes cast (Bache et al., 2011, p. 271).

The European Parliament has also the right to ask the Commission written or oral questions related to the issues it considers essential for the development of European Union. As noticed, the powers of the European Parliament are limited in order to create a balanced participation between the European Parliament, European Council and the Council of Ministers, for instance, according to the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament can ask for a report of each European Council meeting, so that the legislative authority can take into consideration the strategies discussed. A consultative role is also fulfilled in the case of the Common Foreign and Security Policy or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European agencies preserving a close collaboration with the European Parliament (Bache et al., 2011, p. 272-273).

The European elections are implemented on "national stage" (Topaloff, 2012, p. 58), by national political parties, frequently including national issues, that will be transferred on the European Union's agenda, once a certain state member delivers a satisfactory number of MEPs. Although, through the participation to the European Parliament, a state member can advocate for its national clauses, in practice the presence of national MEPs in the European Parliament has an unclear impact on the European citizen's lives, a situation is explained by Topaloff (2012) as persistence of "the same old domestic parties competing in these elections, which a priori presupposes the focus on domestic issues, just on a different battlefield" (Topaloff, 2012, 58). The topics of the European Parliament tend to focus on national issues, only related to global European ones, as consequence it's required an intensive approach on the European Union's perspective.

Starting with the European referendum in 1992, the European elections were associated with the national position related to European integration, as consequence their results highlight the each state member's perspective in the case of EU's expansion. Generally, the European elections proved a constant disapproval of European Union's admission of new members, "galvanizing enough support for their Eurosceptic agenda to become significant actors before the 1993 parliamentary elections and the 1994 European Parliament elections, and thus transform themselves into key partners in the context of ongoing fragmentation of the political system with regard to governing coalitions" (Topaloff, 2012, 201). A suggestive example is the ascension of the Front National party that in 1997 obtained an impressive success in France, receiving a record number of MEPs in the European Parliament, 5 representatives, for the 1999-2004 mandate (Topaloff, 2012, p. 98).

The social context of the 2014 spring, when the EP elections were held, suggest an essential concern of European for unemployment or generally, the country`s economic situation. According to the results pointed out by the Eurobarometer 81, the most urgent issues affecting their social life are the unemployment, which concerns more than 21% of Europeans (+1, comparing with the previous surveys), followed by the rise of taxation (17%, which is unchanged, comparing with previous data), household’s financial situation (16%, unchanged value), health and social security (unchanged value), country’s economic situation estimated at 15% (-2%) and pensions, concerning 15% of Europeans (+2%). The main concerns as suggested by surveys was used as political themes by the political groups competing in the EP elections in the 2014, attempting to obtain the votes of European citizens. Additionally, political groups also included in their agenda themes as environment, climate and energy issues, which are estimated at 7% in terms of concerns (+1%, comparing with previous researches) and immigration, reaching the attention of 4% of Europeans (+1%) (Eurobarometer 81, 19).

The results of the Eurobarometer 81 reveals essential details about the Europeans` approach to European Union, in terms of economic relationship. The national economic situation is seen in spring 2014 as "good" by 34% of the Europeans, marking an increase of +3%, comparing with the previous research in autumn 2013. This detail is remarkable, as European space was affected by the financial crisis in the 2008 and still, the answers of the Europeans suggest the highest proportion of positive opinions on this indicator since the survey developed in 2007. As a consequence, the hypothesis of the financial crisis increasing the Eurosceptic attitude in the European space is denied through this evidence, since Europeans seem not to connect the impact of the crisis with the general evolution of the national economy, implicitly their negative approach to EU can be justified through other reasons. Despite the positive results obtained in the case of national economy performance, asked about the economic situation in the EU, the respondents developed a critical attitude: 31% of Europeans think that the economic situation in the EU is "good", but their proportion is reduced to the number of respondents satisfied by the national economy. The predominantly dissatisfaction related to the inefficient economical evolution of EU can be a justification for the Euroscepticism, as respondents tend to perceive their own countries as efficient, while the European instituations can`t deliver the same results (Eurobarometer, 2014, 30).

(Perception of national and European evolution of economy, Eurobarometer, 2014, 30)

EP elections are a political event, as consequence I analyzed the Europeans` results regarding their interest in politics, as suggested by the Eurobarometer 81. Comparing with the previous research, the index mentioned remained stable, as follows: six out of ten Europeans are interested in politics: strongly (16%, unchanged) or moderately (44%, =). Europeans remain slightly more interested in politics at national (76%, +1) and local (74%, +1) levels than at the European level (62%, =), this attitude affecting the presence of voters in the EP elections (Eurobarometer, 2014, 62). Ast they perceive European agenda too distant from their current events, it`s likely not to support the voting procedure, creating reduced turnout levels.

(Europeans` interest in politics, Eurobarometer, 2014, 62)

Focusing on the national level, respondents in Greece tend to discuss more politics at a local level (45%, +14%, comparing with the previous reserch), national level (43%, +3%), or European (29%, +3%) level. At the other end of the scale, Romanians tend to discuss less politics (10%, +1%), Portugals (11%, +1%), Hungary (11%, -3%) and the Czech Republic (11%, -3%) (Eurobarometer, 2014, 62). The interest for discussing politics can be justification for the Euroscepticism attitude, as respondents aren`t focusing on European themes, as consequence they can`t be informed and effectively express their political attitude. In this case, Eurosceptic attitude can form through the lack of information and critical debate.

Asked whether they consider their interests are reflected by the European institutions, the respondents to the Eurobarometer 81 predominantly manifested a positive attitude. In 11 Member States, most people say that their voice counts in the EU, as in the case of Sweden (78%), Denmark (75%), Netherlands (63%), Croatia (59%), Finland (58%), Germany (57%), Belgium (55%), Malta (55%), France (54%), Luxembourg (51%) and Austria (50%). The results are similar to the data revealed by the previous research in 2013, when the majority of European citizens in particularly, the same member states as Denmark (65%), Sweden (58%), the Netherlands (56%), Belgium (54%), Malta (51%) and Luxembourg (50%) suggested the same attitude. At this level, I observe that the positive attitude regarding the reflection of national interests in the common European strategies is supported by citizens from traditional member states as France or Belgium. On the other, the opposite attitude manifests at both traditional or new member states. For instance, 35% of the Romanians consider that their voices aren`t analyzed in the European decision-making process, while 33% of the British citizens affirm that their national interests aren`t considered by the European Institutions (Eurobarometer, 2014, 10). This index can justified the Eurosceptic attitude that a voter can develop, if he/she considers that his/her voices doesn`t count into EU`s mechanism, is likely to manifest an Eurosceptic attiude, as a sign of revolt.

(Reflection of national interests represented by the EU, Eurobarometer, 2014, 10)

Recently, the ascension of Eurosceptic parties is more impressive, as seen in the case of Greece or Italy. For instance, in 2012, in Greece parties such as Syriza or Golden Dawn, claiming that the country should preserve a traditional manner, rather than the European one, obtained essential results in the national elections. In 2013, in Italy, the 5 Star Movement threatened to end the second republic status, dividing the country into public effervescence. In Spain, the socialists accused for not implemented correct austerity measures, lost their public support, directed towards the Popular Party, managing to obtain major scores in 2011 (Tocci, 2014, p. 18).

May 2014 marked the elections to the eight European Parliament, globally highlighting the emergence of a center-right current, as most MEPS belong to political groups representing this political direction. In terms of political perspective of the European Parliament, the 2014 elections represented a particular situation: as center-right political groups became more visible, the number of Eurosceptic MEPs also recorded an impressive number, including both the populist left and the right political representative. In terms of representativeness, the 2014 elections were the largest in the EU`s history, yet the turnout was disappointing. Approximately 42.54% of the eligible European citizens to vote in the European space effectively vote their representatives in the European Parliament, being the lowest rate of turnout among EP elections. The particular situations related to the 2014 elections continued with suggestive discrepancies at the national level. For instance, member states as Belgium (90%), Luxembourg (86%) and Malta (75%) recorded a constant turnout, while a member state as Italy marked an impressive decrease of turnout, from 65% registered in 2009 to 57% in 2014, a similar situation being noticed in the case of Ireland too, whose turnout decreased from 59% in 2009 to 52% in the current EP elections (McGowan, Phinnemore, 2015, 232).

