Democratic Scepticism and Political [601758]

Democratic Scepticism and Political
Participation in Europe
JEFFREY A. KARP∗& CAITLIN MILAZZO∗∗
∗University of Exeter;∗∗University of Nottingham
ABSTRACT The former Communist countries of Eastern Europe have markedly lower levels of
voter turnout than Western European countries, which could be a cause for concern if it rep-
resents a rejection of democratic values. In this article, we examine what people think about
democracy and how these attitudes affect their likelihood of participating in the democraticprocess. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems drawn from national
election surveys in 22 countries in Eastern and Western Europe, we find that citizens in
Eastern Europe are more likely to express doubts about democracy and be dissatisfied with
how it works in practice. More importantly, while we demonstrate that attitudes about democ-
racy do affect political participation, they cannot fully account for the low levels of turnoutobserved in post-communist countries. This has implications for our interpretation of the sig-
nificance of low turnout in national elections.
Introduction
Although large proportions of the electorate once embraced early elections in many
post-communist countries, enthusiasm for engaging in the democratic process
appears to have faded. In the first wave of open and competitive elections average
turnout rates were around 80%. Since then, there has been a dramatic decline in
turnout observed in a number of studies (Kostadinova 2003 ; Pacek, Pop-Eleches,
and Tucker 2009 ). Turnout in recent elections appears lower than the rates observed
in Western Europe, where concerns have also been raised about low turnout.1
Some have suggested that the low turnout in post-communist countries represents a
transitional process (Kostadinova 2003 ). A more sobering view is that declining
turnout may represent a rejection of democratic values. Disillusionment with the pol-itical process – stemming from social and economic hardship and perceptions ofelectoral malpractice and widespread corruption – is frequently cited as a potential
cause of declining political engagement (Anderson and Tverdova 2003 ; Birch 2010 ).
In existing literature, reliance on aggregate data makes it difficult to ascertain what
has led individuals in post-communist countries to abstain from the political process.
2
Correspondence Address : Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Rennes Drive,
Exeter, Devon EX4 4RJ, UK. Email: [anonimizat] ,www.jkarp.comJournal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties , 2015
Vol. 25, No. 1, 97–110, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2014.996157
#2015 Elections, Public Opinion & Parties

In this article, we examine how attitudes about democracy affect political behaviour.
We argue that citizens in the newer democracies of post-communist Europe are morelikely to be sceptical of democratic institutions, reducing their willingness to partici-
pate in elections. We refer to these citizens as “demo-sceptics”. Using data from the
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) drawn from national electionsurveys in 22 countries in Eastern and Western Europe, we find about three times
as many demo-sceptics in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. However, while
scepticism about democracy does appear to influence why citizens choose not tovote, it only goes a small way toward explaining the differences in turnout
between East and Western Europe.
Attitudes about Democracy in Eastern Europe
Individuals socialized in communist societies were indoctrinated not to challenge the
actions of government. The question of how deeply ingrained these attitudes are insociety and how quickly citizens acquire democratic attitudes when institutions
change is a matter of some debate. On the one hand, cultural theories assume that atti-
tudes acquired early in life persist over time. Such a view would predict that post-communist culture would be incompatible with democratic institutions and attitudes.
This assumption has been challenged by several studies. Hahn (1991 ) found strong
support for democratic institutions just before the collapse of the Soviet Union par-
ticularly among the young and the better educated. Gibson et al. (1992 ) found evi-
dence of a similar shift in Moscow prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In alater study, Mishler and Rose (2007 ) found evidence for life cycle effects, suggesting
that Russians would quickly acquire democratic attitudes. While Neundorf (2010 )
finds that older generations are less positive about democracy than younger gener-ations, she argues that economic development can lead to changes in democraticvalues. Norris (2011 ) argues that citizens in young liberal democracies, which
include the post-communist countries in Europe, are now strongly committed todemocratic values. Other scholars are not so optimistic. Recent European ValuesStudy surveys suggest that the levels of authoritarianism in most Eastern European
countries have actually increased in the 2000s (de Regt, Smits, and Mortelmans
2011 ).
Citizens in post-communist societies are also likely to distrust democratic insti-
tutions, an attitude that is endemic in authoritarian political cultures (Mishler andRose 2001 ). Such scepticism may be reinforced by perceptions of corrupt practices.
In Russia, post-communist rule is most closely associated with criminality and cor-
ruption. Kostadinova ( 2009 ) suggests that many East Europeans are frustrated with
politicians who come to power just to plunder the state. Of course distrust of poli-
ticians, political parties, and political institutions is not unique to post-communist
Europe. Dalton ( 2004 ) has traced an erosion in political support in virtually all
advanced industrial democracies. Nevertheless, the levels of distrust that have been
observed in Russia and other post-communist countries appear to be far greater
(White and McAllister 2004 ). Studies examining the consequences of scandal and98 J.A. Karp & C. Milazzo

