EFFICIENCY OF CONTROL POLICIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RULE [631438]

EFFICIENCY OF CONTROL POLICIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RULE
OF LAW AND CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR EFFECTIVENESS

Abstract

The study aims to analyze statistical indicators and create a quantitative model
to offer an opinion on the opportunity of public policy me asures regarding corruption
control , in the general framework of norms and guidelines in the rule of law area and a
given macroeconomic context.
The research uses advanced statistical analysis tools on The Worldwide
Governance Indicators, which ha ve been examined using fact or analysis, decision trees,
panel regression analysis and a decision model in risk conditions in order to determine
the conclusions to be subsequently used in an estimate of the effectiveness of efficient
public policies.
The an alysis results confirmed that the design and implementation of effectiv e
public policies which generate sustainable economic growth, requires bridging of the
sanctions policy with the rule of law standards, confirming the criticisms of economists
such as A kelhof regarding the classical theory of crime developed by Baker and Tullok
on the sanctioning policy.

Keywords : control, data mining, corruption, rule of law, good governance , civic
engagement
JEL classification : C23, D73, H11, K42

Cosmin SERBANESCU, President, Romanian National Internal Control Institute
[anonimizat]
Adrian VINTILESCU BELCIUG, Senior Researcher, Romanian National Internal
Control Institute adrian.vintil [anonimizat]

Introduction and Study Motivation
According to Tullok (1974) and Baker (1968) sanctions have the ability to
prevent crime s. The concept is part of standard economic theory where, if the cost of an
item is increased its consumption shall decrease (accordingly, if penalties will increase
in efficiency the tendency to offense shall also decrease). A first element to be taken into
account is the cost assigned to identify c ases of corruption (monitoring, tracking, etc.).
The e conomists Tullock (1974) and Ba cker (1968) have previously applied
price theory to explain crime and punishment. These models suggest that, by increasing
the cost of crime, society can reduce the number of crimes committed. Thus, by
increasing the probability of detection or punishments imposed for crimes, the number

of crimes committed can be reduced. However, psychological experiments suggest that
another factor is worthy of consideration: self -motivation to obey the law. Motivated by
cognitive dissonance theory, psycholo gists have found that a threat of severe punishment
can, once removed, increase the probability of a crime being committed. In contrast,
removal of a weaker punishment led to a smaller increase in probability of a crime being
committed.
Akerlof and Dicken s1 explain that these studies suggest that individuals who
decide not to commit crimes with small punishments are driven by an internal belief in
following the rules. In other words, they create an internal justification for their decision
to follow the ru les. These individuals do not just compare costs and benefits of crime,
but also factor in their initial belief in following the rules. In order not to get into
cognitive dissonance people can control their beliefs to some extent, given the
information reg arding the rules around them which persist over time (including customs
and legal regulations).Thus, people enter cognitive dissonance when knowing that by
committing an offense they disag ree with the rules around them. When the power rules
gets deeper into people's conscience, then increased corruption control becomes of
secondary importance compared to t rust and cooperation which rather lead to economic
growth. Therefore, self -motivation to respect the law, to comply with the rules is an
important fact or to keep in mind on the long run, besides implicit costs of anticorruption
measures, as they develop an important element for economic growt h, namely trust and
solidarity. Consequently the study aims to examine whether increased control and
punitive meas ures in cases where there is motivation to abide by the laws is effective or
not.2 On the other hand, the cost of maintaining a trend of increasing development for
control and punitive policies is becoming higher due to psychological changes in
individual persons (not assuming responsibilities, lack of communication) tha t involves
additional steps which cannot be developed at the same pace, both in terms of cost and
growth of cognitive dissonance against the rules. Similar situations have been described
during the experiments of Robert Sears in which people who have been subject to higher
penalties for committing an act prohibited by the rules tend to commit the offense more
often compared to those who were undergoing milder punishment. In fact, social and
legal rules have a time dynamics dependent on collective conscience.
For example, in 2009, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has apologized
for the "appalling" treatment that mathematician Alan Turing had undergone, for
breaking a social norm of the time. The apology came after all the British population
demanded that the recognition of the "tragic consequences of prejudice that ended the

