Application Of Principle Of Manoeuvre In Cyber Warfare

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLE OF MANOEUVRE IN CYBER WARFARE

“Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the change occur”.

– Air Marshal Giulio Douhet

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The principle of manoeuvre has been the decisive factor between defeat and victory in warfare since some of the earliest battles recorded. With the advent of technology, the warfare of today is no more restricted to the physical domain but has spilled to the domains of space and cyberspace. The cyberspace domain is open, borderless and virtualised. Battles rage across the cyber domain between competitor states, non-state actors and private entities, although they have not risen to the level of a declared war. As nations world over are building cyber warfare capabilities it is imperative for us to exploit the cyberspace which is a critical war fighting domain to our favour. Application of principle of manoeuvre in cyber warfare is expected to be one of the decisive factors and thus, needs to be analysed accordingly.

2. A paradigm shift in the methods of warfare is emerging in the information age. Latest technology is heralding a Revolution in Military Affairs and nation states are increasingly becoming more and more vulnerable to information warfare as they

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become more dependent on the cyberspace. However, there is an exponential gap between the emerging information age environment and associated development in doctrine and strategies for cyber warfare at the strategic level and application of principles of war at the operational and tactical level.

3. Cyber domain has emerged as a fifth dimension of warfare in which to attack an adversary and break his "will" to fight, is the key to win future wars, it is a dimension of the universal commons. Cyber warfare is network based conflict involving attacks on information and information systems. Cyber warfare attacks can disable networks, disrupt or disable essential services, steal or alter classified data, and cripple financial systems among many other possibilities. As is the case of

Figure 1 – Dimensions of Warfare

physical dimension, application of principle of manoeuvre in cyber warfare is a prerequisite step to win the battle in cyber warfare. The procedures employed to attack and defend information assets in cyberspace constitute manoeuvre as they are undertaken to give one player a competitive advantage over another. As various countries throughout the world have commenced building cyber warfare capabilities and have dynamically begun conducting operations in cyberspace, it is important to understand what constitutes the principle of manoeuvre in cyber warfare as it relates to the traditional concept of manoeuvre in warfare and how the unique characteristics of the cyberspace warfighting domain alter this concept.

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Review of Literature

4. The research in application of principle of manoeuvre in cyber warfare is still in the nascent stage and very few studies have been carried out in this field. Research has been undertaken to identify the approach of application of principle of manoeuvre in cyber warfare but there still exists a gap relating to the validity of principle of manoeuvre in the cyberspace.

Statement of Problem

5. This study aims at analysing the validity of application of principle of manoeuvre in cyber warfare as well as its effectiveness in cyber warfare as it is in the realms of conventional warfare.

Objective of Study

6. Manoeuvre, as an approach to warfare, emphasises on disrupting the cohesion of the enemy forces at the tactical, operational as well as strategic level by attacking the ability of the enemy commander to make correct timely decisions. Manoeuvre in physical domain aims at gaining a positional advantage over the enemy and by exploiting that advantage, forcing enemy to quit because defeat becomes imminent. In the psychological domain, manoeuvre is applied with the aim of paralyzing the enemy command including command structures. Actions in cyberspace have the potential of affecting both physical and psychological domains.

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Hypothesis

7. The application of principle of manoeuvre is equally effective in cyber warfare as it is in the realms of conventional warfare.

Research Methodology

8. Content analysis was the means of gathering primary data and sources of secondary data were technical journals, books, magazines. SWOT analysis of Cyberspace was carried out for data analysis. A bibliography of sources is appended at the end of the dissertation.

Scope/Chapterisation

9. This study concentrates on validating application of the principal of manoeuvre in the domain of cyber warfare.

10. It is proposed to study the subject in the following manner: –

Chapter I: Introduction. This chapter gives an overview of the principle of manoeuvre and the domain of cyberspace. It highlights how the new way of war fighting will be effected in the domain of cyberspace and how important it is to apply the principle of manoeuvre in this domain.

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Chapter II: SWOT Analysis of Cyberspace. SWOT analysis of cyberspace is carried out to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats involved in cyberspace in order to apply the principle of manoeuvre in cyber warfare.

Chapter III: Application of Principle of Manoeuvre in Cyber Warfare. Cyber manoeuvre is the application of force in the cyber domain to manipulate, destroy, degrade or deny information resources to achieve advantage over the adversary. Manoeuvre in cyber warfare does not involve physical manoeuvre of forces but application of force to specific decisive points in the enemy’s cyber structure thus causing paralysis in the enemy’s mind.

(d) Chapter IV: Articulating Methods of Warfighting for the Application of Cyber Manoeuvre. A new set of methods is required for application of principle of manoeuvre in the cyber domain. Mapping of cyberspace should be carried out in order to identify the surfaces and gaps. Cyber maps will provide the vital details to a campaign planner to plan and orchestrate the cyber war and apply the principle of manoeuvre in cyber warfare.

(e) Chapter V: Recommendations and the Way Ahead. Capability development to conduct offensive and defensive manoeuvre in cyberspace by means of establishing centres of academic excellence, training and upgradation of infrastructure is the need of the hour. Developing a conceptual outline and doctrine for warfare in cyberspace is vital. Most importantly, studying new ways of using cyberspace as a means to impose our will on an adversary must be ingrained in military thinking for all levels of war i.e. strategic, operational and tactical.

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Conclusion

11. Warfare in cyberspace should be seen as a means to unlock the opponent's centre of gravity. The prospect has risen because the information age has generated critical strategic vulnerabilities. War will increasingly be a fight between information systems and forces dominating the cyberspace have a distinctive advantage in imposing their will on an enemy.

12. Though, the concept of manoeuvre warfare in cyberspace may not be applied singularly, since conflicts will still encompass all forms of war. The real power of applying force on an opponent through cyberspace is its combined effect with the use of force in the conventional dimensions of land, sea, air and space. Changing our way of thinking about cyber warfare will be the first step to evolving doctrine, strategy, and capability.

13. The cyber domain will experience many future wars in which principle of manoeuvre will play a significant role to affect victory in own favour. Manoeuvre is used in cyberspace to position and apply force to attack or defend information resources. Unlike kinetic manoeuvre cyber manoeuvres are far quicker and losing the initiative in the cyber domain can leave a force paralysed. The side that can identify the vulnerabilities first in the cyber domain of the enemy and attack them will emerge victorious.

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CHAPTER II

SWOT ANALYSIS OF CYBERSPACE

1. The SWOT analysis for the cyberspace, is carried out to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats involved in cyberspace in order to apply the principle of manoeuvre in cyber warfare.

