Between Cold War Presures And Welfare State Oportunities The Reshaping Of Socialist Party Ideologies And Policies In Western Europe After 1945

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UNIVERSITATEA BUCUREȘTI

FACULTATEA DE ȘTIINȚE POLITICE

LUCRARE DE LICENȚĂ

Îndrumător Științific:

grad didactic, titlul, Nume

Candidat/ă: Prenume, Nume

BUCUREȘTI , 2017

UNIVERSITATEA BUCUREȘTI

FACULTATEA DE ȘTIINȚE POLITICE

LUCRARE DE LICENȚĂ

Titlul lucrării: ,, Between Cold War presures and welfare state oportunities : the reshaping of socialist party ideologies and policies in Western Europe after 1945„

Îndrumător Științific:

grad didactic, titlul, Nume

Candidat/ă: Prenume, Nume

BUCUREȘTI , 2017

TIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

§Contents………………………………………………………………………………………..4
§Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..5

§Chapter I. Socialism ideologies in the aftermath of World War II in Western Europe…………………………….………………………….………..7

1.1. The evolution of the ideologies…………………………………….………7

1.2: Remaking and revival of socialism in a new era…………………………15

§Chapter II. European Western models of Socialist Parties…………….….16

1.1: Breakthrough of the socialist parties………………………………………16
1.2: France………………………………………………………………………19
1.3: Germany……………………………………………………………………23
1.4: United Kingdom……………………………………………………………33

§Chapter III.Social impact and state welfare………………….……..……38

§Conclusion/Recommendations …………………………..………….………48

§ Bibliography……………………………………………………………………52

§Appendix……………………………………………………………………….56

Between Cold War presures and welfare state oportunities : the reshaping of socialist party ideologies and policies in Western Europe after 1945

§INTRODUCTION

There is much to suggest that the world wars and lhe postwar settlements marked major turning points in the ability to establish stable and successful societies in Western Europe, World War One was followed by a period of great instability, culminating in many cases in the overthrow of democracy, the rise of fascism and eventually further war. After World War Two most Western European countries enjoyed a lengthy period of unparalleled stability and prosperity. Now there is a growing feeling that the end of the Cold War marks another turning point. This paper is about the turning points of after 1945 and their relationship to the stability and prosperity of Western European societies. The rapid dismantling of Cold War Europe between 1989 and 1992 undermined the accepted wisdom of a thousand history survey courses, namely, that 'Yalta’ Europe was as inevitable as death and taxes. How many historians predicted the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1985? The Russian dissident, Andrei Amahik's, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (1980), was considered a brave piece of political science fiction. Zdenek Mlynar's Night Frost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism (1980) was read as the sad epitaph to a failed experiment in reformism. When the social scientist Randall Collins, employing geopolitical Weberian sociology, suggested to a gathering of distinguished Swedish academies in Uppsala in the middle 1980s that the Soviet Union was about to collapse, his views were received politely; privately, though, Professor Collins' ideas were probably thought incredible.The new vistas opened up by 1989 have of course encouraged some reevaluation of the respective significance of the postwar eras. Many now see the period 1918-89 in some form or other as a unity; for Mazower or Hobsbawun, for example, an age of ideological extremes flowed from the unintended effects of the guns of August 1914. From this kind of perspective, it is not clear if the 1989/91 era has ushered in an uncharted new era of globalization, or whether it in some senses represents a return to the pre-1914 conditions. There are certainly some similarities, for example, between the new global economy, one the one hand, and the gold standard and sound money phase that characterized the last 40 or so years of the so-called hong Nineteenth Century (1789-1914) up to World War One. In some senses 1989 changed everything, adding a new postwar turning point to a twentieth-century European history with its fair share of them. But at the same time it is not elear what its impact was – if any – on the way historians interpreted the earlier turning points of 1918 and 1945, As historians began publishing major modem and contemporary histories of Europe in the wake of the events of 1989 to 1992, by and large they did not abandon the intellectual framework of the 'Interwar' and 'postwar' eras, Eric Hobsbawm's Age of Extremes (1994) and Mark Mazower's Dark Continent (1998) are organized around the two talismanic dates 1914 and 1989 (or 1991). The Pity of War, Niall Ferguson's stimulating and controversial study, focuses on World War One, but it too invokes the logic of the three postwar eras. Richard Vinen's new study, true enough, is critical of the perspectives of the older generations of historians. Histories of twentieth-century Europe have been warped by the generational experiences of their authors, he argues. Thus Vinen (born 1968) finds the Age of Extremes' approach, the obsession with the interwar period as unbalanced and misleading. Even so he slill must wrestle with 1918-1945-1989 in order lo advance his text ends up rather conventional. His book is divided into parts that follow the logic ol pre-1914, interwar period, Cold War and post-1989. To a historian or political analyst in 1985, possibly even in the summer of 1989, a map of Europe as it was in the year 2000 would have seemed unpredictible.

§CHAPTER I. SOCIALISM IDEOLOGIES IN THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II IN WESTERN EUROPE

1.1. The evolution of the ideologies

The term ‘ideology’ was first coined between 1796 and 1798 by Antoine Destutt de Tracy in papers read in instalments to the National Institute in Paris under the title Mémoire sur la faculté de penser. His book entitled The Elements of Ideology was published later (1800-15). To some extent it is true that Tracy would probably now be a fairly obscure figure but for his association with the word ‘ideology’. Oddly, there is no one unequivocal sense of the concept deriving from Tracy. In fact, four uses of the term can be discerned. First, there was Tracy’s original explicit use to designate a new empirical science of ideas; second, the term came to denote an affiliation to a form of secular liberal republicanism; third, it took on a pejorative connotation implying intellectual and practical sterility as well as dangerous radicalism; finally, and most tenuously, it came in a limited sphere to denote ‘political doctrine’ in general. All these four senses moved into political currency between 1800 and 1830.

The word ‘ideology’ was a neologism compounded from the Greek terms eidos and logos. It can be defined as a ‘science of ideas’. Tracy wanted a new term for a new science. He rejected the terms métaphysique and psychologie as inadequate.

Marx was obviously aware of something of the initial use of the term ‘ideology’, indicating a science of ideas. However, he paid scant attention to this. The only sense he utilized, at first, was Bonaparte’s pejorative use. Crudely, he too considered the Young Hegelians as ‘windbags’ and armchair metaphysicians. In addition, he regarded both the idéologues and Hegelians as vulgar bourgeois liberals. This idea moves quite definitely away from the initial French royalist sense where the liberalism of the idéologues was regarded as a dangerous reforming radicalism.

Marx adds, though, in an unsystematic way, further dimensions to the meaning of the term, which take it into a different realm. In Marx’s work, ideology denotes not only practical ineffectiveness but also illusion and loss of reality. More importantly, it becomes associated with the division of labour in society, with collective groups called classes, and most significantly with the domination and power of certain classes. Some aspects of this extension, specifically the illusory aspect, were implicit in Bonaparte’s pejorative use of the term, but it was not made fully explicit until Marx. Paradoxically, something of the idéologues’ use remains in Marx, namely, the belief that societies can be rationally and scientifically interpreted and that humanity is progressing towards some form of rational social, economic and political enlightenment. To grasp Marx’s use it is necessary to unpack briefly the materialist theory in which it is couched.

Younger fascists were thus encouraged to think of violence in romantic, crusading, almost chivalrous terms. When Sorel linked violence with Bergson’s élan vital (a spontaneous evolving creative ‘life force’ which lifted the whole human species to higher levels of development), and others linked it with the achievement of the historic mission of racial purity, violence took on cosmic significance. Such violence was not the same as the force exercised by liberal states. Violence was instinctual, linking the individual with unconscious spiritual depths. It encouraged the epic state of mind of the hero, or Übermensch. It was a cathartic, character-changing experience. As the Italian fascist Giovanni Papini noted: ‘While the democratic mob raise outcry against war … we look on it as the greatest possible tonic to restore flagging energy, as a swift and heroic means to attain power’. We might recognize here a mundane but, in this case, glossy platitude, namely, that human nature can be transformed in situations of dire hardship and danger. This is often stated by those who have never experienced dire hardship.

The concept and practice of nationalism are, though, in an unusual position at the present moment. As stated above, many felt that nationalism, in the post-1945 era, was on the wane. The main exception to this process was the wide array of anticolonial nationalisms in Africa and Asia. Defenders of the ‘waning thesis’ have interpreted such anti-colonial nationalism as facets of nation-building, which would weaken fairly quickly once the states established themselves. Indeed, it is partially true that the unity of liberationist and nationalist movements gradually fragments as states are established and develop. However, the events of the post-1989 world have not exactly borne out the hopes of those who looked to the demise of nationalism, particularly in Europe. Many of the older nineteenth- and early twentieth-century fears, criticisms and doubts about nationalism suddenly appear to be relevant again. Nationalism looks, in many contexts, like a rediscovered tribalism, which raises once again the spectres of racism, pogrom and military adventurism. In fact, nationalism appears to share some intellectual territory with the current spate of fundamentalisms in the 2000s. As Hobsbawm comments, ‘It seems probable that the visiting extraterrestrial would see exclusiveness and conflict, xenophobia and fundamentalism, as aspects of the same phenomenon.

