Cognitive Biases in Military Decision Making [608446]

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013 -5050This SSCFP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements imposed on Senior Service College
Fellows. The views expressed in this student: [anonimizat], Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government.COGNITIVE BIASES IN MILITARY
DECISION MAKING
BY
LIEUTENANT COLON ELMICHAEL J. JANSER
United States ArmySenior Service CollegeDISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.
USAWC CLASS OF 200 7

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEForm Approved
OMB No. 0704 -0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time fo r reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the
data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or an y other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing
this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704 -0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202 –
4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a curren tly
valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
14-06-20072. REP ORT TYPE
Civilian Research Paper3. DATES COVERED (From -To)
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Cognitive Biases in Military Decision Making 5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
LTC Micha el J. Janser, USA 5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT
NUMBER
U.S. Army War College
122 Forbes Avenue
Carlisle, PA 17013
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
Center for Strategic & International Studies
1800 K Street Northwest
Washington, DC 20006 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DI STRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
DISTRIBUTION A: UNLIMITED
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views of the academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy
of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.
14. ABSTRACT
This paper examines the applicability of recent findings from behavioral economics to military decision making. Army manuals concerning the Military
Decision Making Process mention general biases in decision making but do not mention specific biases or specific mechanisms for mitigating bias. Recent
research has shed light on specific biases to include: overconfidence, insensitivity to sample size, availability, illusionar y correlation, retrievability of
instances, escalation, break even, snake bite, fear of regret, and the confirmation bias. The Military Decision Making Process has a long and distin guished
record of success. However, there are also examples of military failures due to cognitive bias. These failures include Lee at Gettysburg and McClellan in
Virginia. Private industry and some elements of the Army have started to account for these deficiencies through various pract ices including coaching and
training. This paper concludes that the Military Decision Making Proces s as described in FM 5 -0 is deficient in not fully recognizing and accounting for
cognitive biases. The process can be improved through several steps. These steps include not only research, education, and training, but also procedural
and organizational changes.
.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Cognitive Biases, Military Decision Making Process
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION
OF ABSTRACT18. NUMBER
OF PAGES19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT
UNCLASSIFEDb. ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFEDc. THI S PAGE
UNCLASSIFED UNLIMITED 1619b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area
code)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8 -98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

CIVILIAN RESEARCH PROJECT
COGNITIVE BIASES IN MILITARY DECISION MAKING
by
Lieutenant Michael J. Janser
United States Army
Nicholas D. Wilson
Program Advise r
Center for Strategic & International Studies
Disclaimer
The views expressed in the academic research paper are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of
Defense, or any of its agencies
U.S.Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ii

iiiABSTRACT
AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Janser
TITLE: Cognitive Biases in Military Decision Making
FORMAT: Civilian Research Project
DATE: 14 June 2007 WORD COUNT: 5 197 PAGES: 1 6
KEY TERMS: Cognitive Bias, Military Decision Making Process
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
This paper examines the applicability of recent findings from behavioral economics to
military decision making. Army manuals concerning the Military Decision Making Process
mention general biases in decision making b ut do not mention specific biases or specific
mechanisms for mitigating bias. Recent research has shed light on specific biases to include:
overconfidence, insensitivity to sample size, availability, illusionary correlation, retrievability of
instances, es calation, break even, snake bite, fear of regret, and the confirmation bias. The
Military Decision Making Process has a long and distinguished record of success. However,
there are also examples of military failures due to cognitive bias . These failures i nclude Lee at
Gettysburg and McClellan in Virginia. Private industry and some elements of the Army have
started to account for these deficiencies through various practices including coaching and
training. This paper concludes that the Military Decision Mak ing Process as described i n FM 5 -0
is deficient in not fully recognizing andaccounting for cognitive biases. The process can be
improved through several steps. These steps include not only research, education, and training,
but also procedural and organ izational changes.

