From Daraa to Damascus : Regional and Temporal Protest Variation in Syria [631108]

From Daraa to Damascus : Regional and Temporal Protest Variation in Syria

by
Shena L. Cavallo
B.A. International Relations and Spanish, Duquesne University, 2007

Submitte d to the Graduate Faculty of
The Graduate School of Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
M.A International Development

University of Pittsburg h
2012

ii UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

This thesis was presented

by

Shena L. Cavallo

It was defended on
May 23, 2012
and approved by
M. Müge Kokten- Finkel, PhD, Assistant Professor
Ilia Murtazashvili, PhD, Assistant Professor
Paul J. Nels on, PhD, Associate Professor
Thesis Director: Luke N. Condra, PhD, Assistant Professor

iii Copyright © by Shena L. Cavallo
2012

iv
When protest erupted in Syria on March 2011, there was considerabl e analysis seeking to explain the
initial display of collective action. While this initial showing of dissent caught some off -guar d, what was
more remarkable is how the protest m ovement managed to endure, well over a year, despite policies of
severe repression, a lack of established oppos ition organizations , and a lack of regime defections. This
paper seeks to explore which factors have sustained the protest movement, as well as the role of these
factors at different stages in the ‘protest wave’ and the relationship these variables share with region-specific waves of protest. I hypothesize that more traditional approaches to understanding protest
longevity must be expanded in order to help explain contemporary events of protest , particularly in
authoritarian contexts . The time and space as pects, also, must be considered because protest must attai n
a certain critical mass ( in terms of participants, frequency, and dispersion) to present a unified front
against an incumbent regime. I utilize a qualitative analysis in which social movement theory is applied to the Syrian case and also use panel data to test my hypotheses concerning the variables I believe to be
relevant in Syria, at differ ent stages in the ‘protest wave’ and in different regions of the country. Both the
quantitative and qualitative approaches indicate that there have been several critical elements at play
which helped to compensate for the relative lack of resources and opportunities. These factors involve the role of personal networks, collective identity, and the likelihood of success. Protest, however, cannot be explained by simply looking at a movement because bystanders and government actors also m atter . The
government’ s policy of repression played a critical role insofar as it was relatively indiscriminate across
regions and among various demographics. This factor helped to facilitate a process in which more Syrians came to identity and, consequently, sympathize with the fallen protesters, creating a multiplier effect. In this way, repression is not simply a factor which may increase or decrease protest, but also a
critical opportunity which conveys information about the regime that may have otherwise remained
hidden.

From Daraa to Damascus: Regional and Temporal Protest Variation in Syria
Shena Cavallo, MID
University of Pittsburgh, 2012

v TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. XII
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION: ………………………………………………………………………. 2
1.2 ARGUMENT ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 3
1.3 WHY SYRIA? ………………………………………………………………………………………… 4
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW: F ROM DISSENT TO MASS MOBILIZATION …….. 8
2.1 RELEVANT FACTORS FOR UNDERSTANDING PROTES T……………….. 8
2.1.1 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES …………………………………………………………. 9
2.1.2 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY…………………………………………. 15
2.2 PERIODS OF SUSTAINED PROTEST ………………………………………………… 17
3.0 THE DYNAMICS OF PROT EST, GOVERNMENT RESP ONSES, AND
LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCES S……………………………………………………………………………………… 26
4.0 CASE STUDY: SYRIA …………………………………………………………………………………. 30
4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PROTEST AND GOVERNMENT
RESPONSES TO OPPOSIT ION IN SYRIA …………………………………………………………. 30
4.2 POLITICAL OPPORTUNIE S ………………………………………………………………. 36
4.3 RES OURCE MOBLIZATION TH EORY ……………………………………………… 40
4.4 PROTEST WAVES ………………………………………………………………………………. 43

vi 4.4.1 HEIGHTENED CONFLICT ……………………………………………………………… 43
4.4.2 GEOGRAPHIC AND SECTORAL DISPERSION …………………………….. 45
4.4.3 EMERGING ORGANIZATIONS ……………………………………………………… 49
4.4.4 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES …………………………………………………… 50
4.4.5 REPERTOIRES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ………………………………….. 55
5.0 CASE STUDIES OF REGI ONS ……………………………………………………………………. 57
5.1 DARAA ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 58
5.1.1 PROTEST AND OPPOSITION HISTORY ……………………………………….. 60
5.1.2 CURRENT EVENTS ………………………………………………………………………… 60
5.1.3 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES ……………………………………………………….. 61
5.1.4 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY…………………………………………. 62
5.1.5 PROTEST WAVES …………………………………………………………………………… 65
5.1.5.1 HEIGHTENED CONFLICT ……………………………………………………. 65
5.1.5.2 GEOGRAPHIC AND SECTORAL DISPERSION ……………………. 65
5.1.5.3 EMERGING ORGANIZATIONS …………………………………………….. 66
5.1.5.4 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES …………………………………………. 66
5.1.5.5 REPERTOIRES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION …………………………. 68
5.1.6 HOW DO PATTERNS IN DARAA COMPARE TO SYRIA? …………….. 68
5.2 HOMS ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 70
5.2.1 PROTEST AND OPPOSITION HISTORY ……………………………………….. 70
5.2.2 CURRENT EVENTS ………………………………………………………………………… 71
5.2.3 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES ……………………………………………………….. 72
5.2.4 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY…………………………………………. 74

vii 5.2.5 PROTEST WAVES …………………………………………………………………………… 75
5.2.5.1 HEIGHTENED CONFLICT ……………………………………………………. 75
5.2.5.2 GEOGRAPHIC AND SECTORAL DISPERSION ……………………. 76
5.2.5.3 EMERGING ORGANIZATIONS …………………………………………….. 76
5.2.5.4 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES …………………………………………. 77
5.2.5.5 REPERTOIRES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION …………………………. 79
5.2.6 HOW DO PATTERNS IN HOMS COMPARE TO SYRIA? ………………. 79
5.3 ALEPPO ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 81
5.3.1 PROTEST AND OPPOSITION HISTORY ……………………………………….. 82
5.3.2 CURRE NT EVENTS ………………………………………………………………………… 83
5.3.3 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES ……………………………………………………….. 85
5.3.4 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY…………………………………………. 87
5.3.5 PROTEST WAVES …………………………………………………………………………… 87
5.3.6 HOW DO PATTERNS IN ALEPPO COMPARE TO SYRIA? …………… 88
5.4 DAMASCUS …………………………………………………………………………………………. 89
5.4.1 PROTEST AND OPPOSITION HISTORY ……………………………………….. 90
5.4.2 CURRENT EVENTS ………………………………………………………………………… 91
5.4.3 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES ……………………………………………………….. 93
5.4.4 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY…………………………………………. 95
5.4.5 PROTEST WAVES …………………………………………………………………………… 98
5.4.5.1 HEIGHTENED CONFLICT ……………………………………………………. 98
5.4.5.2 GEOGRAPHIC AND SECTORAL DISPERSION ……………………. 99
5.4.5.3 EMERGING ORGANIZATIONS …………………………………………….. 99

viii 5.4.5.4 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES …………………………………………. 99
5.4.5.5 REPERTOIRES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ……………………….. 100
5.4.6 HOW DO PATTERNS IN DAMASCUS COMPARE TO SYRIA? ……. 101
5.5 HAMA ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 102
5.5.1 PROTEST AND OPPOSITION HISTORY ……………………………………… 103
5.5.2 CURRENT EVENTS ………………………………………………………………………. 104
5.5.3 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES ……………………………………………………… 106
5.5.4 RES OURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY……………………………………….. 107
5.5.5 PROTEST WAVES …………………………………………………………………………. 108
5.5.5.1 GEOGRAPIC AND SECTORAL DISPERSION …………………….. 108
5.5.5.2 EMERGING ORGANIZATIONS …………………………………………… 109
5.5.5.3 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES ……………………………………….. 109
5.5.5.4 REPERTOIRES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ……………………….. 111
5.5.6 HOW DO PATTERNS IN HAMA COMPARE TO SYRIA? …………….. 111
6.0 DATA ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 113
6.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE ………………………………………………………………….. 113
6.2 EXPLANATORY VARIABLE S ………………………………………………………….. 115
6.3 CONTROL VARIABLES ……………………………………………………………………. 119
6.4 RESEARCH DESIGN …………………………………………………………………………. 120
6.5 REGRESSION RESULTS F OR EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND
TIME SPAN ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 123
6.6 REGRESSION RESULTS F OR REGIONAL VARIATIO N ………………… 128
6.7 DISCUSSION ……………………………………………………………………………………… 128