In Britain, public works schemes were far more the domain of the Liberal Party aiki those who were Close to Keynes' positions than of orthodox Labourites. Within the Labour government (see chapter 1) Mosley was one of the few people who fought the battle for the nationally coonlmated public works programme before his withdrawal into the politics of the absurd." Others like him — for instance, John Strnchey – turned instead to communism (in Strachey's case without becoming a party member), dismissing as irrelevant the imaginative reformism he had hitherto supported.,Later, however, in his 1940 ‘socialist-Keynesian’ A Programme for Progress and, much later and mote theoretically, in his Contemporary Capitalism (1956) he attempted the integration of Marxism into what he called the ‘Western cultural tradition’.11

Others stayed within the confines of Labour politics and tried to examine practical policies which cuuld resolve the unemployment problem. It is worth emphasising the extent to which the British Left, in the tyjos, was seriously trying to devise an anti-unemployment strategy. The only parallel was in Scandinavia. In France the Left did not consider unemployment to be the most prominent issue. In other countries, such as Germany anti Italy, there was, ol course, no longer a Left to speak of.

However, in Britain, it was only when Labour was ill opposition that Keynes' ideas on the causes of unemployment became influential within the Labour Party, For this to happen Keynes had to be dressed up in socialist language, a task attempted with varying degrees of success by Hugh Dalton and Douglas Jay. Keynes, who was socialist, did not assume that his employment policies would pave the way towards socialism. If anything, they were supposed to save capitalism from the dangers of the free market. Socialists, however, did not see themselves as being in the business of Saving Capitalism. Once again the conception of socialism as an ‘end-state’ stood in the way of developing an intermediate strategy. Socialism was always something which would occur in the future. But politics was always something which dealt with the present, a subject on which Labour had little to say.

Since the Middle Ages, Europe has twice been bifurcated ideologically. The first time, it was the Reformation which in the end divided those parts of Europe which were neither Orthodox nor occupied by a Muslim power between itself and those left to the Counter-Reformation. The so-called Enlightenment was, in a way, an attempt to explain and disseminate the achievements of the Reformed part of Europe— economic prosperity, political liberty—to the rest of Europe. The second major bifurcation arose between the liberal and the Marxist parts of the continent. As an ideological conflict, it began of course in the nineteenth century, but the contest only acquired territorial, political incarnation after 1917. For a time after 1945, the Great Contest, as it was called by a writer who was clear in his mind that victory would and should go to socialism, looked fairly evenly balanced. Unfortunately, as Peter Skalnik brings out clearly, many among the nonmigrants and ordinary citizens of all the countries which have recently (and with good reason) abandoned the fetters of orthodox central planning will find the ‘truth’ of capitalist market economies no more palatable than the alleged ‘lies’ of socialism. Many will find themselves much worse off materially under the new slogans of ‘market economy’ and ‘joining the West’; and they will recall the original moral critique which socialism offered. Indeed, Havel might do well to recall that an earlier generation of East European intellectuals was once just as confident that it had discovered ‘truth’—in socialism itself.As far as the difference between ‘socialism’ and ‘communism’ is concerned, the former has generally been taken to refer to a more or less protracted transitional stage in progress towards the latter, the classless,ultimate destination of human societies. Most of the countries discussed in this volume have described themselves as socialist rather than communist. (Of course, according to one theoretical strand they should be classified as ‘state-capitalist’, thereby allowing one to hail the revolutions of 1989 as the possible resurrection of socialism rather than its demise. In the West, at least until recently, ‘communist’ political parties were obliged to use this name in order to distinguish themselves from other parties of a social-democratic type. In everyday life in Eastern Europe in recent decades the term ‘communist’ has been used, along with the term ‘Bolshevik’, for the most part with emphatic derogatory intent. A similar nuance may be detected in the chapters in this volume, with some authors preferring to write about communism, while others prefer socialism; the editor has not attempted to impose overall consistency.

The material consequences in the East of the German occupation, the Soviet advance and the partisan struggles were thus of an altogether different order from the experience of war in the West. In the Soviet Union, 70,000 villages and 1,700 towns were destroyed in the course of the war, along with 32,000 factories and 40,000 miles of rail track. In Greece, two-thirds of the country’s vital merchant marine fleet was lost, one-third of its forests were ruined and a thousand villages were obliterated. Meanwhile the German policy of setting occupation-cost payments according to German military needs rather than the Greek capacity to pay generated hyper-inflation.

Yugoslavia lost 25 percent of its vineyards, 50 percent of all livestock, 60 percent of the country’s roads, 75 percent of all its ploughs and railway bridges, one in five of its pre-war dwellings and a third of its limited industrial wealth—along with 10 percent of its pre-war population. In Poland three-quarters of standard gauge rail tracks were unusable and one farm in six was out of operation. Most of the country’s towns and cities could barely function (though only Warsaw was totally destroyed).

But even these figures, dramatic as they are, convey just a part of the picture: the grim physical background. Yet the material damage suffered by Europeans in the course of the war, terrible though it had been, was insignificant when set against the human losses, ft is estimated that about thirty-six and a half million Europeans died between 1939 and 1945 from war-related causes (equivalent to the total population of France at the outbreak of war) — a number that does not include deaths from natural causes in those years, nor any estimate of tine numbers of children not conceived or bom then or later because of the war.

Only in 1947 did forced repatriation cease, with the onset of the Gold War and a new willingness to treat displaced persons from the Soviet bloc as political refugees (the 50,000 Czech nationals still in Germany and Austria at the time of the February 1948 Communist coup in Prague were immediately accorded this status). A total of One and a half million Poles, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Romanians, Yugoslavs, Soviet nationals and Jews thus successfully resisted repatriation. Together with Balls these formed the overwhelming majority of displaced persons left in the western zones of Germany and Austria, and in Italy. In 1951 the European Convention on Human Rights would codify the protection to which such displaced aliens were entitled, and finally guarantee them apainsr forcible rptnm to persecution.

Behind these nebulous stirrings of doubt anti disillusion there was a very real and, as it seemed at the time, present threat. Since the end of the Second World War, Western Europe had been largely preserved from civil conflict, much less open violence. Armed force had been deployed to bloody effect all across Eastern Europe, in tire European colonies, and throughout Asia, Africa and South America. The Cold War notwithstanding, heated and murderous struggles were a feature of the post-war decades, with millions of soldiers and civilians killed from Korea to the Congo. The United States itself had been the sire of three political assassinations and more than one bloody riot. But Western Europe had been an island of civil peace.

When European policemen did beat or shoot civilians, the latter were usually foreigners, often dark-skinned. Aside from occasional violent encounters with Communist demonstrators, the forces of order in Western Europe were rarely called upon by their governments to handle violent opposition and, when they were, the violence was often of their own perpetrating. By the standards of the in ter-war decades, Europe’s City streets were quite remarkably safe — a point that was frequently underscored by commentators contrasting Europe’s well-regulated society with the rampant and uncaring individualism of urban America. As for the student 'riots’ of the Sixties, they served, if anything, to confirm this diagnosis; Europe's youth might play at revolution but it was mostly show. The 'street-fighting men’ ran little risk of actually getting hurt.

In the 1970s, the prospect suddenly darkened, lust as eastern Europe, in the wake of the invasion of Prague, was stifled in the fraternal embrace of the Party patriarchs, western Europe appeared to be losing its grip on public order. The challenge did not come from the conventional

Left. To be sure, Moscow was well pleased with the balance of international advantage in these years; Watergate and the fail of Saigon had decidedly reduced America’s standing while the USSR, as the world’s largest petroleum producer, did very well out of the Middle East crises. But the publication in English of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago and his subsequent expulsion from the Soviet Union in February 1974, followed within a few years by the massacres in Cambodia and the plight of the Vietnamese 'boat people’.

1.2. REMAKING AND REVIVAL OF SOCIALISM IN A NEW ERA

After the Second World War there is no immediate break with national historical master narratives. Rather, we witness a variety of attempts in Western Europe to stabilise traditional notions of national community by making them acceptable to liberal- democratic languages of "national community' and purifying them of any contamination from Fascism, National Socialism and authoritarianism. In many cases, languages of an alleged community of victims were vitally important to achieve such stabilisation. Germans, Italians and, most famously, Austrians were constructed as victims of National Socialism and Fascism. Austria was now constructed as the first victim of National Socialist aggression in Europe. Those countries occupied by German troops had been victims’ of occupation. This was also the case for Italians, who could sometimes forget that they had had a Fascist regime of their own. Even the Germans constructed themselves, first and foremost, as victims of Hitler and of war. And, furthermore, the languages of national resistance’ underpinned notions of alternative "national communities' that had successfully upheld the good national traditions even in the years of darkness. Rival narratives of resistance led to different constructions of the national community’ in Italy and France, where Communist narratives competed with Gaullist and Catholic narratives of resistance, The Italian resistance was hailed as a kind of second Risorgimento, and even in West Germany, the resistance of 20 July 1944 was the saving grace of Germany in the post-war world. Traditional national master narratives were also stabilised with reference to the Communist other in the post-Second World War West. Erstwhile Fascists, National Socialists and supporters of other right-wing authoritarian regimes had to learn that many of their former beliefs and definitions of the national community’ had been mistaken, but they could rest assured that at least their first such merger was attempted by the Soviet Union following the successful Bolshevik revolution of 1917, though we might even go further back, to the European labour movements of the nineteenth century that produced largely auto didactic attempts to write class into national histories that comprehensively nationalised class histories in Europe well before 1914.