The complete image of the turnout evolution, based on the comparative results obtained during the 2009 and the 2014 elections for the EP are displayed in the table below:

(Comparative results of the 2009 and 2014 elections, based on turnout, retrieved from http://europedecides.eu/results/)

Perceived in the case of pro-integrationist member state, the turnout fell below 50%, raising questions about their possibility to support their optimistic attitude related to the EU`s expansion, in the absence of parliamentary alliances, to gain majority in the EP. Among the traditional 20 member states, manifesting a predominant optimist attitude related to the evolution of the EU in the context of new member states, the major results were registered in France, whose turnout increased from 41% registered in 2009 to 42% as noticed in 2014, while in the case of Germany, the positive attitude related to the effectiveness of European expansion increased from 43% registered in 2009 to 48% in 2014. Although Germany presented an essential increased of turnout, its performance was counterbalance by the results obtained in the newest member states of Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, turnout dramatically fell in Latvia, from 54% registered in 2009 to 30% noticed in 2014, as well as Czech Republic, registering 28% in 2009 and during the next EP elections the turnout being estimated at 18%. Slovakia, an EU member state since 2004, presented the lowest turnout, estimated at 13%, while Croatia becoming member state in 2013 presented a turnout of 25% (McGowan, Phinnemore, 2015, 232). The data presented suggest essential social changes in every member state that I think should be analyzed individually, to understand the causes of the turnout decrease, in order to suggest general perspective on the EP evolution. For instance, the statistical analysis existing as the voter turnout of Romanian citizens in the case of EP`s elections, as presented below, should be accompanied by further sociologic research, focusing on the reasons why Romanians gradually express more votes for EP, starting with 2007:

(Romanian comparative turnout between 2007-2014, http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=189)

At the moment of integration in the European Union, the turnout of Romanians interested to express their votes in the case of EP was estimated at 29.47%, while in 2009, the moment of EP elections decreased on 27.67%. In order to explain this phenomenon, a potential explanation could be the impact of the financial crisis, determining Romanians to distrust the efficiency of European institutions including the EP, but this hypothesis has to be tested through a survey on a national, representative base. Additionally, during the 2014 elections for the EP, the Romanian turnout was estimated at 32.20%, marking an essential increase, the level being even higher than the performance obtained in 2007, as consequence a research focusing on the change of attitude of Romanians should be performed, in order to efficiently understand the social phenomenon reflected into Romanians` approach to EP elections.

The European elections in 2014 witnessed the increasing impact of Euroscepticism on the development of the European Union. Globally, the European elections in 2014 marked a clear rise of Eurosceptic and far-right parties in the European Parliament, with 86 elected MPEs, which represented 11.45% of the legislature seats. As a consequence, Euroscepticism became a clear voice in the European Parliament, able to support its critical position regarding the evolution of the European Union. Structurally, the Euroscepticism political attitude was significant in France and the United Kingdom, through the performance of National Front securing 25% of the vote in France and UKIP securing 27.5% of the voted in the United Kingdom. Additionally, European states as Sweden, Poland, Germany and Czech Republic, expressed their Eurosceptic position by acquiring seats in the European Parliament, as follows: 4MEPS representing Poland, 2MEPs in the case of Sweden, while Germany and Czech Republic's Eurosceptic attitude was expressed through the presence of one MEP in the European Parliament (Report European Elections 2014. A First Look Pro-European Perspective, 2014, p.3).

As the Eurosceptic position is supported by an increasing number of voters, the pro-European parties continue to decrease in terms of popularity and public trust. Although, pro-European parties hold the majority in the European Parliament with 67.5%, representing 507 MEPs, their electoral support fell by 11.8%. Unexpectedly, European countries as Croatia, Hungary and Austria proved a notable rise in supporting pro-European direction, creating the image of a reversal of pro-European themes. The major public support of pro-European parties is represented by Croatian, representing of 14,34% increase of public support, followed by Hungary (+11,97%) and Austria (+9,35%). Even in the case of the United Kingdom, an European state marked by an acute Eurosceptic social and political movement, the eurosceptic party UKIP managed to obtain 27,5% of the vote, while pro-European parties succeeded in increasing their vote share by 3,08%. Globally, pro-European parties maintain their predominant position in the European Parliament, although they failed to win more than 50% of the seats represented by two member states as the United Kingdom and Poland (Report European Elections 2014. A First Look Pro-European Perspective, 2014, p.3).

In addition to the predominance of the Eurosceptic attitude of voters, the 2014 European Parliament elections recorded a consecutive marginal increase in voter turnout, suggesting that European citizens tend to become more interested in the evolution of the European Parliament, as the European institution affecting the national development through the decisions adopted. Comparing with the European Parliament elections in 2009, the elections held in 2014 highlighted a marginal increase of 0,2 % of average turnout, from 43% previously registered to 43,2%. Among European countries participating to European Parliament elections, Malta recorded the highest turnout performance (75%), followed by Lithuania (23,7%), Greece (7,29%), Germany (4,8%), France (2,87%) and Sweden (3,37%). By contrary, Slovakia (-13.1%) and Czech Republic (-18,2%) registered the lowest turnout rates, highlight a public apathy concerning the idea of European Parliament (Report European Elections 2014. A First Look Pro-European Perspective, 2014, p.3).

Concisely, the results of the 2014 elections for the European Parliament are presented in the following table (Results of the 2014 European elections, retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/election-results-2014.html):

Configuration of European elections in 2014 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/election-results-2014.html)

The total of the seats in EU Parliament was established at 751. The most popular political group elected was the EPP (Group of the European People`s Party), accumulating 221 seats, with a turnout of 29.43%. The political group includes the Group of the European People`s party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats, created after the 2009 European Parliament elections, when the British Conservative Party and other European Democrat parties left the former European political group to form a particular political association, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group. Despite the separation, EEP remains the largest group within EU, as suggested in 2014. Additionally, the moment of the European elections in 2014 suggested that EPP remains the predominant political force in the European Parliament, as comparing with 2009, when 265 MEPs were elected from the members of the political group, in the following election, their number was 221, the highest performance obtained by a political group in the elections. Manfred Weber, the representative of the Germany`s Conservative Christian Social Union, was selected as the new Chairman of the political group in May 2014, marking an essential change in the perspective of EPP as centre-right group, supporting the European integration. Under the leadership of Manfred Weber, the political group advanced the goal of a more competitive Europe, reinforcing the democratic principles guiding the European Union`s concept (McGowan, Phinnemore, 2015, 285). In practice, the EPP supported the ideas expressed through the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the choice of the European Commission's President as a reflection of the result of the European Elections, considering that through these measures the European citizens would be given a chance to indentify themselves with a political family able to support their interests (European Elections 2014: lete the voters have a real choice, retrieved from http://www.eppgroup.eu/press-release/European-Elections-2014%3A-let-the-voters-have-a-real-choice).

The second popular political group is S &D, representing Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, obtaining 191 seats in the European Parliament. The large political group was initially named the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, chaging into S &D, in 2009. Historically, it preserved its second place in terms of popularity, even if the accession of Bulgaria and Romania supplied its MEPs with 18 new elected members in the European Parliament, comparing with the original number of 200 elected MEPs. Uniting different socialist groups, S & D is commonly tributary to a complex, sometimes contradictory political action, as each major group including the German Social Democratic, the French Socialist Party, the Spanish Socialist Party and the British Labour Party, attempt to impose their national interests. As the leader of group, Gianni Pitella, is Italian, the national delegation of Italy being the largest one, S & D tends to firstly focus on Italy`s interests, which might lead to internal tension between the national groups (McGowan, Phinnemore, 2015, 287). The political perspective of S & D focuses on the closer integration of European concept, mostly in the case of environmental and social issues. Based on the statements of the Treaty of Lisbon, the political group militates for social justice or decent wages, adequate healthcare on a minimal average. An essential topic promoted in the public sphere of EU was the democratic access to sexual and reproductive rights, as in some Member States issues as abortion among young women represent a social problem. Additionally, the political group supports the idea of the Free Trade Agreement (TTIP,) protecting European citizens´ human and social rights, as well as environmental standards and legitimating the concept of corporate social responsibility. The most popular member of the S & D group, Martin Schulz, promoted the idea of additional social protection in the case of children´s rights, as the economic crisis in the European space favored a dramatic rise in the number of children that have fallen into poverty or have been abandoned by their parents, approximately a million children being included in this situation (Election Manifestos of EU political groups, retrieved from http://www.epha.org/5984).

Thirdly, ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists), obtained 70 seats, being the promoters of a political program focusing on the support of personal liberty, parliamentary democracy, or national sovereignty. Historically, the ECR group is formed in 2009, primarily based on the British Conservative, David Cameron being the most visible political leader. Its political rhetoric related to Eurofederalism, as the way that European Union impose its strategies to member states, reducing their national sovereignty, was positively perceived by an important number of European citizens, voting for 71 MEPS, representing 15 member states. Structurally, ECR includes 19 members of the British Conservative Party, 17 members of the Polish Law and Justice Party, 7 members of the Alternative für Deutchland Party, 4 members for the Belgian New Flemish Alliance and other members representing Croatia, Greece or Lithuania. Generally, ECR highlights the need to create a non-federalist center-right group in the European Parliament, in order to reinforce the European democracy (McGowan, Phinnemore, 2015, 205). In practice, ECR consider that European families should benefit of improved social protection, in the case of business environment companies should be granted low taxes, as well as the free trade should be stimulated (European political parties, retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections-2014/website/politicalparties/index_en.xml).

