ACADEMIA DE STUDII ECONOMICE DIN MOLODVA [613587]

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ACADEMIA DE STUDII ECONOMICE DIN MOLODVA
FACULTATEA RELAȚII ECONOMICE INTERNASȚIONALE
DEPARTAMENTUL BUSINESS INTERNAȚIONAL

Camelia RUSU

EXPERIENȚA ȚĂRILOR VISEGRAD ÎN
INTEGRAREA EUROPEANĂ: LECȚII PENTRU
REPUBLICA MOLDOVA

TEZĂ DE LICENȚĂ

Specialitatea 0410.2 Economie Mondială și Relații Economice
Internaționale

Autor:
student: [anonimizat]. EMREI 162,
învățământ cu frecven ță la zi
Camelia RUSU
______________________
(semnătura)
Conducător științific:
dr., conf. univ., Dorina HARCENCO
_____________________
Commented [П1]: Foaia de titlu trebuie sa fie in 2 lim bi, 2
foi de titlu, una in romana si una in en gleza

2
(semnătura)

List of abbreviations
RM- Republic of Moldova
EU- European Union
CIS- Commonwealth of Independent States
AA- Association Agreement
DCFTA – Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
EaP- Eastern Partnership
SMEs – Small and Medium Enterprises
EUBAM – The European Union Border Assistance Mission
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
IMF- International Monetary Fund

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Content

List of abbreviations………………………………………..…………….…….2

INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………… ..…… 3

I. Visegrad countries and their place in the European
Unio n…………………………………………………………4
1.1 Institutions and Negotiation Structures in V4’ EU Accession……….…………4
1.2 Visegrad Experience of Economic Integration with the European
Union………………………………………………………………………………………………..…9
1.3 The relevance of the Visegrad Group in European Union politics and decision –
making
process ……….. …………………………………………………………………………………………..18
II. European Union and Republic of Moldova Association Agreem ent
and DCFTA implementation ………………………………………22
2.1 Description of European Union – Republic of Moldova relations…………..…22
2.2 Challenges on the Path to Association Agreement and DCFTA
implementation……………………………………………….. ………………………….……….26
2.3 Results of the Association Agreement and DCFTA
implementation……………………………………………………………..…………………29
III. Perspectives and way forward for Republic of Moldova -European
Union integratio n…………………………………………………..38
3.1 The Perspectives of Republic of Moldova with European Union……………38
3.2 The lessons learned for the Republic of Moldova……………………..…….42
CONCLU TSION …………………………………………………….…..……..4
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BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………….…………………..….………….48

Commented [П2]: In denumirea ca pitolului includeti
denumirile complete , fara abrevieri, deja in text dupa ce
dadti denumirea completa si abrevierea in paranteze,
ulterior puteti utiliza abrevierea

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Introduction

The European Integration became a frequently discussed subject, being one of the most
important priority on the agenda of Republic of Moldova. The relations between the Republic
of Moldova and European Union started after the declarat ion of independence. Moldova has
reached a new milestone after it signed the Association Agreement and Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area.
Consequently, the focus of the thesis will be on economic achievements of the Republic of
Moldova after the imple mentation of the AA/DCFTA as well as on the challenges with which
the country has to cope. In this paper I will analyse the case of the Visegrad Group and their
jourrney to the European accession, focusing on their struggle and achievements during the
integration.
Visegrad countries that undergone through this process in the run -up of their accession to the
EU can offer to Moldova valuable and useful lessons for implementing DCFTA rules in
accordance with its business interests and domestic realities. Viseg rad Group has a lot in
common with the Republic of Moldova. All four countries are ex -communist countries which
their first task was to become a democratic country and to change from a planned economy into
a market -led economy. After the accomplishment of the first task the second one was the EU
accession, which was also successful. Republic of Moldova performed the first task, but it has
a long way to go to realize the second one.
During the last 4 years after the implementation of AA/DCFTA, the government implemented
different reform in order to correspond with the European standards as well as they continued
to improve their relations with the European Union. These implementation s have positive
outcomes but also the government experience some failures, as they could not reach all the
planned areas. Each day Moldova shows progress, unfortunately this progress is very little in
particular after the banking crisis, which made Moldova to make a few steps back and lost the
EU’s trust.

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After analysing the Visegrad countries experience and actions taken by their government, there
can be draw conclusion and identifies main priorities that could serve as guiding principles for
the officials as well as the private sectors in the DCFTA implementation process.

I.VISEGRAD COUNTRIES AND THEIR PLACE IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
1.1 Institutions and negotiations structure in V4’ EU accession
The four countries in the Visegrad Group Hungary, Czechoslovak ia and Republic of Poland,
joint the European Union at the same time, on 1 May 2004 despite the fact that they started the
accession procedure and negotiations on different dates. Following the steps to the integration,
Poland and Hungary were closer to th e accession. After the split of Czechoslovakia, two new
countries were formed the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which also submitted their formal
applications for accession.
The Czech Republic Case
The Czech Republic negotiated for the first time the association treaty with the EU already in
1991, as part of Czechoslovakia. This association treaty however never entered into force. Due
to the split of Czechoslovakia, both newly born states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, had to
negotiate a new treaty. The Czech Republic did so in 1993, and the treaty entered into force in
February 1995, after its ratification in all EU member states. The implementation of the
economic part of the treaty had started a lready in March 1992, on the basis of the interim
agreement. One of the main aims of the association treaty was the creation of a free trade zone
between the EU and the Czech Republic until 2002, through asymmetric lifting of tariff and
nontariff trade bar riers.
There are several ways in which the Czech government co -operates with the business on the
EU related issues. However, the process lacks any systematic features and it usually is very
informal, incoherent and done on ad hoc basis. The only formal in stitutionalized way of
cooperation is the so -called Council of Economic and Social Agreement (Tripartite body),
composed of the government representatives and representatives of the employers and trade
unions. The Council was created already in 1990, as a voluntary body of social partners that
serves as a coordination body between the government and the social partners striving at
achieving an agreement in essential issues of economic and social development. Tripartite was

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included also in the negotiations of accession of the Czech Republic into the EU, by discussing
the draft positions of the Czech Republic for the accession negotiations. In 1998, the Working
Team for the EU Integration was created within the Tripartite. This team served as a main
official entry point for the businesses (through the employers’ associations) to influence the
accession negotiations on the governmental level. After the accession to the EU in 2004, the
team was renamed to the Working Team for the European Union and, according to the
representative of the Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic , its importance, as well
as the frequency of the meetings, diminished. It is also important to mention that the influence
of the Tripartite on the government is generally rather li mited, as it doesn’t have a veto right on
the governmental proposals and it is dependent on the governments’ attitude toward the social
partners (the socialist governments tend to cooperate with the Tripartite while the right wing
governments tend to ignor e it). The The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the main coordinating
body during the accession negotiations. The Deputy Minister for the EU integration was also
the Chief negotiator of the accession treaty. The Department for the EU Policies within the
MFA was responsible for finalizing the negotiating positions. This department served as a main
entry point for influencing the Czech position for Chamber of Commerce of the Czech
Republic.
As far as the implementation of the commitments from the EU accession negotiations and the
implementation of the EU legislation is concerned, the Czech Republic applies a standard
legislative procedure. All the legislative drafts have to contain the so -called “compatibility
clause” that shall state whether, in what extent an d with which specific provisions the draft
regulation concerned is compatible with the EU regulations. The entry point for the businesses
for the implementation of the EU legislation is a consulting procedure organized by the
responsible ministries.
Slova kia
The establishment of the effective negotiation structures and institutions was crucial for the
successful completion of the accession talks. At the parliament level, two committees were
involved in forming a Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EU and Slovak Republic, namely
the Foreign Policy Committee and the European Integration Committee. At the Office of
Government, the position of Vice -Prime Minister for European Integration was formed with
the Institute for the Approximation of Law and the Sectio n for European Integration working
as two subordinate bodies. The Section for European Integration consisted of three departments:
the Department for European Integration, the Department of Foreign Aid, and the Department

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for Building Institutions and Prep aration of Inhabitants for Entry to the EU. At the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the State Secretary for European Integration was put in charge as Chief
Negotiator with the European Union. The Ministerial Council for European Integration was
formed to coord inate the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Vicepremier for
European Integration and which consisted of ministers and top officials of both bodies as well
as other ministers related to the EU accession (e.g. minister of finance, minister o f agriculture,
and others). Subordinate to the ministerial council was a working committee headed by the
Chief Negotiator and consisting of 29 working groups composed from government ministries’
specialists, with each working group specialized in one chapt er of the accession talks. From
these 29 groups, six working groups were established at the ministry of finance, another six at
the ministry of the economy. The Advisory Group/Consultative Committee at the Ministerial
Council was another important body. Th is body was composed from independent specialists
and members of the interest groups. It was headed by the Vice -Premier for European
Integration.
Poland
The opening of accession negotiations by Poland in 1998 required the setting up of an efficient
struct ure in the administration for working out the position they took in the accession talks.
There were two periods in their accession negotiations with two different structures. The former
was more complex, with more actors involved and more extensive inter -ministerial
consultations. In the latter period, the structure was streamlined, so as to ensure that the
decision -making process in the last phase of the negotiations is as efficient as possible.
At the outset, our mechanism for the negotiations was as follows:
• The political leadership of the negotiations was provided by the Prime Minister, with the
support of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of the Commitee for European
Integration and the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland Accession Negotiations to the
European Union. The decision -making mechanism run in the following way: above -mentioned
officials, the Prime Minister, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Commitee for European
Integration, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s
Accession Negotiations to the European Union adopted the guiding decisions relating to the
negotiation process. Then, the Council of Ministers approved the position papers prepared by
the Negotiation Team and recomme nded to the Council of Ministers by the Commitee for
European Integration.