1 Akerlof , George A.; Dickens , William T. The Economic Conseq uences of Cognitive
Dissonance. The American Economic Review Vol. 72, No. 3 (Jun., 1982), pp. 307 -319
2 Dollar, David, and Aart, Kraay. Institutions, Trade and Growth . Carnegie Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, 2002.

career and life of this man and that the gratitude we all owe to him make the inhumane
treatment he had undergone to look even more awful ," said Prime Minister Gordon
Brown. The state norm at that time which was difficult to accept resulted in loss of long –
term development, technical progress that generated growth. Another eloquent example
is that in developed countries there are shops where customers choose their merchandise,
leave the money in the mailbox, as much as each of them appreciate and leave (the
experiment proved that people do not undervalue goods).3
Suppose that in this town where a similar local store exists, migrates a group
of refugees (who have a different perception on rules) , enter the premises and do not pay
for the products. Apparently imposition of control measures seems efficient, such is the
hiring of a seller, but this approach for control causes cost, both by salary in monetary
cost but also due to cognitive dis sonance of people who once were accustomed to that
rule. On the other hand, as we shall see, if the store had existed in the country of the
group of immigrants, increased control over corruption has a direct connection to
economic growth, as it generates a consistent business environment and correct
distribution of the tax burden but also increases public revenue. Building national public
policies must thus take into account punitive measures as well as building a stable set of
rules, predictable and accept ed.4

Similar studies
A number of studies in this field have used indicators in statistical analysis (see,
for example, Neumayer, 2002; Apodaca, 2004; Hart, Atkins and Youniss, 2005;
Llamazares, 2005; Andres, 2006; Das and Andriamananjara, 2006; Jung, 2006 ; Liu San,
2006) , to explore the possible relationship between issues of governance and growth
(see, Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002; Dolar and Kraay, 2003; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2003;
Naudé, 2004; Meon and Sekka, 2005).
Because of the differences in public policy but also in state development, it is
difficult to approach a comprehensive analysis.5 So, of course there are large differences
between countries in terms of natural resources or regarding political or legal rules .

3http://stiri.tvr.ro/autoservirea -pentru -oameni -cinstiti -la-codlea -un-magazin -fara-
vanzator -si-fara-preturi -afisate_61929.html
4 Georgescu, Florin. Financial discipline and economic growth . First deputy Governor
of the Romanian National Bank, Bucharest, July 1st, 2015.
5 Rigobon, Roberto; Rodrik, Dani. Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness, and Income:
Estimating the Interrelationships. National Bureau of Economic Research 1050
Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge; September 2004.

Countries that have legal protection for investors, allowed the development of
sophisticated financial markets, which increased the economy's ability to bear risk.6
Differences in the legal system or the degree of economic development ar e only
part of the explanation. Effective enforcement of the law and public confidence in
standards and corruption are also three other important components. Thus, for example,
attenuation of control on corruption leads to the weakening of potential investment
rewards.7 As other authors felt for given values of gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita and human capital, sustainable development depends positively on long -term
development of the rule of law and short -term on the growth of control.8

A. The statistical study
Considerations on indicators and data te rminology
In order to determine a model of effective public policy we used specific
indica tors of good governance and GDP/ capita in the study.
World Bank researchers have developed series of indicators which classify
countries according to governance quali ty by aggregating data from multiple available
sources. Global indicators of governance (the Worldwide Governance Indicators – WGI)
corroborates perceptions of a significant number of corporations, citizens and experts
who participated in the research in i ndustrialized countries and in developing countries.
The indicators are based on more than 30 individual sources of data produced by a
variety of research institutes, think tanks, NGOs, international organizations and private
sector companies. These indica tors are based on 340 variables produced from 32
different sources, including providers of commercial information, studies of firms and
households, non -governmental organizations and public sector organiz ations
(Kaufmann et al, 2008). The indicators defined by Kaufmann et al, 2008 , are grouped in
6 categories, as follows:
1. Voice and Accountability (VA) is measuring the perception of a country's
citizens being able to participate in choosing their government, freedom of expression,
freedom of association an d a free media.