ix 6.8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATIO N …………….. 131
7.0 CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………………………………… 133
REFERENCES ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 135

x LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Syria ……………………………………………………………………………… 116
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Aleppo …………………………………………………………………………… 117
Table 3: Descriptive Statistic s, Damascus ………………………………………………………………………. 117
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics, Daraa …………………………………………………………………………….. 118
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics, Hama …………………………………………………………………………….. 118
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics, Homs …………………………………………………………………………….. 118
Table 7: Panel Data OLS Regression Results, …………………………………………………………………. 121
Table 8: Impact of Stage of the Protest Wave on Explanatory and Control Variables ………….. 122
Table 9: Regional Variation in Protest ……………………………………………………………………………. 127

xi LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Access to Facebook …………………………………………………………………………………………. 41
Figure 2:Map of Syria ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 58
Figure 3: Percentage of total population at or below the poverty line …………………………………… 59
Figure 4: Protest Pattern in Daraa and Syria ……………………………………………………………………… 68
Figure 5: Map of Homs (areas in yel low are those with most frequent protests) ……………………. 72
Figure 6: Intensified Conflict: Civilian deaths in Homs by month ……………………………………….. 76
Figure 7: Prot est Pattern in Homs and Syria ……………………………………………………………………… 79
Figure 8: Protest Patterns in Aleppo and Syria ………………………………………………………………….. 88
Figure 9: Protest Patterns in Damascus and Sy ria ……………………………………………………………. 101
Figure 10: Protest Patterns in Hama and Syria ………………………………………………………………… 111
Figure 11: Number of Protests Per Week in Syria (Country -wide) …………………………………….. 114
Figure 12: Trends for Protests and Death Toll Across Protest Wave ………………………………….. 115
Figure 13: Regional Variation ……………………………………………………………………………………… 126

xii PREFACE

I would like to thank my thesis committee , Professors Luke Condra, Müge Finkel, Ilia
Murtazashvili, and Paul Nelson for their support and advice , as well as Professor Annemie
Maertens for her patient assistance with STATA and brainstorming . I am also grateful to Aurora
A. Matthews for her assistance with editing and Ahad A. Alsalman for his assistance with
translation. Finally, I thank Professor Condra whose guidance was essential for this project.

1 INTRODUCTION
From the uprisings in the Middle East to ‘los indignados’ in Spa in to the ‘Occupy’ movements
across the United States, the year 2011 was marked by protests, demonstrations, riots, and
revolutions. However, for each event of collective action that attracts media attention and mana ges to achieve a sustained challenge to the status quo, there are numerous events of dissent
that fail to attract enough participants or achieve the longevity required to obtain concessions and achieve their aims. Initial dissent and enthusiasm can be hamp ered by disillusionment, harsh
police coercion, and high opportunity costs such as imprisonment or threats. Given the innumerable obstacles that protesters must overcome, what then are the factors which lead protests to continue, day after day, while encou raging new protesters to join a movement? In the
case of the Syrian uprising (2011 – present) this question is particularly pertinent as the protest
movement has both endured and grown substantially since the initial outbreak of protest in March 2011. This growth occurred in the face of both repressive government responses, as well
as a relative absence of some of the traditional factors commonly perceived as relevant in both
sparking and sustaining protest, such as established organizations and networks, r esources, and
critical windows of opportunity. Based on traditional social movement theory, Syria is a case in which protest should have failed due to a repressive, ubiquitous government security apparatus, and the lack of established networks, organization, and resources.

2 1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION:
Protest, while often triggered by an event and certain favorable, permissive conditions, only
achieves longevity and mounts a significant challenge through a dynamic process of reinforcing
events and the presence of r esources that facilitate mobilization. The determinants of what
sustains protest are worthy of analysis because they help to determine whether or not initial collective action is likely to materialize into more widespread events of dissent or, as is
sometimes the case, vanish as suddenly as it emerged. These issues are particularly timely and
relevant for the case of the Arab uprisings and revolutions , which have generated considerable
debate regarding why the protests have occurred when and where they have , and why they have
spread so rapidly throughout the region. Equally pertinent is why, unlike Iran’s Green Movement
(2009) and other failed uprisings, these movements have largely been sustained, overcoming considerable obstacles, and in four countries have managed to achieve their immediate aims (the toppling of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and the eventual ousting of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen).
To help explain this puzzle, this paper aims to explore two distinct, yet interconnected,
questions: Which factors sustained large -scale mass mobilization in Syria, especially given the
presence of significant obstacles? And, do these factors vary across time and space? Schola rs of
social movements have identified certain factors that help to facilitate both the initial outbreak of
protest as well as f actors that help to sustain it. M ost prominent among these factors are the
presence of both opportunities for collective action, resources that help to sustain the cooperation
and build upon the initial event of collective action, and an overarching collective identity which helps to explain gaps in the previous two approaches. The majority of such factors, however,

3 were not presen t in Syria. A t least not in the way in which such factors have commonly been
defined.
1.2 ARGUMENT
Understanding the dynamics of protest is a complicated endeavor due to the fact that sequences
of protest do not have r egular, predictable frequencies, and prot est does not necessarily disperse
through populations, space, or time in an unvarying way (Tarrow, 1993, 284). However, in the case of Syria, certain factors stand out as being critical in sustaining the protest movement. While Syria was not the only Arab country t o experience uprisings in 2011 – present, Syria
presents the most striking puzzle. Very few analysts predicted that the Syrian people would mobilize to protest due to a variety of factors including the relative lack of opposition organizations, a powerful state security apparatus, and the country’s restrictive emergency rule (Al-Jazeera, February 9, 2011). However, Syrians did mobilize . Even when faced with high
degrees of repression Syrians continued to protest and, what is more critical for this analysis,
protest continued to grow both in terms of the number of participants, as well as in terms of frequency and geographic dispersion. What explains this puzzle? Several factors stand out. First, the Syrian movement received several sign als – namely foreign support and certain concessions
from the Assad regime – that it could be successful. Secondly, the protest movement in the
country was able to overcome, to a degree, the lack of resources by taking advantage of personal ties and mosques as sites fr om which to launch collective action. Finally, one of the most critical
and surprising factors has been the role of repression. This aspect has two dimensions. First, like the protest movement, repression gradually affected every region of Syria. While the regime did

4 use different repressive measures in different regions, each region eventually came to experience
rising death tolls and arrests. This is critical because it helped to foster a sense of collective
identity. Repression was not targeted merely at ‘radical’ Muslims, the working -class, or a
particular region, but rather numerous sectors of society. This ultimately fostered a sense of
solidarity among the people of Syrian and improved the chance that bystanders came to identify with the movement. Alt hough it is critical that the claims of the movement resonate with the
broader public, this was a case in which the claimants mattered as much as the claims. While
scholars normally conceptualize repression as a c onstraint, in this way, it can also be unde rstood
as an opportunity.
1.3 WHY SYRIA?
Given the variety of countries in the Arab world that experienced political protest, it is worth
justifying the selection of Syria. First, the duration of the protest period in Syria, which began in
mid-March 2011 and is still active during the time of this writing, provides the opportunity to
analyze a longer protest cycle than in any of the other countries that experienced uprisings in 2011. This allows for deeper analysis of the variation and provides more observat ions for
statistical analysis. For shorter protest cycles, such as those experienced in Egypt or Tunisia, outliers may greatly skew the data.
Furthermore, the conditions in Syria both leading up to and during the protest have
largely been unfavorable base d on traditional notions and expectations of when and where
protest should both emerge and continue to mount a challenge to the status quo. Although scholars of social movements emphasize the importance of social networks in facilitating both