The fourth political group elected during the 2014 elections for the European Parliament was ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe), represented by 67 MEPs. In terms of energetical, environmental or agricultural strategies, ALDE supports moderated policies on environmental sustainability, energy production, as well as on European agricultural policy, criticizing the overexaggerated reaction of political parties focusing on the environmentalism. In the case of culture or education, the political group considers that they represent methods of self-development, being constantly present in their political programs. Economically, ALDE promotes free trade and a fully functioning European Single Market for the benefit of consumers and small and medium sized enterprises, while in the case of the European integration, the political group supports open enlargement and liberalisation of its particular processes (Values of ALDE, retrieved from http://www.aldeparty.eu/en/content/what-we-stand).

GUE/NGL (European United Left/Nording Green Left) obtained 52 seats in the European Parliament. The political group promotes the diversity of identities and opinions in Europe, in order to create a sustainable European integration. Their interests are multiple, including political economical, social or cultural proper integration of the new members or candidates (http://www.guengl.eu/group/about).

The Green/EFA (The Greens/European Free Alliance) are represented by 50 MEPs, focusing on the respectf of fundamental human rights and environmental justice, an umbrella-concept including good health, education, cultural tolerance or the right to a high quality of life. In the case of European concept, the political group proposes an improved solidarity between member state, as every European citizen, despite living in a traditional member state or newly adhered should benefit of the same rights (http://www.greens-efa.eu/staff/press-webcommunications-and-multimedia/about-us/48-who-we-are.html)

EFDD (Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group) obtained 48 seats in the European Parliament. Its political program relies on multiple interests, similarly to the GUE/NGL, but mostly focused on social and environmental issues such as the moral implication of cloning or the need to reinforced European democracy, so every European citizen could be treated equally, including immigrants or members of cultural or religious communities (http://www.efdgroup.eu/about-us/our-charter).

Finally, NI (Non-attached Members) obtained 52 seats in the European Parliament. Their concepts are miscellaneous, as the majority of them were members of the mentioned political group, but for certain reasons, decided to support the interests of the citizens they represent on an independent base.

Analyzing the results presented, I consider that the results of the 2014 elections for the European Parliament present a balanced perspective between historical political groups as S & D or the recent political groups as the Greens, suggesting that European citizens critically based their vote on the manifesto proposed, not precisely on the tradition of the political group. Additionally, the configuration of the parliamentary elections presented the hegemony of two major political groups as the EPP and the S&D, while the rest of political groups obtained quasi-similar results, as in the case of GUE/NFL (52 seats) and the Greens/EFA (50 seats), the difference being the vector required for the political groups to adopt additional projects, in order to promote more representatives in the European Parliament.

Comparing the results obtained in 2014 with the political configuration of EP in 2009, a suggestive image of fluidity and instability can be noticed, raising questions about political identity and the necessity to establish additional rules to the formation of political groups in the EP. For instance, the last two mandates marked essential changes of MEPs for both major political groups and reduced political groups in the EP. The largest EPP (Group of the European People`s Party) was represented in 2009 by 274 MEPs, while in 2014 their number decreased to 221, marking the highest reduction, as 50 former members consider they can fulfill their political mission through other political groups. On the other hand, the second (McGowan, Phinnemore, 2015, 387). The comparative analysis of the EP elections issued in 2009 and 2014, in terms of political fluidity are reflected in the following table:

(Comparative results of political affiliation in EP between 2009-2014, McGowan, Phinnemore, 2015, 387)

Personally, I consider that if an elected MEP firstly represented the ECR, the political group focusing on conservative strategies, he/she is unlikely to completely support the demarches of ALDE, based on liberal measures, due to the obvious political shift of perception. On the other hand, freedom of association is guaranteed in the European space, as consequence MEPs can`t be forced to remain the associates of a particular political group during a mandate, yet I reckon that repetitive changes of affiliation should be limited, in order to create more stability. Noticing that the elected representative changed several groups during a mandate, is likely to determine voters consider that their representative isn`t supporting their interests in the EP, additionally that the EP isn`t an European institution able to function on a clear base, as consequence the decision-making mechanism will be affected through this perception.

The results of the European Parliament elections in 2014 expressed the following configuration. The largest political groups in the European Parliament are represented by three historical parties: European People's Party (previously Christian democrats), Social Democrats (currently the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats) and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. Additionally, a major increase in the electoral support for Eurosceptic parties created an essential change on the mainstream pro-European agenda, since approximately a thirst of the MEPs are connected with the Euroscepticism as political attitude (Bache et al., 2011, p.272).

The Eurosceptic position in European Parliament include the European Conservatives and Reformists, dominated by the British Conservatives and Polish counterparts in the Law and Justice Party; the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group, dominated by the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Italian 5 Star Movement and the non-attached MEPs, which couldn't form or weren't accepted in a large group as the previously named. The most notable non-attached group is the Front National, securing most of votes in French election. The ascension of Eurosceptic parties on the political agenda of the European Union determines an essential impact on the opposition or acceptance of recurrent themes as immigration or EU integration (Bache et al., 2011, p.272).

The European Elections in 2014, forming the eighth European Parliament, pointed the need of traditional parties to form coalitions with the emerging Eurosceptic and populist organizations voted by electors. The political configuration of European political sphere was radically changed, including partnerships between presumably incompatible partners, for instance liberals and Eurosceptic representatives, in order to maintain the correct function of the European Parliament (Wallace, Pollack & Young, 2010, p.88).

A potential solution to improve the current negative image of Europe Union, as reflected through the results of European Parliament and similar events on the EU's agenda is the creation of a "transparent Europe" (Boros & Vasali, 2013, p.14), able to offer the answers that voters seek. For instance, as European citizens consider that European institutions are bureaucratic organizations unable to completely represent their interests, it's essential that the European Union implement measures able to improve the public perception on the function of its institutions. Projects on the long-term as consumer protection, environmental safeguarding or judiciary cooperation could be one of the issues involving public interest and able to transform European citizens from spectators of European governance to active users of it.

Secondly, European citizens expect a global-local cooperation, as consequence central European authorities are requested to support, not only direct the measures assumed by local authorities, such in the case of the fight against corruption, which is a social phenomenon affecting European institutions, as well as national institutions. If Eurozone is facing an inner risk, a tighter solidarity between state members and central authorities can create the required communication between citizens and European Uninion's management. Particularly, less developed members of the European Union or candidates need to know how European identity changes or would change their social life, economic development or political configuration. In the context of the current recession, European citizens need to be informed about efforts made by the European Union, to reinvigorate the economic environment both on national scale, as on European level.

Finally, the EU is facing a tremendous symbolic association between crisis and unpopular austerity measures, an important proportion of European electors considering that the European officials and authorities force their countries to adopt incorrect strategies, limiting their common daily life, as consequence they point EU as a symbolic guilty. In order to counterbalance this negative perception, is necessary to express EU's reliable contribution to reduce the impact of the financial crisis. The image of EU as the punitive organization should be improved, revealing the measures adopted, so that every state member can minimize and surpass the existence of the crisis (Boros & Vasali, 2013, p.14).

4.1. Potential causes of Euroscepticism manifested in 2014

According to J. M. Magone (2015), the results of the European Parliament elections in 2014 were the effects of a complex phenomenon affecting Europe during the last decade, deepened by austerity perspective of the financial crisis. The European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund constantly involved in the national evolution of each European state member affected by the financial crisis, in order to secure the global structure of European Union, which generated a wave of public revolt or distrust about the necessity of this measure. Major leaders as the German chancellor Angela Merkel manifested their sympathy to the countries affected by crisis, yet they were perceived as unable to monitor the progress of economical recovery or implementation of reliable reforms (J. M. Magone, in Kyriakos, 2015, 45).

In addition, the presence of International Monetary Fund (IMF) on European agenda was regarded be European states as extremely strict, based on their punctual demands of returning the funds granted to countries as Greece or Cyprus, while a softer approach was expected to be adopted. Facing the Greece's difficulties in implementing a reliable economical recovery, the IMF had to change its projections of the austerity programs created for the countries it borrowed, granting more flexible strategies of returning the funds. Ireland in December 2013 and Portugal in June 2014 managed to leave the tutelage of the troika (the monitor of the progress registered by indebted countries), while Greece and Cyprus are still vigilantly monitored (J. M. Magone, in Kyriakos, 2015, 45).