iv

COGNITIVE BIASES IN MILITARY DECISION MA KING
Introduction
Recent research in psychology and behavioral economics has begun to shed light with
great specificity on the nature of human decision making. The practical applications of thi s
research has led to increased performance and improved managerial decision making in various
industries –particularly those with high stress and high function requirements. This study will
address thelatest research findings and their applicability to decision making within the
Department of Defense by:
Outlining the military decision making process and its shortcomings;
Explaining the latest findings on heuristics and cognitive biases;
Offering military case studies with recommendations for improvin g the process by which
military staff, commanders and senior civilian policymakers make major decisions.
Heuristics
The human mind functions much like a powerful computer. However, it is not unlimited
in its processing power. In order to compensate for i ts limitations, the brain has developed
certain short -cuts or rules of thumb called heuri stics. These heuristics allow individuals to make
quick and reasonably accurate decisions despite time constraints or limited information. These
mental processes have developed over the course of human evolution as a means of ensuring
survival. Below are three common heuristics.1
The Availability Heuristic . The availability short -cut supports the premise that the more
examples you can recall of a particular situation, the more likely you will believe in its
occurrence in the future.2This makes perfect sense and is seemingly in line with proper
probabilities. If you live in the dessert where it hasn’t rained in a long time ,then it is reasonable
to believe that it won’t rain tomorrow. Someone who lives on a farm that has been bitten by
several wild cats but never by the pet dog would be wise to avoid cats. Juxtapose this with
someone who lives in a rainforest and expects rain or someone who lives on a different farm that
has wild dogs and domesticated cats. These individuals may reach completely logical -but
completely opposite -conclusions regarding some third situation such as the safety of certain

2pets or the weather in another location. This will occur due to the av ailability of different
experiences that they can recall.
The Representativeness Heuristic . This heuristic entails taking the characteristics of
one object or per son and applying them to a similar object or person. For example, if you have
never personall y seen a lion or rattlesnake, but have been trained by your parents to avoid them,
then you have benef ited from this rule of thumb.3A college admissions committee may look at
certain representative characteristic s of applicants such as the nature of their previous school or
level of parent income in making admissions decisions . While this rule of thumb will work in
many situations it will not work in all. Consider the parents who teach their child to avoid
rattlesnakes and/or members of a certain race or religion. These representative characteristics or
stereotypes may be significantly off for a number of reasons. In addition, a college admissions
committee that has only ever had one student matriculate from a give nhigh school may be in
error in assumin g that single student is representative of that particular high school and
assessing /assuming that the second student will be similar.4The first student may not be an
average or representative example of the school. He or she may be the best student that school
has ever produced or one of the worst and as such should not be used as a representative example
by which to judge others.
The Anchoring Heuristic . The anchoring short -cut relates to how individuals estimate a
value. The first or initial guess is the anchor. For example, this year’s budget is a good starting
point for estimating next year’s budget. Next year’s budget could be plus or minus a certain
percent from this year’s. This is a completely logical and useful process. However, it is not
infallible. Mista kes are particularly evident when the initial estimate such as the first offer in a
salary negotiation or a starting price in a house sale negotiation is offered .5Imagine the exact
same house in two different locations –oneinan overheated u rban market and the other ina
depressed rural market. A person moving from the country to the city will feel that the urban
house is unjustifiably overpriced while the individual moving fr om the city to the country will
feel that they are getting a steal. Research has shown that individuals’ estimates vary greatly
concerning the same situation when they are given different initial values -even when those
values are randomly generated .6