§CHAPTER II. EUROPEAN WESTERN MODELS OF SOCIALIST PARTIES

1.1: BREAK THROUGH OF THE SOCIALIST PARTIES

This trench warfare character of deliberations is symptomatic of a deeper lack of content in its European work. The International seemed to become even more involved in coordinating national policies than making one of its own. The discussions or integration, especially once they move into their functionalist phase, arc characterised by a remarkable lack of debate on what trade liberalisation, convertibility, transport policies etc. would actually imply for the economies involved or for the realisation of socialist goals on a national, let alone international, level. It is not as though socialists were incapable of such debate as the minutes of the socialist group in Luxembourg demonstrate. Confronted with practical questions of coal and steel policy, the six delegations demonstrated a capacity for grappling with technical questions and of often agreeing to socialist positions. The essential difference there, however, was that all parties were operating within a common framework of reference. That did not exist on European questions with the result that the matters discussed in the economic experts committee which was after all the most appropriate forum for collating information and for mulating the direction for debate, tended to be ‘neutered’. In order to avoid transferring the integration/non-integration issue downwards, the Bureau framed the subjects for discussion so broadly that European specifics tended to be lost from sight. Thus the failure of the International to solve the integration debate produced a torpor which stimied initiatives in other directions. The International was not to ‘lead the way for humanity, as Van der Goes van Natcrs had called in June 1951. Indeed one might even question whether Professor Loth’s judgment that “The Socialist International continued to exert no more than a modest effort on the progress of European integration"might not even err on the side of generosity. When the results of the Schuman Plan negotiations were discussed in a special conference, Sweden was the only country outside the “six” to bother to send a delegation at all. Moreover, although all the parties had been asked to submit a memorandum in advance outlining the considerations determining thinking in their own countries, the Netherlands had been the only one to do so. It argued that the ECSC represented a step forward along the road towards both international planning and functional integration and that, if it were to follow an expansionist policy, it could contribute towards full employment and the equal isadon of living standards, presumably in an upward direction. However, the memorandum emphasised the need to anchor the new community in a wider setting via a scries of association agreements with the Scandinavian countries and the UK and by creating deliberate overlaps with the Council of Europe. Finally, it emphasised the need for strengthening democratic control and exercising socialist vigilance. The issue had first been raised at a special conference of the parties of Committee for European Economic Cooperation (henceforth CEEC) countries held in Sclsdon Park in March 1948. The CEEC had been created in response to American demands that the allocation of Marshall Aid funds be decided by Europeans on the basis of a pan-Europcan, as opposed to rigidly national, reconstruction needs. It was also intended to become the vehicle for closer economi c association leading ulti mately to s ome form of political integration. Although it was ultimately to disappoint such lofty ideals it became the immediate focus of European federalist ambitions, and hopes were raised by the fact that it had decided to form a study group for the formation of a European customs union. At the Sclsdon Park conference the French socialists had urged that the impetus for closer cooperation provided by Marshall Aid should be employed for the creation of a European federation. This had been countered by the Bri tish co mention th at the develop ment of a mech a ni sm for more regular inter-governmental cooperation was sufficient for achieving the immediate ends envisaged. Since the only support which the French had obtained had come from the Benelux countries, it was this latter view which had carried the day. Although the final resolution had implied an ultimate goal of a 'United States of Europe’, it made no mention of specific ways in which it was to be achieved and although it ended with the trumpet call. The Socialist International itself did not formally come into existence until March 1951 but the roots of this, the ‘Third International’ can be traced back to the war and the impetus given by a preparatory conference in London in March 1945 or, more precisely, to the conference in Clacton in May 1946 at which the decision was taken to establish a ‘Socialist Information and Liaison Office’ headed by Denis Healey. Even so it was to take a further two abortive conferences and another eighteen months before a ‘Committee of International Socialist Conference' (henceforth COMISCO) was established providing the institutional framework from which the International was to emerge. No sooner had the conference establishing COMISCO (and, incidentally, settling the thorny question of West German admittance) disbanded than the movement was confronted with a split in its ranks in the form of the expulsion and desertion of the East European Socialist parties in the aftermath of the seizure of power by the Communists in Czechoslovakia. This reduced the International to a western European rump, bolstered by a few Eastern European parties-in-exile, but although it removed a potentially paralysing conflict of interest it did little to increase cohesion on so vital a question as the movement towards ‘European integration’.

1.2: FRANCE

The Centre polytechnicien ries éludes économiques (CPEE):: such was X-Crise’s formal and rather cumbersome name. It was formed in December 1931 by a trio of Polytechnique graduate sy Gerard Barde t, André Loizillon, and John Nicolétis, and in its first years the organization functioned more as a debating society than as a partisan body. Liberal voices were listened to, Colson and the up-and-coming star of liberal orthodoxy Jacques RuelT were invited around to join in the general exchange of views. Socialism too got a hearing. Nicolétis was himself ‘Very much on the Left,” and he got support in X-Crise debate from SFÏO party regular Jules Moth and from the pianist Louis Vallon, Bulan X-Cirise mainstream soon emerged, led by Jean Coutrot, a remarkable man by all accounts. Coutrot, a veteran of the Ch eat War, had lost a leg in combat vet remained an avid tennis player. He was an engineer by training but also a visionary who maintained a wide correspondence with unconventional souls like himself, from the maverick Catholic theologian Teilhard de Chardin to the New Age philosopher avant la lettre Aidons Huxley. Control was a firm believer in the plan. The Great War and the depression had closed an era, “An irreversible change of civilization/’ as Nicolétis put it, was under way. It was clear enough that the old laissez-faire order, centered on the profit-seeking individual, had lost its purchase. The unmediated pursuit of self-interest, as the economic slump made all too plain, led to irrationalities and disarray. And the individual? He was a figure of receding importance, as business enterprises, once family affairs, now took on more corporate, managerial forms. Auguste Detoeuf, an electrical industry executive, addressed a well-disposed X-Crise audience in May 1936 on “the end of liberalism.vil The plan, however, promised a way out of the present, liberal-made crisis. For the ruthless and self-destructive egotism of yesteryear, it would substitute a new guiding ethic, “la notion du service social.” And in place of the once-sovereign individual it would substitute a decision-making elite, harmonized and made coherent by “a community of culture.

In a New Statesman pamphlet of 1954 Cole maintained that socialism meant ‘something radically different from the managerial Welfare State’.47 He also returned to the division of political temperaments between ‘anarchists’ and ‘bureaucrats’, explaining that the Webbs had been fond of using it at the time when he had joined the Fabian Society back in 1908. He acknowledged the bureaucratic achievements of—the list is revealing—‘the advance towards the Welfare State … the promotion of state enterprise … the attack on anti-social vested interests … pressing for the assurance of a national minimum standard of life … devising schemes of redistributive taxation, and … attacking private monopolies with proposals for unification under public ownership’.

Cole approved of Kropotkin and Gandhi in contrast to theorists, ‘whether of the Communist or of the Social Democratic varieties [who] have alike accepted the assumption that the most advanced techniques— and accordingly those most appropriate to Socialism—involve not only a continued increase in the scale of production, but also workplaces employing ever larger aggregations of routine workers’:

The ‘large ambitions’ o Guild Socialism, Cole recalled, were for ‘the creation of a libertarian Socialist society’. In ‘Socialism, centralist or libertarian?’, published posthumously, he reflected that ‘there have always been two fundamental cleavages in Socialist thought—the cleavage between revolutionaries and reformists, and the cleavage between centralizers and federalists’. The first cleavage had monopolized attention at the expense of the second, and hence of Cole’s own tradition of libertarian, decentralist socialism. The latter stood outside the conflict between Bolshevism and parliamentary social democracy, both of which ‘regarded increasing centralization of power as an unmistakable characteristic of progress, and regarded themselves as the destined heirs of capitalist concentration and of the centralized power of the modern State’.

There were other intriguing features of the socialist revival. There was that tendency to evoke the socialist future not through conventional political declarations or detailed policy formulations but through aesthetics, myth, Christian symbolism and idioms, metaphor and other forms of literary embellishment, dreams and various kinds of utopian imagining. Another interesting feature was the spate of utopian socialist community building that emerged as a significant strand of socialist political activity during the revival years. These applied forms of socialist utopianism mushroomed during these decades and complemented the imagined forms of socialist utopianism which appeared in contemporary socialist writing and other outlets.

How should we account for all this? How should we explain the sudden awakening of socialist sentiment at this particular historical ‘moment’, and the speed at which it spread? How, too, should we interpret the highly variegated ideological makeup of British socialism in this period, as well as the ubiquitous presence of spiritual elements within this ideology? Additionally, how should we account for that inclination on the part of many contemporary socialists to evoke the socialist future through myth, religious symbolism and idioms, aesthetics, metaphor, dreams and utopian imagining? The ‘sudden’ appearance of those utopian socialist communities at this juncture needs to be explained as well.

