Al-Qaedas Terrorist Threat to UNIFIL [607776]

Al-Qaeda’s Terrorist Threat to UNIFIL

June 2007

Bilal Y. Saab – The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution
Magnus Ranstorp – The Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) at the Swedish
National Defence College

On August 11, 2006, in re sponse to the 34-day summer war between Israel and
Hizb’allah, the United Nations Se curity Council passed resolution 1701, which called for a more
robust international military presence along the United Nations-drawn Blue Line dividing
Israel and southern Lebanon. But the strength ened United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) is likely to face a range of security threats that could undermine its peacekeeping
duties and endanger its personnel. Among the more serious threats, unders cored by intelligence
reports over the past few years that indicate a growing al-Qaeda presence in Lebanon, is a
catastrophic terrorist attack against UNIFIL by local salafist jihadist entities.
UNIFIL IS WORRIED
Since its deployment, UNIFIL ha s publicly voiced concerns about a terrorist attack by al-
Qaeda, not Hizb’allah, against its troops.1 These legitimate concerns have been
reinforced by stern (yet unsubstantiated) warnings issued by Lebanese, Israeli and
Western officials about al-Qaeda’s growing presence in Lebanon.2 For UNIFIL, the
ongoing violent clashes between al-Qaeda in spired Islamic militants and the Lebanese
Army, which erupted May 20 in northern Leba non, have only heightened its sense of
insecurity.
Concerned about the safety of their troop s, UNIFIL commanders do not have the
necessary intelligence resources to protect against a terrorist attack. Lacking clear
authority to engage in counterterrorism or intelligence gathering activities, UNIFIL is
forced to rely on the cooperation of a relati vely weak Lebanese security apparatus (whose
competency is seriously hampered by the polarized political environment).3 Yet without
solid data and objective threat assessments su pplied by its host state, UNIFIL has only
official reports which are largely unre liable, unfocused assessments from UN
headquarters in New York, and fiery statements by al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al Zawahiri, urging al-Qaeda allies in Lebanon to fight Security Council
Resolution 1701.
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THE “OLD” THREAT OF SALAFIST MILITANCY
The surfacing of radical and militant Islamist ideology in Lebanon can be understood at
the local level as a natural reaction to the Lebanese socio-political order. For Lebanon’s
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radical Islamists, the plural structure of Lebanese gove rnance, which negated efforts by
any one group to carry out state-imposed nation al assimilation policies, has always been
a source of frustration and an obstacle to ma ximalist Islamic ideals and aspirations. On a
regional or systemic level, the surfacing of Islamist militancy in the Middle East was non-
coincidentally accompanied by a general id entity crisis in Arab-Islamic society5 and by a
shared sense of humiliation resulting from the Arabs’ successive military defeats to
Israel. In Lebanon, this “identity crisis” was exacerbated by a 15 ye ar-old civil war (1975-
1990) which in large part pitte d rightist Christians against leftist Muslims, and also by
Israel’s invasion and subsequent 18 year occu pation of the southern part of the country
(1982-2000). Today, Islamist militancy in Lebanon remains heavily affected by the
ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as the bloody sectarian war in Iraq pitting
Sunni against Shi’ite Muslims.

Islamist militancy in Lebanon took a salafi st twist in the early 1980s when local and
foreign salafist jihadist leaders penetrated the generally non-violent Lebanese salafist
community. Then, as now, the pool of recr uits ranged from salafist believers who
embraced militancy following a thorough proc ess of ideological pers uasion, to ordinary
outlaws and alienated individuals with deep ec onomic and political grievances but little
care for Islamic thought.