3Cognitive Biases
These heuristics have allowed mankind to survive and thrive to this day. However, a
shortcut entails not doing everything and thus can result in an answer that is a good fit, but not
perfect. Likewise, a rule of thumb is exactly that, a general rule and not a universal truth. While a
rule of thumb may resul t in the correct answer most of the time, it may also result in an incorrect
answer a significant portion of the time. Understanding these rules of thumb and the irinherent
limitations can assist in increasing the effectiveness of the decision makin g proc ess.7Below are
some examples of common cognitive biases that follow from the shortcomings of the heuristics
described above.
The Overconfidence Bias. Consider the following questions:
1.What is the average weight of the adult blue whale in pounds?
2.In what year was the Mona Lisa painted?
3.How many independent countries were there at the end of 2000?
4.What is the air distance, in miles, between Paris, France and Sydney, Australia?
5.How many bones are in the human body?
6.How many total combatants were killed in W orld War II?
7.How many books were in the Library of Congress at the end of 2000?
8.How long, in miles, is the Amazon River?
9.How fast does the earth spin at the equator?
10.How many transistors are in the Pentium III computer processor?
For each question ,a perso n is asked to estimate a maximum and mini mum range such that they
are 90 percent sure to capture the correct answer. The correct answers are (1) 250,000 pounds,
(2) 1,513, (3) 191 countries, (4) 10, 543 miles, (5) 206 bones, (6) 8.3 million, (7) 18 millio n, (8)
4,000 miles, (9) 1,044 miles pe r hour, and (10) 9.5 million.8If a person is 90 percent sure of their
answers then at least nine of their answers should have fallen within their specified range.
However, research has shown that on tests similar to this, up to 43 percent of answers are outside
the range or in other words, an estimated 90 percent accuracy is in reality only 64 percent
accurate.9A 1973 study found this bias to be prevalent in the military and a 1977 study found it
to be pr evalent in t he CIA.10This tendency toward unjustified confidence exists most
prominently in questions of moderate to high difficulty. In situations where subjects gave
themselves 1000:1 odds of being correct, they were in fact only correct app roximately 85 percent

4ofthe time. Giving themselves 1,000,000:1 odds, they were correct approximately 93 percent of
the time. Other studies have confirmed this finding and interestingly, the opposite also holds.
The less one knows about a topic, the more confident that person is in his or her knowledge of
that topic and the more an individual know sabout a topic the less confident they are in their
estimates.11
The Insensitivity to Sample Size B ias. Consider the following situation. A certain town
has two hospitals. One is la rge where approximately 45 children a day are born. The other is
small where approximately 15 children a day are born. Overall, there is approximately a 50/50
mix of boys to girls, but on certain days over 60 percent of the births are boys. Over the course of
one year, will both hospitals experience approximately the same number of days when more
boys are born or will one experience more and if so which one? In tests such as this, only 21
percent of subjects correctly choose the smaller hospital. Because th e large hospital has a larger
sample size, it is more likely to a pproximate the mean value of 50 percent male births.12Even
test subjects who understand statistics fail to properly account for small sample sizes in making
estimat es and their resulting deci sions suffer.
The Availability Bias .It is easier to recall events that are more likely to occur than
events th at are less likely to occur.13Estimating that an event will occur when in the past it
occurred 70 percent of the time, is generally a successful approach. However, a problem arises if
one applies it to more than 70 percent of future scenarios which canresult in an overestimate by
up to 30 percent . Since it is easier to mentally recall a like ly event, individuals can give too
much weight to itsfuture -likely at the expense of other possibilities.
The Illusionary Correlation Bias .This mistake appears when one attempts to correlate
past events. An overzealous sports fan may assign a spurious correlation to the outcome of a
game and something he or she did on game day. This is a superstition without merit and most
people recognize it as such. However, it is symptomatic of the tendency to overestimate the
correlation of two events if they both occurred together in the past. If a person is mugged on a
rainy summer evening by someone with long dark hair then they will think that it is more
dangerous to be around individuals with long dark hair on rainy summer evenings. While it may
be true that evenings are more dangerous than the day time, the le ngth and color of one ’shair