Figure 2 – SWOT Analysis Model

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2. Strengths.

(a) Omnipresence. Today the cyberspace is present everywhere, be it a mobile, a laptop or a television. Cyberspace is functional seven days a week, 365 days a year. Cyberspace has transcended physical boundaries and borders. It has penetrated to the most far flung corners of the earth.

Figure 3 – Devices Connected to the Internet

(b) Real Time Information. With the advent of cyberspace, information in cyberspace can be delivered immediately. There is no delay in the timeliness of the information provided. The amount of data uploaded to the Cyberspace in a single second is a staggering 24,000 gigabytes.

(c) IT Savvy Population. Today most of the population in the globe have good comprehension of technology. They are computer literate

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comfortable and talented with technological devices. They have been and still are being heavily influenced by cyber technology.

(d) Unlimited Communication. Communication is the most popular use of the cyberspace. With the advent of social media, it has changed the way we work, the way we live, and the way we make and maintain friendships.

(e) Online Services and E-commerce. E-commerce is the buying and selling of goods and services, or the transmitting of funds or data, over an electronic network, primarily the Cyberspace. The benefits of e-commerce include its around-the-clock availability, the speed of access, a wider selection of goods and services, accessibility, and international reach.

3. Weakness

(a) Social Isolation and Depression. Cyberspace can create rifts between the real and virtual world. The virtual world can often seem so alluring that once hooked, going back to real life seems difficult. There is an addiction for everything that pertains to the web and that includes excessive surfing, online gambling, social networking, and gaming addiction. These addictions create both physical as well as mental issues that can lead to health complications if left unattended.

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(b) Vulnerability to Cyber Attacks. The cyberspace is vulnerable to cyber attacks which are a type of offensive manoeuvre employed by individuals or whole organizations that targets computer information systems, infrastructures, computer networks, and/or personal computer devices by various means of malicious acts.

Figure 4 – Cybercrime Top 20 Countries

(c) Cyber Divide. There is a cyber divide and economic and social inequality with regard to access to, use of, or impact of information and communication technologies. The divide within countries may refer to

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inequalities between individuals, households, businesses, or geographic areas, usually at different socioeconomic levels or other demographic categories. 

(d) Lack of Cyber Monitoring Organisation. The idea of a single global organisation or agency with overall responsibility for overseeing and securing the cyberspace and all IP-based communications is wanted but the concept is simply unrealistic.

(e) Lack of Cyber Awareness. Statistics indicate an overall lack of awareness of cyber issues around the world even in developed countries. Another serious problem is there are insufficient numbers of personnel trained to deal with IT threats. This is compounded by a low level of computer literacy among world population, which can lead to confidential information leakages, and to the infection or even total disablement of a nation’s IT infrastructure.

(f) Lack of Strategic Culture. We see cyberspace as nobody's land, presently beyond the scope of established political dialogue. In other words, it is exactly the absenteeism of a constraining political framework around cyber warfare that makes cyberspace so attractive as a place in which to achieve cultural, religious, strategic, economic, social and even – paradoxically – political goals.

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4. Opportunities

(a) Public Private Partnership. The public private partnership in cyberspace has vast potential and is aimed at accelerating the development and adoption of Future Cyberspace technologies in the world. It follows an industry-driven, user-oriented approach that combines research and development on network and communication technologies, devices, software, service and media technologies.

(b) Innovations for Future. In the near future, billions of pieces of equipment will be connected to one another. There will be smart cities, where data will be collected and analysed in real time so that traffic flows better, water is supplied more efficiently, and resources are used more economically.

(c) Critical Services. Today most of the critical services of many nations are connected to cyberspace be it the power grid, ATC, banking or Traffic control. As technology progresses more and more services will be linked to the cyberspace for optimum utilisation.

(d) Dependence of Adversaries on Cyberspace. By exploiting adversary’s dependence on cyberspace his critical services both pertaining to civil and military can be bought to a standstill before a conflict and shift the advantage in own favour. Adversary’s civilian and military command and control setup can be targeted to cause a paralysis in decision making leading to chaos.

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5. Threats

(a) Cyber Espionage.  Cyber espionage, is the act or practice of obtaining secrets without the permission of the holder of the information (personal, sensitive, proprietary or of classified nature), from individuals, competitors, rivals, groups, governments and enemies for personal, economic, political or military advantage using methods on the Cyberspace, networks or individual computers through the use of cracking techniques and malicious software including Trojan horses and spyware.

(b) Cyber Warfare. Cyberwarfare is Cyberspace-based conflict involving politically motivated attacks on information and information systems. Cyberwarfare attacks can disable official websites and networks, disrupt or disable essential services, steal or alter classified data, and cripple financial systems among many other possibilities.

Figure 5 – Motivations Behind Cyber Attacks March 2015

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(c) Cybercrime. Cybercrime is a rapid growing area of crime. More and more criminals are manipulating the speed, convenience and secrecy of the cyberspace to commit a diverse range of criminal activities that know no borders, either physical or virtual. New trends in cybercrime are emerging all the time, with costs to the global economy running to billions of dollars.

(d) Cyber Terrorism. Cyber terrorism is the act of terrorist activities, including acts of deliberate, large-scale disruption of computer networks, especially of personal computers attached to the cyberspace, by the means of tools such as computer viruses. It is also the intentional use of computer, networks, and public cyberspace to cause destruction and harm for personal objectives. Objectives may be political or ideological since this can be seen as a form of terrorism.

Figure 6 – Cyber Terrorism Matrix

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PERFORMANCE IMP MATRIX

Cyberspace Strategy for near Term

6. The cyberspace strategy should lay out the vision for the future of the cyberspace, and sets an agenda for partnering with other nations and peoples to achieve that vision. International environment that ensures global networks are open to new innovations, interoperable the world over, secure enough to support people’s work, and reliable enough to earn their trust.  To achieve it, there is a need to build and

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sustain an environment in which norms of responsible behaviour guide states actions, sustain partnerships, and support the rule of law.

7. There is a need to increase and hone the IT savvy population and place joint cyber security structures in order to protect oneself from cyber threats and simultaneously exploit cyber dependent adversaries.

8. There is a need for extensive net-working and placing robust structures with in house research and development and following the public private partnership model. A doctrine on cyberspace management along with infrastructure development and capability building is needed.

9. The need of the hour is to isolate military and strategic network from the world wide web for protection of critical decision making capabilities. Also there is a need to counter cyber warfare capabilities of adversaries and gain effective control of own cyberspace.