5 communication and mobilization, their power is often either greatly diminished or virtually non-
existent under authoritarian regimes, like Syria. It is not simply that organizations and networks
are lacking, thus limiting a fledgling movement’s ability to coordinate an d attract new
participants, but communication is also extremely difficult in such settings. The mere act of
expressing dissent or critical opinions to friends or families may come with a high cost. Charles Tilly (1978), for example, argues that in such set tings the emergence of protest is unlikely.
Thirdly, Syria is unique due to the degree of repression employed by the government. By
November 2011, the end of the period of analysis for this study, over 3,000 protesters had been killed by government forces (Kennedy, October 21, 2011) and tens of thousands of dissidents
had been arrested (NPR, November 8, 2011). Although repression may refer to vast array of tactics and strategies, for the purpose of this analysis, the variable is defined by the number of deaths and arrests due to the fact that these elements are both easy to measure and other ‘ soft’
measures of repression (i.e. surveillance) were prevalent even prior to the outbreak of protest.
While the impact of repression on protest is still debated amo ng scholars and analysts,
the dominant notion for some time was that repression was likely to deter protest, particularly high levels of repression (Tillly, 1978; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977;McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996). Goldstone (1998) predicts that hi gh levels of repression often lead to failed revolutions.
Even scholars who acknowledge that repression may lead to further mobilization through the mechanism of increased legitimacy and sympathy for the movement while simultaneously eroding the legitimacy of the status quo regime have found that moderate coercive policies may
fuel protest but greater degrees of repression simply make the costs of publically expressing dissent too high (Opp, 1994). Syria, in theory, should have been a case where deterrence of dissent was successful. “Successful deterrence emerges if organizing protest is costly (e.g.

6 information cannot flow freely, activists are restricted in their movements and actions, social
networks are dispersed or severed, and the punishment through re pression is severe” (Pierskalla,
2010, 127).
Although presenting some significant obstacles for the generalizability of this study’s
findings, the decision to focus on a single country was based on the fact that the literature on
protest lacks country -specific cases and tends to utilize cross -national comparisons both for the
sake of generalizability, as well as the requisite of having a sufficient number of observations to
successfully test the data and obtain meaningful results (Davenport, 2007; for ex amples of
country specific cases see Rasler, 1996 and Inclán, 2009) because many historical events of
protest, like Bloody Sunday and the Soweto Riots, were day -long events that do not yield enough
tangible information for researchers to test their hypothe ses.
Others scholars point out that while cross -country comparisons are useful, country –
specific analyses also serve an important purpose; Earl and Soul (2010 citing Koopmans, 1997), referring to the study of the relationship between protest and repression, point out that the study has been “obscured by the comparison of radically different types of repressive actors, forms of repression, and measures of subsequent mobilization, which are likely to affect the research findings” (76- 77). The comparison of p rotest across different time periods and regions can be
problematic as each country may have its own unique relationship with protest and factors that can serve as catalysts or deterrents for widespread, prolonged protest may be present or absent to varyin g degrees. Protest may emerge and spread differently in two countries in which one has a
strong opposition movement and established networks, while in the other country, the opposition movement is ineffectual and activists and opposition leaders are typica lly jailed and coordination
is very difficult.

7 Furthermore, and arguably more significant, is the time dimension. Regarding time spans,
comparison of recent protest events to ones that occurred decades ago also may obscure the
precise nature of the relati onship between these two variables, as the role of mass media has
greatly facilitated rapid communication and news transmission. For this reason, news of deaths,
injuries, and arrests travel faster than they did in the past and governments cannot easily hi de
massacres from the outside world. For the above reasons, Earl and Soule (2010) suggest that the
preferred method is to test hypotheses within “theoretically similar locations, periods, and types
of repression as to limit causal heterogeneity attributable to unmeasured alternative sources”(76 –
77), avoiding cross -movement and cross -country comparisons.
In order to improve the internal validity of this case study, following the country analysis
of Syria, I will also analyze five different regions of Syria – Homs, Damascus, Aleppo, Daraa, and
Hama. The advantage of this approach is that sub- national variation holds constant many other
potential causal variables that may have confounding impacts on the findings of the study
(Culpepper, 2005). While multi -count ry studies that use regression techniques may use a variety
of control variables, including country dummies, to overcome this problem, there are limitations to this approach as sometimes “the institutional and cultural features that make the country dummie s significant are themselves integral to the causal story that is being told” (Culpepper,
2005).

8 2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW : FROM DISSENT TO MASS MOBILIZATION
2.1 RELEVANT FACTORS FOR UNDERSTANDING PROTES T
Protest is commonly defined as group activities carried out by non-state actors with the purpose
of expressing disse nt public ly with societal and/or political conditions, institutions, and/or norms
(Ruct, 1998, 30). Protest may also be defined as falling under the umbrella of “contentious
politics” (Tarrow, 1994), a nd may include demonstrations, strikes, sit -ins, and rallies. Sidney
Tarrow (1994) defines actions as contentious if utilized by “people who lack regular access to
institutions, mobilize in the name of a new or unaccepted claim, and behave in ways that
fundamentally challenge others” (2).
In order to guide this analysis, two primary schools of thought concerning protest drivers,
resource mobilization theory , and political opportunity structures, will be examined and then
applied to the case of Syria. Upon first glance, it may appear that many of the factors which these approaches emphasize are lacking in Syria; however, this is addressed due to the fact that this paper proves to challenge the relatively narrow definition that both camps rely on to define relevant variables in understanding protest. These approaches, as outlined below, do not need to
be understood as being mutually exclusive as they each complement one another and often interact to both ignite and sustain protest. Moreover, while these approa ches may provide a
useful framework, there are two principal problems: 1) they give little attention to agency , and 2)

9 they do not specifically address the dynamics of protest waves. Finally, Tarrow’s (1993) model
of protest cycles will also be included in order to take into account both spatial and temporal
variation in protest.
In social movement literature, protest is often understood as being intrinsically linked to a
variety of processes, both internal and external to the movement. A protest movement may
undergo shifts and transformations from developments originating from within (i.e. activists
share ideas, participants’ modify goals and strategies, communication networks are improved).
These shifts and changes, however, are tied closely to external d evelopments, such as
government responses to collective action, shifts in popular opinion, and foreign support or
condemnation (Meyer, 2004). There is no singular factor that fully explains why protests emerge,
why they escalate, why they die off, or why, and far less deeply analyzed, they fail to materialize in the first place (Sawyers and Meyer 1999 as quoted in Meyer, 2004, 135). Rather, protest should be understood as an interaction of a variety of sometimes simultaneous internal and external, macro and micro processes that, for their part, influence one another. The critical
element for this analysis is that protest must be viewed as a continual exchange and interaction between the movement and forces external to it, namely the government and bystanders .
2.1.1 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES
The political opportunity structure (POS) approach or the political process model (PPM), as it is also known, views the presence (or absence) of specific opportunities that may exist both internally or externally to the movement as critical to both facilitate and develop protest
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 21; Kitschelt, 1986, 58). Such factors constantly evolve as potential dissidents, at any given time, experience window of opportunities (i.e. political

10 liberalization, th e sharing of tactics from activists in neighboring countries) and lost
opportunities (i.e. the victory of hard- liners in the government, the implementation of marital
law) (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001, 41). These opportunities may be furnished by sourc es
external to the movement or they may be created and shaped by the activists themselves as they
transform favorable (and even unfavorable, as the case may be) situations into opportunities for collective action.
Though defined differently by various scholars, Doug McAdam (1996), for example,
defines political opportunity as the relative openness of the institutionalized political system, stability or instability of elite arrangements, presence or absence of elites in government, and the state’s capacity or propensity for repression. S idney Tarrow considers the “ availability of
influential allies” another important form of opportunity (Tarrow, 1994). Such opportunities
have tended to be defined quite narrowly, and largely ignore the capacity of individual s to
overcome or transform such constraints. While the presence of specific windows of opportunity may be evident to scholars in retrospective analysis of cases of protest, in the moment activists may fail to perceive such factors as opportunities. Further more, even factors that are commonly
understood as constraints may be seized by activists in order to foster collective anger against the regime and attract broader participation.
The first three factors outlined by McAdams (1996) – along with Tarrow’s (1 994)
inclusion of foreign allies – are linked to important drivers of protest: the likelihood of success.
The more open the political system, the easier it will be for the protest movement to influence political structures. If elites are divided, the prote st movement may be able to exploit the
divisions; or the presence of sympathetic elites in government (or abroad) may help the protest movement gain credibility and recognition. In the case of Syria, few political elites sided with