6 J. Barro, Robert. Determinants of Economic Growth in a Panel of Countries. Annals
Of Economics And Finance 4, 231 –274 (2003).
7 Higbee, Jason and Schmid , Frank A. Rule of Law and Economic Growth. International
economic trend, 2015.
8 Ramanujam, Nandini; Verna, Mara; Charamba, Kuzi; Moore, Marcus. A Comparative
Analysis of Approaches to Economic Development across the BRIC Countries ,
Montreal, December 2012

2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV) is the measuring perceptions
of the likelihood that the government shall be destabilized or overthrown by
unconstitutional or violent means, including po litical violence and terrorism.
3. Government Effectiveness (GE) is measuring the quality of public services
and the degree of independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government 's commitment to
such policies.
4. Regulatory Quality (RQ) is measuring perceptions of the government's
capacity to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that allow and
promote private sector development.
5. Rule of Law (RL) is the evaluation of perceptions regarding the e xtent to
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the
quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts and the likelihood of crime
and violence.
6. Control of Corruption (CC) is the analysis of perceptions regarding the extent
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of
corruption, and "confiscation" of the state by elites and private interests.9

Used data and their preliminary analysis
Concerning the database used in this research paper , the indicators analyzed
have been extracted from the portal www.govindicators.org, for the period 2004 – 2014.
In the database from Word B ank,10 the six aggregate indica tors are reported in
two ways: (1) in their s tandard normal units, ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, and
(2) in percentile rank terms from 0 to 1 00, with higher values corresponding to better
outcomes. A key feature of the WGI is that all country scores are a ccompanied by
standard errors. These standard errors reflect the number of sources available for a
country and the extent to which these sources agree with each other (with more sources
and more agreement leading to smal ler standard errors). These standard errors reflect the
reality that gov ernance is difficult to measure using any kind of data. The data
represent ing percentile rank were then analyzed using data mining techniques and data
analysis.
Data mining techniques, known as "knowledge discovery in large databases"
is a modern and powerful tool that can be used to extract useful information, but still
unexpected or unknown especially in terms of creating patterns.

9 Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay , Aart and Mastruzzi , Massimo (2007c). Governance Matters
VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996 -2006. World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper No. 4280. Washington, D.C.
10 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home

Data mining methods come from classical statistical calculation, from
managing databases and artificial intelligence.
Returning to the data analyzed, we present below, as an example, data relating
to Europea n countries, namely Romania, Greece and Norway .
In Romania's case, as shown in Figure 1 , per capita growth has a direct bearing
on corruption control as the indicator showing freedom of expression is affected on
short -term. In other words, in Romania, increased control of corruption directly
influences economic growth, even if short -term, there is a difficulty in adapting which
adjusts on the long run with increased government effectiveness and quality of regulation
by adopting accepted and consistent norms.

Source: author’s projection
Figure 1: Evolution of WGI indicators for Romania during 2004 – 2014

In the case of Gre ece, as seen in Figure 2, negative economic growth per capita
has a direct bearing on the poli tical stability indicator slump . This decrease of the above
mentioned policy indicator was however preceded by the decrease of the regulation
quality and control of corruption inducers. In other words, in the case of Greece,
lowering both the rules and control has leaded to accentuated economic contraction and
political crisis.