Since its awakening in the early 1980s, sa lafist militancy in Lebanon was largely
defensive and reflected the perceived severity of local crisis conditions. Historically,
Palestinian refugee camps serv ed as hotbeds for various manifestations of Islamic
militancy. Systematic security crackdowns by the Lebanese authorities, large-scale
foreign (particularly Israeli) aggression agai nst Lebanon, and violent clashes with rival
Islamist groups tended to awaken and mobilize the salafist jihadist current as a whole in
defense of an Islamic order. Still, salafist militancy remained ground ed in local realities
and only marginally (if ever) connected to al-Qaeda’s global Islamic insurgency.
Although sympathetic to one another, al-Qaeda’s allies in Lebanon are not united under a single umbrella or organization. Salafist ji hadists like Osbat al Ansar, Jund al Sham,
the dismantled al Dinniyeh group,
6 the Qarun group, and the Majdal Anjar group have
dissimilar agendas and are relatively small and clandestine semi-autonomous entities with informal organizational structures. Each is more concerned about its own survival
than about waging an offensive jihad against “infidels.” Some (such as Osbat al Ansar
and Jund al Sham) are also divided along poli tical lines. Importantly, these groups have
faced constant recruitment challenges with in the Lebanese Sunni community, whose
solid majority is opposed to salafist jihadist ideology.
Arguably, however, this relatively benign prof ile of salafist militancy in Lebanon is no
longer germane. The tectonic changes that have taken place in Lebanon and the region
over the past four years have profoundly affected and perhaps redefined salafist
militancy not only in Lebanon but in the re gion as a whole. In other words, we are
looking today at a threat that is both more complex and diffuse than it was in the past.
THE “NEW” FACE OF SALAFIST MILITANCY
The US invasion of Iraq offered global terrori sm a new base of operations as it opened
doors for al-Qaeda in the Middle East.7 Terrorism spread quickly inside Iraq and easily
found Arab recruits eager to fight American forces. Spilling over to neighboring
countries, salafist militancy was poised to become a key threat to the stability of
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countries throughout the Middle East. Lebano n, the weakest link in the chain, was no
exception.
The spillover effects of the war in Iraq, the re surfacing of political and sectarian tensions
in Lebanon following the May 2005 withdrawal of Syrian troops (an event itself triggered
by the assassination three months earlier of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al
Hariri), the 2006 war between Israel and Hizb’allah, and the Su nni perception of
ascending Shi’ite and Iranian power in the region gave new life and meaning to the
salafist jihadist current in Le banon. The story is now that of Fatah al Islam, the latest
manifestation of salafist militancy in Lebanon.
Until May of this year, few people had heard of Fatah al Islam. Its true identity8 in fact
remains controversial. While some observers point to its links with al-Qaeda, others,
including Lebanese senior securi ty officials, claim that it is no more than Damascus’s
latest invention to advance Syrian interests in Lebanon and derail the establishment of
an international tribunal to try al Hariri’s killers (though no smoking guns have emerged from the UN investigation, Syria remains the prime suspect).
Fatah al Islam surfaced in northern Lebanon in 2006 when it publicly claimed to have
split from the Syrian-based Fatah Intifada , itself a 1980s splinter of the more
mainstream Fatah, led by the late Yasser Arafat. Its origins are Palestinian but the
majority of its Arab fighters and cadres, wh o number anywhere from 500 to 900, come
from Iraq. The group also has a sizable Lebanese constituency, evidenced by the high number of Lebanese that have been captured and killed in the ongoing battle with the Lebanese Army. Having been ousted from the neighboring Baddawi camp by rival
Palestinian forces, Fatah al Is lam now resides in the Palestin ian refugee camp of Nahr al
Bared.
To claim that Fatah al Islam is merely a Syrian tool is not only simplistic but
counterproductive. With the wealth of inform ation that has recently surfaced, Fatah al
Islam’s connections with al-Qaeda are verifi able and unmistakable. Three points stand
out: one, it has repeatedly claimed to be in spired by al-Qaeda’s worldview and ideology;
two, it shares al-Qaeda’s modus operandi; thre e, its leaders have long standing contacts
with al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq and worldwide.
Fatah al Islam’s particular links to al-Qaeda in Iraq can be traced to a statement issued