Result of SWOT Analysis

10. SWOT analysis of cyberspace indicates that the principle of manoeuvre can be applied in cyber warfare by exploiting the weaknesses of dependence of command and control elements, critical military services and nation’s economy on cyberspace. Cyber-attacks could be destructive even deadly targeting nuclear power plants, public water systems, railways, air traffic control and hospitals.

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CHAPTER III

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLE OF MANOEUVRE IN CYBER WARFARE

1. While the cyberspace is viewed as a warfighting domain, so far it has showed itself as to a greater extent a challenged area portrayed by consistent clash between different contender states, non-state actors and private entities. Battles rage over this space ceaselessly and in spite of the fact that they have not ascended to the level of an announced war, the result of some of these battles could have pretty much as critical of an effect on the long haul fate of the states included in these continuous clashes. Critical computing resources are captured, military and industrial secrets are stolen, strategic plans and diplomatic negotiations are negotiated and key government, military, and private infrastructure systems are infiltrated, all to gain a competitive advantage for the nations initiating these attacks.

2. The systems and procedures utilised to assault and defend data assets in the cyberspace constitute manoeuvre as they are attempted to give one player an upper hand over another. As different countries all through the world have started fabricating cyber fighting projects and have effectively started directing operations in the cyberspace, it is vital to comprehend what constitutes the rule of manoeuvre in the cyberspace as it relates to the traditional concept of manoeuvre in warfare and how the unique characteristics of the cyberspace warfighting domain alter concept.

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3. Cyber manoeuvre is the application of force to capture, disturb, deny, corrupt, wreck or control computing and data assets with a specific end goal to accomplish a position of favourable position in respect to contenders. Manoeuvre in the customary warfighting areas fundamentally includes the development of military powers and application of fires, however, in cyberspace, there is clearly no movement of forces in the kinetic sense since it is a virtualised situation. Rather, manoeuvre in the cyberspace includes the use of technology to particular points of attack or defence. This technology is the special purpose code composed to accomplish the aggressor's or defender's targets and is executed at the time and virtual area of their picking. In a very real sense, forces do not move in cyberspace, the point(s) of assault are moved. This makes perception and recognition extremely difficult, particularly in connection to the source of attacks.

4. Cyber manoeuvre is utilised to impact human and machine conduct. In a sure sense that is a redundant statement since the reason behind impacting machine conduct is ultimately to impact human conduct. Cyber manoeuvre is utilised to apply force, deny operation of or gaining access to key information stores or strategically valuable systems.

5. Another key component in considering manoeuvre in the cyberspace is that so far, there has not been any open, state-on-state, cyber wars. There is, in any case, a steady condition of contention between states, surrogates or intermediaries, non-state actors and private elements and a lot of evidence exists indicating state association in much of this ongoing conflict. It is therefore worthwhile to consider not only foe states, but different enemies and contenders when dealing with manoeuvre in cyber operations. Worldwide laws are still naive with respect to cyber warfare, thus it is likely

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that states will influence this equivocalness to take activities in the cyberspace that would be unacceptable in the physical world.

6. In characterising cyber manoeuvre, it is imperative to comprehend the qualities that make manoeuvre in the cyberspace one of a kind and to attempt to distinguish the significant types of both hostile and guarded manoeuvre that have so far developed in this space.

Attributes of Cyber Manoeuvre

7. Speed. One of the most evident attributes of manoeuvre in the cyberspace is the rate at which it can happen. The pace at which manoeuvres can take place in the cyberspace makes it unfathomably troublesome for one to respond and conform to a successful assault or to the alteration of a defensive formation. When an effective assault is distinguished and moderation attempted, it is likely that either information has been traded off or worse, unfriendly activities have as of now already been completed to the detriment of the defending unit. If an adjustment is made to a component's protection amidst an assault, it is improbable the aggressor will have the capacity to alter the assault rapidly enough to proceed effectively without being identified. In cyber operations, pace supports the side which has picked up the initiative and effective manoeuvre permits an aggressor or protector to get inside their enemies' decision cycles and manoeuvre more quickly than they can respond. Speed is a doubled edged sword in the cyberspace. Activities happen at machine speeds, however responses have a tendency to happen at human speeds since responses normally require some type of investigation and the involvement of a decision maker.

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8. Operational Reach. Manoeuvre in the cyberspace verges on boundless operational span. "Operational reach is the separation over which military force can be concentrated and employed decisively". In active operations, operational range is restricted by territory and separation, however since separation is virtually meaningless in cyberspace, reach in cyber operations has a tendency to be constrained by the size of manoeuvre and the capacity of a component to shield its activities from foe perception, location and response.

Figure 6 – DDoS Attacks

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9. Access and Control. Manoeuvre in the cyberspace requires access to friendly, neutral and enemy systems and one of the fundamental objectives of manoeuvre in the cyberspace is to access these frameworks keeping in mind the end goal to facilitate follow-on operations such as exploitation of data, disruption of systems or to gain leverage. Gaining control of systems is synonymous with building forward bases in a kinetic operation. It permits an assailant to move the point of attack forward to systems that are not attributable to the initiating state and conceivably heightens an aggressor's benefit level in respect to a definitive target network or system.

10. Dynamic Evolution. The innovation whereupon the cyberspace is based is always developing. Recent years have seen ascend to overwhelming utilisation of electronic applications, distributed computing, advanced mobile phones, and merging innovations. This progressing development prompts consistent changes in strategies, systems and methodology utilised by both assailants and defenders in the cyberspace.Strategies that work today may not work tomorrow because of new and unexpected technological advances. Unlike kinetic conflicts the battlefield terrain can shift presenting very little room for planning. Surveillance of the targets and defences can offer an advantage.

11. Stealth and Limited Attribution. Stealth and constrained attribution have become the hallmarks of most assaults in the cyberspace. The cyberspace is ruled by non-state actors and state actors that utilises the benefit of secrecy to cover their activities, making them unattributed. Indeed, even substantial scale, unmistakable assaults, for example distributed denial of service (DDoS) assaults are regularly hard

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to credit to a particular actor or state. Each manoeuvre that makes place in the cyberspace is discernible at some level. That being said, most activities are not observed in a meaningful way. This may be due to limited sensor coverage, limited analysis capability or various different elements and it is these components that help aggressors hide their assaults. Moreover, the capacity to jump from compromised system to compromised system makes attribution exceptionally difficult, particularly when the networks being referred to are geologically scattered in diverse global wards.