Source: author’s projection
Figure 2: Evolution of WGI indicators for Greece during 2004 – 2014

In the case of Norway, as observed in Figure 3, lowering of GDP is affected in
different periods by increasing control over corruption.
Thus until 2007 during political stability there is a direct dependence of the
GDP growth on the growth of control over corruption, but due to political uncertainty in
the following period as lowering of GDP and government effectiveness is rather
observed while maintaining control over corruption.

Source: author’s projection
Figure 3: Evolution of the WGI indicators for Norway during 2004 – 2014

The examples discussed above thus reveal particularities that make a global
analysis difficult. In an attempt to determine certain profiles we proceeded further to a
statistical analysis of the global data.11

Data analysis
Firstly we have calculated averages of indicators outlin ed above and the average
of GDP / capita for each state.
The analysis reveals that, largely, the corruption control indicator increases in
countries with a reduced GDP / capita which implies also the growth of the other
indicators (ex. Tajikistan, Serbia) . (if then rules analysis )12

11 Broda, Christian and Weinstein, David. (2003). Globalization and the Gains from
Variety . Columbia University, Mimeo.
12 If GDP, Capita is 3.669,00 … 15.543,00 (average = 7.594,79 ) and Government
Effectiveness is -2,00 … 86,00 (average = 29,00 ) and Regulatory Quality is 15,00 …
62,00 (average = 33,36 )
Then
Control of Corruption is more than -13,80
Rule's probability: 0,929
The rule exists in 13 records.
Significance Level: Error probability < 0,1
Positive Examples (records' serial numbers): 2, 9, 14, 50, 54, 71, 78, 93, 99, 117
Negative Examples (records' serial numbers): 44

Thus the authors confirm that if increased control over corruption exists as an
antecedent the other indicators also increase. For countries with a risen per capita GDP
a moderate increase or a decrease in corrupti on control rather stands out (ex . Germany,
United States, United Arab Emirates) .
In order to determine the relationship between economic growth per capita and
other indicators, we have the GDP per capita with its dynamics as a ratio between the
years 2014 and 2004. In many countries , especially in the underdevelop ed ones, th e
growth of the corruption control indicator has led to the massive incr ease in GDP / capita
(Vietnam, Paraguay) . Another trend is that the decrease of corruption control has a direct
connection with slow growth or decline in GDP / capita in countries such as Portugal
and Greece, but this is not a rule especially for countries with a lower GDP per capita
(Sudan, Surinam, Madagascar, Lebanon, Mauritania).
Afterwards, we conducted a factor analysis of the data presented in Figure 6,
which explains the classi fication of countries according to these indicators. By means of
the factor analysis we can determine these factors (latent variables) which may explain
the variation in a set of directly observable variables, the correlation between them, the
intensity of the relationship between the factors and each of the manifest vari ables.
Generally, for a set of "n" observable variables, there may be "k" factors explaining
variation thereof (k <p). The contribution of the factor in explaining total dispersion is
given by the sum of the squares of the saturations in the given factor and i s called
eigenvalues factor ( "eigen -values").13 The first component of the database analyzed
would be corruption, rule of law, polit ical stability and governments’ effectiveness
which p ractically represent a main component of the measures that can be taken by a
government to streamline its activity. A second major component is given by the GDP /
capita and decreasing voice and accountability. T he third component is given by
regulatory q uality. The result of factorial analysis, by analyzing the impact of the
components, this indicates that 40% of the data can be explained by the specificity of
the control environment and political stability rather than by the specificity of economic
growth .

13 Tudorel, Andrei; Bourbonasis, Regis. Econometrie . Economica Publishing House,
Bucharest, 2008.

Source: author ’s projection
Figure 4 : Main components analysis

In order to determine a set of rules based on statistical algorithms we have
approached the statistical technique of decision trees . The method of decision trees
builds a set of rules and related data partitioning based on field work b y providing
maximum information.14 Each selection is defined by a first partition , partitioned again,
usually using another field and the process continues until samples cannot be divided
anymore. Finally, partitioning at the lowest levels are reviewed and those that do not
contribute significantly to the value of the model are removed or simplified. A decision
tree is a direct description of the partitions found by the algorithm. Each end node
describes a particular subset of primary data and preliminary data belongs in each case
exactly to one terminal node of the tree. Referring to th e data analyzed in further study,
we examined the dependence of GDP growth on other variables by analyzing variables
importance but also by analyzing trees.