As J. M. Magone (2015) states, the impact of the economic austerity programs substantially affected politics and social life, leading to an "instrumental disenchantment with the European Union in normally pro-European countries" (J. M. Magone, in Kyriakos, 2015, 45). Concretely, citizens in several state members are dissatisfied by their national democracy, as well as by the European Union's evolution. According to the results of the Eurobarometer in 2013, citizens of the state members in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe perceive that their "voice" doesn't count in the mechanism of the European Union. For instance, in the autumn of 2013 results obtained in 13 state members including Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania pointed that 29% of the respondents consider that their national position is not taken into account by Central European authorities. On the other hand, in Denmark the highest value of trust in European authorities was registered, 57% of Danish citizens consider that their national demands are analyzed and implemented by the European Union (J. M. Magone, in Kyriakos, 2015, p.45).

For instance, in the case of the Romanians as the representatives of the wave of Euroscepticism attitude fuelled by the impact of the financial crisis, a national survey asking the citizens of the country about their concerns in 2014 revealed that 30% of the respondents are extremely interested in their financial context, rather than politics or economic issues, being preoccupied by unemployment or pensions (Sondaj IRES: Romanii se tem de razboi si de criza economica si vad in coruptie cea mai mare problema, retrieved from http://www.agerpres.ro/social/2015/05/07/sondaj-ires-romanii-se-tem-de-razboi-si-de-criza-economica-si-vad-in-coruptie-cea-mai-mare-problema-14-22-35). As they focus on their national status, this type of European citizens is likely not to be interested in the European mechanism as presented through the political event of EP election, since they perceive the European institution too far from their daily lives. Additionaly, if they are interested in the themes of EP elections, they might invest candidates with symbolical values as the persons able to correct their financial status, in this case the election process might not be performed through a political program, but based on the charisma of the candidate, a possibility can be analyzed thorugh a further research.

The financial crisis emerging in 2008 created the context of debating upon the impact of Eurozone and the utility of European membership. Focusing on the expansion of European integration, European authorities seem to face a constant decrease of public support in the confidence developed in the concept of European Union. According to the results of the Eurobarometer in 2010, "for the first time in the history of the European public opinion research, the distrust in the EU outweighed trust (42% of the respondents trusted the EU, whereas 47% said they distrusted the Union)" (Bârgăoanu , Radu, Negrea-Busuioc, 2014, 10). In 2013, the situation persisted, fuelled by the debates concerning the implication of the European Council and the European Parliament on the approval of the Multianual Financial Framework for the period 2014-2020, only 31% of European citizens were still confident in the viability of the European Union.

Despite its powerful impact, the financial crisis wasn’t the exclusive criterion favoring the tremendous evolution of Euroscepticism. European Union reacted in an unexpected perspective to the public opinion indicating distrust, prompted measures as the Constitutional Treaty, which generated a wide rejection attitude, as in the case of French and Dutch citizens. In addition, in 2008, the Irish citizens rejected the Lisbon Treaty, highlighting the impact of Euroscepticism, raising an eurocrisis debate concerning the "short-circuited EU's legitimacy and strength as supranational body" (Bârgăoanu , Radu & Negrea-Busuioc, 2014, p.10).

At the end of 2008, many experts mentioned that the European Union is facing a risky phase of its evolution, featuring a lack of consistency between public support and the decision-making process. Additionally to the external critics regarding European Union's strategies, internal dissatisfaction occurred as a former Prime Minister and an European expert openly stated that the imbalance affecting the European Union is justified by the slow reaction of the state members in the case of the issue consecutively affecting the European Union's evolution. The state members are expected to react    in a more supportive perspective to the European policy, in order to reduce the effects of the financial crisis (Bârgăoanu , Radu & Negrea-Busuioc, 2014, p.10).

Bârgăoanu , Radu & Negrea-Busuioc (2014) developed a research based on the Eurobarometers issued between 2008 to 2013, in order to create a qualitative approach on the impact of Euroscepticism in the last period. The authors focused on the public perspective in Eurozone countries, comparing with the citizens in non-Eurozone countries, focusing on items as European Union's democratic performance, the utility of EU membership, as well as the existence of negative attitude concerning the EU's development (Bârgăoanu , Radu & Negrea-Busuioc, 2014, p.13).

During the period 2008-2013, citizens in the Eurozone manifested an increased dissatisfaction, their confidence in European Union's efficiency decreasing from 52% in 2008 to 43% to 2013. In addition, as the financial crisis deepened, the public perspective substantially changed, especially in the case of Euro-zone countries, becoming more skeptical regarding the efficiency of European Union, as well as the necessity to expand the European Union. The Greece's difficulties concerning its economical recovery became a central topic on agenda, transforming into the center of the current Euro crisis. From the status of most expensive state member, absorbing more than 400 billion euros, Greece was considered an inevitable bankruptcy case. According to Bârgăoanu, Radu, Negrea-Busuioc (2014), Greece wasn't the only European state with financial difficulties, but it created the context of a public frustration directed to the efficiency of European Union, based on its previous experience as constant beneficiary of European funds. Due to the austerity measures implemented in most of member states, Greece became the symbolic guilty of the current financial situation of European Union. State members as Spain, Portugal, Italy or Ireland expressed their skeptical attitude regarding the crisis of Eurozone (Bârgăoanu, Radu & Negrea-Busuioc, 2014, p.15).

A similar perspective is developed by Boros and Vasali (2013), the Eurosceptic attitude is mostly directed towards European institutions such as the European Commission and the European Parliament, which through the roles fulfilled in the EU's mechanism are able to create a concrete image of European Union's attributes. Among the European institutions existing, the European Parliament faces a "general apathy" (Boros and Vasali, 2013, 1), particularly in the case of European Parliament elections. The public attitude of disinterest creates the context of decreasing legitimacy and authority of the European Union itself (Boros & Vasali, 2013, p.1).

Taking in account the theoretical approach already mentioned, Euroscepticism perceived as a "disease" (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.1) is an unsatisfactory perspective, as it forces European Union to consider it on its superficial form as the results of elections or the positive implementations of community measures, while in reality it's a complex phenomenon, with deep social, economic or political roots.

The positions of the scholars mentioned are confirmed by the results of an internal survey in the EU, the 2014 Parlamenter. The research was conducted through face-to-face interactions between survey operators and subjects, in the 28 Member States, including over 27.800 EU citizens. The temporal framework was established between 29 November and 9 December 2014, the period of time was selected, in order to allow to subjects the required context to analyze their opinions and positions after the effective elections for EU Parliament, held between 22 and 25 May 2014.

4.2. Expressions of Euroscepticism: national versus regional interests

The expression of Euroscepticism existing in the last decades radically changed. Euroscepticism isn't perceived as the existence of "a democratic deficit within the EU" (Torreblanca and Leonard, 2013, 1), as there was a symbolic clash between Brussels and the so-called periphery, including the countries that weren't included in the center of the organization. The emergence of the financial crisis changed the configuration of Euroscepticism, as citizens in creditor countries manifested a protective measure, avoiding to take responsibility for the debts of other state members, as they can't control their national costs. In order to preserve the integrity of the EU itself, officials generally adopted measures that forced the limits of national sovereignty, stirring the reaction of local authorities and citizens, defending "their pensions, taxes, salaries, the labour market, and public jobs" (Torreblanca and Leonard, 2013, 1).

In the case of the southern state members of the EU, the European institutions are associated with the negative image of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), "a golden straitjacket that is squeezing the space for national politics and emptying their national democracies of content" (Torreblanca and Leonard, 2013, 1). State members that have contracts to fulfill with IMF have to build their economic strategies based on the deadlines established, as consequence governments may change, but the debt contracts lead the internal evolution of an European country.

According to Boros and Vasali (2013), comparing with other historic periods in EU's evolution, contemporary Euroscepticism is an alarming phenomenon, as it's associated with complex social layers, including the traditional radical political or social organizations, criticizing the concept of European Union. Today, Euroscepticism is also used by highly educated groups, generally perceived as the winners of the European integration, it's present in both developed and developing countries, rendering the EU's objectives into difficult missions to be implemented: "Both winners and losers experience this trend. This growth supports the notion that the euroskeptic attitude does not haunt existentially threatened demographics exclusively, but it is also prevalent among the beneficiaries of consumerism and European democratic systems" (Boros and Vasali, 2013, 1).

According to the results of the Eurobarometer 78 released in 2012, an impressive amount of European citizens, estimated at a third of citizens in the EU able to express their vote, consider that their countries should leave EU or at least, preserve a protective autonomy related to EU's decisions. Additionally, 10% of respondents consider that they haven't formed yet a clear position regarding the impact of European Union (Boros & Vasali, 2013, p.3).

The United Kingdom and Bulgaria represent the extreme attitudes developed by European citizens, in terms of acceptance/rejection the concept of European integration. The United Kingdom is the negative pole of European acceptance, as 54% of its citizens, consider that the country would be develop in a better perspective, without the EU. On the other side, among Bulgarians (68%) there is a strong attitude regarding the acceptance of EU, as an essential proportion of them consider that Bulgaria is likely to develop through European membership. Among state members, Denmark is the most dedicated to European membership, followed by the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Czech Republic and Poland are divided between acceptance and rejection of European integration (Boros & Vasali, 2013, p.3).