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• The Negotiation Team was responsible for the formulation and implementation of the
negotiation strategy, including the elaboration of position papers and other necessary
document s. The Negotiation Team consisted of nineteen members (negotiators) These were
representatives of key ministries in the ranks of secretaries and under -secretaries of state, and
appointed personally by the Prime Minister. The Negotiation Team was headed by the
Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union.
• The documentation and draft negotiating positions were prepared by the InterMinisterial
Team for the Preparation of Accession Negotiations with the European Union (the Inter –
Ministerial Team). These materials were then presented to the Negotiation Team. There were
also task forces composed of representatives of the ministries who presented the given line
ministry’s position. The InterMinisterial Team consisted of 38 individual Task Forces. A
particular role was played by the “Task Force 32” (analysis and evaluation of the influence of
the integration in the social and economic sphere) and “Task Force 34” (budget and financing
negotiation preparations), which drafted the negotiating positions with respect to their social –
economic and budgetary content. The Head of the Committee on European Integration was the
Head of the InterMinisterial Team, while the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s
Accession Negotiations to the EU was the Deputy Head.
Hungary
The negotiation process and the administrative settings were similar in the four (with partial
exemption of Slovakia) Visegrad countries. In Hungary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
coordinated the process under the aegis of the chief negotiator. Position s were formulated in
interministerial commissions at the government level. The Government -business dialogue was
not formalized during the association negotiations. Reportedly, some companies lobbied for
their particular interests at the chief negotiator, b ut the negotiation team did not have the
resources, time and energy to facilitate broader coordination. At the same time, the association
negotiations were held in the years of a major economic turmoil, in the midst of the transition.
In an atmosphere of u ncertainty, business leaders had only limited resources to take an active
part in the process. Corporate interests were to some extent nonarticulated and difficult to
explore. The situation was reportedly better at the Accession talks. Having experienced t he
significance of the issue and the tensions at the implementation phase of the Association
Agreement, both sides strived for better coordination. Business stakeholders of different levels
were involved in the preparatory phase of the negotiation process .

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The agenda and the highlights showed significant similarities among the Visegrad countries.
Competition policy was important both due to the extensive structural subsidies for large,
lowefficiency plants from the Soviet era (metallurgy, heavy and machine industry, agriculture)
and practices of offering broad tax exemptions for Western green -field investors (like car
industry, processing industries). Since Hungary provided the latter on a mass scale for the
Western companies, Implementation was subordinated to “rapid accession”. At the initial stage,
the negotiation strategies included long transition periods, strong asymmetries and derogations.
Nevertheless, due to a number of different factors, the political pressure for speedy accession,
considerations st emming from the integrationist narrative, competition among Visegrad
countries, in the end, both the negotiation and the implementation strategies focused on a fast
accession process. It is symbolic that initially, the Hungarian government wanted to implem ent
the whole acquis prior to the accession (in 1999, it was planned to be taken over by 2001). Thus
the aspects of implementation and, in particular, the issue of corporate stakeholders’
accommodation were to some extent subordinated to the accession race .
1.2 Visegrad experience of economic integration with the EU
Slovakia
The process of economic transition had already changed Slovakia, but this process was now to
be fused with another task: the task of preparing for EU accession. The prospect of EU
membership helped to accelerate the transition process. Due to the promise o f accession, trade
reorientation and an increase of Foreign Direct Investment could be accomplished. However,
EU membership also forced the economic transition process to follow a specific pattern and
pace. The economic criteria for EU membership are set out in the Copenhagen criteria:
− the existence of a functioning market economy;
− the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the
Community;
− the adherence to the aim of the economic and monetary union.
In 2003 the European Commi ssion already concluded that Slovakia had a functioning market
economy. With the continuation of its current reform path Slovakia should be able to cope with
competitive pressures and market forces within the EU. However, improvements still needed
to be ma de in the macroeconomic situation of the country. Urgent measures were necessary to
reduce the fiscal and current account deficits and despite earlier reforms a decrease in the
expenditure in the areas of health care, pensions and government subsidies rema ined essential.

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The rate of unemployment also posed a challenge and the labour market was in need of many
structural reforms, including a restructuring of the social security system and more flexible
labour market legislation. Furthermore, the supervision in the financial sector needed to be
strengthened and the legal framework for a well functioning market economy was in need of
further enhancement.
During the EU accession process the macroeconomic performance of Slovakia improved. The
GDP growth rates of the country increased steadily and the unemployment rate dropped
slightly, but remained high at 17.7%. The current account deficit was more than 8% of GDP in
2002, but this deficit was fully covered by FDI inflows of 17% of GDP. The government deficit
was 7.2% of GDP in 2002. In 2003 this deficit was brought down to 5% of GDP. The
government debt decreased from 49.8% in 2001 to 44.3% in 2002. This decrease was due to
privatisation receipts. Moreover, the government reversed their expansionary fiscal policy
stance, and restricted government spending in order to further decrease their budgetary deficit.
This goal was further enhanced by the proposed public expenditure reforms, in the area of
pensions and social assistance benefits. After the accession to the E U, some economic
difficulties still remained. Some of the challenges that Slovakia still struggles with today are
the large regional disparities and high unemployment rate. In the short term, the country also
needs to deal with the consequences of the econ omic crisis. Since Slovakia is an open and
export -oriented economy, it was greatly affected by a large decrease in the international demand
for its produce. In order to decrease this vulnerability and to enhance economic growth in the
future, the country w ants to develop a more diversified and knowledge -based economy and
improve the country’s business environment by investing in education, innovation and IT
technology. The EU provides many instruments that can be used for the desired development
of the econ omy. Nevertheless, the current conditions for such EU cooperation are different
today than they were during the EU accession process. The country can still apply and receive
EU funding, but the country needs to outline and make the necessary improvements b y itself.
During the accession period, the government was focused on fulfilling the membership criteria.
Due to the cooperation with institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD, the country
wanted to implement reforms that were not even part of the EU requirements and that were not
even implemented by the old EU member states. An example of this is the pension reform that
the country embarked on. After the period of EU accession, the drive and motivation for
continuing change and reforms seems to have diminished. The necessary economic reforms are
not implemented in the same pace as before EU accession. This could be explained by the fact

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that there is not an EU or World Bank guideline anymore that the country can follow. But there
also seems to be a fe eling of „reform fatigue‟. After the period of radical reform the country
seems to need some time to settle into the new situation and reassess the economic priorities
for the future .
Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is usually described as a “small open economy”. The Czech export is
directed primarily towards the European Union (e.g. 85% of total export in 2008, 84% in 2009)
with Germany as the dominant export target (30% of total export in 2008, 32% in 2009),
followed by Slovakia (9% of total exports in 2008, 8% in 2009), France, Poland, and Austria.
The inter -connection between Czech and German economy has reached such intensity that the
Czech Republic has been even labell ed as “another German Lander”. In the first years after the
EU accession, the Czech economy experienced an unprecedented growth since the beginning
of the economic transformation at the beginning of the 90s. The growth was accompanied by
an increase in labour costs and by the strengthening of the Czech crown. The impact of the
crisis of 2008 -2011 has been relatively limited. The major reason is the conservative approach
of Czech banks in the pre -crisis period. Therefore, no governmental bank rescue package has
been required. Furthermore, the vast majority of the Czech private (household) debt has been
denominated in Czech crowns, which made the financial situations of households less
vulnerable to the currency fluctuation and has prevented problems experienced, for instance,
by Hungary since 2008. As an export -oriented economy, however, th e Czech Republic has been
very sensitive to the consumption trends of its EU neighbours, particularly in Germany. The
export to Germany dropped almost by 10% in 2009 in comparison with previous years and the
economic recovery in Germany in 2010 was reflect ed in the growth of Czech exports. The
impact of the crisis onto the Czech Republic has also been .
The EU membership has been generally considered as a significant, if not the major, factor of
the Czech post -accession economic growth. However, it can be ar gued that the most influential
factor of the post -enlargement economic environment has not been the formal opening of the
internal market per se. Since the tariff barriers and quotas for industrial good were removed
even before the Czech accession (as res ult of the association regime) and significant barriers in
the free movement of services survived even in the post -accession period, the increase in the
credibility and predictability of the regulatory environment in the Czech Republic and the
removal of s ome technical and administrative barriers against mobility due to the EU
membership can be identified as the most significant impact of the Czech accession to the EU.

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The Czech Republic has pursued two major trends in the internal market during its post –
accession years. The first has been the support for liberalization within the internal market; in
other words for removing the remaining national barriers within internal market. Examples of
this strategy include Czech calls for a termination of transitional periods, for the free movement
of workers and/or support of the EU initiatives for further liberalization of the free movement
of services. In the latter case, the Czech representatives criticized the gradual reduction of the
originally ambitious liberali zation plan contained in the Commission’s proposal of the directive
on free movement of services during the legislative process in the European Parliament and the
Council; however, the Czech MEPs voted even for the final, less ambitious, version of the
directive since even the final version of the directive had eliminated some existing problems
and clarified several rules of the service mobility within the internal market.
Poland
In 1989, Poland was suffering through hyperinflation, was undertaking the fi rst transition from
communism to democracy in the Soviet empire and did not have a functioning market economy.
That meant that all of its efforts to integrate with the European Community (as the EU was then
known) had to be done in conjunction with buildin g institutions like stock markets, a capitalist
legal system, a parliamentary democracy and setting up the structures of a capitalist system.
On September 19, 1989, Poland signed an agreement for trade and cooperation with the
European Community. By early 1990, Poland applied for the beginning of negotiations on an
association agreement with the European Community, which was signed in December 1991.
By 1993, the European Council decided that “the associate member states from Central and
Eastern Europe, if t hey so wish, will become members of the EU.”
During negotiations, the Polish government set up a three -level structure to ensure a two -way
flow of information between business and the state. The first was a broad based body looking
at issues of the Europe an integration with places for negotiators, experts and business and social
groups. This body, called the National Council for Integration operated under the authority of
the prime minister and was an organization for discussions on a very general level. T he Council
was supposed to act as an information channel between the government and the society. Poland
also had sectoral bodies where every separate negotiating area would interact with a business
grouping directly concerned with that area, for example, a griculture or pharmaceuticals.
Finally, the ad hoc problems were resolved on an one -on-one basis with specific companies.

