DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE POLITICHE E INTERNAZIONALI [607276]

DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE POLITICHE E INTERNAZIONALI

Corso di Laurea Magistrale in European Studies

Who are EU?
Historical and Spatial dimensions of European identity in
relation to the East

Relatore
Chiar.mo Prof. Gianni Silei

Correlatore
Chiar.mo Prof. Daniele
Pasquinucci

Laureanda
Azzurra Fazio
Anno accademico 2017/18

Abstract

Being inspired by the work of Robert Reich, titled “Who is US?”, the scholar Susan Strange
asked “Who are EU?”. Her work attempted to clarify the am biguity about the competitiveness
in Europe, determined by the difficulty to define which type of ‘nationality’ a firm has or
where it is placed. Even though the scholar’s aim was not to question the European identity,
she nevertheless questioned a notion of identity at the base of ‘competitiveness’ in Europe.
Since the process of European integration began, many have stressed the importance of
establishing a European identity. The current president of European Commission, Jean –
Claude Juncker, still repeats the key point of his program: “united in diversity”. Whatever
Europe is, it is of course characterized by a specific feature: ‘diversity’. ‘Some’ decided to
place this diversity at the base of European identity. The point is how it has developed and,
abov e all, how it is nowadays ‘pitched’ against ‘other international identities’. While the
European Union “tried” to open up the possibility of the construction of a political identity
through a less exclusionary practice, ‘historical and spatial otherings’ p rocesses remain an
important reality in the discourse on European identity. If this observation is correct, it
represents a big challenge to realize that shift from the “old Europe” to the “new Europe”. I
will argue that ‘othering’ still represents a spec ific “foreclusion” due to the empirical
comeback of Europe’s past in its present policies. Specially if we consider the international
relations between Europe and its three ‘others’ that will be taken into account in this study:
Turkey, Russia and Eastern -Central Europe.

Keywords : Europe, identity, history, spatiality, Turkey, Russia, East -Central Europe

Acknowledgments

I thank all who contributed in the completion of this thesis. I am so grateful to Prof.
Gianni Silei to support me and all students in searching a different perspective in what
we study with professionalism and competence. I thank Prof. Daniele Pasquinucci who
believed in my work deciding to be here as assistant supervisor. Finally, I thank my
family who encouraged me throughout the t ime of my research.

Table of Contents

Introduction
Chapter I: Historical and Spatial ‘otherness’ p. 1
1. Discourse and Identity p. 2
1.1 A social perspective about the ‘self’ and a ‘social order’ p. 4
1.2 ‘Otherness’ as an ethnographic tool p. 6
1.3 A ‘continental philosophical’ approach p. 9
1.4 Two ways of ‘othering’ p. 15
2. Historical and spatial identity in the International Relations Context p. 18
2.1 Criticism about the most used ‘historical othering’ p. 21
3. Throwback to historical and spatial dimension of ‘othering’ p. 23
3.1 ‘East’ as a European reality and m ethodology p. 26
Chapter II: The ‘Wild’ Turkey p. 31
1. The case of the ‘Turkish other’: a first genealogy p. 32
1.1 ‘Facing’ the Turkish other p. 37
1.2 ‘Civilising’ the Turkish other p. 41
1.3 ‘Devaluating’ the Turkish other p. 44
2. The ‘civilizational alliance’ p. 46
2.1 ‘European in -group’ as a matter of ‘absorbing integration’ p. 51
Chapter III: The ‘Shady’ Russia p. 60
1. A question of ‘mind’ p. 61
1.1 The ‘irony’ of cartography: the ‘invention’ of Eastern Europe p. 62
1.2 The upcoming ‘Russian other’ p. 70
1.3 “Have you ever met a communist?” p. 80
1.4 C onsolidating ‘Russian other’ p. 84
1.5 “Stagnating” the ‘Russian other’ p. 90
2. ‘Updating Russian other’ p. 94
2.1 Eurocentrism versus Eurasianism p. 95
2.2 Eu -Russia relations: a question of norms p. 102
Chapter IV: The ‘Underrated’ Central Europe p. 105
1. The reasons of a ‘concept’ p. 106

1.1 Eas t or West? A gap of civilisation p. 108
1.2 The ‘spectrum’ of Middle -earth p. 116
1.3 ‘(Post)Colonization’ of the Middle -earth p. 119
1.3.1 ‘The Polish case’ p. 120
Concluding remarks p. 128
Appendix 138
Bibliography p. 148

I
Introduction

Since the process of European integration began, many have stressed the importance
of establishing a European identity.1 They affirmed the necessity of citizen’s
identification with a supranational organization to its development into a possible
political community. Official attempts started foll owing this way by the early 1970s.
The Paris Summit Conference,2 the second Summit Conference of the Heads of State
and Government, called on the initiative of President Pompidou in Copenhagen on 14 –
15 December 1973, emerged in a Declaration on European id entity:
“The nine countries affirm their common will that Europe should speak
with one voice in important world affairs. They adopted the declaration on
the European identity, which defines, with the dynamic nature of the
Community in mind, the principles which are to underlie their action”3
A success claimed by the politics of the identity of the European Union has been
related to the possibility of adopting a European Constitution with the aim “to bring
citizens closer to European design and European inst itutions”.4 The Treaty was signed
on October 2004, but the French and Dutch voters rejected the document in May and
June 2005, ending the process of ratification.5 Whatever Europe is, it is of course
characterized by a specific feature: ‘diversity’. “Some” decided to place this diversity
at the base of European identity. The point is how it has developed and how it is

1 E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: political social and economic forces, 1950 -1957 , Stanford University Press,
Stanford, 1958, p. 16.
2 See The Paris Declaration , Bull. EC 10 -1972, Part 1, Chap. I, http://aei.pitt.edu/56272/1/BUL090.pdf , online
access July 2, 2018.
3 Declaration on the European Identity , Bull. EC 12 -1973, pp. 118 -122,
https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9 -9c69 -4b7d -b2c9 -f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf ,
online access July 2, 2018.
4 Preface, Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe , CONV 850/03, Brussel s, 18 July 2003,
http://european -convention.europa.eu/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf , online access July 2, 2018.
5 P. Hainsworth, France Says No: The 29 May 2005 Referendum on the European Constitution , Parliamentary
Affairs , V ol. 59, Issue 1, 1 Jan 2006, pp. 98 -117, https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsj015 , online access July 2, 2018; A.
R. T. Schuck, C. H. De Vreese, The Dutch No to the EU Constitution: Assessing the Role of EU Skepticism and
the Campaign , Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties , V ol. 18, Issue 1, 1 Feb 2008, pp. 101 -128,
https://doi.org/10.108 0/17457280701858656 , online access July 2, 2018.

II
nowadays ‘pitched’ against ‘other international identities’. It is not difficult to come
across questi ons that, from the nineties, mark the c urrent debate: Is Turkey believable
as as European Union’s country? Is there a ‘common’ European history? Does
enlargement to the ‘East’ represent a shift from ‘old Europe’ to ‘new Europe?’ Why
Russia is not ‘commonly’ in Europe? These are not questions ab out European
institutions or European Union’s structure, b ut about ‘identity’. Or, we may also say,
about a common sense of Europe.
Adapting the Charles de Gaulle’s positions about “ une certaine idée de la France ”6
and taking into account a sub stantial li terature, we have a “certain idea of Europe” . It
is something that remind us the Roman Empire; the Latin and Greek heritage;
Christianity and its own mediation. Then, the Renaissance and the long way to the
European modernity made by the scientific revolut ion. The conflict between
Lutheranism and Catholicism, the Reformation and Counter -Reformation. European
history gave some contents to a European ideal, shaping “a community of values”.
There are two problems here. First, the European Union is usu ally cons idered as
‘Europe’ ( ‘something’), and , as a membership group, it shows some difficulties to
understand wha t people describe as Europe ( ‘somewhere’).7 Secondly, moving from
that, we may contest the notion of ‘Europe’. Geographically, culturally and
historic ally. G eographically: many locate the E astern European border along the Ural
Mountains, the Ural River, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus Mountains, the Black Sea,
the Bosporus and Dardanelles. However, it is a border drawn historical circumstances,
and by no ‘natural’ means . The cultural criticism is quite linked t o the historical.
According to B ritish historian Norman Davies, European history cannot be accused of
Eurocentrism:
“Eurocentrism is a matter of attitude, not content. It refers to the traditional
tendency of European authors to regard their civilization as superior and
self-contained, and to neglect the need for taking non -European viewpoints
into consideration. Nor is it surprising or regrettable to find that European

6 See C. de Gaulle, The complete war memoirs of Charles de Gaulle , V ol. 1 -3, Simon and Schuster, NY , 1967 .
7 R.B.J. Walker, Europe Is Not Where It Is Supposed to Be , in M. Kelstrup and M.C. Williams, Intern ational
Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community , Routledge, London,
2006, p. 17.

III
history has mainly been written by Europeans and for Europeans”8
It is a crucial point to claim that European identity has been built by re -launching a
dualism conflict: Western and Eastern. Now as then, fighting the ‘East’ means facing
what is ‘not civilized’, unknown, different from t he European way to see itself and the
world . Hippocrates, the Greek physician, already saw this clash of civilization between
‘Europeans and Asiatics ’ around the fourth and fifth centuries BC:
“Those Persian Wars saw a Greek David overcome the Asiatic Gol iath […]
the Europeans were courageous but aggressive and bellicose, while Asiatics
were wise and cultivated […] Europeans were committed to liberty, for
which they were prepared to fight and even die. Their favourite political
regime was democracy. As iatics, on the other hand, were content to accept
servitude and barbarian despots”9
No wonder that Hippocrates could feel such a sense of conflict, rather the fact he lived
in the Kos island, in front of the ancient Halicarnassus, virtually the present -day
Turkey, which clearly was not considered as part of the (known) West. Even less today,
given the concerns on its accession to the European Union. The image of the ‘others’
persisted down the centuries. What we usually describe as the ‘search’ for Europe’ s
identity is a continuous identity -making process. Basically, from an analytic point of
view, European identity has been constructed through practices of ‘othering’
generating ‘difference’ against what is not ‘Western’. This is particular ly importance in
the modern international context. While the E uropean Union “tried” to open to the
possibility of the construction of a political identity through a less exclusionary
practice, historical and spatial ‘otherings’ have remained more important in the
discourse on European identity.
The aim of this work is to demonstrate how European ‘self’ has been built according to
exclusive and antagonistic practices taking into account three ‘Eastern others’: Turkey,
Russia and Eastern -Central Europe. The European practice s have such a historical and
spatial dimension. Any history of Europe cannot be told without reference to such

8 N. Davies, Europe: A History , Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 16.
9 J. Le Goff, The Birth of Europe , John Wiley & Sons, NY , 2009, p. 8.

IV
Eastern types of ‘others ’. The point is how the European identity -making process
conducted Europe toward the “clash of civilization” despite the g oals of the European
integration process.

1
Chapter I
Historical and Spatial ‘otherness’

2
1. Discourse and Identity

There is a certain difficulty of interpretation when we recall the concept of ‘identity’. Pe rsonal
identity, Paul Ricoeur pointed out, develops in the so -called ‘recognition’ through a work of
(re)construction.10 Therefore, ‘identity’ is not only individual but also socio -historical,
requiring a comparison with ‘otherness’. We are talking about a process constantly in fieri . We
need to get out of the reasoning contrary to change and finding a compromise, weakening the
narcissistic claims of identity and re-evaluating the role of ‘othernes s’. When Vincent
Descombes tried to solve the embarrassment w ith the ‘self -presentation’ ( «Qui suis -je?», «Qui
sommes -nous? »),11 Erik Erikson made it clear that the ‘self’ should interact with the social
and cultural environment in which it realizes itself.12
The sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu assigned a crucial role to the
‘representation’ in the construction of personal or collective identity. The ‘representations’ are ,
more or less , institutionalized: region, nation, Europe.13 ‘Identity’ is an image built in a clash
of representations and continuous d efinition, in which we classify something or someone and
we are classified as well. The possibility of imposing a definition of ‘self’, or of the social
order we are talking about, is at stake. Then, the identity -making process becomes a relational
phenome non: with or against someone or something:
“Thus, society is made -up of many different universe (which I call social fields),
autonomous and with their own laws […] being dominant. Each field, making
itself, produces a form of interest […] in a hierarc hy of power relations, compet ing
with one another”14
The sociologist Jean-Claude Ka ufmann, in an interesting work Identités: La bombe à
retardement ,15 highlighted three substantial mistakes studying ‘identities’ in the current social
and political context. F irst, it is assumed that identity is based only on shared history, cultural
roots and the individuals’ membership to a certain institution. The second mistake is linked to

10 P. Ricoeur, Le ‘soi’ digne d’estime et de respect , in Le respect. De l’estime à la déférence: une question de
limite , dirigé par C. Audard, coll. Autrement, série Morales, no. 10, Paris, 1993, p. 89 -99.
11 V. Descombes, Les embarras de l’identité , NRF Essais, Gallimard, Paris 2013, p. 282,
https://hal.archives -ouvertes.fr/halshs -00869564/ , online access June 12, 2018.
12 E.H. Erikson, I cicli della vita. Continuità e mutamenti , Armando Editore, Roma 1999.
13 P. Bourdieu, Risposte. Per un’antropologia riflessiva , Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 1992, p. 80ss.
14 P. Bourdieu , Ragioni pratiche , Il Mulino, Bologna, 2009 (1994), p. 142ss.
15 J.C. Kaufmann, Identités, la bombe à r etardement , les édition Textuel, Paris, 2014.

3
the first: if identity is perceived in the recognition of belonging to an institutio n, or defined by
a cultural matrix to which we are referable as a particular community, then our subjectivity
and actions will not emerge in any analysis. Third, the idea that identity is a phenomenon
characterized by a specific ‘fixity’. We should reflect on these conclusions, because due to
those limits (or ‘mistakes’) we undervalue the ‘ individuals ’ openness’ and ‘otherness’, feeding
‘integralist representations’ of identity and ‘comparison’ between cultures. It seems like the
paradox we deduce from the article 167(1) TFEU ( previously, Article 151 TEC, previously
Article 128 of Treaty of Maastricht): “ The Union shall contribute to the flowering of the
cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity” but “ at
the same t ime bringing the common cultural he ritage to the fore” .16
‘Identity’ fascinates and “worries” intellectuals. Only by drawing an evolutionary path on the
formation of European identity, it is possible to understand its importance in a system of
International Relations. Greater awareness of the conceptual self/other issue may give an
ontological status to the various subjects involved in world politics. Western (‘European’)
perception influences the international context in which political, social and economic
relations between States exist.
We should trace that evolutionary path through which Western self/other concepts have
developed. The social perspective introduces the two others, respectively the ethnographic
and the philosophical paths.

16 Treaty On The Functioning Of The European Union , Part III: Union Politics and Internal Actions, Title XIII:
Culture, Article 167, Official Journal of the European Union, C 202/1, V ol. 59, 7 June 2016, https://eur –
lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12016E167 , online access June 12, 2018.

4
1.1 A so cial perspective about the ‘self’ and a ‘social order’

We find a first theoretical speculation about the ‘self’ in relation to a ‘social order’ in the city –
states of the Eastern Mediterranean area17 during the Iron Age, which has profoundly and
permanently changed the society of some cultures, especially in Europe. The aforementio ned
speculation corresponds to “ the human understanding that there is a choice to be made as to
with whom and how one will live […] that what one does be noticed and remembered, be
made part of the past, that one has an identity” .18
There is also a pre -reflective way of ‘self’ and ‘social order’, better seen in Homeric po ems.
Arthur Adkins argued that “ Homeric man, […] has a psychology and a physiology in which
the parts are more in evidence than the whole ,”19 relating those to the social order in which
the Greeks found t hemselves, a world centered on “ the status of competitive excellence, the
paramount importance of success and failure, and the irrelevance or intentions in evaluat ing
the success and fa ilures”20 of human being. Adkins investigated the long transformation o f the
‘self’ idea from that of “many” to the stoic notion of “one” . It was based on the ability to
clearly differentiate between those of th eir own tribe (group) an d ‘others’. By the creation of
business models in the Eastern Mediterranean area and the regularization of human
interactions in the city -states, different forms an d patterns of human relations grew up,
quickly identifying the principles of the political o rganization.
Although it may be difficult to believe it, the ‘self’ idea with unique and special potentials has
reached into modernity. Starting from Humanism, a more evident gen ealogy of the Western
self took shape, coinciding with the “separation” concep tualized by Descartes, forging the
identity -making processes from the seventeenth century onwards. The rising technical and
scientific Western rationality has contributed to reveal the gap between an ‘active self’ and an
‘unconscious other’, waiting for a rational “intervention”, strengthening the Western identity
through caesura and distances. In this ‘hiatus’ of the vision , separating the ‘ self’ from the
‘observed thing’, t he ‘self’ constitutes itself start ing from the ‘other’. Michel Foucault
identified a scopic regime21 to precisely describe the ‘eye’s epistemology’ that characterizes
the Western culture since the Renaissance. It acts on the perception through the distance

17 T. B. Strong, The Self and the Political Order , NYU Press, NY , 1992, p. 9.
18 Ibidem .
19 Ivi, p. 34.
20 Ibidem .
21 M. Cometa, S. Vaccaro, Lo sguardo di Foucault , Meltemi, Roma, 2007, pp. 21 -23.

5
between observer and observed, and through the hierarchical differentiation, the do mination
and control, that this distance brings with it.22
In From The Native’ s Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding , the
American anthropologist Cliff ord Geertz efficiently described the question by emphasizing
the ‘peculiarity’ of the Western conception of ‘self’:
“The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less
integrated motivational and cognitive universe; a dynamic center of awareness,
emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set
contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural
background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea
within the c ontext of the world’s cultures”23
Almost all the social theory’s literature on the co llective identity depends on an
anthropomorphic process of human organizations. Moreover, because of a certain
‘presumption’ in consolidating a privileged position of European cultural roots in international
society, the Western conception of ‘self’ manife sts itself by influencing world polit ics.
Professor Hedley Bull talked about a global internation al society as the outcome of a
“European international society” .24 As the society expanded, some common values and
assumptions have been linked to the internati onal affairs’ practices. Professor Bull forcefully
pointed out the acceptance of these shared norms is a crucial step in transforming the Western
system into a global society, in which non -Western members (‘the others’) should accept the
basic rules and in stitutions of that society.25 This final assumption leads us to the ethnographic
path.

22 Ibidem .
23 C. Geertz, Local Knowledge: Essays in Interpretive Anthropology , Basic Books, New York, 1983, p. 59.
24 J. O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West in International Relations Thought: From Spengler to Said , Palgrave
Macmillan, UK, 2002, p. 122.
25 Ibidem .

6
1.2 ‘Otherness’ as an ethnographic tool

“In dichotomies crucial for the practice and vision of social order the differentiating power
hides as a rule behind one of the members of the opposition. The second member is but the
other of the first, the opposite (degraded, suppressed, exiled) side of the first and its creation.
Thus abnormality is the other of the norm […] stranger the other of the native, enemy the othe r
of friend, ‘them’ the other of ‘us’ ,”26 Bauman asserted .
Basically, ‘otherness’ is an outcome. “A dominant group in -group (‘us’, the ‘self’) makes a
process of construction according to which a dominated out -group (‘them’, ‘other’) is created
by stigmati zing a real or imagined difference ”.27 Bourdieu’s ‘representation’ principles are
quite evident, but there is something more. The in -group marking out is an active part of
identity -making process. T he creation of social boundaries is not a consequence of in tegration
but one of its key ingredients.28 The asymmetry in power relationships also becomes a tool to
improve that ‘standardisation’ of which the American historian Elizabeth Eisenstein talked
about,29 developing a “collective individualism”. This oxymoron well explains the ‘European
logic fence’ to stereotype the ‘others’ (specially thanks to the politics and media contribution).
According to the ethnocentric pattern, the ‘self’ values and distinguishes itself from ‘others’
whom it devalues. Some anthropol ogists focused on these specific phenomena. Claude Lévi
Strauss called ‘auto -ethnonyms’ the in -groups calling themselves the ‘real people’ and ‘real
humans’, essentially considering the out -group ‘not -human’.30 Applying the Lévi Strauss’
scheme (used for hi s study on indigenous people) we may find out that the term ‘European’ is
reserved for a special ‘type’: itself . ‘European’ is a self -image as unique and exclusive notion.
This kind of ‘ethnocentrism’ might also be built up including the findings of the Br azilian
anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, who talked about the self -image referring to a
‘social condition’.31 Specifically, if we use the Viveiros de Castro’s study in European terms,

26 See Z. Bauman, Introduction: the Quest for Order , in Modernity and Ambivalence , John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
27 J.F., Staszak, Other/Otherness , International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, Elsevier, NY, 2008, p. 2.
28 E. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society , Free Press, New York, (1893) 1964, pp. 115 -122.
29 E.L. Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe , Cambridge Univers ity Press, Cambridge,
2005, pp. 56ss.
30 C. Lévi Strauss (1952), Race and History , in C. Lévi Strauss, Structural Anthropology , V ol. 2, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983, pp. 323 -362.
31 E. Viveiros de Castro, Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Pers pectivism , The Journal of the Royal
Anthropologica l Institute, V ol. 4, No. 3, Sep 1998 , pp. 469 – 488,
http://etnologija.etnoinfolab.org/dokumenti/79/2/2012/Eduardo_Viveiros_de_Castro_ –
_Cosmological_Deixis_and_Amerindian_Perspectivism_2401.pdf , access online June 12, 2018.

7
the result could refer to the possibility that the word ‘Europe an’ functions “pragmatically
when not syntactically, ” indicating “the position of the subject ” as “enunciative marker, not
name” .32 Far from manifesting a semantic shrinking of a common name to a proper name, but
moving in the opposite direction, going from substantive to perspective, using ‘European’ as a
collective pronoun : ‘we Europeans/us’.
Going back to Lévi Strauss there is a question quite interesting for the current research:
“whether human societies are not defined (with regard to their mutual rela tionship) by a
certain optimum diversity beyond which they could not go, but below which they should not
go either without endangering themselves ”.33 He explicitly answered in the affirmative, but he
highlighted that, even if ‘diversity’ is a precondition o f rapid progress through coalition and
collaboration, those coalition and collaboration also threatened this precondition (becoming
eurocentrism and ethnocentrism):
“[H]umanity must hold it as a sacred duty to keep the two terms of this
contradiction in m ind. […] It must, naturally, avoid a blind particularism which
would tend to reserve human status for one race, one culture, or one society; but it
must also never forget that no fraction of humanity should dispose of formulae
which could be applied to all , and that a humanity merged into a single way of life
is inconceivable, because it would be an ossified humanity”34
Fredrik Barth proposed the ‘boundaries’ as markers of identity.35 The ethnographic path, as
collective identity -making process, might be exam ined by maintaining the ‘boundaries’. They
divide the ‘self’ to the ‘others’ developing from the inside to the outside action. Even if such
systems would seem based on a relatively high degree or rigidity in the ‘interactional
‘boundaries ,’ they do not imp ly ipso facto the same rigidity in the patterns of other
phenomena.36 As matter of fact, the use of ‘boundaries’ implies markers of identity and
interactions allow ing the cultural and social difference and separation : “The organizational
feature which […] must be general for all inter -ethnic relations is a systematic set of rules
governing inte rethnic social encounters”.37

32 Ibidem.
33 C. Lévi Strauss (1952), Race and History , cit., p. 327.
34 Ibidem , p. 361.
35 F. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The social organization of Culture Difference , Waveland Press,
Chicago, 1998.
36 Ivi, p. 21.
37 Ivi, p. 16.

8
Historically speaking, Greeks fought the ‘barbarians’ (Persians). The ‘barbarians’ did not
know the logos and were not familiar with de mocracy.38 ‘Otherness’ has been firstly included
into spatial ‘boundaries’ (countries, zones, continents). After that, the construction of
‘otherness’ required a ‘hierarchy’ of civilization and ‘western’ universal principles or criteria
to develop the compa rison. Culture and politics fulfilled that role until the upcoming
Christianity and Islam, opposing the ‘believer self’ to the ‘unbeliever others’. Humanism and
Renaissance opened the way to Westerners to find new elements to classify societies. The new
‘organized’ societies shaped a hierarchy dividing ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’. From the
nineteenth century onwards, anthropology and ethnology sought to ‘scientifically’ explain that
hierarchy. Of course, thinking about the ‘civilized’ as different to the ‘uncivilized’ we justify
the supremacy’s fundament according to which the (Western) ‘self’ has been legitimized to
dominate the (Eastern) ‘others’.
The Professor Edward Said explicitly talked about the so -called ‘orientalism’.39 The ‘Western
self’ construc ted the ‘Eastern otherness’ through the same stigmatizing stereotypes, promoting
a collective identity -making process in opposition to them. The West thereby gained the right,
if not duty, to dominate the East, to save itself from incivility, barbarity, de spotism,
superstition, decadence, etc.
Although the ethnographic path seems to provide a complete framework for the development
of the research object of the present study, it is worth pointing out that the process of
formation of the European identity al so includes a ‘continental philosophical’ path.

38 A. Kasravi, Persians: uncivilized savages or just non -Greek? Use of the word Barbarian in Herodotus ’
Histories , Iran Chamber Society, April 2016,
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/pdfs/persians_just_non_greek.pdf , online access June 18, 2018.
39 cfr. E .W. Said, Orientalismo , Feltrinelli, Milano, 2001 .

9
1.3 A ‘continental philosophical’ approach

“The movement is simply the double movement of the two self -consciousnesses.
Each sees the other do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the
other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the
same. […] The middle term is self -consciousness which splits into the extremes
[…] It is aware that it at once is, and is not, another consciousness, and equally
that this other is for itself only when it supersedes itself as being for itself, and is
for itself only in the being -for-self of the other. Each is for the other the middle
term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and
each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own account, which
at the same time is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves
as mutually recognizing one another”40
Hegel might be considered the first who argued about the po ssibility that through the
recognition of the ‘other’, the ‘self’ deny (or not) this recognition and contextually constitute
itself. Hegel reformed the current Kant’s vision opening the way to a transcendental subject of
experience in a socio -historical di mension.41 Basically, we should refer to the most famous
‘Master -Slave Dialectic’ broadly debated in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit . Its ambiguity
influenced intellectual community promoting flexi ble interpretations, specially “ finding a
place in Marxism, psychoanalysis, and postcolonial studies to name but a few disciplines –
fundamentally in any critical discourse that wrestles with some idea of the “other” as that
against which you define yourself”.42
French research strengthened the Hegel’s philosophical tradition “as a follower of a
philosophical tradition governed by solipsism and individualism, but also perpetuate two
traditional concepts; to wit, otherness as something threatening that must be overcome and
self-other relationships as inexorably violent ”.43 The pra ctices of ‘othering’ and the concept of

40 G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’ s Phenomenology of Spirit , transl. by A.V . Miller, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1977, p. 112.
41 A. de Laurentiis, J. Edwards, The Bloomsbury Companion to Hegel , A&C Black, UK, 201 3, p. 237.
42 A. Cole, What Hegel’ s Master/Slave Dialectic Really Means , Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies,
34(3):577 -610, October 2004,
https:// www.academia.edu/2493268/_What_Hegels_Master_Slave_Dialectic_Really_Means_ , online access
June 12, 2018.
43 C. Sims , Othe rness Matters: Beauvoir, Hegel and the ethics of recognition , University of Stellenbosch, 2009 ,
SA, http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/1948 , online access June 12, 2018.

10
‘the other’ guide us to some implications shaping a sort of “logic of othering”. For instance ,
Turkish Professor Engin Isin has highlighted how the logic of othering, rather than a logic of
exclusion, is produced by the citizen. On the one hand:
“The logic of exclusion assumes that the categories of strangers and outsiders,
such as women, slaves, peasants, metics, immigrants, refugees, and clients, pre –
existed citizenship and that, once defined, it excluded them. The logic of
exclusion presupposes that the excluding and excluded are conceived as
irreconcilable; that the excluded is perceived in purely negative terms, having no
property of its own, but merely expressing the absence of the properties of the
other; that t hese properties are essential; that the properties of the excluded are
experienced as strange, hidden, frightful, or menacing; that the properties of the
other; and the exclusio n itself…is actuated socially”44
On the other hand, the logic of othering also suggests that the citizen and its ‘others’ are
simultaneously part of the same logic. Thus “slaves were not simply excluded from
citizenship but made citizenship pos sible by their very formulation” .45
Back to French points of view , ‘the other’ became cruci al because it has been used to draw a
wide range of interrelated ideas. Specifically, we distinguish three main different ‘others’ for
three different thinkers.
Emmanuel Levinas’ other, according to which it is another ‘individual or body’, unintelligible
to the ‘self’ .46 Levinas confers an important role to the ‘other’, overturning the cartesian
Western thought of the ‘insignificant other’ and the Hobbesian enemy wi thout a ‘face’.
Levinas pointed out the Hegelian solipsistic negation of the other as a repugnance f or the
proximity of the other: “ The proximity of the Other, the proximity of the neighbour, is in
being an ineluctable moment of the revelation of an absolu te presence (that is, disengaged
from every relation), which express itself. His very epiphany consists in soliciting us by his
destituti on in the face of the Stranger”.47 He tried to imagine the ‘other neighbour’ as part of
the self -constitution through a ‘other -as-neighbour’ relationship, by which the ‘self’ is
responsible for that ‘other’, and vice versa.
Simone de Beauvoir built ‘the other’ as a ‘self -other distinction’. The ‘other’ is in opposition

44 E.F. Isin, Being political: Genealogies of citizenship , University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2002, p. 3.
45 Ivi, p. 4.
46 See E. Levinas, Time and the Other: (and Additional Essays) , Duquesne University Press, Paris, 1987.
47 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority , Springer Science & Business Media, Netherlands,
1979, p. 78.

11
to the ‘self’, and the ‘self’ in opposition to that ‘ot her’. Going beyond the ‘feminism’,48 de
Beauvoir’s ‘other’ as a category come first the division man/woman: “ otherness is a
fundamental category of human thought; the category of the Other is as pri mordial as
consciousness itself” .49 No group “ ever sets itse lf up as the One without at once setting u p the
Other over against itself” .50 She argued that ‘other’ is essential for the identity, and
particularly for the ‘collective identity’. With de Beauvoir, we should mention Jean Paul
Sartre, who firstly inspired h er. He polarized the self/other opposition refusing Hegelian
ontological optimism. In Sartre’s L’Être et le néant: essai d’ontologie phénoménologique ,
separation and conflict are an ever -past condition involving both historical and social
dimension. As sel f/other, Master/slave relation is trapped in its conflict and mutual
incomprehension for all the time.51 Probably, we may summarize with the most famous qu ote
from the play ‘Huis Clos’: “ Alors, c’est ça l’enfer. Je n’aurais jamais cru…vous vous rappelez:
le soufre, le le bûcher, le gril…Ah! Quelle plaisanterie. Pas besoin de gril, l’enfer, c’est les
autres” .52
Finally, the Lacan’s work. Moving from Freud that used ‘ other’ as der Andere (“the other
person”) and das Andere (“otherness”), Lacan firstly spok e about ‘other’ as simply ‘other
people’. Then, “Lacan draws a distinction between the “little other” and the “big Other” (‘the
Other’), remaining crucial in the rest of his work ”.53 Lacan formulated “mathematical little
other a as a reflection of the self and big Other A as the ‘radically other.’ Lacan talked about
institutionalized relationships between the ‘self’ and those ‘others .’”54
There are two f aces of th e postmodern ‘other’ with associated ideas became near insepara bly
intersected:
“The apparent identity of what appear to be cultural units – human beings, words,
meanings, ideas, philosophical systems, social organizations – are maintained only

48 Simone de Beauvoir has been considered one of the most influential contemporary feminist, mainly for her
ideas about the logic of “equality and difference”.
49 F. Scarth, The Other Within: Ethics, Politics, and the Body in Simone de Beauvoir , Rowman & Littlefield,
Lanham, 2004, p. 102.
50 Ibidem.
51 See J.P. Sartre, L’Être et le néant: essai d’ontologie phénoménologique , Gallimard, Paris, 1943.
52 “So that is what hell is. I would never have believed it. You remember: the fire and brimstone, the torture..Ah!
The farce. There is no need for torture: Hell is oth er people”. J.P. Sartre, Huis Clos , Psychology Press, London,
1987, p. 95.
53 J. Lacan, The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud’ s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954 -55,
trans. Sylvana Tomaselli, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, Chapter 19.
54 See J. Lacan, Écrits: A Selection , trans. Alan Sheridan, Tavistock Publications, London, 1977.

12
through constitutive repression, an active process of exclusion, oppositi on, and
hierarchization. A phenomenon maintains its identity in semiotic systems only if
other units are represented as foreign or “other” through a hierarchical dualism in
which the first is privileged or favoured while the other is deprivileged or
devalu ed in some way. This process must itself be hidden or covered up, so that
the hierarchy can be assumed inherent in the nature of the phenomena, rathe r than
a motivated construction”55
We should not forget that Hegel influenced another intellectual who was i nterested in the
‘other’, but in terms of ‘alienation’. Marx identified the alienation from the nature; from
himself; from “species -essence” ( Gattungswesen ) and from others.56 The Marxist and
postmodernist thinkers tried to complete Marx’s missing points.
Jean-François Lyotard studied the “language games” about the conception of ‘other’.
According to the philosopher, the ‘other’ as a figure is the pragmatic function of the human
language:
“I is the who is speaking now; you is the one to whom this communicat ion is
currently addressed. You are silent when I speak, but you can speak, has spoken,
and will speak […] The instances I and you cannot merge […] are deictic […] are
alike […] In theory the human we does not precede but results from interlocution .
In this we the figure of the other remains clearly present […] The citizen is the
human individual whose right to address others is recognized by those others […]
It is important to distinguish the republican principle from the democratic fact […]
The individual of the demos is recognized as such not for his right to speak but for
his birth, language and historical heritage. These individual form a nation […]
Though possessed of interlocutory capacity, the democratic individual […] uses
the lang uage to signal emotions and actions to other… Homines […] The other
remains alien and does not enjoy the rights reserved to nationals. The very Greeks
who invented the politeia excluded barbaroi […] The figure of the other is that of
a threat weighin g on the national community from without, which cannot h elp but
undermine its integrity”57

55 L.E. Cahoone, From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology , Blackwell, Oxford, 1996, p. 11.
56 A. Swingewood, A Short History of Sociological Tho ught, Macmillan Publishers Limited, UK, 1984, Part I,
Chapter 3.
57 J.F. Lyotard, The Other Rights (1993), in The Belgrade Circle, O. Savic, Jean Baudrillard, The Politics of

13
According to Theodor Adorno, that threat perception will ever exist whatever
counterbalancing policy is made because of all the solutions will remain ‘palliative’. Th at’s
exactly why he feels there is a need to change this perception from the very beginning,
preventing the risk of achieving a sort of an ‘absolute identity’.58
Habermas bears that dialogic process to the forefront. He draws a project in which, the
congest ed liberal democracy is replaced by a ‘comprehensive’ deliberative democracy, based
on discourses of rational individuals with ‘others’. Considering that, Habermas dogmatization
is a matter of criticism. There is not any certain avanguarding turning point about the
guarantee that deliberative democracy. Moreover, his project is designed around an
ethnographical method, silently accepting ‘otherness’ and the ‘other’. Habermas, in his
subsequent works, renouncing to Marx for shifting to Kant, continued to pur sue to examine
the process of establishing a European identity and the conditions of cosmopolitan
citizenship.59 In other words, there was a chance to re -think the ‘other’ in light of peace.
However, this chance blurred his boundaries when ‘the other’ back progressively to become
again the ‘stranger’ or the ‘enemy’.
Carl Schmitt, to begin with, expanding the scenario to the institutions, claimed that a state is
considered to be united against an ‘enemy’. If a state fails in this enterprise, another
‘author ity’ will immediately be ready to question that ‘unity’ and take its place:
“The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not
appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage
with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger;
and it is sufficient to this nature that he is, in an especially intense way,
existentially something different and alien, so that in th e extreme case conflicts
with him are possible. These can neither be decided by a previously determined
general norm nor by the judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral third
party ”60
Nietzsche spoke of “nutrition instincts ,” “expulsion instinc ts» and “assimilatio n instincts” .61

Human Rights , Verso Books, USA, 2002, pp. 182 -3.
58 See T. Adorno, Negative Dialect ics, trans. E.B. Ashton, Taylor & Francis e -Library, 2004.
59 See J. Habermas, The Divided West , John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2014.
60 (personal translation) C. Schmitt, Le categorie del «Politico»: saggi di teoria polit ica, (a cura di) G. Miglio, P.
Schiera, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1972, pp. 108 -109.
61 F. Semerari, Il predone, il barbaro, il giardiniere: il tema dell'altro in Nietzsche , EDIZIONI DEDALO, Bari,
2000, p. 13.