5may be irrelevant . In fact winter, especially around the holidays, may have a much higher
incidence of muggings.14
The Retrievabil ity of Instances Bias . A bias related to the ease of recalling a past event
has to do with the s ize of the past event. It only seems natural that someone can better recall the
few hours of their wedding ceremony than they can the few hours from their 52nddate or at
someone else’s wedding. This is in spite of the fact that both events may have take n the same
amount of time out of their life. However, by being able to more easily recall some events over
others, individuals systematically overweigh them in making judgments about the future.
Research has shown that people grossly overestimate the dan ger of flying versus driving when in
fact they have a much greater chance of death or injury while driving . This is because a plane
crash is very dramatic and receives proportionally much more media atte ntion than does a car
crash.15
The Escalation B ias.Consider the following scenario. A bank loan officer approves a
loan of $50,000 to a seemingly good project. Later, the head of the project returns and states that
the project is advancing well, but without an additional $50,000 all will be lost. What s hould the
bank loan officer decide? Credible research has shown that bank loan officers will
disproportionably make the second loan disregarding the fact that the first loan is a sunk cost and
the second loan decision is an independent event that should n ot be in fluenced by the first
event.16Psychologically, what is occurring is that the loan officer is unconsciously reaffirming
hispersonal stake in his belief in the “correctness” of his earlier bad decision by “escalating” his
commitment.
The Break Even Bias. Another biasrelated to associating current decisions with
independent past events is the break even or seeking pride bias. Research has shown that there is
a disproportionate tendency to gamble “double or nothing” or take undue risk even with
unfavorable odds on a second decision when a first decision has resulted in a loss. This tendency
is manifest at the horse track where long -shots on the last race of the day receive more bets than
long-shots earlier in the schedule.17
The Snake Bite Bias .How ever, a poor first outcome does not always lead to more
aggressive behavior. When a bad first decision creates a strong and significant lynegative

6emotional experience for a person, then they will tend to be overly cautious with future
decisions . This hold s true even in the face of strong positive odds for the second decision .18
The Fear of Regret Bias . Fear of regret is the opposite tendency of seeking pride. When
faced with a second decision after a successful first decision, individuals will be unjustifi ably
cautious. Research on the stock market has shown what some would consider counter -intuitive.
Investors are 50 percent more likely to sell a stock after it has risen than to sell a stock after it has
fallen.19This is in spite of the fact that selling t he loser is the better d ecision on an after- tax
basis20while other research has shown that a rising stock will often continue its rise .21Everyone
has experienced the situation of looking back and thinking of missed opportunities or regretting
an action not taken. This is similar in that the investor will sell the stock in order to avoid regret
later should the stock close lower. This deviates from rationality when all the fundamentals of
the stock point to a continued rise.
The Confirmation bias . Consider the following question. What rule will yield the
following numeric sequence: 2, 4, 6? In this test ,subjects were allowed t o generate their own
sequence, for example: 8, 10, 12 or 200, 400, 600 ;and ask the moderator if it adhered to the rule.
Subjects w ere asked to announce the rule only after they were sure of their findings. In taking
this test a majority of subjects missed the answer at least once. In fact, a large minority, even
after repeated attempts, were unable to find the rule at all. The answe r is any sequence in
ascending order. The reason so many people failed to decipher the rule or did so only after an
initial mistake is because people tend to problem solve by forming a hypothesis and then
attempt ingto prove it through positive examples or information that confirms it. The Venn
Diagram below show s that because a subject ’s hypothesis is a subset of the actual rule, looking
to disprove it rather than prove it would be a more effic ient way of proceeding.22