12. Rapid Concentration. In the cyberspace, assaults can quickly manufacture from a solitary source network to thousands or even a huge number of networks with practically zero cautioning to the objective network. In dynamic operations, it is extremely hard for an aggressor to create this kind of mass with next

Figure 7 – Anatomy of a Botnet Attack

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to zero cautioning, particularly in the modern time of satellite imagery and radar. In the cyberspace, attackers can utilise botnet and crowd sourcing to quickly produce dispersed mass effects that are particularly viable in assaults like distributed denial of service attacks. This kind of massing can likewise be utilised to conceal subtler assaults, diverting defenders who are attempting to restore services from these massed assaults while assailants lead more clandestine infiltration assaults.

13. Non-serial and Distributed. Manoeuvre in the cyberspace permits aggressors and defenders to at the same time conduct activities over various systems at multiple levels of fighting. For defenders, this can mean solidifying various networks all the while when new dangers are found, killing numerous entrance focuses amid assaults, gathering and connecting information from different sensors in parallel or other protective activities. For aggressors, this can mean at the same time assaulting various targets at different areas in parallel as opposed to taking part in serial assaults. "Serial assault is the obsolete rhythmic manoeuvre of battle. It is a straight idea where two enemies participate in a progression of assaults and counter assaults. In parallel assault, the purpose of assault is against numerous objectives and the impacts are non-direct". These non-linear impacts can create genuine issues for defending units who frequently have constrained assets to safeguard substantial quantities of networks. This is particularly true when aggressors centre their assaults at numerous levels creating strategic, operational and tactical effects simultaneously.

Essential Forms of Offensive Cyber Manoeuvre

14. Exploitive Manoeuvre. It is the procedure of gathering data resources keeping in mind the end goal to pick up a tactical, operational or strategic upper hand. It is cutting edge undercover work at its finest, however it is the utilisation of this data in

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follow on operations that makes it a valid and dangerous form of cyber manoeuvre. In this new warfighting area, data is undifferentiated from terrain and the catch of key data assets can prompt conclusive results over the political, monetary, or military spectrum. Dissimilar to terrain on a kinetic combat zone, once caught, data assets can't be retaken to recover favourable position. On the kinetic combat zone, a key bit of territory caught by the adversary can possibly be counter-assaulted and the upside of holding that landscape recaptured for future operations. This is not valid in the information environment when managing delicate information or data stores. Once basic data assets are uncovered, the starting state frequently loses a critical upper hand and the picking up state uses these assets for its own motives. Through the span of the most recent decade, different country states have perceived the upper hand they can pick up by gathering the licensed innovation and state privileged insights of contender countries. While reconnaissance is surely not new, the internet has empowered the catch and abuse of data on an uncommon scale. Given that data is comparable to territory in the internet, it makes sense that the procedures included in assaulting and shielding it must represent a key form of manoeuvre in cyber operations.

15. Positional Manoeuvre. Positional Manoeuvre is the procedure of capturing or compromising key physical or intelligent hubs in the data environment which can then be utilised during follow on operations. These hubs could be seen as centres of gravity in the data environment and increasing sensible control of these hubs will give the assailant key focal points and influence amid the heightening of contention, particularly on account of war or other battle operations. "Influence is applied to force own will on the adversary, build the foe's quandary, and keep up the activity". The consistent hubs being referred to could be Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems, enemy command and control systems, systems intended to give a common operational picture amid battle operations or some other key systems whose trade off at a key moment in

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fight could give the initiating force a decisive advantage. A prime illustration of this sort of positional manoeuvring could be intuited from the 2007 Israeli assault on a suspected atomic reactor at Dayr az-Zawr, Syria. Israeli strike aircraft figured out how to fly into Syria without cautioning Syrian air defence networks to complete this attack. This was apparently accomplished through a blend of both electronic and cyber assaults which created the greater part of Syria's air defence radar networks to be logged off for the length of the time of the strike. Before the kinetic operation could be embraced, the Israelis needed to realize that they could disturb the networks being referred to. This suggests the Israelis had as of now picked up the fundamental level of access into these networks and had pre-situated themselves to do this assault. They must be certain they could upset these basic networks at the season of their guaranteeing the achievement of the assault. The utilisation of positional manoeuvre before the start of actual operations set them up for success and illustrates the potential undisputable nature of this type of cyber manoeuvre, particularly at the strategic and operational levels of war.

16. Influencing Manoeuvre. Influencing Manoeuvre is the procedure of utilising cyber operations to get inside an adversary's decision cycle or even to drive that decision cycle though direct or indirect actions. This is a broad form of manoeuvre planned to gain and maintain information superiority and predominance and keep flexibility of manoeuvre in cyberspace. Influencing manoeuvre is frequently utilised in conjunction with other forms of offensive manoeuvre. Influencing manoeuvre can be utilised in direct or indirect operations. An immediate illustration of influencing manoeuvre could be compromising command and control systems and manipulating data subtly in order to degrade the confidence a commander has in his systems to slow down his decision cycles. Roundabout activities may incorporate feeding controlled information to the media to compel a desirable response from a foe.

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Influencing manoeuvre falls intensely in the range of conventional data operations yet makes utilisation of cyber manoeuvre to achieve its objectives.

Essential Forms of Defensive Cyber Manoeuvre

17. Perimeter Defence and Defence in Depth. Line Defence is the Maginot Line of the cyberspace and like this historic example; it is exceedingly vulnerable to manoeuvre. The line safeguard is utilised by numerous associations who spend assets securing the edge of their system with firewalls, interruption recognition frameworks and other cautious measures yet leave the inside of their systems generally undefended. Protection inside and out is relief procedure that endeavours to relieve the vulnerabilities of the line resistance by solidifying the inside of the system and individual frameworks too. While protection top to bottom is a more successful methodology than a line guard, both these cautious developments experience the ill effects of the way that they are altered focuses with moderately static safeguards which an adversary can invest energy and assets testing for vulnerabilities with practically no danger of countering.

Figure 8 – Maginot Line

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18. Moving Target Defence. The Moving Target Defence, dissimilar to the line guard talked about above, does not endeavour to make impervious cautious rings to avert assaults and secure assets. Rather, this type of defensive manoeuvre utilises specialised components to manoeuvre certain parts of focused frameworks to make it more troublesome for an attacker to have the capacity to distinguish, target and effectively attack an objective. A Moving Target Defence endeavours to “generate, evaluate and install mechanisms and strategies that are varied, continually shifting and change over time to increase complications and costs for attacker, bound the exposure of vulnerabilities and opportunities for attack, and increase system resiliency”. Ordinarily, Moving Target Defences utilise one of three routines, Address Space Randomisation, Instruction Set Randomisation and Data Randomisation, to attempt to prevent attacks although other forms of system diversification are currently being researched. Amid the 2008 cyber assaults against Georgia, the Georgian government exhibited a simple type of Moving Target Defence by relocating its primary sites on servers in several other allied countries. The Georgian government took a peculiar step and looked for cyber asylum in the United States, Poland and Estonia. Within the United States, Georgia established its cyber capacities on servers

Figure 9 – Cyber Attack on Georgia

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at Tulip Systems (TSHost) in Atlanta and at Google in California. When Estonia experienced a cyberattack in 2007, it essentially defended in place; Georgia, on the other hand, manoeuvred. By utilising defensive manoeuvre, Georgia could keep up key government services despite a massive denial of service attack which was largely effective against its Defence-in-Depth strategy.