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For example, talks over applying the EU directives on the emissions involved only Poland’s
largest electrical utilities.
The high lev el of consultation with business served a useful role during Poland’s talks with
Brussels. The Polish negotiators said that having a strong business opinion on a given issue
allowed Poland to strengthen its position with the EU, demonstrating that it was n ot just the
government talking, but that it was reflective of a broader social position.
As Poland’s economy became more civilized and more formal, thanks in large part to the drawn
out accession process, egregious examples of attempts at directly influen cing the government
policy became rarer. While giving business a voice served a very useful purpose during the
talks with Brussels, Poland did notice that there was a severe asymmetry between the local and
foreign companies.
For the local business, concent rated on the local or at most, on the national markets, and with
relatively little international exposure, the very language used by the negotiators, dense with
unfamiliar bureaucratic terms, is off -putting and unfamiliar. Many entrepreneurs see little sen se
in investing time and energy learning the complicated EU negotiating language, often feeling
they have little potential gain through the opening of more sophisticated EU markets to their
products. However, the foreign businesses are usually much more aw are of the gains to be made
through the FTA agreements, and are more sophisticated about lobbying the politicians than
their local rivals.
The sectoral organizations were also often divided between the local and foreign businesses.
The pharmaceuticals wer e one good example. There, large foreign companies investing in
Poland were very keen for Poland to quickly sign on to the EU’s patent regulations, which
would protect their production. However, smaller local companies tended to have few original
drugs and were instead focused on the generic production. That meant that they were in favour
of delaying the adoption of the patent protection for as long as possible in order to keep their
businesses operating.
Other sectors like agriculture were very difficult t o organise. Poland had a very large class of
peasant small holders, essentially subsistence farmers, with a very small number of larger
commercial operations. One issue that arose with agriculture was changing the standards as
Poland approached the EU acce ssion. In agriculture, the Polish government tended to adopt
regulatory solutions more suited to large producers, while leaving smaller farmers producing
just for the local market less affected by the sanitary and other requirements of producing for

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the mo re demanding EU market. However, the Polish experience was that the higher EU
standards tended to infiltrate through the industry due to the changing consumer tastes and
demands.
In one such example from the dairy sector, the white cheese destined for expo rt had to be made
according to the EU standards, while the local cheese was not subject to the same regulations.
However, the local farmers used methods like collecting the milk from small producers that
was left in unrefrigerated cans by the side of the r oad, warming for hours before being picked
up by distributors. As consumers became aware of the differences in standards between cheese
destined for export and that produced for the local use, they simply bought the cheese made to
export standards. In a re latively short time, the whole market was brought into conformity with
the EU standards, despite the exemption initially carved out for smaller producers.
As the negotiation process continued, Poland set up a system of informing the business about
progress in specific areas and industries. This was largely done through the internet, to make
the process as transparent as possible and to make the business aware of what was going on at
the talks with Brussels. The government would also send circulars to intere sted parties to ensure
that they were aware of negotiations. However, there was often no response from the business
community.
One of the most time -consuming areas for the government was to screen every proposed EU
regulation to see if it existed in Polish law or if it had to be passed through parliament. As part
of that process, the officials would also try to determine the impact the regulations would have
on specific parts of the economy and on individual businesses.
As a final note, the overall accessio n process in Poland was an enormous success. Poland has
seen its best quarter century in about 300 years, with the economy growing at an average of
slightly more than 4 per cent a year since 1992.
After joining the EU in 2004, the flood of structural funds pouring into the country has seen the
construction of a modern highway system, modern airports and a massive improvement in rural
living standards.
Hungary
In 1994, Hungary applied for European Union membership, and concentrated from then on to
meet the criteria set by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. Obviously, becoming a
member of the European Union has been a complex task requiring much adaptati on.

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The political transformation of Hungary had very different economic implications across the
country. In western Europe two major phenomena were observed: the very swift process of
economic privatisation, partly through western investors and the action s taken to deal with the
recession caused by this restructuring that was viewed as transitory. Both phenomena were seen
as very important as, within ten years, the state sector’s share of GDP fell from 80% to 30%. In
1998, 70% of GDP came from the private sector, of which, 49% was domestically controlled
and 21% foreign owned. Compared to all the other Eastern Bloc countries, Hungary had the
highest per capital foreign direct investment and even in absolute figures was only surpassed
by Poland, a country wi th three times the population.
The statistics associated with the ‘restructuring recession’ are formidable but they in no way
convey the nature of the resulting social crisis and have never been fully appreciated in western
Europe. In less than five years industrial production sank 32%, agricultural production fell by
35% and GDP by 18%. To demonstrate just how high these figures are, Hungary’s industrial
production fell only 20% in the wake of the 1929 Crash and the resulting global economic crisis.
Unem ployment went from 0.3% in 1989 to 13.2% in 1993, sinking to 6% between 2000 and
2004 before rising again to 11 -12% in 2008. In just a few years, real wages fell 25% and
pensions lost 30% of their purchasing power.
The recession is visible in all areas of agriculture. Before 1990 Hungarian wheat production
was, on average, about the same as the EU average but it is now some 2.13 tons less.
Instead of using the economic revolution as a vehicle for modernisation, Hungarian politicians
responded to the recess ion with amateurish and anti -capitalist arguments. One example of this
was the claim of the small farmers’ party that if former state agriculture holdings were restored
that would enable a 50% reduction in retail food prices. The very idea that small hold ers
working tiny parcels of land without machines could achieve cost effective production was an
illusion. The destruction of collective farms went along with the complete loss of all their plant
and equipment. Just as important was the loss of technical k nowledge as the new smaller units
could not afford to employ agricultural experts or veterinarians. Some three million individuals
had got their land back by 1998. The majority of them could do nothing with their land and
either quickly sold it or left it fallow. As the rural population was the most socially neglected
they created the status of ‘traditional agricultural producers’ in 1997. This group were allowed
to sell 2 000 euro of produce from their own holdings free of tax to provide them with fixed
‘pocket money’. For a proper income more land and a more professional way of working would
be required. Originally some 720 000 people received this status and even today there are still

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around 340 000. Counting family members there are certainly more than o ne million people
involved in the scheme. Their products undergo no system of quality control in contrast to the
strict measures in place for German small part -time organic producers even when they pay no
tax. The figures demonstrate that ‘traditional agri cultural producer’ status in Hungary is clearly
more significant than that of those in Germany who now and again sell ten kilos of vegetables
at the weekly farmers’ market. In 2010, however, only 27 000 from this group actually paid tax
amounting to 27.6 m illion euro. The result of this system is an illicit economy for the most part
involving meat products and an uncontrolled, out of date and uncompetitive means of
production.
International economic relations between countries in central Europe underwent ra dical change
between 2004 and 2007 on account of the two waves of European Union enlargement, which
created new conditions for economic development and convergence.
EU accession lent new momentum to the economic growth and therefore convergence of all the
new member states, including the V4 countries –with the exception of Hungary, where the
initially higher rate of growth had slowed substantially by 2007 and living standards, measured
in terms of per capita GDP, have merely stagnated since joining the EU i n contrast to the
dynamic growth recorded in the other new member states. Hungary's per capita GDP figure
stagnated between 2004 and 2008 at a time when the other members of the V4 converged by
more than 8 percent, on average, towards the living standards of the more developed EU
countries. On the whole, the region developed at a pace rarely seen before in its economic
history and accelerated the rate of convergence, though it will be practically impossible to
repeat this in the near future. The economies i n the central European region are supposed to
formulate radically different economic strategies under the new domestic and international
conditions.
Surprisingly for many, new euro area member Slovakia were heading towards an increasingly
severe downturn i n growth in comparison to what was previously expected. Slovakia's
opportunities for growth were very much limited in the current situation by the country's
vulnerability linked to its one -sided economic structure. The automobile industry was very
sensitiv e to cyclical trends, and the crisis has hit this sector extremely hard, even in spite of the
measures taken by government to stimulate demand in the sector. In the long run it may even
be questionable just how much an economic structure based on the car i ndustry will be capable
if at all of reaching previous levels of growth.

17
The Czech Republic and Poland had relatively stable fundamentals. In Poland, management of
the crisis had not taken the form of bank bailout packages or international loans linked to
economic conditions but in a continuation of the structural reforms that had already been
launched. However, this only partly explains the endurance of the country vis -a-vis the crisis:
what is even more important is that it has a very large domestic econo my by central European
standards and, relatively speaking, is less open, which means changes in international demand
do not affect it as much; additionally, domestic demand together with the domestic market are
able to reduce the pace of the economic slowd own. Nonetheless, the fact that the IMF provided
Poland with a flexible credit facility in spring of 2009 to overcome any unexpected financial
difficulties just demonstrates the unpredictable and increasingly severe consequences of the
crisis.
Hungary did not really stand out from the other economies in central Europe in terms of
expected growth. Yet because of the country's vulnerability and its level of debt it is more often
than not grouped with the Baltic states. For this reason there were no reserves which could
provide more budgetary options, as is the case in more stable countries (such as the Czech
Republic and Poland), nor are there any tools available to stabilize the situation, such as the
euro in Slovakia, while the domestic market is too small on its own to stabilize demand.
What should not be forgotten is that thanks to the stabilization measures taken, demand had
narrowed significantly and the economy had slowed down in Hungary even before the crisis
erupted.
Even though the countries collided with the crisis just a few years after the integration the
development based on cheap external funding has been replaced by development fueled by
domestic savings, was better conceived but significantly slower. Every country had to adapt to
a new economic development model that focused on gradually redressing the balance and
mitigating the social implications of the crisis.
1.3 The relevance of the Visegrad Group in EU politics and decision – making
The Visegrad Group was formed in 1991, before the associat ion with the European Union in
2004. One of the priorities on the agenda of the group was the integration, but after its
accomplishment the members decided continue the co -operation within the European Union,
increasing their chances to advance their inter ests.