One could follow the trajectory of earlier historiography to explain all this. The onset of the socialist revival itself particularly in its earliest stages from 1881 through to around 1896, has been put down to a chain of developments leading inexorably towards the emergence of a more secular, mature and representative class-based political party system, a ‘tributary’ feeding into a political mainstream that was to be eventually filled by the Labour Party. In this interpretation, which clearly exhibits historicist undertones, no particularly unique, novel or special characteristics are ascribed to the sudden awakening of socialist sentiment at this 'moment1. Other accounts go further, even rejecting the view that the sudden emergence of socialist groups in the 1880s represented a 'turning point’ or ushered in a new, distinctly socialist era. Rather, it is claimed that there was no sharp break with the past in the 1880s and that account needs to be taken of the strong line of continuity between British socialism and Liberal Radicalism.11 Again, such accounts are unwilling to ascribe novel or special qualities to the socialist revival. As for the presence of those aesthetic, utopian, religious and other spiritual elements within socialism’s ideological makeup during the revival years, this has been the subject of plentiful comment in the scholarship. This being said, this scholarship has tended to employ a particular mode of conceptual language to describe these elements. The widespread use of the concept of ‘ethical socialism’ is a particular case in point. Though it does shed some light on the strong moral component within the revival, the broad, allembracing master-narrative of ‘ethical socialism leaves other important areas of socialist ideology relatively unexplored. At the very least, the ethical socialism interpretation has been unable to fully explain why British socialism assumed such a highly variegated, nuanced and luxuriant profile during these decades. Other attempts to view aspects of the revival's spiritual and religious content through the prism of concepts such as the 'religion of socialism' or theological 'primitivism' also lack the necessary precision to fully comprehend the extraordinary richness of socialism at this point in its development; Other comment is less fulsome. These accounts tend to understate or downplay the exotic religious, aesthetic and utopian strands within British socialism, passing them off as aberrant phenomena, a quirky sub-text to the main story concerning the development of Labour socialism which tends to follow the trajectory of the dominant Fabian narrative or a Marxist narrative associated with Hyndman’s SDF or Morris’s SL.

1.3: GERMANY

Right-wing motivated acts of violence and terrorism in Germany after the Second World War are deeply rooted within the attempt to establish a tradition of continuity with the National Socialist regime and the emergence as well as development of organized Right-Wing Extremism in Germany needs to be seen in the social and political context of the first decade after 1945. One of the first major political topics influencing the growth of right-wing parties and movements was the creation of the socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the Soviet-controlled Eastern part of Germany in 1949. The subsequent German partition and its solution remained a central political topic for all parties, including the Far-Right. In addition the growing East-West conflict and Cold War resulted in strategic support for the anti-communist forces in Germany through Allied intelligence agencies, oftentimes including rightwing extreme groups and individuals. Highly qualified former Nazis (e.g.. from the SS or Gestapo) were swiftly integrated in specialized new organizations, for example, the so-called Organization Gehlen, which later turned into the German international intelligence (Bundcsnachrichtcndienst, BND), or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Their intimate knowledge about Soviet military structures and the Eastern European landscape acquired during the Second World War made them valuable assets during the Cold War despite their political past.With a membership of approximately 10,000, the SRP acted as a collaboration organization for numerous former high-ranking Nazis, for example former Wehrmacht general Otto Ernst Reiner (1912-1997), who had helped to put down the Stauffenberg coup d'etat against Hitler in 1944. Other former Nazis decided to infiltrate other parties, for example the liberal FDP (see below). One member of the DKP-DRP who entered the first Bundestag was Adolf von Thadden (1921-1996), who had been an officer in the Wehrmacht and NSDAP member since 1939. Thadden was mostly responsible for founding the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) in 1964 as the first unifying political party for the Extreme Right in Germany. He remained chairman of the NPD until 1971. After his death, it became known that he had been an informant for the British MI6 during his time with the NPD.However, between 1945 and 1949 all re-establishment of political parties required a license issued by the Allied Control Council and thereby the official establishment of an openly National Socialist party was impossible. Hence, right-wing extremists or former Nazis discussed the strategic infiltration of small but promising new parties versus the establishment of extra-parliamentary organizations. Some former Nazis achieved high political positions within the young German democracy. Kurt Georg Kiesinger (1904-1988) for example became the third German Chancellor between 1966 and 1969 for the CDU party, despite the fact that he had been an NSDAP member since 1933 and was a high-ranking official in the National Socialist Foreign Affairs Office. Another politician with a Nazi past was Hans Filbinger (1913-2007), who became prime minister of the state Baden-Württemberg between 1966 and 1978. Filbinger had to step down after it became public that he had issued death sentences as a navy judge between 1943 and 1945 and was an NSDAP member. The first right-wing conservative party was the DKP-DRP (German Conservative Parly – German Reich Party) established in 1946. No West European communist party was as badly affected by the Cold War as the West German one, The once powerful KPF> had already been decimated by Nazi persecution up to 1945 and widespread popular Russophobia immediately afterwards, but still achieved respectable results in various post-war regional elections, gaining representation at many levels including, in 1949, the first parliament of the Federal Republic. The East German workers' uprising of June 1953, however, worsened the already hostile Cold "War climate to such an extent that the 1956 ban proclaimed by the Federal Constitutional Court hit an isolated organisation incapable of rallying much opposition against its proscription. Operating underground and through legal front organisations such as the pacifist DFU (DeutscheFriedensunion, German Peace Union) and the WN ( Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Nazircgimes, Association of those Persecuted by the Nazi Regime), its members being subjected to frequent police harassment and legal persecution, it became even more dependent on East Germany, where its organisational centre wras now located. In 1969, thethe Berufsverbot (the ban on the employment of political radicals in the extensive German public sector), the Vietnam solidarity campaign and the Peace Movement, The membership of the DKP reached its high point in the mid-1970s with 42,453 according <o the executive report to the IV Party Congress in I976. In 1949, the party gained five seats in the first Bundestag (federal parliament) but dissolved itself due to internal power struggles between the conservative wing and the openly National Socialist wing. The latter split off and founded the strong National Socialist “Sozialistische Reichspartei” SRP (Socialist Reich Party) in 1949 after the license requirement had been abolished. The SRP was prohibited in 1952 after it had gained seats in two German state parliaments. Although extreme right-wing parties are not the main topic of this work, they are essential to order to understand the roots of the militant and clandestine German Far-Right during the early years of the Federal Republic. Three political parties attempted to continue the ideological tradition of National Socialism soon after the war had ended: the Deutsche Reichspartei (German Reich Party, DRP) founded 1950 and disbanded 1965, the Sozialistische Reichspartei (Socialist Reich’s Party, SRP) founded 1949 and prohibited 1952, and the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democrats Party of Germany, NPD) founded 1964 and which is still active. These parties gave hope for renewing the political success of the Extreme Right and National Socialist ideals to the remaining former cadres of the Third Reich and the still committed followers of the movement. Acting as safe havens for irreformable Nazis, these three parties were key to the re-establishment of working networks, propaganda and fundraising structures after the downfall of the Third Reich.In 2001, this radicalization led to the first attempt by the German government to prohibit the NPD, which was rejected by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2003 because the majority of the incriminating material had been produced by paid informants from various intelligence services. In 2004, the NPD started to regain some electoral support and won seats in some state parliaments and also added another pillar to its major strategy called “struggle for the organized will," which aims at unifying Extreme Right parties and movements to one common entity. In 2010, Udo Voigt lost internal power struggles over the new party strategy to more extreme and radical forces, showing another shift to extremism. He was replaced by Holger Apfel, who was succeeded by Udo Pastors and Frank Franz in 2014 (e.g., Staud 2005; Brandstetter 2006; Backes, Mletzko & Stoye 2010). The party has clearly shifted to a more violent and criminal approach since 2000. Between 2002 and 2012, for example, 110 elected NPD officials across Germany had committed 120 crimes or were charged, while in office. These crimes mostly consisted of physical assault, illegal restraint, possession of weapons and explosives, robbery and blackmail (SWR 2012), This shows how the party has become not only a political institution openly tolerating severe crimes by its members and leading personnel but also setting clear examples to their supporters regarding the NPD's disrespeet for the democratic legal order. Going back to 1950 however, after the license requirement of the Allied Control Council had been abolished, a number of right-wing extremist organizations and parties were founded- Most notably, a support and network organization for former Waffen-SS members (HiAG), tire Viking Youth (active between 1952 and 1994, when it was prohibited), and many openly National Socialist publishing houses. In addition, previously illegal associations of former military members could now be re-established. In 1951, the German parliament adopted a law designed to allow for the re employment of former officials of the National Socialist state who were not classified as high ranking or charged. In consequence, up to 90 percent or the former stale employees could be reintegrated into the posl-Second World War German bureaucracy. The NPD itself remained the most important political party of the Extreme Right, although it was politically irrelevant for the most time of its activity. After its creation in 1964, Adolf Thadden became the party’s second chairman between 1967 and 1971 during its best electoral results and nearly missed entering the Bundestag in 1969. Afterwards the NPD was not able to regain any significance for the following twenty years. Thadden resigned as chairman in 1971, after the militant wing within the party grew stronger and blamed the “too soft” political standpoint for their failure to enter the Bundestag. Thadden’s successor – Martin Mubgnug, who remained chairman till 1990 – attempted to focus the party on nationalistic conservatism with no success in terms of electoral support Günter Deckert – Mußgnug’s successor – shifted the party’s main focus by including more open National Socialist elements into the NPD and starting a process of radicalization. Deckert himself was imprisoned for denying the Holocaust. His successor – Udo Voigt, who became chairman in 1996 – further advanced this process by actively seeking organizational links with openly neo-Nazis groups and skinhead comradeships. He also introduced a new main strategy called the “Three Pillar Strategy,” involved the “struggle for the parliaments," the “struggle for the streets” and the “struggle for the minds.” This concept was the starting point of a strong increase in the NPD’s involvement in public events such as concerts, rallies and youth camps. In 1950, the positive German economic development had a negative impact cm the electoral support for right-wing parties, however, in 1959, the first nationwide waves of neo-Nazi crimes – mostly swastika paintings on synagogues – swept over the country, which intensified with the trial against Adolf Eichmann 1961 in Israel. During the first German recession in 1966/67, right-wing parties saw their first major surge in electoral support, creating the climate for the NPD’s best results a few years later. Regarding the development in the violent and militant part of the Far-Right, one concept with wide inspirational value – albeit lacking any military value at that time – were the Werewolf guerrilla tactics developed in the last months and weeks of the Third Reich, which did produce a small number of arson attacks and assassinations, but remained a propaganda stunt (Biddiscombe 1998). Nevertheless, small, clandestine cells operating in the fashion of insurgent or guerrilla movements can be seen as a very early and continuously strong aspect of the German militant Extreme Right ever since. Of course, a number of still committed National Socialists, former SS soldiers and officers, and adolescents socialized and educated by the Nazi state played an important part in reviving the militant Right after the war, which led a number of politicians and experts to assume this phenomenon would naturally die out sooner or later. Seventy years later, Germany, nevertheless, has experienced wave after wave of rightwing militancy in many different forms, which indicates that the Extreme Right was able to renew itself and to maintain a constant level of attraction towards new followers. This chapter gives a chronological account of the most important events, groups, networks, individuals and developments regarding the violence and terrorism from the Far-Right in post-Second World War Germany. As mentioned above, the first visible re-emergence of Extreme Right public activism occurred in 1959, when the two DRP members Arnold Strunk and Paul Schonen painted swastikas and anti-Semitic slogans on a newly opened synagogue in Cologne, causing a wave of 470 registered similar events across West Germany within the following four weeks. This period became known as the “Schmierwelle” (roughly “graffiti wave”) in the German press). In addition, right-wing parties could gain small initial electoral successes in several German states during the early 1950s and 1960s, nurturing the hope among right-wing extremists of being able to take over the republic through the ballot box again. Soon the NPD party established itself as the most successful political force of the Far-Right having entered seven state parliaments between 1964 and 1968 – a success attributed generally to the economic depression and political stagnation perceived by large parts of the population, caused by a federal coalition government between the two largest parties (CDU and SPD).At the same time, between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s, the conflict in South Tyrol began to turn violent with several bomb attacks being carried out in different waves of terrorism by clandestine insurgency movements supported by German extreme right-wing individuals and groups. One of the supporters fueling the conflict was a clandestine network of former SS-security agency (SS- Sicherheitsdienst) officers who had established their own intelligence among former SS members in the 1960s and reportedly delivered explosives to partner organizations in South Tyrol). But also within Germany, former SS-officers and Nazi officials practiced clandestine tactics in an attempt to regain power. On January 15, 1953, the British occupation government publicly reported that a conspiracy of former high-ranking Nazis aiming to infiltrate the liberal party (FDP) had been uncovered. The so-called “Naumann-circle” or “Dusseldorf-circle" was led by the last secretary of state in Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda, Werner Naumann (1909-1982). Naumann gathered at least twenty-eight known former high-ranking SS and NSDAP officials in an attempt to strategically infiltrate the young liberal party (FDP) in North Rhine-Westphalia in order to rehabilitate National Socialism, themselves, and re-erect an authoritarian state . In the elections of 1969, the NPD party narrowly missed the 5 percent threshold to enter the federal parliament (Bundestag) leading to the party’s first internal crisis and political decline. Nevertheless, these events also convinced the more radical wing of the political right that waiting for electoral takeover of the government would be hopeless. Although it is w idely believed that the NPD’s failure to enter the Bundestag caused the first generation of post-wrar right-wing terrorists to become active at least two small groups planning attacks out of a National Socialist ideology w'ere detected prior to the election of 1969: a three-person cell attempting to assassinate the Federal Prosecutor General and carry out an arson attack against the German coordination office for the punishment of war criminals in Ludwigsburg between 1965 and 1966 (“Werewolf Cell”); and a group of eight Germans and Austrians planning explosive attacks against infrastructure in South Tyrol between 1963 and 1964 (“Group around Dr. Burger”). These groups, however, were not seen as a threat to the public safety and were completely ignored by the press and academia at that time, even after a clearly right-wing motivated Josef Bachmann, who had contacts to other neo-Nazis and right-wing terrorists, attempted to assassinate the left-wing activist Rudi Dutschke 1968, which greatly impacted the radicalization process of the extreme left in Germany at that time .That only slowly changed after more sophisticated and better prepared groups and individuals were uncovered after 1969. In addition, for the 1960s, no detailed statistics about right-wing crimes exist. However, the annual intelligence report of the German Ministry of the Interior for 1970 states that 6 percent of 1,724 rightwing crimes between 1960 and 1970 – that is, 103 – were carried out with terrorist motives including: arson, bomb explosions, homicide, manslaughter, and kidnapping (BMI 1971) making for a substantial number of violent right-wing extremist incidents during that first decade of organized Far-Right movements and parties since the prohibition of the SRP in 1952.