14
But there is more: otherness is the will of evil . And to represent this type of relationship he
used the ‘barbarian’ as a clear image of it, made the ‘self’ suffering the evil (‘other’).62
Georg Simmel, went further. Modernity exaggerates thi s rapprochement with the ‘other’ and
sharpens a widespread sense of strangeness thus producing “ a tension that can be channelled,
but not dissolved, between forces that bring together and unify and for ces that drive away and
divide”.63 In this dynamic, the stranger ( Fremdsein )64 is fixed in the framework of a structural
ambiguity of relationships and it “ assumes a characteristic and, at the same time, emblematic
form of the social relations proper to modernity”.65

62 Ibidem .
63 B. Giacomini, Relazione e alterità. Tra S immel e Lévinas , Il Poligrafo, Padova 1999, p. 87
64 B. Accarino, La democrazia insicura. Etica e politica in Georg Simmel , Liguori, Napoli 1982, pp. 169 -170.
65 B. Giacomini, Relazione e alterità , p. 87.

15
1.4 Two ways of ‘othering ’

Merging the results of the previous analysis about th e three main paths of otherness it is
possible to distinguish two different kinds of ‘others’. For this purpose, ‘othering’ may
develop into a simple or complex form. Both developed in a different kind , but linked . As we
said before the identity -constitution process requires a struggle of opposition . The ‘ self’ builds
its ‘counterpart’ in a clash with it through a hierarc hical process . We may observe the basic
distinction between the in -group and the out -groups because the hierarch ical process implies a
common sense of superiority provided by the in -group against the out -group considered
inferior.
Moving from the Hegelian and Marxist dialectic onward, the otherness’ construction acquired
more complex dimension.
The two ways of ‘othering’, imply the inside and outside process on the one hand; a deep
relationship between self and other in terms of self -determination, on the oth er. ‘Simple
others’ have not self-constitution features, but the gap between the two forms is not huge. The
reasonableness of the complex one lodges in its capacity to persuade and going beyon d the
hierarchy challenging the self-imposition attitude. It’s quite evident that the two kinds of
‘othering’ run up and down to the socio -ethnographic or continental -philosophical path.
Moreover, “the self tends to dominate his other through subjection or dehumanization ”.66 This
is generally implied when one speaks of superiority of the subject over another. Basically, the
self considers its other to be inferior or alien. A boundary is established along which the
processes of simple and complex othering run, justifying and nurturing exclusion or
subm ission. What we just explained might be represented according to the diagram below
(Figure 1).

66 C. Sims , Othe rness Matters: Beauvoir, Hegel and the ethics of recognition , cit.

16
Figure 1 . Othering Process

Both cases of ‘othering’ offer the tools to understand the third big dimension object of this
research. In -fact, the West (self ) and the East (others) othering -making process involves each
single path in shaping the ‘border’ that makes real the results just examined. Although,
Hegel’s heritage about the self -other identification and dissociation is based on an
individualistic appr oach, the ‘other’ should inevitably be intended as ‘social’. Thus, according
to the two types of othering above, (socio -ethnographic and philosophical, Figure 1), there is
no doubt we may apply the same conclusions because we are talking about of two big s ocial
groups.
This first particular analysis gives us some specific tools to understand more in detail in
which way it is possible to place the relation between Europe and those countries we define as
‘others’ in terms of self/other relations. But it is n ot enough.
The European integration involves all those debates related to the possibility to constitute a
European identity in a ‘temporal’ and ‘spatial otherness’. Europe’s o ther should be founded in
its own ‘past’ also characterised by a principle of ‘s patial’ exclusivity, in all which socio –

17
ethnographic and continental philosophical paths develop. Basically, Europe is composed by a
good number of ‘sovereign’ nation -states that, never as today, improve the European
fragmentation. Current Europe apparentl y builds itself as an ‘open peace project’, but it
necessary requires a ‘historical’ and ‘spatial’ Other to ‘identify’ itself.
Thus, Europe’s self -constitution has always been based through an ‘othering’ process that
tried to ignore. This statement implies a deep intervention into the fundamental conditions
characterising what Gayat ri Spivak called the ‘ontopological place’. She used this term during
a conference in New Zealand in 2010. She went across what her ‘master’ defined as a “ the
topos of territor y, native soil, body in general ,”67 “an axiomatic linking indissociably the
ontological value of present -being [ on] to its situation”.68 Indeed, she demonstrated something
more sophisticated th an exclusion. The author distilled the foundations, categories and
concepts that all lead to t he name of Europe, speaking of “ foreclusion .”69 Native is the non –
native European foreclosed along with his own ability to inform himself, if not conforming to
the language that the (European) reason intends, then decrees.70
In the next section we will examine the discussion about the important link between
‘historical’ and ‘spatial’ othering needed before to identi fy the Europe’s o ther in a context of
international relations.

67 J. Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Dept , the Work of Mourning and the New International ,
Routledge, London, 1994, p. 82.
68 Ibidem .
69 Lacan introduced this term as an equivalent to Freud’s verwerfung or repudiation.
70 G.C. Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason , Harvard University Press, USA 1999, p. 4

18
2. Historical and spatial identity in the In ternational Relations Context

Very often, E uropean scholars investigate the new European integration project as the
potential tool to create a political community without the necessity to identify itself according
to a self -definition process that inevita bly implies ‘othering’, opening the way to that ‘logic of
peaceful pluralism’. Or better: on the one hand, the most traditional and known constructivists
and poststructuralists recognize ‘identity’ as not only based on own properties but in relation
to the ‘other’;71 on the other hand, their positions turn off the possibility to catch the
conceptual value of self/other relationship. Certainly, taking into account the fact that
European integration does not involve nothing else ‘entity’ all around the world, Europe
properly continues to be a spatial subject next to the ‘others’. In this regard, some intellectuals
highlighted the curre nt Europe’s Other is basically “ its own past which should not b e allowed
to become its future”.72 That might be wel l explained th inking about the E uropean goal to not
fall again in the collapse of antagonistic fragmentation of nation -states after the Westphalia
peace. Even if, the Westphalia peace is quite over -valuated in terms of historical watershed of
modern states, because at m ore deep analysis it developed rather gradually.73
Similarly, some argued that the E uropean practices of ‘historical othering’ were the first step
to start a process of self -definition after the Second World War. Unlike the potential ‘spatial
othering’, his torical or temporal ‘othering’ is a self -reflection way to link the ‘self’ with its
own history, which is not a concrete place of ‘otherness’ to achieve one’s own identity:
“otherings between geographically defined political entities tend to be more exclus ive and
antagonistic against out -groups than otherings with a predominantly temporal dimension ”.74
Thus, this way to conceptualize temporal othering reveal the impossibility to delineate
‘otherness’ to a real locus, where ‘self’s ontological uncertainty’ mi ght be ascribed. Likewise,

71 See A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, September
2012, p. 227, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612183 , online access June 6, 2018; and J. Ruggie, What
Makes the World Hang Together? Neo -utilitarianism and Social Constructivist Challenge , International
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 855 -885, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26 01360 , online access June 6, 2018.
72 O. Wæver, Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non -war Community , in Emmanuel Adler
and Michael Barnett (eds), Security Communities , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 90.
73 B. Teschke, Debating ‘The Myth of 1648’: State Formation, the Interstate System and the Emergence of
Capitalism in Europe, International Politics, 43, 2006, pp.531 –573,
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8256/0fdb99bec94525c67eb1bd2a3a29f65b6978.pdf , online access June 11,
2018.
74 T. Diez, ‘Europe’ s Others and the Return of Geopolitics’ , Cambridge Review of International Affairs, V ol. 17,
Issue 2, 2004, pp. 319 -335, https://doi.org/10.1080/0955757042000245924 , online access June 1, 2018.

19
it may be that renaissance of own E uropean past to threaten the “new upcoming identity”.
European ‘self’ will be never bolted and weakened again by a “clash with others”. Rather it
will set out on the undertaking for self -transce ndence, eliminating those elements of own past
from own present and future. So, when we ask what might be this ‘heavy past’ that Europe
tries to rewrite, we should answer relating to a E uropean background where many nation –
states exist; where borders prev ent the possibility to create a more broad ly shared identity;
where history is basically a ‘spatial othering’.
This pretentious settlement of the ‘othering’ issue through altering the issue itself pushes
Europe to that global level, where there is a proble m of accountability about the discourse of
the existence of a global Self in the absence of any determinate Other. Scholars have found a
solution using the ‘temporal othering’ itself to resolve the unavoidable of their thesis.
One of them moving from the Hegelian dialectic about the construction of subjectivity
through the conflict of recognition, he paradoxically concludes that the ‘world identity’,
which is ipso facto divested of the Other, whose recognition it usually searches, is not solely
possible bu t also inevitable. Specifically, adopting the logic of ‘global self ’, Alexander Wendt
stated that “ a world state could compensate for the absence of spatial differentiation through a
temporal differentiation between its present and its past […] In Hegel ian terms, we could say
that ‘history’ becomes the Other in terms of w hich the global Self is defined” .75 Discussing
the possibility of asserting as ‘history’ could be a ‘specific subject of recognition’, he also
contends that ‘identity’ might be built thro ugh an act of temporal self -differentiation.
But careful, as the anthr opologist Ralph Linton stated, “ The last thing a fish w ould ever notice
would be water” .76 Like fish do not notice the water in which they live, so the ‘Western
practices’ to ‘self -defin ition’ do not notice the incessant addiction in whi ch they move . Ergo,
what we usually describe as the ‘search’ for Europe’s identity is of course a continuous
identity -making process and there is nothing special about this. However, f rom an analytic
point of view, E uropean identity has been constructed through practices of ‘othering’
generating ‘difference’, historically and geographically. Historical e spatial ‘othering’ are
necessary interconnected.
Today Europe, taking into account its politics develop ment, makes us think and ask how
much we may consi der E uropean history, simply history or current present. Whether Europe
(or European Union) is still oriented to that European integration project of openness.

75 A. Wendt, ‘Why a World State is Inevitable’ , European Journal of International Relations, V ol. 9, Issue: 4 ,
December 2003, p. 527, https://doi.org/10.1177/135406610394001 , online access June 11, 2018.
76 Cit. in J.M. Henslin, Sociology: a down -to-earth approach , Allyn & Bacon, Boston, 1999, p. 36.

20
Whether Europe abandoned that attitude typical of a community as a complex and fruitful set
of experiences and of inexhaustible heritage of resources to only ‘boast’ about.
European scholars and intellectuals should admit that ‘othering’ in terms of historical and
spati al ‘foreclusion’ is still a defined reality in Europe, due to the empirical comeback of
Europe’s past in its present policies. Specially if we consider the International Relations
between Europe and its three ‘others’ that will be analysed in this study: Turkey, Russia and
Central -Easte rn Europe. ‘Others’ and ‘neighbours’.

21
2.1 Criticism about the most used ‘historical othering’

American historian Christopher Browning in his work The Internal/External Security
Paradox and the Reconstruction of Boundaries in the Baltic: The Case of Kaliningrad ,
showed the security paradox that Europe (EU) faces in employing its foreign policy. By
discussing the implications about the Kaliningrad question,77 he found many doubts related to
the re lations between Europe and its E aster n neighbour (Russia):
“On the one hand, the logical demands of internal EU security are seen to support
the need for a very strict border regime with Kaliningrad in order to prevent the
infiltration of crime and illegal immigration from the Russian enclav e. On the
other hand, the negative effects of EU enlargement on Kaliningrad threaten to
destabilize EU -Russian relations. In this respect, it is argued that in order to foster
the Union’s external security and enhance the EU -Russian relationship, the borde r
with Kaliningrad should be open and porous with the semi -integration of
Kaliningrad into the EU. On this reading, however, preserving external security
through opening up the EU's external border is seen to undermine internal societal
security, while mai ntaining a strict border regime in the interests of internal
security is, in turn, seen to undermine external security”78
In other w ords, EU intends to create an ‘E uropean zone of prosperity’ in the easter n border
but according to the ‘E uropean standards’ a nd improving that ‘external security’ in light of the
praised openness. However, EU should also to be cautious about the ‘potential threat’ coming
from Russia by reinforcing ‘internal security’ from the ‘other’ eastern neighbour. In this case,
does it not seem that historical and spatial othering coexist?
Thinking that an ‘historical othering’ may function according to the European logic of
denying its own past and ‘who’ has been part of that past in the light of a new post -modernist

77 Concerning the status of Kaliningrad Oblast as an exclave of Russia, collapsed in 1991 as USSR. Turned to
the West for investment and leadership, Kaliningrad own source of income and stability, with a massive military
presence, was withdrawn. Moreover, with the eastward enlarg ement of the EU and NATO, many fear that Russia
may remilitarize the region and possibly deploy nuclear weapons there. See R.J. Krickus, The Kaliningrad
Question , Rowman & Littlefield, USA, 2002.
78 C.S. Browning, The Internal/External Security Paradox and the Reconstruction of Boundaries in the Baltic:
The Case of Kaliningrad , Alternatives, V ol. 28, issue: 5, November 1, 2003, p. 545,
https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540302800502 , online access June 12, 2018.

22
politi cs, is impossible to consider. “ To argue that a community is solely based on temporal –
internal differentiation requires the presumption be made that the community is unequivocally
bounded, so that there is not the need to re -inscribe the boundary betwe en the self and
exter nal others” .79
To strengthen the current way to conceptualize ‘historical othering’ in a context of
International Relations, another scholar Pertti Joenniemi also pointed out Europe is a ‘peace
project’ trying to prevent what’s happened in its catastrophic past. Moreover , this type of
approach changed the relation between its past and the understanding of its present day
providing a sort of opening and less antagonist ic practices functional to the E uropean identity –
making process.80
The problem of the ‘histor ical othering’ like the attitude to refuse own past to obtain an ‘ideal
self’ results itself in the resurgence of the very same practices of ‘othering’. As long as the
interweaving of the temporal and spatial aspects of ‘othering’ will be placed as a mere
empirical contingency, it w ill be condemned to affect the E uropean world politics in the
context of International Relations. It will therefore be necessary to replace the discussion of
‘othering’ regarding the question of the way in which history and space enter the structure
itself of the act of ‘othering’.

79 B. Rumelili, Constructing Identity and Relating to Di fference: Understanding the EU’ s Mode of
Differentiation , Review of International Studies, V ol. 30, no. 1, Jan 2004, p. 46,
http://ww w.jstor.org/stable/20097897 , online access June 12, 2018.
80 P. Joenniemi, Re‐negotiating Europe’ s identity: The European neighbourhood policy as a form of
differentiation , Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 23, Issue: 3, 21 Nov 2011, p. 85,
https://doi.org/10.1080/ 08865655.2008.9695710 , online access, June 12, 2018.

23
3. Throwback to historical and spatial dimension of ‘othering’

Alexandre Kojève, Russian -born French philosopher, in his Introduction to the Reading of
Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology o f Spirit asserted:
“Now, the negated real is the real that has ceased to be: it is the past real, or the
real Past. Desire determined by the Future appears, in the Present , as a reality
(that is, as satisfied Desire) only on the condition that it has nega ted a real -that is,
a Past. The manner in which the Past has been (negatively) formed in terms of the
Future is what determines the quality of the real Present . And only the Present
thus determined by the Future and the Past is a human or historical Presen t”81
Moreover, in the related note highly explained:
“Indeed, we say that a moment is “historical” when the action that is performed in
it is performed in terms of the idea that the agent has of the future (that is, in terms
of a Project ): one decides on t he future war, and so on; therefore, one acts in terms
of the future . But if the moment is to be truly “historical”, there must be change ;
in other words, the decision must be negative with respect to the given: in
deciding for the future war, one decides against the prevailing peace. And,
through the decision for the future war, the peace is transformed into the past.
Now, the present historical act, launched by the idea of the future (by the Project),
is determined by this past that it creates: if the pea ce is sure and honorable, the
negation that relegates it to the past is the act of a madman or a criminal; if it is
humiliating, its negation is an act wo rthy of a statesman; and so on”82
The first perception is that ‘historical action’ seems it should be i nterpreted according to the
‘historical othering’ practice. All ‘othering’ are historical. If we apply the Kojève’s statesmen
to understand better the current E uropean ‘self -constitution’ we may discuss about the
possibility that after the Second World War launched an integration project by the “nihilation”
of its present as the result of a historical past’s self -constitution. And E uropean historical ‘self’
is not only represented by the anarchic fragmentation, sovereign territoriality, etc., but also by
a continuum process of ‘othering’ that involves ‘other’ actors. That’s why ‘historical action’

81 A. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit , Cornell University
Press, Ithaca -London, 1969, p. 135 -136
82 Ibidem .

24
through ‘historical othering’ cannot be considered alone but it necessary includes the ‘spatial
dimens ion’. Indeed, for ‘existing’ (empirically speaking), ‘history ’ should be negated
considering something tangible:
“In order that Time may exist, therefore, there must also be something other than
Time. This other thing is first of all Space (as it were, the place where things are
stopped). Therefore: no Time without Space; Time is something that is in Space.
Time is the negation of Space (of diversity) […] Therefore, Time must exist in a
World : it is indeed, then, something which “ ist da ”, as Hegel says, which is there
in a Space, and which is there in empirical Space-that is, in a sensible Space or a
natural World […] and if there were no real World that was annihilated, Time
would only be pure nothingness: there would be no Time […] Hence Time that is,
therefore, is indeed something that “exists empirically” -i.e., exists in a real Space
or a spatial World”83
So, historical action needs of some spatial locus where the past will be negated. Historical and
spatial ‘othering’ are two faces of the same coin because it is impossible to negate only
historically or spat ially, as the most part of scholars of history of International Relations
usually do. Basically, what should be the new present is simply the past.
Spatial othering is not simply an unfortunate complement of temporal self -constitution, but
rather the only way it can take place in empirical reality. In other words, the ‘self’ is
temporarily transcended by denying the ‘other’ in space and there is no possibility of
separating the two dimensions.
The past that Europe has changed launching the integration proc ess proves to be present today
as a territorial ‘other’: the strong opposition to the Visegrad Group, which represents that
post-communist Eastern Europe whic h reminds the worst example of E uropean conflicts; the
persistent refusal of Turkey as member of t he EU, recalling the attempt to control that
uncivilized Ottoman Empire outside the civil west; the persistent containment of Russia’s
initiatives, recalling the idea of ‘barbarians’ in front the doors of Europe.
It is easy to find in contemporary territ orial ‘othering’, the historical dimension, whereby the
concrete spatial is not in terms of totality, but rather as a phantom from one’s own past,
exhibiting the features that to possess. Thomas Diez, again, also notes, that the ‘historical
othering’ linke d to the ‘ spatial delimitation’ may push the possibilit y the ‘self’ to legitimize

83 Ivi, p. 137.

25
the “domination of the Other” on the grounds of the latter’s “backwardness ,”
“underdevelopment” and “ other mo des of being stuck in the past”.84 But the seminal work of
Edward Said, just broadly showed how Europe’s ‘others’ (neighbours), were never merely
considered as ‘spatial others’ but also intended in ‘historical’ relationships with Europe,
making possible the politics of tutelage, ‘development aid’ or ‘democracy promotion’ to
‘civilize’ them.85
As Kojève highlighted, the ‘other’ in ‘present evaluation’ linked to the own past ‘self’ in order
to escape potential exclusion, or asymmetry and hierarchical ‘inclusion’ is a long -lasting
circumstance, because the two modes of ‘other ing’ are at work together and assume their
effectiveness from their reciprocal operant -conditioning.
Obviously, a certain antagonism in the process of ‘othering’ is ontologically admissible as
well as verifiable. Many things “deserve” to be “annihilated” both spatially and historically.
However, what is the object of this criticism is the attitude to eradicate the spatial arrangement
of the ‘othering’, pretending not to recognize the importance of the ‘others’; and the
inclination to deny history by relega ting it to an ‘autonomous mode’ of ‘self -constitution’

84 T. Diez, Europe’ s Others , pp. 320 -1.
85 Cfr. E.W. Said, Orientalismo , cit.

26
3.1 ‘East’ as a European reality and methodology

“First of all, there is a value judgment (an axiological level): the other is good or
bad, I love or do not love him, or, […]  he is my equal or my inferior (for there is
usually no question that I am good and that I esteem myself). Secondly, there is
the action of rapprochement or distancing in relation to the other (a praxeological
level): I embrace the other’s values, I identify myself with him; or else I identify
the other with myself, I impose my own image upon him; between submission to
the other and the other's submission, there is also a third term, which is neutrality,
or indifference. Thirdly, I know or am ignorant of the other’s identity (this would
be the epistemic level)”86
The B ulgarian Cvetan Todorov’s masterpiece is the first to set up ‘dialogue’ with ‘otherness’
in a historical -spatial discursive sequence. Todorov showed how the relationship between
‘self’ and ‘other’ might follow the same thoughts that Hernan Cortés and Bartolomé de Las
Casas revealed about “the Indians”.87 “Las Casas knows the Indians less well than Cortés, and
he loves them more; but they meet in thei r common policy of assimilation”88 or submission
we may sa y. Todorov, basically, argued that if only ‘human collectives’ came to know one
another better, they would also act less fiercely toward one another.
But if Europe tends to distort what makes such an ‘ identity’ through a process of historical
and spatial ‘othering’, how does it claim to be able to start a process of integration whose
foreign policy is not tendentially exclusivist and oriented towards safeguarding internal
security?
It is necessary to recognize and retrace the history and the Eu ropean dimen sion in which the
‘European self’ has evolved, not denying it by ‘designing’ another history. An evolution path
of the ‘European self’ through three its ‘others’ and ‘neighbours’: Turkey (Chapter II), Russia
(Chapter II) and Eastern -Central Europe (Chapter IV).
Each of these three ‘others’ has played a different role in the E uropean self -constitution,
which will be argued in the last chapter by launching a provocation on the ‘bankruptcy of the

86 C. Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other , Harper and Row, New York, 1982, p. 185.
87 Hernán Cortés de Monroy y Pizarro Altamirano, Marquis of the Valley of Oaxaca (1485 -1547) was a spa nish
Conquistador famous for the fall of the Aztec Empire; Bartolomé de Las Casas was a spanish historian famous
for his writings ‘A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies ’ and ‘ Historia de Las Indias ’, about the
colonization of the West Indies.
88 C. Todorov, The Conquest of America , p. 185.

27
peoples’ in the traces of the work of the Italian philos opher Gi orgio Agamben (see Concluding
remarks ).
Why Turkey? As Lucien Febvre highlighted:
“The whole history of European civilization from the fourteenth century onwards
is the story of a progressive conquest of civilization by the laity, is the story of the
progressive appropriation by the laity of Christian civilization, is the history of the
systematic secularization of the whole culture from new forces, is the story of the
Church's subtraction of the highest cultural values; at the bottom of all this there is
Europe, Europe evoked in a very natural way by the pen of Sully, but still mixed
with a notion whose condemnation has since been marked, but which still
survives in the spirits: to the notion of Christianity ”89
Many ‘others’ were and actually are instrument al in the process of forging European identity.
From the clash with Islam and the Spanish colonisation to the end of 19th century onward,
European intellectuals should face ‘the Turk’ both historically and spatially. Socio –
ethnographic and continental phil osophical paths showed how much this ‘othering’ proces s
has been influential in the ‘E uropean self -constitution’. Moreover, Europe -Turkey relationship
pushes into a superior self/inferior other relationship in light of that simple ‘othering’ process.
The ‘ Turkey other’ has always been considered an uncivilized out -group that had to start all
the necessary practices to sit at the European tables to which he was invited as (unwelcome)
guest but not as a participant. This aspect is quite important because it p lays a key role in the
development of T urkish identity -making process along a completely cultural change of the
country, turning into a sort of ‘mimesis’ of its European other.90
Why Russia? As the R ussian poet Fëdor Ivanovič Tjutčev asserted, long time ago:
“To understand what is at stake in the supreme crisis in which Europe has entered,
it is necessary to understand that in it there are now only two powers: Revolution
and Russia. These two powers are today, on e in front of the other; tomorrow,
perhaps, they will collide ”91
The represe ntations of Russia concern the E uropean present as well as its future. It emerged

89 (personal translation) L. Febvre, L’Europa. Storia di una civiltà , Corso tenuto al Collège de France a.a. 1944 –
1945, (a cura di) T. Charmasson, Traduzione italiana di Adelina Galeotti, Donzelli Editore, Roma, 1999, p. 180
90 R. Malighetti, V . Matera, U. Fabietti, Dal tribale al globale: introduzione all' antropologia , B. Mondadori,
Milano, 2000, p. 182.
91 (personal translation) Quoted in G. Galli, Storia delle dottrine politiche , Pearson Italia S.p.a., Milano, 2 000,
pp. 244 -245.

28
from the ruins of a failed modernization strategy and is now launched in a project of
institutional ization supported by a policy that brings with it the historical memory of an
exclusion. The substantial problem of the European representation of the ‘Russian other’ has
always been characterized by the idea of dealing with something completely ‘alien’.
It is not questioned the fact that, for example, Russia has problems with human rights and the
protection of minorities, including political ones. Acts to be condemned as much as those of a
no less guilty Turkey. Rather, we argue that it has always be consi dered as an irregularity to be
kept at the ‘door’ of the ‘civil’ borders of Europe. That’s why it is possible to identify a
comp lex ‘othering’ type process of E uropean self -constitution.
Finally, why Eastern -Central Europe? As the polish writer Witold Gomb rowicz wrote:
“Until we differ from Europe we will never become a truly European nation –
because being European does not mean merging with Europe, but being a specific
and irreplaceable component. And again: only the opposition to the Europe that
created us can finally make us become someone with a life of their own. […] If I
did not glimpse it, I would not lose my time talking about unattainable things. I
am convinced that the Polish, in spite of the terror of being gagged at home and
the emptiness that is here that sucks him in, is desperately looking for himself ”92
That’s the point. Eastern -Central Europe took the shape of a Cold War moral appeal, claimed
by the Polish, Czech, Hungarian (and so on) politicians and intellectuals, to Western ‘civil’
socie ty. Later, European intellectuals replied to the call. The discourse on the ‘other’ east part
of Europe became part of the official foreign policy, in proposal of the expansion of the EU
and NATO. Today, they it is named as the “h ard hoof” of Europe, the V isegra d group born in
1991 to strengthen the collaboration between Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia.93 It seemed to be an alliance that could not have problems with the democratic, open
and welcoming Europe. And yet, the four countries consu lt each other before every European
summit and by now they seem to have a single voice.
We should reflect on the concept of European Central Europe and try to understand in which
way European self -constituted its more next ‘other’. Not forgetting that in 1915 has been

92 (personal translation) W. Gombrowicz, DIARIO. Volume I (1953 -1956) , Feltrinelli Editore, Milano, 2004, p.
169.
93 Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the
Republic of Hungar y in Striving for European Integration , Visegrad, February 15th, 1991,
http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad -declarations/visegrad -declarat ion-110412 -2, online access
June 12, 2018.

29
published a book dividing Europe but becoming a bestseller: Mitteleuropa , by Friedrich
Naumann. The concept of Central Europe has ever been contested. However, there just four
reason according to which Eastern -Central Europe should be conside red a E uropean ‘other’:
1. the countries of Central Europe have lagged behind those of Western Europe, not only for
their economic, social and demographic development, but also for the slow emergence of
cities and middle classes; 2. national and cultural ‘ diversity’; 3. the social and political elites
of the middle class in most Central European countries were too weak to create a solid
democratic tradition and to open an efficient path to modernity; 4. finally, Central Europe was
and is not only an idea or simply an ideological invention, but it was at least in the last two
hundred years also a historical reality with its dynamics of change and its own path to
modernity.
In this sense the E uropean ‘othering’ might be resolved according to a sort of hybrid relating
to the Eastern -Central Europe, involving both simple and complex characteristics of
‘othering’. Even if, as we said before, there is no much gap between simple and complex
‘othering’: the first may turn into the second, and vice versa. Both gain f rom their self –
imposition their rhetorical force. Merging the results of the previous analysis and these first
impressions we may re -design the Othering Process (Figure. 1) according to a new model as
follow, in light of the identification of E uropean ‘ot hers’.

30
Figure 2. European identity, Othering Process.

31
Chapter II
The ‘Wild’ Turkey

32
1. The case of the ‘Turkish other’: a first genealogy

As we have highlighted in the first chapter, identities do not emerge fr om the empty place.
They are defined through the relationship with ‘others’. This relationship is built in the
‘historical experience’ developing in a ‘spatial dimension’. Consi dering the European
integration’ s historical memory mainly oriented to evoke an intra-European construction
project, we should begin from elaborating the construction of a European identity as
necessarily dependent on the existence of ‘others’. European “civilized” peoples have been
juxtaposed against a multitude of “barbarians”, “Ea stern barbarians”.94
Edward Said , already at the beginning of his book , claims the Orient was a European
historical -space upon which Europe shaped its ‘other’ and, in developing this ‘othering’
process , came to constitute itself and its identity:
“On a vis it to Beirut during the terrible civil war of 1975 -1976 a French journalist
wrote regretfully of the gutted downtown area that ‘it had once seemed to belong
to … the Orient of Chateaubriand and Nerval.’ He was right about the place, of
course, especially s o far as a European was concerned. The Orient was almost a
European invention, and had been since antiquity ‘a place of romance, exotic
beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences. […] The
Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is a lso the place of Europe’s greatest and
richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its
cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the other.
In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe ( or the West) as its contrasting
image, idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this Orient is merely imaginative.
The Orient is an integral of European material civilization and culture ”95
Likewise, other scholars stated that “ The very idea of what Europ e was from the beginning
was defined partly in terms of what it was not. In other words, the Other, i.e., the non –
European barbarian or savage, played a decisive role in the evolution of the European identity

94 While Islam is often regarded as the ‘other’ of European identity, the influence of European exchanges with
Muslims on European civilization itself is often neglected in the present civilizational discourse in Europe. For
an interesting study on Islamist influences through the religious, philosophical, scientific and political
innovations, also becoming part of Europe, see S. A. Sofos, R. Tsagarousianou, Islam in Europe – Public Spaces
and Civic Networks , Palgra ve Macmillan, London, 2013.
95 (personal translation) see E. Said, Orientalismo , cit., pp. 11 -12.

33
and in the maintenance of order among European states. ”96 Throughout history, a common
European identity has been built on a variety of others of which the Turks are perhaps the
main ones. The Turk s with their military capability, physical proximity , religious myth and
increasing political role represen ted the most growing challenge f or Europe and served as a
shared source of fear .97
The Ottomans built an empire of the most lasting of history and among the largest. At its
height, between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, under the reign of Suleim an the
Magnificent it stretched from the southern borders of the Holy Roman Empire, to the outskirts
of Vienna and the north Poland, to Yemen and Eritrea to the south; from Algeria to the west to
Azerbaijan in the east, controlling most of the Balkans, the N ear East and North Africa. That
was an indisputable reality .
The importance of examining the relationship between European civilization and the Ottoman
Empire depends on the extreme relevance of the topic, especially considering those that today
are the d ynamics that distinguish the relationship between the European Union and Turkey.
Furthermore, we can not exclude a priori that European identity is not strictly connected to the
evolution of this relationship which is an integral part of European history. P recisely , because
the process of identity formation implies the otherness. Thus, an analysis of the Europe an
representation of the “ Turk ish other” is useful for understanding the elements of that
exclusivity in shaping the current relationship of “potentia l” and “fruitful” collaboration.
Until the beginning of the fifteenth century it is difficult to speak of precise connotations that
providing a setting to be functional to the identification of a European identity. The concept of
Europe is not yet an entit y that unites around itself.98 In the eighth century the unity of the
Mediterranean has been broken by the Arab expansion.99 It seems that Carlo Martello, from
the Merovingian king dom of Austrasia used the term ‘ Europeanenses ’ to define the armed
coalition d eployed against the Moors.100 Observing a first form of ‘collective’ recognition is
certainly interesting. This fact, however, reckoned with the rise of Christianity in the eleventh
century, combining stoicism and universalism to link together the humanity a gainst the
‘infidel ’. The Church, in the Mid dle Ages, legitimately exercised , according to the canonists,

96 I.B. Neumann, J.M. Welsh, The Other in European Self -Definition: A Critical Addendum to the Literature on
International Society , Review of International Stu dies, Vol. 17, Issue 4, October 1991, p. 329,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500112045 , online access June 19, 2018.
97 Ivi, p. 330.
98 P. den Boer, P. Bugge, O. Waever, The history of the idea of E urope , ed. K. Wilson. J. van der Dussen,
Routledge, London, 1995, pp. 14 -23.
99 Ivi, p. 26.
100 Ibidem .

34
a universal jurisdiction with the purpose of protecting Christians. Anthropologist Talal Asad
pointed out that “ in the contemporary European suspicion of Turkey, Christian history,
enshrined in the tradition of international law, is being reinvoked in secular language as the
foundation of an ancient identity ”.101
The Crusades ’ experience was particularly instrumental in the construction of a shared
Europ ean identity and in the formation of a long -term perception of the ‘ Turk ish other’ .
Following the defeat of the Byzan tine emperor Romanus IV in the Battle of Ma nzikert
(1071) ,102 the C rusades began to remove the Turks from the domination of Eastern
Christian ity. In 1081, Constantinople was subjected to two threats. The Seljuk Turks were
pushing from the East. Roberto Guiscard with the Normans conquered Palermo, in Sicily, and
there were serious intent ions that he could move to the W est, close to the Byzantine capital.
Alexius Comnenus was proclaimed emperor to face these threats and internal political
problems of a declining empire. He appealed to Pope Urban II and others in Europe for help ,
and the image of the ‘Turk’ first appeared in a letter written by the Byzantine emperor to
Robert I, the Earl of Flanders .103 He described these invaders as barbarous peoples, very
brutal to the Christians who had come under their domination.104 And, in order to reinforce his
appeal, he adverted to prefer “ bow down to Lat in shr ines that those of pagans”:
“So, for the love of God and piety of all Greek Christians, we beg you to bring
here whatever warriors true to Christ you can find in your lands, the powerful, the
less powerful and the insignificant, to help me and the Greek C hristians; just as
you largely free Galicia and the other kingdoms of the West from pagan rule last
year, now let your warriors try to free the kingdom of the Greeks for the salvation
of their souls. Although I am Emperor I still do not know how to find an y recourse
or suitable way forward; I constantly flee the Turks and Petchenegs and stay in
each city in turn until I know they are on their way. I would much rather bow
down to your Lat in shrines that those of pagans ”.105

101 T. Asad, Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam? , in The Idea of Europe: From
Antiquity to the European Union , ed. A. Pagden, Cambrid ge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 213.
102 J.J. Norwich, Bisanzio , Mondadori, Milano, 2000, p. 347.
103 E. Joranson, The Problem of the Spurious Letter of Emperor Alexius to the Court of Flanders , The American
Historical Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, July 195 0, pp. 811 -32.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1841162.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A8589117a8a6717eb694797b0212c360c ,
online access June 19, 201 8.
104 Ibidem.
105 Quoted in C. Sweetenham, Robert the Monk’s History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana ,
Routledge, London, 2006,p. 220

35
Although the Crusades were militaril y a failure, the Crusaders became a unifying ideology of
Western Christian unity and the ‘Turk’ represented a feared power in the European Christian
conscience. As the Tomaz Mastnak’ s provocative analysis of the roots of peace -making in the
Western world i n the high and late Middle Ages highlighted, “t he ideas, iconography, and
discourse associated with the Crusades made a profound imprint on ‘all Christian thinking
about sacred violence’ and exercised influence long after the end of actual crusading…The
crusading spirit has survived through Modernity well into our own postmodern age. ”106
Similarly, Ballard:
“The Crusades can usefully be regarded as a mould -setting development. In the
face of the emergence of an overwhelmingly powerful Islamic order to its south
and east, a sense of collective identity began to crystallize amongst the population
of the territory which was subsequently to identify itself as Europe – and most
especially as western Europe. However the banner under which collective
mobilization began to be organized was that of Christendom, while the other at
whom this nascent power was directed was perceived as being Muslim, oriental
and black. The foundations around which contemporary conceptualizations of
Europe were to be constructed were now in place. ”107
Obviously, the Agareno108 is not yet the other of Europe, in latest terms. The question is firstly
religious. From the fifteent h century onward, a process of ‘identification’ of Europe with
Christianity began to ta ke shape at the end of a great ‘depression’ . The progress characterizing
the previous period has been interrupted. Wars, plagues, famines and revolts slow ed down
development and urbanization. The Ottomans conquer ed Asia Minor and the Balkans. The fall
of Constantinople was imminent. Pop e Clement V transferred the Papal Residence to
Avignon. The heretics in Bohemia shocked the Church and the simultaneous election of two
popes, one in Rome and one in Avignon , initiated at the Schism.109 In 1453 Constantinople
was lost. Pope Pius II tried to save Christianity from Muham mad II, but it was useless. The
‘Turks’ already were a big and inevitable reality. “ Nostra Europa. Nostra Europa Cristiana”

106 T. Mastnak, Crusading Peace: Christendom, the Muslim World, and Western Political Order , University of
Califo rnia Press, Berkeley, 2002, p. 346.
107 R. Ballard, Islam and the Construction of Europe , in Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the
Presence of Islam in Western Europe , ed. W.A.R. Shadid, P. Van Koningsveld, Peeters Publishers, 1996,
Lovanio, p. 2 6.
108 Synonym of Saracen. An etymological St. Jerome’s joke, according to which the Saracens would rather call
themselves ‘Agarenes’, as descendants of Agar concubine of Abraham, and not of Sara his legitimate wife. cfr.
Enciclopedia Treccani, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/saraceni_%28Enciclopedia -Italiana%29/ .
109 P. den Boer, P. Bugge, O. Waever, The history of the idea of Europe , cit., p. 34.