by the “Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq” (which communicates its Iraq agenda with
bin Laden, al Zawahiri and other al-Qaeda ce ntral staff members) in which it claimed to
have exported its franchise to northern Lebanon9 under the umbrella of this new salafist
jihadist group.
According to press reports, Fatah al Islam’s main leader is Shaqer al Absi, a Palestinian
whom Jordanian officials insist is an associ ate of the late al-Qaeda emir in Iraq Abu
Mus’ab al Zarqawi. Along with al Zarqawi, Absi was tried in absentia in Jordan and
sentenced to death for his role in the 2002 slaying of a US aid worker. He was also
implicated in other planned terror plots in the Hashemite Kingdom. Around the time of the American official’s death, Absi was jailed in Syria on charges of planning terrorist
attacks inside that country; he was suspicious ly released by the Syrian authorities in the
fall. Born in 1955 to a poor Palestinian family in Ein Sultan, a village near the West Bank
town of Jericho, Absi joined the Fatah movement under Arafat at the age of 18. Fearing
arrest amid tensions betwee n Jordan and the Palestinian movement, which sought to
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topple the Jordanian king, Absi fled to Tuni sia in the early 1970s. From Tunisia, he
traveled to Libya where he became a professional air force pilot. He attended aviation
courses in several East European countrie s, including East Germany, the former
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Months be fore the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon,
Absi met and married a Palestinian girl in Lebanon. Today, he is is embroiled in a life or
death battle against the Lebanese Army and threatening civilians with attacks
throughout the country.
Absi’s role notwithstanding, Fatah al Islam is a clandestine and fluid network of salafist
jihadist fighters who do not necessarily see eye to eye on jihad related activities. Fatah al
Islam’s leadership and virtual organizational structure, as pointed out by Hazim al Amine, can be divided in to three distinct layers
10. Those who have been killed so far by
the Lebanese Army come from the second tier and tend to have special combat skills (the
Syrian Mehyeddine Abd al Hay; Aby Midyan, the leader of the cell which was behind the
double attack on a bus in the Mountains above Beirut in Marc h; and the Lebanese
Saddam al Haj Deeb who was accused of part icipating in the attempted bombing of two
trains in Germany). The first tier is managed by three obscure ideologues, one of whom is Muhammad Ali Omar (a.k.a. Abu Hattab and Abu Azzam) who, unlike Absi, has yet to
make a public appearance. The third tier includes the scores of fighters now coming from
Iraq (many of whom are Yemeni and Saud i) who have been serving as logistical
facilitators, technical experts and recruiters in northern Lebanon.
Spokesmen for Fatah al Islam claim that the group’s only objective is to protect the
Sunnis of Lebanon and to reform the Palestin ian refugee camps according to the Islamic
code. Their true ambition however, like al-Qaeda’s, is to create an Islamic insurgent force
to liberate Jerusalem and other Muslim lands from the infidels. As Robert Fisk correctly
wrote, the road to Jerusalem li es through the city of Tripoli.11
THE CURRENT THREAT: REAL BUT NOT IMMINENT
A catastrophic terrorist attack against UNIFIL by al -Qaeda inspired entities in Lebanon
is real but not likely imminent. The very na ture of the salafist jihadist movement in
Lebanon plays against its ability to wage a du rable insurgency or to plan a major attack
against the international force. Random explos ions (such as the recent ones in Beirut
and elsewhere) near UNIFIL stations should be anticipated. These will affect UNIFIL’s
posture and morale, but should neither inflict heavy casualties nor cause serious harm to
the troops. As argued earlier, UNIFIL may be ill-equipped to avert all attacks, but its
current state of high alert and awareness due to the numerous threats it has been receiving lately
12 is unquestionably its best line of defense.
Meanwhile, despite recent st atements made by al-Qaeda ideologues underscoring the
utility of Lebanon as another battlefield ag ainst the West, the “al-Qaeda hardcore” has
yet to unequivocally declare Lebanon a thea ter for major operatio ns. For al-Qaeda’s
senior leadership, notwithstanding the many advantages the Lebanese battlefield offers
to the Islamic insurgency in the Middle Eastern corridor (most importantly the geographical proximity to th e Israeli-Palestinian theater in general and the spiritual
significance of Jerusalem in particular), Lebanon is not currently a priority; Iraq is.