7The Mi litary Decision Making Process (MDMP)
The military has a specific and firmly engrained decision making process. Taught at all
levels, it isrigorously adhered to and ruthlessly evaluated . This process has seven part sthat
include: 1.) receipt of mission, 2) mission analysis, 3) course of action (COA) development, 4)
COA analysis, 5) COA comparison, 6) COA approval, and7) orders production.
The MDMP begins with the receipt of a formal order from higher headquarters or a field
commander’s assessment that the higher headquarters commander’s intent can be accomplished
by a different means. Staff is alerted, the required tools of mission analysis such as maps ,
intelligence report, etc, are gathered, and any required estimates are gathered for an initial
asses sment. The commander will issue his initial guidance and the staff may issue a warning
order that will include initial timeline s,required movements and inf ormation requirements.23
Upon receipt of the commander’s initial guidance and issuance of the warning order, the staff
begins the mission analysis.24This process consists of a series of clearly outlined steps that
involve a review of the headquarters order, detailed risk assessment and review of the mission.
A warning order will then be issued to subordin ate units and the commander’s planning guidance
will be issued to the staff. The commander’s guidance will contain hisvisualization /concept of
the operation along with constraints on which COA’s can and cannot be considered.25The staff
then begins COA dev elopment. COA development is a formal process that outlines possible
mission scenarios including forces and combat power needed. COA development relies hea vily
on brainstorming.26Once a reasonable number of feasible solutions are decided upon, the staff
begins the COA analysis which essentially tests the feasibility and probability of a successful
outcome using war game results. Based on the war game results, the commander decides whichU
E
S
U = Universal set of all triples
E = Expe rimenter’s rule of all ascending
triples
S = Subject’s rule

8COA to follow. Once a COA has been decided upon, the final stage of th e Military Decision
Making Process is to produce orders and disseminate the m to subordinate units.27
The full MDMP is used whe ntime is not a significant constraint. However, time isoften
a constraint and as such, there are techniques that can be employed to decrease the time
necessary to formulate and produce a workable plan. These specific techniques include:
-maximizing parallel planning so subordinate units may begin their planning by
issuing as many warning orders as needed
-increasing collaborative pl anning with subordinate units so that they have as much
information as possible, as quickly as possible
-using liaison officers to pass information as quickly as possible
-increasing the commander's involvement so that decisions may be made without
detailed briefings
-limit ingthe number of COAs to include only one that is deemed acceptable though it
may not be optimal28
The danger with shortening the MDMP is that the staff will “not explore all available
options when developing friendly COAs” and “it increases the risk of overlooking a key
factor .”29
SELECTED CASE STUDIES
Lee at Gettysburg . Generations of military officers have been trained on the strategy and
tactics of this decisive battle. It is one of the most studied battles in American history andis
therefore a good reference point for looking at the psychology of command and the significant
role cognitive biases can play in war. The battle was fought in the summer of 1863, more than
two years into the Civil War. Robert E. Lee was the commander of the Con federate forces and ,
up to this point, had a long and successful career. He had successfully turned back General
McClellan near Richmond and won a smashing victory at the Second Battle of Bull Run. At
Antietam Lee was badly outnumber ed,and although he los t the element of surprise and
ultimately failed to achieve is objective, he was , nonetheless, able to prevent the destruction of
his army and inflict high casualties on the opposing Union force -resulting in the dismissal of its
commander. Lee had also be en successful at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville in December
1862 and May 1863 respectively .

9The Battle of Gettysburg lasted for three days. The first day began with cavalry clashes to
the west of Gettysburg and ended with significant fighting between thetwo opposing armies .At
the end of the first day of fighting, t he Confederate Army seized control of the town proper and
established positions along Seminar yRidge to the southwest of Gettysburg. The Northern Army
took up defensive positions along Cem etery Ridge due south of the town. The second day saw
heavy fighting as the Confederates defeated the Union forces of General Sickles and pushed
them back to Cemetery Ridge. The third day saw the fateful attack of the Confederates across a
long open field against the center of theUnion forces which possessed artillery superiority. The
Confederate forces were repulsed with heavy losses and as his troops returned from the field
Robert E. Lee is quoted as saying “It was all my fault this time.”30
Many histori ans and military officers have asked how and why General Meade
won and General Lee lost. Why did a successful veteran such as Lee commit his forces to a
“suicidal and ill -fated attack?”31The required text used to train generations of future
commanders from West Point and overseen by the former Dean of Cadets, Brigadier General
Roy K. Flint, in critiquing Lee at Gettysburg states that he had a “fatal flaw –he tended to
underestimate his opponent.”32In essence, Lee overestimated his own capabilities. The Wes t
Point text alludes to another issue with psychological implications. It states that
“Chancellorsville appeared to be his model for victory, while Fredericksburg was locked
somewhere in the recesses of his mind.”33Lee was a master of the offense, but Fred ericksburg
was a battle of immense carnage that clearly showed the advantage of the defense. The
implication here is that General Lee suffered from the confirmation bias. In a separate study, a
psychologist and a historian , Robert Pois and Philip Langer, teamed up and agree with the West
Point findings. They conclude that General Lee “could not and would not admit to himself at any
time during the three days that the battle would not in the end be successfully resolved by his
personal touch.”34What they cal l “psychological rigidity” leads to confidence not born of “an
accurate and thorough appraisal of one’s situation”35and can lead to failure when “a fixed
conviction as to the ultimate success of ones undertakings may sharply decrease the possibility of
seriously considering options dissonant from those envisaged by one’s fond hopes.”36
McClellan in Virginia . George McClellan was a West Point graduate who had
experience in both the Mexican War and as a military observer ofthe Crimean War. After
approximately ten years of service, he left the Army and became a railroad president. At the