Before the 2014 European Parliament elections, the great part of citizens (39%) across European Union perceive it in a neutral perspective, followed by the group of citizens displaying a positive attitude related to the European Union (30%), while the critical proportion of European citizens represented only 29%. As mentioned by Boros & Vasali (2013), the report of European acceptance is likely to change, as the fall of 2009 highlighted the emergence of a negative perspective, from 15% to 29%, doubled by the decrease of public approval of EU's strategies, from 48% to 30% (Boros & Vasali, 2013, p.4).

In terms of confidence in the European institutions, an alarming majority of 57% of European citizens lack confidence in their correct function, while only a third of them consider they satisfy their needs. Among state members, there is an essential difference between the levels of trust associated with the idea of European Union. Out of the 27 members, only 7 developed a predominant confidence in the effectiveness of European institutions, while in the case of 18 state members the reverse attitude is present, mostly in Spain severely affected by economic recession and the traditionally eurosceptic United Kingdom, expressing an impressive negative proportion of 72% (Boros & Vasali, 2013, p.5). The Figure 2 presents the configuration of public trust in the European institutions, based on nationality of the respondents participating to the research.

Public trust in European institutions (Boros & Vasali, 2013, p.6)

Generally, citizens in the state members joining the European Union after 2004 present a more confident attitude related to the impact of European institutions. Practically, Central and Eastern Europe, as represented in the figure below are more optimistic, comparing with the United Kingdom, with the exception of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, who have developed a predominantly skeptical approach (Boros & Vasali, 2013, p.6).

The public attitude related to European Union in the last decade can be justified through a constant period of distrust in public sphere, based on a suite of factors negatively affecting the citizens' perspective, as the global financial crisis or the disappointing performance of the Eurozone. Simultaneously, during 2003 and 2009, European Union was perceived with more confidence, as the newly members in 2004 and 2007 expressed their optimism. The recent period of 2009-2010 marked a returning to an increasing distrust, while lately a balance seems to have been established between confident and skeptical citizens. The European polls organized in the 2012 expressed a moderate improvement to the situation of balance, suggesting that the confidence in the European Union increased by a slight percentage (2%), while the critical perspective decreased with a similar percentage (Boros & Vasali, 2013, p.7).

Comparing the attitude developed towards the European Union, with the confidence developed towards national authorities, the recent polls highlighted that European citizens seem to place more trust in the European Union rather than in their national authorities, with a difference of 10-15% (Boros & Vasali, 2013, p.8).

Internally analyzed, Euroscepticism in the case of each member state develops on particular features. For instance, some member states modified their attitude related to the European Union, based on the impact of the global financial crisis. Currently, in addition to the traditional eurosceptic United Kingdom, the Czech Republic or Hungary expressed their vehement eurosceptic reactions regarding European Union's evolution, creating social and political disputes inside the European community.

Additionally to the member states developing eurosceptic attitudes based on recent economic features, there are member states distancing from EU, based on the inability of the European bloc to manage the regional economic crisis. In this case, EU's budgetary regulations are criticized by mainly the Mediterranean countries as Greece, Cyprus, Portugal or Spain, considering that EU is exclusively focusing on their financial context, doubling the austerity they internally face.

Unlike economical features, some of state members as Estonia, the Netherlands, Poland or Latvia, distance themselves from EU, based on a different perspective in policies. Those states consider that Brussels' decisions aren't based on a representative basis, as consequence it cannot reflect the evolution of EU.

The reduced level of critical approach is represented by foundation member states amicably criticizing the European Union, as Swedes, Belgians, Luxembourgers, Finns, and Austrians. This sceptic group considers that the EU isn't developing in the right direction, yet they preserve a minimal sceptic approach, in order to avoid the destabilization of it. The friendly critics of EU propose a different political culture, focusing on national interests, primarily to matters of sovereignty.

Lately, the optimist member states are represented by France, Malta, Denmark, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria. With the exception of France or Denmark, the optimist group is represented by recently adhered members, considering the European Union as the central agent in essential areas as agriculture, the new members benefiting of long-term expertise of European experts (Boros & Vasali, 2013, p.9).

4.3. Euroscepticism in several member states

Euroscepticism, analyzed on a large scale, is synonym with a general apathy among citizens, politicians or local authorities regarding the efficiency of European Union. Additionally to this general perspective, Euroscepticism is also reflected by the distrust of creditors and debtors in the feasibility of the EU, as well as the intentions of candidates to the EU to postpone their entrance, as a protective measure. Euroscepticism isn't anymore a British attitude, although UK scores an impressive level of distrust, but state members in the Eurozone also reconsider their positions (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.1).

Generally, Euroscepticism preserves a traditional separation between North and South, as the northern area of the European Union is considered more advanced, as consequence more likely to demand more warranties from EU and feeling more disappointed, in the case of a refusal (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.2).

Bulgaria is one of the southern member states and one of the recently adhered countries. Trust level in the EU has actually increased slightly since Bulgaria joined in 2007: 60% of the respondents to an European research based on the satisfaction of EU tend to trust the European concept, comparing with 54% registered before. In the case of Bulgarian themselves, 74% of them seem to distrust more their national parliament and prefer to support the European strategies. On the other hand, some of the EU's measures adopted in Bulgaria created the opportunity for mass protests threatening the mechanism of parliamentary elections, as protesters revolted against poverty and corruption (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.2).

Czech Republic, one of the central member state and having joined EU before Bulgaria is the image of a spectacular distrust in the efficiency of European Union, decreasing from +29 percent in 2007 to -26 percent in 2012. Despite this level of distrust, Czechs preserve their pragmatic attitude towards the EU as a required partnership, providing prosperity and security. However, the financial crisis affected their image about EU, being satisfied that, unlike the Slovaks, they haven't joined the single currency (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.2).

Denmark is one of the oldest state members of the EU, marked by a moderate public distrust, from +36 percent in 2007 to +2 percent by 2012. Denmark adopts every crucial European measure through referendums, being its protective measure for safeguarding its national sovereignty. Through its particular method of governance, it's considered a two-speed European pillar, as common European topics such as community justice, defense or Eurozone have to be accepted by Danish, before local authorities can implement it. Understanding the increasing level of Euroscepticism in Denmark, Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt postponed the referendum on Europe, leaving Denmark for the moment outside the Eurozone (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.2).

Euroscepticism in ambiguous in Finland, as it adopted the single currency, yet Finnish express their concern about an European identity. The financial crisis has polarized Finnish regarding the indebted, marking the ascending of an eurosceptic party, the True Finns party, which became the third largest political organization in parliament, with 39 seats, in the elections of 2011 (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.2).

Similarly to other state members in the central area of EU, France as one of the historic pillars of the European concept highlights a severe reduction of public trust in EU, starting with the financial crisis. In 2012, the number of French respondents not trusting in EU's efficiency increased to 56%, comparing with 41% registered in 2007. The anti- EU National Front party highlights French's opinions regarding EU, being counterbalanced by moderated or pro-EU political organizations supporting the idea of Eurozone as a recovery priority for the EU itself (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.4).

Germany considers itself another victim of the euro crisis, as it's one of the oldest members of the EU. Public distrust, more than 56%, is associated with the need to pay higher taxes or accept higher levels of inflation, in order to save the euro. Traditional parties attempt to preserve a balanced general opinion, supporting the euro and the fundamental economic recovery of EU. On the other hand, small parties, but based on Euroscepticism, as Alternative for Germany, managed to entered the competition of general elections, being a serious candidate on German political configuration (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.4).

Greece, before its critical financial moment in 2012, was the image of economic progress and social recovery, following a totalitarian regime. Greece is the European state member facing recession, austerity and structural reform, which determined Greeks many times to protest. If in 2007 Greeks expressed a public support of EU, estimated at +26%, in 2012 it decreased to -63%. The mainstream political parties, New Democracy and PASOK, almost collapsed, as the radical Syriza party, which opposes the austerity program agreed with the IMF, the European Commission, and the ECB, drew the attention of Greek voters. Additionally, anti-EU parties such as the communist KKE and the far-right Chryssi Avgi (Golden Dawn) supported the idea that Greece should leave Eurozone, in order to save itself from EU's potential bankruptcy (Torreblanca and Leonard, 2013, 4).

Italy is another traditional state member affected by the financial crisis. Austerity changed the attitude of mostly young Italians, unemployed. The recent Italian elections showed that Italians have lost in EU, as unable to reduce the impact of financial crisis in the European space. On the other hand, Italians identify themselves with Europe, refusing the idea of leaving the EU (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.4).