corruption suggest that it does not only affect what people think of specific politicians
but it can also affect attitudes about government (Bowler and Karp 2004 ) and erode
confidence in national institutions (Anderson and Tverdova 2003 ).
These attitudes may be moderated by the degree to which citizens feel they are
better off in a democracy. It is widely assumed that strong economic performancecan help to promote democratization and democratic values. Likewise, economic
adversity is assumed to reduce the capacity of citizens to bear the costs of political
participation if those who lack resources do not have the means to engage meaning-fully in elections. Hopelessness and despair may also discourage the poorest from
participating, which lowers overall turnout (Solt 2008 ). Dissatisfaction with econ-
omic conditions is often cited as an explanation for low turnout in post-communist
societies. For example, Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmaier (2008 ) find that unemploy-
ment explains low turnout in post-communist elections for the European Parliament.Similarly, in their analysis of 137 elections in 19 post-communist national elections,Pacek et al. ( 2009 ) find that high unemployment and high inflation were associated
with lower turnout.
Political competition is widely assumed to be an essential element of democracy. It
is linked to the nature and dynamics of campaigns, media coverage, party systems,
and strategies. Competitive elections are likely to attract quality candidates and trans-
late into greater party mobilization efforts and more media attention (Goidel andShields 1994 ). As a result, competition should stimulate voter interest, enhance pol-
itical efficacy (Karp and Banducci 2008 ), and increase voter turnout (Franklin 2004 ).
Competitive elections are also believed to make representatives more responsive topopular demands (Powell 2000 ). Competition therefore has the potential to
enhance satisfaction with democracy and strengthen democratic values (Pietsch,Miller, and Karp, 2015 ). These expectations would predict that citizens are more
likely to be disengaged and more dissatisfied when elections are not competitive, a
common feature in authoritarian regimes.
This brief review of the literature leads to several expectations. Theories of politi-
cal socialization predict that generational differences, education, and political orien-tations may lead people to accept democratic values and be more supportive of
democratic institutions. By contrast, disillusionment with the economy may leadpeople to reject democracy. Finally, we might also expect political context to
matter. When elections are un-competitive, citizens may be more dissatisfied with
democracy and less supportive of democratic institutions.
Explaining Variation in Democratic Attitudes
To examine these questions, we rely on data from the CSES. The CSES provides a
common module of questions across a range of established and new democracies.
It differs from other cross-national datasets such as the World Values Surveys
because all surveys are administered as part of a post-election wave in a national elec-tion study. Thus, measures such as reported turnout should be more accurate than in
other surveys that rely on recall from a previous election or intended vote in a futureDemocratic Scepticism and Political Participation 99