19. Deceptive Defence. Deceptive manoeuvre is the cyberspace analogy to a trap. Deceptive manoeuvre uses procedures to draw an assailant into conferring activities which will uncover their philosophy or help the protector in attribution. An amazing case of this is the utilisation of honeypots, deliberately defenceless systems intended to appeal to an assailant as a lucrative target. The utilisation of these sorts of frameworks can permit a defender to recapture the initiative by stalling an attack, giving the defender time to gather information on the attack methodology and then adjusting other defensive systems to account for the attacker’s tactics, techniques and procedures.

Figure 10 – Honeypot Attacks

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20. Counter Attack. The counter attack is another type of defensive manoeuvre and has a direct kinetic counterpart. While the idea of a counter attack is generally straight forward, the execution of a counter attack in the cyberspace is complicated by the trouble of attribution and the way that numerous assaults start from compromised, third party systems. Considering these issues, counter attacks may demonstrate importance to restore basic operations even at the expense of crippling or harming a traded off outsider framework. In circumstances where attribution has been built up, the utilisation of a counter attack can permit a defender to slow down an attack and recapture the initiative. Consider a circumstance in which the order and control server for a botnet has been recognised. Directing a counter attack against such a system could upset a distributed attack and allow the defender to restore operations.

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CHAPTER IV

ARTICULATING METHODS OF WARFIGHTING FOR THE APPLICATION OF CYBER MANOEUVRE

1. The pervasiveness of global communications has made the cyberspace avenues that emanate into and out of first world nations, for example, the United States. The cyberspace, especially the cyberspace systems for national and worldwide data frameworks, is progressively necessary to the working of all key national frameworks. These new systems have made the cyberspace a war zone. Conducting information warfare over the cyberspace won't decrease the ruthlessness of war, it includes another dimension for that fierceness to be played out. To put it plainly, the cyberspace is a viable dimension in which to pressure a foe and to break his will to stand up to. In spite of the fact that at this stage the idea of the cyberspace dimension rises above our customary comprehension of battlespace. Not all concur with this vision of cyberwar. Some contend that it is ethically unsatisfactory for a military power to embrace information warfare activities amid peace-time. This chapter contends that warfare in cyberspace should be embraced as "an act of force, where there is no logical limit to the application of that force." This vision of using force in cyberspace requires a conceptual framework and doctrine to become reality.

2. Cyberwar Playbook. A Cyberwar Playbook is an encoding of knowledge on the best way to adequately handle an assortment of cyberwar

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circumstances. It utilises concepts such as deception, confusion, stimulation, and blockading and defines the cyber tactics, techniques and procedures one may employ given various strategic goals. It is independent of any specific network infrastructure and is not intended for use in building a static defence plan. Rather, its intended purpose is to aid human defenders during active cyber-attack situations. It is utilised to rapidly decide the best manoeuvres to make when confronted with a given circumstance. Along these lines it contains the hostile manoeuvres one may hope to see and the counter manoeuvres accepted to be viable against those manoeuvres. We anticipate that the playbook to be a living document, updated constantly to capture our continuously evolving knowledge of attacks and defences.

Soft Killing the Enemy in Cyberspace

3. Manoeuvre warfare theory has advanced through the works of theorists such as Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, J.F.C. Fuller, and more lately William Lind. Manoeuvre theory is "… a way of fighting smart, of out-thinking your adversary that you may not be able to over power with brute strength … being constantly faster through however many OODA (Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action) loops it takes until the enemy loses cohesion – until he can no longer fight as an effective, organized force." Manoeuvre warfare theory does not give total proverbs to the fruitful behaviour of war or to give a recipe to triumph. Rather, manoeuvre fighting is the procedure of, as defence consultant Edward Luttwak writes, "trying to crush the foe's physical substance, the objective is to incapacitate by systematic disruption." Lind hypothesizes that manoeuvre fighting is "a point of view which looks to set superiority against shortcoming to break the foe's will." The point of fighting is not as a matter of course to killing the foe, in fact, the "acme of skill" is to subdue an adversary without killing. In a philosophical sense, it gives the idea that the cyberspace is fruitful ground to apply

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compel, out manoeuvre the foe, and use pressure without essentially slaughtering. The best approach to consider applying power, is to comprehend the cyberspace through its network with strategic systems and subsystems.

4. In the Airpower Journal article "The Enemy as a System," Colonel John Warden opined "As strategists and operational specialists, we must free ourselves of the thought that the focal element of war is the conflict of military powers [and] in the event that we are going to think deliberately, we think about the adversary as a framework made out of various subsystems." Thinking of the foe as a system is the premise to seeing how the cyberspace may be exploited for fighting. Warden's simplistic Five Ring model was produced keeping in mind the end goal to make a conceptual framework of an enemy system for use in planning a strategic air offensive. The model is not mechanistic, but rather only offers a stage to see how to attack a key centre of gravity and in this manner annihilate a foe's will and capacity for war. In this situation: " Strategic war will be a war to compel the adversary state or association to do what you need it to do. In the extreme, it may even be a war to demolish the state or association. It is, on the other hand, the entire system that is our objective, not its military strengths." For example, an assault on a key focal point of gravity with "electronic fires" through the cyberspace may be directed in conjunction with different assaults on the operational level focal point of gravity with customary fighting techniques.

5. Warden's Five-Ring model can be utilised for planning a strategic offensive or defensive information warfare campaign at the strategic level. An essential proviso is the restriction of arranging the cyberspace manoeuvre in unacceptable situations. While the impacts of data fighting could be crushing in information dependent nations, for example, the United States, Australia and Britain; then again the impacts could be immaterial against agrarian nations like Vietnam or recently industrialising nations like

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China. In such manner Warden's model has been criticised as being excessively mechanistic and drives planners into over-assessing the vital impacts on the foe's war capacity and will. Nevertheless, the model can be utilised as a structure for comprehension the immediate and aberrant results for the utilisation of power, in customary or data fighting, to assault a vital centre of gravity.