11 the protest movement. I n such a situation, the support of foreign allies, particularly those who
are powerful and can exert considerable influence on the incumbent regime, is significant to
enhance the perceived efficacy of the movement. The final factor -repression is particular ly
relevant in the case of Syria. The government of Syria chose to respond to the protest movement
through a policy of civilian killings, mass arre sts, and other coercive tactics such as raids and
cutting off entire towns and villages’ electricity and wate r supply.
Governments, particularly those led by dicta tors, tend to assume that both “serious” and
“effective” repression will work to deter protest (Francisco, 2005). Repression may also be
perceived as far less costly than actually offering substantial concessions or yielding to some of the protesters’ demands. Some scholars have argued that the likelihood that a government will utilize repressive policies is largely based on the degree to which the regime views protest as threatening to the status quo (Davenport, 1995, 690). Christian Davenport argues that this perception is primarily based on four distinct factors: system type, coercive capability, economic development, and dependency on the global economy (Davenport, 1995, 690- 692).
However, the dyna mic relationship between protest and repression, despite a myriad of
cross -discipline literature, remains unclear. On one hand, repression may be understood as a cost
that may lower protest participation (Opp, 1994). On the other hand, repression may inc rease the
incentives to protest by increasing the level of political discontent (Opp, 1994). This may occur because protest is perceived as either unjust or illegitimate or due to the fact that “integration in protest -encouraging networks” may increase the incentives to engage in collective action (Opp,
1994, 104). Research confirms that repression has had several very distinct impacts on protest. Some scholars have found support for a positive relationship, in which coercion increases protest (Francisco, 1 996; Lichbach and Gurr, 1981; Gurr, 1970). Other scholars argue that the

12 potentially negative effect of repression on protest can be mitigated or negated if repression
results in a micromobilization process as dissidents’ actions demonstrate the commitmen t of
others, making their aims appear desirable and increasing the social rewards for participating in
collective action (Opp and Roehl, 1990). The negative relationship between protest and repression has, in the past, been maintained by rational choice th eorists (among others), who
hold that government sanctions, such as bans and arrests, can limit the ability of opposition
groups to assemble resource s, such as people and money (Ti lly, 1978; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977;
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996).
Other scholars have found support for different effects, based on the degree to which
governments employ repressive policies and tactics. For example, some scholars have found
support for the view that repression deters protest, but only to a point. In this c ase, repression
initially makes it more difficult for the opposition to carry out rebellious activities and capitalize on resources. However, at some point a threshold is crossed in which additional members of the
population, outraged at the government’s s trong -arm tactics, join the protest movement, as
illustrated in a “U -shaped” relationship (Lichbach and Gurr, 1981; Francis co 1995; Francisco,
2004). The “inverted -U” hypothesis finds the reverse: protest is most likely when coercion is
moderate and least likely when it is absent or severe (Opp, 1994).
Repression as a possible explanatory variable for protest, however, should not be
considered in isolation as it is rarely the only constraint (or opportunity) influencing an individual’s decision to partici pate in protest. Moreover, repression in and of itself, is rarely
sufficient to drive a protest movement and is unlikely to ever adequately sustain it. The Iranian
Revolution of 1979 is a clear example of repression’s ability to spark surges in protest (Ra sler,
1996; Goldstone, 1998). However, the presence of economic, religious, and social grievances

13 among vast segments of the population was also key to ensuring the longevity and strength of the
protest movement (Goldstone, 1998, 139). Members of clergy r esented the Shah’s policy of
secularization, merchants disliked the growing strength of the dominant industrial -technological
economy, civil servants and citizens felt aggrieved over the rampant corruption, and students
were critical of the Shah’s monopoli zation on power (Goldstone, 1998, 139). Furthermore, the
repression in Iran had another important featur e that helped to result in wide spread mobilization:
the coercive policies implemented by the state were not directed at one particular group but
rather many segments of society which ultimately created a national cross -class coalition against
the Shah (Goldstone, 1998, 140).
While scholars of the POS approach have classified repression as a constraint, this may
rob this relevant factor of its potential to explain protest surges. While it is true that repression
increases the cost of mobilization by instilling fear among participants and potential participants and signaling that the state is powerful, the use of repression may also foster a sense of outrage and indignation among the opposition (Lichbach and Gurr, 1981; Fra ncisco 1995; Francisco,
2004) , and may signal that the government is weak (Rasler, 1996). Not only may it demonstrate
the weakness of the government but it also may expose factors that wer e suspected but not
necessarily known (the government’s abuse of human rights for example). Repression may serve as an opportunity insofar as it has the capability to unify various groups in a society against the incumbent regime while also providing legitimacy to the opposition movement. The idea that repression may be an opportunity is not necessarily new. Though not dealing specifically with repression, McAdam (1982, 48 as cited on Oliver, 1989, 10) notes the “cognitive liberation” or a “sense of injusti ce” (Turner and Killian,1972, 259 as cited by Oliver, 1989, 10) may also be
integral in explaining the emergence of collective action. Oliver, in considering the impact of

14 actions and events on protest, points out that “one of the most important ways in which collective
actions are affected by prior actions is the creation of an occasion for deciding” (Oliver, 1989, 7).
This “occasion for deciding” can be prompted by a critical event , which makes protest more
attractive – like we saw unde r the rubicon of opportunities – but also may not be an actual
opportunity in this sense . Instead it might be a point in which a population becomes significantly
outraged which we later see in the case of several events early in the protest wave in Syria.
On the flipside of repression are concessions that “can be understood as any right,
prerogatives, or benefits gained from the state by collective action efforts ” (Almeida, 2007 as
quoted by Inclán, 2009, 799). Concessions are not all equal. Some scholars divide concessions
into two separate categories: procedural versus substantive concessions. The former refers to
“low -level accommodation that reflect the government’s attempt to negotiate with designated
leaders of the opposition” (i.e. release of political prisoners, mass pardons) and the latter refers to
higher -level accommodation in which “the regime attempts to co -opt the challenging group
leaders and their political platforms” (Rasler, 1996, 138). Concessions in Syria have come from
both categories, but also are differentiated in terms of who m they attempted to target. Certain
concessions, such as permission for teachers to wear the niqab and the closure of a casino , were
meant to appease more conservative Muslims, while other concessions, such as the repeal of emergency law or mass pardons , targeted activists demanding greater political rights.
Governments select to offer concessions to quell dissent, either by meeting some of the
protest movement’s demands or by co -opting powerful elements of the movement. Protesters
may come to see protest as unnecessary as the government begins to address at least some of their demands. However, concessions do not necessarily lead to a decline in collective action. Concessions may be understood to impact protest both on a large scale and in terms of the

15 individual choice to participate in protest. Some scholars, such as Karen Rasler (1996) , find
support for the notion that concessions may increase protest, particularly when they are
interpreted as signaling the weakness of the regime. In this sense, concessions may increase “the
expected value of the collective good for many people at the same time” (Rasler, 1996, 135).
Concessions also tend to have a positive effect on protest particularly if they are combined with repressive policies or used inconsistently (Khawaja, 1993; Francisco 1995).
Though neither McAdam (1996) or Tarrow’s (1994) definition of political opportunities
include concessions, if they are interpreted as signaling the efficacy of the movement, they should be included in any conceptualization of opportunity. If, on the other hand, they are viewed by claimants as signaling that they can achieve their aims without collective action, they may be conceptuali zed as a constraint. Regardless of their ultimate effect, they shou ld be
included because as Ronald Francisco (1995) notes, concessions are tied to the dissidents’ relationship with the state and as noted earlier, this relationship is critical throughout the protest cycle as each move of the protest movement is met by a counter move from the regime.
2.1.2 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY
Rational choice theory views collective action as a rational calculation to “obtain a collective good, which the individual cannot do on his [sic] own” which makes both cooperation and coordination necessary (Oberschall, 1994, 79). The emphasis of this approach is how “differing
mixes of benefits and sanctions [from both the government and its opposition] affect the political preferences and behavioral choices” of individuals (Mason and Krane, 1989, 177).
Some rational choice theorists tend to emphasize the role that resources play in
facilitating and fostering collective action (Snow and Oliver, 1995, 573), and this approach