In the case of the Netherlands, the public trust in EU decreased from +44% in 2007 to -8% in 2012, as the Dutch are disappointed by the evolution of the Eurozone. Eurosceptic parties as VVD and PvdA obtained the attention of the Dutch voters (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.4).

Poland, one of the member states with a long trust in EU marked in 2012 its first public dissatisfaction moment, when Poles not trusting the EU (46%), mostly in the case of the common currency, surpassed the level of EU supporters (41%) (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.5).

Similarly, Portugal's traditional pro-European position was affected by the euro crisis, Portuguese expressing their dissatisfaction, their support decreasing from +41% in 2007 to -24% in 2012. Portugal joined the single currency, but was affected by harsh austerity measures, leading to violent demonstrations against government and EU's strategies. Similarly, Spain, the close neighbor, developed a difficult recovery program, to overcome the crisis and prevent the option of leaving the euro (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.5).

Perception of the EU in the UK was associated, starting with 2004, with a constant dissatisfaction. The percentage of British not trusting in EU increased from 48% in 2004 to nearly 80% in 2012, being partially influenced by the financial crisis. The major criteria fuelling the Euroscepticism current in UK is related to the potential acceptance of the single currency, as well as a suite of European regulators including labor market, stirring the vehement reaction of British citizens (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013, p.5).

In terms of MEPs obtained, the Eurosceptic attitude reflected by the 2014 elections of the EP are presented in the table below:

(Comparative results of the 2009 and 2014 elections, based on Eurosceptic and far-right parties support, retrieved from http://europedecides.eu/results/)

Focusing on the data retrieved, the major increase in terms of Eurosceptic attitude is reflected in the case of France, obtaining 24MEPs in the presence of Eurosceptic candidates, marking a +15.21 evolution, comparing with the previous election in 2009, when only 3 MEPs represented the Eurosceptic affiliation. The major theme developed by the new Eurosceptic MEPs representing France`s interests is related to the presence of Islamic immigrants in France, who lately were involved in civil incidents (White, 2004). Despite their aggressive discourse, the position of French MEPs in EP remains a balanced one, France being present in major European projects, as a traditional member state.

As UKIP was a constant critic on national level of the European economical policies, as well as the immigration strategies, its increase in 2014 in the EP was somehow expected. UKIP doubled its number of MEPs, from 13 MEPs in 2009 to 24MEPs, while the other Eurosceptic group voted by British citizens didn`t manage to impose a single MEP in the 2014 EP elections, comparing the performance reached in 2009, when 2 MEPs represented its position. Its moderate rhetoric related to the economical situation of UK and the Foreign Affairs` politics in terms of gradual progress (http://www.bnp.org.uk/introduction-0) didn`t convince anymore British voters of its efficiency.

Concisely, the results of the 2014 EP elections suggested a clear rise of support for the far-right parties, associated with Euroscepticism. Comparing with previous EP elections, in 2014, the Eurosceptic-influenced parties increased the number of their MEPs to 86 MEPs, representing 11.45% of the EP’s seats, as consequence an importance voice in the decision-making process. In terms of national participation, far-right and Eurosceptic parties dominated the polls in both France and the United Kingdom, with the National Front reaching 25% of the votes in France and UKIP obtaining 27.5% of the votes in the United Kingdom. In member states, traditionally manifesting a strong or moderate pro-European support, Eurosceptic parties managed to make electoral breakthroughs, such in Sweden (2 MEPs), Poland (4 MEPs), Germany (1MEP) and the Czech Republic (1 MEP). On the other hand, the electoral support for pro-European parties fell by 11.8%, but such parties continue to hold the majority in the European Parliament with 67.5% (or 507 MEPs) in EP. Noticing the relationship between the increase of Eurosceptic wave and the decrease of support for pro-European parties, I will analyze in certain cases the implication of the direct relationship between the two phenomena. In some other member states, it can be noticed a global support for pro-EU parties as Croatia (+14.34%), Hungary (+11.97) and Austria (+9.35%). Overall, pro-EU parties failed to win more than 50% of the seats in two member states – United Kingdom and Poland, while in the rest they obtained the majority, as consequence the voice of the pro-European parties is predominant in the EU, comparing with the Eurosceptic political groups.

The case of UK can be considered the European paradox, as the member state is generally considered an Eurosceptic-influenced member through the performance of the Conservative Party and similar small parties. During the last election, Even in the UK, UKIP party reached 27.5% of the vote, while pro-EU parties managed to increase their vote share by 3.08%. Despite its traditional Eurosceptic attitude, UK wasn`t the leader of Euroscepticism attitude during the 2014 elections, but other member state, a detail that confirms my hypothesis related to the constant functioning of European mechanism, despite the presence of Eurosceptic parties in national or European forums.

In terms of turnout, the 2014 European Parliament elections recorded, a marginal increase in voter turnout, average turnout being estimated at 43.2%, a marginal increase of 0.2%, comparing with the 2009 elections. Malta recorded the highest turnout performance, estimated at 75%, while Lithuania experienced the highest increase in turnout with an increase of 23.7%. Notable increases were also observed in Greece (+7.29%), Germany (+4.8%), France (+2.87%) and Sweden (+3.37%). By contrary, the biggest national drop in turnout was recorded in Latvia, its turnout falling with -23.7%, while in Slovakia the lowest turnout overall was recorded in Slovakia, – 13.1% turnout.

As presented, the results of the 2014 EP elections suggest that hard Euroscepticism, as defined by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2012), is less common than soft Euroscepticism. The researchers created in 2002 a chart of vehement Eurosceptic parties in each member state and "softer" political groups, that are reflected below:

(Hard and Soft Eurosceptic Parties in the EU, Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2012, 10)

As noticed, at least five member states (Slovenia, Spain, Estonia, Ireland, Portugal), have no parties or political groups to express an Eurosceptic attitude, as consequence the mechanism of EU can`t be affected on this level. Additionally, Spain and Portugal are traditional members of the EU, starting with its debut, their position being considered as symbolical for the understanding of European mechanisms as decision-making in EU. On the other hand, there is only one member states, Belgium, that has no soft parties to express Euroscepticism, raising questions on its ability to support the European projects through the position of its Flemish Block, a hard Eurosceptic party. Lately, the party was supporting additional measures against immigration and multiculturalism, particularly in the case of Islamic communities (Barker, 2007), as consequence its MEPs might impose their negative attitude in European projects related to the freedom of movement, freedom of speech or religious freedom.

Small political groups, based on a soft approach, as the Freedom Party in Austria, managed to draw the interest of sufficient voters to enter national Parliament and later, EP, as noticed in 2014. The Freedom Party is characterized through a pronounced nationalism (McLaughling, 2013), raising questions about Austria`s tolerance and respect of civil rights. Nationalism, as in the case of Italian Northern League, asking the territorial separation of the north part of the Italy can be combined with economic reforms as the end of euro (Squires, 2013), being present in the EP for two mandates, suggesting that their nationalist and economic rhetoric is essential to Italians not only in the period of financial crisis, but even in the previous period, as consequence the Eurosceptic attitude presented by the Northern League is a constant social fact and has to be adequately analyzed in terms of the causes determining some Italians, traditional members of the EU, to consider that the unique currency or European institutions don`t reflect their interests. An exception to the rule of small soft parties presenting an Eurosceptic program is the case of the Conservative Party in the UK, traditionally militating for UK`s national sovereignty and later, an improved immigration strategy (Spiering & Harmsen, 2004).

Concisely, the EP elections in 2014 suggested both negative perspectives as the higher emergence of Euroscepticism, but also positive facts as the increase of turnout, comparing with the previous elections. Generally, the configuration of the European Parliament suggested the presence of 11.45% Eurosceptic and far-right MEPs, their impact having a great importance on the proceedings of the European institution. On the other hand, the pro-European parties represent the 67.5% of the European Parliament’s seats, but it`s a reduced number from the 2009 elections, that raises questions regarding their ability to draw the interest of voters through their political programs.

In the case of Eurosceptic group of parties, I could notice a diversity of ideological perspectives that generate in time issues related to collaboration. For instance, the Greek Golden Dawn is a far-right group, focusing on a neo-Nazi ideological structure, yet the party doesn`t deny the Eurozone membership. On the other hand, for the British UKIP threatens the existence of European strategies of immigration, due to its vehement reaction against European immigrants in UK.

Personally, I consider that the results of the recent European Parliament elections should still be a symbolic warning for the European institutions, as Euroscepticism tends to become more popular, able to threaten the base of European or national democracies.