Figure 11 – Warden’s Five Ring Model

6. The national command element, or leadership ring, is the most imperative component on the grounds that it is in charge of compelling operation and coordination of different systems to accomplish national objectives. Information warfare attacks on the external rings and subsystems can control, occupy, over-burden and even

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overpower the leadership’s stability. Information warfare can likewise be utilised to make a feeling that the national charge component is senseless. A myriad of attacks through the cyberspace may bring in command paralysis. The essential point of Warden's Five-Ring model is that “all activities are pointed against the psyche of the adversary leadership or against the enemy systems in general." Manoeuvre in the cyberspace gives the war fighter the chance to utilise the idea of parallel assault as opposed to just take part in serial assault. Serial attack is the dated back and forth manoeuvre of warfare. It is a straight idea where two enemies participate in a progression of attacks and counter attacks. In parallel attack, the purpose of attack is against different targets and the impacts are non-straight. Parallel fighting may incorporate synchronous assaults at the key and operational level, moving offensive capabilities over ocean, air, and the cyberspace. Such assaults could be facilitated against the foe's "five rings" of force with crushing impact. Manoeuvre in the cyberspace expands the potential and chances to utilize parallel blows and sudden activities to smash the adversary's cohesion and make a turbulent and decaying circumstance with which enemy leadership can't adapt. Manoeuvre fighting in the cyberspace at the strategic level offers a way to accomplish such a result.

Figure 12 – Boyd’s OODA Cycle

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7. If so, then information warfare attacks ought not to be seen as likening to a couple of programmers attempting to enter an adversary system. This impression of information warfare would be much the same as a solitary plane assaulting the adversary's capital. Rather, information warfare attacks ought to be led with gigantic power, if significant by a huge number of programmers, something proportionate to a "thousand aircraft" strike. Such assaults may be led for a considerable length of time or years to wreck the adversary's vital centre of gravity. While the thrust of Warden's Five-Ring model lends itself to warfare at the higher end of the spectrum of conflict, it is also appropriate for the lower end of the spectrum. Martin van Creveld, in Transformation of War, contends that future war won't be a relatively simple high-tech conventional war, but rather extremely complex low-intensity conflict. Van Creveld states that war will swing to the complex environment in light of the fact that "PCs have come to rule the moderately more straightforward situations of mid-to high power conflict." Aggressors without access to conventional weapons may progressively utilise the cyberspace as an approach to accomplish goals. The cyberspace can be utilised by terrorists, lawbreakers and other non-state agitators to undermine government power, make disorder, pick up reputation, or reason harm and losses. Information warfare could rapidly develop as a component of low intensity warfare. In specific circumstances information warfare should be incorporated as a classification of OOTW.

Redefining Battlespace for Cyber Manoeuvre

8. A new paradigm for battlespace is required keeping in mind the end goal to adjust the idea of manoeuvre warfare in the cyberspace. In the information age there will be a converging of the physical and non-physical components of battlespace and the cyberspace will turn into a distinct dimension for warfare in its own particular right. Previously, the cyberspace was considered as a subordinate to the conventional measurements of land, sea, air and space.

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Figure 13 – Flowchart of Cyber-Attack

9. In the cyberspace the most extreme ability for manoeuvring force is not characterised by physical mass. The impact of the cyberspace dimension is to

Figure 14 – The Phases of Cyberwarfare

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increase, very nearly unbounded, the extents of the present day battlespace. The cyberspace changed the nature of war fighting in light of the fact that it significantly lessens the separation between the forward region of operations and mainland bases. Targeting so as to handicap adversary systems key centres or frustrating essential subsystems by utilising soft kill techniques, may be baffled by the trouble of recognising precisely how data systems are associated. There is an impressive contrast between devastating an individual target and obliterating a system. At this stage a significant part of the cyberspace measurement is undetectable. It is likewise quickly evolving. Like terrain, the cyberspace ought to be mapped Dynamics such as cyberspace highways, systems, subsystems, gates, barriers, node points, choke points all need to be mapped. Such maps provide the vital intelligence for campaign planning. An assailant, for instance, could control certain organisations in a securities exchange, say London, which could bring about significant tension in the United States. Having the cyberspace maps showing the connectivity between systems, and understanding the nature of causality in cyberspace, will be the key to gaining dominance in this dimension.

10. All in all, fighting in the cyberspace ought to be seen as a way to wreck the foe's centre of gravity with massive force. The open door has emerged in light of the fact that the information age has created critical strategic vulnerabilities. War will progressively be a battle between information systems and forces dominating the cyberspace have a advantage in compelling their will on an opponent. In any case, the idea of manoeuvre fighting in the cyberspace is not one of peculiarity in light of the fact that contention will even now incorporate all types of war. The genuine force of applying power on an enemy through the cyberspace is its joined impact with the application of force in the conventional dimensions of land, sea, and air. Changing our way of thinking about cyber warfare will be the first step to developing doctrine, strategy, and capability.

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Foremost in changing our military paradigms will be a redefinition and new understanding of battlespace in the information age.

Figure 15 – Providing Freedom of Manoeuvre in Cyberspace

Validation of Hypothesis

11. A new environment for warfare is emerging in the information age, but the application of principles of war especially that of manoeuvre have not been recognised.

12. Manoeuvre is used in cyberspace to position and apply force to attack or defend information resources, unlike kinetic manoeuvre cyber manoeuvres are far quicker & losing the initiative in the cyber domain can leave a force paralysed. The

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side that can identify the vulnerabilities first in the cyber domain of the enemy & attack them will emerge victorious.

13. However, the application of principle of manoeuvre in cyber warfare should not be looked in isolation & should be looked in a holistic manner encompassing all forms of warfare. Application of principle of manoeuvre in cyber warfare is a prerequisite step to win the battle in cyber warfare. The procedures employed to attack and defend information assets in cyberspace constitute manoeuvre as they are undertaken to give one player a competitive advantage over another. Finally, the stated facts substantiate that the principle of manoeuvre is equally valid in cyber warfare but with certain differences & thus the hypothesis is proven.

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CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE WAY AHEAD

1. Lastly, this paper recommends a three tier strategy for setting up an offensive and defensive ability to permit manoeuvre fighting in the cyberspace. Comprehensively, the three levels are initially, build up top organisation to advance and facilitate change; second, create and articulate national security and military strategies for strategic information warfare and define the requirements for offensive and defensive capabilities; and third, define the role and responsibilities for the military and other agencies in the information warfare environment. Information warfare doctrine, strategy and capabilities need to be developed if the opportunities and threats created by the cyberspace environment are to be controlled. Most importantly, exploring better approaches for utilising the cyberspace as a way to force our will on an enemy must be instilled in military thinking for all levels of war- tactical, operational and strategic. The craved result is to envision changes in the character of war and pick up an unassailable lead in readiness for information warfare.