Given Ayman al-Zawahiri’s leadership posi tion within al-Qaeda, the two messages13 he
issued on December 20, 2006 and February 13, 2007, in which he briefly addressed Lebanon and Security Council Resolution 1701 , are worth exploring. The fact that al-
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Zawahiri, not bin Laden, issu ed the statements should not go unnoticed. Though an
effective organizer and military tactician, al-Zawahiri lacks the prestige and charisma of
his superior. Bin Laden is the icon and centra l rallying figure in the jihadists’ fight
against infidels worldwide. Statements issued by bin Laden and the principles he
articulates resonate with Muslims worldwide; he is hailed throughout much of the Arab-
Muslim world as the symbol of resistance to the enemies of Islam. This does not mean
that any call for jihad issued by bin Laden is automatically obeyed and acted upon. That
there is a correlation between al-Qaeda’s leaders calling for attacks and their eventual execution is certain. What is uncertain however is how strong and automatic this
correlation is.

It is impossible to know precisely why al-Qaeda’s allies act only selectively upon their leaders’ calls for jihad. It is safe to a ssume that answering bin Laden’s call (or al-
Zawahiri’s) is largely contingent upon the loca l environment. If conditions permit, it is
assumed, jihad is waged against the “infidel s.” If local circumstances are unfavorable,
jihad is postponed (sometimes indefinitely). After all, launching a terrorist operation
that has a good chance of succeeding requires extensive field work including intelligence
gathering, surveillance, recruitment, financing and rehearsal, all of which are extremely difficult to carry out under conditions of tight scrutiny by the authorities.
In Lebanon, though Lebanese salafist jihadist entities may see bin Laden as a heroic
figure symbolic of their collective struggle, they have their own leaders and often deeply parochial agendas; they do not necessarily feel compelled to subordinate themselves to
bin Laden or al-Zawahiri. Moreover, salafi st jihadists in Lebanon have not one but
several enemies – the Lebanese government, Israel, Shi’ite and Christian groups, and
UNIFIL – and with their limited resources, selection and prioritization of targets are key to their strategic posture.
It is also worth noting that the salafist ji hadist scene in Lebanon has yet to produce a
unifying leader of the stature of the late al Zarqawi in Iraq. While it has been circulated
by Lebanese sources that the Emir of Bilad al Sham (who operates under the name of
Abu Rushd al Miqati) is today present in Pesh awar, is Lebanese and has fought in Iraq,
and has extensive relations with salafist jihadi st factions operating in Tripoli and Ein el
Helweh, conclusive evidence remains inaccessible.

Sheikh Bilal Sha’ban, the current leader of Harakat al Tawhid al Islami (a Lebanese
Sunni Islamist movement formed by Shei kh Sa’eed Sha’ban soon after the 1979
revolution in Iran) who admires bin Laden an d al-Zawahiri but has strong reservations
about their militant strategies, may have summed up the situation in Lebanon, and
specifically the reluctance to engage in a mi litary confrontation with UNIFIL, by stating
the following:

“You can’t consider the international tr oops as occupation forces…Osama bin
Laden faced in Afghanistan the Soviet occupation followed by an American
[occupation], and in Iraq he has confro nted the American occupation, but in
Lebanon, no occupation exists over all the territories such as in
Iraq…International resolutions are not fo rmulated to the benefit of the ummah,
however I don’t see al-Zawahiri’s call to put down the resoluti on as realistic,
despite our position against [Security Council Resolution] 1701; Sheikh Osama
represents an intellectual school, howeve r the citizens of Mecca know better of
its customs [an Arab saying meaning “we kn ow better what to do”], and it is us
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who will identify our national interests, and before we enter into a military
confrontation we have to agree over who is the enemy and who are we
fighting .”14

Finally, it is extremely difficult to dissec t the multiplicity of actors that arm and
financially support the various salafist jihadist groups in Lebanon. Most of the weaponry
that enters the Palestinian refugee camps is of Syrian origin. Fund ing also comes from
the Arab Gulf, where wealthy in dividuals with close governme nt links seek to shape the
strategic environment and balance of (communal) power in the region.