election. Citizens may also be primed to think more about the democratic process
during an election than at other times when politics is less salient.
The CSES began in 1996 and now provides data from four modules that have been
administered in a number of countries often more than once. While we would like toexamine differences over time within countries, we are limited to Module 2, fieldedbetween 2001 and 2006, the only module to have included a question that allows us to
measure fundamental orientations to democracy. Based on Winston Churchill’s
famous line, this question asks respondents to consider the statement, “Democracymay have problems but it’s better than any other form of government”. Possible
responses include “agree strongly”, “agree”, “disagree”, or “disagree strongly”.
Concerns have been raised about the validity of questions that measure abstract
concepts without specifying any of their concrete attributes. Respondents may under-stand that democracy is a good thing without being able to specify what it is supposed
to represent. This may lead more people to support democracy as an abstract concept(Schedler and Sarsfield 2007 ). Also, the question does not pose an alternative to
democracy so we can only assume that responses reflect scepticism about democracy.Nevertheless it is reasonable to assume that East Europeans, who have experiencedauthoritarian rule, may use that as a benchmark when answering the question.
The CSES also includes an item meant to capture attitudes about democratic per-
formance , which is theoretically distinct from attitudes about democracy. Many
studies have shown that citizens express strong support for the principles of democ-
racy while at the same time expressing discontent with the way democracy works in
practice (Klingemann 1999 ; Lagos 2003 ). The CSES question reads, “On the whole,
are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the
way democracy works in [country X]?” This question is frequently asked in cross-
national studies and assumed to be an indicator of the diffuse support necessaryfor building legitimacy (Klingemann 1999 ). Although concerns have been raised
about its validity, it nevertheless is assumed to capture attitudes towards democraticpractices and performance distinct from democratic aspirations.
Table 1 shows how the responses to both of these items are distributed across a
sample of 22 countries in Europe.
3The figures represent the percentage of all respon-
dents who “disagree” or “strongly disagree” and the percentage of respondents whowere “not very satisfied” or “not at all satisfied”. Of the respondents surveyed in the
Western European countries, only 6% expressed doubt as to whether democracy is
the best form of government, compared with 18% in the post-communist countriesof Eastern Europe. Italy is the only Western European country where the percentage
of demo-sceptics exceeds 11% while Albania is the only country in Eastern Europe
below 11%. The responses suggest that a considerable proportion of citizens in thepost-communist countries remain sceptical about democracy. Far more people
express dissatisfaction with the way democracy works. Across both regions, 42%
of respondents indicate that they are dissatisfied with this aspect of democracy.However, as in the case with scepticism about democracy, the level of dissatisfaction
in the post-communist countries is far greater, with nearly two-thirds expressing dis-
satisfaction, compared to 33% in the established democracies of Western Europe. The100 J.A. Karp & C. Milazzo

percentage of respondents who indicate that they are dissatisfied with the way democ-
racy works ranges from 7% in Denmark to 79% in Bulgaria, and once again, Italy isthe only Western European country amongst those counties with the highest
percentages.
We test several hypotheses in order to examine why citizens in the post-communist
countries of Eastern Europe are more likely to be sceptical about democracy and dis-satisfied with democratic performance. As discussed above, various studies have
found that older citizens socialized under communism are likely to hold quite differ-ent views about democracy than younger citizens. However, these studies often reach
different conclusions about the nature of these generational differences, with some
suggesting that younger citizens are more likely to embrace democratic attitudeswhile others suggest that younger citizens are more sceptical about democracy.
We examine these generational differences by relying on the age of the respondent.
4
In addition, we include measures of ideological orientation measured by dichotomousTable 1. Attitudes about democracy in Eastern and Western Europe (%)
CountrySceptical about
democracyDissatisfaction with
democratic performanceSceptical and
dissatisfied
All 10 42 7
Eastern Europe
All 18 62 15Bulgaria 32 79 31
Russia 28 67 24
Hungary 18 53 14
Czech Republic 16 54 10
Poland 15 60 14Slovenia 15 61 13
Romania 13 56 10
Albania 3 64 3
Western Europe
All 6 33 4Italy 18 61 15
Germany 11 49 9
France 10 44 8Finland 9 30 6
Britain 9 28 6
Portugal 6 51 4
Ireland 5 18 3
Spain 4 22 1Norway 4 22 2
Switzerland 3 23 3
Sweden 3 23 2
Denmark 3 7 1
Iceland 2 30 2The Netherlands 1 34 1Democratic Scepticism and Political Participation 101