2. Building an Analytical Framework for Cyber Early Warning. A cautious audit of various politically driven cyber-attacks uncovers a predictable example by the way they are organised out and executed. Past attacks, whether executed by non-state or state actors, give off an impression of being grounded in latent political tensions between opponents. As these latent tensions heat up, cyber aggressors tend to execute cyber surveillance probes in a clear push to get ready for future assaults.

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Inactive strains require some kind of starting occasion that can be utilised to assemble cyber patriots into a cyber volunteer army. The cyber volunteer army can be utilised to do brute force assaults, while more sophisticated hackers can utilise the insight assembled from former cyber observation tests to execute more modern assaults.

3. Cyber Reconnaissance. Prior to the start of hostilities in the cyberspace, enemies are liable to conduct probe of one another's infrastructure. The reasoning for directing cyber reconnaissance is no different than the rationale for conducting reconnaissance in the physical world. Enemies conduct cyber surveillance with an end goal to find vulnerabilities in their rival's infrastructures that can be exploited if and when tensions erupt into hostilities. Cyber reconnaissance likewise permits adversaries to create viable apparatuses particularly intended to assault an adversary's infrastructure. During the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia in the disputed region of South Ossetia, a parallel clash happened in the cyberspace preceding the start of hostilities on August 8, 2008.

4. Cyber Mobilisation. Cyber mobilisation is a procedure of massing power against decisive points. Most importantly, cyber mobilisation is a prominent type of contention, not a group of elite soldiers typing ceaselessly in cubicles attempting to build their unit's Google page rank. It survives on public participation and dies without it. Cyber mobilisation offers state and non-state actors three critical points of interest: movement-building, reach and discretion. Propagandising or doing unrefined hacking attacks gives adherents not able to pick a rifle an ability to contribute and further emotionally bonds them to the cause. By joining the endeavours of a wide range of topographically scattered clients, cyber mobilisation likewise permits states and movements to increase the combat effectiveness of their assaults. Furthermore, since non-combatants do all the hacking, states are protected from retaliation. Given the

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scattered way of the Cyberspace and the relative simplicity of obscurity, crediting assaults to particular people and joining those people to groups will be troublesome. In particular, there is an absence of agreement regarding what constitutes cyberwar in the first place the greatest obstruction to cyber deterrence. On the off chance that cyber assembly is a return to the period of Jomini, current military thinking about cyberspace is reminiscent of maritime scholar Alfred Thayer Mahan. He argued in The Influence of Sea Power upon History that triumph goes to the individuals who control the ocean, and the strategy for controlling the ocean is frontal fight with the adversary armada. It is hard not to see the parallels to the cyberspace here, as the sea and the advanced ocean have numerous similitudes, as today's programmers are reminiscent of corsairs of old who attacked from secure bases in shrouded island atolls. Like the ocean, the computerised sea is a wellspring of business, correspondences, and human association. It additionally a dispatch point for assault. Naval forces used to do waterfront assaults called "plummets" on port towns, and programmers attempt to utilise the cyberspace to dispatch attacks of their own against powerless corporate and government servers joined with the worldwide advanced ocean. Like Mahan, current military speculation concentrates on controlling the information house, accomplishing “information dominance “through an incorporated blend of strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities. In any case, the idea of information dominance mirrors a basic strategic misconception about the nature of cyberspace. As military analyst Robert Bunker writes, the cyberspace exists in an alternate dimensional space than standard fighting. The fluid and scattered nature of the cyberspace makes it outlandish for one power to rule, as power in the cyberspace ultimately derives from information and perception –much more pliable variables than traditional military measures of effectiveness. With everybody with an Internet connection hypothetically equipped for practicing impact over the cyberspace, multilateralism is incorporated with the info sphere’s parity of force. While it is conceivable to mass powers in the cyberspace, as programmer local armies illustrate, keeping up mass and energy is troublesome. Bloggers, programmers, and coders likewise tend to be seriously suspicious of

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government associations and have a propensity for defying even the smallest endeavours at control. Governments and armies naturally begin on edge at whatever point they take part in the cyberspace because of their absence of validity among clients. Maybe the best sample of the misrepresentation of data predominance is the way to go of "mass shelling in the cyberspace."

5. When It Comes to Cyber Warfare: Shoot the Hostage. Here's another situation. A state or non-state programmer assaults a basic system voluntarily and without trepidation of discovery or attribution. He can do this from behind the assurance of two extremely significant "hostages" or, all the more accurately, "holy cows" utilising Microsoft Windows and directing a section of private industry:

Prisoner 1

The pervasive utilisation of the Microsoft Windows working framework (OS) all through knowledge group, and exclusive basic systems controlling the power, water, transportation, and communication systems.

Prisoner 2

The continuous, supported financial growth of Internet service providers, server farms, and domain name registrars who benefit by offering services to criminal associations and nationalistic programmers. For this situation, the best arrangement, without exception, is to figuratively "shoot the prisoner," hence precluding an enemy both from claiming his weapons (1) malware designed for the Windows OS and (2) his assault stage—the most reliable Internet services organisations on the planet. Shoot the first prisoner by changing from Microsoft Windows to Red Hat Linux. Red Hat Linux is a demonstrated secure OS with fewer than 90% of the bugs discovered per 1,000 lines of code than in Windows. Numerous decision makers don't have the foggiest idea about that it is the most certified operating system in the world. PCs are changed each three to four years by and large in any case, so the financial torment is most likely not

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as overwhelming as it may appear. The advantage, on the other hand, would be quick. The information from Kaspersky Lab demonstrates what a limited number of malwares have been produced for working frameworks other than Windows. Linux surely has its vulnerabilities, yet the math justifies itself with real evidence. Shoot Windows and dispose of most of the malware danger with one stroke. Shoot the second hostage by cracking down on companies that provide internet services to people and organizations who participate in illicit exercises, give false data, and different pointers that they are potential platforms for cyber-attacks.