14 Han, Jiawei; Kamber, Micheline. Data Mining: Concepts and Techniques , 2nd
edition, MorganKaufmann Publishers, ISBN 1558609016, 2006.

Source: author’s projection
Figure 5: The Importan ce of WGI factors on GDP growth

A first conclu sion is that the evolution of corruption control is a decisive factor
alongside the rule of law, political stability and regulatory quality. Besides, as shown in
the table below, where the rule of law growth is positive, the second factor that matters
is the effectiveness of governments. When this is high, growth is ensured without the
need for increased corruption control. But when government effectiveness is lower,
regulatory quality ensures high economic growth without the need of corruption control
and in its absence increased political stability is the next factor.
As a first conclusion, we can see that corruption control importance is rather
secondary in states that have developed other components.
A second conclusion is that in states where the rule o f law is increasing slower,
the second important factor is corruption control (a s is the case of Romania) .

In states with a very low corruption control, pol itical stability and regulatory
quality are important.

Source: author’s projection
Figure 6: Analysis trees rega rding WGI factors on GDP growth

We have performed a lag regression of the panel data representing the above mentioned
indicators .

Source: author’s projection
Figure 7 : Panel l east squares analysis

The regression model confirms that government effectiveness is dependent on
the previous y ear’s efficiency (variab le ge -1) and short term control of corrupti on
(variab le cc). However it depends in the opposite direction of la st year’s control of
corruption: (cc(-2) cc( -4)).
Moreover, the growth of corruption control has only a short term effect in the
growth of the government efficiency which confirms Akelhof ’s criticize of Baker’s &
Tullock ’s theory.

B Model
Furthermore , given the findings by statistical an alysis, we shall describe a
model specific to the decision theory regarding the appropriateness of control measures

of th e state in a certain regulation framework . This analysis model is specific to the
decision in hazardous conditions and can provide designing of appropriate public policy
measures. We can define control as the procedure by which the state constrains a group
of persons who do not willingly exercise their obligations resulting from social norms.
One of the problems that arises from the amplitude of control processes relates
to optimal decision that should be taken when carrying out punitive measures for non –
compliance, for example, on anticorruption, when considering allegations of fraud,
given that there is either the possibility to use this control option or to defer social norms
to take effect. If the state has a drastic attitude towards control compared to the existing
rules, this may induce a cognitive dissonance that leads to the growth of instabilities, but
by sanitation of the eco nomic environment determines social growth. In other words, if
the rules are in cogniti ve consonance with the values of the group (society) ,15 increased
control can lead to negative effects. Based on the data, state bodies of power analyze and
establish san ctioning measures, taking into account the immediate interest of the state
and the rights and obligations of individuals. This model analyzes the decision which is
based on trust in the environment of norms that should lead to sustainable development
and t o a sanctions policy to minimize loss due to corruption. If society has a certain level
of trust in the rules, then it is better that they be allowed to function (cognitive
consonance with the norms of the group being sufficient). If the level of confidenc e in
the rules is low then control processes are useful although they generate in medium -term
a sense of instability. People can observe social norms or not (having to do with
corruption in this case) and the state can perform the control or not (which has a cost h).
The person wins by violating the w rules, less if the s tate notices and confiscates income.
The state shall not sanction them, but penalize them by confiscating all income.
For the person, the "costs" of compliance to the rules is c, and if the y do not
violate the rules, people contribute to the welfare of the state in the value v. The normal
form of the game is schematically defined as follows:
y 1-y
The state controls The state does not
control
x Incorrect behavior towards the rules 0 , – h w , – w
1-x Correct behavior w-c , v-w-h w-c , v-w
Source: author’s projection
Figure 8: The Balance model of the sanctions policy in t he case of revenue
confiscation