10onset of the Civil War he returned to uniformed service and received media praise after a series
of small victories in West Virginia. Given that Abraham Lincoln was searching f or a commander
for the Army of the Potomac who could deliver victories, McClellan gained Lincoln’s attention
withhisbackground and reputation, and quickly rose to become the Commander of the Army of
the Potomac.37Under significant political pre ssure to take the fight to the s outh, McClellan set
outto capture the Confederate capital of Richmond.
McClellan’s plan was to land forces at Yorktown and proceed on Richmond. The landing
at Yorktown took place on April 5, 1862, however, Yorktown was not secured u ntil May 4.
McClellan advanced at a slow pace and finally reached the vicinity of Richmond on May 25.
Once there ,he began to methodically plan his attack. However ,on June 26 the Confederates
struck first andMcClellan was forced to withdraw to Harrison’s landing in what would become
know as the Seven Days’ Battles. The result McClellan’s indecision was that his army was
forced into a small defensive pocket by a force that was smaller and less well equipped.38
What could cause a larger and better equipped a rmy to move so slowly and lose to a force
inferior in manpower and material ? The West Point text reflects the feelings of both Abraham
Lincoln and subsequent historians that McClellan was timid.39This seems unlikely for someone
who was professionally train ed as a soldier and who had achieved victories in West Virginia.
Pois and Langer couch it in psychological terms. They claim he had a fear of failure similar to
what was described earlier as a fear of regret. He was less concerned with winning then he was
with avoiding failure.40
ANALYSIS
The MDMP. The military decision making process is a robust and proven method for
rational choice but it is not perfect. For the model to work perfectly commanders and staff would
need to fulfill the below criteria:41
-Accura tely define the mission
-Accurately assess the enemy and friendly situation
-Identify all alternatives
-Identify all criteria
-Accurately weigh all criteria
-Accurately assess each course of action

11-Correctly make a decision based on a COA comparison
In real wor ld circumstances, human judgment with ingrained heuristics and their
associated biases affect final decisions. For example, the confirmation bias could affect the
assessment of the enemy and friendly situation. The availability bias could adversely affect the
identification of possible COAs and the representativeness bias could adversely affect the
identification of criteria. The weighing of each COA could suffer from the illusionary correlation
bias. Overconfidence or insensitivity to sample size could aff ect the COA comparison and the
final decision made by the commander could be affected by the escalation, break -even, snake –
bite or fear of regret biases.
Selected Best Practices. The use of applied psychology is widespread in professional,
college and Oly mpic athletics. The psychologist works with the athlete to improve their
concentration, confidence, control and commitment through techniques such as relaxation,
centering and mental imagery. Increased concentration allows for focus despite distractions su ch
as fatigue, anxiety, weather and negative thoughts. Confidence allows one to persevere despite
difficult odds, be positive and share in responsibility. Control allows for mitigating the negative
affects of emotion on concentration. Commitment allows one to remain on task over extended
periods of time despite problems such as anxiety, injury, boredom, lack of enjoyment, or
perceived lack of progress.42
The high stakes and high stress world of hedge funds and stock trading are increasingly
using applied ps ychologists to increase performance. SAC Capital, with over $12 billion in
assets ,is one of the largest, best known and most successful hedge fund s in the world. SAC
Capital charge sthehighest fees in the industry and as such is often viewed as an indust ry
bellwether. Working at a hedge fund is one of the highest paying and most sought after jobs.
Hedge funds have their pick of employees and hire only the brightest people from the best
schools, all of whom have distinguished records of achievement. Last y ear the Wall Street
Journal reported that SAC Capital maintained a psychologist on staff. SAC Capital’s
psychologist Dr. Ari Kiev says that “Most people trade with the notion of avoiding failure.”43
His role is to help these highly educated ,motivated and a ccomplished individuals overcome
cognitive biases and achieve increased performance.
The broader investment community also makes use of applied psychology at the highest
levels. The investment committees of major mutual funds make decisions regarding tens of