6. Use of Active Defences to Defend Critical Information Systems. The cyberspace is a developing front in 21st-century war fighting. Today, states depend on the Cyberspace as a foundation of trade, communication, emergency services, energy production and distribution, mass transit, military defences, and countless other critical state sectors. In actuality, the Cyberspace has turned into the sensory system of present day society. Sadly, dependence on the Cyberspace is a two-edged sword. While it gives enormous advantages to states, it additionally opens them up to assault from state and non-state actors. Given the simplicity with which anybody can procure the tools important to direct a cyber-attack, secretly and from a far distance, cyber-attacks give the adversaries of a state with a perfect tool to wage asymmetric warfare against it. Thus, it should come as no shock that states and terrorists are progressively swinging to cyber-attacks to take up arms against their adversaries. Today nations regard cyber-attacks as a criminal matter and have predestined utilising active defences to protect its critical information systems. This is a slip-up. The governments need to modernise its way to deal with cyber-attacks keeping in mind the end goal to sufficiently secure critical information systems. Unless policymakers change course, nations will keep on being at more serious danger of a cataclysmic cyber-attack.

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Figure 16 – Active Defence in Cyberspace

7. Modernising the way to deal with cyber-attacks requires real changes to the way governments as of now works together. Above all else, nations need to begin utilising active defences to protect its critical information systems. This will better ensure these frameworks, serve as a hindrance to assailants, and provide an impetus for other states to crack down on their hackers. Second, nations need to give altogether more assets and staff to its cyber warfare forces. Creating the preeminent cyber warfare force is an absolute imperative in order to secure critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks, and to prevent the Internet from becoming the Achilles’ heel in the 21st century. Furthermore, a big, expertly skilled cyber warfare force should be a must to actually using active defences, since using active defences on the nation-wide scale without adequately trained personnel could easily lead to unjustified damage against illegitimate targets. The choice to use active defences will, no doubt, generate a lot of controversy, as would any significant change to state practice. However, there is sound legal reasoning to use them, as long as their use is limited to attacks originating from sanctuary states

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CONCLUSION

1. So what will the subsequent war resemble? Positively nobody has a flawless crystal ball to foresee what's to come. Be that as it may, even a quick thought of potential future enemies uncovers the significance they put on information as a strategic asymmetric means to conduct warfare. While assaults on information systems are representing a perpetually believable risk, dependence on the cyberspace to battle the "war of thoughts" is progressively essential. One can't resist the urge to perceive the significance of the Cyberspace as an empowering influence of that space in today's information environment. The World Wide Web, as a subset of the Cyberspace, is basically ungoverned, giving clear opportunities and alerts. The web gives the individual a voice, frequently a mysterious voice and a possibly a potentially vast audience.

2. The utilisation of Cyberspace innovations to effect national security and warfighting issues won't only increase in the future, but will do so exponentially. Consider the Cyberspace as a significant means to lead the "war of ideas." Web logs (online journals), YouTube, Myspace, Google Earth, and Second Life are all "new media" empowering advances that are right now utilised by foes to gain asymmetric advantage by influencing attitudes, perceptions, practices and ultimately beliefs. There is no doubt that the technology will continue to be faster, cheaper and more capable in this time of fast advancement. Information as a strategic means, earlier the select domain of country states and expansive multi-national organisations, is presently wielded by people, boding a caution to both policy-makers and war fighters. In view of this, future warfighting difficulties must mull over the verging on certain utilisation of the cyberspace by any potential enemy to get out their message. Nor should analysts gain a false sense of security based on limited Internet penetration in some of the most contentious parts of the world.

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3. Managing this danger while giving the chance to connect with successfully and endeavour the opportunities the cyberspace provides requires a rebalancing of policy from where it as of now stands. Leaders and commanders must be given the power and assets to direct quickly proactive and responsive strategic communication. The information environment comprises of three dimensions: the physical dimension, comprising of the "means" by which one sends messages; the informative dimension, or substance of the messages themselves, and; the cognitive dimension, or the effect of the message on the discernments, states of mind and practices of the intended interest groups. It's safe to say that future war will progressively incorporate clash in the cyberspace… in every one of the three dimensions. Without an ensured and proficient physical dimension, for this situation the Cyberspace, the informational and cognitive dimensions cannot be affected. Also, Cyberspace use, compelled by strategy prerequisites and proscriptive channels enormously decreases the capacity to influence the informational and cognitive dimensions through engagement in the war of thoughts too. The response to the problem lies in a suitable parity of barrier of the physical dimension and exploit of that same dimension to get the message out.

4. Exploiting opportunity while overseeing danger is the vital basic that ought to address this imperative issue. A good military plan, whether on land, sea, or air will both "secure the force" while assaulting the foe. Civilian leaders and military commanders weigh risk, emplace policies and establish actions to mitigate the risk, at the same time concentrated on accomplishing military goals. In the cyberspace this implies both securing the cyberspace while utilising it to engage. It's time to separate a portion of the virtual dividers to permit "manoeuvre " to happen in what might as well be called Airland Battle with the goal that leaders can carry out their job. Only in that way will the nations meet its long haul target of countering fanatic belief system while at the same time securing the way to do as such.

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5. Information warfare doctrine, strategy and capabilities should be produced if the opportunities and dangers made by the cyberspace environment are to be controlled. Most importantly, examining better approaches for utilising the cyberspace as a way to force our will on a foe must be instilled in military thinking for all levels of war tactical, operational and strategic. The craved result is to anticipate changes in the character of war and pick up an unassailable lead in readiness for information warfare. There is an extensive distinction between obliterating an individual target and wrecking a system. At this stage a significant part of the cyberspace dimension is invisible.

6. Like terrain, cyberspace should be mapped. Dynamics such as cyberspace highways, systems, subsystems, gates, barriers, node points, choke points all need to be mapped. Such maps provide the vital intelligence for campaign planning. Having the cyberspace maps showing the connectivity between systems, and understanding the nature of causality in cyberspace, will be the key to gaining dominance in this dimension.

Figure 17 – Cyber Electromagnetic Activities

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7. In conclusion, fighting in the cyberspace ought to be seen as a way to annihilate the adversary's centre of gravity with massive force. The opportunity has emerged in light of the fact that the information age has created strategic vulnerabilities. War will progressively be a battle between information systems and forces overpowering the cyberspace have a particular favourable position in forcing their will on a foe. On the other hand, the concept of manoeuvre warfare in cyberspace is not one of peculiarity in light of the fact that conflict will encompass all forms of war. The genuine force of applying power on an enemy through the cyberspace is its consolidated impact with the utilisation of power in the routine measurements of area, ocean, and air. The actual power of exercising force on an opponent through cyberspace is its collective effect with the application of force in the conventional dimensions of land, sea, and air. Shifting our way of thinking about cyber warfare will be the first step to evolving doctrine, strategy, and capability. Primary in changing our military paradigms will be a redefinition and new understanding of battlespace in the information age.