18
One of the most important changes for the V4 countries was the move from passive recipients
of EU policies to active participants in the formation of common policies this gave them the
right to shape the decisions with other members rather than simp ly accepting the decisions made
by other. Since the dominant form of decision -making in the EU is governed by the rule of
qualified majority voting, the modalities of policy -making in the EU are determined by
consensus formation and coalition -building to r each the required number of concurrent votes
or ensure the composition of blocking minorities. Depending on the issues, there can be
formatted temporary coalitions or there are permanent regional coalition such as Benelux or
Visegrad Group.
Heads of governments, foreign ministers, diplomats and experts from the Visegrad states hold
regular meetings and discuss a number of issues on occasions convened for V4 representatives
or on the margin of various multilateral congregations within and outside the E U as well . While
these scheduled meetings do no guarantee any collective position or its persistent representation
within the Union or in any other organisation, these opportunities still offer the potential
advantages of an established the formation of co llective positions and the exercise of concerted
policies by the Visegrad partners whenever possible.
The nature of decision -making has been significantly altered and shifted towards the increased
role of supranational institutions of European politics , making, the role of the European
Parliament has also been extended decisively . The largest EU countries naturally represent the
crucial centres of gravity in the process of any decision -making and the formation of interest
groups within the circle of 27 mem bers. Smaller members must deliberate carefully and gauge
the positions of others. Lonely voices of less sizeable or influential EU countries do not stand
much of a chance to change the tune of policy and legislative proposals. There are two options
for th ese smaller members if they want to be heard in the Union dominated by variable geometry
and shifting coalitions. They either create stable alliances with larger Member States or rely on
regional groupings such as the Baltic, Nordic, Benelux and Visegrad g roups. Both options are
built on the presumption that the national preferences continue to coincide among the partners
in any of these coalitions. Member States and their smaller allies or in regional clusters cannot
be taken for granted permanently . Issue areas and policy fields would determine the
combination of Member States in the course of often protracted clashes of interests and concepts
before any decision could be reached through the accumulation of necessary (qualified)
majority. [2]

19
The Central E urope was often considered as a trouble region based on their economy, politics
and history. At some point the Visegrad Group was considered the troublemaker due to refugees
and migration crisis. At the same time, there were a period where Slovakia, and at some extend
Czech Republic had different intentions than Poland and Hungary. Slovakia and the Czech
Republic wanted to become a more constructive member, were Poland and Hungary were on
the edge to start a conflict with Brussels and other state members.
Even in such cases the members of the group had a significant role in the debates on: Climate
and energy related issues; Transportation policies; Negotiations of the EU’s multiannual
financial framework; Cohesion policy; The double -standards of food product s.
In another example, the Visegrad Group presented its position on the issue of European External
Action Service (EEAS) to other Member States and to the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in response to an invitation addressed to all Member
States by the European Council to encourage national deliberations on the new foreign policy
instrument of the Union. In this situation many countries are supporting the Visegrad group call
for the equa l and proportionate representation of the member states.
On other occasions, the Visegrad partners directly address the European Commission through
joint letters to the responsible members of the EU executive body in order to stimulate policy
debate or enc ourage the continuation of certain favourable solutions – such as EU financial
support for energy infrastructure projects – in fields of shared importance for all the V4
countries. [2]
V4 co -operated on some sectorial issues that influenced the implication of external countries
outside the coalition, the important issues are energy security, supply connection and the
operation of energy markets – at regional and at European level alike, those issues concerning
the energy policy cannot be resolved without the implication of other members of the union. In
recognition of the need of broader regional consultations, the Visegrad Group initiated the V4+
Energy Security Summit in Budapest in February 2010. In addition to the V4 officials, high
ranking representativ es from countries of Central – and South -Eastern Europe from within the
EU (Austria, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria) and from outside the Union (Croatia, Serbia and
Bosnia -Herzegovina) were invited to the extended Visegrad gathering in search of co -ordinate d
policy responses with regard to common energy supply challenges on the basis of regional co –
operation and within the context of EU policy goals. These were considered to include
strengthened co -operation in the further integration of gas networks and div ersification of routes

20
as well as sources of supplies, the promotion of North -South interconnections through all V4
countries, the acknowledgement of common regional interest in the update of EU energy action
plan and joint efforts for the allocation of EU financial resources to energy infrastructure
projects. As a result of the summit. the Hungarian -Romanian gas interconnector opened in
October 2010 was built as an instance of bilateral contribution to the practical implementation
of systematic reinforceme nt of regional gas supply links. [3]
Visegrad Group extended the V4+ format in the Eastern Europe to discuss and collaborate with
countries interested within and outside the European Union. Some “Eastern partners” (Ukraine,
Moldova and Belarus) have been o ffered separate occasions to meet the Visegrad Group. [1] In
its largest extended version of V4+ congregation of foreign ministers so far, the representatives
of the Visegrad Group as the core cluster of the event invited all the heads of national
diplomac ies of the Ea stern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine) together with the most probable directly interested EU members
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden) and the institutional representation of the Union b y the
2010 -2011 Trio Presidency of the Council (practically Spain and Belgium, because Hungary
was the host of the diplomatic conference) and by the European Commission (through the
presence of its member responsible for enlargement) . This meeting was the occasion devoted
specifically to the further development of Ea stern Partnership in March 2010 . [4]
Taking in consideration the implication of V4 members in different areas, they would have a
significant role in the EU. The result of a survey conducted by the Konrad -Adenauer -Stiftung
set out the views held by European policy makers and opinion leaders of the four countries.
According to this project, at the statement the Visegrad Group is an influential actor in the EU
the highest number of answers was that thy disagree. The highest number was Poland followed
by Czech Republic. The answer of the Czech Republic was mainly because during the last 2
years it tried to distance itself from the problematic image the Group received. Polish
respondents’ reluctance concerning the role of the V4 is not entirely unexpected given that
Poland tends to think in other regional formats. Slovakia gave the most positive answer the
majority of votes agreeing with the statement, this being driven from the Slovakia’s goal
becomi ng a constructive member for the EU. The Visegrad Group has received high visibility
in Hungary since 2015 and even higher praise from the Hungarian government as the EU’s new
engine.
Visegrad countries showed a bigger interest in the Energy and cohesion p olicy, being the
sectoral policy areas where stakeholders would wish to see more cooperation among the

21
Visegrad countries in the coming years. As respondents also anticipate that these will be high
on the European Union’s agenda in the next five years, and with the upcoming negotiations of
the next multiannual financial framework this will likely be the case, it would be indeed worth
investing resources into developing common positions and coordinating priorities in both fields.
Further on the EU level, the fact that all countries’ stakeholders view the deepening of the
Single Market as potentially beneficial for their countries can provide a starting point for future
cooperation. As further market integration in the energy and services sectors are supported by
stable majorities in all countries, these should be areas of coordination for further coalition
building in the European Union.[5]

II. EUROPEAN UNION AND REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA –
ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT AND DCFTA IMPLEMENTATION
2.1 Description of Europ ean Union -Republic of Moldova relations
The relations between European Union and Republic of Moldova started after the declaration
of independence. Moldova's relations with the European Union were launched with the signing
on 28 November 1994 of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) .
In February 2005 was implemented the Action Plan between EU -RM. The 2004 enlargement
provided the European Union and Republic of Moldova the opportunity to develop a continuous
rapprochement going beyond cooperation, to involve to a degree the economic int egration and
to deepen the political cooperation. Moldova is invited to establish stronger political, security,
economic and cultural relations with the EU, to step up cross -border cooperation and to share
responsibility for conflict prevention and resolut ion. One of the key objectives of this Action
Plan will be to further support a long -term settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. [6]

22
In march 2010, Republic of Moldova became a full member of the Energy Community, the
accession lead to a gradual change of the legislation in the field, and to the improvement of the
energy regulatory system. The activity within the energy community focuses on studying and
sharing energy -related experience among member states. [7]
On 26 June 2012, Republic of Moldova sign the agreement of Common Aviation Area with
European Union. This give the opportunity to develop the air transportation, but also to attract
foreign investors.
Since 28 April 2014, the citizens of the Republic of Moldova with biometric passports can
travel to the Schengen area without a visa. The persons who do not have a biometric travel
document, can benefit from Visa Facilitation Agreement, where the visa fees is 35€. The refusal
rate of visa decreased from 11% in 2010 to 2% in 2017.
On June 27, 2014, in Brussels, Belgium, was signed the Association Agreement between the
Republic of Moldova, on the one hand, and the European Union and the European Atomic
Energy Community and their Member States, on the other hand, which on 2 July 2014 was
ratified by the P arliament of the Republic of Moldova. On 1 September 2014, domestic legal
procedures have been completed in all EU countries, which noted the entry into force of AA /
DCFTA with the EU.
Republic of Moldova receives assistance and support from EU in order to implement the
reforms foreseen in the Association Agreement. It aims at improving the life of Moldovan
citizens, the business climate, the quality of goods and services, and increasing the number of
work places.
The European Union worked on creating a f inancial plan for Moldova for 2017 -2020 with the
objective to increase their support, strengthening the European visibility and bringing
opportunities to the society. The implemented programme is Single Support Framework (2017 –
2020) and it focuses on four priority areas: 1. economic development; 2. governance; 3.
connectivity; 4. contacts between people.
For the first sector Economic development and market opportunities the main objective is to
stimulate the economic growth, to improve the business climate and to increase the investment
potential. As a result EU became Moldova’s first trading partner and biggest investor. Exports
of goods to EU countries amounted to US $ 1.9 billion, accounting for 68.8% of total exports.
The Deep and Comprehensive Area do n ot interferes with other free trade agreements. The

23
DCFTA contributed at the implementation of reforms in different areas, which increased the
inflow of investments and created opportunities for future trade with EU. Also Moldovan SMEs
benefit from EU fina ncing. Thanks to the EU financial support of SMEs, EU help 5000
enterprises and contributed the creation of new jobs. As well 10 business incubators were
oppened in the areas of Leova, Stefan Voda, Rezina, Singerei, Cosnita, Cedir Lunga, Nisporeni,
Cimisli a, Cahul and Calarasi.
The second area Strengthening institutions and good governance is more focused on improving
the political environment. The EU has been always open about their intensions to strengthen
the democratic standards, the rule of law and to diminish the high level of corruption in
Moldova. The European Union expressed its opinion on the invalidation of Chisinau mayor
elections in June 2018, recalling that EU -Moldova relations are strengthened on respect for
democratic rights and state law. Af ter the local Chisinau elections the EU expected that
Moldova will respect the democratic standards and the rule of law during the Parliamentary
Elections of February 2019. To ensure that the previous situation will not repeat itself an EU
observer was pre sent at each election station. Still the main spheres that should be approach are
the independence of the juridical system, fight against corruption and solving the case of the
bank fraud. Besides the political aspects the European Union supports the civil society from
both banks of the Dniester River by creating ties of trust between the civil organizations.
According to the third sector Connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate change
supporting better, energy connectivity with the EU, and improving the low level of energy
supply security, rehabilitation of transport infrastructure, sustainable management of natural
resources are crucial for the economic development of the country. Tangible results was
registered:
− With the EU support were bu ilt new drinking water supply infrastructures.
Approximately 15,700 people have access to safe, drinking water.
− Public transport has been improved because of EU donations of trolley buses in
Chisinau and Balti.
− The countries energy supply was diversified by new regenerable energy. In 225 schools,
kindergartens, community centers and village halls were installed biomass heating
systems which is more cheaper. In the same time 35 new biomass businesses were
established and 400 new work places were created. An d in 47 of this places were
installed Solar Hot Water Systems.

