culture: a perpetual challenge or an opportunity for Romanian companies? Roland Iosif Morar u 1 * , Gabriel Bujor B [631727]

Safety
culture: a perpetual challenge or an
opportunity for Romanian companies?

Roland Iosif
Morar
u
1
*
,
Gabriel Bujor
B
ǎbuț
1
,

Lucian
–
Ionel
Cioca
2
,

Mihai
Popescu
–
Stelea
1
,
and
Victor
–
Gabriel

Vasilescu
1

1
University of Petroșani, Faculty of Mines, Department
of Management and Industrial Engineering,
University Street, number 20, Petrosani, Romania

2
"Lucian Blaga" University of Sibiu, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Industrial Engineering
and Management

Abstract.

The main objective of the paper is to ana
lyze the safety culture
in order to understand how theory and practice can be integrated to
improve safety performance and related economic outcomes. The research
includes the synthesis of systematic studies on safety culture and the
factors that influence
the relationship between organizational culture and
safety behavior. In a global manner, the results obtained generate relevant
insights into how safety culture can be theoretically systematized and
provide a series of recommendations that can guide the d
evelopment of
future safety culture interventions. Finally, a framework is proposed for an
in
–
depth understanding of all the implications of safety culture in the
practice of Romanian companies.

1

Introduction

European companies of all types achieved sign
ificant improvements in terms of safety and
health (OSH) in recent decades. These improvements are due in part to the recognition by
employers that taking an active leading role in terms of safety and health is important not
only for legal or ethical reaso
ns, but also for commercial reasons. On the other hand, every
year, over 5 500 people die in the EU from work accidents, and another 159 000 people die
as a result of occupational diseases
[1]
. EU companies lose about 143 million workdays
each year due to
workplace accidents. Estimates vary, but such accidents and illnesses are
to cost the EU economy at least 490 billion Euros a year
[2]
.

First, employers must promote a
culture of health and safety to support employee
participation
.
Workers, however, should
not limit their cooperation only to passive
participation and compliance with security rules. If workers wish to obtain the strongest
protection for their health and safety, they should use all the modalities of participation in
the workplace.

The main go
al of this study is to analyze the safety culture in order to understand how
theory and practice can be integrated to improve safety culture and related economic
results. The research includes studies of the safety culture concept, factors that influence t
he

*

Corresponding author:
[anonimizat]

relationship between organizational culture and safety behavior and examine the
differences in perception of safety culture in organizations. Globally, the results will
generate relevant insight on how safety culture can be systematized theoretically an
d can
provide a series of recommendations to guide the development of future interventions on
safety culture.

We aim to answer some basic questions to deepen the theme: Is the work safety culture
important? For whom could it be important? And how is it app
licable? How does it work in
organizations? What are the key parts of the equation and how can we apply them at best to
continuously improve the working environment in a systematic and uniform way?
Cumulating the responses to this question, we tried be abl
e to setup a framework for in
–
depth understanding of all the implications of OSH culture in practice.

2 Literature review

During the last 35 years, researchers demonstrated the increasing interest in the concept of
safety culture due to its impact on safet
y results. Following several major disasters in the
areas of nuclear, offshore drilling, and mining processes, safety culture was identified as a
critical concept for organizations aimed at reducing on systematic bases the safety incidents
in the workplace
[3]
.

Researchers of safety culture in the workplace tend to use one of the existing two main
approaches: interpretative or functionalist
[4]
. The
interpretative vision
considers culture as
being an emergent property, which is a complex result generated b
y all employees, not just
by top managers, and that culture
cannot
be "developed" fast, but it evolves through
organizational learning in time
[5]
.

Instead, the functionalist school sees culture as something that can be “manipulated”
deliberately by manag
ement to support corporate interests and is largely generated by a top
–
down approach
[6,7]
. For example, a functionalist approach to culture should be reflected
in comprehensive risk management processes, while an interpretative approach can focus
on dev
eloping the shared vision and identity of the organization’s members.