PRECIPITANT FACTORS
For salafist jihadists in Lebanon, there ar e several events (called precipitants) which
might change the current calculation and focu s attention on a terrorist operation against
UNIFIL. As background to this assessment, the authors interviewed two Lebanese militants whose thoughts are offered here to illuminate the thinking of one segment of
the salafist jihadist current.
15 Needless to say, the ideas ex pressed by these individuals
should not be interpreted as either binding or representative of the disparate views of the
salafist jihadist current in Lebanon as a whole.
In order of magnitude, the following precip itants were communicated to the authors:
first, the killing or capture of bin Laden;16 second, the convening, under Chapter 7 of the
United Nations (UN) Charter, of an international tribunal to try the killers of former
Prime Minister Rafiq al Hariri;17 third, the loss of Iraq as an operational base for al-
Qaeda in the Middle East; and fourth, the defe at of al-Qaeda in the global war on terror
in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
THREAT CONTAINMENT AND ELIMINATION
Finding a permanent solution to the threat of salafist milita ncy in Lebanon will
ultimately require a careful understanding of its complex root causes. As cliché as it
sounds, there is no military solution to al -Qaeda’s growing presence in Lebanon. Any
winning strategy aimed at solving the proble m of al-Qaeda in all its dimensions must
combine both hard and soft measures, with an emphasis on the latter. Lebanon’s most potent antidote to extremist and militant ideo logy is a socio-economic vision rooted in
policies of balanced development. Building so lid state presence and capacity in relatively
deprived regions of the country is fundam ental. Such an approach, as crafted and
implemented by responsible elites, will very much help to deny al-Qaeda additional
Lebanese recruits and foot soldiers. Concom itantly, al-Qaeda should be denied safe
havens in Lebanon. Such havens include several relatively isolated northern and
southern regions – Majdal Anjar, Qarun, Arqoub, Tripoli and Sidon. Meanwhile, no
durable solution to the problem of al-Qae da in Lebanon can be achieved without
seriously addressing the armed Palestinian presence inside the refugee camps. This
continues to be a huge challenge for the Lebane se state. For decades, all salafist jihadist
activity in Lebanon has been linked to the camps in one way or another. There is today
an apparent consensus among the main Lebanese political factions to refuse weapons to
Palestinians outside the camps and to supervise the regulation of weapons inside the
camps. Whether a genuine and transparent dialogue and a solution to this sensitive issue
will emerge from recent developments – such as the ongoing dialogue between the Lebanese government and the Palestinians – is questionable at the moment. Yet, the
mere fact that a Lebanese-Palestinian discours e has opened up should be seen as a step
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in the right direction, one which could furthe r lead to negotiations on alleviating the
suffering of the Palestinian people by providing them with basic civil needs, rights and
liberties. Obviously, the Pale stinian refugee proble m in Lebanon (and in other countries
in the region) is intrinsically linked to the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As such,
only a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will bring
about a definitive solution.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To secure UNIFIL today, the followin g near-term recommendations should be
considered by the UN and participating sovereign nations, in consultation and
coordination with the Lebanese governme nt including its security and military
institutions:

o Engage Syria (while preserving Lebanese sovereignty and independence) with
the intention of securing its cooperation in providing intelligence regarding
arms smuggling and human traffickin g along the Lebanese-Syrian borders.18

o Seek the cooperation of Hizb’allah, whose human and technical intelligence assets are essential to en suring UNIFIL’s security.
19

o Improve surveillance, albeit intelligently and without provocation, around Palestinian refugee camps.
20

o Ensure UNIFIL personnel’s physical se curity by maximizing the distance
between potential terrorists and inhabi ted UNIFIL buildings and barracks and
by equipping UNIFIL personnel with intrusion detection systems, a mass
notification system, automated entry control equipment, cargo inspection
devices (including under-vehicle inspection devices), modern communications equipment, delay and denial technology (including fences, barriers and locks),
explosives detection and explosive ordnan ce disposal devices (including hand-
held and static), and unattended ground sensors.

o Adequately finance the budget of the Lebanese Military Intelligence Directorate
(MID) since it is the most capable public counter-terrorism institution in the
country.21

o Earn the trust of local communities in the South for the purpose of securing
their human intelligence cooperation. Ensure their protection and welfare and
convince them that UNIFIL’s job is li mited to monitoring the cease fire and
keeping the peace, not disarming Hizb’allah.