It was hardly surprising that the reform intentions of the PDS were also outpaced by change that had become even more rapid. After the Volkskammer (Chamber of Deputies) elections of March 1990, the PDS found itself on the opposition benches, backed by only 16 percent of East German voters, facing isolation and hostility from other parties and among the wider population. The survival of the PDS introduced a new element into the German party system: a left-socialist party, neither communist nor social democratic. According to PDS election campaign manager Andre Brie, “[T]hc Socialist People's Party of Denmark and the Party of the Left of Sweden have demonstrated for several decades . .. that it is possible… to develop politically effective parties beyond the social democratic and the communist type of party.”4 The Jeft- socialist PDS could function in a way past communist parties (Communist Party of Germany [KFD], German Communist Party (DKP) could not—as a “strategic reserve" of the Social Democrats.5 Although the result of the 1998 elections gave Social Democrats and Greens a majority in the Bundestag without requiring the support of the PDS. the new constellation in the party system made future "Swedish majorities" possible in Germany, that is, minority governments of Social Democrats and Greens relying on parliamentary support by a left- socialist party. By 1998, however, the PDS had consolidated its position in East Germany and had become somewhat less marginal in West Germany. It had, for the first time, gained 5 percent nationwide in the 1998 Bundestag elections. And it had broken through the isolation imposed on it by all other parties since 1990. For the first rime, the PDS had been accepted as junior partner of the Social Democrats in a state government, in Mecklenburg^ West Pommcrania. This party without a purpose, facing the prospect of becoming totally insignificant after unification wiih a much larger West Germany, came close to selfdissolution at the extraordinary party congress of December 1989. Its continuing isolation and loss of members made its demise appear predictable and inevitable. However, the PDS succeeded in surviving and transforming the remnants of the SED into a viable left-socialist party, leaving behind ideology and party structures modeled on the Soviet communist party. From 1990 to 1992 the survival of the Democratic Socialists was always in doubt. By 1994 it was still possible to describe the PDS as party without future, although by the end of 1994 the party had survived a second national election. In Germany the situation was complicated by the fact that the Social Democratic movement was the object of special attention from Marx and Engels. By the last decades of the nineteenth century, the SPD had become the most powerful Social Democratic party in the world and had come to believe that much of its reputation and strength derived from its position as the standard-bearer of Marxist ideology. Within the SPD, therefore, challenges to orthodoxy faced greater psychological and intellectual resistance than they did in many other Social Democratic parties. Karl Kaut- sky’s intellectual brilliance further enhanced the SPD's theoretical preeminence but served to reinforce the hold of rigid traditionalism. Especially after Engels’s death in 1895, Kautsky was unquestionably the most important Marxist theoretician in Europe, and Ins interpretation of Marxism became the SPD’s official credo. As time passed, however, and the situation in Wiiheimine Germany began to diverge from that laid out in the writings of Marx and Engels, first Engels and then Kagtskv defended the party’s official orthodoxy from increasingly frequent attacks. Even though they played no official role in running the party, their interventions into policy debates played an important role in stifling challenges to traditional doctrine, such as Eduard Bernstein’s revisionism, helping to maintain the intellectual hegemony of a distinct set of programmatic beliefs.