Safety culture subsumes and appeals to a number of different disciplines of study and
therefore remains a fragmented and confusing concept, insofar as there is currently no
universally a
ccepted definition

[8]
.
[9]
d
escribes
the concept of safety culture as
ambiguous, with definitions often unclear and inconsistently applied.

In terms of safety culture content, we retain an approach derived from organizational
culture theorists, selected
culture is described as having three distinct layers, namely, basic
assumptions (core), shared values
(middle); and artifacts (outer layer)
[10,11]
. Each layer
differs in terms of external visibility and awareness of its members selected, in the outer
layers being easier to identify and measure through specific research tools. Guldenmund
suggests a cau
sal link between layers, using the most common terms of safety culture,
safety climate and safety behavior. This causal link considers the combination of safety
perceptions of individuals (
safety climate
) a consequence of the underlying assumptions of
the
members of an organization (
safety culture
). Early empirical research on safety culture
and climate focused on exploring their multi
–
dimensional nature
[12, 13]
. In one of the
earliest studies on safety climate,

Zohar
, in year 1980,
proposed a model with e
ight factors,
which was later tested and refined in a three
–
factor model
[12]
.

Various meanings were attributed to the safety culture concept, generating a lot of

definitions [14
–
16
]
. Nevertheless, most of them are broad and implicit
[10]
. We can state
th
at there is no unanimously accepted definition. Previous studies have shown that
management commitment to safety represents a determining factor of employees'
attitudes/behaviors related
to risk [5, 8]
.

3 Safety culture. What is it?

The lack of clarity aro
und the concept of safety culture renders developing and
implementing a safety culture increasingly difficult, so many important scholars of the field
focuses on the concept of "climate". Some definitions frequently cited in the literature are
shown in Tab
le 1.

Table 1.
Highly cited definitions of “safety culture”

Crt.
No.

Reference

Definition

1
.

Uttal (1983)

"common values and beliefs which interacts with an organisation
structures and control systems to produce norms of behavior."

2
.

Cox & Cox
(1991)

"safet
y culture reflect the attitudes, beliefs, values that employees
share them in relation to
safety
".

3
.

IAEA (1991)

“set of characteristics and attitudes of organizations and individuals
who set as a first
–
rate priority that the safety issues of nuclear pla
nts
will receive the attention guaranteed by their importance”

4
.

Pidgeon
(1991)

“set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and social and technical
practices aimed at minimizing the exposure of employees, managers,
clients and members of the public to condit
ions considered
dangerous or harmful”

5
.

Geller (1994)

“in a total safety culture, everyone feels responsible for safety and
pursues it as an ongoing goal”

6
.

Reason
(2000)

“an ideal safety culture is the engine that continues to propel the
system towards he
alth and safety objective, regardless of personality
or leadership of current commercial concerns. "

7
.

Cooper
(2000)

"that the observable effort degree by which all members of the
organization keeps the attention of and action by the continuous
improvement
of safety".

8
.

Guldenmund
(2000)

"aspects of organizational culture that will impact on attitudes and
behaviors related to increase/reduce the risk."

9
.

Hale (2000)

“common attitudes, beliefs and perceptions shared by natural groups,
defining norms and va
lues
that determine how they act and react to
risks and risk control systems”

10
.

Mohammed
(2003)

“a sub
–
facet of organizational culture that affects the attitudes and
behavior of workers in relation to an organization's continuing safety
performance”

Analyzin
g the definitions listed in Table 1, it becomes clear that many scientists
understand the safety culture that is intrinsically linked to organizational culture, and the
definitions are therefore quasi
–
similar to the corresponding definitions of organizat
ional
culture
[10, 15, 17, 18
]
. Some definitions s
pecific put emphasis on safet
y [
7, 19
]
and others
indicate daily effort required to maintain safety standards
[14,
20
]
.