12millions of dollars and the results of their decisions will become unambiguously apparent in the
form of a percentage return on investment. These extremely successful powerbrokers recognize
the shortcomings of some individual and group processes and use effective techniques to
mitigate the impact. For example, the chairman of the investment committee will not predispose
the group by giving his opinion before different options, or courses of action, are formulated.
Secret balloting is also used to determi ne the best course of action. The chairman does not
relinquish control, but simply uses various techniques to lay out the best options before him .44
Outside the financial industry, corporate CEOs use “professional coaches” to enhance
personal performance. T hese coaches are in fact trained psychologists who work with some of
the most successful and highly performing individuals in the country on issues such as anxiety,
fear, lack of confidence and emotional control.
West Point -and increasingly the broader Army-is beginning to recogniz ethe benefits
of applied psychology. The Academy’s Center for Enhanced Performance was founded in 1989
and began by working with intercollegiate athletic teams. Shortly afterwards, they branched out
to help cadets improve th eir academic and leadership skills. Recently, they have helped units
around the Army prepare for real -world missions. These units have included Recruiting
Command, marksmanship units, Stryker brigades and the 3rdID prior to a deployment to Iraq.
They use techniques similar to those for athletes to help maintain focus, concentration and
confidence in highly stressful and demanding situations45.
Recommendations. Military decision making occurs at many levels simultaneously.
Below is a nonexhaustive list of i deas that could be easily implemented to help address some of
the current shortcomings of the military decision making process.
Research. The officer corps that comprises the majority of planning staffs and
commanders is a fairly homogonous group especiall yregarding age, educational
background and work related experiences. Targeted research should be conducted to
determine exactly which cognitive biases exist among this demographic and the degree to
which they exist. This is an important step in more clear ly defining the problem.
Education. One of the strengths of the military is that the planning culture is engrained
early and reinforced often. One shortcoming of this education is that heuristics and

13cognitive biases are not adequately addressed. Instructi on in these areas should be
incorporated into the leadership and decision -making training beginning with pre –
commissioning and continuing through the basic course, captain’s course, the Command
and General Staff College and the War College. The first step in overcoming biases is to
understand them so that they can be recognized and mitigated.
Procedural . One of the strengths of the MDMP is that it is standardized. That strength
could be capitalized upon by incorporating a few additional steps to address co gnitive
biases. As part of the quality control for each step, a matrix or checklist could be
incorporated to address those biases most prevalent at each stage and assess the factors
that may contribute to its presence and strength. For example, the option of having a “red
teamer” or someone to provide a critique to the commander could be formalized.
Training. Another strength of our military is its realistic training and quick feedback. An
observer -controller familiar with performance enhancement and applie d psychology
should be assigned to the Combat Training Centers, the Battle Command Training Center
or any other high level war game where commands and planning staffs are evaluated.
This option could be easily implemented and would provide targeted feedbac k where it is
most valuable –to the commanders and staffs of the largest operational units.
Organization al.To fully internalize the lessons and best practices that performance
enhancement has to offer, an officer familiar with the issues should be assign ed to the
major commands. That person would serve as a coach to the commander as well as
trainer to, and objective observer of, staff planning. An ongoing trusted relationship with
the commander and staff would help this officer ensure the lessons learned in training are
carried forward during combat operations.
Conclusion
The Army has a robust and proven tool in the seven -step Military Decision Making
Process. However ,this tool has some inherent weaknesses in that it depends on the estimates,
judgments and decisions of imperfect humans. Furthermore, these weaknesses are exacerbated at
the most critical times such as decision -making during combat operations when there is fatigue,
stress, limited time and incomplete information. While acknowledging bias, th e Military