CONCLUSIONS

The terrorist threat to UNIFIL posed by al-Qaeda affiliated entities in Lebanon is not
likely imminent and should not be exaggerated. It is nevertheless real and, contrary to
what Lebanese officials continue to claim, uncaused by Syria. This hardly means that
Damascus is innocent from what is taking plac e in northern Lebanon. Syria’s lack of real
cooperation on arms smuggling and huma n trafficking along the Lebanese-Syrian
borders seriously undermines any efforts aimed at fighting salafist jihadism in Lebanon.
There is no doubt that salafist militancy in Lebanon, fueled locally by harsh living
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conditions and regionally by continuing bl oodshed in Iraq, is gradually but surely
growing. If Lebanese officials do not swiftly and seriously deal with the spread of salafist
jihadism in their country, it is only a matter of time before this violent movement
solidifies, finds new leaders, and reaches orga nizational maturity, at which point it would
be much harder to contain and eliminate. The Lebanese Army’s battle with Fatah al
Islam is likely to come to an end soon, but Le banon’s war with al-Qaeda has just started.

Endnotes :

1 The head of Spain’s military contingent in Lebano n, Colonel Luis Melendez, has underscored his concern
about the threat posed by a foreign organization, such as al-Qaeda, to his troops (see Agence France Presse ,
September 19, 2006). Also, former commander of the UN IFIL mission, French Genera l Alain Pelligrini, in an
interview with Italian newspaper La Republica on December 20, 2006, said th at “the threat issued by al-
Qaeda is to be taken seriously. We have stepped up security measures so as to protect the Blue Helmets
against any attacks.” (See BBC Worldwide Monitoring , December 21, 2006).

2 On December 20, 2006, Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D’Alema warned of a risk of an attack by al-
Qaeda against UNIFIL. “It is right to warn the UN contingent about the risks, because the risks are real,” he
said (see Associated Press , December 20, 2006). Later on January 9, 2007, Israeli military intelligence chief
Amos Yadlin told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defe nce Committee that “dozens, if not hundreds, of al-
Qaeda operatives arrived in Lebanon. These operatives are trained and have terror knowledge.” Yadlin
added: “those who can be harmed by al-Qaeda operatives are UNIFIL and Western interests in Lebanon (see
Yadiot Ahronot , January 10, 2007). Recently on February 8, 2006, Lebanese Defense Minister Elias Murr
warned that there were intelligence reports of possible attacks being planned against UNIFIL. “We have information on threats against UNIFIL,” Murr said in an interview with the privately owned Lebanese
Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) (see Associated Press , February 8, 2006).

3 On a general level, the convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel is extremely
vague in its articles 7,9,11, and 12. The term “terrorist attack” does not even feature in the document; instead there are general laws and regulations aimed at preventing and dealing with crimes against UN personnel.
See
http://www.un.org/law/cod/safety.htm

4 On December 20, 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the second man in al-Qaeda, issued a statement urging his
followers to fight Security Council Resolution 1701 (see Agence France Presse , December 20, 2006). Later
on February 13, 2007, al-Zawahiri issued a similar audi o statement also urging Lebanon's Muslims to reject
Security Council Resolution 1701 (visit Al Jazeera.net, February 13, 2007, at
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/2 EDF40EC-6133-473C-9C1B-3526932E1DEE.htm )

5 The crisis of individual and collect ive identity among Muslims stems from the progressive decline of the
global Islamic community (the ummah ) which felt it was losing the ideological and civilizational battle to the
West and its respective system of beliefs.

6 The al Dinniyeh group is attempting to regroup in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ein el Helweh under the
leadership of Ahmad Miqati.

7 See Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaeda Strikes Back”, Foreign Affairs , (May/June 2007), p. 27.

8 See the SITE Institute’s report on November 29, 2006 titled “Fatah al-Islam announces their split from
Fatah at the Nahr al Bared Palestinian Refu gee Camp in Northern Lebanon” online at
http://siteinstitute.org/bin/artic les.cgi?ID=publications230506&Cate gory=publications&Subcategory=0

9 Al Akhbar , April 28, 2007.

10 Al Arabiyah , May 23, 2007.

11 The Independent, May 25, 2007.

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12 Fatah al Islam spokesperson Abu Sa lim Taha has accused UNIFIL of shelling the group from the sea in
support of the Lebanese Army and has threatened to retaliate against the international force. UNIFIL has
categorically denied such accusations.