4
Safety culture and management of uncer
tainty. A model
proposal for Romania

Although
the main role detained by organizational culture in directing an organization’s
success or failure, one can find no apparent consensus on describing the culture of any

organization [10]
. Moreover, unsolved discussion persists as to whether organizations
ha
ve
or
are
a culture
[21
]
.

Consequently, it is hardly surprising that no acknowledged model of
the safety culture exists. Evolutionary multifaceted and change management models of
safety culture are reflecting the individual and organizational change and ma
turity level
in
terms of safety management [
3, 22
–
24]
. T
his approach is less focused on culture content

and on mapping safety culture results, but aims to describe how individuals and
organizations go through stages of change in terms of their approach to
safety and risk
management.

Hudson
[25
]
proposes a model describing a hierarchy of cultural refinement in terms of
safety. As shown in Figure 1, Hudson suggests that high levels of information and trust are
critical for organizations to reach a mature saf
ety culture in which safety values
are
integrated in the organization’s philosophy and business practices.

Fig. 1.
Evolutionary safety culture maturity model
[25]

The development was based on
[26]
typology on three levels of culture
–
pathologic
al
bure
aucratic and generative
–
and
[7]
, who proposed the extension, including two additional
levels, reactive and proactive. Hudson also applied this model (renamed "the safety culture
ladder", 2007) to the implementation of safety culture in a major multinatio
nal oil
company. Known as the "Hearts and Minds" project, Hudson used the OSH culture scale as
a tool for consultation to gain support from senior management in developing a culture of
safety and to monitor progress over time.

In terms of individual behavi
or,
[27]
believes that individual safety performance should
be composed of two components:
safety compliance
safety and
safety participation
.
Safety
compliance
refers to people adhering to safety procedures and to conduct operations in a
safe manner, while

participation
refers to helping co
–
workers, promotion of the safety at
work, demonstrating initiative and submitting effo
rts to improve workplace safety

[2
8
, 29
]
Namely, safety compliance can be considered a core activity for the safety of an individual,
while participation in involves a behavioral conduct that has no direct impact on the safety
of an individual, but contribute to the development of an environment that supports long
–
term security ( Figure 2).

Fig. 2.

Safety performance framework

From thi
s point of view the discussion of safety culture appears in a new light. Culture
from this perspective is considered more as a tool to provide enough
coordination/integration of otherwise autonomous activities than as a general assurance of
the core value
of safety. This thinking can be sketched in a socio
–
technical safety culture

model. Connecting safety management systems, organizational culture, and socio
–
technical
systems design in the manner suggested in Figure 3, helps to surpass shortcomings of
exist
ing safety culture models in order to apply them in Romanian organizations.

Fig. 3.
Safety culture model from socio
–
technical perspective

In view of this simple model, we propose a series of indicators to measure safety culture
of any organization, as fo
llows:

a.
Proactive approach in promoting safety



Strategic and/or operational safety goals for all company departments;



Resource planning for promotion of safety;



Measuring negative and positive safety indicators;



Institutionalized continuous improvement;



Adapted change management for positive organizational change.

b.
Socially and technically integrated system’s design



Task
–
adequate technical and organizational safety systems;



Self
–
regulation in small control loops;



Worker’s individual motivation through
orientation of working task;



Safe technical systems.

c.
Actions with consciousness value



Individual/collective actions reflecting safety awareness;



Reflection on the equilibrium between centralized and decentralized autonomy and
control;



Participative deci
sion
–
making and change processes;



Freedom in questioning attitudes regarding practices and/or guidelines.

On this basis, more detailed safety culture indicators can be derived, to develop a
questionnaire to support safety management and safety culture audi
ts in Romanian
companies.