14Decision Making Process fails in any meaningful way to account for them. Current research in
the fields of applied psychology and behavioral economics have shed light on how the human
brain makes judgment and related cognitive biases namely: ove rconfidence, insensitivity to
sample size, availability, illusionary correlation, retrievability of instances, escalation, break
even, snake bite, fear of regret, and the confirmation bias. There are sufficient historic examples
of military failures stemmi ng from individual cognitive bias and flawed decision -making
including Lee at Gettysburg and McClellan in the Peninsular Campaign. Industry, especially
professional sports and investment management, has applied these findings with success. The
Army and mil itary in general could improve its decision making process by incorporating these
research findings and industry best practices. These changes could include not only research,
education, and training, but also procedural and organizational changes. By doin g this the Army
may be able to avoid mistakes in the future and enhance its ability to successfully meet its
mission of fighting and winning the nation’s wars.
Endnotes
1Max Bazerman, Judgment in Managerial Decision Making ( New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1986), 8.
2Ibid., 7.
3Lee Roy Beach and Terry Connolly, The Psychology of Decision Making (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications,
2005), 82.
4Bazerman, 7.
5Beach, 82.
6Ibid., 83.
7Bazerman, 8.
8John R. Nofsing er,The Psychology of Investing (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002), 3.
9Bazerman, 33.
10Ibid.
11Ibid., 34.
12Ibid., 24.
13Ibid., 18.
14Ibid., 21.

1515Ibid., 19.
16Ibid., 68.
17Nofsinger, 33.
18Ibid., 32.
19Ibid., 24.
20Ibid.
21Ibid., 25.
22John St. B. T. Evans, Bias in Human Reasoning: Causes and Consequences (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Publishers, 1989), 46.
23U.S. Department of the Army, Army Planning and Orders Production , Field Manual 5 -0 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Departme nt of the Army, 20 January 2005), 3 -12–3-15.
24Ibid., 3 -12–3-29.
25Ibid., 3 -15–3-29.
26Ibid., 3 -33.
27Ibid., 3 -57.
28Ibid., 3 -60–3-61.
29Ibid., 3 -59.
30Robert Pois and Philip Langer, Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership (Bloomin gton: Indiana
University Press, 2004), 76.
31Ibid., 74.
32Timothy H. Donovan, Jr. et al., The West Point Military History Series: The American Civil War (Wayne:
Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1987), 165.
33Ibid.
34Pois, 81.
35Ibid., 80.
36Ibid.
37Dono van, 41.
38Ibid., 51 -52.
39Ibid., 47.
40Pois, 54.

1641Bazerman, 4.
42Brian Mackenzie, SportsCoach.Com available at http://www.brianmac.demon.co.uk/psych.htm ; Internet;
accessed 22 March 2007.
43Susan Pulliam, “Private Money: The New Financial Order,” The Wall Street Journal , 16 September 2006
[newspaper on -line]; available from www.wsj.com ; internet; accessed 18 April 2007.
44Richard L. Peterson, M.D., MarketP sych.com, telephone interview by author, 19 April 2007.
45Nathaniel Zinsser, Ph.D. et al., “Military Application of Performance -Enhancement Psychology,” Military
Review (September –October 2004): 62 -65.