As presented in this chapter, European elections in the 2014 marked an essential chapter in EU's history, as it expressed an alarming level of dissatisfaction in the majority of state members, likely to affect the implementation of European Union's measures on the long-terms. Similarly to Wallace, Pollack and Young, (2010), we consider that the tremendous wave of Euroscepticism emerging in Europe has to be attentively analyzed and used, in order to find the suitable solutions for the issues unbalancing the European concept. EU doesn't precisely need to find new strategies related to the global financial crisis or the sovereign debt crisis, as it has already implemented a suite of austerity measures, considered harsh by state members as Greece or Italy. On the other hand, it has to create "forms of cooperation" (Wallace, Pollack & Young, 2010, p.488), to stimulate the state members and as possible to avoid the case of another financial crisis. In 2014, EU couldn't offer suitable answers for its citizens, as consequence it "fuelled the hostility to European integration, now associated in the minds of many European citizens not with prosperity and opportunity but with bitter austerity" (Wallace, Pollack & Young, 2010, p.488).

4.4. Euro-optimism in the European space

The results of the EP elections in the 2014 suggested that the support of voters towards Pro-European parties decreased with 11.3%, comparing with the previous elections. As reflected by the table below, the major changes were registered by Spain (-23.36%), affected by the austerity measures imposed by the Governement of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, who resigned in front of the public protests (Lopez, 2014). I consider that as Spanish reduced their confidence in national authorities and their abilities to turn Spanish economy into an efficient mechanism, as before the emergence of the financial crisis, it`s likely they appreciate the European institutions in a similar perspective, symbolically considered guilty for their country`s situation. In the case of Slovenia, one of the MEPs elected, Milan Zver, explained the tremendous decrease of pro-European perspective, as the citizens of his country perceive that EU isn`t interest to help Slovenia surpass the difficult economical situation starting with 2008 (Lewis, 2014). In this case, the European institutions being associated with the symbolical obligation of supporting Slovenia, although other countries as Greece faced more acute economical troubles. France was the third member state with the largest decrease in terms of pro-European supports, that can be explained through multiple causes. Generally, it could be the effect of the financial crisis, as France too was affected, yet in the case of France I associate the result with the socialist political attitude represented by President Hollande, arguing that France has been underestimated lately in the European mechanism, despite Germany and UK, gradually represented in the main European institutions (Kaletsky, 2014). As consequence, the decrease of public support to pro-European parties in France can be considered a gesture of national pride and protest, against the hegemony of the two member state.

(Comparative results of the 2009 and 2014 elections, based on pro-European Parties` Support, retrieved from http://europedecides.eu/results/)

I consider that, in order to support my hypothesis related to the minimal impact of Euroscepticism suggested by the EP elections in the 2014, the results retrieved in terms of support of Pro-European parties to be compared with the results obtained in the case of the performance of Eurosceptic parties. More precisely, I will analyze whether in the case of member states as Spain, Slovenia or France, the decrease in support towards European projects is associated with the effective increased of Eurosceptic attitude. For instance, in the case of France, the hypothesis is confirmed, as the Pro-European support decreases by -15.26%, the Eurosceptic attitude increases with +15.21%. In the case of Slovenia and Spain, the hypothesis can`t be confirmed, as no Eurosceptic political party is revealed, as consequence although in France it can be established a direct connection between the two attitudes, the situation isn`t generally retrieved in the European space, being unable to affect the global functioning of the EU.

Although Ukraine isn`t a member state of the EU, its supportive position regarding the mechanism of the European concept is considered by Aslund Anders (2015) as an evidence that Euroscepticism is a moderate social and political phenomenon, unable to affect the correct functioning of European institutions. Partially the results highlighting the pro-European attitude of Ukrainian citizens can be explained through the popular desire that their country becomes a Member State, yet the analysis of the data below suggest a deeper connection between Ukraine`s intentions and the effective global perception:

Euro-optimism in Ukraine, during the national elections in October 2014 (Anders, 2015, 116)

The national elections of the Ukrainian Parliament, including a total of 450 seats, suggested that despite the Russian occupations of Crimea and parts of Donetsh or Luhansk, the democratic approach towards European integration is predominant. As represented in the table below, the political configuration of Ukrainian democracy presents an obvious victory for the pro-Western, reformist, center-right groups, such as the President Poroschenko`s Bloc, obtaining 148 seats, followed by the People`s Front of Prime Minister Yatsenyuk, obtaining 81 seats and the civil activist party Self-Help, obtaining 32 seats. The parliamentary majority formed by the three political groups is the image of a clear euro-optimistic attitude that is likely to manifest during the next period. The case of Ukraine, either it will be accepted or not as State Member, could be analyzed further, as a standard of attitudes regarding EU`s efficiency. Personally, I consider that the Ukrainian phenomenon is a mixture of concrete euro-optimism and reflection of the fear associated with Russia`s hegemony. It will be extremely interesting to highlight how Ukrainians changed their positions, in terms of Euroscepticism or by contrary, how their euro-optimistic position was reinforced in the context of 2019 EU elections, comparing with the political perspective offered by the national elections in 2014.

5. Eurosceptics and radicals

British Euroscepticism was considered the most vehement, as it includes multiple themes as immigration, the adoption of measures adopted by central authorities, despite national sovereignty. As mentioned by Spiering and Harmsen (2004), the particular British political and historical context of the Euroscepticism can be associated with an anti-integrationist attitude issued both the Conservative and Labour Parties throughout the post-war period. As consequence, British Euroscepticism is not simply an opposition to the particular institutional forms which have been assumed by European integration, but it`s rooted in a deeper sense of a (Franco-German dominated) Continent as "the Other". British society doesn`t reject the European concept, but questions about the evolution of EU through through the voice of British Conservative and Labour Parties (Spiering & Harmsen, 2004, 14).

The case of UK is particular in terms of Eurosceptic attitude, reaching a radical approach in the case of political groups as UKIP, focusing on the threatens represented by immigration of European citizens from Eastern Europe. The political discourse related to the inefficiency of EU`s strategies in the case of several issues as immigration is doubled by a media debate, expressing the same public disapproval attitude, raising questions upon the UK`s global perspective as member state. For example, a media article published in 2010, focuses on the dramatic increased of immigration in UK, as immigrants would benefit of the social rights as the born-British citizens, particularly without working or studying, being pointed the category of Eastern- European unemployed immigrants. As mentioned in the article, the issue of immigration of European citizens became a social problem, as it`s four-fold multiplied in the last period, from 136.000 people working and studying in UK, while the current situation showed that immigration was, up to 340.000 new immigrants arriving to UK (Casciani, 2010).

Starting with 2011, the public discourse related to European immigration into UK became more vehement. For instance, Daily Mail, one of the most read newspapers in UK created public campaigns, asking UK citizens to impose their attitude related to this theme, as the authorities aren`t able to control it. The journalists openly accused the Government for its failure, since it granted access to Eastern European immigrants, as the number of immigrants reached the level of 100.000, potentially asphyxiating the British state. The case of Eastern European immigrants is particular, as mentioned through the phrase "Last year 71.000 people from Poland and other Eastern European countries came to Britain, up from 52.000 the year before" (Doughtly, 2011), the newspaper connecting the permanency of financial crisis in Eastern Europe with the waves of immigration towards UK.

2014, the moment of the EP elections, represented the peak of a public discourse, criticizing the British government attitude of accepting EU`s strategies in terms of immigration, an article published in Newstatesman.com (Behr, 2014), expressed the idea of the media organization and UKIP, as one member is quoted, that European immigrants are undesirable newcomers in UK. The justification of the radical attitude is based on the fact that receiving more immigrants than other member states, as UK is considered a wealthy country, the national and local authorities are forced to find solutions regarding the costs of the phenomenon, as the raise of public taxes, in order to support the welfare programs, the proposals related to retirement in the case of born-citizens or immigrants retiring in UK. The UKIP representative argues that Brussels only prompts a bureaucratic strategy, while the social reality in UK is different and has to be solved, according to the particularities existing, severer measures regarding immigration being necessary (Behr, 2014). On the other hand, The Guardian, admits the overwhelming social issue created by the European immigration, yet highlights that UK should adopt a moderate position in terms of national interest, as follows: "What is needed is a more realistic approach to migration in the context of broader social change. Younger people, including young EU expats, enrich and sustain our economy as we age. Many UKIP voters have children and grandchildren who will benefit from the chance to study and work abroad. They should be careful what they wish for" (Ben-Towin, 2014). The moderate approach was expressed through the results of the EP elections in 2014, in the case of UK, as UKIP, the radical political party obtained less votes than political groups that propose a balanced perspective related to the role of UK in EU`s mechanism.