15 Akerlof, George and Kranton, Rachel E. Economics and Identity. The quarterly
Journal Of Economics vol S. CXV August 2000 Issue

The Balance d model

The game does not have a balance in pure strategies, so if the state does not
control, people are tempted to break the rules . If the administration decides to control
and people know this, then it would be better not to violate the rules. Therefore, the state
must choose a mixed strategy. Let x be the likelihood that a person violates the rules and
y the likelihood that the state controls.
The person is indifferent whether they break social norms or not if y * 0 + (1 –
y) * w = y * (w – c) + (1 – y) (w -c); y * w = c, y = c / w.
The pe rson is indifferent whether to choose between violating the rules or not
as long as the amount of gain from the violation of norms w is put in line with the c ost
of compliance to the rules c. The state is indifferent whether it chooses between
controlling or not, as long as x * (h) + (1 -x) (v -N- h) = x * ( – w) + (W) (v – w) ie w = x
* h; x = h / w.
The state is indifferent whether it chooses between controlling or not as long
as the cost of control regarding rules breach h is placed in accordance to the lo st value
from their non -compliance. In conclusion, the only balance of the considered game
would be a balance in mixed strategy, described by the equation ((h / w, (W -h) / w) (c /
w, (w -c) / w)).
Another design of the model can be considered as follows: i f the state finds that
the taxpayer violates the rules, applies a fine.
The model is similar to that described above, with the addition that the state
will be able to compel the one who break s the rules to pay a fine of m.
y 1-y
Inspects Does not inspect
x Incorrect behavior towards norms w-m , m – h w , – w
1-x Correct behavior w-c , v-w-h w-c , v-w

Source: author’s projection
Figure 9: Balance d model of the sanctions policy in case of applying a sanction

The Balance d model
The balance of the game will still be mixed and will be descri bed, this time by
the equation: ((H / (w + m) (m -w + h) / (w + m)) (c / m, (m -c) / m))
The state is indifferent whether it chooses between controlling or not as long
as the cost of control h is equal to the value of the irregularity against the rules and

sanction m and a person takes the decision regarding the violation of norms against the
cost of abiding by them and the fine.
The significance of this study is that, in order to maximize revenue the state
must choose a mixed control strategy, which is highly sensitive to costs. In fact, the
frequency of controls is determined by the amount of penalties (seen in the broad sense
of effective penalty, confiscation of property, conducting years of detention, stress due
to research), the cost of control and the specific value gained by fraud and lost by the
state (this value is specific in various areas of society).

Let us now analyze each factor on another model:
H which determines the cost of control is primarily given by the organization
of the country (democracy, dictatorship) and the technical possibilities of getting
eloquent evidence (moni toring devices, etc.) . W represents the amount won by the person
by fraud and practically lost by the state. If the lost value is very high (both financially
and through the impact value of the deviation from the norm) then control is especially
required. This variable is basically the gain of the person who does not abide by the
rules. Another variable is the amount of the sanction m which can lead to an impact
decrease of the lost value w (sanction ’s effectiveness). From the statistical study carried
out in the first part, it results that the value of the applied sanctions, besides the value
gained by the state through the recovery of the amounts, has also a second effect
component j cognitive di ssonance before applying the sanction
m = f (w, j)
Finally, the last variable is c which represents the utility of compliance to the
rules and is basically cognitive consonance of compliance by the individuals.
According to Akelhof 16 the individual utility function is dependent on the
income per capita, fr aming in a set of rules imposed by the rule of law and the satisfaction
of belonging to a certain group , compared to a control of society.
For example, in poor and homogenous communities belonging to a group
majorly compensates incomes unt il reaching an in come that cannot provide for basic
conditions. Maintaining this income above a minimum consumer basket can maintain
the utility function at a high level in terms of membership to a group and a set of accepted
rules.17

16 Akerlof, G. The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales .
Quarterly Journal of Economics , 1976, 90, 599 -617.
17 Kahneman, Daniel and Deaton , Angus . High income improves evaluation of life but
not emotional well -being. Center for Health and Well -being, Princeton University,
Princeton, NJ 08544.