16 commonly known as resource mobilization theory. Thi s perspective views pr otest as “ goal-
oriented action constrained by resources, costs, network ties, and organizational capacities”
(Snow and Oliver, 1995, 573). Resource mobilization theory focuses on factors which facilitate
organization and mobilization like “extensive non- governmental organizations, socio- economic
development and access to communication networks” (Dalton et al, 2009, 54- 55).
One critical variable for this perspec tive is mobilizing structures such as informal and
formal organizations (McAdam, Tarrow, and Til ly 2001, 14) which play a crucial role in
understanding the process of protest as they offer protesters sites for initial mobilization, help to further facilitate surges in protest as opportunities arise, and help to develop activists’ capacity to exploit resources (41). Although collective action is impossible without the individual choice of
deciding whether or not to participate in the first place, it is individuals’ face -to-face interactions,
social networks, personal relationships, and institutions from which the movement may be activated, to gain recruits and ultimately be sustained (Tarrow, 1994, 21). Under authoritarian
regimes, the presence of groups, organizations, and social networks may be greatly restricted or
even non- existent. H owever, as ment ioned earlier, it is possible that personal connections (i.e.
friends, co- workers, and family) serve a similar purpose (Opp and Gern, 1993).
The transmission of information is another crucial resource which may refer to either the
information about prote st itself or information about the effects of protest in terms of government
responses, the reaction of the general public, and likelihood of success. Information, however, can serve to facilitate protest but also can emerge from protest. Protests reveal w hat is previously
known (dissent or at least dissatisfaction with the regime) but hidden; protest brings this collective dissatisfaction to the surface and allows others to act on it and become more aware of it. Information regarding protests does not only reveal the level of opposition in the country, but

17 also leaves the regime’s nature entirely exposed ( Lohmann, 1994). Even in cases where the
brutality and repression of the regime is previously known, government responses to protest
make this fact evident and difficult to deny.
Syria does not clearly fall in line with either of these two approaches due to both a lack of
resources, such as organizations and the relative absence of any discernible, ‘traditional’
opportunities within the country. However, i n terms of political opportunities, the Syrian protest
movement did have at least one important opportunity. This opportunity, however, differs from
the way opportunity is conceptualized by McAdam (1996) because it was not internal, but rather
emerged as p rotest spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Such a development
created a window of opportunity both insofar as it demonstrated the possible success of protest
as well as offering models from which Syrian protesters could both learn and modif y techniques.
The notion that opportunities are usually seen as developing within a country’s borders limits the possibility of influential regional developments. As more countries obtain greater access to communication a nd technological developments – such as Internet and cell phones – foreign
developments and events may be as influential as events within a country’s borders. The story is not complete through an analysis of which favorable factors are present or absent but also how people perceive such opportunities and constraints, as well as how they overcome or attempt to overcome them.
2.2 PERIODS OF SUSTAINED PROTEST
Tarrow (1993) defines sus tained sequences of protest as “protest cycles… an increasing and then
decreasing wave of interrelated collective a ctions and reactions to them whose aggregate

18 frequency, intensity, and forms increase and then decline in rough chronological proximity”
(287). Although this definition is widely accepted, Koopmans’ slight modification is appropr iate
here: the use of the t erm “w ave” instead of “cycle” due to the fact that “the notion of cycle
suggests a periodically r ecurring sequence of phenomena ” while the “wave” metaphor does not
(Koopmans, 2004, 4). There is no reason to suspect that episodes necessarily repeat themselves
within the various stages of protest (Koopmans, 2004). Episodes of protest action should be
conceived as a series of actions that build on one another and continually evolve due to both
internal and external dynamics. Oliver writes that it is precisely this sequence of action/reaction
that defines collective action (Oliver, 1989, 3).
Protest waves are far from uniform (Tarrow, 1993). Tarrow (1993), however, does
highlight certain trends that have been fairly consistent throughout the course of various protest
waves. T hese features include: heightened conflict; broad se ctoral and geographic extension; the
appearance of new social movement organizations and the empowerment of old ones; the
creation of new “master frames” of meaning; and the invention of new for ms of collective action
(284). Heightened conflict refers to episodes of intensified conflict that brings the movement to
the attention of the elites, while setting in motion “a process of institutional adaptation or
collapse” (Tarrow, 1993, 285). P rotest only becomes sign ificant inso far as the movement is able
to attain a critical mass and represent a significant challenge to the status quo. This element is also often characterized by increased violence and intensity of the conflict. This intensifie d
period of conflict ultimately may pose a threat to the longevity of the movement. Violence has a “polarizing effect on conflict and alliance systems” and the threat or actual presence of violence may serve to discourage bystanders from joining the moveme nt (Tarrow, 1994, 104). Tarrow

19 also notes that as protest spreads there is a tendency for claims to broaden, “often radicalizing
them into general challenges to authority” (Tarrow, 1994, 168).
“Geographic and sectoral diffusion” refers to the finding that protest tends to originate in
the center and gradually move to the periphery (Tarrow, 1993, 285). Center, in this sense, refers
to heavy industrial areas while the periphery refers to areas in which light industry and farming are prevalent (Tarrow, 1993, 285). It could be argued, however, that this feature of protest waves
is not necessarily common to all occurrences of collective action, particularly more recent protest
waves; in both the case of uprisings in Tunisia (2010 – 2011) and in the uprisings in Syria (2011
– ?), protests emerged in the periphery and spread to urban centers (Associated Press, 2011).
Tarrow (1993) also predicts that dispersion is prevalent across various social sectors with
activists being disproportionally comprised of members of certain groups – such as students and
union members i n the early stages – while later, protest gradually attracts less ‘traditional’
participants such as business elites, break -away political elites, and white -collar workers
(Tarrow, 1993, 285).
Which mechanisms trigger such diffusion? Protest spreads geographically insofar as the
movement is able to depict the struggle in favorable terms, as well as demonstrate the likelihood of success through a process of framing explained in further detail below. “Unli ke conventional
forms of participation, contentious collective action demonstrates the possibilities of collective action to others, offering even resource -poor groups opportunities that their positions in society
would deny them” (Tarrow, 1994, 96). “This occurs when ‘early risers’ make claims on elites
that can be used by those with less daring and fewer resources. Moreover, collective action exposes opponents’ points of weakness that may not be evident until they are challenged, and

20 can also reveal unsus pected or formerly passive allies, both within and outside the system ”
(Tarrow, 1994).
Theories of how protests spread are often divided among two different camps: one camp
tends to focus on the role of organizations in explaining protest diffusion (Morri s, 1981, 1984 as
cited by Andrews and Biggs, 2006) and views organizations as essential in disseminating
information and sharing tactics, and thus facilitating further collective action; while another
camp views the spread of protest as largely a spontaneous phenomenon (Killian 1984;
Oberschall 1989 as cited by Andrews and Biggs, 2006). However, the term “spontaneous” is
somewhat misleading as there are often crucial mechanisms at play, such as the dispersion of
information (Andre ws and Biggs, 2006). For ex ample, Susanne Lohmann (1994) utilizes a
behavior cascades model in which individuals can select to participate in collective action or
abstain, and “ the net benefits derived from each alternative depend on the number of other
individuals choosing that alt ernative” ( Lohman n, 1994, 47). Lohmann highlights how mass
protest activities expose information about the regime's lack of public support, thus increasing the desirability and benefits of protest, while also revealing the “malign” nature of the regime
(Lohman n, 1994, 47).
This model interprets a sequence of mass protest activities as information cascades ,
which proceed as follows: 1) people take costly political action to express their dissatisfaction with the regime; 2) the public then takes information al cues from changes in the size of the
protest movement over time; and 3) the regime loses public support and collapses if the protest activities reveal it to be malign ( Lohmann, 1994, 47). Lohmann notes that the individual choice
to participate in protes t must be understood as being heterogeneous; each individual has their
own specific threshold “denoting the number other individuals who must choose an alternative

21 before the individual finds it worthwhile to do so” ( Lohmann, 1994, 47). For a given frequency
distribution of thresholds, one individual’s choice of an alternative has the potential to push
another individual over her threshold; the second individual’s action in turn may induce other
individuals to follow; and so on ( Lohmann, 1994, 47). Although the initial action requires that an
individual or some individuals must be willing to go against the majority and take significant risks, the ultimate benefit depends on how many people choose to participate , which increases
the likelihood of success and, particularly applicable in authoritarian contexts, lessens the risk of
being targeted by the government’s coercive tactics ( Lohmann, 1994).
The third characteristic in Tarrow’s model (1993) regards organizations and networks.
New social movement organiz ations tend to emerge once the protest wave has gained
momentum while the early stages a re usually comprised of “older” social movements (Tarrow,
1993, 285). Older social movements have established networks and can overcome coordination
obstacles that newer or less organized social movement organizations may face. In authoritarian regimes, where the existence of social movements or organizations may be weak or non- existent,
it is possible that the movements do not generate the protest wave, but rather the w ave ultima tely
creates the movements and organizations. In this case, the impetus of these movements is the protest wave. Another way in which to explain situations in which organizations are lacking is analyzing more closely the role played by personal ne tworks , which may be the only form that
exists in repressive, authoritarian countries. Personal networks of co- workers, fam ilies, and
friends may fill this gap, although the degree to which personal networks play a role in
facilitating and fostering mobilization in authoritarian settings is largely unknown (Opp and Gern, 1993, 662).