variables that capture whether citizens place themselves on the right or the left of the
ideological spectrum.5We also capture a respondent’s ideological extremism by
including a variable that measures the respondent’s distance from the median voter
in her country to test whether ideology is the source of dissatisfaction. Attitudes
about democracy are also likely to be affected by economic conditions. Those withthe lowest levels of income are assumed to be the most vulnerable to economic
forces. We include two dichotomous variables that capture whether the respondent
fell into the highest or lowest income quintile in their country.
6
In addition to individual-level characteristics, we examine whether electoral
context affects attitudes about the democratic process. We hypothesize that citizensare more supportive of democracy and more engaged when elections are competitive,relying on a measure of competitiveness that measures the overall margin of victory
for the largest party over the second largest. Higher values are associated with less
competition. To take into account differences in the saliency of elections, we alsocontrol for whether the contest was only a presidential election. Finally, we control
for whether a respondent is from Eastern Europe to capture any remaining differences
that can be attributed to the legacy of communism.
7
Given that (a) our dependent variables comprise multiple ordered categories and
(b) that our data are hierarchical in nature (i.e. citizens nested within countries), weestimate two multilevel ordered logit models. These allow us to correct for depen-dence of observations within countries (i.e. intra-class correlation) by estimating
random intercepts for each country.
Results
Table 2 presents the results of the ordered logit multilevel models, where the
dependent variables are the extent to which a citizen holds authoritarian attitudes
and the extent to which a citizen expresses dissatisfaction with democracy. The
results confirm that there are substantial attitudinal differences between citizens inEastern and Western Europe; the average level of scepticism with democracy
and overall dissatisfaction in Eastern Europe are nearly 1 point higher on a 4-point
scale.
The results also provide mixed evidence regarding other determinants of demo-
cratic attitudes.
8We find that younger citizens are more sceptical about democracy
than older citizens who were socialized under different norms, similar to Denemark,Donovan, and Niemi ( 2012 ) who examined generational differences in Europe and
Anglo-America and found that the youngest cohorts were inclined not to value demo-cratic principles and practices as much as older cohorts. However, younger citizensare less likely to be dissatisfied with democratic processes than older citizens.
Those who place themselves on the right side of the ideological spectrum are less
likely to be sceptical about democratic structures and are more satisfied with thedemocratic process than those who place themselves in the centre. In contrast,
those on the left are more dissatisfied with the democratic process than those in the102 J.A. Karp & C. Milazzo

centre. Ideological extremism does not appear to have an influence on authoritarian
values or dissatisfaction with democracy.
We find results that are more consistent with expectations with respect to education
and economic dislocation. Those with a high level of education and high-incomeearners are more likely to express strong support for democracy while those whohave lower levels of education and low incomes are more sceptical. Finally, a lack
of electoral competitiveness (i.e. when the largest party secures a larger margin of
victory) is associated with greater scepticism about democracy but is nonethelessassociated with greater satisfaction with process. Presidential elections are also
associated with greater scepticism about democracy and greater dissatisfaction with
democratic performance.
Attitudes about Democracy and Turning out to Vote
As the results in Table 2 show, citizens in the post-communist countries in Eastern
Europe are more sceptical about democracy and more dissatisfied with democraticTable 2. Multilevel ordered logit models of attitudes towards democracy
Scepticism with
democracyDissatisfaction with
democratic performance
Coef Std. Error Coef Std. Error
Eastern Europe 0.93∗∗(0.05) 0.86∗∗(0.03)
Age (in 10s) 20.04∗∗(0.01) 0.02∗∗(0.01)
Left 0.04 (0.05) 0.12∗∗(0.05)
Right 20.28∗∗(0.05) 20.26∗∗(0.04)
Distance from median voter 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Low income 0.22∗∗(0.04) 0.11∗∗(0.03)
High income 20.37∗∗(0.04) 20.29∗∗(0.03)
University degree 20.65∗∗(0.04) 20.17∗∗(0.04)
Female 0.18∗∗(0.03) 0.05∗(0.03)
Margin of victory (largest party) 0.02∗∗(0.00) 20.01∗∗(0.00)
Presidential 0.52∗∗(0.05) 0.80∗∗(0.04)
Intercept 1 0.02∗∗(0.05) 22.06∗∗(0.05)
Intercept 2 2.84∗∗(0.05) 1.08∗∗(0.05)
Intercept 3 4.34∗∗(0.07) 3.13∗∗(0.05)
Random effectsVariance component 0.05 1.02Log-likelihood 221,288 225,029
N(Respondents) 23,673 23,991
N(Countries) 22 22
Notes : The dependent variables comprise four, ordered categories, where higher numbers
indicate that a respondent expressed less support for democracy and greater dissatisfaction withdemocracy. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
∗p,0.05.
∗∗p,0.01.Democratic Scepticism and Political Participation 103