24
− The simplification of the rules of business foundation have allowed 70 people from both
sides of the Nistru river to set up businesses and create 350 jobs.
− The forensic centre of the Police was equipped with modern technologies facilitating
criminal investigations.
− Due to European funds more than 700 kilometres of road were rehabilitated or will be
in the future.
The fourth sector Mobility and people -to-people contacts, includes the visa liberal isation of
citizens movement to EU member states, education, research. In 2015 -2017 more than 900
students benefited from the exchange programme Erasmus+, and more than 2300 young people
took part at exchanges and volunteering activities from the same prog ramme. Young people as
well had the opportunities to take part at educational trainings, exchanges and common events.
More than 350 Moldovans who lived in diaspora received financial support in order to create
their own firms. Also in order to increase the economic growth through tourism the Soroca
Fortres, major national heritage and the hystorical Manuc Bey mansion in Hincesti were
restored from the European funds.
EU support is determined by the progress of the country in its reform agenda. In this regard
after the major banking fraud occurred in 2014 -2015, the European Union stopped their
financial support payment to the Moldovan authorities. After the agreement from 2016 between
the Republic of Moldova and International Monetary Fund which has the main scope to stabilise
the banking system in Moldova, the EU continued its budget support payment. The Commission
will pay special attention at the reform implementation, especially in the justice and financial
sector, energy sector, public administration and procurement as well as in decreasing the high
level of corruption. The European Union will pay attention at the level of compliance of the
democratic rules, the rule of law and the human rights in Moldova
Moldova also benefits from regional programmes for the Eastern Partnership region, supporting
SMEs, energy, transport, environment, access to finance, growth as well as the overall business
environment. Moldova became one of the first eastern countries to participate in the EU's
Competitiveness of Ent erprises and SME programme. This program promotes
internationalization of small and medium enterprises, also help creating interactions between
entrepreneurs.
The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Moldova and Ukraine was
launched in 2005. The aim of EUBAM is to support Moldova’s and Ukraine’s efforts to

25
effectively manage their common border and actively support concrete measures contributing
to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.
On 13 September 2017 the European Parliament and the Council agreed on a €100 million
macro -financial assistance programme with a view to supporting Moldova's economic
stabilisation and a substantive reform agenda. The decision entered into force on 23 September
2017 and foresees the assistance to be pro vided in three tranches. However, the disbursement
of each tranche will be subject to strict conditionality. The Commission will closely monitor
the fulfilment of this pre -condition throughout the lifecycle of the programme. Moreover, on a
technical level, Moldova will have to fulfil a number of policy conditions at the moment of the
disbursement of any tranche.
In addition, European Unions is an observer in the 5+2 negotiations, where supports a peaceful
settlement of the conflict, based on regional int egration of Moldova with a special status for
Transnistria. EU also contributes to the regional development of Gagauzia, and facilitates the
settlement by encouraging the Chisinau and Tiraspol authorities to cooperate.[7]
At the moment European Union continues to guide and offer financial support for the Republic
of Moldova to achieve the level of the EU members. The main priority on the Moldova’s agenda
still remains the economic integration. The relation between the UE and RM are getting tighter,
which will result the in the accomplishment of the goal in the future.
2.2 Challenges on the path to AA and DCFTA implementation
The Association Agreement (AA) between Moldova and EU, which includes the DCFTA, was
signed on June 27, 2014, and ratified by the Moldovan Parliament on July 2, 2014. After the
implementation of the AA and the DCFTA, Moldova struggled with several obstacle s. Russia,
for example, stopped exporting Moldovan products to its market. Russia banned imports of
alcoholic beverages, processed meat, canned produce, fruit and vegetables. Not long after the
implementation of the AA and DCFTA, the Russian government has taken a decision through
which it has the right to apply customs duties to 19 categories of Moldovan products (meat,
agricultural production, sugar, wheat, beer, wine, furniture, etc.), despite the existence of the
free trade area in the CIS. [8]
The Asso ciation Agenda is the main document stipulating Moldovan priorities to implement
the Association Agreement. In it are stipulated reforms in different fields, which are a finality
of the reforms initiated during the DCFTA negotiations such as: company law, accounting,

26
auditing and corporate governance; employment, social policies and equal opportunities;
consumer protection; statistics; taxation; financial services; industrial and business policy;
agriculture and rural development; regional development; ener gy; transport; environment, etc.
During the negotiation of the Agreement of Association, the government have begun internal
reforms in several areas and on different economic dimensions, such as competition, public
procurement, market access, trade statist ics, tariff barriers and Non -tariff barriers, Technical
Barriers to Trade, Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures, Trade facilitation and customs
administration, services and investments, intellectual property rights; sustainable development
(Environment Soci al and Labor), strengthening administrative capacities.
One of the biggest priorities is to improve the business climate. DCFTA provides for new
customs regulations, international standards, quality controls, competition on free market,
significant policy improvement of business regulation, a positive change in the relationship
between business and authorities, growth the country's attractiveness for foreign investors, etc.
After the DCFTA the government have implemented a range of reform to simplify the li fe of
small and medium -sized entrepreneurs.[9] Due to the abolition of 140 permissive documents,
including 18 licenses, as well as to the efficiency of the activity of the state institutions with
control function, the new changes contribute to the reductio n of expenses and the simplification
of the activity carried out by the economic agents.
Another important area is agriculture and rural development. This is the most sensitive area in
the context of trade liberalization outside. Priorities for institutio ns responsible of the sector are
the implementation of the National Strategy for Agricultural and Rural Development for the
years 2014 -2020, increasing institutional capacity responsibilities in the field, and especially
the National Agency for Research an d Development Food Safety (ANSA), modernization of
the quality infrastructure, which, besides the harmonization of the legal framework with the
European one it also should to provide for the accreditation of the quality certification
laboratories, and to increase in the export offer of the vegetable and animalier. Unfortunately,
the assessment revealed a modest progress in implementation: more than half of the
intermediate targets that were possible to estimate have not been achieved (53% of the total),
and the probability of achieving them by 2020 is estimated at only 48%. One of the projects of
the National Strategy for Agricultural and Rural Development is “Support for agriculture and
rural development in ATU Gagauzia and Taraclia district” which was car ried out during the
period of 2016 -2018. The Programme contribute to development of the agro -food sector,

27
promotion of local entrepreneurship, creation of jobs, and increasing the income of the
population living in ATU Gagauzia and Taraclia district. [10]
In the field of customs cooperation and trade facilitation, further implementation of the Strategic
Framework for Cooperation is foreseen adjustment of the system of authorized economic
operators of the Republic of Moldova to the system EU with the perspec tive of mutual
recognition, modernization of the Customs Service of the Republic of Moldova, its
infrastructure and the conduct of training cadres, diminishing complexity and modernization
customs procedures, consolidation the anti -fraud dialogue to preven t illegal trade, the approval
of the new Customs Code, based on the European Customs Code.
In the field of information society, the Law on Electronic Commerce and the draft Law on
Electronic Communications were adopted. A legislative initiative was also ad opted to allow IT
professionals to work in Moldova. This reform encourages business start -ups in this area,
creating faster and more efficient access for people investing in IT.
In the field of public procurement was approved the Regulation on the organization and
functioning of the Public Procurement Agency, which did not require changes to meet the new
requirements in the given field.
In the field of energy, a number of progresses have been registered one of the is the contracting
of services for the execution of the project "Connecting pipeline of the natural gas transmission
system in Romania with the Republic of Moldova gas transmission system, Phase II, on the
Iasi-Ungheni -Chisinau rout ", as well as modernization of electrical networks transpo rt and
thermo energy systems and the preparation of renewable energy projects. Also, the project
documents necessary for the functioning of the Operations, Management and Maintenance
Complex and the legal framework foreseen for transposition were developed .
As regards the commitment for the temporary entry and temporary stay of natural persons on
business visit, was adopted the Law on the Foreigner s' Regime in the Republic of Moldova and
the Law on Labor Migration . Moldova allows the temporary stay of Euro pean citizens on
business visit in compliance with the terms and conditions stipulated in the Association
Agreement .
In telecommunications, it was launched the 112 National Emergency National Service, which
aims at taking over and processing emergency calls to a single phone number and reducing

28
service intervention time specialized by automatically locating the caller and reducing the
questioning time .
Another important area is cooperation and administration customs . Due to the modernization
of the cust oms infrastructure it was possible to extend the electronic declarations for all customs
procedures and regimes. In 2018, it managed to record about 98% of electronic export
declarations and 32% of imports.
In the field of transport was adopted the air cod e that offers access to the ground handling
market in the airports of Moldova, was restructured the activity of the Moldovan Railways, the
rehabilitation program for national and local roads is still ongoing, and a progress has been
made in removing barrie rs to the creation of the Common Aviation Area.
At the same time, reforms in the fields of justice, internships, prosecutors' offices are
indispensable to eliminate corruption, trafficking in interests, embezzlement of public property,
smuggling, flags tha t would distort the implementation process of the agreement.
Besides all these achievements there are many fields that have not made the most of the
opportunities offered by AA / DCFTA. Especially areas such as public procurement, sanitary,
phytosanitary a nd veterinary measures, human rights, intellectual property. the Republic of
Moldova still failed to obtain permission to export animal products to the EU market. [11]
The successful implementation of reforms is influenced by three factors: governance voic es,
financial support from the EU and the involvement of society. Unfortunately, the progress
towards European integration is stagnating. The problems affecting integration progress include
economic instability, lack of institutional capacity; lack of reso urces for the implementation of
sectoral reforms.
2.3 Results of the AA and DCFTA implementation
Trade in goods between EU and Republic of Moldova
Against a difficult economic and political background, DCFTA succeeded in generating the
first tangible results, and the EU strengthened its position as the main selling market for
Moldova. Analyzing trade exchanges between the RM and the EU we can see onl y positive
trends, the trade with the EU accounting for about 25 -30% of RM's exports. With the entry into
force of the DCFTA on 1 September 2014 did not lead to an explosive growth of exports
because it did not come with a substantial liberalization of tar iffs. After 2014 the importance of