36
the Pope will say.110 So, between the Turks’ advance and the first continental dis coveries
(America), Euro pe turned into new horizons. A concept of Europe was emerging no longer
mythological or geographical, but political. For the record, the first project for the union of
the (European) states has been elaborated by the “East”. The king of Bohemia, Georg von
Podebrad, with the support of the French councillor, Antoine Martini, draft ed the De Unione
Christianorum contra Turcas .111 This was certainly a premature proje ct, but, for the first time,
it has been mentioned an ‘assembly’ of states ‘united’ against the ‘Turks’. The king asked to
renounce the war between the European states and appeal ed for a united and peaceful Europe .
He proposed to finance this assem bly with taxes and to assign a ‘vote’ to each ‘state’
involved.112
Ottoman power was consolidating. T he ‘Sar acen’ was gradually replaced by the ‘Ottoman’
and the growing political differentiation of the Christian worl d strengthened the role of the
‘Islamic other’. The ‘Ottomans’ will be the ‘others’ of the slow project of realization of
modern Europe.

110 Ibidem .
111 J. Le G off, Il cielo sceso in terra. Le radici medievali dell’Europa , Laterza, Roma, 2003, p. 235.
112 Ibidem .

37
1.1 ‘Facing’ the Turk ish other

The peculiarity of the European representation of the Ottoman begins to get rich, although the
memory of the ‘Islamic religious enemy ’ was hard to put down. William Montgomery Watt,
an orientalist and historian of British religio ns, has long meditated on the European self –
awareness in the Middle Age , to overcome many ancient Chr istian prejudices about Muslims.
He argued that the European s tended to distort the representation of Islam to balance a sense
of inferiority in different fields: science, techno logy, political, military.113 He finally claimed
that “Because Europe was reacting against Islam it belittled the influence of Saracens
[Muslims] and exaggerated its dependence on its Greek and Roman heritage. So today an
important tas k for us is to correct this false emphasis and to acknowledge fully our deb t to the
Arab and Islamic world.”114 We do not dare, if we believe that ‘Ottoman other’ has become a
challenger of the ‘European self’ , due to the mixing of political, military and co mmercial
relations with the religious character.
After the Peace of Westphalia (1648), significant changes take place. First, t he end of the
conflicts (Thirty Years War). Secondly, the emergence of a new European geopolitical
perspective with a shift of th e ‘central government’ from the centre -south (Spain, Holy
Roman Empire -Austria) to the west and the north (France, Holland, Great Britain, Sweden).
The third one is the disruptive entry of equilibrium . The ‘ Preserver of the Liberty in Europe’ ,
William III of Orange, prepared the gr eat alliance against Louis IV , ‘The freedoms of
Europe’ .115 The fourth one is the abrupt abandonment of the Christianity as a necessary basis
for European unity. Now Europe itself uses the Christianity. The independence of states (a nd
princes) is the pivot of the system vanishing the universalistic i dea of a Christian Europe. The
absolute sovereignty is the essential mechanism of the Westphalia ’s order . The result is a
fundamental concept of modern politics : the raison d’état . To pre vent religion from
constituting, again, a reason for conflict, the “architects of peace” resort ed to the principle of
cuius regio, eius et religio : the religion of the prince was the religion of the people.
At this point, how can the new ‘Westphalian’ system face the Ottoman Empire? The slogan
“chasing the Turk out of Europe” prompted the Europeans to rally against the expanding
Ottoman empire. The siege of Vienna by the Ottomans , in 1683 , helped to consolidate a

113 See W.M. Watt, The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe , Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1994.
114 Ivi, p. 84.
115 P. den Boer, P. Bugge, O. Waever, The history of the idea of Europe , cit., pp. 41 -42.

38
‘community ’. Centuries later, the history dr aws a ‘modern’ defence of Vienna shaping the
most ardent Austrian opponent s to the EU’s Turkish membership . The Austrian government’ s
attempt to block the start of negotiations with Turkey has been welco med by the Austrian
press. In September 2004, the Vie nnese liberal newspaper magazine Profile titled its editorial
Turks at the Gates of Vienna , describing the Turkish demands fo r the negotiations as “ not so
much a r isk as a danger.”116 Today, any time is a good time for the Austrian Chancellor,
Sebastian Kurz to ‘stop talks on Turkey’s EU accession’: “The talks on membership
between the European Union and Turkey should be ended taking into account the system
systematic violations of human rights and essential democratic values, and because the
Copenhagen Crite ria [rules defining if the state is ready to join the European Uni on] are not
implemented anymore.”117
What could be the solution for a peaceful coexistence between the ‘European self ’ and its
‘Turkish other ’? Well, in 1693, a short essay circulating in Euro pe by the British explorer and
philosopher William Penn, titled An Essay Towards The Present And Future Peace Of Europe,
By The Establishment Of An European Dyet, Parliament, Or Estates Concluded , in which he
imagined “Soveraign Princes of Europe […] agree to meet by their Stated Deputies in a
General Dyet, Estates, or Parliament, and there Establish Rules of Justice for Soveraign
Princes to observe one to another; and thus to meet Yearly, or once in Two or Three Years at
farthest, or as they shall see Caus e, and to be Stiled, The Soveraign or Imperial Dyet,
Parliament, or State of Europe; before which Soveraign Assembly, should be brought »118 He
also included “ the Turks and Muscovites , as seems but fit and just .”119 This was already an
absolute novelty for the time, but the next passage was more forward -looking :
“Another Advant age is, The Great Security it will be to Christians against the
Inroads of the Turk, in their most Prosperous Fortune . For it had been impossible
for the Port, to have prevailed so often, and so far from Christendom , but by the
Carelessness, or Wilful Connivence if not Aid, of some Christian Princes . And for
the same Reason, why no Christian Monarch will adventure to oppose, or break

116 Quoted in I. Traynor, In 1683 Turkey was the invader. In 2004 much of Europe still sees it that way , The
Guardian, 22 Sep 2004, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/22/eu.turkey , online access June 19, 2018.
117 Austrian Chancellor Urges to Stop Talks on Turkey’s EU Accession , Sputnik, 26 Mar 2018,
https://sputniknews.com/europe/201803261062894015 -austria -chancellor -urges -stop-eu-accession/ ,
online access June 19, 2018.
118 W. Penn, An Essay Towards The Present And Future Peace Of Europe, By The Establishment Of An
Europe an Dyet, Parliament, Or Estates Concluded (1693), Europe’s Human Rights Watchdog, p. 406,
http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/library/penn.pdf , online access June 19, 2018.
119 Ivi, p. 409.

39
such an Union, the Grand Seignior will find himself obli ged to concur, for the
Security of what he holds in Europe : Where, with all his Strength, he woul d feel it
an Over -Match for him.”120
Basically , the author implicitly inv ited the Ottoman Empire to the ‘renunciation’ for
‘competing’ in the guarantee of securi ty and peace. And there was little doubt about linking
this renunciation to a fundamental characteristic of the Sublime : Islam. Is the ‘requirement’
practice , the bulwark of ‘multiculturalism’ flaunted by the European Union , accompanying
Turkey’ s accession process? We will back on this point later.
According to Bernard Lewis, the ‘European other ’ continued to be set in terms of cultural
exclusivity with the only difference that it became usual to call the Turks as ‘uncivilized’ and
not ‘infidels’ . As Lewis pointed out, “ Europe and the Turk were old acqu aintances and
intimate enemies.”121 As a result, Europe pursued the decline of the Ottoman empire, which
accepted the treaties of Carlowitz (1699) and Passarowitz (1718).122
The cultural patterns were flanked by t he civilisation more deeply. The theologian and
economist Nicolas Baudeau spoke for the first time about civilisation européenne in 1766, in
a work on the French colonies.123 The ‘European self ’ evolved according to a sense of
superiority , deepened in the ei ghteenth and nineteenth centuries, reinforcing the unity of
European society.124 Europe started to become a “ society of nations and states, each of which
has its laws, its customs, and its maxims, but which it cannot put in execution without
observing a grea t deal of delicacy t owards the rest of the society.”125 Probably the most
emblematic proponent of the European idea of that period was Edmund Burke. The legal
background, i ncluding ius naturale , ius gentium , common law, criminal law and positive law,
soaked his political philosophy, developing a sense of Europe as great Commonwealth of
nations , with a common moral and juridical heritage, and the trust in a journey of tradition
and history.126 Burke’s European Commonwealth categorically excluded a non -Christian
society, then the Ottoman Empire.127 Europe was as one great state that “ no citizen of Europe

120 Ivi, p. 415 .
121 B. Lewis , The Emergence of Modern Turkey , Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 40.
122 Ivi, p. 41.
123 P. den Boer, P. Bugge, O. Waever, The history of the idea of Europe , cit., p. 64.
124 M.S. Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century, 1713 -1783 , Long man, London, 1987, p. 265; and E.
Lipson, Europe in the 19th & 20th Centuries 1815 -1939 , Adam and Charles Black, London, 1970, p. 247.
125 E. Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power , Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1955, p. 16.
126 J.M. Welsh, Edmun d Burke and International Relations: The Commonwealth of Europe and the Crusade
against the French Revolution , Springer, 1995, p. 71.
127 Ivi, pp. 78 -80.

40
could be altoget her an exile in any part of it” and the Ottomans “had nothing to do with
European power; they considered themselves wholly Asiatic … They despised an d condemned
all Christians as infidels, and only wished to subdue and exterminate them and their people.
What had these worse than savages to do with the powers of Europe, but to spread war;
destruct ion, and pestilence among them?”128
However, the Ottoman Em pire was too attractive for the European ‘balancing games ’, so
much so that it has been gradually involved in Western international dynamics with the result
of the progressive military, political and commercial weakening. It is enough to mention the
Russo -Turkish war (1768 -1774 and 1787 -1792) that “gave” southern Ukraine, the Northern
Caucasus and Crimea to Russia. And the Austro -Turkish war (1788 -1791), which took place
in parallel with the Russo -Turkish war and ended with the concordats of the Treaty of S istova
which forced Leopold II to renounce the few conquered territories due to the announced
Prussian intervention, let aftermath not just pleasing to the Sublime .129 The II Coalition
(1798), following the landing of Napoleon in Egypt, supported by Great Br itain, Russia,
Austria, Kingdom of Naples, Pontifical State and Ottoman Empire, deprived the latter of the
remaining political capabilities.130 Finally, the Treaty of capitulation Küçük Kaynarc (1774)
was the most humiliating (of a long series) since it forc ed the sultanate to surrender the part of
the region between the Dnieper and Southern Bugs, ensuring the port of Kherson to Russia
with direct access at the Black Sea.131 Moreover, from this moment on, what it had to do with
the Ottoman E mpire will acquire t he name of ‘Eastern Question’ .132

128 Ibidem .
129 V. Aksan, Ottoman Wars: An Empire Besieged , Taylor & Francis, 2007, UK, p. 138.
130 Ivi, pp. 2 29-31.
131 Ivi, p. 158.
132 Ibidem.

41
1.2 ‘Civilising’ the Turkish other

During the first half of the nineteenth century, Europe had a deep and overpowering impact on
the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans were the ‘devalued out -group’ to ‘civilise’ by importing
of instructors from European technical schools, by influencing Turkish architecture . Religious
architecture included . The Ottoman Empire tried to meet European expec tations and
standards. The European ‘requirements’ .133 The 1826 Ottoman army code has been re formed
introducing European -style uniforms, while Sultan Mahmud II, in 1827, even with the strong
religious opposition, sent 150 Turkish students to various European countries.134 Moreover,
the Sultan tried to shape the structure and organization of its empi re in a European -styled
central government, at least to achieve appearance of its European ‘equivalent’ , and thereby to
impress European observers with the modernity and progressiveness of the Ottoman Empire.
In 1847, civil and criminal courts attempted to set up the same number of European and
Ottoman judges, with rules of evidence and procedures drawn from European rather than
Islamic practices.135
Following the end of the Crimean War, the Otto man Empire was admitted to the ‘ Public Law
of Europe’ in 1856. With the Paris Treaty the Ottoman Empire was the first non -European
power to officially enter the ‘equilibrium play’, dear to Wes terners. The preamble recognized
the independence and integrity a s vital for the maintenance of “peace in Europe” and the
Articl e 7 guaranteed to the Sublime Porte to take the advantage of “ the public ben efits and the
European concert.” Few historiographers have attributed the right value to the treaty, Sir
Thomas Erskine Holland talked about a corpus iuris publici orientalis “in which the rights of
Turkey, of the new states which have been carved out of it, and of the semi -independent
provinces which still remain subject to its suzerainty, are declared and defined by the
authority of the great powers collectively .”136 And he continue d: “On the one hand, the
Turkish Empire is placed, as it were, under the tutelage of Europe; while, on the other hand,
the claim of any single power to settle the destinies of that empire without the concurrence of
the rest has been repeatedly negative.”137

133 See H.E. Adivar, Turkey Faces West , Yale University Press, New Haven, 1930; A.J. Toynbee, Civilization on
Trial , Oxford University Press, NY, 1948; and A.J. Toynbee, The World and the West , Oxford University Press,
NY, 195 3.
134 B. Lewis , The Emergence of Modern Turkey , cit., p. 141.
135 Ibidem .
136 T.E. Holland, The European Concert in the Eastern Question , Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1885, p. 2.
137 Ibidem.

42
However, now as then, political figures contested the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in the
European Concert, and protested its inclusion in the European balance of po wers system on
the grounds that “ the Turks will be admitted by everybody to form no part y to this union.”138
Even though the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) abolished the unequal treaties that the Europeans
had imposed on the Ottoman Empire, the Europeans demanded more widening and deepening
of domestic changes to conform further to European ‘civil r equirements ’. The nineteenth –
century European lawye rs practiced and developed the ‘ civil and formal European canons’ to
design that community within which it was possible to recognize who was fully a part of the
international civil society (in-group) and t hose who instead constituted it si mply as an
‘optional’ element (out -groups).139 A ‘legislation’ presupposes an interaction to re -elabor ate
‘rules of behaviour’ , so the relationship (from the politician to the economic) with those who
were non-European has p roduced what we know today as an international European society,
made up of customs and habits first ‘habitually’ heard and now constantl y ‘outsourced’ .140
Probably the most immediate proponent, of what has been said so far , was a Scottish lawyer
and a profe ssor of Public law. In short, an authoritative personality of undoubted notoriety in
the international context . James Lorimer, elaborating the theories of Count Joseph Arthur de
Gobineau, made a clear distinction between ‘civil society ’ and ‘barbarism ’, and he gave to
everyone a different ‘legal recognition ’. The total one to the Europeans and the European
colonies, and only one limited to Turkey, among ‘others ’.141
The Ottoman Empire’s admission to the ‘Public Law of Europe’ was ‘provisional ’, and even
then, it reflected more a European manoeuvre to preserve the existing balance of power s by
guaranteeing Ottoman territorial integrity from ‘Russian aspirations ’, rather than an effort to
enlarge the scope of internat ional society. The standard of ‘civilization’ was required to the
conditions on which the Ottoman Empire was provisionally accepted as a subject of the
European international law. Indeed,
“Article 7 of the Treaty of Paris does not deal with Turkey’ s status in international
law. It is not an instance of the recognition of an Oriental State as a subject of that
law. Its purpose was not even, in a strict sense, a legal but rather a political
purpose. The benefits to which it admitted Turkey were those of being formally

138 E. Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power , cit., p. 16.
139 G. W. Gong , The Standard of Civilization in International Society , Oxford University Press, 1984, Oxford,
pp. 10 -42.
140 Ibidem .
141 M. Wight, Systems of states , Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1977, pp. 116 -22.

43
declared to have been part of the legal structure of European in the nexus of
treaties and accepted policies which underlay and maintained the sta bility of the
continent, and of being expressly included in the operation of the European
concert. ”142
The Paris Treaty reflected the positions of the (current) European dilemma: declaring Turkey
a ‘civilized’ country me ant nothing if the standard of ‘civilization’ was not enforced by the
Ottoma ns themselves by renouncing to ‘something’, or simply ‘enforceable’ by the European
countries concerned.143 “International law is a product of the special civilization of modem
Europe and forms a highly artificial system of which the principle could not be supposed to be
understood or recognised by countries differently civilized. States only can be presumed to be
subject to it as are inheritors of that civilization .”144 Lorimer, again, argued that in the case of
the Turks, Europe “had bitter experience of the consequences of extending the rights of
civilization to barbarians who have proved to be incapable of perf orming its duties, and who
possibly do not even belong to the progressive races of mankind .”145 Even the partial
acceptance of the Ottoman Empi re in 1856 had been premature: “‘the Turk’ had no t yet
attained the standard of ‘civilization’, which would allow t he Ottoman Empire to sustain
orderly international relations. ”146
As a result, the European standar d of ‘civilization’ became ‘formal’ to demarcate those
members of the ‘civilized’ European international society (in -group ) from those which were
merely ‘other s’ (out-groups). Do these requir ements remind the contemporary ‘Copenhagen
Criteria’ , the fulfilment of which is needed for candidate states to join the EU? The standard
of ‘civilization’ emerged as an explicit legal concept, used to formally justify Europ ean
behaviour that constantly recognizes t he Turkish inability to uphold ‘civilized’ standards.

142 G. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in Inter national Society , cit., 1984, p. 111.
143 Ivi, pp. 112 -13
144 W.E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law , Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1924, p. 117.
145 J. Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations , Edinburgh University press, Edinburgh, 1883, p. 102.
146 Ibidem .

44
1.3 ‘Devaluating’ the Turkish other

From “ruler ” to “ruled ”, the path of Turkey is characterized by a c ontrary evolution. Thanks to
a “welfareist” Europe, it has made progress in different fields, but Europe pressed to ‘shape’
something like itself. If we compare the work from Muhammad ’ Ali (1769 –1849 ) to Nasser
Hussein ( 1918 –1970 ), we obtain an interesting profile. The passion for dams,
industrialization, s cientific development, the removal of religion from the political and social
context.147 European expectations have been governed by their own aims which, of course,
influenced those of Muslim communities.
By the 1907 Second Hague Conference, the defeats had clearly become a certainty for the
Ottoman Empire. Considering the Ottoma n legal system less than fully ‘civilized’, the
countries attending the Second Hague Conference ranked the Empire among the second -class
powers and prohibited it from nominating a pe rmanent mem ber to the Court of Arbitration.
While ‘the Turk’ was a part of the European states system, the logic of culture denied it equal
status within the European society of states. Once again, th e Ottoman Empire is invited to ‘sit’
and certainly not t o ‘participate’ . Following the diplomatic classification of the Ottoman
Empire at The Hague Conference, The Times reported that the incident was regar ded as “a
fresh humiliation for Turkey’, but it was recognized as ‘ the inevi table outcome of
circumstances .”148
During the intra -war years (1914 -1918), the Ottomans con tinued to be regarded as Europe’s
‘other.’ As late as 1916, the leading Russian liberal Pavel Milyukov (ironically) used the idea
of the ‘other’ as proof that Russia was better equipped than the Sublime to take care of the
Straits and C onstantinople. Quoting the contem porary British writer Gong:
“The presence of the Turk in Europe is incidental. They remain at the end of five
hundred years as much strangers as they were at the beginning. European ideals
and words, like nation, government, law, sovereign, and subject, do not apply to
them. ”149
The defeat of the Central European Powers in the First World War isolated further the
Ottoman Empire from Europe. In a Joint Note of the Allied Govern ments to the American

147 G. Corm, Petrolio e rivoluzione. Il Vicino Oriente negli anni d’oro , Editoriale Jaca Book, Milano, 2005, pp.
11-12
148 G. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society , cit., p. 115.
149 I.B. Neumann, J.M. Welsh, The Other in European Self -Definition: A Critical Addendum to the Literature on
International Society , cit., p. 43.

45
President Wilson it was stated that amon g the goals of the allies were “ the liberation of the
peoples who now lie beneath the murderous tyranny of the Turks” and “ The expulsion from
Europe of the Ottoman empire which has proved itself so radic ally alien to Western
civilization.”150 The general mood of the era was that the Allied Powers should deliver the
Christians of the Ottoman Empire from a government which the last f ive centuries had done
nothing “but oppress them.”151
With the decline of the O ttomans, Europe entered a process of internal competition
characterized by the two World Wars. The end of World War II led to the Cold War, when a
strong Soviet Union moved the attention of the European eye.
Despite the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unification of
Western and Eastern Europe, under the umbrell a of European integration, created a n ew
geopolitical context quite marked by cultural diversity with greater visib ility of Muslims.
Around these ‘minorities’ , Europeans are facing a deep fear of ‘losing ’ their cultural integrity.
And w e just anticipated what integration means today and how Turkey has ‘never ’ been ‘in’
Europe.

150 A.J. Toynbee, The World and the West , cit., p.4.
151 Ibidem .

46
2. The ‘civilizational alliance’

The ‘good purposes’ of the ‘young Turks’ were not enough to convince the Euro pean
Community to accept Turkey’s entry in Europe. When the latter submitted its application for
membership in 1987, the Commission expressed “ negative opinion. The reas ons for the
rejection of Turkey’ s request were in the opinion of 18 D ecember 1989 .”152 The document
noted that “ opening the negotiations would not pursue any useful purpose, as the European
Community is not ready for further enlargement and Turkey is not ready for access”153 and
“the links between the two parties could be stren gthened within the structure of the
Associatio n Agreement concluded in 1963.”154 Thus, Turkey has not, the right ‘requirements’ .
Again.
For the Ottomans, the reform according to ‘uncivilized’ standards were an anathema . It
seemed not only a betrayal of the e stablished customs and order, but also a highly visible
reminder of concessions made to a foreign standard of ‘civilization’. The Ottomans well knew
that their Empire lacked viable choices , the European pressure to ‘civilize’ the Ottoman
Empire to only add ed insult to injury. This may remind us the current feelings and perceptions
of Turkish people regarding the treatment of their country by the EU. These feelings are
important to understand better how historical and spatial dimensions shape the current EU –
Turkey relationships.
During the past hundred years of Turkish history, a method of defensive modernization was
enforced, supported by the reasoning that, so as to be strong against the West, one should
adopt its ‘civilization’ standard. As the Turkish po litician and journalist Ahmet Agaoglu , also
one of the founders of Pan-Turkism , highlighted:
“Above all , we must be honest ; do we accept and admit the superiority and
supremacy of the Western civilization , or do we not?… Western life by means of
its ent irety has achieved dominion over the entirety of our life. Therefore, if we
wish to be saved, to live, to continue our existence, we must adapt ourselves to it,
not merely with our clothing and some of our institutions, but with our heads, our
hearts, our way of looking at things, our mentality. Outside of this there is no

152 V. Fiorani Piacentini, Turchia e Mediterraneo allargato: democrazia e democrazie , Franco Angeli, Milano,
2005, p. 285.
153 Ibidem .
154 Ibidem .

47
salvation.”155
Even though, Agaoglu insisted upon the indivisibility of civilization and he attributed to the
desire to mix elements of various civilizations, the major philosopher of Turki sh nationalism ,
Ziyā Gökalp , managed this view in one of his poem s:
“We were defeated because we were so backward ,
To take re venge, we shall adopt the enemy’ s science .
We shall learn his skill, steal his methods .
On progress we will set our heart .
We shall skip five hundred years and we shall not stand still .
Little time is left ”156
Turkey’ s defensive modernization was characterized by thi s impatience to learn from the
‘West’ rather than integration. In embarking on a process of Westernization, the new Turkish
regime saw t he social and political influence of Islam as its most significant challenge to
establish for itself a political hegemony and to associate it with backwardness. From the
traditional Islam as an obstacl e to progress, the modernizing é lites sought emancipati on in the
West through a process of ‘civilization ’.157 Thus, the Westernization to resist the West
required de -esternization from the ‘eastern remnants ’, a process that was never completely
completed in Turkey.
Anthropologists would talk about the activatio n of mimetic processes, which consist of
manifestations of adjustment and imitation of symbols and practices belon ging to the cultural
model to imitate .158 Turkish literature significantly illustrates the role of mimesis in cultural
change. The work of Turki sh Nobel Prize -winning Orhan Pamuk, Il libro nero (1996), is a
novel about identity. Identity of the protagonist (Galip) who ‘wants to be like’ his cousin, the
journalist Celal , grown in the West and shaped by the West ; identity of characters looking for
themselves but at the same time wishing to be ‘someone else’ .159
These opposing and contradictory elements run as constituent units of what can be called the
Kemal ist identity: on the one hand, the “Political Islam” as opposed to the principle of
secularism a nd Westernization; on the other, “the West” as opposed by the principle of

155 Quoted in A. Holly Shussler, Between Two Empires: Ahmet Agaoglu and the New Turkey ,
I.B.Tauris, London, 2003, p. 202.
156 Quoted in S.V. Mayall, Turkey: Thwarted Ambition , Diane Publishing, Oxford, 1997, p. 14.
157 N. Gole, The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling , University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, 2013, pp. 57 -82.
158 R. Malighetti, V. Matera, U. Fabietti, Dal tribale al globale: introduzione all’antropologia , cit., pp. 192 -94.
159 Ivi, pp. 198 -200.

48

Turkish -Muslim nationalism and national sovereignty.160 Europe is at the same time the centre
of civilization, which the Kemalists are eager to unite through a civilizing mission , and a
threat to Turkish independence and national integrity, from which the Turks try to escape . On
foreign policy, the first image suggests an anti -Arab and anti -Islamic isolationism from the
historical memory of the Arab Revolt of 1916 -1918, while the other image implies
isolationism from Europe, an external threat that occupies and foments seeds of national
disintegration fed by the historical memory of events such as the Treaty of Sèvres (1920).161
The image of European security and the cultural threat in th e Kemalist mentality is often
revealed in forms of expression such as political comics. For instance , Turhan Selçuk, the
leading Turkish Kemalist designer, portrayed the EU as a pig nursing numerous pigs, while
the lone Turkish lamb waits in the corner, de sperately hungry and isolated, suggesting the
existence of a strong and irreconcilable biological difference between Europe and Turkey. In a
related case, Selcuk illustrated Islamist support for EU membership in the form of a gir l
wearing a veil carrying a pig’s head and turning her face to the arrow indicating the EU ( in
Turkish A.B. – Avrupa Birliği ).

Clearly, a Turkey versus Europe dichotomy expressed with a discourse of Islam versus
Christianity runs in the background of Kemalist nationalist imagination of the West. Yet the
irony of the matter is that the Westernization process , implemented by Kemalism as a
civilizing mission , is itself about losing cultural essence and becoming like the West. As
Turkish political scientist Tanil Bora claims “ The civilizationist discourse of liberal

160 M. A yoob, Political Islam: Image and Reality , World Policy Journal, Vol. 21, No. 3, Fall, 2004, pp. 1 -14,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40210231 , online access June 19, 2018.
161 H. Kosebalaban, Turkey’s EU Memb ership: a clash of security cultures , Middle East Policy Council, Vol. IX,
No. 2, 2002, https://www.mepc.org/journal/turkeys -eu-membership -clash -security -cultures , online access June
19, 2018; E.l Aydinli, N.A. Özcan, D. Akyaz, The Turkish Military's March toward Europe , Vol. 85, No. 1, Jan.
– Feb., 2006, pp. 77 -90, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031844 , online acces s June 19, 2018.

49
nationalism considers liberal market economy per fectly in tune with the ideal of ‘attaining the
rank of modern civilization’ inherited from Ataturkism and defines a cultural identity in terms
of its ability to ‘achieve’ and ‘catch up with’ the modern lifestyle.”162 In this vision of liberal
secularism, Tu rkey will achieve the elevation of its civilization standard by joining the EU.
After the collapse of the Erbakan government in February 1997, two Islamic -oriented political
parties emerged: the Felicity Party, which was under the control of Necmettin Erba kan; and
the AKP of Erdogan, whose challenge ended with his electoral triumph in 2002 and the
subsequent formation of the ongoing government. The current AKP emerged from an internal
challenge to the leadership against Erbakan especially on foreign policy, where the issue of
EU membership concerns the commitment to negotiations for full EU memb ership.163
However, the government’ s enthusiastic efforts counteract the formation of a movement
embracing a common political platform, the Ulusal Cephe (National Front ), which includes
nationalists of all varieties and Kemalist conservatives.164
The AKP’ s support for EU membership demonstrates the fact that the Turkish process of
Westernization and de -Easternization of civilization has become a hegemonic ideology. It is
important to note that the AKP leadership has redefined the European integration project.
Starting to say that EU membership for Turk ey is a project of civilization, current President of
Turkey, Erdogan, eloquently stated that to have
“a country like Turke y, where the cultures of Islam and democracy have merged
together, taking part in such an institution as the EU, will bring harmony of
civilizations. That is why we think it is the project of the century. We are there as a
guarantee of an entente between t he civilizations. The countries that want to
exclude us from Europe are not playing their roles in history. ”165
Then,
“our greatest claim is that of civilizational alliance. We claimed that [if Turkey is
rejected] the EU is doomed to stay as a Christian cl ub. Only if Turkey joins the

162 T. Bora, Nationalist Discourses in Turkey , South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 102, Issue 2 -3, Spring -Summer
2003, p. 443, https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876 -102-2-3-433, online acces s June 19, 2018.
163 Hakan Y.M., The Role of the New Bourgeoisie in the Transformation of the Turkish Islamic Movement , in
The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party , ed. M. Hakan Yavuz, University of Utah Press,
Salt Lake City, 2006, pp. 1 -19.
164 Ibidem .
165 S. Castle, Recep Tayyip Erdogan: ‘Taking part in the EU will bring harmony of civilisations – it is the project
of the century’ , Independent, 13 December 2004, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/recep –
tayyip -erdogan -taking -part-in-the-eu-will-bring -harmony -of-civilisations -it-is-the-project -of-24489.html , online
access June 19, 2018.

50
EU, then it will not be remembered as a Christian club, but rather as the address
for civilizational alliance .”166
Now as then, Turkey challenges Europe to the ‘centrality ’ of European civilization. The AKP
discourse of civiliza tion requir es authenticity for a Turkish/ Islamic civiliz ation in Europe.
What is Europe’ s attitude towards a Europe of ‘different’ shared communities in light of
European integration project ? Are the European answers to Turkey different from those that
have shaped the ‘European self ’ in its historical and spatial dimensions? Is Europe really
willing to give up the ‘centrality ’ of European civilization for a community of shared
civilization?

166 Quoted in R. Taras, Xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe , Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2012,
p. 187.

51

2.1 ‘European in -group ’ as a matter of ‘absorbing integration’

When the French referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe has been
launched and France has been called to ratify the Constitution , President Jacques Chirac said
that Fran ce would also decide in a referendum whether it wa nts Turkey to join the EU or not.
He has asked the government to prepare a constitutional amendment that would require a
referendum to be held whenev er the EU wants to take in a new member.167 President Chirac
was a supporter of Turkish accession, but many of his colleag ues in the UMP party were not.
The prime minister, Jean -Pierre Raffarin, encapsulated French concern when he asked: “ Do
we want the river of Islam to en ter the riverbed of secularism?”168 In a similar way, few years
earlier, when European Council decided to not name Turkey as a candidate for membership in
1997, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van Mierlo, strongly claimed that Turkey should
never be admitted as a full EU member: “ There is a problem of a large Muslim st ate. Do we
want that in Europe?”169
During the referendum campaign in
France, a picture of a group of
Muslim women, clad in EU flags
that fully covering their heads
circulated provoking cultural shock
among the increasingly conservative
French people by bringing to mind
Europe’s changing cultural and
religious landscape. The Turkish
artist Burak Delier reproduced that image in an Instambul exhibition in October 2005 . The
question of the place of Turkey became a focal point of many political campaigns .
After his victory, Nicolas Sarkozy’s marked in sistence to grant a “privileged partnership ”,
rather than full membership :
“Negotiations began in 1964. We are in 2007. The time has rather come to tell the

167 Chirac backs French vote on Turkey , Euractiv, 4 Oct 2004, https://www.euractiv.com/section/central –
europe/news/chirac -backs -french -vote-on-turkey/ , online access June 19, 2018.
168 A. Gentleman, French public given veto on Turkey’s EU membership , The Guardian, 2 Oct 2004,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/02/eu.france , online access June 19, 2018.
169 T. Barber, Europe set for clash over Turkish question , Independent, 7 February 1997 ,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe -set-for-clash -over-turkish -question -1277301.html , online
access June 19, 2018.

52
Turks whether we want them or if we do not want them. For me actually, it is not
a question of dem ocracy, it is not at all a question of Muslims, of Islam. It is to say
that it’s Asia, it is not Europe. One must tell clearly to this great people that they
are meant to be the heart of the Union of the Mediterranean but not the heart of
the European Unio n.”170
So why in Europe, which is known as behaviourally and attitudinally more secular than
Turkey, is there such a strong anti -Turkish opposition that is increasingly expressed in a
religious and cultural framework? Specially in the great and multicultural framework of
European integration project. Maybe like ‘history’, paraphrasing Norman Davies, the
‘integration’ has been written by Europeans ‘for’ Europeans.
There are two opposing perspectives in Europe on Turkey: Turkey as an integral part of
Europe, an d Turkey as the essential ‘historical other ’ of Europe. Underlying these two
perspectives there is the debate on the definition of European integration. Is the European
integration based on a single civilization, defined as European civilization and marked by
distinct European cultural heritage and values? Or is Europe based on common ideals and a
common destiny, a union that members of ‘different civilizations ’ can join on ‘equal terms ’?
Imagining Europe as a civilizational project allows ‘others ’ the poss ibility of becoming
“European” only if they can be assimilated into Europe’s civilizational (Christian) values. The
first view emphasizes a culturally homogeneous Europe, while the second emphasizes
multiculturalism and advocates a pluralistic interpretati on of civilizational identity. In contrast
to Turkey, which demands recognition of its civilizational authenticity, Europe suggests the
contrary, that European integration is an ‘in -group’ civilizational project. According to this
increasingly widespread v iew, Turkey is not part of Europ e because of its different and
‘inferior’ civilizational roots. It is not a member of Europe’s ‘historical’ cultural heritage
based on Christianity and Enlightenment values and thus is doomed to remain outside its
‘spatial’ boundaries.
References to Christianity as well as Europe’s commo n secular history and culture ( such as
the Enlightenment and Hellenic -Roman traditions) automatically exclude Turkey, which does
not share the same cultural heritage. Defining Europe as a cult urally open space, however,
would assist the integration only not of Turkey but also Europe’s increasingly large Muslim
minority. However, ‘Christianity’ continues to inform the ideological subconscious,

170 Quoted in A. Bernard, Quotes From, and About, Nicolas Sarkozy , New York Times, May 7, 2007,
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/07/world/europe/07francequotes.html , online access June 19, 2018.