22 The fourth feature in Tarrow ’s (1993) description of protest waves is “new frames of
meaning .” The concept of frames is based on sociological and psychological approaches to
understanding social movements through collective identity. This approach emerged among
critics who believed that other approaches, namely the POS approach, gave far too much weight to external factors while ignoring the role of agency in explaining the proce ss of social
movements and protest (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003). Due to such criticisms, another approach
emerged that focuses on how identity – namely collective identit y – both serves to drive protest
while it also is created and modified within the moveme nt (Polletta, 1998; Klandermans, 2000).
Collective identity, defined as an individual’s “cognitive, moral, and emotional
connections with a broader community, category, practice, or institution” (Polletta and Jasper,
2001,285 and 298), is constantly impact ed by its relation to the external environment and
external actors which consequently provide both opportunities and constraints that “are in turn
recognized and defined as such by the actor” (Melucci 1995, 47). The process of cooperating to achieve a com mon goal ultimately transforms identity, as identity both constructs and becomes
constructed through social interactions and relations among groups (Zack, 2002, 60). Collective identity becomes politicized in light of a sequence of events which “gradually transform the
group’s relationship to its social environment ,” and frequently begins with “the awareness of
shared grievances,” followed by a process through which an “external enemy” is blamed for the
group’s present condition and demands are presented to the responsible party (Klandermans,
2005, 159).
Perhaps the most well -known variant of this theory is framing , or as it is also known,
“collective action frames” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001, 14) . This is the fourth element of
Tarrow’s (1993) protes t cycle. Frames are the “interpretive packages” that activists develop to

23 mobilize potential adherents and participants, making a s trong case of the existence of injustice,
thus increasing the “effectiveness of collective ‘agency’ in changing the condition ” (Polletta and
Jasper, 2001, 291). These frames can be used to “justify and dignify collective action” and serve
as a mobilization tool (Tarrow, 1993, 286).
David Snow and his colleagues have defined this tool of collective action as a process of
“render ing events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide
action, whether individual or collective” (Snow et al., 1986, 464- 465). Some examples of this
process are seen in the linkage of indigenous rights groups and environment al organizat ions.
These two groups have, in some cases, partnered to link the idea of defending indigenous
peoples’ livelihoods and environmental conservation, or in the re -naming of female circumcision
or clitoridectomy to female genital mutilation (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 224- 225), a name which
evokes a more powerful response.
For a frame to be effective it is critical that it conveys that “a given state of affairs is
neither neutral nor accidental,” while also offering a credible solution (Keck and Sikkink, 1998,
225). A sense of injustice is critical to propel participation in collective action. Framing must also clearly convey the efficacy of the movement. In order to convince people to act collectively, activists must frame the action in such a way as to demonstrate change is only possible through
collective action (Oliver, 1989, 10). Participants challenging authority must “strategically ‘frame’ identities” in such a way that they attract participation, nurture commitment, and foster solidarity (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, 291) in order to overcome a variety of obstacles such as free-riders, fear, and high costs.
This framing of identity serves another purpose as well. The process helps to distinguish
between the opposition, the opponents , and bystanders and helps to sustain participants’

24 commitment while managing both real and potential internal divisions (Polletta and Jasper, 2001,
291). Framing aims to increase identification from the broader populace with the movement. As
others have noted, “the m ore someone identifies with a group, the higher the chances are that he
[sic] will take part in collective action on behalf of that group” (Klandermans, 2005, 160).
Participation, in turn, ultimately serves to reinforce this collective identity (Klanderma ns, 2005,
170). “Movement activists come to value the image of themselves as activists as an end in itself
so that it becomes an intrinsic motivation to ‘do the right thing’” (Oliver, 1989, 12).
Tarrow (1993) considers the final common feature across protest waves to be “ expanding
repertoires of contention” which refers to the development within the protest wave of new
strategies and tools of protest and dissent (286). Movement leaders invent, adapt, and combine
various forms of collective action to stimu late support from people who might otherwise stay at
home in order to overcome their relative disadvantage of facing a state with considerably greater
access to resources and capacity to confront the protest movement (Tarrow, 1994, 19; McAdam,
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 15). For example, strikes may be seen as less costly than
demonstrations, especially if the regime has traditionally responded to demonstrations with violence and repression. McAdam (1983) points out how there is a strong link between the emerg ence of new protest techniques and peaks in protest. This “tactical innovation” and the
corresponding government response is part of the “ongoing process of tactical interaction in which insurgents and opponents seek, in chess -like fashion, to offset the m oves of the other”
(McAdams, 1983, 736). While the evolution of protest tactics does present an advantage, a movement “must be able to sustain the leverage it has achieve d through the use of such tactics ”
because even “the most successful tactic is likely to be effectively countered by movement opponents if relied upon too long” (McAdam, 1983, 736). This is typically done in one of two

25 ways: 1) movements may use the leverage that new tactics have given them in order to obtain
positions of “institutionalized power” or 2) continue “to experiment with noninstitutionalized
forms of protest” (Mc Adams, 1983, 736).

26 3.0 THE DYNAMICS OF PROT EST, GOVERNMENT RESP ONSES, AND LIKELIHOO D
OF SUCCESS
As mentioned previously, repression may have two possible effects on protest. First repression
may work to deter dissent by creating greater fear among potential dissidents as the costs
increase and may also signal the strength of the regime and consequently the fact that protest is unlikely to be successful. On the other hand, severe coercive measures may lead to greater opposition and anger towards the regime (Zwerman and Steinoff, 2005; Linden and Klandermans, 2006), while also serving to delegitimize the regime. Secondly, repression may also contribute to a greater sense of soli darity among citizens, leading more people to sympathize
with the killed or arrested protesters, and thus, consequently, perceive the opposition in a more favorable light. Furthermore, such acts of severe repression could also be perceived as a sign of the vulnerability of the regime due to the fact that it may appear to some that the regime sees the
dissent as a very real threat. In the case of Syria, protest spread rather rapidly after the initial outbreak in Daraa, in spite of the government’s repressive clampdown, and it appears that in
Syria repression had a positive impact on protest (i.e. appeared to be linked with the increase in
the number of protests) . In Syria, after instances in which the government used a great deal of
force (i.e. in early responses to the situation in Daraa, the torture and death of a 13 year old boy, and high death tolls in Homs during Ramadan) , high numbers of protests were reported in the
following days (my data). While the protest spread could have been triggered by other fa ctors,

27 the frequent references to the martyrs of Daraa and other regions (Euronews, April 1, 2011;
Blomfield, June 3, 2011) appear to indicate that repression was seen as largely excessive and
illegitimate. I posit that repression, measured by the number o f deaths and arrests in the previous
week1, has been one of the principal forces driving increased protests in the current week. I
expect that coercive government policies lead to great protest with the primary mechanisms
being outrage and a delegitimizing effect on the regime.
H1: Government repression, measured by the number of deaths and arrests in a given week, increases the number of protests in the following week.
Based on previous findings that concessions are also influential (Rasler 1996; Lichbach,
1987) and the idea that governments are constantly making a choice between coercive and accommodating policies, concessions will also be considered. I hypothesize that concessions will likely increase protest because they are not perceived as meaningful, due to the Syrian regime’s
history of limited concessions and short -lived reforms (Ismail, 2010), as well as regional patterns
which seem to indicate that insignificant, vague, and unrelated concessions on the part of leaders, demonstrated in the case of Egypt and Tunisia had little impact on deterring protest. This notion
is further supported in t he literature , which maintains that for concessions to be perceived as
meaningful, thus possibly reducing protest, they must be “substantial and address the diss ident
needs, otherwise they tend to generate more protest activity” (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001). Moreover, concessions can serve as a signal to the protesters that their efforts are effective at challenging the regime.