29
the European market increased significantly, which cause a decrease in the export on the CIS
market (figure2.1).
Figure 2.1. Exports by group of countries, mil USD

Source: Calculation by author based on BNS data (Natio nal Bureau of Statistics)
If we analyze the period of 2015 -2018 with the years prior to the DCFTA, we notice that exports
to the EU registered an upward trend in value terms for the entire reference period, with
approximately 21%. For comparison, exports to CIS during the reference period decreased by
25%, while those with other countries remained relatively constant (+1.5%). The trend
continued in 2018: after the first half of the year, exports to the EU increased by 38.1% over
the same period last year, with the EU market accounting for 68.5% of the total Moldovan
exports. It is important to note that this development took place on a rather difficult economic
and political background which prevented an even more pronounced growth of exports to the
EU: pol itical crisis, sanctions and reciprocal restrictions imposed by the EU and the Russian
Federation, appreciation of the dollar on the international stock exchanges, unfavorable climatic
conditions and declining international prices for some products.
If we are analyzing the exports by country to the EU, it indicates a positive development for
most of the directions. In fact, exports have increased for all most important EU countries where
Moldovan exports arrive. Obviously, the most important trading partner in this region, but also
in general, remains Romania with 28% of total exports during the reference period. Romania is
followed by Italy and Germany with 12% and 8% of total exports respectively in 2018. If
compared with the exports to Russian Federation, it can be observed a downward trend,

30
Moldovan exports to Russia decreasing with 14% in comparison with the previous year or
constituting about of 8% of total exports. (Figure 2.2)
Figure 2.2. The main destination of Moldovan exports, thousands USD

Sour ce: Calculation by author based on BNS data (National Bureau of Statistics)
The net effect of the DCFTA on exports, which was estimated at about 410 million USD, had
wider implications for the economy, influencing imports, growth, employment, investments
and budget revenues. Being the most important free trade agreement signed by Moldova, the
DCFTA has an important influence on the whole economy, not just on exports. Thus, the
modelling of effects, after the increased exports to the EU by about 410 million USD in 2015 –
2018, reveals important macroeconomic effects on economic growth, employment, investment,
imports and budget revenues.
Agri-food products benefited the most after the implementation of DCFTA , which recorded a
30% increase that offset the loss of the CIS market . The evolution of exports of agri -food
products was influenced by climatic conditions but also by the trade restrictions imposed by the
Russian Federation following the implementation of the Association Agreement . A negative
impact on exp orts of agri -food products was also the regional tensions that resulted in economic
sanctions between the EU and the Russian Federation, thus reducing the price of the products.
The increase of agri -food exports to the EU has offset losses on CIS market. O ver the period
between 2015 – 2018 , the volume of agri -food exports to the EU increased with about 515
million USD, compensating the 512 million USD reduction in exports of these products to

31
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Therefore, the DCFTA allowed a full c ompensation for losses
caused by Russia’s trade restrictions regarding Moldova, as well as by the armed conflict in
Ukraine and the worsening economic situation in Russia, Ukraine and other CIS countries
The main agri -food products exported to the EU are: sunflower with an annual growth and over
25% share of EU food exports, these being exported in the proportion of 44% in Romania and
32% in the UK. Exports of walnuts with a weight of 15% respectively, the main destinations
being France (37%), followed by A ustria and Germany, each with 14% each. Sunflower oil,
with a weight of 10%, is delivered in Spain (45%) and Italy (40%). (Figure 2.3)
Figure 2.3. The main agro -food products exported to EU, thousands USD

Source: Calculation by author based on BNS data (National Bureau of Statistics)
One of the advantages that the exporters have after the DCFTA was the liberalization of exports
for all products, except those contingent. Thus, out of the six products for which they are
provided tariff quotas (exempt from the payment of entry prices), only 3 of them were used.
The tariff quota for grapes and prunes representing 10 thousand tons is used on fully export
grapes and in ¾ for plums. The export of apples has evolved negatively, this may be the result
of restricti ons imposed by the Russian Federation creating a surplus of export to the EU. The
other product such as tomato, garlic and juice are not requested from lack of demand.
Exports of non -agricultural products to the EU have been more stable compared to other
destinations, accounting for 68% of the total export of non – agricultural product. Among the
main non -agricultural products that were exported to the EU furniture holding a share of 12%

32
,and their main destination being the Netherlands and Romania with 79% and 19% respectively.
The biggest share of the non -agricultural exports are dominated by textile products (apparel and
footwear). (Figure2.4)
Figure 2.4 The main non agricultural products exported to EU, mil. USD

Source: Calculation by author based on BNS data (National Bureau of Statistics)
After the implementation of the DCFTA there where speculations that the domestic market will
be invaded with products imported from EU. The imports of agri -food registered a positive
tendency, but nether s uch a sharp increase as it was expected.
Similar to exports, a tendency of increase we observe by analysing the imports of Moldova.
The biggest share is represented by the EU market of 49,5% followed by CIS with a share of
25%. In this case we do not see such a sharp decrease as in the case of the exports (figure2.5).
Figure 2.5. Imports by group of countries, %

33

Source: Calculation by author based on BNS data (National Bureau of Statistics)

Imports of the main agri -food products from EU is very diversif ied. In the first place in the top
of imports are food preparations not covered elsewhere, which account for about 5% of the
EU’s food imports, imported in proportion of 25% from Germany and 16% from Romania. On
the second and third place with the same sha re of 5% is placed the import of sunflower seeds
for sowing, as well as preparations for animal feeding, the main import sources being Hungary
(37%), followed by Denmark and Germany, with 18% and 14%. (figure 2.5)
Figure 2.5. The main agri -food products im ported from EU, thousands USD

Source: Calculation by author based on BNS data (National Bureau of Statistics)

34
Industrial exports to the EU have also grown steadily, but the growth was less surprising and
spectacular than the agri -industrial one. Exports of these products to EU increased by about
11% over the period under review and remained concentrated on three areas: cabling, car
upholstery and textiles, the highest increases being characteristics of industries which are
managed under lohn (exports of goods manufactured from imported raw material). However,
the exports of industrial products to EU were already relatively advanced and fairly liberalized
compared to the agro -industrial products. Therefore, the DCFTA could not have had a stron ger
impact on these exports.
The imports of the non -agricultural products were largely affected by the need of the national
economy, but in the same time by the restrictions implemented by the Russian Federation.
Imports of non -agricultural products are d ominated by petroleum products accounting for 17%
of the total EU non -agricultural imports, the main source being Romania (91%). Those products
being followed by medical drags with a share of 7% imported from Italy, Germany, Hungary,
France, Slovenia (22%, 15%, 11%, 11%). On the third place are the cars representing 4%,
imported from Germany (37%), UK (21%) and the Czech Republic (17%). (figure 2.6)

Figure 2.6. The main non -agriculture products imported from EU, mil. USD

Source: Calculation by author ba sed on BNS data (National Bureau of Statistics)
It is worth mentioning that the number of companies that carry out commercial operations with
the EU countries is growing steadily. Thus, according to the data available at the National
Bureau of Statistics o ver 1800 local companies perform export operations in the EU, which

35
represents over 70% of the total number of exporting companies. Thus, the top of the countries
where the companies in the country exports are: Romania (1052), Germany (280), Italy (237),
Poland (221) and Bulgaria (148).
Moreover, about 6000 active enterprises are registered in the Republic of Moldova foreign
investments coming from EU countries, most of them from Romania and Italy. The value
investments in the share capital of enterprises with European capital amount to a bout 10.1
billion lei. The top investors include the Netherlands – 2.39 billion. lei, Italy – 1.73 bln. Lei
Cyprus – 1.67 mlrd. lei, Romania – 1.3 billion. Lei, and Germany – 691 mln. lei.[13]
In addition to the increase in exports, the DCFTA had also deep er macroeconomic implications,
boosting the economic growth, budget revenue, imports, investment, and employment. The
DCFTA contribution to the growth in exports to the EU, estimated at 410 million USD in 2015 –
2018, has generated a GDP growth by 7% or abou t 1.5 billion USD, has increased the
investment in fixed capital by 11% or about 360 million USD, increased budget revenues by
5% or about 400 million USD, and growth of employment by 15 thousand people.
The service sector has an important economic role, which is manifested in two dimensions:
employment and creating added value. In developed countries the sector of services accounts
for approximately 40% of the workforce employed and over 50% of the value added. In these
countries, exports of services acco unt for a substantial share of GDP, generally around of 10%.
Worldwide, services account for more than 20% of global trade. However they are a series of
services that participate in all stages of the production cycle of goods that are not fixed in
statisti cs.
The workforce in the service sector is more productive than the average in the economy. Labor
productivity in the service sector is 30% higher than the average per employee economy and
practically is commensurable with industry. According to official d ata, over the last years the
trade of services of the Republic of Moldova shows a positive evolution both in the expression
value as well as types of services provided, one of the main partners being the EU. Also, there
has been a significant geographical diversification of trade in services. Thus, trade with
transport services have an essential share, with an average annual increase of about 25% and
from a negative balance in 2013 to more than 10 million US dollars in the year 2018. [14]
The liberalisation of services under the DCFTA, it is anticipated that this sector could create
new opportunities for Moldova by expanding its output of services in sectors where it has a
comparative advantage, thus creating jobs, contributing more to GDP and generating for eign