53
particularly when it comes to draw the boundaries of a perceived European civilization. This
is also evident in the electoral support of political parties that openly refer to their Christian
identities. For instance , in Germany, Christian Democrats are a very important political force,
having emerged as th e leading party in the 2005 general elections. They are known for their
strong opposition to the idea of multiculturalism, which envisions a culturally ‘neutral ’
Europe.171 German C hancellor An gela Merkel openly states that “ democracy is unthin kable
without Christian values.”172
From this point of view, the accession to the EU of a country like Turkey with a majority
Muslim population is clearly seen as highly problematic. Speaking in 1997, German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl succinctly pointed out that the EU was a ‘civilizational project’ in
which “Turkey has no place.”173 Similarly, in a 2002 interview, French President and
President of the European Constitutio nal Convention Valery Giscard d’ Estaing argued that
Turkey should not be allowed full membership of the E U as it has a different culture, a
different appr oach, a different way of life. Giscard d’ Estaing broadened this idea of how
Turkey was not ‘suitable’ to be included into ‘European civilization’, as the European
Convention attempted to define it:
“The Euro pean Convention sought a clearer definition of the foundations of this
entity, which include the cultural contributions of ancient Greece and Rome, the
religious heritage pervading European life, the creative enthusiasms of the
Renaissance, the philosophy of the Age of the Enlightenment and the
contributions of rational and scientific though t. Turkey shares none of these.”174
Most of Europe is contrary to the idea of Turkish accession to the EU. According to the
Eurobarometer survey conducted in Spring 2005 by the European Commission , the support
for Turkish membership among the old European member states was only 32 percent, while it
was 48 percent among the ‘newbies’ . Overall, 52 percent of respondents in the EU indicated
that they did not want to see Turkey as a member of the EU . Opposition to Turkey was, of
course, quite strong in Austria, with 80 percent of respondents against it.175

171 V. Valt, Life on the Front Lines , Time, 28 February 2005, www.time.com/time/europe/html/050228/story.html , online
access June 19, 2018.
172 Quoted in C. MacMillan, Discourse, Iden tity and the Question of Turkish Accession to the EU: Through the Looking
Glass , Routledge, London, 2016, p. 103.
173 Ibidem .
174 Ibidem .
175 Standard Eurobarometer 63.4, Spring 2005, TNS Opinion & Social, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_exec_tr.pdf , online access June 19,

54
Moreover, in a recent study named Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey’ s EU
Accession, Turco -skepticism in Europe : A Multi -Level Analysis , some authors claimed :
“Our findings still demonstrate that, unlike the previous enlargements, Turkey’s
accession to the EU depends to a large extent on the public’s readiness and
enthusiasm. […] Thus, a critical element in the ne gotiations currently unfolding
would be a significant public relations campaign specifically addressing the
European public’s concerns. For example, the European Commission might
choose to emphasize the Turkish economic growth and the multiple opportunitie s
that Turkish market brings for the European companies. Similarly, a discussion on
the Turks in Europe, especially those who have become notable participants in
their host countries’ political and economic lives could generate a public debate
on the merit s of Turkish accession. De -emphasizing the cultural differences, and
focusing on the mutual benefits for both parties might be a good strategy to
increase public’s interest in the Turkish accession. It is clear that the European
public’s approval for Turke y’s accession will be a determining factor for the
accession negotiations as well as for the final approval of the Accession Treaty.
Thus, it would be important for the European Commission to address areas where
the European public feels uneasy towards Tur key. This also requires a responsible
political behavior on the behalf of incumbent governments in the EU as they need
to refrain from mobilizing popular support by demonizing the Turkish
accession .”176
Even if the EU started its negotiation process with Tur key as agreed at the EU summit in
December 2005, it seems certain that Turkish membership will be refused in almost all EU
countries , especially if it brought to referendum at the end of the negotiating process . Like it
has happened yet . Probably, the nego tiations will never end to prevent they will end
unsuccessfully. There ar e key problems unresolved between the EU and Turkey. Cyprus
among them. If the Republic of Cyprus b ecome a member of the EU before the settlement of
the Cyprus question, there will no t chances for any future negotiation. Three of four Greek
Cypriots , in 2004, rejected the plan put forward by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan ,

2018.
176 E. Hatipoglu, M. Muftuler -Bac, E. Karakoc, Explaining Variation in Publi c Support to Turkey’s EU
Accession, Turco -skepticism in Europe: A Multi -Level Analysis , MAXCAP Working Paper Series, No. 04, July
2014, p. 23,
http://userpage.fu -berlin.de/kfgeu/maxcap/system/files/maxcap_wp_04_0.pdf , online access June 19, 2018.

55
allowing thousands of Cypriots to return to their homes they lost in 1974 , during the Turkish
occupation in the north of the island.177 That was not a surprise. Thus, the EU would expect
Turkey to turn its position on the Cypru s issue. Turkey must always to ‘renounce’ to
something. Recently, t he EU “warned Turkey to refrain from any “threat” against Cyprus. ”178
A European Commissi on spokeswoman said in Brussels:
“Turkey needs to commit unequivocally to good neighbourly relations and avoid
any kind of source of friction, threat, or action d irected against a member state.”179
It seems unlikely that any Turkish government will accept conditions related to the Cyprus
issue, particularly in the context of increasing uncertainties surrounding the prospect of
Turkish membership. Even after the start of negotiations, key European leaders like Jean-
Claude Juncker, former Presiden t of the European Commission, and previous Austrian prime
minister Wolfgang Schüssel, prefer to continue to follow the ‘privileged partnership’ rather
than full membership.180
Also the French historian and journalist Alexandre Adler, known as pro -turkish int ellectual in
France, moving from a vehement position against Europe about the ‘ Islam Turc ’:
“A lazy and ignorant Europe does not want to know that the majority of Turks
intensely reject the Salafist integralism, whose devastations are evident in Egypt
and in the Maghreb as well as in our suburbs […] the Turkish Shiites, Alevis and
Bektashis have pushed back any integralism for centuries. […] Even the
brotherhoods of the Sufi Sunnites t hat are very present in the gov erning party
know, under the influenc e of this Shiism and latent paganism introduced by the
Janissaries, authorizing the mystical dance, and music everywhere, and the
equality of women is incomparable with the remainder of the East and the
freedom of thought encouraged by the Hanafi School wh ich is the most liberal of
all. I do not hesitate to write that Turkish Islam is, for our Europe, which is in a

177 S. Sachs, Greek Cypriots Reject a U.N. Peace Plan , New York Times, April 25, 2004,
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/world/greek -cypriots -reject -a-un-peace -plan.html , online access June 19,
2018.
178 E. Maurice, EU warns Turkey over ‘threat’ to Cyprus , Euobserver, 12 Feb. 2018,
https://euobserver.com/foreign/140954 , online access June 19, 2018.
179 Ibidem .
180 C. MacMillan, Discourse, Identity and the Question of Turkish Accession to the EU: Through the Looking
Glass , cit., p. 106.

56
process of constitution, more of an asset than a disadvantage”181
he had to admit that Turkey’ s entry in EU will not be possible if it keeps visi ble Muslim
identity. From a cultural rather than a reli gious point of view, Giscard d’ Estaing said:
“Turkey has developed its own history and its own culture, which deserve respect.
However, the foundations of Europe’s identity, so vital to the cohesion o f the EU
today, are different. Turkey’s accession would change the nature of the European
project.”182
The aforementioned “privileged partnership,” is the best shared solution from Austria to
France. The ‘Turkish other’ is not in Europe, but invited to sit ( and not to participate) at the
‘historical’ European tables and ‘spatially controlled’ to prevent it would direct its glance to
‘East’, maybe to Russia. And the ‘old’ European balance of power game is served, again.
Hans -Gert Poettering, a German conservat ive, Christian Democratic Union politician, and
president of the European Parliament (2007 -2009) , highly pointed out: “ I believe that Turkey
and the European Union will have a more fruitful and satisfying relationship if they develop a
privileged partnersh ip, where they work together as closely as possible, but still remain
auton omous in their decision -making.”183
The idea of a ‘privileged partnership ’ had its origins in the eighteenth century. In order to
address the problem of Islam surrounding Europe, Fren ch social philosopher Charles -Irénée
Castel de Saint -Pierre (1658 – 1743) showed in his Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en
Europe the idea of a defensive partnership with the Mediterranean Muslim neighbors of
Europe, including the Turks. According t o this notion, however, Muslim lands would have ‘no
say in making political decisions ’:
“Once the Mahometans were associated with the Union, the advantages of such a
settlement for Europe would be numerous. First of all, the institutional
incorporation of Mediterranean Mu slim countries into the Union – as a
“partnership for peace” avant la letter, that is to say, not as equal partners – would
neutralize their military power… Once associated with the Union, Mahometans
would have to provide troops for Euro pean security. They would also have to

181 Quoted in B.Ç Tekin, Representations and Otheri ng in Discourse: The Construction of Turkey in the EU
Context , John Benjamins Publishing, Amsterdam, Philadelphia 2010, p. 172
182 R. Taras, Xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe , cit., p. 185.
183 H.G. Poettering, Reasons for a Privileged Partnership between Turkey and the EU , New Europe , 27 November 2004,
https://www.neweurope.eu/article/reasons -privileged -partnership -between -turkey -and-eu/, online access Ju ne 19, 2018.

57

contribute financially to the maintenance of the Union… [I]t was certainly
beneficial for European commerce. The imagined and proposed settlement would
open the borders of neighbouring Muslim states to un restricted commercial
activity.”184
Clearly, the current privileged partnership proposal has much in common with the ideas of
Saint -Pierre. Turkey should be held defensively within the European “arms” , and the Turkish
market, the fastest growing market in Europe, must be kept open to Europea n exports. So
Turkey should be anchored off the European coast, but it will never be able to dock at the
European port. Ironically, a Polish writer wrote : “Ex oriente lux, ex occidente luxus! ”185 As
Fadi Hakura , global expert, highligh ted, “ Privileged partnership boils down to certain
potentially dangerous propositions, namely, that Turks should not be judged by the values of
democracy, human rights, goodneighborly relations and cultural diversity. This is somewhat
reminiscent of the pr ejudicial nineteenth – and twentieth -century Orientalist views of Turkey,
summed up by the Scottish essayist and philosopher Thomas Carlyle: ‘The unspeakable Turk
should be immediately struck out of the question, and the country be lef t to honest European
guidance.’”186
In a ny case, the European identity ‘practices’ in
recognizing its ‘others ’ will not be without serious
implications in a new globalization context. E specially
if we consider the question of integrating the many
Europe’s cultural minorities. Fo r instance, the
controversy about the Danish cartoons portraying
Prophet Muhammad in degrading ways provided th e
solidarity for a small Danish newspaper which,
defending “European civilization”, marked by its
freedom of speech against the ‘uncivilized’ Muslims.187

184 T. Mastnak, Abbe De Saint -Pierre: European Union and the Turk, History of Political Thought , V ol. 19, No. 4, 1 April,
1998, pp. 585-86, https://philpapers.org/rec/MASADS , online access June 1 9, 2018.
185 S.J. Lec, Pensieri spettinati , Bompiani, Milano, 2001, Sez. II.
186 F. Hakura, Partnership Is No Privilege: The Alternative to EU Membership Is No Turkish Delight , EUROPEAN
PROGRAMME EP BP 05/02, Chatham House, September 2005, p. 5,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/bpturkeyeu.pdf , online access June 19, 2018.
187 The Jyllands -Posten Muhammad cartoons question (o r Muhammad cartoons crisis) started after the Danish
newspaper Jyllands -Posten published on September 2005. It contained many ‘degrading parodies’ about
Muhammad. The newspaper asserted that it was trying to enrich the debate about Islam and self -censorshi p.
Muslim groups in Denmark complained, and the issue became a question of diplomacy around the world. See P.

58
Many other newspapers in Norway, France, Germany, and other European countries
expressed their solidarity by reprinting the images opening new way for the clash of
civilizations.
The Dutch politician Geert Wilders , founder and current leader of the Party for Freedom ,
recalling the image of Frits Bolkestein188 about the siege of Vienna in 1683 , vehemently
argued, visiting Italy:
“The first Islamic invasion of Europe was stopped at Poitiers in 732. The second
Islamic invasion was halted at the gates of Vienna in 1683. Now we have to stop
the current – stealth -Islamic invasion. Ladies and gentlemen, once Islam
conquered Constantinople, now it wants to conquer Rome. We have to stop the
Islamisation of Europe, because if we don’t, Europe will become Eurabi a.”189
In the political vocabulary of Europe, particularly in continental Europe, ‘integration ’ is
characterized by signifying cultural assimilation in opposition to multiculturalism. In the
words of German Chancellor Merkel, “The idea of a multicultural soc iety cannot succeed. It
is prone to failure from the start. Multi culturalism is not integration.”190
‘Integration ’ should mean recognition and apprec iation of multiculturalism. The ‘absorbing
integration’ or the ‘assimilation’ conducts to swallow the periph eral identities in the ‘dominant
cultural identity’ , while ‘integration ’ is the movement of all identities to meet each other to
create a culturally ‘neutral ’ coexistence space. As John Murphy e Jung Min Choi assert:
“The tenets of assimilation are based on a dualistic philosophy that is
antagonizing to equality. Clearly stated, assimilation reflects a racist ontology
where there are two separate ontological places of existence: whites and others.
Accordingly, the assimilation perspective is grounded on ra cist principles where
one group is automa tically accorded a high status.”191
Evidently, at the core of Europe’s integration prob lem there is the question of a ‘hierarchical’

McGraw, J. Warner, The Danish Cartoon Crisis of 2005 and 2006: 10 Things You Didn’t Know About the
Original Muhammad Controversy , Huffpost, 09/25/ 2012, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter -mcgraw -and-
joel-warner/muhammad -cartoons_b_1907545.html?guccounter=1 , online access June 19 , 2018.
188 European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services (1999 – 2004) and famous for the so -called
“Bolkestein Directive”.
189 C. MacMillan, Discourse, Identity and the Question of Turkish Accession to the EU: Through the Looking
Glass , cit., p. 105 -106.
190 V. Valt, Life on the Front Lines , cit.
191 J.W. Murphy, J.M. Choi, Postmodernism, Unravelling Racism, and Democratic Institutions , Praeger, Westport, Conn.,
1997, p. 45.

59
notion of civilization, according to which the do minant in -group (self) accepts ‘inf erior’
civilizations (out -groups, others) in terms of their proximity to the European center. Thus, th e
‘European self’ can accept the ‘Turkish other’ in the European center only on the condition
that they are willing to be assimilated or absorbed. The ins istence, for instance, among many
European intellectuals on referring to “Muslims in Europe” rat her than to “European
Muslims”192 is linked to the perception of these two notions: Europe as ‘civilization ’ and
Muslims as its ‘others ’.
The simple ethnographic pattern according to which a dominant group in -group (‘us’, the
‘self’) makes a process of construction according to which a dominated out -group (‘them’,
‘other’) is created by stigmatizin g a real or imagined difference, evolves into the European
integrati on process.
The problem can not be solved without first tackling the question of how Europe defines itself.
Europe must decide whether to accept ‘diversity ’, in the strict sense of the term, as a
fundamental principle. It should choose between the awarenes s of a historical -spatial
dimension as a basis for the construction of an identity that accepts its own civilization as
‘neutral ’, based on the common destiny and on th e future of its inhabitants, or continuing to
be considered a common project of civiliza tion for people who share a common heritage as
dominant in-group, where the concept of ‘integration’ deprives itself of its real meaning. If the
latter vision remains hegemonic, the Turkish efforts to become part of Europe will be
successful to the extent that the Turks are preparing to be “integrated”, “absorbed”,
“assimilated” .

192 See T. Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim: A Study of Islamic Sources in the Euro pean Context , Islamic
Foundation, Leicester, 1999.

60
Chapter III
The ‘Shady’ Russia

61
1. A question of ‘mind’

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko at the opening of the summit on the European strategy
of Yalta, in September 2016 in Kiev, expressed his point of view on the relationshi p between
Russia and the West: “ Russi a is trying to enter the head of western civilization […]
Euroscepticism, anti -Americanism, isolationism destroy the system of coordina tes of the
West ”193 This is not case to debate about the Ukrainian question, but it’s interesting to note the
phrase and the first doubts of the journalist: “ The main question would be to understand what,
in reality, Petro Poroshenko mea ns by “western coordi nates”. Understanding his concept of
“West” : which coordinates? Geographical? Cultural? Policies? Geopolitical?
Philosophical? ”194 Surely, w ith the collapse of the USSR, many Eastern European countries
that now define themselves as “Westerners” have moved th e border to the East (‘arbitrary,’
according to the journalist), that for mos t of the twentieth century the “Cold War” has
demarcated on the European continent. But the first feeling, reading those ‘doubts’, has been
‘how Ukraine can believe in understandi ng what is West ’. Actually, Poroshenko’ s statement
is, precisely , the crucial issue of this section.
In the first chapter we have distinguished two types of ‘othering’ process: the simple and the
complex. T here is no much gap between simple and complex ‘othering’: the first may turn
into the second, and vice versa. Even if, w hat differentiates the simple from the complex
‘othering’, is that in the first case ‘others’ become part of a basic s elf/other (in/out)
dissociation process, in the second case, a deep self/other relationship becomes a key factor.
The reasonableness characterizing the complex ‘othering’, maximizes the role of persuasion.
The question of ‘Russian other’ is quite ‘complex’ and we should go step by step. So, in this
section we firstly trac e an interesting path about the invention of Eastern Europe, after that we
go back again through the historical dimension to find that moment when Russia became a
question of mind, activating that ‘complex’ process of European ‘othering’ already mentioned.

193 E. Bertolasi, Poroshenko, La Russia sta cercando “d’introdursi nella testa” della civiltà occidentale , Sputnik
Italia, 03.10.2016, https://it.sputniknews.com/opinioni/201610033434773 -poroshenko -russia -occidente/ , online
access June 22, 2018.
194 Ibidem .

62
1.1 The ‘irony’ of cartography: the ‘invention’ of East ern Europe.

The first map of the world is found in a manuscript b y Isidore, bishop of Seville, titled
Etymologiarum sive originum libri XX .195 He simply reproduced the prophetic narrative of
Noah’ s three sons not indicating a distribution in the world, but outlining a division:
“In its simplest form, the world is like a pancake, the top half of which is taken up
by Asia and the bottom half of which is divided in two, with Europe on the left
and Afr ica on the right. In this representation, Asia is the same size as Europe and
Africa together. This means that the size of Europe is not overestimated as much
as by Pliny, who considered it to take up half the world. The boundary between
Europe and Africa is constituted by the Mediterranean, that between Africa and
Asia by the Nile, and that between Europe and Asia by the River Tanais and the
Meotides Paludes, now known as the Don and Sea of Azov. The whole world is
surrounded by the Ocean ”196
In the fifteent h century the extension of Europe into the world diminished. In 1448, Andreas
Walsperger, a Benedictine monk from Salzburg, drew a nice map aligned to the north. The
peculiarity was the distribution of well -defined Christianity.197 Europe has always been a
problem from a geographical point of view.
Many locate the eastern European border along the Ural Mountains, the Ural River, the
Caspian Sea, the Caucasus Mountains, the Black Sea, the Bosporus and Dardanelles.198
However, it is a border drawn historical circ umstances, and by no means ‘natural’. In -fact, a
French historian pointed out: “L’espace européen s’arrête là où les phénomènes dominants de
civilisation, ayant une permanence historique et une densité territoriale, s’estompent ou
deviennent ponctuels dans le temps et dans l’espace ”.199
The European peculiarity is characterized by this self -definition effort, that Italian philosopher

195 P. den Boer, P. Bugge, O. Waever, The history of the idea of Europe , cit., p. 23.
196 Ibidem .
197 Ivi, p. 32.
198 National Geographic Atlas of the World (7th ed.), National Geographic Society, Washington, 1999, pp. 68 –
69; 90 -91.
199 “The european space ends where the main civilization’s phenomena with historical permanence and territorial
density, fade or become punctua l in time and space”, C.O. Carbonell, Une histoire européenne de l’Europe , Vol.
1, Mythes et fondements (des origines au XV siècle ), Privat, Paris, 1999, p. 89.

63
Giacomo Marramao, considering the thesis of Karl Jaspers,200 says:
“While every other civilization is characterized autocentrica lly, identifying itself
as 'the center of the universe' […] Europe is constituted by 'an internal polarity of
the West and the East'. The antithesis of East and West is, therefore, an exclusive
mythic -symbolic property of the West: a typical Western dual ism not found in
other cultures. ”201
In the eighteenth century ‘Europe’ is very popular,202 dominating the titles of books and
magazines proli ferating in the century of the “audience of readers”. The century consecrated
“public opinion”, which will coincide wi th emerging bourgeois society within the ancien
régime . Many debated the existence of a civilization and identity that was properly
‘European’ . The discussion dealt with the question of the limits of the continent, of the rightly
European nations. Not only along the coordinates of the north -south axis privileged by
humanism which reflected the religious division triggered by the Reformation. In this regard
Jean Bodin, beyond a rather widespread vulgate, elaborated a complex position:
“Though there is no id entifiable boundary between east and west, as there is
between north and south, all the ancients held that oriental peoples were gentler,
more courteous, tractable, and intelligent than western peoples, though less
warlike. ‘See’, said the Emperor Julian, ‘how docile and tractable are the Persians
and Syrians , the Germans and Celts proud and jealous of their liberty, the
Normans both courteous and warlike, the Egyptians intelligent, subtle and
generally effeminate’ […] if one reads histories carefully one w ill find that within
the same latitudes the western peoples approximate more to the character of
northerners, and orientals to southerners … But the most notable cause of variation
is the difference between mountains and plains. Moreover it makes a great
difference whether valleys in the same latitude or even on the same parallel are
opened to the north or south. This can be seen where a mountain range runs from
west to east as do the Apennines dividing Italy into two halves, or the Auvergne

200 See J.L. Adams, The European Spirit, The European Spirit, by Karl Jaspers, translated with an Introduction
by Ronald Gregor Smith. 64 pp. London, Student Christian Movement Press, 1948. 2s 6d , Theology Today, Vol.
7, Issue 4, January 1951, http://journal s.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/004057365100700417?journalCode=ttja ,
online access June 22, 2018.
201 (personal translation) G. Marramao, Passaggio a Occidente. Filosofia e globalizzazione , Bollati Boringhieri,
Torino, 2003, p. 59.
202 P. Jager, Les limites ori entales de l’espace européen , Dix -huitième siècle, Vol. XVII, No. 25, 1993, p. 11,
https://www.persee.fr/doc/dhs_0070 -6760_1993_num_25_1_1905 , online access June 22, 2018.

64
mountains in Fra nce, the Pyrenees between France and Spain, and the Atlas
mountains in Africa, which extend from the Atlantic ocean to the frontiers of
Egypt, a distance of six hundred leagues, or the Alps, which start in Fran ce and
stretch as far as Thrace … In conseque nce those who live in Tuscany, for instance,
are of a very different complexion and much more intelligent than the inhabitants
of Lombardy. […] It is no wonder then that the Florentine, whose country lies
open on the east and the south and is protected b y mountains to the north and west
has a much more subtle nature than the Venetian and is more skilled in the
management of affairs”203
Cartography played an eminent role in shaping the frame of reference, giving “ the
cartography was clearly identified with the Enlightenment, the work of “enlightened people”
who tried to throw light on the darkest corner of the continent. Moreover, the light of
cartography was implicitly linked to the light of civilization, since Eastern Europe was often
described in the eight eenth century as emerging from the darkness ”.204 To the point that, in the
Atlas Universel (1757) of Gilles and Didier Robert de Vaugondy205 “the cartography was
clearly identified with the Enlightenment, the work of “enlightened people” who tried to
throw lig ht on the darkest corner of the continent. Moreover, the light of cartography was
implicitly linked to the light of civilization, since Eastern Europe was often described in the
eighteenth century as emerging from the darkness ”.206
Apart from the western lim it never questioned, from the geographic al point of view, the label
of ‘Eastern Europe’ was traditionally referred to Northern Europe. In the geographical
imagination of Western European countries in the eighteenth century, Russia was still a
northern powe r, although barbaric. In the same Russ ian texts of the time the term sever
(north) was omnipresent, unlike other geographical terms. The expansion beyond the Urals to
Siberia and its natural rich es, initiated by the Stroganov , was perceived as a movement

203 J. Bodi n, Bodin: Six Books of the Commonwealth , trans. M.J. Tooley, Basil Blackwell Oxford, Oxford, 1967,
pp. 159 -60.
204 “a fundamental geographical structure to organize other forms of knowledge, from natural history to national
history, and also visually making evident the emerging distinction between east and west”. L. Wolff, Inventing
Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of Enlightenment , Stanford University Press, Stanford,
1994, p. 145.
205 a large volume completed in fifteen years, more or less. It has been realized in two versions, both published in
Paris in 1752.
206 (personal translation) L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of
Enlightenment , cit., p. 149.

65
towards the north.207
Montesquieu contributed to the eastern limits of Europe, but in the sense of a marked
exoticism, facilitating the spread of stereotypes that prevented seeing the similarities (see next
paragraphs): Lettres P ersanes (1721) exalted the naïf Persian trave llers in Europe in order to
criticize the customs of France, and in so doing they added the differences to serve the
satirical end of the work .208
“Montesquieu n’a pas eu besoin d’Aristote, ni de Bodin, ni de Chardin, ni de
l’Abbé Du Bos, ni d e Arburthnot, ni d’Espiard de la Borde, ni de toutes les
“sources méconnues” quel es érudits n’en finissent pas de découvirir, pour
produire les principes fondamentaux de sa “théorie” des climats: il lui a suffi de
puiser en lui -même, c’est -à-dire dans un incoscient social qu’il avait en commun
avec tous les hommes cultivés de son temps et qui est encore au principe des
“influences” que ceux -ci ont pu exercer sur lui”209
In the previous chapter we have highlighted how through the treaties of Carlowitz (1699) and
Passarowitz (1718), Europe pursued the decline of the Ottoman empire. But we did not
mention the important role of the Italian explorer, scientist and soldier Luigi Ferdinando
Marsili. Probably, more known abroad than in Italy. In Austria he showed his undisputed
military strategy and cartography skills, contributing to the defin ition of the Habsburg
Empire’ s borders, after the peace of Carlowitz and marking the first step of the subsequent
fundamentals which are the core of this research.210 The Ottoman Empire’ s decline marked a
decisive point in the development of the invention of Eastern Europe.
To unde rstand how the use of the term ‘invention’ is not a forcing, as well as that of ‘irony’ ,
we must pay attention to two events, both cartographic, defining this new geography of

207 J. Kusber, Mastering the Imperial Space: the Case of Siberia. Theoretical approaches and recent directions
of research , Ab Imperio, Vol. VI, Issue 4, 2008, p. 57, http://doczz.com.br/doc/1156269/mastering -the-imperial-
space –the-case-of-siberia , online access June 22, 2018.
208 See A.M. Medici, Città italiane sulla via della Mecca. Storie di viaggiatori tunisini dell’Ottocento ,
L’Harmattan Italia, Torino, 2001.
209 “Montesquieu did not need Aristotle, or Bodin, Chard in, Abbé Du Bos, Arburthnot, Espiard de la Borde, nor
all the ‘unrecognized sources’ that the scholars do not cease to discover, to produce the fundamental principles
of his ‘theory’ of climates: it was enough to draw within himself, that is, in a social u nconscious that he had in
common with all the learned men of his time and that is still the basis of the ‘influences’ that they have been able
to exercise on him”. P. Bourdieu, Le Nord et le Midi. Contribution à une analyse de l’effet Montesquieu , Actes
de la recherche en sciences sociales, Vol. 35, 1980, p. 25, https://www.persee.fr/doc/arss_0335 –
5322_1980_num_35_1_2096 , online access June 22, 2018.
210 F. Farinelli, I segni del mond o. Immagine cartografica e discorso geografico in età moderna , La Nuova Italia,
Firenze, pp. 83 -105.

66
Europe: the distinction between European Russia and Asian Russia and the partition of
Poland.
The fourteenth -century expansion of Genoa and Venice grew apart the trade route from the
Varangians to the Greeks .211 It opened a long period of isolation of the Russian area compared
to Europe , making this pa rt of the world one of the lesser -known by Europeans, despite its
relative proximity.
Until 1613, when the Romanov dynasty began, Russia remained an unknown land, provoking
distrust: “ Russ ia remained therefore still foreign and foreign, a distant world, where reality
was deformed through the stories that the Westerners, more and more sparse and scared, sent
to the much -regretted motherland ”.212
Before the Treaty of Nerčinsk with the Chinese E mpire (1689), the E astern limits of the
largest empire of the time were not even established. T sar Peter I the Great (1672 -1725),
author of the treaty, gave the decisive impulse for the definition between the European and the
Asian territories of Russia , obtaining that the 1716 edition of the Almanach Royal – the French
administrative yearbook predecessor of the Gothaischer Hofkalender , the Gotha Almanac –
recorded Russia in the category of “European powers”.213 Russia was coming at the gates of
Europe.
Still, in the map of Europe by
Guillaume Delisle at the beginning of
the century,214 the distinction between
European Muscovy and Asian M uscovy
– also between European Turkey and
Asian Turkey , but not including the
results of the Carlowitz Treaty – was
traced f rom the course of the Don,
continuing to the north in a very
irregular manner. The respective
Western sections of Muscovy and

211 The medieval route along the Dnieper basin, inaugurated by the Scandinavian warriors -merchants (well
known in Constantinople) which in the West became th e “Normans” and here the “Varangians”. It connected
Scandinavia, Kievan Rus’ and the Eastern Roman Empire.
212 (personal translation) P. Licini, La Moscovia rappresentata. L’immagine «capovolta» della Russia nella
cartografia rinascimentale europea , Guerini, Milano, 1988, p. 206.
213 S. Moravia, Il pensiero degli idéologues . Scienza e filosofia in Francia (1780 -1815) , La Nuova Italia, Firenze,
1974, p. 533 ss.
214 L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of Enlightenment , cit., p. 1 52.

67
Turkey, together with Poland, were precisely the core of what will later become Eastern
Europe.215
Peter I was the proponent of appr oaching European colonial culture and politics, not only with
the impressive works such as the construction of the new capital of Petersburg (1703) or the
adoption of European court customs, but above all with a vision of Russia that it had to reflect
the territorial conception of the Western powers. Looking for outlets on the sea, in Azov on
the Black Sea or, with Petersburg, on the Baltic. Then in applying the European scheme of the
colonial center -periphery relationship to the Russian Empire.
In 1721 the name of Muscovy changed from ‘tsarstvie’ (kingdom) to ‘imperia’ .216 Pietro I
promoted the collaboration between foreign and Russian scholars for the compilation of the
geographical maps of the Empire, with the opening of a geographical office and with the
inauguration of a solid Franco -Russian cooperation. The Russian scientific projects benefited
from a newfound determination and an innovative impetus. All the Russian cartography was
organized by the first director of the Cartographic Office, Ivan Kirilov, flanked by Joseph –
Nicolas Delisle, a French astronomer and geographer sent to Russia.217
Vasily Tatishchev , commissioned by Peter I in the 17 30s, elaborated the new geographical
vision of the empire: he chose the chain of the Urals as the eastern limit; limi t continued south
from the river Ural up to the Caspian Sea; and then, in the south -west, across the Caucasus to
the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea .218 This proposal became the official cartography with the
first imperial atlas – the Atlas Vserossiiskoi Imper ii of Kirilov ( 1734) and the Atlas R ossiiskoi
(1745) of the recently founded Academy of Sciences (another pro -European initiative).219
Catherine II, in 1767 officially declared Russia as a European power. She sent a letter to
V oltaire, from Kazan (city at th e crossroads of the Russian, Tatar and Finno -Ugrian ethnic
groups, which she r ebuilt after the Pugačëv revolt), claiming to be in Asia.
Russia of Peter I up to Catherine II was pressing to formalize and consolidate the difference
with the territories to t he East, with the intention of ‘placing’ itself in Europe. At the same
time Eu rope found the ‘spatial’ tools to develop its ‘othering’ process, creating the East
Europe. Europe consolidated the Eastern vision of Russia through its progressively territorial
strengthening . The difference in perception with Turkey was that Russia acted as an insider .

215 Ibidem .
216 M. Bassin, Russia between Europe and Asia. The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space , Slavic
Review, Vol. 50, Issue 1, Spring 1991, p. 6, https://doi.org/10.2307/2500595 , online acces s June 22, 2018.
217 Maps and Atlases from the Era of Peter the Great , The National Library of Russia,
http://nlr.ru/eng/coll/maps/peter.html , online access June 22, 2018.
218 M. Bassin, Russia between Eur ope and Asia. The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space , cit., p. 7.
219 Ibidem .

68
The centrality of European civilization was threatened by the rise of an intruder first northern
and then eastern. A bove all , unknown .
Caterina succes sfully continued military campaigns. We already mentioned the Russo -Turkish
war (1768 -1774 and 1787 -1792) that “gave” southern Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and
Crimea to Russia. Then, the turn of Poland. The divisions of 1772, 1793 and 1795.
We should point out that in the seventeenth century the Polish -Lithuanian Confederation was
at its pe ak. In the year of Westphalia, excluding the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire,
the Confederacy was the largest state in the European area by extension, consisting of a
myriad of territorial units corresponding to the current Poland, Lithuania and Bela rus, beyond
to most of Latvia and Ukraine and a portion of Russia. The division was ‘on paper’ , because
one of the concerns of the Polish king was the mapping and the representation as exact as
possible of the territory of the Confederation, in order con trol it against the pressure of the
three ‘black eagles’.220 Thomas Jefferson spoke about “ a country erased from the world
map”.221
These events consolidated the role of Russia. Thanks to her prestigious mediation with France
in the Treaty of Teschen (1779), whi ch ended the War of Bavarian Succession, Catherine
began quite strong in the internal structures of Central Europe and her armed neutrality (1780)
dictated Law on the sea to the powerful British navy.222 The huge territorial gains extended
further to the wes t and south boundaries of the empire. The annexation of southern Ukraine,
Crimea and eastern Poland provided the conditions for the development of a navy in the
south. The strategic implications of these acquisitions revealed their full potential only in t he
nineteenth century. The southern border now followed the northern shores of the Black Sea
and with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) the Turks granted unmanned Russian ships
access to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles strait.223 Catherine ’s nava l power
challenged France and England in the Mediterranean. Thanks to the division of Poland,
Russia confined with two other great powers, Prussia and Austria.
Alexander I, after 1815, tried to keep an army twice as great as Austria and Prussia together.
However, Russia needed a system of alliances that did not discover it, guaranteed by the
system from Vienna and the like, despite the diplomatic failures of Nicholas I.224
In 1939, Hitler and Stalin signed the secret Molotov -Ribbentrop Treaty. Treaty’s protoc ols

220 L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of Enlightenment , cit., p. 151.
221 Ibidem .
222 See R. Bartlett, Storia della Russia , Edizioni Mon dadori, Milano, 2014.
223 Ibidem .
224 Ibidem .

69

defined the German and Russia territorial influence after the Poland’s invasion . Russia should
control Latvia, Esto nia, and Finland, and gain a very huge area of eastern Polish lands.
It’s interesting to note how the cartography changed from 1700 up to 1945. In 1944, Churchill
and Stalin decided the new geopolitical of Europe. Churchill scrawled the list of countries and
the influence of the USSR and Western allies on a piece of paper. The first country subject to
the 'partition' w as Romania: Russia 9 0 percent, “the other” 10 percen t. Then Greece: Great
Britain (in agreement with the US ) 90 percent, Russia 10 percent. Yugoslavia and Hungary:
50 percent of each influence. Bulgaria: 75 percent Russia, 25 percent to “others” . Winston
Churchill pushed the list to Stalin, to the Kremlin. Stalin read carefully and then ratified it
with a big blue pencil mark. After wards, Churchill asked Stalin: “ Could they not judge us
rather cynical if we know that we have treated this question, so vital for mi llions of peop le, so
hurriedly?” Stalin answered, “No,” and then he said to Churchill, pointing t o the pa per left on
the table: “Hold it ””225

Source: R. Bartlett, Storia della Russia , cit.

225 Così Stalin e Churchill si spartirono l’Europa , la Repubblica.it, Archivio, 1992,
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1992/01/12/cosi -stalin -churchill -si-spartirono –
europa.html , online access June 22, 2018.

70
1.2 The upcoming ‘Russian other’

Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the notion of Europe took its first steps to
become social -political on the “ashes” of Christianity.226 A mechanism developed through a
system of forces that could be measured and defined. It was important to translate into
“numbers” the greatness of a nation or a state an d above all “adjusting” the distortions of the
political and social system of that time.
“In place of the great number of precepts from which logic is composed, I
believed that the following four rules would be sufficie nt for me […] The first was
to never accept anything that I did not recognize with such evidence, diligently
avoiding the precipitation […] The second was the subdivision of every difficulty I
examined in as many parts as possible and necessary to bett er solve it. The third
was to lead my thoughts by order, starting with the simplest and easiest things to
know, to gradually rise, as if by degrees, to the knowledge of the most complex
[…] And the last, making such comprehensive enumerations and revisio ns so
general as to be sure not to omit anything ”227
Thus, Russia should be measured in the European representation according to its own regime
and civil ization resulting respectively ‘barbarous’ and ‘uncivilized’ .
First of all, Russia inherited doubts in it s own Christian being, a recognition previously
attributed by Enea Silvio Piccolomini (later Pope Pius II), who for the first time included
Eastern Christianity in the concept of ‘Europe’ .228 This, it had to deal with some realities: on
the one hand, the ter ritorial expansion of Ivan III the Great (1462 -1505) who started a gradual
mingling process between secular state management and the Byz antine tradition of the
kingdom’ s sacredness (tsar) ; and the confusion regarding the identification of Russian as a
Muslim, on the other.229
In light of such difficulties, the use of political and social elements was inevitable. The rise of
Ivan IV “the Terrible” simplified the process. The Danish diplomat Yakob U lfeldt defined the

226 J.B. Duroselle, L’idea d’Europa nella storia , Edizioni Milano Nuova, Milano, 1964, p. 127.
227 (person al translation) R. Descartes, Il Discorso sul metodo , (a cura di) E. Lojacono, B. Widmar, UTET,
Milano, 2016, Parte prima.
228 R. Lala, Diecimila anni di identità europea , Alpina Srl, Torino, 2006, Vol. I, p. 249.
229 L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Ma p of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment , cit., p. 11; Sir
J. Horsey, Travels , in L.E. Berry, R.O. Crummey, Rude and Barbarous Kingdom: Russia in the Accounts of
Sixteenth -Century English Travel Voyagers , , University of Wisconsin Press, Milwauke e, London 1968, p. 264 –
65.