performance. While we assume that scepticism about democracy will make citizens
less likely to vote, we do not have any clear expectations about the effects of dissa-tisfaction with democratic performance. On the one hand, citizens who are dissatis-
fied may withdraw from the political process. On the other hand, discontented
citizens may be more motivated to participate. Norris (1999 ) has argued that citizens
who are critical of democratic performance are more engaged in the political process.
It is unclear, however, whether these attitudes affect the decision to vote or whether
attitudes about democracy have a different impact in different contexts.
To examine these questions, we rely on a measure of reported turnout in the
national election. A common problem with measuring voter participation is thatnon-voters may be motivated to give a socially desirable response and reportvoting when they have not (Karp and Brockington 2005 ). While the CSES advised
collaborators to ask questions that minimized over-reporting, there is no way to ascer-tain whether such efforts were successful. To deal with this issue, we estimate themodels with data that are weighted to reflect estimates of actual voter turnout. If atti-
tudes about democracy alter the incentives for voter participation, then we should see
a negative coefficient associated with these variables (i.e. citizens with unfavourableattitudes towards democracy should be less likely to vote). To examine whether these
effects are stronger in Eastern Europe, we estimate a second model with interaction
terms.
Beyond these key variables, we also control for several alternative individual-level
explanations for voter turnout. Past research has shown that voters with strong partyattachments are generally more involved in the political process, more interested, andmore likely to vote (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978 ). Partisanship can also engender
greater support for the political system which may be particularly helpful to theprocess of democratization (Vidal et al. 2010 ). Some early studies suggest that citi-
zens in emerging democracies are likely to have weak party preferences, largely
because citizens have had less opportunity to accumulate electoral learning –both
from their parents and from their own repeated experience in elections (Dalton andWeldon 2007 ). The legacy of communism may also have contributed to a greater
sense of scepticism about politicians and political parties, leading many citizens todevelop strong negative feelings about political parties (Rose and Mishler 1998 ).
Early empirical studies in Russia and Eastern Europe supported this view, finding
few party identifiers and more people with multiple attachments (White, Rose, and
McAllister 1997 ; Chiru and Gherghina 2011 ). In contrast, other studies of post-
Soviet citizens indicate that citizens are rapidly developing a sense of party attach-
ment at the same time that they express negative judgements about how the political
parties are operating more generally (Miller and Klobucar 2000 ). To measure party
attachment, we rely on a series of questions where respondents are asked to evaluate
up to six political parties on a 10-point scale ranging from “strongly dislike” to
“strongly like”. Our measure is the maximum value that the respondent ascribed toone or more parties.
Beyond party attachment, we control for several other factors that might explain a
respondent’s decision to turn out to vote. First, it is well known that respondents are104 J.A. Karp & C. Milazzo

more likely to vote when they are contacted by a political party (Karp and Banducci
2007 ). Second, as already mentioned, political and economic disenchantment may
explain lower levels of turnout. We measure economic disenchantment using two
variables. Perceptions of Corruption captures the extent to which the respondent
believes that corruption is widespread in his or her country. This variable ranges
from 0 (the respondent believes that it hardly happens at all) to 3 (the respondent
believes that corruption is “very widespread”). We also rely on a measure asking
respondents whether they approve or disapprove of government performance.9
Government Job Approval ranges from 0 (the respondent believes the government
has done “a very bad job”) to 3 (the respondent believes it has done “a very goodjob”). Third, we also control for a variety of individual-level characteristics thatmay affect voter turnout, including citizens’ distance from the median voter in
their country, income, education, age, gender, and whether they are married.
Finally, we control for the competitiveness of elections measured by the percentageof votes that differentiated the largest party from its nearest rival along with whether
the election was only presidential.
Results
The results are presented in Table 3 . Attitudes about democracy emerge as one of the
primary explanatory factors. In comparison, concerns about corruption exert less
influence. However, even after controlling for these various factors, citizens in
Eastern Europe are less likely to vote than those in Western Europe. While attitudes
towards democracy are significant predictors of voting across Europe, they cannotexplain the differences in voter turnout between the two regions. This means that
there is something else that is either not taken into account in the model or not prop-
erly measured that is depressing turnout in the post-communist countries. Moreover,as the results in model 2 show, none of the interaction terms are statistically signifi-
cant, indicating that the effects of democratic scepticism are not any stronger in the
post-communist countries.
To ease the interpretation of the coefficients, Table 4 reports the estimated prob-
abilities of voting for an Eastern European for each of the independent variables attheir minimum and maximum values, holding all other variables constant at theirmeans and modes. As Table 4 indicates, all other things being equal, the average
citizen in Eastern Europe has a probability of voting that is 0.14 lower than anaverage citizen in Western Europe. The average Eastern European citizen who isthe most sceptical about democracy has a probability of voting of just 0.40. The like-
lihood of voting increases to 0.57 for the same citizen who is the most supportive of
democracy. Dissatisfaction with democratic performance can also reduce the likeli-hood of voting. These effects are stronger than the effects of a university education
or party mobilization, which increase an average citizen’s probability of voting by
0.11 and 0.10, respectively.
We can use these estimates to simulate the effects on overall turnout by taking into
account the overall proportions in democratic attitudes (see Table 2 ). AssumingDemocratic Scepticism and Political Participation 105