36
exchange. New investors from the EU should contribute to a higher diversification of services
and also improve the know -how in the services sectors. Imports of services into Moldova can
improve economic performance by bringing greater competition to s ome sectors, and better
skills and technologies.
The permission for temporary presence of natural persons for business purposes can bring
benefits for Moldova by facilitating work in the EU by different service providers (nurses,
teachers and domestic wor kers, as well as more skilled ones, such as medical doctors, architects
and engineers), resulting in remittances of income, which is the largest source of external capital
in Moldova. The country will also benefit from the enhanced skills and resources of returning
migrants. However, as mentioned above, the EU will apply several reservations, such as the
requirement of an economic needs test, residency requirements and nationality conditions. On
the other hand, there is a high probability that skilled indiv iduals are more likely to emigrate,
thus raising concerns about a ‘brain drain’. As for establishment, it is necessary to transpose
definitions and conditions of temporary stay into national legislation. Amendments to national
legislation on labour migrati on were proposed. The progress in this area, although significant.
The immediate goal must be to review immigration policy in order to facilitate the integration
of foreign workers on the local labour market and remove discriminatory practices. [1, p. 75 –
76]

37
III. PERSPECTIVES AND WAY FORWARD FOR REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA –
EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATION
3.1 T he Perspectives of Republic of Moldova with European Union
The only question that lingers in the minds of officials in the Moldova is what the answer of
the EU would be, according to the integration.
One of the mainstream narratives among Moldovan policy makers is that neither the European
Union nor the the Repub lic of Moldova are ready for further enlargement and EU membership
at the moment and that Moldova should wait for the proper moment and their window of
opportunity. This implies carrying out sustainable reforms envisaged by the Association
Agreement, inclu ding the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, and then applying for the
EU membership. However, there is little to no discussion about what the window of opportunity
means and what should be considered as a proper moment for applying for EU membership.
To some extent, policy makers are also afraid that without the informal and prior consent from
the EU member states, particularly Germany and France, the application might be turned down.
If the EU decides that the three states are forcing a decision witho ut showing progress, the
answer might be postponed.
According to the public opinion the level of EU support decreased significantly in Moldova.
Analysing the data below 6 years ago more than 50% of the population supported the EU
integration. By 2015, the trend had reversed. The causes of these trends are numerous, with the
most important ones being disappointment by the declared pro -European ruling political elite
and an increasing impression in society that the EU does not want Moldova as a member. In
2016 the number of supporters and the people against integration were almost equal this was
due to the Presidential Election. In present the number of people who support the EU integration
is bigger but because of the political instability there is not a cle ar view what will be the future
of Moldova.
Figure 3.1. Level of popular support of EU integration

38

Source : http://bop.ipp.md/
Member states and EU institutions have not seriously considered the issues of granting the
European perspective to the front runners of the EaP. By far, it is only the European Parliament
which adopted the non -binding resolution acknowledging the European perspective of the EaP
states. The resolution adopted on 16 April 2015 reiterates that the AAs with Moldova do not
constitute the final goal in their relations with the EU. It also points out in this connection that,
pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union, Moldova — like any other European
state — have a European perspective and may apply to become members of the Union provided
that they adhere to the principles of democracy, respect fundamental freedoms and human and
minority rights and ensure the rule of law.
The member states became increasingly hesitating, especially when the EU was facing serious
domestic issues like the refugee crisis. Since Croatia joined the EU, member states have become
more implicated in the enlargement process and attempts to derail the process have increased
over the past years, suggesting the so -called “nationalization” of enlargement. A number of
member states have increased their options to prevent the process. For instance, a change in the
French constituti on obliges the government to hold a referendum to ratify the accession treaty
of a future EU member state should there be no qualified majority in both chambers of
parliament. Other states are also considering new constitutional requirements for the ratifi cation
of the accession treaties in the form of 2/3 qualified majority in the parliament. Also, the
referendum from 2015 in the Netherlands on the EU Association Agreement showed that the
member states are increasingly hesitant to deepen relations with ext ernal partners, although in
the case of Dutch referendum, the organizers confessed that the real reasons for holding the
plebiscite was to weaken the EU.

39
Following the member states, the EU itself is becoming as disengaged in the Eastern
neighbourhood as t he countries themselves would like. The process is focused more on
stabilization and less on transformation, given that the EU will not apply the usual top -down
approach but only work on issues of joint interests. EU is ready to create new partnerships wit h
the eastern countries which would focus more clearly on commonly identified shared interests.
There is also a dark side to Moldova’s efforts to obtain the membership perspective. The
country shares huge responsibility for how it is viewed by the European community and their
future chances.
Moldova had some issues on the way to the European association. The corruption in the banking
sector that came to light in 2014 following the disappearance of $1 billion has set Moldova
back in its relations with the E U after a rather positive track record on certain reforms.
Following several years of positive dynamics in implementing certain reforms and predictable
dialogue with the EU, the domestic political animosities and the control of many state
institutions by p olitical interests have seriously damaged the image of Moldova. While it used
to be the EaP frontrunner, Moldova is now slowly outpaced by Georgia and Ukraine because
of the above problems and the political turmoil that has put democratic development on ho ld.
Despite bureaucrats’ efforts to keep a positive record at the technical level, especially in
implementing the Association Agreement, many areas are lagging behind because they are
politically motivated. The same happened quite often under the Communist government (2001 –
2009) which selectively applied reforms in areas that did not damage the political interests of
the incumbent government.
Another obstacle in the Moldova’s way to European integration is the Transnistrian issue.
Although the official neg otiation framework has been in place in its present configuration
named 5+2 since 2005, comprising the parties concerned (that is, Moldova and Transnistria),
the mediators (Russia, Ukraine and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe),
and t wo observers (the EU and the United States), little progress has been made in the settlement
of the conflict because of several factors. First the elites from Transnistria profit from corruption
and privatization, which will chance after the conflict is so lved. The second factors, is the
dispersion between the European Union and Russia, which also leads to a difference in opinions
between the population about the future of the country. Russia does not hesitate to use the its
military presence in Transnistri a, as well as it has the leading position other the energy supply.
The third factor is the poverty in particular in the rural areas, were Moldova should focus as
well. The fourth obstacle is the public opinion of the citizens living in Transnistria, majori ty of

40
which are not pro -European, and they support the east movement which slows down the process
of integration.
Although Moldova and Transnistria have continued to alienate each other over time, fostering
economic reintegration and interdependence could be a first step to bring the parties back
together. Managing to include Transnistria in the DCFTA can be looked at as a success story
for the EU, as was acknowledged in various European media. Key tools for the EU in targeting
civil-society actors are the so-called confidence -building, which represent the cooperation
between the non -governmental organizations, local businesses and media located on the both
sides of the Dniester. This had a successful outcome. By doing so, they provide a clear example
of strategic patience, with the EU slowly having impact on the ground in order to plant the seeds
for further Europeanisation of the area. In order to improve Transnistrian citizens’ perceptions
of the EU, it is thus crucial for the EU to give more visibility t o the positive effects of its policies
in the region.
Despite the relative successes of both more active and patient forms of EU engagement, the
prospects for conflict settlement are low, as reintegration is almost entirely an externally driven
process. Bo th Transnistria and Moldova have, despite Moldova’s official discourse, no real
interest in reintegration at present.
Moldova with the support of EU should gradually implement the prosses of Europeanization in
Transnistria as the society just now starts to change their view about the western side, which if
this is not managed properly a geopolitical crisis could rise, removing the chances of Moldova
of integration.
Moldova has made numerous mistakes during their short history of European integration.
Howeve r, the recent history of its relations with the EU shows that Moldova is able to mobilize
itself when needed. The examples of visa liberalisation Action Plans show that bureaucrats and
the political elite are able to overcome serious hardships and find com promises in order to
deliver on reforms. Moldova has demonstrated good coordination in implementing reforms in
the areas of migration, anti -corruption, border management, human rights, etc. It is hard to
believe that the reforms adopted under the visa libe ralisation program would have been possible
without the EU reward. Therefore, Moldova has shot itself in the foot with certain “reforms”
that produced a bad image, corruption and economic hardships, but not applying for the EU
membership might mean shootin g themselves in the head, since the EU integration process
might be the only force capable of creating the necessary critical mass to reform the country.

41
The process of EU integration and the efforts to obtain candidate status will steer reform of the
political elite and will expose the problems that the country has. Also, if Moldova would like
to achieve candidate status, provided that the membership perspective exists, it will have to
deliver on reforms. No progress will be possible otherwise. Thus, Moldo va needs the possibility
of being officially assessed and receiving what it has been promised if it delivers, as was the
case with visa liberalisation. While the EU does not need to make concessions, it has to be strict
but fair and recent examples show th at this is possible.
Moldova’s long history with Russia, influences the internal instability of the country. Over the
past few years, the Kremlin has successfully deployed both constructive strategies to preserve
or gain influence in Moldova, often through its relations in the Moldovan political and
economic elites. Over the past few years, the Kremlin has successfully deployed both
obstructive and constructive strategies to preserve or gain influence in Moldova, often through
its relations in the Moldovan political and economic elites. The remaining strong ties between
Russia and Moldova have thus obviously affected the development of Moldova’s relations with
the EU.
Today, the EU can only increase its leverage over the elites and give an offer that shows t he
seriousness of the block. Concrete EU initiatives such as the installation of biomass -powered
heating systems in Moldovan public institutions, which – apart from other positive effects –
decrease dependency on Russian energy.
Russia’s influence in Mold ova is also relevant to the EU’s engagement at the political level.
Russia’s strong ties with parts of the Moldovan elite provide the EU with the crucial dilemma
of with which local political actors it should choose to engage in order to foster real reform s.
Ather problem is constituted by the fact the pro -Russia elites are pushing forward to the
integration in Eurasian Economic Union despite the fact of them approving the implementation
of AA. On the other the media manipulation has a great impact on the p ublic opinion, those
who have limited or not at all, they can be easy manipulated by any false information.
It is better to have a process of EU integration than a discussion on EU integration. In this way,
the EU would obtain real influence over the refo rm process which is not desired by many
political actors in the country, but have a strong backing from the society. The elites, as one
could have observed in Moldova are in general in favour of slowing down the transformation
and having a more theoretical discussion about EU membership. Beginning a process of
obtaining candidate status might be the only force capable of steering reforms and changing the