71
tsar as the “worst enemy of Christianity” a nd told about the terrifying images in Livonia230
after the Russian’s attack.231 If “Regular body control is a fundamental means of maintaining
a biography of personal identity; but at the same time the self i s also more or less constantly
“exposed” to others, ”232 then the body become “a visible bearer of personal identity ”233 and
we cannot exclude that, for instance, the practices perpetrated against the subjugated
populations become the object of representatio n of Russia in the eyes of the ‘Europeans’ .
Although i n the homeland of Shakespeare, Marlowe, Francis Bacon, Edmund Spenser, a
certain Golden Age has obscured some events not likely to be called ‘civilized’ .
Bacon, indeed, Attorney General and Lord Chancellor of England, in some notes on the ‘State
of Europe’ , described the “ Muscovite Emperor of Russia […] always at war with the Tartars
[…] like a tyrant advised by no advice […] a prince who deposits himself for a Tartar, who
removes again, who sends an ambassador to Rome, givin g some hope of submitting to it […]
whose religion is close to the Greek Church, steeped in superstition and idolatry ”.234
Thus, the representation of a ‘barbarous’ Russia was realized with the constant association
with a political system shaped by an arbitrary and questionable absolutist power , and with a
social system made of a network of relationships with savage and unfaithful peoples. Europe
began to define itself as a cultural entity and a civilization. This was a universalist and not
divisible trait, since different civilization s wer e not conceived, rather a ‘civilized’ world and
one that ‘did not’ .
The legitimacy of Russia as ‘ European other’ started to turn into ‘ anothe r challenge’ .
‘Christianity’ struggled with difficulty to win the primacy of European identity by facing the
gradu al transition from the need to ‘balance’ to that of ‘weighing’ the expansio n of
civilization, which intended to acquire an institutional structure. A context where ‘kingdoms’
were turning into ‘sovereign states’ .235
Until M uscovy resolved its ‘businesses at the E ast of the Empire, the problem did not arise,
but when the wars, like the Russian -Swedish wars, continued over time, the alarm bell of
expansionism sounded.
Peter I, who had travel led far and wide in Euro pe, pushed Russia on a path of ‘ westerniza tion’

230 The Baltic region around the Gulf of Riga, today an integral part of Latvia.
231 A. Filjushkin, Ivan the Terrible: A Military History , Frontline Books, London, 2008, p. 246.
232 A. Giddens, Modernity and Self -identity: Self and Soc iety in the Late Modern Age , Stanford University Press,
Stanford, 1991, pp. 57 -58.
233 Ibidem .
234 F. Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon: Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, and Lord High Chancellor of
England , Baynes and son, London, 1824, Vol. 3, p. 21.
235 L. Febvre, L’Europa. Storia di una civiltà , cit., p. 188.

72
and ‘modernization’ . According to the Europeans, the pupil demonstrated the willingness to
abandon barbarism and learn good ‘civil’ practices. Furthermore, the consolidated hegemony
in the Baltic area transformed the ‘expansionist’ Russia into a potential ally against the Turks.
Leibniz undertook a “conversation” with Peter I, during the marriage of the zarevic Aleksej
Petrovič ( tsar’s first -born) and Carlotta (sister Charles VI’s wife, Emperor of Habsburg).
Leibniz seemed to have also been the author of th e marriage, among others.236 With the secret
Treaty of Dover (1670), between Britain and France, Louis XIV was free to declare war to
Holland. A young Leibniz, demoralized by the impossibility of con tributing to peace,
developed a ‘plan’ to divert France’ s attention to Egypt. The Consilium Aegyptiacum237 was a
masterpiece of foresight and strategy. If Le Roi Soleil wanted to increase la gloire , why not
divert his expansionist ambitions in the Mediterranean against the most bitter enemy of the
Empire in the East : the Turks.238 Involving a ‘redeemed’ Russian tsar in this challenge would
have fuelled hopes for a cultural and peaceful Europe against the ‘ savage’ Muslims.
Thus , there was a first Russia’s inclusion in the Western world, albeit with due ‘precautions’ .
Leibniz tried to modify those ‘mechanical’ reasonings of the two preceding centuries, through
a universalistic vision. He followed the way of ‘reconciliation ’, proposing a pluralism that
admitted the possibility of understanding and collaboration. ‘Talk’ wi th Russia did not mean
‘assimilation ’ to the ‘European self’. Leibniz was looking for a sort of ‘convergence’ . Europe
and the world in general should go towards a single common point of arrival.
The Sankt -Peterburg (1703) foundation was the most representa tive step of Russia in Europe.
The ‘window on Europe’ , famous for the Bronze Horseman (1833) by Pushkin, much desired
by Peter I the Great . The historian James Cracraft wrote : “Visiting the city in 1739 the Italian
Earl A lgarotti called St. Petersburg ‘ this large window recently opened in the North throu gh
which Russia looks at Europe’”.239 Italian essayist Ettore Lo Gatto, highly pointed out that
“l’Algarotti scrisse più precisamente: ‘gran finestrone’ ”.240
As we said before, Peter I (f irst, Catherine II then) engaged in a long war against Sweden for
the conquest of the Baltic (the so -called Wa r of the North), which ended with the

236 B.M. D’Ippolito, A. Montano, Monadi e monadologie: il mondo degli individui tra Bruno, Leibniz e Husserl:
atti del Convegno internazionale di studi, Salerno, 10 -12 giugno 2004 , Rubbettino Editore, Salerno, 2005, p.152.
237 See G.W. Leibniz, Consilium Aegyptiacum. L'ultimo progetto di Crociata contro i Turchi (1671 -1672) , Il
Cerchio, Rimini, 2012.
238 M.R. Antognazza, Leibniz: Una biografia intellettuale . La visione si amplia: Norimberga, Francoforte,
Magonza (marzo 1667 – marzo 1672) , Hoepli Editore, Milano, 2015, parte I.II.
239 J. Cracraft, Major Problems in the History of Imperial Russia , D.C. Heath, Lexington, 1994, p. 109.
240 “Algarotti precicely said: ‘big window’”. E. Lo Gatto, Il Mito di Pietroburg o: storia, leggenda, poesia ,
Feltrinelli, Milano, 1960, p. 78.

73
consolidation of Russian hegemony in the Baltic area, replacing the Swedish. The
consequences of the Northern War , and the passage o f Sweden to Finland and Scandi navia,
transformed the concept of the ‘North’ linked to Russia, moving to the ‘East’.
Russi a learnt French and slowly the ‘European good practices’ . Considering the new role in
the international context, the tsa r, during his l ong journeys, met intellectuals, diplo mats,
politicians, who wanted to ‘educate’ him.241 Peter I the Great “ ha spezzato tradizioni locali di
per sé incapaci di auto -superarsi spontaneamente, con le loro proprie risorse ”.242 This
revolution took place in a hist orical moment in which the Enl ightenment was shaping the
philosophes interested in investigating the exploits of the Russian Emperor.
V oltaire dwelt a great deal on Muscovy. He admired the tsar who wanted to build a Nation
nouvelle . But he did not have a f undamental virtue for a réformateur des hommes :
humanity.243 This negati ve meaning was due to the author’ s desire to construct an antagonist
of Charles XII.244 V oltaire’s enthusiasm gro w to such an extent that it was anonymously
published in 1748 , Anecdotes su r le Czar Pierre -le-Grand , almost a preview of what will
then, more than ten years later, its own tribute to Peter , Histoire de l’empire de Russie sous
Pierre le Grand , released in two volumes . Peter was responsible of the miracle russe .245 He
embodied the c oncrete realization of enlightened actions. Moreover, V oltaire, moving from
two arguments, such as the creation of Russia ex novo on the one hand , and that it had all the
elements to be part of the most advanced countries of Europe on the other, developed the idea
of a myth rather than a historical digression. However, doubts about the ability of the
Russians to internalize European values gripped the mind of the great ‘Western community’ .
Rousseau, who did not hide his sympathies for Poland, assumed an ext remely critical attitude:
“On vient dʼen voir une preuve à jamais mémorable la Pologne étoit dans les fers
du Russe, mais les Polonois sont restés libres. Grand exemple qui vous montre
comment vous pouvez braver la puissance & lʼambition de vos voisins. V ous ne
sauriez empêcher quʼi ls ne vous engloutissent; faites au moins quʼils ne puissent
vous digérer […] Malgré lʼexpérience assez frappantes que les Russes viennent
des faire en Pologne, rien ne les fera changer dʼopinion. Ils regarderont

241 M.S. Anderson, Britain’s Discovery of Russia, 1553 -1815 , Macmillan, London, 1958, p. 50.
242 “broke down local traditions that are incapable of spontaneously overcoming themselves, with their own
resources”, V. Strada, EuroRussia. Letteratura e cultura da Pietro alla rivoluzione , Laterza, Bari, 2005, p. XIII.
243 Voltaire, Oeuvres de Voltaire. 24, Histoire de Charles XII / avec préfaces, avertissements, notes, etc. par M.
Beuchot , Werdet et Lequi en fils, Paris, 1829, pp. 50 -62.
244 Ibidem .
245 A. Lortholary, Le mirage russe en France au XVIIIe siècle , Éditions Contemporaines, Paris, 1951, p. 58.

74
toujours[537] les hommes libres comme il fa ut les regarder eux -mêmes: cʼest -à-
dire, comme des hommes nuls, sur lesquels deux seuls instruments ont pris e,
savoir lʼargent et le knout”246
He piled it on Peter the Great and Russia in a blatant response to V oltaire. The reformist Tsar
was a génie imita tif, an imitator of laws and manners that did not belong to his people, and
instead of pulling out the true Russian na tional character, had turned it into what it was not:
Europeanization was not natural or even positive. He expressed his disappointment ab out
Russia’ s superficial claim to civilization. Peter had not understood that his people were still
immature for civilizati on. Rousseau asserted that the people’s politics , correspond ing to its
nature, could only be changed in youth. The only phase in whic h this could be shaped. The
Russian people could not therefore become civil because they had been barbaric for too
long.247
Montesquieu’ s consideration was also substantially negative. Russia, although worthy of
European interest thanks to its rapid progress , had a long way ahead of it before fully carrying
out the process of Europeanization. First, its inhabitants and Peter himself retain ed the typical
features of the barbarians . Secondly, Russia remained a despotic government, where there was
a system of sl avery. At the heart of Russian despotism was the absence of the third state, the
lack of a social class that represented intermediate powers.
“V oyez, je vous prie, avec quelle industrie le gouvernement moscovite cherche à
sortir du despotisme, qui lui est plus pesant qu'aux peuples mêmes. On a cassé les
grands corps de troupes; on a diminué les peines des crimes; on a établi des
tribunaux; on a commencé à connaître les lois; on a instruit les peuples. Mais il y
a des causes particulières, qui le ramèneront peut-être au malheur qu'il voulait fuir
[…] La loi qui obligeait les Moscovites à se faire couper la barbe et les habits, et
la violence de Pierre 1er, qui faisait tailler jusqu'aux genoux les longues robes de
ceux qui entraient dans les villes, étaient ty ranniques. Il y a des moyens pour
empêcher les crimes: ce sont les peines; il y en a pour faire changer les manières:

246 “We have just seen a proof for ever memorable Poland was in the irons of the Russian, but Poland remaine d
free. Great example that shows you how you can brave the power and ambition of your neighbours. You cannot
prevent them from swallowing you up; at least they cannot digest you […] Despite the rather striking experience
that the Russians have made in Pola nd, nothing will change their opinion. They will always look at free men as
one must look at them themselves: like null men, on whom only two instruments have taken, namely silver and
knout.” J.J. Rousseau, Considérations sur Le Gouvernement De Pologne, et sur sa Réformation Projetée ,
Collection complète des oeuvres, Genève, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1780 -1789, pp. 427, 537,
https://www.rousseauonline.ch/pdf/rousseauonline -0006.pdf , online acces s June 22, 2018.
247 Ivi, p. 515.

75
ce sont les exemples […] La Moscovie voudrait descendre d e son despotisme, et
ne le peut”248
Montesquieu argued about the theory of correspo ndence between the type of government and
climate, that the peoples of the North were predisposed to live in liberal governments, while
in countries with high temperatures it was easier for the body to relax and passively accepting
servitude and an authori tarian regime. Russia was an exception to this general rule, a despotic
power of the North, but whose customs were “ foreign to the climate, born of the m ixture of
peoples and conquests” .249 Montesquieu historically explained this extravagance by linking it
to the Mongol invasion in the Middle Ages that had altered the native characters and brought
the Eastern despotism into a non -natural place. Peter should not impose, in short, by force his
reforms which were a return to the original nature of his people.
Contrary to what Rousseau argued, which for the first time criticizes the Enlightenment
inclination to universality (Europeanization), Montesquieu accepted the reformist character of
Peter I the Great, although he did not appreciate the ways in which it was realized. There was
a common denominator in relation to the Enlightenment analyses : the ‘natural formation’ of
the other Russia n, different from the European ‘cultural’ self.
Peter’s Russia was “in” Europe, but partly. Frederick the Great of Prussia was n ot the only
one to deny the tsarist empire a lasting place among the “civilized nations of Europe” . Seen in
this way, from the center of Europe, Russia appeared distinctly 'other'. When confronted with
the true East, it was considered, fleetingly, European . The angry response of Edmund Burke to
William Pitt’ s proposal during the 1791 crisis of Ochakov to send British troops to hel p the
Sultan resist the Tsar has been : “What do these worse than savages have to do with the powers
of Europe? ” Russia could be h alf-civilized, but it was above all ‘barbaric’ for the other half.250
At the beginning of the nineteenth century Russia was still too Asian. With the spread of

248 “See, I beg you, with what industry the Muscovite government seeks to extricate itself from despotism, which
is heavier to it than to the people themselves. We have broken the great corps of troops; the penalties for crim es
have been reduced; courts have been established; we began to know the laws; we educated the people. But there
are causes, which may bring him back to the misfortune he wanted to escape […] The law which obliged the
Muscovites to have their beards and cl othes cut off, and the violence of Peter I., who had the long dresses of
those who went into the towns cut to their knees, were tyrannical. There are ways to prevent crimes: they are the
penalties; there are some to change the ways: these are the examples […] Muscovy would like to descend from
his despotism, and cannot”, C. de S. de Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (1758) , (Texte de 1758, dernier état du
texte revu par Montesquieu. L'orthographe a été modernisé et la ponctuation légèrement, mais non la gra phie.
Édition établie par Laurent Versini, Éditions Gallimard, Paris, 1995, p. 56, 208, 263.
249 Ivi, Book XIX – Chapter IV.
250 See A. Pagden, Europe and world around , in Early Modern Europe: An Oxford History , ed. E. Cameron,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.

76
democracy, the accusations against the Russian autocratic regime enriched the many
speculations ab out a form of non -European government. In Germany, historian Leopold von
Ranke claimed that Russia was too Asian to succeed in becoming an integral part of Europe.
This rejection was linked to the idea tha t nothing could give to Russia the Greek -Latin
heritage, shared by all Western Europeans and essential part of the European ethos .251 The
marquis Astoplhe de Custine described Russia as a country governed by Asian patriarchal
tyranny. Semi -barbaric Russia, ruled by terror, was trying at all costs to unite th e incompatible
national characteristics of the East and the West.252 The French journal Journal Des Débates
highly asserted “L’ordre a Paris, c’est la loi, c’est la loi sagement libèrale, l’ordre a Saint
Pètersbourg, cè est la toute -puissance d’un homme tempè rèe de temps en temps par des
rèvoltes armè es et par des complots de palais. Horrible alternative et qui suffit seule pour
montrer ce que cíest que des institutions où il faut compter le c rime comme balance des
pouvoirs”.253
Napoleon “invited” the Russians t o the “gates” of Paris. With its defeat, Russia was co –
protagonist, thanks to the manoeuvres of Chancellor Metternich and Tsar Alexander the
Blessed, of the new European political scenario together with Great Britain, Austria and
Prussia. It played a full role in Europe , facilitated by the Bismarckian ‘intertwining’ policy.
The Reinsurance Treaty (1887) with Alexander III, “paralyzed” the tsar in the face of a French
attack, but at the same time guaranteed him a mortgage on the possession of the Black Sea
and on the enlargement in the Balkan sector, with specific interest to Bulgaria.254
Russia was part of the European debate also for the fortunes in Turkey and Persia. The
perception of a potential rivalry was formalized in the elaboration of a principle: Russ ia could
effectively act according to the s pheres of influence like other ‘great Europeans’ . The
impressions about possible Russian strategies of deploying their hegemony in Europe seemed
to ‘warm up the stage’ to the future Cold War. A not inconsiderable detail : the most of the
nineteenth century was still characterized by a game , if not balances, at least of stratagems,
which Russia had become part of. There is a certain ambiguity: on the one hand there seemed

251 H. Mikkeli, Europa. Storia di un’idea e di un’identità , Società il Mulino, Bologna, 2002, p. 151 -152.
252 See V. Milchina, La Russie en 1839 du marquis de Custine et ses sources contemporaines , Cahiers du monde
russe, 41/1, 2000, 15 Janvier 2007, p p. 151 -164, https://journals.openedition.org/monderusse/42 , online access
June 22, 2018.
253 “The order in Paris is the law, it is the wisely liberated law, the order in Saint Petersburg, is the omnipotence
of a man tempered at times by armed revivals and palace plots. Horrible alternative and enough alone to show
what it is that institutions where the crime must be counted as balance of powers”, Ivi, p. 152.
254 A.J.P. Taylor, L’Europa delle Grandi Potenze , Laterza, Bari, 1977, pp. 310 -311; see also F. Herre, Bismarck.
Il grande conservatore , ed. spec. Il Giornale, Mondadori, Milano, 2004, p. 377.

77
to be an inclusion of the ‘Russian other’ in Europe in order to involve it in interna tional
relations as a power affirmed in the W estern scene; on the other, an attempt to relativize this
inclusion through the awar eness of having to deal with ‘barbarians’ ready to invade and
plunder the precious trea sures of European civilization. That’s basically the ongoing story if
we think to one, among others, episodes we already mentioned in the first chapter. American
historian Christopher Browning in his work The Internal/External Security Paradox and the
Reco nstruction of Boundaries in the Baltic: The Case of Kaliningrad, showed the security
paradox that Europe (EU) , discussing the implications about the Kaliningrad question, he
found many doubts related to the relations between Europe and Russia :
“On the one hand, the logical demands of i nternal EU security are seen to support
the need for a very strict border regi me with Kaliningrad in order to prevent the
infiltration of crime and illeg al immigration from the Russian enclave. On the
other hand, the negati ve effects of EU enlargement on Kaliningrad threaten to
destabilize EU -Russian re lations. In this respect, it is argued that in order to foster
the Union’s ex ternal security and enhance the EU-Russian relationship, the border
with Kaliningrad should be open and porous with the semi -integration of
Kaliningra d into the EU. On this reading, however, preserving external security
through opening up th e EU's external border is seen to undermine internal societa l
security, while maintaining a strict border regime in the interests of interna l
security is, in turn, seen to undermine external security”255
At the end of the eighteenth century, in 1797, the French government received from the Polish
general, Michał Sokolnicki, the so -called Will of Peter the Great (a historical forgery
circulated during the invasion of Russia decided by Napoleon Bonaparte), a s an appendix to
the Des Progres de la Puissance of Charles Louis -Lesur , where he tried to show how the
Kremlin had set out to seize Paris, Berlin, Madrid. After the fall of the Emperor, propaganda
against Russia continued with Archbishop Dominique Georges Frédéric de Pradt, who in a
series of volumes portrayed the Tsarist Empire as an “Asian and despotic” Power, forced by
its own libido dominandi to expand to the W est with violence and deception.256 Yet France
contradicted itself when numerous pamphlets, com missioned by Napoleon III, were published
insisting on the need for a Franco -Russian alliance to stem the overwhelming power of

255 C.S. Browning, The Internal/External Security Paradox and the Reconstruction of Boundaries in the Bal tic:
The Case of Kaliningrad , cit., p. 545.
256 G. Mettan, Russofobia. Mille anni di diffidenza , Sandro Teti Editore, Roma, 2016, p. 337 -339.

78
England.257
During the entire period, opportunistic russophilia and a “hounded animal” russophobia
alternate. John Gleason, in fac t, identified the foundations of the russophobia in the pamphlets
of the general and politician Sir Robert Wilson, one specifically: A Sketch of the Military and
the Political Power of Russia in the Year 1817 . In this pamphlet, Wilson, who had been a
British military observer in Russia during the Napoleonic invasion, argued that Russia had
opportunistically used the gains of the Napoleonic war to obtain the ascendancy ov er its allies
in order to hold “ the scep tre of the dominion" universal”.258 Even an editor ial in the Morning
Chronicle declared that Russia believed it was destined to rule the world.259
When Carl Schmitt said that in Belgium he lived under the eyes of the Russians and that
Russia was the state that more than any other was governed by an absolute monarch, he
clearly explained the crisis: the recogn ition of Russia as the “radical brother” of Europe and
its possible constant presence in the future of Europe.260 Marx, in his Inaugural Speech of the
International Workers’ Association to the First Socia list International, vehemently stated:
“The shameful approval, the ironic sympathy and the idiotic indifference with which the
upper classes of Europe witnessed the collapse of the mountain fortress of the Caucasus,
which had become the prey of Russia, and the murder of Poland by the same power, the
immense usurpations, endured without resistance, of this barbaric power, whose head is St.
Petersburg and whose hands are in all the ministerial cabinets of Europe ”.261
We should pay specific attention to the fact that still here, Europe consolidated the Eastern
vision of Russia through its progressively territorial strengthening. The difference in
perception with Turkey was that Russia acted as an insider . The centrality of European
civilization was threatened by the rise of a ‘barbaric intruder ’. For this first part of historical –
spatial dimension we may talk about a peculiar simple form of the European othering process,
according to which basic self/other (in/out) distanciation process acquires more developed
features. Although the process of ‘otherness’ often confirms a contrapos ition between a
superior ‘self’ and inferior ‘other’, the ‘other’ also becomes not only implicitly inferior, but
completely alien. Russia from a spatial point of view extends over an area facing east but

257 Ibidem .
258 J.H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain: A Study of the Interaction of Policy and Opin ion,
MA: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1950, pp. 50 -51.
259 J.P. LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 1700 -1917 , Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p.
309.
260 Marx – Engels, Opere Complete , Vol. 20. settembre 1864 -luglio 1868, Editori Riuniti , Roma, 1987, pp. 79 –
80.
261 (personal translation) . Ivi, pp. 5 -13.

79
unknown to the European perception of the world. Differently from the age -old opposition
between Europe and Islam inherited from the Hellenes. The i nvention of Eastern Europe is the
first turning point in the European identity -making proce ss. The progressive territorial
expansion of Russia from Europe to Eu rope, forces Western Europe to “coexist” with the
threat rather than overwhelm it as happened with the Turks.
However, in the first paragraph we revealed in advance that what differentia tes the simple
from the complex ‘othering’, is that in the first case ‘others’ become part of a basic self/other
(in/out) distanciation process, in the second case, a deep self/other relationship becomes a key
factor. The reasonableness characterizing the complex ‘othering’, maximizes the role of
persuasion.
During the Cold War the European perception of the ‘ Russian other’ has been greatly
exacerbated, because after the military, there was a perception of ‘invasion’ in political and
economic terms. The ‘Soviet barbarian at the gates of Europe ’ proposed a model of
modernization alternative to the Western one. Surely, there was the question about the
relations between Europe and the United States, which reinforced the Westernization of West
Europe. But, Euro pe has faced not only the expansionary event, but above all the possibility
that European identity could be shaped through a process of identification provided by
Russia: the communism. That’s why we should analyse the early twentieth century from a
differ ent point of view, before to examine in depth the ‘Russian other’ in the last part of the
period.

80
1.3 “Have you ever met a communist?”

“A spectre is haunting Eu rope – the spectre of communism”. When Karl Marx started his
Communist Manifesto in 1848, together with Friedrich Engels, he could not have imagined
the way in which Communism would develop in the twentie th century. It was not simply a
spectrum but a tangible reality. And not just in Europe, but all around the world, in many
different places from those in which Marx could expect a proletarian revolution. Marx’ s
statement in the middle of the twentieth century became almost a euphemism. Of course, we
should not claim the “communism” launched in so many countries had much resemblance to
anything M arx had imagined. There was a wide gap between the original theory and the
subsequent practice of communist domination. In the central decades of the last century there
were communist governments not only in the Soviet satellite states in Europe, but also in
South -America, Asia. Com munism dominated the so -called “second world” . Communism
also became an attractive pole for democratic countries like the United States and Great
Britain. Indeed, in France and Italy, support for communism was intellectual and po litical
with significant parliamentary representation. It even got the feeling that when communism
became permanent in the satellite countries of the Soviet Union, in Asia and in Cuba, it could
take off also in Africa. The West -Communist bloc dualism prolo nged tensio ns and the Cold
War. Sometimes “hot war” , during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, two Europeans were distinguished in the Eu ropean
politics of Russia: the “false” reactionary and the “real” progressist . At the outbreak of World
War I, Leon Trotsky wrote :
“In the present historical conditions, the proletariat is not interested in defending
an anachronistic national ‘Fatherland’, which has become the main impediment to
economic advance, but in the creation of a new, more powerful and stable
Fatherland, the republican United States of Europe, as the foundation for the
United States of the World. To the imperialist blind alley of capitalism the
proletariat can oppose only the socialist organisation of world ec onomy as the
practical programme of the day”262
Later with the strengthening of the Soviet Union, Trotsky became favourable to trade with the
false capitalist Europe, convinced that this would strengthen the Soviet economy. Vladimir

262 Quoted in I. Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879 -1921 , Verso, London, NY, 2003, p. 178.

81
Lenin had paid much atten tion, even before the war, to the exchange of views between the
European democratic socialists on the idea of the United States of Europe. When the war
broke out, he exposed his doubts about this kind of alliance in an arti cle published in 1915
entitled “ On the slogan of the United States of Europe ”:
“It would be quite wrong to object to such a presentation of the question within
the limits of a political appraisal of this slogan —e.g., to argue that it obscures or
weakens, etc., the slogan of a socialist r evolution. Political changes of a truly
democratic nature, and especially political revolutions, can under no
circumstances whatsoever either obscure or weaken the slogan of a socialist
revolution. On the contrary, they always bring it closer, extend its b asis, and draw
new sections of the petty bourgeoisie and the semi -proletarian masses into the
socialist struggle. On the other hand, political revolutions are inevitable in the
course of the socialist revolution, which should not be regarded as a single ac t, but
as a period of turbulent political and economic upheavals, the most intense class
struggle, civil war, revolutions, and counter -revolutions […] the slogan of a
republican United States of Europe […] From the standpoint of the economic
conditions o f imperialism (i.e., the export of capital and the division of the world
by the “advanced” and “civilised” colonial powers) a United States of Europe,
under capitalism, is impossible”263
“Russia” challenged the “European self ” (and not only, if we consider the prominent role of
the United States) in the expectation of being able to conceive a different p rocess of self –
identification. “The radical brother” used those own tools: principles, rules, cul ture, politics,
economy. What is important to analyse in thi s section is not so much to retrace the structure of
communism as much as its transposition. This elem ent is crucial in defining the ‘othering’
process that will follow in the next part.
Communist Parties had not a leadership role among the left of the Wes tern countries, from the
formation of the Comintern in 1919 to the fall in 1989. However, with their organization and
discipline, they influenced better than with numbers, especially in the trade union movements.
Joining Communists, it basically depended t o the main alternative to conservative or liberal
parties, more com mon in Europe. In other cases, Communists were trailed far behind socialist
parties of a social democratic type. Donald Sassoon highly pointed out:

263 Lenin, On the Slogan for a United States of Europe , Sotsial -Demokrat, No. 44, August 23, 1 915,
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/aug/23.htm , online access June 22, 2018.

82
“In France, Italy and, to a lesser exten t, Finland, the Communist Party was,
however, for much of that seventy -year period a serious political force. In the first
post-Second World War elections these were the three democratic countries in
which the Communists did best ”264
Moreover,
“In the Czec h lands of Bohemia and Moravia the Communist Party got 40 per
cent of the vote […] The appeals of Communism in Czechoslovakia owed much
to disillusionment with the Western powers for colluding with Hitler – in the
Munich Agreement of 1938 – to hand over pa rt of Czech territory to Germany; to
the Czechs’ historically good relations with Russia; and to the role of Soviet
troops as the principal liberators of their country from German occupation”265
According to other scholars the Communist a lso influenced regi onal groups “ignored” by the
political élites. “France, in particular, with its own Jacobin tradition, was a natural home for a
revolutionary party. The PCF made the most of this, portraying the Bolshevik revolution as a
continuation of the French Revoluti on of 1789 and noting Lenin’s affinity to Robespierre”.266
The poet Hugh McDiarmid in his First and Second Hymn to Lenin ‘intensely’ expressed his
strong desire for social revolution: “What matters wha we kill / To lessen that foulest murder
that deprives / Maist men o’ real lives!”;267 “Oh, it’s nonsense, nonsense, nonsense, /
Nonsense at this time o’ day / That breid -and-butter problems S’ud be in ony man’s way”.268
French writer Nobel Prize And rè Gide in 1932 affirmed: “ My conversion is like a faith […] In
the deplorable state of distress of the modern world, the plan of the Soviet Union seems to me
to point to salvation. Everything persuades me of this […] And if my life were necessary to
assure the success of the Soviet Union, I would gladly give it imme diately. ”269
There also was the contribution of ‘teachers ’, especially those who came from the working
class. British historian Raphael Samuel , describing his activism experience as spiritual,
highlighted:

264 D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentie th Century , Fontana,
London, 1997, p. 95.
265 Ibidem , pp. 95 –6.
266 S. Courtois, M. Lazar, Histoire du Parti Communiste Français , Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2000,
p. 32.
267 A. Bold, Cambridge Book of English Verse 1939 -1975 , Cambridge University Press Archive, Cambridge,
1976, p. 177.
268 Ibidem .
269 Quoted in R.W. Crossman, The God that Failed , Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, p. 173.

83
“The ambitions of the Communist Party – and the se lf-perception of members –
were unmistakably theocratic. Organizationally, we conceived ourselves to be a
communion of the elect, covenanted to a sacred cause. Politically, we aspired to
be teachers and guides. As a visible church, we traced an unbroken li ne of descent
from the founding fathers, claiming scriptural precedent for our policies […]
Authority in the Party was theocratic too, an institutionalized form of charisma
which operated at every level of Party life. Reports were handed down with all the
majesty of encyclicals and studied as clos ely as if they were Bible texts”270
We should not forget that the radicalism of fascism in the 1930s involved many Jewish
intellectuals in joining Communist Parties. For Eric Hobsbawm, Communism was the
obvious alter native:
“What could young Jewish intellectuals have become under such circumstances?
Not liberals of any kind, since the world of liberalism (which included social
democracy) was precisely what had collapsed […] We became either communists
or some equiva lent form of revolutionary marxists, or if we chose our own version
of blood -and-soil nationalism, Zionists. But even the great bulk of young
intellectual Zionists saw themselves as some sort of revolutionary marxist
nationalists. There was virtually no ot her choice. We did not make a commitment
against bourgeois society and capitalism, since it patently seemed to be on its last
legs. We simply chose a future rather than no future, which meant revolution”271
As Viatcheslav Morozov and Bahar Rumelili pointed o ut “The Soviet communist utopia
initially presented itself as entirely incompatible with the existing capitalist world order, but
as the revolution was running out of steam it became increasingly obvious that it was
conceived of in terms of Western moderni st discourse. The late Soviet ideology is an even
better illustration of Bhabha’s notion of hybridity, since it was based on the image of the
Soviet Union as an alternative to the capitalist West both in modernist and in traditionalist
terms. It presented itself as a country where science and social r eforms had liberated the
masses”272

270 R. Samuel, The Lost World of British Communism , Verso, London, 2006, p. 58
271 E. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries , Abacus, London, 1999, p. 300.
272 V. Morozov, B. Rumelili, The external constitution of European identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe –
makers ,
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 47, Issue 1, 2012, p. 37, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836711433124 , online
access June 22, 2018.

84
1.4 Consolidating ‘Russian other’

The deep concerns for Russia exacerbated the European attitude to consider Russia as part of
Europe. This time, in fact, it was Europe in fa ct to start from the spatial dimension on the
maps. The pan -European conception of Coudenhove -Kalergi was symptomatic of the fear of
the East for European integration in the aftermath of the First World War. In 1935
Coudenhove -Kalergi proposed the question of the eastern borders of Europe to all
geogra phers of the continent (Western, clearly).273
The Polish historian Oscar Halecki, who had fled to the West, claimed that Russia was not
European. Even the administrative border between European Russia and Europe an Russia (the
line along the Urals) had vanished and there was no possibility of placing any part of the
Soviet Union in Europe.274 More in detail, Swiss historian Gonzague de Reynold vehemently
asserted that, despite the efforts of Peter I and Caterina II, Russia has never been in Europe,
geographically and historically:
“La Russie est l'antithèse géographique de l'Europe. Cette constatation est
primordiale: l'antithèse Russie -Europe se retrouvera sur tous les autres plans.
L’Europe se définit par la monta gne et par la mer. […] C’est, en effet à la fusion
de tous les éléments qui peuplent leur empire quel es Soviets travaillent
aujourd’hui. Dès leurs premiers pas, les Russes vont donc se trouver en presence
de l’Asie nomade […] La première était qu’alcune p rotection naturelle ne la
protégeat à l’Est et au Sud -Est contre les poussées de l’Asie nomade. La route des
steppes n’était point seulement celle des caravanes, elle était encore celle des
invasions […] C’est dire que la Russie n’est pas seulement l'antit hèse
géographique de l’Europe: Elle en est encore l'antithèse historique”275
The ‘European self’ reacted with that perplexity surrounding the never -ending story of the

273 H. Mikkeli, Europa. Storia di un’idea e di un’identità , cit., p. 158.
274 Ibidem .
275 “Russia is the geographical antithesis of Europe. This observation is essential: the antithesis of Russia and
Europe will be found on all other levels. Europe is defined by the mountains and the sea. […] It is, indeed, to the
fusion of all the elements which populate their empire which the Soviets work today. From their first steps, the
Russians will t herefore find themselves in the presence of nomadic Asia […] The first was that no natural
protection protects it in the East and Southeast against the surges of nomadic Asia. The route of the steppes was
not only that of the caravans, it was still that of the invasions […] We should say that Russia is not only the
geographical antithesis of Europe: it is still the historical antithesis” G. de Reynold, La formation de l’Europe:
Le monde russe , Egloff (Luf), Paris, 1950, pp. 25, 55, 81, 88.

85
concept ‘in Europe but not in Europe’ . Moreover, there was the question about the relation s
between Europe and the United States, which reinforced the Westernization of West Europe.
By the way: Said dated the first phase of ‘his’ Orientalism intended as a rationalization for
colonial rule during the eighteenth century with the rise of what is n ow called the Second
British Empire, and continued into the Cold War when the United States displaced Britain as
the global hegemon.276 According to Said, the ‘Orientalism’ prospered as a corpus of
knowledge describing and systematizing how the East should b e understood, but also
justifying how the East should be dominated by the West.
The European perception of ‘invasion’ kept in mind in re -shaping the idea that Soviet Union
used the World War II to be an insider in Europe through military power. The concept of the
‘Russian barbarians at the gates of Europe’ has been quite evident in the reconstruction of the
Britis h historian David Reynolds : “Churchill’ s famous broadcast of 22 June 1941 gave the
impression, which has largely endured, that he welcomed the Sov iet Union as an ally and was
willing to disregard past differences. In private, however, Churchill spoke at times in terms
that would have shocked most of those who listened to his broadcast. On the previous
evening, for example, he had told his private secretary, John Colville, that ‘ Russia will
assuredly be defeated’ . So, his offer of aid may have amounted to little more than posturing.
Or, as he put it to Colville, ‘ if Hitler invaded Hell he would at least make a fav ourable
reference to the Devil!’ Then on the next day he privately ‘ trailed his coat for [Stafford]
Cripps [the British ambassador in Moscow], castigating Communism and saying th at the
Russians were barbarians’ . He adde d, according to Colville, that ‘ not even the slenderest
thread connected Co mmunists to the very basest type of humanity’”.277
Konrad Adenauer, father of the Federal Republic of Germany, worried in his Memoirs , “There
was, too, the danger of atheistic Soviet communism. The Soviets had penetrated deep into
central Germany, up to the Elbe”.278 And, of course, the US State Department papers recorded
William Harriman ’s opinions , American ambassador to the So viet Union until January 1946,
“what we were faced was ‘a barbarian invasion of Europe’, that Soviet control over any
foreign country did not merely mean influence on their foreign relations but the extension but
the extension of the Soviet system with secret police, extinc tion of freedom of speech,
etc.”.279

276 E. Said, Orientalismo , cit., pp. 3,4, 41, 42, 95, 201.
277 Quoted in D. Cannadine, R. Quinault, Winston Churchill in the Twenty First Century , Cambridge University
Press for the Royal Historical Society, Cambridge; New York, 2004, p. 175.
278 K. Adenauer, Memoirs, 1945 -1953, H. Regnery Company, Chicago, 1966, p. 47.
279 B. Lightbody, The Cold War , Routledge, London, 2005, p. 13.