1.4. UNITED KINGDOM

The parties and party systems of the United Kingdom are plural, not singular, The system of party competition in England is not matched in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland because the names of competing parties sometimes differ, because of territorial differences in party strength, and in organisation. At the extreme, tn Northern Ireland there is no party lighting under a Conservative label, albeit until 1974 Ulster Unionists took the Conservative whip at Westminster, and two parties the pro-British Northern Ireland Labour Party, and the pro-Irish unity Social Democratic and Labour Party—compete for the claim of being the “true" Labour parly of the Province.

The following pages combine references to regional or parallel organisations of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties as well as descriptions of parties that are distinctive to one part of the United Kingdom Three small Northern Ireland parties—Sinn Fein, Provisional Sinn Fein and the Republican Clubs—also maintain close links with Dublin-based organisations and maintain in Scotland a political Labour Party", In 1977 a proposal for a Scottish Assembly necessitated the addition of the aim "to organise and maintain in the Scottish Assembly an Assembly Labour Party", in Scotland the establishment of a Scottish Parliament remained formal party policy up to ! 958, although the aim was dropped from election manifestos from 1950. In 1970 the party submitted evidence to the Royal Commission on the Constitution opposing the establishment of a Scottish Assembly or Parliament, On 16 August 1974 a special conference voted for "the setting up of a directly elected Assembly with legislative powers within the context of the political and economic unity of the United Kingdom". It campaigned officially for a Ves vote in the 1979 devolution referendum, and ran its own campaign organisation. The party’s 1979 general election manifesto reaffirmed its commitment to devolution, and advocated all-party talks to discuss changes in the Scotland Act so as to establish a Scottish Assembly – The Labour Party in Scotland has no separate party leader in Parliament. Since 1955 a named party spokesman has been appointed to deal with Scottish affairs: The party is organised into Constituency Labour Parties, one in each of the 71 Scottish Parliamentary constituencies. Delegates from CLPs and affiliated bodies meet annually in a Scottish conference. The conference is a regional meeting of the British Labour Party, but the rules stipulate that it does have the power "to decide from time to time what specific proposals of legislative, financial or admi nistrative reform shall be included in the party programme". An executive committee is elected annually and two auditors from the executive committee ratify the accounts. In 1977 the post of treasurer was created and Norman Buchan MP was elected by conference. The Scottish Labour Party was formed in January 1976 by pro-devolution]st elements within the Labour Party Scottish Council, including two MPs, Jim $t liars and John Robertson. The party’s principal aim, as enunciated at its inaugural meeting, was “to secure the establishment of a powerful Scottish Parliament capable of applying socialist solutions to the problems of Scotland”, The party first contested a parliamentary seat in the Glasgow Garscadden by-election in April 1978; the candidate, Mrs.Shiona Farrell, lost her deposit. In the 1979 general election, the party's three candidates fought Ayrshire South, Paisley and Edinburgh Central All three seats were lost, and in Edinburgh Central a deposit was lost as well. From the foundation of the party in 1976, the leader in Parliament and the Chairman was Jim Sillars, who was Parliamentary leader until 1979. From 1976 the executive chairman was Joe Farrell, and the general secretary Alex Neil The treasurer from 1976 to 1977 was Tom Yates, and since 1977, Paul McDonald. No details of membership or finance were published. A national council met quarterly to consider policy between annual conferences. An annual conference was held in October 1976 and 1977, to elect an executive committee and approve policy. The Labour government of 1945-51 had to confront unprecedented economic problems, especially problems of the balance of payments, whilst at the same time attempting major reforms of the economy. Much recent writing has focused on the extent of consensus (benign or malignant according to taste) underlying policy in the 1940s. The key concern is the interaction between such ideas and the constraints of actual policy-making. A recent author has described the Labour leadership of the late 1920s as assuming ‘evolutionary change and the Webbian “inevitability of gradualness”: socialism would not murder capitalism but emerge from it. For them social justice and economic efficiency through organisation co-ordination, and application of science were the hallmarks of the modem world’. This quotation aptly summarises much of Labour’s approach to the economy, extending both before and after the 1920s. On the one hand, ‘social justice and economic efficiency’ is probably the best one-line description of Labour’s general approach to policy-making through most of its history;1 on the other hand, the idea that socialism would emerge, in evolutionary fashion, from capitalism equally helps us understand much of Labour thinking, though this evolutionism was an extent discussed further below, challenged in the 1930´s by the evident faillite of capitalism to continue 'evolving' in the expected direction. The purpose to put Labour’s approach to the economy in 1945-51 into a longer-term perspective, by looking at the broad developments of its economic policy from the party’s foundation (as the Labour Representation Committee) in 1900. This debate ran alongside a parallel debate on the future of Scottish politics. The result was that the experiment of operating as an "open party" was first undertaken in Scotland under the name of Scottish Militant Labour, standing Tommy Sheridan for election from his jail cell.The Militant tendency became Militant Labour in 1991, after leaving the Labour Party. The journal Militant International Review, founded in 1969, became a monthly publication and was renamed Socialism Today in 1995. In 1997, Militant Labour changed its name to the Socialist Party, and the Militant newspaper was renamed the Socialist in the same year. The Socialist Party was formerly the Militant group (also known as the Militant tendency) which practised entryist tactics in the Labour Party and organised around the Militant newspaper. Founded in 1964, the Militant newspaper described itself as the "Marxist voice of Labour and Youth". In the 1980s, prominent Militant supporters Dave Nellist, Pat Wall and Terry Fields were elected to the House of Commons as Labour MPs. In 1982, the Liverpool District Labour Party adopted Militant's policies for Liverpool City Council in its battle against cuts in the rate support grant from government, and adopted the slogan "Better to break the law than break the poor". It came into conflict with the Conservative government. In 1989-90, Militant led the All-Britain Anti-Poll Tax Federation, which organized a successful non-payment campaign against the Community Charge, commonly called the poll tax. Militant's battles in Liverpool and against the poll tax involved defiance of what it regarded as iniquitous laws. Militant supporting Labour MP Terry Fields was jailed for refusing to pay the poll tax and expelled from the Labour Party for defying the law. The Labour Party had earlier found Militant guilty of operating as an entryist group with a programme and organisation entirely separate from that of the Labour Party running contrary to the party's constitution. Militant rejected these findings, claiming it stood for Labour's core socialist policies, whilst the 'right-wing' leadership were the real infiltrators, intent on changing the Labour Party into a capitalist party. In 1991, there was a debate within Militant as to whether to continue working within the Labour Party. The debate centred around whether Militant could still effectively operate in the Labour Party following the expulsions, whereas previously, under a more left-wing National Executive Committee (NEC), the Labour Party had not been inclined to support expulsions. Furthermore, the ferment and anger the poll tax had generated suggested that there was more to be gained as an open organisation than inside a Labour Party which opposed the Anti-Poll Tax Unions' tactic of non-payment of the tax. At a special conference 93% of delegates voted for the 'Open Turn'. A minority around Ted Grant broke away to form Socialist Appeal and remain in the Labour Party. The Socialist Party is a Trotskyist political party in England and Wales which adopted its current name in 1997. It was formerly known as Militant, an entryist group in the Labour Party from 1964 until it abandoned that tactic in 1991. It stands under the electoral banner of the Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition (TUSC). The Socialist Party has members in executive positions in a number of trade unions. It has sister parties in Scotland and Ireland and is a member of the Committee for a Workers' International and the European Anti-Capitalist Left. It is considered by many centre-left publications as being on the hard left of British politics.