everyone had the same characteristics, the model predicts that democratic scepticism
across Eastern Europe contributes to a maximum loss of turnout of about 3%.10In
Bulgaria where 32% of the electorate is sceptical about democracy, the loss is
nearly 6%. If one takes into account the joint effects of scepticism and dissatisfaction
with democracy, then the overall effect on turnout is more substantial but still doesnot approach the gap in turnout between West and Eastern Europe of 15%.
Beyond these attitudes, we find that party attachment and age are strong predictors
of voting behaviour; respondents with strong party attachments, and those who werecontacted by a party or a candidate, are more likely to turn out to vote. Older citizens,
those who hold a university degree, and citizens who are further from the median
voter in their country are all more likely to report that they voted. While there areno meaningful differences between affluent citizens and those who fall in theTable 3. Multilevel logit models of voter participation
Model 1 Model 2
Coef Std. Error Coef Std. Error
Eastern Europe 20.60∗(0.30) 20.79∗(0.32)
Demo-scepticism 20.23∗∗(0.03) 20.24∗∗(0.04)
Democratic performance 20.12∗∗(0.03) 20.15∗∗(0.03)
Government job approval 0.06 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03)
Perceptions of corruption 20.11∗∗(0.03) 20.10∗∗(0.03)
Party contact 0.40∗∗(0.05) 0.40∗∗(0.05)
Party preference 0.21∗∗(0.01) 0.21∗∗(0.01)
Age (in 10s) 0.22∗∗(0.01) 0.22∗∗(0.01)
Distance from median voter 0.04∗∗(0.01) 0.04∗∗(0.01)
Low Income 20.41∗∗(0.05) 20.41∗∗(0.05)
High income 0.07 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05)University degree 0.47
∗∗(0.06) 0.47∗∗(0.06)
Female 20.01 (0.04) 20.01 (0.04)
Married 0.27∗∗(0.04) 0.27∗∗(0.04)
Margin of victory (largest party) 20.00 (0.01) 20.00 (0.01)
Presidential 0.50 (0.42) 0.48 (0.42)Demo-scepticism
∗Eastern Europe 0.03 (0.06)
Democratic performance∗Eastern Europe 0.10 (0.05)
Intercept 21.11∗∗(0.22) 21.05∗∗(0.22)
Random effects
Variance component 0.42 0.43
Log-likelihood 29549 29546
N(Respondents) 19,797 19,797
N(Countries) 22 22
Notes : The dependent variable is dichotomous and captures whether the respondent reported
that they voted in the election (or not). Reported turnout and abstention are weighted by theactual rates of turnout and abstention in each country. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
∗p,0.05.
∗∗p,0.01.106 J.A. Karp & C. Milazzo