86
Adenauer’s “spiritual” approach was emphasized by Irish playwright Bernard Shaw , who
wrote:
“There is, however, a danger against which you should be on your guard.
Socialism may be preached, not as a far -reaching economic reform, but as a new
Church founded on a new revelation of the will of God made by a new prophet
[…] They preac h an inevitable, final, supreme category in the order of the universe
in which all the contradictions of the earlier and lower categories will be
reconciled […] Their prophet is named neither Jesus nor Mahomet nor Luther nor
Augustine […] but Karl Marx […] Two of their tenets contradict one another […]
One is that the evolution of Capitalism into Socialism is predestined, implying
that we have nothing to do but sit down and wait for it to occur. This is their
version of Salvation by Faith. The other is that it must be effected by a revolution
establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat. This is their version of Salvation by
Works ”280
When Yugoslavia tried to become the first Communist state to attempt to reconstruct and
revise the Soviet model, was expelled (1948) . Vladimir Velebit, broke off the exploitative
negotiations with the Soviet Union . As Dennison Rusinow claimed: “ The basic issue in the
great quarrel of 1948 was very simple: whether Tito and his Politburo or Stalin would be the
dictator of Yugoslavia. What stood in Stalin’s way was Tito’s and hence the Yugoslav regime’s
autonomous strength, based on the uniqueness in Eastern Europe of Yugoslavia’s do -it-
yourself and armed Communist revolution and its legacy: a large Party and People’s Army
recruited primarily on the basis of patriotic rather than socialist slogans, and the independent
source of legitimacy as well as power which came from the Part isan myth of political
founding”.281
This was a turning point. Stalin became more isolationist towar ds Europe and above all the
Soviet police became an instrument of control available to the leaders of the party, even if at
times this meant only available to the supreme leader.
“Stalin wanted to be obeyed, he wanted to be secure against conspiracy, and he
believed that instilling fear was essential to winning and maintaining that
obedience and security. Having achieved this by egregious display of his power to

280 B. Shaw, The Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism and Capitalism , Constable, London, 1928, p. 441.
281 D. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948 –1974, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles,
1977, p. 25.

87
kill, he thenceforth avoided the obvious mistake of so abusing his power as to
drive his entour age to collective desperation. The prudent despot or gangster boss
will seek to ensure that those around him, those on whom he depends for
information and for executing his will, are men whose unqualified subservience
and sensitivity to his needs has been tested over many years, and whose strengths
and weaknesses he knows inside out”282
The Soviet communist model was associated with the Nazi one, calling it ‘totalitarian’ . Hanna
Arendt, for instance, wrote a work in 1948 titled The Origins of Totalitarianism , according to
which the cruelty of the Russian barbarian is even more evolved than that of the Nazi:
“In Soviet Russia the situation is more confused, but the facts, unfortunately, are
only too obvious. On the one hand, the Bolshevik system, unlike the Na zi, never
admitted theoretically that it could practice terror against innocent people, and
though in view of certain practices this may look like hypocrisy, it makes quite a
difference. Russian practice, on the other hand, is even more "advanced" than the
German in one respect: arbitrariness of terror is not even limited by racial
differentiation, while the old class categories have long since been discarded, so
that anybody in Russia may suddenly become a victim of the police terror. We are
not concerned here with the ultimate consequence of rule by terror —namely, that
nobody, not even the executors, can ever be free of fear; in our context we are
dealing merely with the arbitrariness by which victims are chosen, and for this it
is decisive that they are o bjectively innocent, that they are chosen regardless of
what they may or may not hav e done”283
Recalling Arendt, Raymond Aron “ also termed Soviet communism totalitarian, not only until
1956 but during the whole communist period. […] on the basis of rigorous scientific methods
as wel l as sound political judgement”.284 Aron made it perfectly clear that while the free
societies of the West, where the powers are divided and the State is secular, constituted a
singularity of history, on the contrary the communist re volutionaries, who dreamt freedom,
used the despotism.
The immediate aftermath of Stalin’s death (1953) saw the development, in the W estern

282 Quoted in S. Davies, J. Harris, Stalin: A New History , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 115.
283 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism , Meridian Books, Cleveland, Ne w York, 1979, p. 6.
284 T.M. Kjeldahl, Defence of a Concept: Raymond Aron and Totalitarianism, Totalitarian Movements and
Political Religions , Vol. 2, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 121, https://doi.org/10.1080/714005460 , online access June 22,
2018.

88
studies, of a term originally derived from the ‘Third Estate of France’ model and used before
and during the French Revolution: the so -called Third World . Within the bipolar d ivision of
the world (US/ Western allies – and Soviet Union) the Third World identified those nations less
developed, not -aligned to either bloc and, more or less, with a shared history of
colonisat ion.285 During the Bandung Conference in 1955, attended by delegations from new
nation -states or nationalist movements in Asia, Africa, as well as observers from Greek
Cypriot, it has been emphasised the opposition against the ‘colonialism’. Both Soviet
domi nation in Eastern Europe and Western European colonialism in Asia and Africa were
debated as ‘equivalent’.286 Khrushchev, as well as Mao Zedong, called on Third W orld
revolutionaries to launch “wars of national liberation” against the capitalist world.287 The
Soviet s was pressing to propose that model of modernization alternative to the Western one.
The United States pushed to offer its democratic ideology and its adva nced economy to those
nations. “ Moreover, the seeds for liberty and independence in Eastern Eu rope were planted in
1975 with the signings of the Helsinki Accords. Evidence shows the Carter administration
stepped up anti -Soviet propaganda in Eastern Europe with the deployment of U.S. -backed
Radio Liberty and Radio Europe. U.S. archives also demonstr ate that the U.S. moved to
increase trade contacts with Eastern Europe in an attempt to decrease the economic
dependence of the Ea stern bloc on the Soviet Union”.288 Clearly, the results were that, even if
“The ideological attraction of the Soviet system, wh ich gained some prestige as it result s of
the Second World War and some adherents, among newly independent Third World countries,
waned over the period. By contrast, Western culture and economic methods proved eminently
exportable and adaptable to local co nditio n, in many parts, of the world”.289
Khrushchev’s Secret Speech (1956) and the ‘Revolution of Solidarity’ marked the way to that
‘moral appeal’ from Eastern countries to Western Europe (see Chapter IV). The first step to
re-centralize the ‘European self ’ in Europe including the future Eastern countries’

285 R.J.C. Young, Postcolonialism: a very short introduction , Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p. 17;
see also R. Cassen, Rich country interests and Third World development , Croom Helm, London, 1982.
286 M.T. Berger, After the Third World? History, destiny and the fate of Third Worldism, Third World Quarterly ,
Vol. 25,
No. 1, February 2004, p. 12,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233306192_After_the_Third_World_History_destiny_and_the_fate_of
_Third_Worldism , online access June 22, 2018.
287 Ivi, p. 21.
288 D. Rivero, The Détente Deception: Soviet and Western Bloc Competition and the Subversion of Cold War
Peace , University Press of America, Lanham, 2013, p. 5.
289 Quoted in R. Saull, Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War: The State, Military Power, and Social
Revolution , Routledge, London, 2001, p. 12.

89
membership to the European Union and re -defining those historical and spatial dimensions to
exclude ‘Russia other’ from its own European identity -making process, renewed in the
developing of European inte gration process.

90
1.5 “Stagnating” the ‘Russian other’

Soviet Communist Party passed to Leonid Brezhnev during a social, political and economic
decline of the Soviet Uni on. Soviet society changed and something it was moving behi nd the
eyes of political él ites. He tried to “relax” East–West relations, despite he did not want to lose
any part of the territory under Soviet control, but preventing that Western ideas could affect
the Soviet Union.
The West now offered an alternative too tempting. Better standar ds of life and democracy. The
reconstruction plans carried out by the allies gave a touch of official centrality of European
civilization that could only be admired and desired. The Russian novelist, philosopher and
political essayist Alexander Zinoviev ironically stated: “ On top of all that, there’s abroad. If
only it didn’t exist! Then we’d be home and dry. But they’re eternally dreaming up something
new over there. And we have to compete with them. To show our superiority. No sooner have
you pinched one little machine from them than it’s time to pinch the next one. By the time
we’ve got it into production, the bastard’s obsolete! ”290
Europe on the “map” was not yet complete. Willy Brandt succeeded in presenting a friendly
West Germany to the East, not satur ated with aggression and rancour; a member of NATO,
but with a human face. There was no doubt about his position on the dictatorships against the
will of the peoples, yet he succeeded in relating directly to the East Germans, the Poles, the
Czechs and the Russians. Brandt made it easier for East Germany to surrender to the West
when the time was ripe, accepting Article 23 of Federal Germany that conceived the East as
part of the West. He made reasonable the DDR (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) being
reaso nable himself. Brandt “made the step by Kohl of 1989 possible ”.291
Brandt sent Bahr to negotiate with Moscow outside the traditional diplomatic channels.
Following the most refined line of Ostpolitik channels. He managed to sign the Moscow
Treaty on 12 August 1970, providing for the recognition of the Oder -Neisse border. The
Soviet Union was committed to seekin g a negotiated solution to the ‘Berlin problem’ .
Attached to the treaty there was a “Letter on German Unity” , in which the German
Government “specified” that this t reaty was “ not in contradiction” with the aim of

290 Quoted in P. Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy , Longman, London, 2003, p. 124.
291 W.D. Lippert, The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik: Origins of NATO’s Energy Dilemma , Berghahn
Books, NY, Oxford, 2010; see also O. Bange, An Intricate Web: Ostpolitik, the European Sec urity System and
German Unification, in O. Bange, G. Niedhart, Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe , Berghahn
Books, Oxford, 2008, pp. 23 -38, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qd6cz.6 ., online ac cess June 22, 2018.

91
“reunification” to be achieved by self -determination of the German people.292
As we have already mentioned, a decisive step was the Helsinki Agreement, because the
cohesion of the “Nine” members of the European Economic Community (EEC) was
particularly crucial . The Soviet Union demanded the recognition, by the United States and the
Western European countries, of the immutability of the borders established at the end of the
Second World War. The Nine succeeded with the cunning of the word to declare the
boundaries ‘inviolable’ and not ‘immutable’: “ The participating States regard as inviolable all
one another’s frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe ”293 This guaranteed the
possibilit y of reaching consensual agreements by exc luding the use of armed force: “ They
consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful
means and by agreement”.294 Basically, the final act seemed to exclude any kind of military
intervention from the Soviet Union, inspired by the precedents in Czechoslovakia, stating:
“they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will
also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and us urpation of part or all of the
territ ory of any participating State”.295
In shaping the next passage in ‘stagnating the Russian other’ the Final Act included that “ The
participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the
freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion”.296
The chairman of KGB reacted quite worried: “The principle of inviol ability of borders – this
is of course good, very good. But I am concer ned about something else: the borders will be
inviolable in a military sense, but in all other respects, as a result of the expansion of contacts,
of the flow of information, they will became transparent […] So far the game is being played
on one side of t he field – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is gaining the poi nts, and the KGB is
losing them”.297
It was tim e to put the Communism ‘out of mind ’. The so -called ‘ Eurocommunism ’ was

292 Ivi, pp. 93 -100.
293 Conference On Security And Co -Operation In Europe Final Act , Helsinki 1975, Part 1 (a), Declaration on
Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States The participating States, Principle III, p. 4,
https://www.osce.org/helsinki -final-act?download=true , online access June 22, 2018; see also R. Davy,
European Détente: A Reappraisal , Royal Institute of International Affairs and Sage, London, 1992, p. 16.
294 Ivi, Principle I, p. 3.
295 Ivi, Principle III, p. 4.
296 Ivi, Principle VII, p. 6.
297 Quoted in S. Savranskaya, Unintended Consequences: Soviet Interests, Expectations, and Reactions to the
Helsinki Final Act , in O. Bange, G. Niedhart, Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe , cit., p. 181.

92
mature.298 Among the most important impulses there clearly was the Prague Spring , which
involved many members of the Western European parties, including the Italian PCI (Italian
Communist Party), the Spanish PCE (Communist Party of Spain) and a vaguely skeptical
French PCF (Communist Party of France).299
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslo vakia was an indelible event for these communists. Above
all for the relations with the Czech colleagues. They began to look critically at their teachers.
With the Helsiki agreement and a more relaxed international atmosphere, they also began to
develop a more independent action.300 About this, in a meeting in Tuscany, the leaders of the
Italian and Spanish parties, Enrico Berlinguer and Santiago Carrillo, sealed a solemn
declaration stating that :
“The Italian and Spanish communist parties, which work out th eir internal and
international policies in complete autonomy and independence, are fully aware of
their grave national and European responsibilities. From these common
viewpoints they will in future develop their fraternal relations sealed b y a broad
and s olid friendship”301
For the “Soviet democrats” like Roy Medvedev, this was a misfortune, conceiving the
possibility of serious doubts about the reasonableness of the So viet invasion of
Czechoslovakia. To not to mention the Soviet modus operandi impo sed by th e central
government to the Eastern Europe.302
Radio Liberty (RL), broadcast to the Soviet Union, and Radio Free Europe (RFE), broadcast
in the languages of all the states of Eastern Europe. You could hear the call from the West.
Both in Munich. Western Germ any became an important radio station, among other things.303
In Central Europe, the transmissions of Italian nationals abroad through these broadcasters
were considered more important than the national mass media.
“Seeing the W est” was much more important t han just hearing about it. If before the Jews had
no other solution than communism, now the goal was to go to the West. Intellectuals,
politicians, influential economists wanted the evidence of the stereotypes told by the Soviets.

298 coined by a Yugoslav journalist, Frani Barbieri, in an article published on June 26, 1975.
299 See P.F. Della Torre, E. Mortimer, J. Story, Eurocomunismo: mito o realtà ?, Arnoldo Mondadori, Milano,
1978 ; and R. Kindersley, In Search of Eurocommunism , MacMillan, London, 1981.
300 P.F. Della Torre, E. Mortimer, J. Story, Eurocomunismo: mito o realtà ?, cit., pp. 9 -23.
301 Ivi, pp. 330ss.
302 R. Kindersley, In Search of Eurocommunism , cit., pp. 150ss.
303 Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Foreign Relations, Volume
XXIX, 1969 –1976, pp. 81 -163, https://2001 -2009.state.gov/documents/organization/97929.pdf , online access
June 22, 2018.

93
Mikhail Gorbache v, one of the most important. He said he saw for the first time the gap
between Soviet propaganda on the West and reality. He questioned his “ a priori faith in the
advantages of soc ialist over bourgeois democracy”.304 He concluded: “ Why do we live worse
than in othe r developed countries? ”305

304 Quoted in W. Taubman, Gorbachev: His Life and Times , Simon and Schuster, UK, 2017, p. 98.
305 Ibidem .

94
2. ‘Updating Russian other’

In a passage of Anna Karenina , Tolstoy described a scene about the dialogue between
Princess Darya Alexandrovna and little Tanya :
“What have you come for, Tanya?’ she said in French to the little gi rl who had come in.
‘Where’s my spade, mamma?’
‘I speak French, and you must too.’
The little girl tried to say it in French, but could not remember the French for spade; the
mother prompted her, and then told her in French where to look for the spade. And this made
a disagreeable impression on Levin”.306
When Gorbachev, for the first time, spoke of a ‘common European house ’, he caused a
reaction similar to that of Tanya and Levin , in the international context. Europe, like Levin,
was working to include Easte rn Europe in the EU isolating Russia, one the one hand. On the
other, Russia, like Tanya, dealt with the failures of the Soviet Union and went through a deep
crisis of national identity.
Substantially, Gorbachev re -proposed the apprentice version of Russia by Peter I the Great.
Europe was economically advanced and politically democratic. In short, a model f rom which
to learn the updated ‘civil’ practices: “ Some in the West are trying to “exclude” the Soviet
Union from Europe. Now and then, as if inadvertent ly, they equate “Europe” with “Western
Europe.” Such ploys, however, cannot change the geo graphic and historical realities. Russia’s
trade, cultural and political links with other European nations and states have deep roots in
history. We are Europeans. O ld Russia was united with Europe by Christianity. The history of
Russia is an organic par t of the great European history” .307
The ‘European othering’ process that currently shapes the EU -Russia relations, evolved
through the context of the identity -making pr ocess in Russia and the renewed practices of
foreign policies between the two actors involved. That’s the core of this section.

306 L. Tolstoy, Anna Karenina , trans. by C. Garnett, Planet PDF, Part Three, Chapter 10, p. 592,
http://www.planetpdf.com/planetpdf/pdfs/free_ebooks/Anna_Karenina_NT.pdf , online access June 22, 2018.
307 M.S. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World, Harpercollins, Lon don, 1987, p.
191.

95
2.1 Eurocentrism versus Eurasianism

We must point out that until the beginning of the nineteenth century, Russian intellec tuals
were not particularly interested in the East. First , because Russian goals have always deployed
in a dispute between Russia and Europe. Secondly, Russia had a very vague and disquieting
idea of what was in the East of its borders.308 The only memories were related to th e Mongol
invasion.309 Despite the E astern roma nce of Pushkin, the Russians discovered the East in the
south of the Empire, in the Caucasus.
In the mid -nineteenth century, with the defeat in the Crimea (1853 -1855), Russia changed its
strateg y, launching itself in a campaign towards the eastern lands and quickly reaching the sea
(the Pacific Ocean). This breakthrough inspired important personalities such as the theorists
of the narodnost ’ Sergej Uvarov and Michail Pogodin.310 The serious repercu ssions of this
expansionism led to war and defeat with Japan (1904 -1905), forcing Russia to withdraw both
on land from Mukden and from the Tsushima Islands. However, the gaze to the East
fascinated the first P anslavists (or Slavophiles). Although it was a ‘Tolstoian’ curiosity, so far
from a political -social approach.
Thus, t he Russian leanings on Europe around the middle of the nineteenth century might be
summarized in two attitudes. The Westernize rs (Zapadnik ) saw in Europe and in the
Europeans an ideal t o which Russia itself would have to aspire. The so -called “apprentices ” of
Peter the Great . The Slavophiles sought to promote sol idarity among the Slavic people and
saw with resentment the values represented by the West, unrelated to Russia. Europe with it s
nationalist movements was violent and individualistic.
The famous First philosophical letter by Petr Čaadaev, published in 1836, for which the
author was accused of madness, had a great resonance and provoked an intensification of
discussions and opposit ion between the Slavophi les and Westerners between the ‘30s and ‘60s
of the n ineteenth century. The idea of an u ncorrupted ‘Slavic’ specificity and moral force
would have echoed in the West even in the following century .311 The schism of 1054 had
marked Russ ia's drift with respect to historical progress that continued in the West. Since then,
Russia had failed to create anything by itself. Čaadaev saw the imperfections of Western

308 A. Ferrari, La foresta e la steppa. Il mito dell'Eurasia nella cultura russa , Libri Scheiwiller, Milano, 2003, p.
137.
309 Ibidem .
310 Ivi, p. 70.
311 C. Pieralli, C. Delaunay, E. Priadko, Russia, Oriente slavo e Occidente europeo. Fratture e integrazioni nella
storia e nella civiltà letteraria , Firenze University Press, Firenze, 2017, p. 10.

96
civilization but he still maintained that it contained the seeds of future development.312
Another great Westernizer was Vissarion Belinskij who identified the man with the European
and saw in Europe the banner of ci vilization that Russia would have to follow .313 Both
attracted the criticism of the S lavophiles who emphasized the value of Russia and especially
the orthodox confession, exalting the legacy of romantic nationalists. The latter affirmed that
Europe had not d eveloped due to the influence of the authentic Christian faith. The Roman
Catholic church limited itself accepting authori ty, or unity. The Slavic people , on the other
hand, were an example of the conjunction of unity and spiritual freedom expressed by the
Orthodox faith, which assimilated the pure Christian faith.314 Konstantin Aksakov was the
most tenacious among Slavophilist proponents. He was struggling to protect the social,
political and cultural values of ancient Russia and the spiritual heritage of hi s people against
the commodification, mechanism and individualism of Western European culture.315
The panslavism of the years 1860 -70 involved many Russian patriots. This nationalism was
the result of Nikolai Danilevskij’ s manifesto, Russia and Europe . Man y believe that Putin’ s
Russia: The National Question article , was borrowed by Danilevskij .316 According to
Danilevskij, Russia had to be happy with the inescapable cultural gap that divided it from
Europe. Russia was not part of Europe; Europe hated Russia and soon there would be war
between Slavic and Germanic peoples. The smaller nations, squeezed between these two
identities, should line up with the Slavs, otherwise they would have had no chance of
surviving.317 Danilevskij, being a geographer, could not accep t the idea of an natural gap
between the European and Asian continents. He saw Europe as a peninsula on the Asian
continent and consequently attributed it with ‘inferiority ’ to the motherland, Asia.318 In this
way, Tatishchev’ s division between European Russ ia and Asian Russia lost significance.
Soon, the political geographer Vladimir Lamansky developed the idea of Russia as a cultural
and geographical region distinct from both Asia and Europe. This vision remained silent
during the Bolshevik revolution but developed in the words of the famous economic

312 H. Mikkeli, Europa. Storia di un’idea e di un’identità , cit., p. 153.
313 C. Pieralli, C. Delaunay, E. Priadko, Russia, Oriente slavo e Occidente europe o. Fratture e integrazioni nella
storia e nella civiltà letteraria , cit., p. 323.
314 H. Mikkeli, Europa. Storia di un’idea e di un’identità , cit., p. 153.
315 C. Pieralli, C. Delaunay, E. Priadko, Russia, Oriente slavo e Occidente europeo. Fratture e integraz ioni nella
storia e nella civiltà letteraria , cit., p. 198.
316 A. Yanov, Putin’s Cheat Sheet. Reflections of an Historian , Institute of Modern Russia, February 2012,
https://imrussia.org/e n/nation/199 -putins -cheat -sheet , online access June 22, 2018.
317 I.V. Podberezsky, Between Europe and Asia: the search for Russia’s civilizational identity , in G. Chufrin,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 33 -51.
318 Ibidem .

97
geographer Petr Savitsky:
“Eurasia is indivisible. As a result, there is no ‘European ’ Russia or an ‘Asian ’
Russia, as the lands so designated are just as Asiatic lands. The Urals [simply]
divide the country in to cis -Uralic Russia and trans -Uralic Russia ”.319
The rise of Bolshevism, according to Samuel Huntington, interrupts the Slavophile
dialectic,320 guaranteeing that Russ ia will differentiate itself from the West by jumping to the
bottom of the Western model.321
However, we must note that in pre -revolution period there has been an important turning point
in two phases. the first is marked by the movement of writers such as Vladimir Solov’ ev,
Valerij Briusov, Andrej Belyj, Aleksandr Blok who, jo ining the magazine proposals ‘Skify’ , in
1917, relaunched an almost mystical rhetoric of the fate of Russia;322 the second, more
important, took place concomitantly with the arrival of socialism, when intellectuals like
Nikolai Trubeckoj, Roman Jakobson, Georgij Florovskij, laid the foundations of the eurasist
principles, postulating the strangeness of Russia to the Roman -Germanic world and
supporting instead, the indigenous historical -cultural character of Russia, in which the
positive presence of Turanic and Asian elements is f ound.323
The implosion of the USSR reopened the debate. In fact, in the mid -1980s, Soviet society
began to lose connection and capacity for adequate reflection. Soviet models cracked.
Everyone felt the need for change, but this feeling was still confused, no one knew what kind
of change to make.
“When the Soviet system collapsed, no clearly formulated national thinking was
available. T he emptiness was therefore filled by the "new occidentalists" who, by
adopting liberal democracy and the principles of mercantile society, immediately
began to copy the West. But it is also in the eighties, at the beginning of
perestroika, that our group h as taken up the task started by the precursors of
Eurasism, trying to give a new form to the intuitions of the Russian structure to

319 Quoted in M. Bassin, Russia between Europe and Asia. The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space ,
cit., p. 14.
320 A. Stilo , La Russia secondo il “modello delle civiltà”: Paese in bilico o civiltà originale? , Geopolitica, Vol.
I, No. 1, 2012, pp. 233 -244,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291523413_La_Russia_secondo_il_modello_delle_civilta_Paese_in_bi
lico_o_civilta_origina le, online access June 22, 2018.
321 Ibidem .
322 A. Ferrari, La foresta e la steppa. Il mito dell'Eurasia nella cultura russa, cit., pp. 151 -152.
323 Ivi, pp. 191 -204.

98
make it an alternative to Atlanticism and to liberalism ”.324
The pro -Western narratives of Mikhail Gorbache v and Boris Yeltsin were soon joined by a
strong opposition, which carried forward a different identit y of civilization for Russia. Russia
as a distinctly Eurasian power was the prospect of the presidential adviser Stankevich and
then the head of foreign intelligence, Yevgeni Primakov. Westernizers, like the Europeans,
demonstrated an attitude of refusing the no n-Western other and developing a ‘learning –
dependece’ on the West concerns.325 According to them, Russia was part of Western
civilization. Russian ‘naïve’ identity has been hijacked by the Bolsheviks and the Soviet
system.326 Russia finally h ad the oppor tunity to become a “normal” Western country.327
On the other hand, renewed Eurasianists developed a threatening feeling toward Western
countries. As Huntington pointed out “ Eurasianists concluded that the world represents a
struggle for identity and dominati on among culturally alien units”.328 Among them, Aleksandr
Dugin. As Jeffrey Mankoff claimed: “His underlying message is the need for Russia to re –
emerge as a great empire, dominating the Eurasian space and challenging the United States
and the West more gen erally for world supremacy,”329 moreover, “Dugin rejects the historic
and cultural legitimacy of all post -Soviet states except Russia itself and Armenia (a Christian
state with a history stretching back thousands years), believing that historical, cultural, and
geopolitical reasons, they should return to Russian control”.330 The main thre at to Russia’s
identity is the “Atlantic civilization” , mainly associated to the United States. That me ans
Europe should line up to the biggest geopolitical axis with Germany, Iran and Japan, in order
to ‘contain’ Atlantic expansionism. Dugin’ s system is quite famous as multipolar system.
Introducing the map of his system highly claims:

324 (personal translation ). A. Dugin, quoted in , P. Borgognone, Premessa. L’eurasiatismo com e teoria filosofica
e geopolitica conservatrice , Controinformazione.info, Mag 10, 2016,
https://www.controinformazione.info/premes sa-leurasiatismo -come -teoria -filosofica -e-geopolitica –
conservatrice/ , online access June 22, 2018.
325 A.P. Tsygankov, Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from Russian Civilizational
Debates , International Studies Review, Vol. 10, 200 8, p. 770,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227757987_Self_and_Other_in_International_R elations_Theory_Lear
ning_from_Russian_Civilizational_Debates1 , online access June 22, 2018.
326 K.D. Qualls, The Russian Revolutions: The Impact and Limitations of Western Influence , in R. Bova, Russia
and Western Civilization: Cultural and Historical Enco unters , M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 2003, pp. 113 -41.
327 A.P. Tsygankov, Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from Russian Civilizational
Debates , cit., p. 771.
328 A. Stilo , La Russia secondo il “modello delle civiltà”: Paese in bilico o c iviltà originale? , cit., pp. 233 -244.
329 J. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Rowman & Littlefield Publishing
Group, USA, 2009, p. 69.
330 Ibidem .

99
“The creation of the European Union was crucial in helping Europe to restore its
status as a world power alongside the United States. This was the response of the
Old World to the intensive challenge offered by the New World. If we consider the
alliance of the US and Western Europe as the Atlantic vector of European
development, the idea of Europ ean integration under the aegis of the continental
countries (Germany and France) can be called European Eurasianism. This
becomes more and more obvious if we take into consideration the idea of a
Europe stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals […] In other words, the
integration of the Old World should include the vast terr itory of the Russian
Federation”331
Moreover he “reassures” that
“Russia offers the integration of Europe a Eurasian dimension in both the
symbolic and geographical senses, in ter ms of the identification of E urasianism
with continentalism […] The meridian zones in the Euras ian project consist of
several “Great Spaces” or “democratic empires.” Each possesses relative freedom
and independence but is strategically integrated into a corresponding meridian
zone”332

“Eurasian plans for the future presume the division of the planet into four vertical
geographical belts, or meridian zones, from North to South. Both American
continents will form one common space oriented toward and controll ed by the US

331 A. Dugin, Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo -Eurasianism , Arktos, Bu dapest, 2014, p. 46.
332 Ivi, pp. 46 -47.

100
[…] Additionally, three others are planned. […] Euro -Africa, with the European
Union as its center; the Russian -Central A sian zone; the Pacific zone. […] Each of
these belts (meridian zones) counterbalances each other, and all of them together
counterbalance the Atlantic meridian zone. In the future, these belts might be the
foundation upon which to build a multipolar model of the world: the re will be
more than two poles”333
At this point a question is needed: Can we really admit that the process of European self-
identification takes place without historical and spatial perception of the ‘others’ ? Among
them, he ‘Russian other’? Especially if we consider that Dugin is one of the most influential
interpreter of ‘organic democracy ’as a radical alter native to the post -democracy (liberal
techno -mercantile society) of the West and supporter of Vladimir Putin.
When between 1991 and 1992 Yeltsin became president of the First Russian Federation with
the Soviet Communist Party, isolating Gorbachev after the attempted coup of the most
conservative communists, the Westernizers match closed. The reason was obvious: efforts to
accept Russia as a “normal” European country had failed. The Russian nationalist compon ent
drew from the symbolic capital of the Westerni zers and transform it in a way compatible with
its own representation.
Putin became head of the state pro tempore in 1999, after the resignation of Yeltsin . On the
eve of his election, Putin published two significant documents: Russia on the Turn of the Ne w
Millennium and Russia’ s National Security Concept . These were programmatic -ideological
documents driven by the need to define a new Russia.334 Both emphasized the importance of
empowering the Russian state, its internal authority, its international initiat ive and, above all,
the idea of redefining national identity.
Russia on the Turn of the New Millennium started out of a sincere awareness: Russia is weak
and the main danger is the definitive loss of Mosco w’s international leadership.
“For the first time from 200 -300 years to today, Russia is facing the real threat of
slipping to the second, and perhaps even the third echelon of the world rank ”335
The admission of the economic disaster and the risk that the leadership was now strongly
compromised was linked to the urgency of starting a new international initiative, conducted in

333 Ibidem .
334 A. Romano, La Russia di Putin: un’apparente “Nuova” identità nazionale per un vecchio assetto di potere ,
in Le Sfide dell’Europa in un mondo che cambia , (a cura di) G. Ravasi, C. Banfi, Rivista della Fonda zione
Dragàn, n. 18, 2002, pp. 261 -268.
335 Ibidem .

101
terms of productive competitiveness and political initiative. Naturally these objectives had to
be pursued through social harmony and the consolidation of the Russian community.
Russi a’ s National Security Concept was a set of programmatic goals of Russian international
action. First, he criticized the unipolarism that dominated the ent ire international scene. Clear
allusion to the United States. Second, he noted that such unipolarism w as also threatening
international institutions (e .g. UN and OSCE) by changing the profile of the entire
international community. Equally clear was the exhortation addressed to Russia to get back to
‘itself’ to secure a new role of great power against the a ttempts of some countries to weaken
their positions in the economic, political and military fields.
All the Eurasian heritage emerged with great clarity: pluralism of value sy stems; tradition;
multipolarity, and so on.

102
2.2 Eu -Russia relations: a question of norms

In an article titled Only a combination of deterrence and detente can meet this challenge ,
British historian and journalist Timothy Garton Ash claimed that “Putin’ s Russia is now
squaring up to test Europe’ s whole way of doing things ”336 It sounds like something already
heard . It was the period of Russo -Georgian War (2208) and he highly pointed out:
“Russia now poses to the whole way western Europe has tried to conduct human
affairs since 19 45—and the creed most of Europe has lived by since 1989 [… ]
The essence of our new European way of doing things is something more like
procedural integrity. The frontiers of existing states must be respected, but in
exceptional cases territories within states may negotiate special autonomies or
even vote to becom e independent, like Slovakia and Kosovo, or perhaps Scotland
one day – but always by peaceful means, by negotiation and consent, with the
sanction of national and international law. The how m atters even more than the
what”337
Beyond the interpretations of ev ents in Georgia, the core of Ash’s point of view is the
“European way to do”, and “whether Russia conforms or not with such way to do”. Basically,
we are talking about the language of the EU and the European integration process, made of
norms shared by the all members and promoted outside the 'borders' of Europe. This is in line
of the European self -definition as the 'right civilisation'. However, how much this discourse is
different from what we have analysed till now?
Article 2 of the Consolidated versio n of the Treaty on European Union states that “ The Union
is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule
of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.
These value s are common to the Member States ”338 and article 49 states that “ Any European
State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them
may apply t o become a member of the Union”.339 When Ash claims that “ The essence of our

336 T.G. Ash, Only a combination of deterrence and detente can meet this challenge , The Guardian, 4 Sep 2008,
https://www.theguar dian.com/commentisfree/2008/sep/04/russia.eu , online access June 22, 2018.
337 Ibidem .
338 Treaty on European Union , Official Journal C 326 , 26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390, Title I, Common
Provisions, Article 2, https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT , online
access June 22, 2018.
339 Treaty on European Union , cit., Title VI, Final Provisions, Article 49.

103
new European way of doing things is something more like procedural integrity ” he practically
says that what was previously a customary practice of a process of self -determination today is
also a formal and juridical practice as well as cultural and social. Regarding the 2004
enlargement, for instance, that is valid “ not only geographically, but also in terms of their
culture, their history, and their aspirations, the countries concerned are decidedly European .”
Thus, those countries should be considered to b e European on the basis of geography, culture,
history and self -identification. Moreover , the Copenaghen Criteria give the requirements each
country should achieve:
“stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights
and respe ct for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market
forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union”340
European rules might be intended as the specific modes of behaviour in social, political as
well as economic area . As James Headley pointed out:
“Russian policy makers challenge the tendency in EU rhetoric to claim implicit
ownership of European norms, insisting that Russia be an equal creator of pan –
European norms. They do this by asserting that Russia is a European country that
operates according to a set of values and principles, some of which are
‘Europ ean’, and some of which are part of international law. They challenge the
idea that the European Union is a coherent, consensual body, and point to
differences of attitude and policy among its member states. They also accuse the
European Union of ‘double s tandards’, that is of not abiding systematically by its
own declared values/norms ”341
According to Saari “ Russia is willing to cooperate with European organisations and has many
times called for even closer ties with them. However, it is only willing to do i t on its own
terms, which are based on its interests and not on shared val ues and identities”342 In one of the
last Russian Foreign Policy Concept , “Russia calls for building a truly unified Europe without
divisive lines through equal interaction between Rus sia, the European Union and the United

340 European Commission, Accession Criter ia,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm , online access
June 22, 2018.
341 In N. Kuhrt, Russia and the World: The Internal -External Nexus , Routledge, London, 2013, p. 437.
342 N. Kuhrt, Russia and the World: The Internal -External Nexu, cit., p. 445.

104
States. This would strengthen the positions of the Euro -Atlant ic States in global
competition”.343 However, Europe still build its identity according to an ‘othering’ process
according to which ‘Russian other’ represent s the core of that ‘complex othering’ according to
which it constituted ad something completely alien of what could be represented as European.

343 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation , 12 July 2008,
http:// www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml , online access June 22, 2018.