5 Are behavior based safety and safety culture change
divergent?

Two distinct approaches to OHS management have generated a significant amount of
debate or even controversy during the last 15 years. Behavior
–
based safety (BBS) is
focused on the identification and modification of critical safety behaviors, emphasizing
how such behaviors are connected to workplace injuries. The second approach emphasizes
the basic importance of the safety culture and how it shapes/influences safety b
ehaviors and
the effectiveness of safety programs.

BBS management is basically an extension of applied behavior analysis, seen as a
continuous process. Culture change approaches come largely from management and
organizational behavior theory. Table 2 gives
a synthesis of main features of the two
approaches.

Table 2.
Synthesis of main features of BBS and safety culture change

Feature

BBS

Safety culture change

Origin

Psichology/behavior modification

Organizational behavior

Bottom
–
up

Top
–
down

An
alytic

Intuitive

Setting specific

Setting specific

Key apects

Continuous process

Self
–
sustained process

Critical behaviors identification

Assess values, beliefs, assumptions

Set performance goals

Plan alternative vision

Observe behav
iors

Work to implement change
(leadership and workers)

Implementation
(typical)

Feed
–
back/reinforcement

Specific technology

Emphasize organizational change

Empirical/objective

Focus
on basic causes

Frontline workers focus

Participatory (often)

Main strenghts

Participator
y (usual)

Comprehensive

Victim blaming

Diffuse technology

Minimizes environment

Subjective/intuitive

Main weaknesess

Focus on immediate causes

Indirect

First of all, behavior change and culture change are intervention strategies aimed at
improving sa
fety performance. Workplace injury causation is frequently described as a
sequence of stages. As highlighted in Figure 4, exposures, ( unsafe conditions and/or unsafe
behaviors), represent the immediate causes of most workplace accidents.

Fig. 4.
Safety
management. A sequential model

Despite that BBS and safety culture change may agree on the benefits of achieving a
positive and participatory culture for safety, they obviously differ on how this target can be
achieved. But they can be considered complemen
tary to the extent that their respective
strengths can be joined and their disadvantages minimized or eliminated.

It should be possible to highlight the culture change process in terms of stages that
could be monitored and used to measure progress/impact.
Figure 5 gives a map of these two
tasks and emphasize this integration.

Improving the organizational safety culture can be
considered to be a significant outcome for both for BBS and for culture change approaches.
The culture change process related to the
integrative approach presented in Figure 5 is more
comprehensive in problem identification, data
–
based, open
e
d and participatory in
implementation. The improvement process can originate both at the top or at the bottom of
the organization, so it could rep
res
e
nt a starting point for Romanian organizations.

Fig. 5.
Roadmap of the integrative approach to OHS safety management: a proposal for Romanian
companies

6 Conclusion

Presently, there is large recognition in the literature that safety culture is a bas
ic element in
the organization's efforts to prevent occupational injuries and illnesses. The main aim of
this paper is to submit to the Romanian specialists in health and safety at work the
safety
culture
concept and to highlight a set of basic issues asso
ciated with it, hoping not only to
reduce possible ambiguities but also to stimulate the development of safety culture and
participatory and proactive occupational risk management in Romanian companies.

From
the perspective of industrial companies, questio
ns may persist regarding the difference
between operational elements of safety culture and their connection with the results at
different levels in an organization.

Research efforts have remained, historically, focused on ambiguous debates regarding
concep
tual distinctions and size of influence factors rather than on the relevant industry
results, such as building integrative multi
–
method useful to understand the depth of risk
management directions and performance
–
based culture and to facilitate industry pr
actices.
However, the current need remains to integrate theory with practice, to highlight
differences in level of organization, to map the relationship between safety culture and
behavior
–
based safety, and translate relevant applied research in solutions
for industrial
organizations. By all means, to minimize injuries, save lives and target towards zero
incidents, both researchers and practitioners must pay more attention to this vital topic of
„safety culture”. The efficiency of a safety management system
depends on its capacity to
encourage the participation of the workforce and thus decentralize decision
–
making. This,
in turn, provides the flexibility in risk management.

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