§CHAPTER III. SOCIAL IMPACT AND STATE WELFARE

When people face what nothing in their past has prepared them for they grope for words to name the unknown, even when they can neither define nor understand it. Some time in the third quarter of the century we can see this process at work among the intellectuals of the West. The keyword was the small preposition ‘after’, generally used in its la finite form ‘post’ as a prefix to any of the numerous terms which had, for some generations, been used to mark out the mental territory of twentieth- century life. The world, or its relevant aspects, became post-industrial, post-imperial, post-modern, post-structuralist, post-Marxist, post-Gutenberg, or whatever. Like funerals, these prefixes took official recognition of death without implying any consensus or indeed certainly about the nature of life after death. In this way the greatest and most dramatic, rapid and universal social transformation in human history entered the consciousness of reflective minds who lived through it, This transformation is the subject of the present chapter. This explosion of numbers was parricularjy dramatic in university education, hitherto so unusual as to be demographically negligible, except in the USA. Before the Second World War even Germany, France and Britain, three of the largest, most developed, and educated countries with a total population of 150 millions, contained no more than 150,000 or so university students between them, or one tenth of one per cent of their joint populations. Yet by the late 1980s students were counted in millions in France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain and the USSR (to name only European countries), not to mention Brazil, India, Mexico, the Philippines and, of course, the USA, which had been the pioneer of mass college education. By this time in educationally ambitious countries, students formed upwards of 2.5 per cent of the total population – men, women and children – or even, in exceptional cases, above 3 per cent. It was not uncommon for 20 per cent of the twenty to twenty-four age- group to be in formal education. Even the academically most conservative countries – Britain and Switzerland – had risen to 1,5 per cent. Moreover some of the relatively largest student bodies were to be found in economically far from advanced countries: Ecuador (3.2 per cent), the Philippines (2,7 pier cent) or Peru (2 per cent). In fact, where families had the choice and the chance, they rushed their children into higher education, because it was by far the best way of winning them a better income, but, above all, higher social status. Of the latin American students interviewed by US investigators in the mid-1960s in various countries, between 79 and 95 per cent were convinced that study would put them into a higher social class within ten years. Only between 21 and 38 per cent felt that it would win them a much higher economic status than their family's (Liebman, Walker, Glazer, 1972). In fact, of course, it would almost certainly give them a higher income than non-graduates, and, in countries of small education, where the certificate of graduation guaranteed a place in the state machine, and therefore power, influence, and financial extortion, it could be the key to real wealth. Meanwhile, of course, the peasants of agrarian Europe stopped rilling the land. By the 1980s even the ancient strongholds of peasant agriculture in the east and south-east of the continent had no more than a third or so of their labour force in farming (Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece), and some had considerably less, notably Bulgaria (16.5 per cent in 1985). Only one peasant stronghold remained in or around the neighbourhood of Europe and the Middle East – Turkey, where the peasantry declined, but, in the mid-1980s, still remained an absolute majority. In some ill-advised countries the crisis produced a veritable industrial holocaust. Britain lost 25 per cent of its manufacturing industry in 1980-1984. Between 1973 and the late 1980s the total number employed in manufacturing in the six old-industrial countries of Europe fell by seven millions, or about a quarter, about half of w hich was lost between 1979 and 1983. By the late 1980s, as the working classes in the old industrial countries eroded and the new ones rose, the workforce employed in manufactures settled down at about a quarter of all civilian employment in all western developed regions, except the USA, where by that rime it was well below 20 per cent (Bairoch, 1988). It was a long way from theold Marxist dream of populations gradually proletarianized by the development of industry until most people would be (manual) workers. Except in the rarest cases, of which Britain was the most notable, the industrial working class had always been a minority of the working population. Nevertheless, the apparent crisis of the working class and its movements, especially in the old industrial world, was patent long before there was – speaking globally — any question of a serious decline. If the relationship between organized labour and postwar Labour governments was characterized by a form of policy-making in which the unions had privileged access to Labour policy-making, and that between organized labour and Conservative governments after 1979 was characterized by exclusion, the relationship between organized labour and the New Labour government has been distinctive. On the one hand, unions have had very little formal or institutional access to this government (Taylor 1998: 1 2). though there have been quarterly meetings between general secretaries, ministers and civil servants since late 2000. While there has been a sizeable influx of business people into the government, as ministers, advisers and heads of various task forces, unionists have only rarely been tapped for office. Evidence covering 300 task forces found that only 2 per cent of the members of the new bodies were from trade unions, compared writh 36 percent from private business and trade associations (Barker et aL 1999: 26). In 2001 the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) proposed a reorganization that would have put business executives on newly formed strategy boards and sent civil servants out to work in business for one week of each year. Only union protest led to backtracking and a statement that unionists could also sit on the strategy boards. Union influence has been informal, dependent upon personal relations between unions and individual ministers, for the most part junior ministers. The Varieties of Capitalism approach suggests that the existence of institutions in one part of the political economy may make the introduction of a new set of institutions in another sphere difficult, if not impossible; the selfreinforcing character of institutions makes it extremely difficult to jump paths from one type of political economy to another. Varieties of Capitalism theorists have identified two primary ideal-type political economies (though the outlines of a third, Mediterranean', type have been suggested: see 11 a 11 and Soskice2001: 21). In liberal market economies (LMEs), markets perform the role of co-ordinating relations between economic actors, labour markets are lightly regulated, and capital is allocated primarily through stock markets, ensuring high degrees of labour and capital mobility, which in turn encourage rapid economic adjustment and relatively low-wage, low-skill production. The United States is the exemplar here. In co-ordinated market economies (CMEs), on the other hand, markets are subordinated to regulation through non-market co-ordination mechanisms among collective economic actors, collective bargaining and legislation regulate the labour market, and financial markets provide long-term capital to firms, limiting labour and capital mobility. Low labour market flexibility' is compensated for by high-skill production and a high-trust system of industrial relations. As the capsule description above suggests. Germany is the most cited example of a CME.

The empirical evidence presented in a few studies suggests that job security regulations have been strengthened in periods of labour movement strength. After both world wars, the political left emerged with a vastly improved reputation, while the political right was 'at best unpopular. In countries that suffered the hardest consequences of the war (Germany in World War I; Prance, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands in World War II), the political left used these moments of strength to enact and strengthen job security regulations. In addition, the evidence suggests that the initial regulation of job security mattered because countries that had opted for the regulation of job security by means of collective agreements before World War I continued to rely on collective agreements even in periods of govern men t control (in particular Great Britain and Sweden after World War II).It is a challenge to explain the historical development of job security regulations in Western Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, t he varieties of capitalism thesis expects employers to consent to job security regulations because they help reduce or even eliminate market failures in the area of skill provision. However, there is little empirical evidence to support such a notion. For instance, it is certain that German industry opposed both the 1920 Works Council Act and the 1951 Dismissal Protection Act. This is also true for the skill-intensive industries and large manufacturers, which the varieties of capitalism thesis expects to be most supportive of job security regulations because it is exactly these kinds of industries that controlled the governing bodies of the employers' associations involved in the negotiations on the reform of labour law. In general, anti-capitalist forces, either of fascist or socialist origin, have pushed for the regulation of job security, not business representatives. In cases where post-war national unity coalition governments strengthened job security regulations, the reforms were enacted by coalitions that were strongly biased towards the radical left—a response to the dire economic situation, and often inspired by fascist precursor laws (France, Italy, and the Netherlands after World War 11). Overall, employers and business representatives tried to keep job security regulations as flexible as possible. It could be argued that the evidence presented docs not falsify the varieties of capitalism thesis because the thesis only applies to events after the late I940s/early 1950s, For instance, Hall (2007) does not analyse events before 1950 in his discussion of the evolution of varieties of capitalism in Europe. However, this rebuttal is not convincing, for two reasons: First, the main proponents of the skill-based varieties of capitalism thesis argue that an industrial pattern of diversified quality production had already emerged in the late nineteenth century a view also supported by economic historians Second, there is evidence that employers were concerned about the lack of skilled workers . However, rather than regulating job security, employers sought mechanisms to strengthen training, for instance by impeding the poaching of trained workers and by certifying the acquisition of skills. In fact, the available evidence suggests that attracting trainees willing to invest in skills was not a big issue. Hence, if the varieties of capitalism thesis were correct with regard to job security regulations, employers and business representatives should already have consented to job security regulations before the 1950s. This, however, was dearly not the case. The power resources thesis fails to acknowledge that unions have a strong interest in retaining control over the regulation of job security because it maximizes unions' Influence in the actual determination of the rules. Hence, in countries with strong labour movements but no existing legal regulation of the employment relationship (Denmark, Great Britain, and Sweden), unions used the 'corporate channel' to fi11 the policy space and regulated job security by means of collective agreements. In these countries, the unions retained issue ownership over the regulation of Job security even in times of labour movement strength and social democratic incumbency. When the governments of Germany, Italy, and the Neiberlands reformed job security legislation in the aftermath of World War 2, British, Danish, and Swedish unions were still negotiating with employers' associations about the regulation of job security in collective agreements. Their relative lack of success in securing better protection against dismissal was also influenced by the fact that the British, Danish, and Swedish employers were not discredited by wartime collaboration with fascist groups to the same extent as the French, German, and Italian ones.