105
Chapter IV
The ‘Underrated’ Central Europe

106
1. The reasons of a ‘concep t’

The period following the collapse of the Iron Curtain was characterized by many
transformations and heated discussions that “gripped vast areas of culture, together with the
particularly sensitive realm of art and education, which had considerab le impa ct on the
shaping canons”.344 The canons of Central Europe seemed resemble an oscillation “oscillation
between [its] closed and open form, reflected in the line -up of political forces, extremely
disparate attitudes to tradition and endless disputes on who sh all and who shall not represent
the nation ”.345
Following the words György Konrad ’s words we can talk about the ‘ myth of the longed -for
integration’, a “longed -for cultural integration […] which comes from the East (but this time
from a different East, which opposes the former split into two) resurrected in the 1980s and
revitalised at the turn of the centuries”.346
Central Europe has a story that unfolds between the final decline of the Ottoman Empire a nd
the fall and lifting of the Iron C urtain; between the e mergence of national awakenings and the
disintegration of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (but not only); between the world wars and
the latent suspicions of cultural nationalism they had somehow to be put aside in the pursuit
of a cultural history of Centra l and Eastern Europe. Perhaps there is no other region in the
world where political boundaries h ave changed more often than in East -Central Europe.
“In 1900 there were more than forty two million German speakers in the area,
fifteen million Poles, thirteen and a half million Ukrainians, almost ten million
Romanians, more than eight million Magyars, seven and a half million Jews, six
million Byelorussians, four and a half million Serbs, more than four million
Greeks, more than three million Bulgarians, almos t three million Croats, two and
a half million Turks in Europe, two million Slovaks, almost two million
Lithuanians, more than a million Slovenes, 850,000 Albanians, 820,000 Gypsies,
742,000 Italians outside of Italy, 693,000 Macedonians, 612,000 Bosnians,
540,000 Carpatho -Rusyns, 500,000 Zekelys, 402,000 Friulians, 294,000

344 Boguslaw Bakula quoted in J. Gwioździk, “He does not seem alien, but he is not ours either…” Ludwig
Bauer: a Central European homo nostalgicus? , Pannoniana : Časopis za humanističke znanosti, Vol.1. No.2.,
2017, file:///C:/Users/Utente/Downloads/Jagoda_Gwiozdzik_ENG.pdf , online access June 27, 2018.
345 Ibidem .
346 Quoted in M. Cornis -Pope, J. Neubauer, History of the Literary Cultures of East -Central Europe: Junctures
and disjunctur es in the 19th and 20th centuries. Volume IV: Types and stereotypes , John Benjamins Publishing,
Amsterdam, 2010, p. 97.

107
Montenegrins, 249,000 Armenians, 200,000 Pomaks, 156,000 Vlachs, 100,000
Kashubes, 93,000 Lusatian Sorbs, 67,000 Wends, 56,000 Gagauz and 28,000
Ladins. And all of these ethnolinguistic groups had active cu ltures contact with
each other”347
When Czeslaw M ilosz told about ‘Vilnius’ he said that it was the city of “semantic
misunderstandings”.348 The discourse on Central Europe i s the discourse of a ‘region’ that
from humble origins t ook the fo rm of a moral appeal during the Cold War. An emigration of
intellectuals and activists who provided an “arsenal” for European foreign policy and NATO,
becoming a general speech on the expansion and enlargement of Western Europe. The Central
and Easter n Eur ope was ‘less to the East’ than Russia.
In the first chapter we have defined East -Central Europe as a hybrid in the process of
‘European oth ering’ by incorporating some aspects of the ‘simple ’ and the ‘complex ’ process .
In this chapter we will try to arriv e at this conclusion in a path divided into three phases: first,
covering the history of East -Central Europe as a concept; second, by making an analy sis of
the consequences of defining it as a Middle -earth ; finally, postulating that the European
enlargemen t was a post -colonial project and we will use the case of Poland as an example.

347 M. Cornis -Pope, J. Neubauer, History of the Literary Cultures of East -Central Europe: Junctures and
disjunctures in the 19th and 20th centuries. Volume I , John Benjamins Publishing, Amsterdam, 2004, p. 14.
348 N. Davies, R. Moorhouse, Microcosmo. L’Europa centrale nella storia di una città , Paravia Bruno
Mondadori Editori, Milano, 2005, pp. 1 -13.

108
1.1 East or West? A gap of civilisation

When the Germans defined themselves as Mitteleuropäer , “they claimed a middle ground
between East and West ”.349 Already in the tenth c entury, German influence penetrated East-
Central Europe through the Holy Roman Empire. Christianization was carried on in a
tripartite dispute between Germany, Byzantium and Rome.350 German influence also
continued with trade .
According to Jacques Le Rider, Mitteleuropa became important “In a direct line with Austro –
Prussian dualism” that “entrenched at the time of Maria Theresa and Frederick II, two empire
– the German Reich proclaimed in 1871 and the Habsburg monarchy – succeeded the Holy
Roman Empire (abol ished at the time of Napoleon, partially restored in 1815 in the form of
the German Confederation, irrevocably destroyed by the Austro -Prussian War in 1866)”.351
In fact, the opposition between France and Germany which dominated the long history of
European politics until 1870 represented the heart of the debate. During the first years of the
Great War the idea of creating a strong Mitteleuropa with a dominated position in Europe
became concrete. While the war and the victories succeeded each other, Friedrich Naumann
wrote Mitteleuropa (1915), describing a post -war Europe in which a strong Central Europe,
under the leadership of Germany, would play the leading role in European politics. Naumann
insisted until the end that Mitte leuropa was carried out in the ‘3 0s and ‘40s of the twentieth
century “ by the pseudo -science of German geopolitics, and fortified with a strong injection of
race theory”.352
The nineteenth -century geographers already engaged to define where Central Europe might be
positioned. The term itsel f was coined by the same geographers to represent a separate and
distinct region between Western Europe and Russia.353 At the turn of the century German
geographer Joseph Partsch , born in Slesia, tried to give a physical, political and economic
definition.
“German is understood everywhere from Galatz, Sofia, Sarayewo, Trieste,

349 M. Cornis -Pope, J. Neubauer, History of the Literary Cultures of East -Central Europe: Junctures and
disjunctures in the 19th and 20th centuries. Volume I , cit., p. 2.
350 N. Davies, R. Moorhouse, Microcosmo. L’Europa centrale nella storia di una città , cit., p. 57.
351 J. Le Rider, Mitteleuropa as a lieu de mémoir , in A. Erll, A. Nünning, Cultural Memory Studies: An
International and Interdisciplinary Handbook , Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, NY, 2010, p. 37.
352 H.C. Meyer, “ Mitteleuropa” in German Thought and Action, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1955, p. 2.
353 P.M.R. Stirk, D. Willis, Shaping Postwar Europe: European Unity and Disunity 1945 -1957 , Pinter, London,
1991, pp. 4 -6.

109

Geneva, and Antwerp far into the interior of Russia. Only the most backward
regions of Servia and Montenegro must be excepted. All the rest of Central [ i.e.
Middle ] Europe, consciously of unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly, belongs
to the sphere of German civilization”354
Naumann’ s vision was a clear picture of an area led by Germany extending from the North
Sea to the Middle East. However, the German Social Democrat Karl Kautsky did not share
Naumann’ s plan. In an article entitled Mitteleurop a, published in the journal Die neue Zeit , it
showed how the project was aimed exclusively to guarantee Germ an hegemony over Central
Europe .355 To be achieved against the rights of the Balkans and the Scandinavians, and
overthrowing the monarchies along the Danube . Kautsky rejected the idea of a united central
Europe thanks to the victory of the Pr ussians and proposed the establishment of a large
supranational federation of socialist and peer states .356
In 1904, Halford Mackinder in a work titled The Geographical Pivot of History , marked a
crucial turning point . Specially, in the study of international relations . He imagined an
“Heartland” in whi ch the Eastern Europe included “some East European state s from the
Ottoman Empire ( the Kingdom of Bulgaria, the Hungarian Kingdom, the Rumanian
Princedom, t he Princedom of
Montenegro, the Kingdom of
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Macedonia) and some from
Russian Empire (the Kingdom of
Poland, the Gran d Duc hy of
Finland, the Central Ukraine , part
of Byelorussia and the
govern orships of Bessarabia,
Lifland, Kourland, and Estland)” .357
According to the Mackinder’s formula: “ Who rules Easter n Europe commands the Heartland.

354 Quoted in H.C. Meyer, “ Mitteleuropa” in German Thought and Action, cit., p. 110.
355 H. Mikkeli, Europa. Storia di un’idea e di un’i dentità , cit., p. 163.
356 Ibidem .
357 N. Megoran, S. Sharapova, A. Faizullaev, Halford Mackinder’s ‘Heartland’ – a Help or Hindrance? , Central
Asia and Consensus, Vol. 4, No. 34, 2005, pp. 8 -21,
http://www.ca -c.org/journal/2005/journal_eng/cac -04/02.megeng.shtml , online access June 27, 2018, see also E.
Ismailov, V. Papava The Heartland Theory and the Present -Day Geopolitical Structure of Central Eurasia ,
Rethinking Central Eur asia, pp. 86 -87, https://www.silkroadstudies.org/publications/silkroad -papers -and-
monographs/item/13128 -rethinking -central -eurasia.html , online access June 27, 2018

110
Who rules the Hear tland commands the Wor ld Island. Who rules the World Island commands
the world ”358 If we think about when the Soviet Union extended its area of dominion to the
West, this principle might also be valid. The COMECON (1949) and the Warsaw Pact (1955)
merged the classic Heartland wit h Russia.359 Once disintegrated with the Soviet Union at the
end of the 1990s, new geopolitical and geo -economics conditions emerged: the enlargement
of the European Union.
“When Thomas Eliot was shaping his first speculative and symbolic new European
consci ousness” ,360 Thomas Masaryk, both founder and first President of Czechoslovakia and
called the ‘President Liberator’,361 in exile in London, promoted his idea of a “‘new Europe’
of decolonise d and newly independent nations”.362 Not only that, “the creation of th e Czecho –
Slovak Legion in Russia, in an attempt to show the Allies and Wilson in particular that the
Czech nation was not me rely to discursive construction”.363 Masaryk claimed that the heart of
Central Europe should rule out Austria and Germany. And unlike Mackinder, he did not speak
of sovereign states but of a future of small independent states, organized according to a liberal
and democratic spirit.
Between the two wars the term Mitteleuropa began to lose salience. Giselher Wirsing
preferred to use Zwisch eneuropa . She was close to the Die Tat circle with geopolitical ideas
oriented towards the Conservative Revolution. In fact, she invoked the need for Ge rman
economic expansion in the E astern regions, sti ll combining with a “Neumannophile”
vision.364
The most important contributions to the debate were historiographical. The Czech Slavist
Jaroslav Bidlo (1927) proposed a clear distinction between Greek -Slavic civilizations in
Eastern Europe; and the Latin -German on e in Western Europe . Basically, between the

358 M. Rosenberg, What Is Mackinder’s Heartland Theory? This Theory Focused On The Role Of Eastern
Europe , February 08, 2018, ThoughtCo.,
https://www.thoughtco.com/what -is-mackinders -heartland -theory -4068393 , online access June 27, 2018.
359 Ismailov, V. Papava , The Heartland Theory and the Present -Day Geopolitical Structure of Central Eurasia ,
cit..
360 D. Ayers, The New Europe and t he New World: Eliot, Masaryk, and the Geopolitics of National Culture ,
Modernist Cultures, Vol. 11, Issue 1, March 2016, p. 13,
https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3366 /mod.2016.0123 , online access June 27, 2018.
361 Czechs Celebrate Republic’s Birth, 1933/11/06 , Universal Newsreel, 1933, retrieved February 22, 2012,
https://archive.org /details/1933 -11-06_Czechs_Celebrate_Republics_Birth , online access June 27, 2018.
362 Ivi, p. 14.
363 Ibidem ; See also the Declaration of Independence of the Czechslovak Nation , drafted in in Washington, D.C.
and published by Czechoslovakia's Paris -based Pr ovisional Government on 18 October 1918,
https://archive.org/details/declarationofind00czec , online access June 27, 2018.
364 H. Mikkeli, Europa. Storia di un’idea e di un’identità , cit., p. 164.

111
Orthodox and the other Catholics and Protestants.365 Contrary, the Polish historians Oskar
Halecki and Marceli Handelsman (1934) suggested a different point of view. They proposed a
process of integration between the small states between Russia and Germany with common
characteristics like ethnicity, language, culture.366 Maybe a primordial example of Visegra d
Declaration. Always in line with the multicultural aspect, the Slovak politician Milan Hodza
stressed the importance of economic and social features. Specifi cally, he conceived a project
of regional agricultural development and democracy to face and prevent the consequences of
nationalism.367
The conceptual debate was severely silenced immediately after the Second World War.
However , there were some interesting food for thought to mention. The Revue d’Histoire
Comparee (1943 -1948) of Domokos Kosary, Zoltan I. Toth, Laszlo Makkai, and Laszlo
Hadrovics was a regional comparatist agenda and a center for international cooperation.368
Istvan Bib ó lucidly highlighted the situation of the small countries of the region as “A kelet –
europai kisállamok nyomorusága ” (The misery of the East -European Small States.)369 The
author pushed the debate on the historical traumas that struck East-Central Europe and
produced a kind of exist ential fear for survival :
“The suffering and lamentations of the oppressed Poles, Hungarians and Czechs
gave the image of a martyred Poland, a martyred Hungarian and a martyred
Bohemia, relating this image to the integrity of the divided historical countr y […]
The greater good of these conditions is derived from a period of dissolution of
historical policies through the assumption of strict ethnic principles and self –
determination […] From this situation derives the most characteristic trait of
imbalan ce in political psychology in Europe Central and Eastern: the existential
fear for one's own community. It is a foreign state without roots, which presents
itself either in European forms or as an unbearable oppressor who […] deprived it
of the best yout h by offering a career to the most endowed and the prison and the
gallows to the most justs ”370
The problem of East-Central Europe and its nature remained suspended on the agenda until

365 D. Mishkova, B. Trencsényi, European Regions and Boundaries: A Conceptual History , Berghahn Books,
NY, Oxford, 2017, p. 170.
366 Ibidem .
367 Ibidem .
368 Ivi, p. 172.
369 I. Bibó, Miseria dei piccoli stati dell'Europa orientale , Il mulino, Bologna, 1994.
370 (personal translation) Ivi, pp. 46, 53 -54.

112
the appeals on behalf of a ‘East -Central land lost ’ during the division o f the Cold War blocks
that could have destroyed this cultural area.
In 1983, the Hungarian Jenö Szü cs wrote an article entitled Three historical regions of
Europe , in which he developed the Bibó’s ideas . He began from Charlemagne when there
were two regio ns in Europe divided by religion. That was responsible for long -term
consequences , because Byzantium did not contemplate the division between State and
Church. Around 1500 Christendom consecrated the East to acquire the appellative of savage.
While in the West, with the birth of the modern state, civil society and its democr atic values
developed. The fate of Central Europe has been falling between these two regions. This third
region was a hybrid, where people have always joined to one or the other Christia n church;
for this reason, Central Europ e did not belong culturally to the East . If Central Europe wanted
to reborn as a political unit, it had to complete the process of W esternization of civil society
that emancipated itself from the state.371
The Hungaria n Csaba Kiss stressed the point that the question of East-Central Europe went
beyond the Westernization:
“many motives may be hidden behind the discovery or rediscovery of Central
Europe. During the construction of modern national culture, roughly over two
centuries, writers and thinkers have been confronted by the dilemma – sometimes
sooner, so metimes later – that they must expound the backwardness of their ow n
national cultures and the dif ferences from that European culture from which they
sprang. This wa s how two possible solutions were formulated and these have, in
effect, recurred repeatedly since the Enlightenment and romanticism. One of these
is the imitation of Europe and the other is total differentiation from it”372
The writers most involved in the d ebate from Danilo Kiš to György Konrad, from Claudio
Magris to Czesław Miłosz, and others, met in Budapest for a round table in 1989. Shortly
before the profound changes of the period.373 In his opening document, Miłosz defined
Central Europe as “being all t he countries [including the Baltic states] that in August 1939

371 See L. Zsinka, The Roots of Western Societal Evolution. A concept of Europe by Jenő Szűcs , Society and
Economy, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 185 –197, http://unipub.lib.uni -corvinus.hu/1163/1/SE_2014n2_Zsinka.pdf , online
access June 27, 2018.
372 K. Csaba, Central European Writers about Central Europe: Introduction to a Non -Existent Book of Reading ,
in G. Schöpflin, N. Wood, In Search of Central Eur ope, Barnes & Noble Books, NY, 1989, p. 135.
373 M. Cornis -Pope, J. Neubauer, History of the Literary Cultures of East -Central Europe: Junctures and
disjunctures in the 19th and 20th centuries. Volume I , cit., p. 1.

113
were the real or hypothetical object of a trade betwee n the Soviet Union and Germany”374
Indeed, as George Schöpflin pointed out “ the emergence of the Central Europe debate and the
slow, halting ( re)construction of a Central European identity ” were a political process:
“Not only does this identity offer a way out of Soviet -type homoge nization in
emphasizing the European qualities of the local cultures, including above all those
of pluralism and dem ocracy, but by offering individuals a second, higher tier of
identity, it can help them to escape the threat of reductionism encapsulated in
political nationalism. By the same token, despite all the major a nd minor
variations that differ entiate Central Eur ope from the West, the central Europe
project is potentially a viable way of re -Europeanizing the area, of recovering
some of the values, ideals, aspirations, solutions and practices that were
eliminated by Soviet -type systems”375
One can only agree with Cla udio Magris when he defined the q uestion of Central Europe as a
“metaphor of protest”376 On the one hand, the reproach against Western Europe for having
entrenched the possibility of being included among those who could define themselves as
Europeans. On the other hand, the necessary consequence of having to prove that they have
nothing to do with Russia. These positions were already thundering in the early ‘80s when
Kundera unpleasantly pointed out that “ Eastern Europe is Russia, with its quite specific
history anchored in the Byzantine world. Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, just like Austria, have
never been part of Eastern Europe. From the very beginning they have taken part in the great
adventure of Western civilization, with its Gothic, its Renaissance, its Ref ormation —a
movement which has its cradle precisely in this re gion. It was here, in Central Europe, that
modern culture found its greatest impulse: psychoanalysis, s tructuralism, dodecaphony,
Bartó k’s music, Kafka’s and Musil’s new esthetics of the novel. T he postwar annexation of
Central Europe (or at least its major part) by Russian civilization caused Western culture to
lose its vital center of gravity”.377
This was also the leitmotif of the original title of Kundera’s essay A Kidnapped West . The
kidnapping must not be justified, and especially not when it is conduc ted against part of the

374 Ibidem .
375 G. Schöpflin, N. Wood, In Searc h of Central Europe , cit., p. 27.
376 A.A. Lisiak, Urban Cultures in (post)colonial Central Europe , Purdue University Press, West Lafayette (US),
2010, p. 2.
377 N. Lindstrom, The Politics of Europeanization and Post -Socialist Transformations , Palgrave Pivot, London,
2015, p. 19.

114
group, “the West” .378
The events of 1989 were greeted with enthusi asm by those who used the term “Central
Europe” . In January 1990, Vaclav Havel highlighted the idea that Cen tral Europe was a
cultural concept (one year later Visegrad Declaration has been realesed):
“there is before us the real historic cha nce to fill with something mean ingful the
great political vacuum that appeared in Central Europe after the break -up of the
Habsburg Empire. We have the chance to transfer Central Europe from a
phenomenon that has so far been historical and spiritual into a political
phenomenon. We have the chance to take a string of European countries that until
recently were colonised by the Soviets and that today are attempting the kind of
friendship with the nations of the Soviet Union which would be founded on equal
rights, and transform them into a definite special body, which would approach
Western Europe not as a poor dissident or a hel pless, searching amnestied
prisoner, but as som eone who has something to offer”379
In line with the cultural image presented by most of the Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Slovenian
and Croatian participants in the speech, there was also a marked difference in ele ctoral
behaviour in Eastern Europe compared to the post -war period. The non -communists were
elected and a regime change started. The seeds of central Europ ean cooperation which, in
Havel’ s words, should h ave turned Central Europe into “a political phenomen on” had begun.
Thus, ‘ the Central European project continued to function as a political project in the way it
began as a moral appeal and remedy for Western Europe ’.380 This is a crucial aspect to
consider because it underlines once again that what is good f or Central Europe is good for
Eastern Europe and for Europe. This formula quickly entered the ‘rhetorical armoury ’ of the
politicians of those lands.
For instance, in 1992, Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski in a business deal on
European relat ions argued that “as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, contemporary
security relations on our continent have lost their simplicity and may be geo graphically
described as concentric circles progressing from the stable nucleus of the countries of th e

378 C. Tighe, Kundera’s kidnap revisited , Journal of European Studies, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 112 -133, May 2014,
https://www.researchgate.net/publ ication/273919421_Kundera's_kidnap_revisited , online access June 27, 2018.
379 V. Havel, Warsaw 20 January, 1990 , in A. Jagodziński, The Visegrad Group. A central European
Constellation , Publication on the Occasion of 15th Anniversary of the Visegrad Group, International Visegrad
Fund, Bratislava, 2006, p. 57.
380 I.B. Neumann in J.W. Müller, Memory and Power in Post -War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past ,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 125.

115
European Communities, the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance, to the
most unstable peripheries […] The most important danger zone in Europe, with regard to
possible military c onflicts, is the area extending between Russia , the Ukraine, and Rumania
[…] The association of the three countries [Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland] with the
European Community is relevant to their security but also to that of the West: the hard core o f
Europe w ill comprise a bigger territory”381
With statements like these, the discourse on Central Europe relau nched its challenge to the
Europe . It began as an appeal by Czech, Hungarian and Polish dissident intellectuals, emitted
over the heads of local po liticians, to Western civil society. Western intellectuals responded to
the plea for only “European reasons” . Finally, disappearing the local communists and former
dissidents under the command of the state apparatus, the topics of the discourse on Central
Europe have become part of the armament of official foreign policy.

381 Ibidem .

116
1.2 The ‘ spectrum ’ of Middle -earth

It is inevitable to state that the countries of East -Central Europe were never seen as a solid
component in the eyes of European governance. The “spectrum ” of countries as blocked in
the middle also involves the neighbours in the immediate east and south -east.382 Larry Wolf’s
“prophecy” according to which Eastern Europe would continue to occupy an ambiguous place
between inclusion and exclusion still s eems to confirm this fact.383
In the wake of 1989, when Wolff meditate d on the constant power of the Enlightenment’s
“mind map” of Eastern Europe , the transition from socialism to the next milestone of
civilization seemed to justify the shift to the ‘middle -earth ’. Usually, the change affects entire
societies , not just their economies. Sometimes its impact is so overwhelming as to leave some
states ‘suspended in indeterminacy ’, with political scientists wondering if the transition might
still be considered a “liminal rite of passage ” or should instead be considered a “permanent
status quo ”.384
The mo st recent speculations about the so -called “stuck in between” , however, were
geopolitically motivated. Russia’ s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, together with its
subsequent m ilitary intervention in Ukraine, has placed Eastern Europeans in the dual role of
intrepid mediators between Western Europe and Russia , again . This turn of events marked yet
another instrumentality of history, since what we define “middle -earth” is profiled not only in
the narratives of the present of Eastern Europe. With even greater emphasis , it shapes visions
of the past. “Politicians, scholars and media experts in Eastern Europe and abroad have
regularly described this part of the continent as if it had been trapped between East and West,
Hitler and Stalin, Catholicism and Orthodoxy, Westerni zation and Orientalism”.385
Hypothetically, “the interstitial position might have been a blessing: a n alternative ‘third way’
to the “East -West dualistic thought”; or to the late opposition to Russia about neither the West
nor the E ast of the Eurasianism’s ideology; or a synonym for one area rich in stratification of
cultures”.386 However, in practice, it has assumed a closer resemblance with a curse. The log ic

382 A. Maxwell, The East -West Disco urse. Symbolic Geography and its Consequences , Peter Lang, Frankfurt am
Main, 2011, pp. 1 -82.
383 L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment , cit., p. 9.
384 See M.D. Kennedy, Cultural Formations of Postcommuni sm. Emancipation, Transition, Nation, and War ,
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2002.
385 A. Maxwell, The East -West Discourse. Symbolic Geography and its Consequences , cit., pp. 1 -82.
386 M. Marszałek, On Slavs and Germans: Andrzej Stasiuk’s Geopoet ics of Central European Memory , in J.
Beinek, P.H. Kosicki, Re-mapping Polish -German Historical Memory: Physical, Political, and Literary Spaces

117
of the “middle -earth” persistently persists, cementing the geographical position of the area as
absolutely i mportant and indisputable. The “historical continuity” of Eastern Europe derives
“from its unfortunate position among the most o rganized and powe rful neighbours”.387
The “middle -earth” rhetoric was an instrument in the much broader project of merging
geography as the inevitable and unfortunate fate of the area. In contrast to Russia, where since
the nineteenth century space -as-destiny has risen (cons ciously chosen) in a welcome
opposition to the self -determinatio n of Western Europe through space and history, for Eastern
Europe this “destiny” has had far more ambiguous implications.388
Thus, the “middle -earth” has not only geopolitical implications. Les lie Adelson pointed out
that a concept of “‘ between ’ often works literally as a reserve designed to c ontain, restrain and
prevent”.389 Indeed , it prevents the widest recognitio n and re -evaluation of the area’ s
connections with ideas, locals and cultures.390 These links can be positive, based on interest or
solidarity, as well as negative rooted in rejection. As Maxim Waldstein suggests, a concept of
“midd le-earth” leaves Eastern Europe “ as a consumer but not a producer of methodological
innovations”.391
Political ly, it consolidates the suspicions about the territorial volatility of Eastern Europe
being an “ expanding and contracting ar eas with very fluid boundaries”.392 Its sovereignty,
violent entanglement and distraction of populations and its “colonial or postcolo nial
subordination ”, have been encapsulated in the moniker “the buffer zone”.393 Culturally, the
“middle -earth” acts like the great homogenizer . For a lay observer, it simulates a semblance of
unity between the constituent elements of the area and it is equa lly easily mistaken for the
most obvious definition characteristic of the area, since it is misinterpreted as the glue that
holds the most disparate pla ces together. Furthermore, on the one hand, “the “middle -earth”

since World War II , Slavica Publishers, Bloomington (US), 2012, p. 189; see also M. Laruelle, Space as Destiny:
Legitimizing the Russian Empire through Geography and Cosmos , in S. Turoma, M. Waldstein, Empire
De/Centered: New Spatial Histories of Russia and the Soviet Union, Ashgate, London, 2013, 85 –104.
387 A.V. Prusin, The Lands Between: Confl ict and the East Eur opean Borderlands, 1870 –1992 , Oxford
University Press, NY, 2010, p. 1.
388 M. Laruelle, Space as Destiny: Legitimizing the Russian Empire through Geography and Cosmos , cit., p. 89.
389 L.A. Adelson, Against Between: A Manifesto , in S. Hassan, I. Dadi, Unpackin g Europe: Towards a Critical
Reading , NAI Publishers, Rotterdam, 2001, 245 -246.
390 Ibidem .
391 M. Waldstein, Theorizing the Second World: Challenges and Prospects , Ab Imperio , Vol. 1, 2010, 98 –99,
101,
https://www.academia.edu/905304/Theorizing_the_Second_World_Challenges_and_Prospects , online access
June 27, 2018.
392 A. Webb, The Routledge Companion to Central and Eastern Europe since 1919 , Routledge, London, NY,
2008, p. 2.
393 A. Maxwell, The East -West Discourse. Symbolic Geography and its Consequences , cit., p 32.

118
invalidates the attempts to distinguish between the numerous designations Eastern, Central, or
East Central Europe”.394 On the other, “the intrinsic vagueness of the “geographical domains”
of these labels, le aves room for their mappability”.395 As a result, the “middle -earth” validates
that Cold War era label “ Eastern Europe as an appropriate term for cou ntries mistakenly
perceived as “geographically contiguous” and “structurally homogenous” that should be
‘contained’ or ‘dominated’”.396

394 M. Cornis -Pope, J. Neubauer, History of the Literary Cultures of East -Central Europe: Junctures and
disjunctures in the 19th and 20th centuries. V olume I , cit., p . 2-6.
395 L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment , cit., pp. 23 –
41.
396 L. Kontler, Introduction: Refl ections on Symbolic Geography , European Review of History – Revue
européenne d’Histoire, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1999, p. 11, https://doi.org/10.1080/13507489908568218 , online access
June 27, 2018.

119
1.3 ‘(Post)Colonization’ of the Middle -earth

Although we c an frame the enlargement of the Europe an Union in the context of Said’ s
speculations, there is an equally interesting theory that we intend to consider concluding this
section. We just said that the position of East -Central Europe as the “middle -earth” , not
European at all but in Europe, places it between the West and the East. Political geographer
Merje Kuus argued that:
“the shared logic of otherness seems to make the disco urses of Eastern Europe
and the Orient variant forms of the same kind. […] Secondl y, the discourse of
Eastern Europe is different from Orientalism because it is not simply the other,
outside Europe. Eastern Europe is rather between the West and East, Europe, but
not-Europe, the last outpost of Europe and at the same time on the doorstep of
Europe. […] We can assume here that the ‘Eastern’ Enlargement discourse on
reuniting Europe was underpinned to a significant extent by Orientalist discourse
which presupposed essential differences be tween Europe and Eastern Europe”397
Starting from what Kuus postulated, we will try to explain how the enlargement of the
European Union represented a process of ‘hybrid othering’, precisely because of the peculiar
characteristics of East -Central Europe that we have analysed so far. Basically , referring to
post-colonialism we do not generalize on Eastern Europe as non -Western, rather we will
evaluate the European enlargement as a means of producing the difference. It might sound
like a provocation, but the spatial assumptions, the principles of inclusion and ex clusion, the
Self and the Other, are involved and the periphery is still an integral part of politics. We will
examine Poland as a case study, although we can talk about a process that could be extended
to other countries as well. But it will be interestin g to note the way in which the opposition of
Europe and Eastern Europe was used by the accession countries themselves. As Kuus said:
“the discourses of Europe and Eastern Europe are neither imposed on the acceding countries
nor reflect a genuine Eastern Eu ropean point of view. They should be seen as a discursive
practice of power with each other and the esse ntial essence at its center”.398

397 M. Kuus, Europe’s Eastern Expansion and the reinscription of otherness in East -Central Europe , Progess in
Human Geography, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, pp. 472 -489,
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.482.6985&rep=rep1&type=pdf , online access June
27, 2018.
398 Ibidem .

120
1.3.1 ‘The Polish case’

Firstly, in Poland, intellectuals and politicians have rarely questioned the issue of Polish
identity as Eastern country has been rarely considered critical. Even though some scholars
tried to conceptualize some outcomes of the Eastern studies to the Polish conditions. These
outcomes have been used to "redeem" certain Polish political traditions, an d not to reconsider
the European identity formation in the ‘90s in Poland.399 There was also a proposal by
anthropol ogist Michał Buchowski to analys e the post -socialist transformation in the series of
essays entitled Rethinking Transformation , where he also c onsidered the meaning of Poland’s
“Eastness” for transformation.400 Last but not least, it is worth mentioning a li terary attempt to
represent the Polish collective imagination of the people behind the eastern border of Poland.
This would serve as an example of a popular shift eastward of the discursive border of
civilizations between Central Western Europe and Eastern Europe.401
In Polish transformation studies, three lines of interpretation can be distinguished. In the early
90s, many social researchers spoke about modernization models. There were also many
institutional analyses on transformation. Lately, the studies have been extended to a global
perspective emphasizing the structural limitations of Polish transformation.402 In the earl y
2000s, there was a “ semantic revolutio n” in public and academic discourse. It aimed to
overcome the dominant modernization paradigm b y undermining the significance of political
and academic consensus on transformation.403
This attempt should be seen within a broader context of overcoming the predominant
paradigms in European thinking. We should go beyond institutionalism, intergovernment alism
or systematic analysis, which are anchored in the essentialist hypothesis of Europe. They
imply that “there is a substance or a core to Europe – a relatively coherent set of values, norms
or perhaps instit utions. In speaking of the govern mentalizatio n of Europe we call attention to

399 Z. Mach, Polish National Culture and its Shifting Centres , Humanity in Action, 2000, pp. 1 -16,
https://www.hum anityinaction.org/files/278 -Polish_National_Culture_and_its_Shifting_Centres.pdf ,
online access June 27, 2018.
400 A. Galasinska, M. Krzyzanowski, Discourse and Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe , Palgrave,
London, 2008, p. 7.
401 See K. Cordell, K . Jajecznik , The Transformation of Nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe Ideas and
Structures , Etnopolityka, vol. 2, 2015,
https://depot.ceon.pl/bitstream/handle/123456789/7945/1114%20Transformation%20of%20Nationalism_ebook.
pdf;sequence=1 , online access June 27, 2018.
402 Ibidem .
403 A. Galasinska, M. Krzyzanowski, Discourse and Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe , cit., p. 100

121
the production of a plurality of Europes within discontinuous regimes and practices of
knowledge. Not Europe but Europes”.404
The non -essential vision of Europe and the EU will not propose or test any definition of the
nature of Europe. Instead, it will discover the processes and practices with which political
authorities are trying to get to know Europe. The non -essential perspective of transformati on
in Poland must abandon the “return to Europe” discourse.
“The West hardly e ver agreed to treat Poland as a full member of its community
[…] while Poles usually have felt themselves part of the West, they had, at the
same time, a problem of not being fully accepted, as wel l as being treated as
somehow in ferior ”405
Thus, in the dis course on transformation and Europeanisation, EU membership is per ceived as
an opportunity to be “fully accepted” as part of the Western community. Instead we suggest
that transformation and Europeanization could be replaced by different, but significantly
interdependent, patterns that follow.
Poland, as well as the entire region of post -communist countries, has been placed in Eastern
Europe. This movement originated both in the superiority of the West after the defeat of
Soviet Union during the Cold War, a nd in the profound anxiety to open to those countries.
Western Europeans had to face own fear of the unknown in the 1990s.406 Therefore, in order
to obtain their ontological security, they had to "fabricate uncertainty" by recalling a fanatical
image of East ern Europe.407
We have already discussed in the course of the Russia's chapter the development of the
existence of a consolidated Eastern Europe especially during the Enlightenment. Eastern
Europe became one of the generalized "others" essential for self -understanding and self –
portrait of Europe. The notion of the East can be seen as a stereotype, which has been
internalized by the West in its long -standing historical and cultural socializations. This
stereotypical image of Eastern Europe as not completely ci vilized and not completely
European has been incorporated into narratives in both Western and Eastern Europe.
Consequently, following an anthropological approach (see first chapter) we can see how the
Eastern image has influenced Eastern enlargement as a k ind of symbol of culture (Western

404 J.H. Haahr, W. Walters, Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration ,
Routledge, London, 2004, p. 139.
405 J. Kochanowicz, Poland and the West: In or Out? , Transit, No. 21, 2002, http://www.iwm.at/transit/transit –
online/poland -and-the-west-in-or-out/, online access June 27, 2018.
406 See A. Giddens, Modernity and Self -Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modem Age , cit., 184 -195.
407 Ibidem.

122
Europe an culture ).
The research conducted by the Polish think tank408 in several EU member states between 1998
and 2001 has convincingly measured the perception of Poland as an “eastern” country.409 It
could be argued that the new criteria and the formalization of entry conditions for new
member states (including the predominant focus on the implementation of independent legal
provisions of the acquis communautaire as well as the assessment of compliance with
democratic norms a nd values, for example, the Copenhagen criteria) derived from the
commonly shared image of ca ndidates, including Poland, as “eastern” countries.410 Without a
doubt, this formation of political conditionality has originated in the common feelings of
anxiety a mong the elites and societies of Western Europe in the 1990s towards the imminent
integration with Eastern Europe. It could be described to some extent as a fear of the
unknown. The think tank survey also showed that Eastern Europe was predominantly
repres ented as an unknown, semi -predictable and semi -rational land.
Therefore, as we have already pointed out, the overwhelming conditionality of the EU, also in
line with the principles of Eastern enlargement, marked an important change not only in the
way of E U governance, but also left a significant mark on the formation of the understanding
of European identity as a land of democracy, the rule of law and market economy.
Enlargement has helped to consolidate this brand of the essence of Europe, both for the EU
and for the acceding States. As a result, EU conditionality – monitoring and evaluation of
candidates – has been perceived as a sort of embodiment of Europeanity .
So, the doubts about European enlargement of the Professor Ulrich Sedelmeier just in 2014
seemed justified:
“10 years after the first eastern enlargement that was so strongly associated with
ending the division of Europe, attitudes towards further enlargement are distinctly
negative, both among EU citizens and Member State governments. Is this
increasing opposition the result of the impact that these earlier eastern
enlargements had on the EU? Did a negative impact of enlargement on the EU
undermine the continued integration of the continent through further enlargement?

408 Institute of Public Affairs (IPA).
409 See K. Krzysztofek, Poland’s Integration with the European Union as Cultural Universe , Polish European
Studies, Vol. 3, 1999, pp. 83 -105, http://www.ce.uw.edu.pl/pliki/pw/y3 -1999_Krzysztofek.pdf , online access
June 27, 2018; and J. Kucharczyk, Poland’s Road to Europe in the Eyes of Public Opinion , Tr@nsit online, No.
20, 2001, http://www.iwm.at/transit/transit -online/polands -road-to-europe -in-the-eyes-of-public -opinion/ , online
access June 27, 2018.
410 Ibidem .