Generally, the turnout in UK increased in 2014, reaching 35.4%, comparing with the level registered in 2009, 34.7%, marking a slightly higher interest of British citizens to express their opinions related to EU`s evolution. Among the 73 seats in the EP obtained by UK, 24 belong to UKIP, 20 to the Labour Party and 19 to the Conservative Party, while the rest represent regional parties as the Scottish National Party or the Ulster Unionist Party (UK European election results, retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/events/vote2014/eu-uk-results). In the UK context, the Labour`s representatives associated with the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in Europe, while the Conservative`s representatives chose to unite forces with the large political group, European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR). The members of UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) originally associated with the Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty Group, established after Romanian and Bugaria`s integration, the first one represented by 35MEPs, while the second one by 18MEPs. As the political group dissolved, UKIP is associated with Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (EFDD) (McGowan, Phinnemore, 2015, 233).

Conclusions

The thesis Euroscepticism objectively presented the European theme of EP election, analyzing the elections issued in May 2014, in terms of Euroscepticism and Pro-European support of the European voters. In order to obtain a clear image of the event, the results retrieved for the 2014 EP elections were compared with the results obtained in the previous election procedure, in 2009.

The research demarche was based on a deductive structure. In the first part of the thesis, theoretical approaches were presented, while in the last part, I focused on the effective research of the Eurosceptic phenomenon in the case of the 2014 EP elections. The concepts I used in my analysis were the turnout, the number of seats obtained in the EP, as well as public perception. If the first concepts can be analyzed through quantitative approach, as they are fixed realities, in the case of public perception, I used qualitative documents as media articles, implied to verify the results generated through the implementation of the first concepts.

The results of the research proposed suggests that Euroscepticism is an increasing political phenomenon in the European space, yet unable to affect the global mechanism of European Union. For instance, the number of Eurosceptic MEPs increased, comparing with the previous elections, but the predominant position is occupied by the pro-European parties. In the case of member states as Austria, the number of pro-European MEPs (14) is higher than the number of Eurosceptic ones (4 MEPs), creating a balance between approval and denial of European projects, yet in the case of traditional member states as UK, the number of pro-European and Eurosceptic MEPs is equal, suggesting the British attitude related to European themes as immigration, that it considers unsolved in the favor of its national interests.

The emergence of Euroscepticism in the 2014 EP elections shouldn`t be treated as an alarming phenomenon, although it marks an essential shift of political approach of European voters related to the efficiency of EU. During my analysis, I suggested that indeed there are member states with a high increase of Euroscepticism approach, as they reached more MEPs, comparing with the previous elections, such as France or UK. On the other hand, the majority of the member states preserved a predominant pro-European position, for instance, states as Italy decreased its number of Eurosceptic MEPs in 2014, comparing with 2014, which suggests a potential reduction of the interest voters invest in the nationalist or economically protectionist attitude of those political groups. Additionally, during the 2014 EP elections we assist to the disappearance of Eurosceptic MEPs in the EP, as in the case of Bulgaria or Slovakia, which were previously represented by 2MEPs or at least 1MEPs, as consequence the Euroscepticism phenomenon is a natural reaction, a democratic exercise that has to be treated with objectivity, based on its effective configuration and potential impact in the European decision-making process.

The present research can be continued with further analysis regarding the national perception on 2014 EP elections. For instance, in the case of Romanian, I consider relevant to research through a survey whether the selected respondents consider they voted a pro-European or Eurosceptic MEPs and how they consider he/she represents their interests in the EP.

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=== rezumat ===

Euroscepticism

The thesis Euroscepticism aimed to analyze the impact of Euroscepticism attitude based on the results of the EP elections in 2014. The research demarche was structured on a deductive basis, firstly defining Euroscepticism as philosophical attitude and historic reality in the UE, following to contextualize it to the political event occurring in the European space, in the spring of 2014.

Generally, the Eurosceptic attitude of Europeans can be understood as a critical approach to the mechanism of the European Union, focusing on the national background of each member state. The political parties reflecting the Eurosceptic attitude in their member states, such as the British UKIP, French National Front, Austrian Freedom Party for Freedom or the Hungarian Jobbik in Hungary focus on themes as the protection of national identity, national economy or cultural diversity in the context of European democracy. While implementing the personal analysis, I relied on the framework established by Taggart and Szczerbiak, considering that hard Euroscepticism is the deep rejection of EU`s concept, while soft Europeticism focusing on a sequential opposition to European themes as immigration of cultural diversity. Currently, Euroscepticism is associated with the Eastern enlargement and the potential admission of candidates as Turkey, traditional members as UK or France expressing their positions related to the efficiency of European institutions in the case of a hazardous expansion of EU. Another essential factor increasing the Eurosceptic perspective is the emergence of the financial crisis in the 2008, weakening national economies and implicitly, the public trust into national institutions and European institutions.

I selected to analyze the EP elections in 2014, since the moment succeeds the occurrence of financial crisis in several member states, as consequence its impact can be objectively analyzed in the creation of Euroscepticism. Additionally, the EP represents the legislative, budgetary and supervisory functions of the European concept, as consequence it can be considered one of the pillars of EU, whose decisions will essentially affect the evolution of member states.

The eight election procedure for the EP in the spring 2014 represents an important moment in the development of EU, as the number of Eurosceptic MEPs increased, as the lowest turnout rate was registered, comparing with the previous elections, in 2009. In this context, the theme of my research focused on the potential negative impact of this political phenomenon on the efficiency of European concept: is the Eurosceptic trend highlighted by the EP elections able to affect the EU`s mechanism?

In order to justify this hypothesis, I comparatively analyzed the results of the EP elections in 2009 and 2014, in order to highlight the essential changes of political attitude. As in 2009, there were 55 MEPs representing the Eurosceptic attitude, in 2014 their number increased to 86MEPs, mostly in the case of UK and France, traditional member states of the EU, raising questions about their ability to support the European projects. Despite the tremendous raise of Eurosceptic representatives in the EU, the voice of the majority is represented by pro-European MEPs, representing 507 MEPs, Croatia, Hungary or Austria being the most interested in supporting pro-European themes.

In terms of political affiliation, the Eurosceptic attitude in the EU is represented by European Conservatives and Reformists, dominated by the British Conservatives and Polish counterparts in the Law and Justice Party; the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group, dominated by the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Italian 5 Star Movement and the non-attached MEPs. The emergence of these political groups, instead of the traditional European People`s Party or Socialists and Democrats can be justified through the reduced transparency of European procedures, as well as the inefficient cooperation with the national authorities, as consequence the European agenda should include measures to improve EU`s connection with each member state, in order to reduce the impact of Euroscepticism.

Analyzing the evolution of each member state, comparing the results of the 2009 EP elections with the 2014 EP elections, France marked the major increase in terms of Eurosceptic attitude, obtaining 24MEPs in the presence of Eurosceptic candidates, marking a +15.21 evolution, comparing with the previous election in 2009, when only 3 MEPs represented the Eurosceptic affiliation. Based on its radical discourse related to immigration and the marginal role of UK in the EU`s mechanism, UKIP doubled its number of MEPs, from 13 MEPs in 2009 to 24MEPs in 2014.

As Euroscepticism can be an active attitude in member states as UK or France, in other member states, mostly belonging to recent integrations, as Slovenia, Spain, Estonia or Ireland, no parties or political groups are revealed to express an Eurosceptic attitude. As consequence the mechanism of EU can`t be affected, since the most effervescent Eurosceptic attitudes are counterbalanced with the absence of Euroscepticism. Additionally, Eurosceptic political groups as the Italian Italian Northern League, asking the territorial separation and the end of euro, represented by 9MEPs in 2009, managed to only 5MEPs in 2014, suggesting that Euroscepticism is a fluid political reality, that has to be constantly find arguments to draw the attention of voters. Analyzing the political profile of each Eurosceptic group, I noticed essential differences, as follows: the Greek Golden Dawn is a far-right group, focusing on a neo-Nazi ideological structure, yet the party doesn`t deny the Eurozone membership. On the other hand, the British UKIP threatens the existence of European strategies of immigration, due to its vehement reaction against European immigrants in UK.

Focusing on the comparative analysis of the EP elections, I observe that there is a connection in the case of some member states between the emergence of Euroscepticism and the reduced support of pro-European parties. For example, in the case of France, the Pro-European support decreases by -15.26%, while the Eurosceptic attitude increases with +15.21%, confirming my assumption. By contrary, in the case of Slovenia and Spain, the hypothesis can`t be confirmed, as no Eurosceptic political party is revealed, their situation suggesting Euroscepticism is unable to affect the global functioning of the EU.

Based on the data comparatively analyzed, I consider that he emergence of Euroscepticism in the 2014 EP elections shouldn`t be treated as an alarming phenomenon, although it marks an essential shift of political approach of European voters related to the efficiency of EU. Indeed, there are member states as France which doubled their MEPS representing an Eurosceptic attitude, on the other hand other member states as Bulgaria, which were previously represented by Eurosceptic MEPs in 2009, don`t rely on the activity of an Eurosceptic MEP in 2014. Euroscepticism appears to be a natural reaction, a democratic exercise that has to be treated with objectivity in the European decision-making process.