Along with the Commission, the UK was the main mover hellinet EU reform. Having opened tip electricity supply in England and Wales to competition, the UK had a strong incentive to seek market opening in continental Europe through the EU. PowerGem National Power, the National Grid Company, the Electricity Association and ihe DT worked alongside each other to proselytize for European liberalization. The UK's main liberalization ally was Sweden, where as in telecommunications moves towards restructuring the sector on competitive lines anticipated EU membership. The relative cost-efficiency of the incumbent uiility, Vattenfall, equipped it to exploit the opportunities or a European power market. As in telecommunications, Vattenfall was already gearing up for competition with the commercialization of its corporate structure and management team (interview 23 November 2000). A hove all, Swedish interests in liberalization derived from the need to sharpen the competitive edge of an open economy in the face of intensifying international competition .There was cross-party agreement on liberalization. Initialed during a brief interlude of Centre-Right government in 1991-2, the reform was implemented by a Social Democratic government concerned that a competitive economy should sustain an extensive welfare state.Without ihe effects of revolutionizing technologies and dynamic market growth, electricity utilities were slower than their counterparts in telecommunications to refocus their interests from domestic towards European markets. Domestic consolidation remained a priority. Their strategy was to combine 'con solid a lory mergers at home with expansion and acquisition in other European markets incumbent utilities with a 'national champion1 potential were sponsored by governments, which had an interest in delaying market opening until their utilities were lit to compete. Negotiations culminating in the adoption of directive 96/92/EC were protracted by foot-dragging by all member states except the UK and Netherlands (and, after accession. Sweden and Finland). Although most member states had become liberalization converts by the end of the 1990s, France (assisted to a degree by Germany) persisted in resisting proposals for a second directive (2003/54/EC) designed to accelerate liberalization. German interests in liberalization divided along quite complex lines. The large generating companies had long been planning for liberalisation. I lowcver, smaller, regional and municipal power companies opposed reform . Municipal authorities faced the loss of’around DM6 bn in revenues deriving from exclusive distribution contracts that had served to cross-subsidize other municipal services. These conflicting interests created problems for the industry association, the VDEW. which publicly opposed liberalization, although its leading members were gearing up for it. The German Confederation of Industry (BDI) was split by interest conlliets between a recalcitrant electricity sector and electricity-intensive industry interest in competition. French interests were hound up with the strategic positioning oT the stale- owned utility EdK Initially, EdF had conceived European market opening as a vehicle for expanding an already well-developed international market strategy. Around 1990, however, it reversed its position, preferring to pursue export markets via cooperation with other European utilities, its hesitancy stemmed from a realization that European liberalization would undermine the domestic political networks in which its management composed largely of grand corps engineers – were deeply embedded (Eising and Jabko 2001: 750) EdF strategy thus revolved around defending its domestic dominance against European liberalization for as long as possible, whilst pursuing an aggressive Investment strategy to gain a slice of newly opening markets elsewhere The French government mirrored this shift in EdF's position, turning from advocacy of European liberalization to opposition, French interests were now conceived in terms of’ protecting massive state investment in nuclear power, and in preserving the revenues accruing to the slate from EdF profits – a particularly sensitive issue in view of budgetary constraints in the run-up to Economic and Monetary Union. France, Spain and Germany, then, all had a strategic interest in delay to enable potential ‘national champions’ to prepare for liberalization and to buy time to resolve the political difficulties of domestic reform. They also had an interest in broadly specified legislation allowing the preservation of key elements of national policy. Belgium shared these concerns because the government had little coherent idea of where its interests lay, in both sectors, German interests were divided between an advocacy coalition for liberalization and recalcitrant actors. In telecommunications, the conflict was largely resolved by the early 1990s, leaving Germany free to embrace liberalization in tandem with EU reform. In electricity, by contrast, the incentives were less compelling, and the difficulty of reconciling the opponents of reform meant that Germany was a relative laggard in implementing EU directives. In telecommunications, reform had been placed on the agenda as early as 19S0 by a Monopoly Commission report criticizing the protectionist procurement policies of the Bundcspost and advocating a full liberalization of terminals equipment and a limited degree ol competition in telecommunications services. Support for reform also came from business users of telecommunications services and would-be suppliers of telecommunications equipment from the computer sector like Nixdorf and IBM. In the political arena, the main advocate of reform was the liberal DP. which occupied the influential Economies Ministry after the Christian -Liberal coalition came to power in 1982. Initially, this reform coalition was opposed, by an equally strong array of interests. The CDU was concerned about universal service provision to its rural heart I and s' and its ‘social’ wing backed the trade unions in their opposition to liberalization, for its part. The CSU was sensitive to the benefits that the Bavarian electronics industry derived from protectionism.

§CONCLUSIONS

In many western European Countries, including the United Kingdom (Great Britain), Germany, France, and Sweden, democratic socialism is the political ideology that guides either the dominant governing party or the major opposition. In the United Kingdom, the democratic socialist British Labour Party, which has been out of power for a number of years, holds a significant lead in public opinion polls and is currently the party favored to win the next British election. In France, Socialist Francois Mitterrand was elected president in 1981 by a slim margin and won reelection in 1988 by 5TH percent of the vote. In 1995, although Jacques Chirac, a member of the R.P.R. (Rally for the Republic) party, defeated the Socialist candidate for the French presidency, the victory was by a narrow margin. A democratic socialist party has been the dominant ruling party in Sweden during most of the years since 1932. A democratic socialist party is the main opposition party in the national government in Germany and is in powet in many of the German laender, or states. Democratic socialist parties have also led governments in Belgium, Holland, Austria, Norway, Denemark, and Greece. The democratic socialists emerged as a major political force in Portugal after a longstanding dictatorship was overthrown in 1974 Mario Soares stepped down as president after serving two five-year terms, and was replaced in 1996 by another socialist candidate Jorge Sampaio. Currently, Portugal has both a socialist president and premier. In 1982 the Socialists won an overwhelming victory in Spam and remained in power until 1996, when Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, a four-term winner, was narrowly defeated. Outside of Europe, democratic socialist regimes have led governments even in Australia. Nothing better conveyed this uncase than the repeated use by political and intellectual figures of the phrase 'true democracy'. This adjectival qualification rapidly became and remained, for much of the 1950s, a key dement of European political discourse. It was one which also had several meanings. Most obviously, it formed part of the arsenal of anticommunist language by which the political parties and leaders of Western Europe defined their concept of democracy against what they regarded as the caricature of democracy that operated in the 'people's democracies' of Central and Eastern Europe. The visible spectacle in the East of mass crowds, crude propaganda techniques and show trials provided an almost daily demonstration of what democracy should not be, and in doing so helped to solidify a Western definition of a true democracy based around the individual citizen, pluralist intellectual debate and the rule of law. Socialist political figures in particular hastened to emphasize how their definitions of democracy should not be confused with those of the Communists. Indeed, a commitment to democratic practice and values became the means by which the Socialist parties of post-war Europe defined themselves against the false democrats of the Moscow-directed Communist Internationale. The ease of the Belgian Socialist Party (PSIMîSP), undoubtedly one of the most powerful Socialist parties in post-war Western Europe, was typical in this respect. Though in manyrespects, the party remained loyal to its nineteenth-century Marxist heritage, and eschewed attempts by some intellectual groups to make it adopt a new and more 'liberal' programme after the Liberation, the Socialist political leaders were at pains to demonstrate that they were 'socialistes de l'Occident' who had inherited the democratic values of West European culture. At the same time, however, most European .Socialist parties remained sensitive, as they long had been, to accusations that participation in democracy was in some sense a retreat from their Socialist ambitions. Thus, Socialist leaders often sought to present their commitment to democracy as part of their wider struggle for a Socialist transformation of society. As the banner held over the stage at the conference of the Belgian Socialist Party in June 1945 declared: 'La Victoire de la Démocratie sera celle du Socialisme', Writing shortly before the collapse of the Fourth Republic, the French Socialist leader, Guy Mollet, adopted a very similar tone, declaring that the members of the SFIO were committed to what he termed a 'démocratie socialiste', in which the political liberties of the existing regime would be supplemented by a real material equality of conditions. West Germany's Socialists of the SPD argued pretty much along the same lines. In 1946, Richard Lowenthal, a Social Democrat exiled in London during the T hird Reich, published his book, Beyond Capitalism, in which he developed the vision of a 'demokratischer Soziaiismus' that combined the teachings of Karl Marx, Rudolf Hilfcrding and John Maynard Keynes.24 Three years later, Willy Brandt argued at the annual convention of the SPD that the party's agenda of 'democratic socialism' was founded on a shared commitment to 'humanism, the rule of law, and social justice'. With the consolidation ot Western Europe during the later 194tJs into a defined and inter-connected framework of nation-states, discussions of the content of democracy did, however, become both more prominent and more 'political'. This was especially so in France, Germany and Italy, where the highly contested debates surrounding the nature of the new constitutions to be introduced in each country necessarily focused attention on issues that were sometimes highly technical in nature (notably the relative merits of different voting systems) but also powerfully symbolic. Thus, the referendum in 1946 on the future of the monarchy in Italy, the parliamentary debates and referenda which eventually led to the establishment of the Fourth Republic in France in 1946 and the widely voiced calls for free and general elections to a national parliament in occupied Germany between 1945 and 1949 were all ways in which discussions of the form of democracy came to the fore in post-war Europe. This was reinforced throughout Fur ope by the ritual (and self-congratulation) which accompanied the elections, both local and national, that served as symbols of the new democratic order. The enfranchisement of women in France, Italy and Belgium, as well as the return to a multi-party structure of elections in llaly, Austria and eventually Germany after a hiatus of more than a decade meant that by 1950 for the first time directly elected governments ruled all the states of Western Europe outside of the Iberian peninsula. As a consequence, the very concepts of 'Europe' and democracy' began to merge in political and intellectual discourse: Europe came to be seen as the home' of democracy, just as democracy was the expression of a shared European identity. Once again, however, it would be wrong to exaggerate the extent of the debate provoked by this rather sudden democratic revolution. As historians liave long remarked, the most tangible change in democracy – the introduction of female suffrage in those states which had not formerly adopted it – did not give rise to much public debate of celebration. It was perceived as little more lhan an adaptation to an unavoidable necessity, and one which on the political left was accompanied by HI-disguised unease at the electoral advantage that they assumed Christian Democrat parties would derive from female enfranchisement. Moreover, in more general terms, the most distinctive element of the way in which the term 'democracy' was used by post-war political elites was the sense of unease and even of nervousness with which they approached it. lor many of Europe's political leaders, the operation of a stable democratic politics was a complex task, and one replete with potential dangers.

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§APPENDIX I

§APPENDIX II

§APPENDIX III