123
And even if EU enlargement without doubt contributes to the integration of the
two halves of the continent, to what extent has enlargement helped to overcome
the division of the continent – specifically with regard to the spread of
democracy? ”411
Following the studies on the premises of governability, we could conclude that within this
logic of power, the candidates bec ame governable and knowable as “Europe, but not Europe.”
In a Western vision, Eastern Europe was in a frontier, transitional space “neither developed
nor underdeveloped, neither learnt nor wholly ignorant, but in the process of becoming mature
Europeans ”.412 As a result, there was a sort of double framing of Eastern Europe as
simultaneously in Europe and not yet in Europe. This passage was decisive. It opened a large
space within which it was possible to build Poland and other countries classified as Eastern
Europe as half of Europe, Europe, but not Europe. They have been put in a position to learn
about Europeanity and at the same time have been instructed by the EU institu tions,
politicians, experts and intellectuals about the essence of Europe.
Another step, here, is important. T he self -Easternization of Poland, which meant internalizing
the Poland as an Eastern country . It was manifested by the common acceptance of the Po les of
their position late in relation to Europe, to West, and “by granting that their cultural legacy
and their mentality , homo sovieticus, made them incapable of modernizing and becoming
fully Europeans. ”413 As a result, Europe’s “learning” and “adoption” speech has been
incorporated during the accession period. The feeling of how good Europe was to Poland was
and is somewhat generalized amplified by the newspapers : “How the EU transformed Poland .
The benefits of joining 10 years ago have not been all econo mic: Poland is becoming more
outward -looking, tolerant and confident ”.414
This is a path that has guided the Poles towards the realization of the need to become more
Western than Eastern. In other words, transformation should be considered as the process of
de-Easternization of Poland. Surprisingly the Polish people pushed that Easternization inside

411 U. Sedelmeier, Europe after the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: 2004 -2014 , Heinrich Böll
Stiftung – European Union, June 2014, https://eu.boell.org/en/2014/06/10/europe -after-eastern -enlargement –
european -union -2004-2014 , online access June 27, 2018.
412 M. Kuus, Europe’s Eastern Expansion and the Réinscription of Otherness in East -Central Europe , cit., p.
476.
413 J. Gwioździk, “He does not seem alien, but he is not ours either…” Ludwig Bauer: a Central European homo
nostalgicus? , cit.
414 R. Adekoya, How the EU transformed Poland , The Guardian, 1 May 2014,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/01/eu -poland -10-years -economic , online access June 27,
2018.

124
and out. But, of course, the main heart of this process has manifested itself through the
process of Europeanization of Poland.
By orienting others inwardly, we m ean the process of creating and inventing categories of
people who have lost during the tra nsformation due to the lack of “cultural competence” .
They have been defined as an example of the manifestation of homo sovieticus. This internal
oriental ism constru cted people who felt to be from the West and East by adopting or denying
Western standards.
Here we report a particularly pertinent case. The anthropologist Marshall Sahlins, in
explaining the culture trafficking in terms of mimesis, has interpreted the Co ok case.415 The
interest in the Cook case derives from the fact that it is historically placed in the moment of
maximum expansion of the West (1779). James Cook was welcomed by the Hawaiians as
chief, even deified, becoming part of the Hawaiian culture.416 This fact also allowed the
Hawai ian aristocracy to establish a ‘privileged’ relationship wi th the West, compared to other
‘similar’ populations. Instead of constitutin g an ‘imitation’ of Western customs, the Cook case
represented the start of a learning proc ess that would internalize the ‘model’. ‘Assimilating’
the Europeans, the Hawaiians were distinguished from others ‘similar’ . 417 For our purpose,
other Eastern similar.
Kuus pointed out that identity in Eastern states shaped their border s as the eastern bor der of
Europe. “By emphasizing their European credentials, the accession countries sought to shift
the discursive border between Europe and Eastern Europe further east and ther eby move
themselves into Europe”.418 It was the precondition for the practice of t he other on the outside.
The main “East other” of Poland was Russia .
In the 1990s and 2000, the notion of central Europe was resumed to reposition itself on the
political and imaginary map of Europe. Within this climax, Central Europe was closer to an
ideal Europe than Eastern Europe; Eastern Europe was closer than the Balkan states and
Russia, and so on. The fluidity of this speech was appropriately developed by Timothy Garton
Ash who provocatively said: “Tell me your Central Europe, and I tell you who you are”.419
Moreover, in his Does Central Europe Exist? , Timothy Garton Ash emphasized that there was
a particular inclination to attribute to the central European past what the hope of Central

415 R. Malighetti, V. Matera, U. Fabietti, Dal tribale al globale: introduzione all’antropologia , cit., p. 195.
416 Ibidem .
417 Ivi, p. 196.
418 M. Kuus, Europe’s Eastern Expansion and the Réinscription of Otherness in East -Central Europe , cit., p.
479.
419 T.G. Ash, History of the Present: Essays, Sketches and Despatches from Europe in the 1990’s , Penguin,
London, 19 99, p. 384.

125
Europe will characterize its future. He stressed that “the confusi on of what shou ld be with
what was – is rather typical of the new Central Europeanism. We are to understand that what
was truly ‘Central European’ was always Western, rational, humanistic, democratic, sceptic al,
and tolerant. The rest was ‘East European’ , Russian, or possibly German. Central Europe
takes all the ‘Dichter und Denker, Eastern Europe is left with the ‘Richter und Henker’”.420
As Jacek Kochanowicz points out, the co ncept of Central Europe was re -invented by the
Eastern Europeans themselves : “the presumption was that some societies within Eastern
Europe were more Western, or less Eastern than others. While these differences were half –
forgotten at the early stages of the transformation when everybody shed communism, they
reappeared at the end of the present decade [the 1990’s – JG], when it became obvious that the
transformation record di ffers sharply across the region”.421
The interesting, emerging question is how this speech builds the candidate countries as
students and users of European standards. The massive learning process employed by
politicians and intellectuals in Central Europe – i.e. adherence to EU conditionality – has
largely been maintained by rhetorical strategies for locating in a discu rsive way its own
countries in ‘Europe’ while ‘othe rs’ their E astern neighbours.
Furthermore, Kuus argues that the teaching and learning processes simultaneously fuelled a
threefold division of the continent into: a European core, Central European candidates who
are not yet fully European but in harmony w ith the European project, and an eastern periphery
actually excluded from membership. Thus, “ the image of a single Europe has given way to a
generalized multitier patchwork Europe with varying degrees of Europeanness and Eastness.
But the generalized East has remained a defining characteristic of European identity
construction”.422
EU membership has become a kind of delocalization from Eastern Europe to the right Europe
because of the contrast between Eastern and Western Europe. This process of
transnationali zation of cultures inevitably leads to openness to external cultural influences,
even when these states intend to embody the role of custodians of the authentic cultural
traditions of their country.423
In the 1990s the Europeanisation of Eastern Europe was t reated both in the candidate

420 T.G. Ash, Does Central Europe Exist? , in G. Schöpflin, N. Wood, In Search of Central Europe , cit., pp. 194 –
195.
421 J. Kochanowicz, Poland and the West: In or Out? , cit.
422 M. Kuus, Europe's Eastern Expansion and the Réinscription of Otherness in East-Central Europe , cit., p.
475.
423 R. Malighetti, V. Matera, U. Fabietti, Dal tribale al globale: introduzione all’antropologia , cit., p. 180.

126
countries and in the EU as a means of preventing the risk of authoritarianism or nationalism.
Eastern Europe was presente d as in need of overcoming the “mental strength shirt” of homo
sovieticus . As a result, Europeanisation wa s conceived as a kind of graduation from Eastern
Europe to Correct Europe, a process in which access to countries must have shown that they
were “available and capable” of internalizing Western norms.
Therefore, the silent premise of European integration p resupposes that the East of Europe
must have stood on the right side by applying the package of European values and norms
instead of overcoming the West -East division. It could be concluded that the whole effort of
transformation and of Europeanization has been and continues to be the abandonment of the
Eastness. And is not this a modern attitude of colonialism?
As the polish writer Witold Gombrowicz wrote:
“Until we differ from Europe we will never become a truly European nation –
because being European does not mean merging with Europe, but being a specific
and irreplaceable component. And again: only the opposition to the Europe that
created us can finally make us become someone with a life of their own. […] If I
did not glimpse it, I would not lose my time ta lking about unattainable things. I
am convinced that the Polish, in spite of the terror of being gagged at home and
the emptiness that is here that sucks him in, is desperately looking for himself ”424
Today, it is named as the “hard hoof” of Europe, the Visegrád group born in 1991 to
strengthen the collaboration between Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. It
seemed to be an alliance that could not have problems with the democratic, open and
welco ming Europe. And yet, the four countries consult each other before every European
summit and by now t hey seem to have a single voice:
“A favorable basis for intensive development of cooperation is ensured by the
similar character of the significant change s occurring in these countries, their
traditional, historically shaped system of mutual contacts, cultural and spiritual
heritage and common roots of religious traditions. The diverse and rich cultures of
these nations also embody the fundamental values of the achievements of
European thought. The mutual spiritual, cultural and economic influences exerted
over a long period of time, resulting from the fact of proximity, could support
cooperation based on natural historical developme nt […] Simultaneously, th e

424 (personal translation) W. Gombrowicz, DIARIO. Volume I (1953 -1956) , cit., p. 169 .

127
signatories of the Declaration respect the right of all other nations to express their
own identity. They emphasize that national, ethnic, religious and language
minorities ”425
Recently, the “V4 reiterated its will of a different Europe ”.426 They met in Buda pest on March
2018 with their several commissions “ formed to address different themes of cooperation in
order to strengthen and develop them ”.427
“Having regard to our shared historic heritage and to the significance of a strong,
responsible and cooperative Central -European region, meeting in Budapest on 2nd
March 2018, we the Speakers of the Visegrád Group Parliaments have discussed
our parliamentary cooperation as well as the opportunities offered by a joint
presentation of issues of common interest at the different fora of the European
Union”428
BBC’s journalist Katya Adler , responsible for European affairs, titled her article Visegrad:
The clash of the euro visions .429 She reported the words of Agoston Mraz, CEO of the
Hungarian government -sponsored Nezopont Institute, “fighting empires is a Hungarian
tradition: first the Turks 500 years ago; then the Austrian Empire; followed by the Nazis and
the communists in the 20th Century. Now, he said, they were resisting attempts to build a
European empire. […] a clash of “euro visions” between the V4 and EU -integrationists is
inevitable”.430

425 Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the
Republic of Hungary in Striving for European Integration, Visegrád, cit.
426 In Budapest, the V4 reiterated its will of a different Europe , VPost, Ma rch 5, 2018,
https://visegradpost.com/en/2018/03/05/in -budapest -the-v4-reiterated -its-will-of-a-different -europe/ ,
online access June 27, 2018.
427 Ibidem .
428 Ibidem .
429 K. Adler, Visegrad: The clash of the euro visions , 30 January 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world –
europe -42868599 , online access June 27, 2018.
430 Ibidem .

128
Concluding remarks

129

“An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become
socially recognized. These differences are essential to its bei ng. If they did not
coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidity.
Entrenched in this indispensable relation is a second set of tendencies […] to
congeal established identities into fixed forms, thought and lived as if their
structure expressed the true order of things […] Identity requires difference in
order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own
self-certainty”431
To conclude this research, we may say that there is an important marker of th e European
identity -making process: the East. Europe continues to recycle the ‘Eastern other’ in historical
and spatial dimension. Thus, it is impossible to speak of the end of the division between the
two blocks, typical of the Cold War, because the East / West dualism persists in customary
European practice. Also , formally. We have analys ed the question on the basis of a very broad
context, demonstrating t hat the East is constituted as ‘the other’ in the framework of a process
of ‘othering’ concerning the formation of the European self.
Surely a similar approach can be challenged, if we take literally the words of the American
philosopher Richard Bernstein according to which “despite all the professed scepticism about
binary oppositions, there has been a t endency in many ‘postmodern’ discourses to reify a new
set of fixed oppositions: otherness is pitted against sameness, contingency against necessity,
singularity and particularity against universality, fragmentation against wholeness. In each
case it is th e former term that is celebrated and valorised while the latter term of these
oppositions is damned, marginalized, exiled. […] Western philosophy began wit h this
‘problem’ : philosophers have always been concerned with understanding what underlies and
perva des the mul tiplicity, diversity, and sheer contingency that we encounter in our everyday
lives ”432
In the first chapter we mentioned the overcoming of the constructivist and post -structuralist
perspectives in the approach to the study object of this research . On the one hand, the most
traditional and known constructivists and poststructuralists recognize ‘identity’ as n ot only

431 W.E. Con nolly, Identity \Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox , University of Minnesota
Press, Minneapolis, London, 1991, p. XIV.
432 Quoted in V. Paipais, Self and Other in Critical International Theory: Assimilation, Incommensurability and
the Pa radox of Critique , Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, Issue 1, January 2011,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000288 , online access June 30, 2018.

130
based on own properties but in relation to the ‘other’;433 on the other hand, their positions turn
off the possibility to catch the conc eptual value of self/other relationship. Moreover, “ Post-
structuralism remains characterized by an intentionality outside its analysis. Its emphasis on
the uniqueness of the identity linked to the context, which is perhaps its main strength, is also
his mo st paralyzing weakness because it does not leave much margin for the analysis of the
process of social identification. ”434 However, this process conceptualizes a subject/order
relationship, and not a subject/subject relationship .435 On the contrary, “construct ivism has a
grip on intentionali ty, and drawing on the idea of ‘recognition’ is able to understand
identification not only as a relationship between a self and an order, but also between one self
and another, intended as a subject. ” The problem here is the broader intentionality, limit ing
this perspective, in terms of reality around the couple self/other .436
But the greatest limit to the approach on the study of self and other is certainly the historical
and spatial one. Very often, European scholars forget t he importance of the process of
othering involved in the self -definition process. European integration seems the only useful
way to create a political community. However, this mechanism initiates a logic of
unbelievable peaceful pluralism. Certainly, Europ ean integration is a process designed by
Europeans for Europeans but makes Europe a territorial subject in the proximity of others.
In this regard, some intellectuals hi ghlighted the current Europe’s other is “its own past which
should not b e allowed to be come its future”.437 This practice inserts Europe into the world
only through the conception of a global self in the absence of others. The application of
European principles through the treaties best represents the core of the issue. Scholars have
found a s olution in temporal alteration to support their thesis. Othering that is resolved in the
negation of a historical and spatial dimension.
However, as we highlighted, t he problem of the ‘historical othering’ like the attitude to refuse
own past to obt ain an ‘ideal self’ results itself in the resurgence of the very same practices of
‘othering’. As long as the interweaving of the temporal and spatial aspects of ‘oth ering’ will
be placed as a mere empirical contingency, it will be condemned to affect the Europea n world
politics in the context of International Relations. As Kojève pointed out , the ‘other’ in ‘present

433 See A. Wendt, Social Theory of Internat ional Politics , cit.; and J. Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang
Together? Neo -utilitarianism and Social Constructivist Challenge , cit.
434 I.B. Neumann, J.M. Welsh, T he Other in European Self -Definition: A Critical Addendum to the Literature on
International Society , cit.
435 Ibidem .
436 Ibidem .
437 O. Wæver, Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non -war Community , in Emmanuel Adler
and Michael Barnett (eds), Security Communities , cit.

131
evaluation’ l inked to the own past ‘self’ in order to escape potential exclusion, or asymmetry
and hierarchical ‘inclusion’ is a long-lasting circums tance, because the two modes of
‘othering’ are at work together and assume their effectiveness from their reciprocal operant –
conditioning.
Taking into account the ‘others’ examined in this study we can find all the principles
according to which a process o f ‘othering’ or ‘otherness’ is developing in a context of
historical and spatial dimensions. Moreover, all the paths producing ‘simple’, ‘complex’ and
‘hybrid’ process of othering should be contextualised historically and spatially.
After the Ottoman Empi re’s defeat, a representation of Turkey shifted to be major threat to a
subject in developing in terms of modernization and normalization. However, it does not
mean that it was less important or present in the European othering process. Of course, it was
useful to shift the attention from Turkey to Russia. Although the escalation of Russian other
the question of Turkish other continued to be shaped in the production of difference. In the
related chapter we have travel led a long way to con firm our thesis. Wh en British editorialist
Edward Mortimer saw the contemporary European perceptions of Islam and Turkey, he
realized that history and space echoed in the logic of culture:
“First, there is its geographical proximity. Travel south from almost anywhere in
Euro pe and the first non -European (or non -Christian) society you meet will be a
Muslim one. Next comes a chain of historical or quasi -historical folk memories of
conflicts between Muslims and Christians, stretching right across Europe. In these
memories, the M uslim appears as the invader: Moors conquering Spain, Saracens
raiding France and Italy, Turks at the gates of Vienna […] The fact that Europeans
invaded and conquered virtually every Muslim country much more recently is
often forgotten, or remembered in a way which again presents the Muslim as
villain […] Such episodes continue even now. […] the Muslim communities
within Western Europe are seen as potentially only the vanguard of a much larger
wave of immigration resulting from the population explosion a nd the lack of
economic development in their countries […] All these factors are pushing Europe
to define itself in terms, not perhaps of Christian belief, but certainly of Christian
heritage, and to emphasize as sharply as possible the distinction and the frontier
between itself and the world of Islam. This may be unavoidable. It may in some
respects even be desirable: if Europe is to function successfully as a political
entity its members will need some sense of a common heritage and some criterion

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for de ciding where Europe begins and ends. But the implications need to be
considered very carefully. If the price to be paid is to make every Muslim resident
in the Community feel that he or she is at best a tolerated alien, and every
neighbouring Muslim state feel that it is looked on by Europe as an enemy, then
that price is certainly too high. A more constructive and harmonious way to define
Europe needs to be found”438
Turkey brings with it the memory of a historical -spatial representation that is reflected in the
Turkish -European dis course. Above all when it says ‘ to be an integr al part of Europe for
centuries’ . It is therefore inevitable to not exclude Turkey as one of the others Europe. In the
case of Russia, representatio n becomes more complex because “the other Russian” has
challenged Europe by providing an alternative way for European self -determination. .
Russia emerges from the ruins of a past of political, economic and social failures. Today, the
representation of Russia is important because it involves the present and the future. The new
governance has launched a project of institutionalization that does not forget a history of
exclusion. The substantial problem of the European representation of the Russian other has
always been characterized b y the idea of having to face a ‘radical brother’ . Both for historical
and spatial reasons.
The history of Russia in Europe is a century old and has revolved around the problem whether
it was in Europe or not. The irony of geography wanted Peter the Great to give Eur ope the
means to differentiate itself, but the course of history wanted Russia to be a threat. Who acted
as an insider learning European practices and playing with the major European powers,
reserving a place of hono ur at the tables of power. A privilege t hat has never been guaranteed
to Turkey, invited to sit but not to participate.
The peculiarity of Russia lies in the long historical -spatial path that has been produced by the
perception of a request for Europeanization. However, this demand was interpre ted as a
danger by marking Russia as a case on the borders of Europe. Too close to the borders. This
produced a profound uncertainty. The European self could not conceive of whether Russia
was Christian between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; civi l in the eighteenth; reliable
between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the twenty -first century, Russia returns to

438 E. Mortimer, Christianity and Islam , International Affairs (R oyal Institute of International Affairs 1944 -),
Vol. 67, No.
1, Jan 1991, pp. 12 -13,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2621216.pdf?refreqid=exc elsior%3Acc1e383f511405f1b64ed86761c8a73d ,
online access June 30, 2018.

133
the limelight with a charismatic leader who once again proposes a climb to success from the
ruins of the Soviet disintegration. He does so by proposing a vision that again challenges the
European logic of self -determination. After the communism, the Eurasianism is at the gates of
Europe.
“Paul Henri Spaak, il sostenitore belga della politica dell’integrazione europea ed
estensore del Trattato di Roma, ricorda nelle sue memorie i numerosi statisti che
dalla fine della guerra furono onorati del titolo di ‘padre dell’integrazione
europea’. Eppure secondo lui questo titolo apparteneva esclusivamente a uno,
Iosif Stalin ”439
In this case too, European integration develops into a progressive exclusion of Russia.
Russian other is the protagonist of the European debate when it comes to enlarge to the
eastern countries or economics and security. It is the half -millennium legacy of the
representati on of Russia. The problem is that all this also becoming an object of debate on
how Russia sees its European other European. In this context the q uestion of East -Central
Europe become part of the great of integration. The first characteristic is with the T urks
compared to full membership in the European Uni on, Mortimer eloquently explained it:
“the thought of a tide of East European migrants on the whole inspires less alarm,
precisely because it is assumed that their Christian heritage would make them
assim ilable in Western Europe in a way that Muslim North Africans or Turks are
not. And there can be little doubt that this belief lies behind many of the more
technical or circumstantial reasons given for opposing, or at least delaying,
consideration of Turkey ’s candidature for full EC membership”440
But there’s something more. The discourse on Central Europe was born as an appeal to
Europe against Soviet Union . The debate had first set itself as the definition of an area and
then became an imagined community. A debate that involved the greatest intellectuals of those
lands by resounding their positions in Europe because they were forced into exile in the West.
So, the second distinctive feature of Central Europe is surely the construction of someone
who was more to East of them in the European perception. And this was an important element
because Europe responded to that appeal to contain Russia.
The point here is not the difference between Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Central Europe .
Central Europe became a great homogenizer in the eyes of Europe . Although the latter

439 (personal translation H. Mikkeli, Europa. Storia di un’idea e di un’identità , cit., p. 104.
440 E. Mortimer, Christianity and Islam , cit., p. 12

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formalized in a T reaty the exaltation of diversity making it a bulwark of the political rhetor ic
of European governance .
The moral appeal was a double -edged sword. On the one hand, Russia was built li ke the other
of Central Europe to exalt its greater Europeanity compared to the other Russian. This has
engaged us in an analysis of the indeterminacy of the concept as much as the boundaries of a
land blocked in the middle. On the other hand, the moral ap peal has become a political
rhetoric promoting the de -Easternization of those countries (see Poland) in order to approve
the European good practices by renouncing the uniqueness of their own identity. A request for
Identity that today explodes ahead of tim e in the close action of the Visegrá d group. The new
European colonies rebel against colonizing Europe. It seems like a story already seen. This
fact is very important because it leads us to consider how the ethnic and cultural differences
must be politica lly elaborated and therefore made politically relevant. The discussions on the
revision of the Dublin Treaty are a clear example of what we are saying. The language and
thrust of the Central European project are similar to those of nationalism when they tr y to
transform the political field into a battlefield.
Samuel Huntington ’s work titled The clash of civilizations comes to mind. Exclusion and
integration are two sides of the same coin. The core of our study is ‘how’ the process of self –
determination dev elops.
Is the other the price to pay to carry on the integration? In the current international context, it
seems that it imp lies a fairly high price. Analys ing and studying ‘identity ’ should lead us to
understand in order to live or coexist in difference. But not at the expense of others.
In this regard it could be interesting to brush up the speculations of the Italian philosopher
Giorgio Agamben. Kojève has exerted considerable influence in the philosopher' studies. In
fact, it represents a constant seek ing to merge with the politics of globalization. According to
Agamben, speculation on the ‘end of history ’, that presupposes a process of negation , brings
with it a crisis of the ‘state’ or of a ‘well defined order’ .
“[T]oday, it is clear for anyone who is not in absolutely bad faith that there are no
longer historical tasks that can be taken on by, or even simply assigned to, men. It
was in some ways evident starting with the end of the First World War that the
European nation -states were no longer capable of taking on historical tasks and
that peoples the mselves were bound to disappear”441
Moreover, in this context he underlines the Koéjevian dèsoeuvrement of politics:

441 G. Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal , Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, p. 76.

135
“There is politics because human beings are argos -beings that cannot be defined
by any pr oper operation, that is, beings of pure potentiality that no identity or
vocation can possibly exhaust. [. . .] Politics might be nothing other than the
exposition of humankind’s absence of work as well as the exposition of
humankind’s creative semi -indiff erence to any task, and might only in this sense
remain i ntegrally assigned to happiness”442
Basically, the denial grows in the claim to remove the past as historical epoch. As a result , this
implies that we tend to deny ourselves. Better, that a society rej ects the past connected to its
historical and spatial logic. Politics with its rhetoric does not inaugurate a new beginning but
the end. So , all the fanciful theories about the end of the history would not be the prelude to a
new history. Agamben stresses that it is necessary to abandon a form of struggle that
manifests itself in the process of self -determination to make possible a peace that does not
come from a war to end again in a war.443
The problem that is immediately evident is how it is possible to im agine a process of
recognition without the presence of the other. Well, the philosopher maintains that it is enough
to abandon the logic of di fference and define oneself as “ whate ver being” . This kind of self –
determination escapes any pos itive analysis of identity .444
“Whatever singularity, which wants to approp riate belonging itself, its own being –
in-language, and thus rejects all identity and e very condition of belonging, is the
principal enemy of the State ”445
The concept of "Whatever being" will no longer r equire the logic of denial. If we speak of a
state, or of a constituted order, the rule is the same. In fact, according to Agamben, the most
dangerous and damaging thing for a state is not the claim of an identity, but the assimilation
of identity. That is , that humans participate in a process of rec ognition by renouncing identity
for the membership .446
“[O]ne of the few things that can be declared with certainty is that all the peoples
of Europe (and, perhaps, all the peoples of the Earth) have gone bankrupt . Every
people has had its own way of going bankrupt, and certainly it does make a
difference that for the Germans it meant Hitler and Auschwitz, for the Spanish it

442 G. Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics , pp. 141 -142.
443 G. Agamben, Idea of Prose , SUNY Press, NY, 1995, p. 82.
444 G. Agamben, The Coming Community , University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1993, pp. 1 -4.
445 Ivi, p. 86.
446 Ivi, p. 85.

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meant a civ il war, for the French it meant Vichy, fo r other people instead it meant
the qui et and atroci ous 1950s, and for the Serbs it meant the rapes of Omarska; in
the end, what is crucial f or us is only the new task that such a failure has
bequeathed us. Perhaps, it is not even a ccurate to define it as a task, because there
is no longer a pe ople to undertake it. As the Alexandrian poet [C. P. Cavafy] might
say today with a smile: ‘now, at last, we can underst and each other, because you
too have gone bankrupt”447
Agamben claims that the declaration of a bankruptcy would solve the problems of the
othering. This changes the cards on the table. Bankruptcy is the solution that allows to
disconnect the other from its historical -spatial othering practice. By affirming our own failure,
we accept something that happened in the past and that continues to be part of our present. We
make bankruptcy an unequivocal condition of our present.448 Therefore Europe must not deny
the past, but declare its failure. In fact, Agamben challenges the self -sufficiency of
contemporary politics and intellectuals to contribute to the vain search for the ideal self.
We can not escape bankruptcy either in history or in space. Ergo, instead of transcending its
own past through negation, Agamben’ s community assuming its own bankruptcy brings the
otherness towards the self.449
Agamben elaborates an interesting process postulating the en d of the search for the subject’ s
elusion in order to transcend the condition he intends to deny. The self will no longer emerge
in the delimitation of the other, historically and spatially. So, the proce ss of othering will not
represent the failure of recognition. Europe will be able to define itself as fully contemporary
only when a similar process is operating.
In 1991, Danish film director Lars von Trier directed an art drama titled Europa (or Zentrop a).
It take s as a starting point the idea that Europe is in a state of crisis. This film is part of a
trilogy and question the view of history as a series of events that mark out precise boundaries
between the mistakes of the past and the present historica l reality. In the end, the voiceover
narrator resignedly intones :
“You want to wake up… to free yourself of the image o f Europa. But it is not
possible”

447 G. Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics , p. 142.
448 Ivi, pp. 128 -136.
449 Ibidem .

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138

Appendix

In line to our work we wanted to test some people all around Europe and not only
(conside ring the results) about their perceptions and opinion on some international concerns
related to what has been analysed in this research. 108 people completed the survey with a
series of questions whose answers we will examine. It is a limited sample but wi th a wide
perception that could be the first step to deepen these topics with greater interest.
First of all, we ask Sex (Male/Female), Age’s range and Occupation. The 54,6% of the
respondent is female and other 45,4% is male. A good 63% of respondent is placed between
24-34 years old; the 26,9% between 18 -24 years old; the 5,6% between 35 -44 years old and
finally the 4,6% is 45+ years old. About occupation, the 46,3% is a student; the 37% is
employed; the 8,3% is self -employed and other little percentages pertains Homemaker
(2,8%), Unemployed (2,8%) and Other (2,8%). The following three graphics show what we
just explain.

139

After that we ask the Nationality to understand the distribution of the respondents in Europe
and not only, because some of them are from other countries. Even if people from Italy seems
to be the biggest there is a very broad participation: Turkey; Spain; Finland; Belgium;
Germany; Russia; Poland; Bulgary; Ukraine; Greece; Sweden; Slovakia; Switzerland;
Portugal; Latvian; Netherlands; Hungary; UK; Brazil; France and finally Austria.

140
Something else is quite important because we ask to the respondents the following question:
“Thinking about the TV , websites and publications you use for news, which specific news
source do you use most often? And do you generally trust or generally distrust it? ” Basically,
we wanted to understand how much people could be influenced by the media discourse and
how much they are engaged to search and trust news. A lthough many declared to prefer TV
and newspapers, or radio and social media, or independent sources, the most interesting
answers are the following: “ Internet sources, official pages, CNN, BBC, International
Amnesty, official newspapers. I trust them up t o a level, since I always want to be sure about
their content”; “ Helsingin sanomat (the biggest newspaper in Finland) and YLE (the biggest
news producer in Finland) I read the most and mostly trust ”; “Tagesschau, the economist,
france 24, YouTube I general ly trust those sources ”; “ not a single one: cnn.com,
euronews.com, sputniknews.com, liveuamap.com. I distrust each of them generally and try to
compare information”; “Bbc, ANSA, (app); gt 24 Rai, tg la7 (tv) breaking italy (YouTube
channel) I’m used to chec k the piece of news I hear on more than one source”; “ Mostly Swiss
public and some French news source without a high trust but with skepticism”; “ Online
version of newspapers and tv stations – i normally trust them but always take into account
which countr y it comes from ”; “Websites, but I am afraid of fak -news (most of which are
spread out by major newspapers as well) and, ther efore, try to verify varied news”; “ I
generally use information acquired through television, anyway I tend to be judgemental about
it because some of it might be biased ”; “Mass media (Spanish and worldwide), but with a
very skeptical approach”; “ Spanish and Italian journals. I usually read more th an one source
to obtain a more “objective” opinion. I do not trust so much journalism”; a nd so on. The
context is quite interesting because the aim of our work is also going beyond the possible
“induced perception”.
Well, the ‘hot’ section is beginning. We asked to tell which opinion they have about European
Union. The 53,7% of respondents hav e a somewhat favourable opinion about EU; the 34,3% a
very favourable opinion; both somewhat unfavourable and very unfavourable opinion are
represented by the 6,5% of consensus. Well, these results are not surprising us, considering
the age of most part of people involved. The so -called Erasmus Generation. Among them,
Turkish, Belgian, Swiss people have an unfavourable opinion and someone from Italy, Spain
and Poland. About Belgium it is compressible. After the ‘Brussels bombings’, the civil society
is livi ng increasing tensions, especially for the huge presence of Muslim minorities. About
others, there’s something reminding the current political patterns in those countries.

141

Then we asked to tell us if they have a very favo urable, somewhat fa vourable, somewhat
unfavo urable or very unfavo urable opinion about the United States . The reason of this
question is linked to the fact the from the WWII onwards the United States became the most
prominent ally of the European Union deeply influencing the European foreign policy, and
not only. Well, Donald Trump has not completely ‘appeal’ for the young generations (45,4%
somewhat unfavorable and 39,8% very unfavorable). In some sense there is a reason behind
that. Trump talks and works for the old generati ons, even if he is the best Twitter -man in
circulation. Moreover, there is the problem of international relations. Indeed, this aspect
affects the perception of the United States as the major threat in the view of the respondents.
We will see better later.

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Now we continue with the ‘others’ of our research. The respondents told us which opinion
they have about Russia. The 51,9% have a somewhat unfavourable opinion about Russia and
the 22,1% a very unfavourable opinion. The ‘favourable community’ is composed by Turkey,
Switzerland, some from Belgium and Italy. Only one from Spain. ‘Europeans’ have sentenced,
again. Russia cannot emerge as something to see with favourable. The reasons that Turkey
may have to positively recognise Russia could be probab ly linked to the persistent failure of
the possibility to become part of the European Union. Many Turkish politicians stressed the
consequences of European -Turkish talks: Turkey will turn the eyes to the East. Currently,
Russia would welcome Turkey accordi ng its idea of multipolar system in the context of
International relations. This system involved the way to Mediterranean Sea. In Italy, Lega’s
leader Matteo Salvini highlighted the fact the he would want to cancel the sanctions to Russia
and he is one of the Vice Premier in the so -called Yellow -Green government. As we said
before, Belgium is facing serious problems of security and if might see Russia as a potential
ally against the terrorism. Switzerland should historically be neutral

Then, we ask impressions about Turkey. The result is not different. The 46,3% of the
respondents have a somewhat unfavourable opinion and the 26,9% have a very unfavourable
opinion about Turkey. It’s interesting the fact that there is division among Polish re spondents
and it reflects the current political fragmented scenario in Poland. But it is pushed by

143

Hungary. Indeed, people from Hungary see with very favourable opinion Turkey. It is in line
with the self -determination requests of the two countries. Both want to be in Europe as not a
part of assimilating process. The Hungarian president Viktor Orbán is always there in the
corner to remind to Europe the existence of East -Central Europe. Now, the Visegrad Group.
There are also some positive opinions from It aly and Spain.

Finally, we asked the opinions about the Visegrad Group. Respondents are quite divided. The
36,1% of the respondents see with somewhat unfavourable opinion the Visegrad Group; the
12% with very unfavourable opinion; the 41,7% with somewhat favourable opinion and the
10,2% with very favourable opinion. These results exactly recall the idea of the land stuck in
the middle that in our study we define as the Middle -earth.

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Following this approach, we also asked in which percentage these countries represent a threat.
The respondents think that, considering the current international context, Russia is the major
threat for the 36,1%; a minor threat for the 42,6% and not a threat for the 21,3%. The
threatening perception rem ains high and widespread between the respondents. We should also
consider the problem of Islamic Fundamentalism linked to the tragedy of immigration in
Europe. Ironically, Trump he managed to draw attention to himself so much that he made the
United States the worst threat in history. At l east on the basis of these results. Even if the
media are not joking about it.

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Then we collect the opinion about Turkey. For the 68,5% of the respondents, Turkey is the
minor threat; for th e 19,4% the major and for the 12% not a threat. There are some common
features marking Turkey as the declined empire. The question here is when you ask to people
if Turkey should be a member of the European Union. In the second graphic the 45,4% of the
respondents oppose Turkey becoming a European ‘state’ and the 20,4% strongly oppose for a
total of 68,8% against the Turkish membership. Among those who favour the ‘enlargement’
Turkey, Russia, Finland and Belgium. The ‘old’ Europe continues to be shaped by t he never –
ending story about the clash between Christianity and Islam. Although the young age of the
respondents, some cultural marks remain a deep sign of European common heritage.

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History does not change also for the Visegrad Gor up. For the 50% of the respondents it is the
minor threat; for the 16,7% the major threat mainly for Germans respondents; for the 33,3%
not a threat. The question here is why those countries that respected the Copenhagen Criteria
becoming part of that comm unity promoting ‘unity in diversity’ should be threat, even minor.
The answer has been written in time and space. At the beginning, East -Central Europe was the
victim of a ‘totalitarian regime’ should be contained and defeated. Secondly it became the
good student of the European civilisation practices de -orientalizing its process of self –
determination. Today all those features came in a struggle inside and outside Europe.

Last but not least we asked how much the respondents are satisfied wit h the way democracy is
working in their countries. The 47,2% are somewhat satisfied; the 10,2% very satisfied; the
34,3% are not too satisfied and among them Turkey, Italy, Spain, Poland, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Slovakia; the 8,3% are not at all satisfied and a mong them some citizens of those countries
just mentioned. The fact that such a young community perceives such a democratic deficit
does not paint an attractive picture of the European future . Precariousness, economic crisis,
brain drain, immigration, soci al fear radicalize certain opinions. Europe must reflect a lot on
the legacies left to the new ruling classes. Closing in itself in search of an ideal self by closing
one's eyes in the face of the decay of one's own civilization is not the right path to ta ke.

147

Out of curiosity we also asked for an opinion on some leaders. We have chosen the Franco –
German axis represented by Angela Mer kel and Emmanuel Macron on one side and Donald
Trump and Vladimir Putin on the other. Based on the data obtained so far, the answers are
clearly predictable. But at the base of this choice there is a very precise reason or perhaps a
wish. Europe should start on its own, but not the frantic search for an idealization rather than a
realization.

Some confidence to our leadership is not the completely trust. Although the good results of
the European side should be emphasized that a certain confidence is not equivalent to trust in
those who represent us. The phantom of suspicion and intolerance dwells in the inabi lity of a
certain class to turn confidence into trust. That is probably the right point from which to start
again.

148
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