13 In his first message al-Zawahiri said: “….all the UN re solutions that have taken pa rts of it, and recognized
Israel's presence on it, starting with the partition reso lution to Resolution 1701 are all null and void, and, in
the balance of Islam, are worthless. We should reject, renounce and fight these resolutions. We should not
take hesitant positions towards these resolutions by sa ying that we will respect and acknowledge them as a
fact of life, and other such statements that would squander the Muslim's rights. Recognizing these resolutions implies the recognition of the Hebrew state. ” And in his second message he said: "I call on the
brothers of Islam and of jihad [struggle] in Lebanon no t to yield to resolution 1701 and not to accept … the
presence of international and Crusader [Western] forces in south Lebanon.”

14 Al Akhbar , September 28, 2006.

15 Interview between the authors and two militants who are former members of an established Lebanese
Sunni Islamist movement. Both fighters, who spoke on condition of anonymity, now live in the Nahr al
Bared refugee camp and are close to salafist jihadist circles.

16 Attacking UNIFIL would constitute , in the interviewed militants’ mindset, the “perfect revenge.”

17 The argument made was that further internationalization of the Lebanese crisis could only mean further
submission to a US-dominated regional sy stem, which must be fought at all cost.

18 This is the toughest nut to crack. The authors believe that a long term solution to al-Qaeda’s growing
presence in Lebanon is extremely hard to attain without Syria’s cooperation on the Syrian-Lebanese border.
The Syrian government has recently said that it has “real hard knowledge” about the presence of al-Qaeda
sleeper cells in Lebanon and that it is prepared to share it with the United States. Syrian Cabinet member
Amr Salem was also quoted saying that his governme nt was ready to mediate discussions on Iraq between
the United States and Iran. At this stage, it is almost impossible to judge the authenticity of Syria’s claims. It
is not illogical to interpret Syria’s proposal as a threat or reminder by Damascus that it still holds the key to
stability in Lebanon, and that it remains the main play er in the region capable of curbing militant Islamism.
Nevertheless, assuming that Syria’s proposal is valid, what will Damascus ask in return for its cooperation on
such essential demands? Syria has already balked at the suggestion that UN peacekeepers could be deployed
along its border with Lebanon. Ulti mately, when it comes to defiant and proud states like Syria, the
challenge is to find the right mixture of incentives and penalt ies that will induce cooperation.

19 As unpleasant or irrational it might seem to Wester n officials, it is a fact that Hizb’allah’s extensive
intelligence repertoire in the South can considerably help UNIFIL avert a terrorist attack against it.

20 It would seem rational for a salafist jihadist group to plan for future terrorist attacks in an area where
Lebanese law enforcement agencies have little or no access. The Palestinian refugee camps of Nahr al-Bared
and Ein el Helweh are perfect though not the only sites for planning a terrorist operation.

21 Post-Syria Lebanon must embark on a serious and holi stic process of security sector restructuring. For
nearly fifteen post-war years, the Damascus-controlled Lebanese security sector arguably served as a structural impediment to Lebanese freedom and human development. Syrian intervention forced the
Lebanese state to strategically margin alize all local forces that were capable of change or influence. Indeed,
during Syrian presence, Lebanese political society suffered from repressive action and intimidation. Restoring the integrity, credibility, and effectiveness of the Lebanese security apparatus is of vital
importance to the future security and stability of the country. As yet, the Lebane se government’s short term
measures have been deficient at best. They have not only failed to prevent the occurrence of additional
assassinations and security incidents in the country, but have also falle n short of a wider security reform
approach. However, given how sensitive and politically loaded the task of Lebanese security restructuring is,
the process could take forever. To efficiently start curbing the spread of al-Qaeda in Lebanon today, the
Lebanese government should efficiently use the military aid it is receiving from the United States and the international community to supplement the budget of th e MID. Despite its limited funds, small staff, and
very old technical equipment, the MID is the most experienced and capable counter-terrorism public
institution in the country. Trained by the Syrian military intelligence services since 1976, the MID has been
able to foil numerous terrorist plots in Lebanon over the years. In sum, the MID, which falls under the
9

authority of the Minister of Defense, himself supervised by the collegial body of the Council of Ministers,
should be at least temporarily at the forefront of any local co unter-terrorism campaign.

10