middle income quintiles, citizens with the lowest incomes are more likely to abstain.
Interestingly, government job approval, which is known to vary with economic con-
ditions and which is frequently used in aggregate level analyses, appears to have noeffect on the likelihood of turning out to vote.
Discussion
The findings presented above suggest that many citizens in Eastern Europe remain
sceptical about democracy. However, perceptions of corruption and economic perform-
ance do not appear to explain why citizens in post-communist countries abstain from
the political process. Instead, the lack of participation is linked to scepticism aboutdemocracy. This is a particular problem in post-communist societies where more citi-
zens are sceptical and democracy is fragile. While they are in a minority, the fact that
scepticism is more prevalent in Eastern Europe raises concerns about the long-termconsequences for democratic consolidation. Shin and Wells ( 2005 ) argue that tran-
sitions to democracy may be threatened when authoritarian orientations coexist withdemocratic ones (see also Pietsch, 2015 ). However, as Dalton ( 1994 ) notes, citizens
in post-communist Europe were socialized under systems that mixed democratic and
authoritarian attitudes. One of the problems with measuring democracy as a concept
is that it may contain conflicting values (see Gibson 1996 ) and its core meaning may
vary across countries. This should make us somewhat cautious about what kinds of
inferences we can draw from these data.Table 4. Predicted probability of voting
Minimum Maximum Change
Eastern Europe 0.68 0.54 20.14
Demo-scepticism 0.57 0.40 20.17
Democratic performance 0.69 0.49 20.20
Government job approval 0.51 0.56 0.04
Perceptions of corruption 0.59 0.50 20.08
Party contact 0.52 0.61 0.10Party preference 0.18 0.65 0.46
Age (in 10s) 0.38 0.79 0.42
Distance from median voter 0.52 0.58 0.06Income (low) 0.63 0.54 20.10
Income (high) 0.54 0.55 0.02University degree 0.54 0.65 0.11
Female 0.54 0.52 20.02
Married 0.54 0.60 0.07
Margin of victory (largest party) 0.56 0.49 20.06
Presidential 0.54 0.66 0.12
Note: Probabilities derived from Table 3 (Model 1) holding all other
variables constant at their means and modes.Democratic Scepticism and Political Participation 107

Our results also have implications for larger debates about the consequences of
democratic performance. Clearly, many people remain dissatisfied with the way
democracy works even where support for democracy remains strong. We have also
seen that economic considerations can have an effect on these attitudes, which
suggests that the path to democracy may depend in part on how governmentsrespond to economic challenges. Ideological differences also appear to be a factor
with those on the left in post-communist countries being more sceptical of democracy
and more likely to be dissatisfied with democratic performance.
The consequences of this dissatisfaction remain subject to debate. On the one hand,
Norris acknowledges that “critical citizens” may support democracy yet at the sametime remain deeply sceptical about performance (Norris 2011 , 4–5). She argues that
critical citizens are a positive force for democracy because they are actively involved
in the political process. But the evidence presented here suggests that citizens who
remain dissatisfied are more likely to abstain from the political process at least interms of conventional participation, even if the negative effects of dissatisfaction
for the average citizen are not as strong as those of democratic scepticism.
Many scholars have expressed concerns about the low rates of voter turnout that
have been observed in Eastern Europe. While we have demonstrated that a linkexists between these attitudes and political behaviour, this cannot explain why
overall turnout is substantially lower in the post-communist countries. While thereare segments in the society who are sceptical about democracy, the majority of citizens
in post-communist countries fully support democracy and yet are still less likely to vote
than citizens in Western Europe. Even if we were to find that one out of every twodemo-sceptic citizens would abstain from voting we could still not fully explain the
gap in turnout of nearly 15% between East and West Europe. This suggests that con-
cerns that low turnout may represent a rejection of democratic values is unwarranted.We have also ruled out other popular explanations, such as perceptions of corruption
and economic malaise as well as contextual factors such as electoral competition.
Our findings suggest that low turnout in post-communist countries is due to factorsas yet unmeasured. Solving this puzzle will require further investigation.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Mark Franklin, Pippa Norris, Arthur Spirling and members of
the Electoral Integrity Project at the University of Sydney for helpful comments.
Funding
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number RES-239-25-0032].
Notes
1. For comparisons of turnout in national elections across European countries see www.jkarp.com/jepop .
2. Notable exceptions include Kostadinova ( 2009 ).108 J.A. Karp & C. Milazzo

3. See www.jkarp.com/jepop for a list of the election studies included in the sample along with an illus-
tration of how these attitudes vary by country.
4. Unfortunately with cross-sectional data, it is not possible to disentangle the generational differences
hypothesized above from simple life cycle effects.
5. The reference category includes respondents who self-place in the middle of the ideological spectrum.
6. The reference category includes respondents who fall into the middle three income quintiles.
7. Mean values of all of our variables for each region, as well as the average across regions are available at
www.jkarp.com/jepop/ .
8. Note here that positive coefficients indicate that a characteristic is associated with more scepticism
about democracy or greater dissatisfaction with democratic performance, while negative coefficients
indicate that the characteristic is associated with more democratic attitudes and greater satisfaction
with democracy.
9. Direct measures of economic performance are not available in Module 2 of the CSES.
10. The estimate is obtained by multiplying the change in probability by the overall distribution. Of course,
not everyone is identical. Comparable census data across countries are needed to provide more precise
estimates.
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