42
political elite. Because of the instable political environment, and without a fixed government
Moldova i s in stagnation. On the other hand, the leading position of the Russia -oriented Party
of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova, there is a question mark about the future EU
membership of Moldova.
If Russia does not have such a huge influence other Moldova, it has a huge saying in
Transnistria. Russia was the main investor and importer for the Transnistrian region. Before the
Ukranian crisis and its engagement in eastern Ukraine, Russia no longer has the financial
solidity to support the Transnistrian econom y fully. It therefore now seems that continuing
investments in Transnistria and paying pensions at the same level are financially unviable
options. Moscow thus seems to have accepted the Transnistrian trade reorientation towards the
EU, even if this implie s a degree of (economic) rapprochement between Tiraspol and Chișinău.
Also, as Russian support for Transnistria is decreasing, the positive effects of EU initiatives
that target societal issues and foster the implementation of economic reforms (according t o the
AA) will only become more obvious to Transnistrian citizens. This, of course, will occur on the
condition that the EU manages to achieve these positive outcomes and gives proper visibility
to them.
Since implementation of AA, the result of the reform s in Moldova could be described as
insufficient for sustainable change and Europeanization, but strong enough for an officially
recognised membership perspective that could advance to an application after the a few years
if a positive track record on refor ms is recorded.
If this geopolitically favourable context is timely and appropriately exploited, Moldova could
in the future also become a successful benchmark to use when dealing with other countries in
the post -Soviet space that are affected by comparabl e (yet of course contextually different)
problems. Ukraine, with its breakaway ‘republics’ in the Donbass region, is the most prominent
(yet possibly the hardest to address) case in point. In this context, it would not be advisable to
envisage closer coope ration in Moldova with the United States and NATO, as this could destroy
any small prospect of working with Russia. The EU should take a clear lead on this issue and
should deploy all the necessary means to play that role effectively.
3.2 The lessons learned for the Republic of Moldova
EU members in the Visegrad Group have the same commitments, but unlike the Visegrad
countries Moldova have no candidate status and are economically disadvantaged because of
more limited access to certain instruments of E U funding.

43
Even though candidate status, unlike accession, is not a goal in itself, it helps the country
become aware of its problems an d mobilize itself for greater co ordination and implementation
of reforms. The fact that the membership perspective for t he Visegrad countries did not always
produce the expected results in terms of reforms is an argument that is often used to avoid a
discussion on the membership perspective for EaP countries — a sort of conventional wisdom.
At the same time, however, the Vi sagrad countries have made certain reforms and improved
their living standards driven by, among other things, the European integration perspective.
Moldovan authorities have to set clear policy objectives and show firm political leadership.
These two key factors are more important than DCFTA PR and partial communication
strategies. While Slovakia did invest heavily in marketing the advantages of the EU accession
to its population, it was the commitment of its political leaders and strong support for integr ation
by the public opinion that ultimately defined the success of Slovakia’s efforts. The European
integration in Slovakia was seen not just as an economic issue, but as a civilization task, so that
even the major temporary obstacles like the isolation of the government could be overcome
quickly.
As well they should to measure the potential impact of the new legislation on business. In the
case of Slovakia, the impact of new legislation on the economy and businesses is measured by
the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Employment, and the Ministry
of Environment. The system of assessment was introduced in 2008 and further improved in
2010. Every law that is put forward to the inter -ministerial review proceedings must include a
specifi c impact clause, which specifies the impact of the law in 5 areas (impact on the public
finance, the social impacts, impact on the business environment, the ecological impacts, and
impact on the informatization of the society).
Also the government should p rovide the necessary information to the public, in this case it
should integrate the ministries & agencies responsible for the DCFTA implementation into the
emission campaign in order to provide first hand information for the stakeholders. In the case
of H ungary, the information emission activities were partly separated from the state
administration. Chambers of commerce and industries attempted to serve as a connection.
Nonetheless, Ministries were not sufficiently involved in their activities and some of the
information was lost in this emission chain.
Government should devise a Communication strategy on EU integration that would comprise
as well the DCFTA implementation. The Czech Republic has adopted such a strategy in 1997,

44
before the start of the EU ac cession negotiations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which
created a special department responsible for its coordination, was the institution in charge with
the strategy. In 2001, an Inter -ministerial Coordination Committee for the Implementation of
the Communication Strategy was also established. The main aim of the strategy was to provide
the public with information on the essential aspects of the EU integration.
Another way to help the businesses with the adjustment to the implementation of the DCFTA
is that the Moldovan authorities should open the EU integration regional information centres
that would provide information and consultancy in areas related to the DCFTA implementation
& the EU integration, such as: internal market, trade agreements, procu rement, completion
rules, research, development and technology, transfer legislation, technical standards, taxes,
customs etc. For example, in 1998, the Chamber of Commerce of the Czech Republic
established the Centre for European Integration that operated until 2008. Its main task was to
provide businesses with information related to the EU integration and monitoring of the EU
related legislation. The Centre also organized training and educational activities. For example,
during the 1998 – 2004 period, hun dreds of entrepreneurs graduated a certified course “Manager
at the EU internal market”.
Implementing reforms the Moldovan authorities should pay attention to its sectors
characteristics. Even if there is a high level of clarity about the sectoral adaptati on processes,
future administrative procedures, the uncertainty about future competitiveness, export
opportunities, implications to the labour market remained considerable. On the list of corporate
stakeholders, these questions are the top priority concern s, while the answers lie much beyond
the scope of the administrative capabilities.
On the other hand the government should take in consideration that the opportunities and
consequences are not identical for each country. The outcomes depend on many factors;
preparations may have only a limited value. In Hungary, the textile industry almost fully
disappea red despite all sizeable efforts to adapt it to the new situation. An opposite example is
the changing attitude of the small landowners, who were rather sceptical before the accession,
but they became solid supporters after 2004, when they experienced the scale of the EU
subsidies. Thus, both the anticipation and the perception of the implementation of the DCFTA
remain to a large extent relative, independent of the process and its technocratic interpretation.
The Government has to undertake regularly high l evel consultation with the businesses.
According to the Polish negotiators, having a strong business opinion on a given issue, allowed

45
Warsaw to strengthen its position with the EU, thus demonstrating that it was not just the
government talking, but it ref lected a broader social position.
Moldovan authorities have to address the issues of its vast agricultural sector, in order to prevent
them from becoming a conservative, anti -reform force. Although the agricultural sector in
Slovakia was one of the main be neficiaries of the EU integration, there have been some
shortcomings in the government policy and communication in addressing its issues. The
agriculture has not counted as a large fraction of the economy at the time of accession, and so,
priority was put on the manufacturing sector. Some small agricultural holdings failed to comply
with the EU norms and went out of business. Unfortunately, as a result of the rapidly falling
agricultural employment, the agricultural sector in Slovakia has become somewhat an ti-market
and now regularly lobbies the government for protectionist measures.
Export -oriented industries shall constitute one of the major goals for the state policies.
Industries, capable to export to EU markets, will have higher chances to step into oth er markets,
may establish clusters of modernization in the local economy, as it happened in the Visegrad
countries (i.e. car industries, modern processing factories, agricultural production).
Microeconomic integration was a crucial, inseparable factor of s uccess of the Visegrad EU
accessions. Moldova is advised to establish a broad based national body looking at issues of the
European integration that would include negotiators/ officials, experts, business and social
groups. In the case of Poland, this body was called the National Council for Integration,
operated under the authority of the prime minister and was an organization for discussions on
a very general level. The Council acted as an information channel between the government and
the society.
The SM E corporate actors in the DCFTA should be engaged in the process long before they
have to face the consequences. In the case of the Visegrad countries, the EU -awareness grew
gradually during the implementation process. In the negotiation phase, when issues were
decided substantially, these corporate actors did not qualify the accession process as a
significant matter. It was during the implementation phase, when large number of the CEOs
and financial directors understood the imminent nature of the process.
The Government has to undertake regularly consultation with the businesses. According to the
Polish negotiators, having a strong business opinion on a given issue, allowed Warsaw to
strengthen its position with the EU, thus demonstrating that it was not j ust the government
talking, but it reflected a broader social position.

46
Republic of Moldova has all the potential to became an EU member the biggest disadvantages
that it has is an instable political environment where the political actors have completely
different visions in what part Moldova should tilt to west or east. This issue results in the
dispersion of society and leads to the creation of conflicts.

47

Conclusion and recommendations
Republic of Moldova made a huge step forward with the implementation of AA/DCFTA, but
the government should be consistent and continue to improve the economic, social and political
spheres. According to the statistics during the last three years after the implementation of the
DCFTA we can see a signific ant increase in our economy.
The government of the Republic of Moldova should continue with the improvements of the
countries indicators and situation in order to achieve the ultimate goal „the integration”. To
have higher opportunities, Chisinau should lo ok at the EU enlargement proccess form the EU’
stand point and have, communicate with EU and to address their conserns and how to solve
them. During the period of the integration proccess the Republic of Moldova should appoint
experienced specialist who ca n communicate with the EU member state elites esspecialy with
the countries that are sceptic about the integration if new countries. Republic of Moldova has a
lot of potencial unfortunatly becase of some unfavorable events Moldova lost its position and
has to prove that the is integration is still its number one priority. In 2014 three members signed
the AA/DCFTA Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. This countries should cooperate the activities
related to the european integration and membership application. This will be a very strong
signal that states a engaged in the proccess and going through self -learning. Besides the
cooperation between this countries Moldova could interact with the Visegrad countries, and
create a dialog on membership issues. The Visegrad Gr oup went throught the same proccedure
that will be applied to the Moldova. In this case the members can share their expirience and
knowledge to simplify the proccess for Moldova. Because during the last few years after the
implementation of AA/DCFTA the pu blic support for the integration has decreased, in this
circumstances the guvernment should inform more properly about what represents european
integration and that the minorities will not be discriminated . As well as Moldova should
mentain a consistent d ialogue with the European Union and act like a member and present a
membership plan, by doing this actions the member states will see the commitment of the
country in achieving its main goal.

48

Bybliography
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1. Csaba Törő. Collaboration Between Visegrad Group Countries and their Place in the
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