When income falls below a certain thres hold, the individual decision is to leave
the social group for another group with other rules in which they have to adapt.
An excessive control can create dissatisfaction and decreased utility at
individual level. Given the above considerations, the critic al point that determines the
optimal control strategy is:
a) With respect to the decision of state to control :
Y = h / (w + m) = h / (f (w, j) + w)
b) Regarding individual decision :
X = c / m = F (income, satisfaction of group maintenance and abiding by th e rules, the
cost of exiting the group) / f (w, j)
A sensitivity analysis of this model is given by the evolution of control cost
which is becoming lower with the evolution of technology. Developing the capacity to
control influences the satisfaction of belongin g to a group. At large values of w, an
increased capacity control is useful, but for lower values this practice of control becomes
inefficient. Returning to the examples that have generated the design of this study (the
store without a seller of Al an Turing) they are e xplained by the present model.

Conclusions
Depending on the development of each state, besides the rule of law /
corruption control ratio, the citizen’s confidence in the state rules , besides the sanctions
policy determ ines the design of adequate public policies. Long -term growth of GDP /
capita depends primarily on the rule of law but also on its acceptance by the society. In
short -term, increased corruption control leads to long -term economic development .
On the long run, however, specific rule of law rules need to be correlated with
its perception in the groups. In groups where the power of the rules is effective and
accepted, maintaining this set of values is more important than the development of
corruption contro l. In countries where the power of the rules is low, control of corruption
is an important factor as long as this direction of development is in consonance with the
expectations of the population regarding the acceptance of the rules. If this condition is
not observed, increased corruption control can become a factor of social non -cohesion.
In countries where the rule of law are abided by and known, a cooperative
behavior would be more useful, and in countries where this is not done, control and
penalties should be more severe due to a proportional increase of regulatory norms and
of several conviction policies on the rules themselves. For example, in the absence of a

law regarding the lobby traffic, the control of excessive influence trafficking contradic ts
with the group’s expectations and belief who thinks that lobby is useful.
Therefore, the increase of law power is the factor to be followed in the long
term. I n the short term , measures to combat corruption represent viable solutions to
streamline gove rnments provided that they are acceptable by public conscience. Another
consequence of this study is that in the case of migrations, we can observe even the
leaving of groups to which one belongs and affiliation to other groups which places
governments in a dilemma that generates instability. The dilemma is characterized by
heterogeneity that is created in the behavior and attitudes towards the same rule of
different groups that require different control measures.
On the one hand, additional control for im migrants is necessary (ex. border
control or control of social benefits in the developed countries in Europe) because they
are in cognitive dissona nce with the legal norms of the s tate where they are going, but
this generates discontent amongst those who a re in cognitive consonance with the state
laws. Thus, in the short term until the acceptance of the rule of law by the migrant
population, governments are in need to apply effective measures that do not generate
high social costs and this hesitation leads to distrust in the short term. From a certain
level of development, the importance of consciousness of complying with the rules for
individual cognitive consonance satisfaction may be greater than the punishment itself.
In underdeveloped countries where th e rule of law is less developed and accepted,
control measures are more effective than in over -developed countries.
Thereby when a certain level of compliance of a cognitive consonant is
reached, cooperation and stability is more important than increased s anctions policy.
This statement reflects the fact that corruption control is useful in the short term
especially in countries where the rule of law exists to a lower extent with the condition
of maintaining stability of the groups. A growth of control in c ountries where the degree
of cognitive consonance is high is rather harmful.

Bibliography

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