1 By “week”, in order to capture the effect of the Friday “Day of Rage” after prayers, I aggregated daily data on a
seven –day period beginning with Friday morning and concluding with Thursday night though this is obviously not
a week in either the Gregorian or Hijri calendar. This was done due to the fact that the largest number of protests,
and consequently killings and arrests were carried out on this day. Furthermore, due to the fact that since some
bodies have been discovered later, it is not always clear on precisely which day certain deaths occurred and this
time period captures deaths that were discovered in the da ys following Friday’s protests.

28 H2: Government concessions will increase protest in the same period in which the
concessions are offered.
Finally, due to both the length of the protest wave, as well as fairly consistent surges,
some consideration must be given to the likelihood of success. Engaging in collective action is
associated with considerable costs ( i.e. time, possible loss of employment, the chance of arrest)
but in a repressive, authoritarian regime, these costs greatly increase. Any individual
participating in protest in Syria, particularly after the first weeks in which the government
responded severely to the mobilization in Daraa, likely had some idea of the risks involved.
Given these high costs, outrage and solidarity may not be the only factors driving the protes t
movement and the presence of opportunities is critical. For this reason, likelihood of success is
crucial and is measured by two separate factors: statements of support from foreign leaders and international organizations and protest movements’ victories in neighboring countries. Foreign support is defined as any action or statements that at least give lip service, if not substantial
backing, to the opposition’s cause and actions, such as sanctions and threats of expulsion from the Arab League, and are likely to generate even greater number of prote sts. As foreign support
increases, particularly from important international players, the regime grows increasingly isolated and the protest movement’s claims are recognized and legitimized.
The second element of likelihood of success is the victory of re gional opposition
movements. During Syria’s protest wave, important developments were occurring in other
countries in the region, such as President Saleh’s departure from Yemen, and the rebels surge in Libya. Such events likely reinforced the efficacy and desirability of collective action and as
Francisco (2004) notes, “protest is event driven” (121). Although some of these “victories” did
little to actually achieve the opposition’s aims, what is critical is the perception of such events as

29 they occurred, w hich was assessed by looking at the coverage of events from periodicals of the
region. I expect regional events to impact protest positively as they may serve to maintain the
momentum of protest and convince Syrian dissidents that if success has been achie ved in other
countries, their uprising also may be successful in the long -run in achieving their aims. The
inclusion of both of these variables is important because some sort of signal for mobilization and
coordination that is “potent” enough to ensure “that everyone else reads the same signal with
enough confidence to act on it, thus providing one another with the immunity that goes with
action in large numbers” (Schelling, 1963, 54) is critical in explaining surges.
H3: The occurrence of statements of fo reign support and the success of other opposition
movements in the region will increase protests in the current week.

30 4.0 CASE STUDY: SYRIA
4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PROTEST AND GOVERNMENT
RESPONSES TO OPPOSIT ION IN SYRIA
Syria has been under authoritarian rule for decades and has experienced only limited periods of
contes ted power and protest. Decision- making is believed to be heavily concentrated in the hands
of the President, Bashar al -Assad , and his close inner circle (European Neighbourhood and
Partnershi p Instrument, 2007). Although al -Assad, upon taking office after the death of his father
in 2000, initially expressed support for political liberalization and pluralism, such support was short -lived, though it resulted in a brief mobilization and period of debate among opposition
figures known as the “Damascus Spring”. However, t his period of rel ative openness and
opportunity was quickly crushed through a policy of repression, including arrests and censorship
(Wieland, 2006). The possibility of political re form did not emerge again for nearly five years .
In June 2005, during the 10th Ba’ath Party Congress, certain decisions on political reforms, such
as the licensing of independent political parties, were accepted, but lacked any specific timetable for impl ementation and ultimately failed to materialize (European Neighbourhood and
Partnership Instrument, 2007).
Prior to the uprisings in Syria, all parties other than the ruling Ba'ath party were banned
under both Bashar al -Assad as well as his father, Hafez (Spyer, October 27, 2011) , and

31 membership to the Muslim Brotherhood was an offense punishable by death under Article 49 of
the Syrian penal code enacted in 1980 (Pace and Landis, 2009). Moreover, the country also
lacked established organizations and civil society has been described as a “ wasteland ” (Wieland,
2006). In the absence of effective political opposition groups, some human rights organizations
(estimated to number around 12 at their peak) were marginally active in Syrian society and,
although frag mented and small, have usually been considered "arguably the most effective"
opposition on the ground to the regime (Pace and Landis, 2009). However, t here als o were a few
opposition groups operating mostly from abroad (Spyer, October 27, 2011) , and were extremely
fragmented (Al -Jazeera, February 9, 2011).
For such reasons, upon the advent of the so- called “Arab Spring ”2, few analysts predicted
a Syrian uprising (Al -Jazeera, February 9, 2011). Other factors expected to deter opposition
include the presence of a repressive state apparatus, a relatively popular president, and the
military’s close ties to the regime (Al-Jazeera, February 9, 2011). Other reports note that while
dissent may have existed in Syrian society, most Syrians tended to prefer the statu s quo to the
unrest that regime change had sparked in neighboring Iraq (United States Institute of Peace, March 2006). The Emergency Law, moreover, which has been in place since 1963, severely
restricts citizens in terms of free speech, association, assemb ly, and press (European
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 2007). Furthermore, would -be Syrian activists bear
the reminder of what can occur to those who dare to challenge the regime in the example of the Muslim Brotherhood uprisings in 1982, which were crushed violently in Hama and believed to
have resulted in 20,000 or more deaths (Al -Jazeera, February 9, 2011). Additionally, political

2 Although the media typically refers to the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria as the
‘Arab Spring’, some analysts object to such terms (see Rothkopf 2011) and the term seems to be rarely, if ever ,
used by Arab activists.

32 activists are commonly detained and there were estimated to be around 4,500 “prisoners of
opinion” in Syrian jails prior to the uprisings (Al-Jazeera, February 9, 2011).
Doubts that Syrians would join in the revolutions spreading through the Arab world were
reinforced when a call to protest on Facebook in February 2011 failed to materialize (Al -Jazeera,
February 9, 2011). H owever, in mid- March, protests erupted in the city of Daraa and while the
initial demands were centered on freeing youths who had recently been arrested for spraying
anti-government graffiti on a wall, the demands evolved to call for grea ter politic al freedoms and
quickly grew in scale. The Syrian government chose to respond to the protesters with a
combination of repressive and conciliatory gestures. Security forces fired live ammunition at the
crowds, resulting in several deaths and scores of injur ies within the first few days of the protest
(New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology). Meanwhile President Assad offered several
conciliatory gestures, such as increased pay and benefits for state workers, the removal of Daraa’s governor, Faisal Kal thoum, the release of 200 political, the dismantling of the cabinet,
and a decree granting nationality to thousands of Kurds (Al -Jazeera, "Syria Uprising: Key
Events; New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology). The protests, however, continued to grow and gradually disperse d throughout the country, with crowds sometimes reaching tens of
thousands of participants in Damascus, Baniyas, Latakia, and Daraa (New York Times, Events
in Syria: A Chronology; Al -Jazeera, "Syria: The People Awake"). By March 30, President
Bashar al -Assad made his first public address to the nation, and blamed the unrest largely on a
foreign conspiracy (New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology).
As the protests continued, the government continued to rely on concessions but a lso
increased repression and by early May the death toll was estimated to have reached 600
causalities (NPR, May 6, 2011). Estimates of the number of arrests were much higher, rumored

33 to be around 10,000 by June 2011 (The Economist, June 18, 2011). Even in the face of ever –
increasing obstacles and constraints including extensive crack -downs in Daraa and Homs,
Syrians continued to mobilize (New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology). Deaths and
arrests were not the only costs of protests; on June 12th, a rmed forces took control of Jisr al –
Shughour in the province of Idlib, resulting in an estimated 12,000 Syrians crossing the border to Turkey (Al -Jazeera, "Syria Uprising: Key Events).
Protests, in the first few months, tended to be sequential, moving from place to place,
rather than occurring simultaneously (The Economist, July 2, 2011). Several months into the protest, analysts and journalists began to emphasize the emerging divisions, particularly sectarian , in the country (Arango, February 28, 2012) . As the pr otest movement continued, it
appear ed that Alawites, Christians, and some middle -class Sunnis were reluctant to support the
protesters both due to their own vested interests with the regime or simply due to fear of what a post-Assad Syria would be l ike. The regime played into these emerging divisions. The Syrian
government was rumored to be supplying Alawite villages, near Sunni areas, with arms (The
Economist, June 4, 2011).
However, the depiction of the divisions in Syria as sectarian does not ful ly explain the
dynamics at play , which were actually more complex and often fell not only along sectarian, but
also regional and socio -economic divisions. Despite the predominance of Sunnis in the country,
some scholars highlight the fact that Sunnis hardl y comprise a uniform group. For this reason,
Syria has often been characterized as having an “empty center” due to a lack of unity among
Sunnis and internal divisions (Abd- Allah, 1983, 35). These divisions are primarily class -based,
and at various stages o f the protest trajectory this has been clearly established; despite the fact
that Sunnis predominate in the opposition movement, the participation has been primarily from

34 working- class Sunnis, while Sunnis who occupy higher socio- economic strata in society have
tended to avoid coming out in support of the opposition. Many educated, middle -class
individuals, including Sunnis, dismissed the protesters as “rural illiterates” or “religious fanatics”
(The Economist, June 4, 2011). At the same time, protest attra cted minorities . Some Alawites
and Christians came out on the side of the protesters (The Economist, June 4, 2011; BBC, April 6, 2012). Also, the movement received backing from important Kurdish figures, including
Mishaal Tamo, the leader of the Kurdish Future Movement (Al -Jazeera, “Syria: The People
Awake”).
The divisions were also linked to the role networks play in facilitating protest, though in
this case the category of networks were largely those based on personal ties. In the absence of
more establi shed networks, protesters relied on the support of family members (which may have
also been a basis for recruitment) . This factor may also help to explain the absence of significant
numbers of minorities, such as Christians and Alawites in the protest move ment. Meanwhile,
supporters of the President rallied in Damascus and other cities, indicating that despite widespread dissent, the President still enjoyed some public support (New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology), or at the very least had the coe rcive capabilities to pressure Syrians to
mobilize in his behalf.
On June 27, dozens of opposition figures met publically for the first time in Damascus,
although the meeting was sanctioned by the government, thus resulting in its condemnation by
many act ivists (New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology). Earlier in the month, over
300 exiles, along with a few Syrian activists who had managed to cross the border, met in Antalya, Turkey (The Economist, June 4, 2011) as the opposition continued to organi ze. On the
eve of Ramadan, July 31, 2011, activists claimed that security forces had killed nearly 140

35 people, 100 in Hama alone (Al -Jazeera, “Syria Uprising: Key Events ”). Despite the high death
tolls leading up to Ramadan, tens of thousands of protestors gathered in Hama, which President
al-Assad continued to dismiss, this time as religiously inspired unrest with foreign backing (New
York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology).
Amid continued defections, the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), led by Colonel
Riad al -Asaad, was announced and estimated to have between 3,000 and 15,000 members (Al –
Jazeera, "Syria: The People Awake"). Although after its formation, the FSA aimed to protect
protesters and facilitate demonstrations and protest, t he organizat ion later bega n to attack
government forces and strategic targets (Al -Jazeera, "Syria: The People Awake"). The
government’s assault on Hama continued throughout August, as security forces bom bed the city
after dawn prayers and the entire province suffered high causalities, estimated to be in the
hundreds (New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology). I n August 2011, Daraa and Deir al
Zour continued to be “under siege” by security forces (The Economist, August 6, 2011).
That same month, a group of "revolutionary blocs" announced they were forming a new
coalition, called the Syrian Revolution Commission (Al- Jazeera,"Sy ria Uprising: Key Events)
while the death toll had reached 2,000 by the beginning of August 2011 – this also included an
estimated 300 member s of the Syrian security forces ( The Economist, August 6, 2011) – likely
due to the incorporation of defecting soldiers in the movement and greater defensive capabilities
on the part of the opposition. On August 23rd, opponents of the Assad regime met in I stanbul to
launch a "national council" which would come to be known as the Syrian National Council or the Syrian National Transitional Council (Al- Jazeera, Syria uprising: Key events).
International pressure on the Assad regime intensified. The Arab League announced that
Nabil al -Arabi, the Secretary -General, would visit Syria, shortly after reports had surfaced that

36 Damascus had called off a previously planned visit (BBC, September 7, 2011). The Syrian
government c ontinued its heavy offensive in the provi nce of Homs, focusing particularly on the
town of Rastan (BBC, September 30, 2011). The possibility of the opposition movement
receiving substantial foreign help seemed unlikely by October 2011 when Russia and China vetoed a European- drafted resolution in the Security Council, condemning the crackdown (BBC,
October 5, 2011). Despite the mounting death toll and the uncertainty of foreign assistance, the
protest movement continued to surge and was continually met wit h repression. B y the end of
October 2011 the death toll had exceeded 3,000 casualties (Kennedy, October 21, 2011).
4.2 POLITICAL OP PORTUNIES
In terms of the political opportunity model, Syria would appear to be a case where the
opportunities for collective action were few: networks of oppositional act ivists were nearly non –
existent; the regime’s potential for repression was both quite high and certain; and, unlike
Assad’s first year in office in which he appeared to be sympathetic to political reforms, there was no elites on the regime overtly sympathe tic to a pro -reform agenda (Wieland, 2006; Al -Jazeera,
February 9, 2011). It would seem that Syria was a case where constraints would ultimately have greater influence on Syrians’ decisions to participate in collective action, ultimately deterring any sign ificant mobilization of opposition. As mentioned earlier, however, the Arab world was
simultaneously undergoing significant upheavals, from reforms in Morocco to the overthrowing of two long -standing dictators in North Africa. In Syria, the protests emerge d at a time when the
potential pay -offs of protest had increased with the regional events that clearly demonstrating
that protest under authoritarian regimes was not only possible, but could be successful.

37 Yet external events of protest do not fully expla in the events in Syria and it took domestic
occurrences of protest to fuel the dispersion of collective action in Syria. This does not imply
that the events in the region were not opportunities, but rather they failed to be perceived. The
outbreak of prote st in Daraa conveyed extremely crucial information that was, in turn, perceived
as an opportunity to mobilize. First, the collective action in Daraa demonstrated that discontent
with the regime was present within Syria, while the government’s repressive re sponse helped to
expose the malign nature of the regime. Along with Lohman n’s typology of protesters, the turn-
out of “anti -status quo extremists” (i.e. individuals that require relatively low turn -out to decide
to participate in collective action) in Dar aa provided the window of opportunity and the
information necessary for other extremists to mobilize in other areas, including Homs and
Damascus.
This initial dispersion of protest was also linked to the emerge nce of structural
opportunities in the form of the government’s decision to offer some concessions directly to the
protesters, offering hope that the movement could be successful. Political opportunities also emerged in the presence of sympathetic political elites, though to a very minor degree. Afte r the
government’s initial repressive response in Daraa, members of the Ba’ath party resigned over the crackdown (Reuters, April 27, 2011). The support of cleavages within the ruling elites has been identified by Tarrow (1994) as a critical element of the political opportunity structure that helps
to facilitate protest and improve the likelihood of success of the movement. The support of Syrian elites, however, remained relatively minor, with no significant events of political elite support for the movement emerging again until nearly six months into the protest wave. In
September , in addition to further military defections, some government officials chose to break
from the regime, including the attorney general of Hama, Adnan Bakkour, who resigned over the

38 crackdown , and Hassan Abdul -Azim, a Syrian politician who demanded an end to the
government’s repressive response and agreed to meet with U .S. ambassador Robert Ford (Al –
Jazeera, Syria uprising: Key events).
In the relative absence of sympathetic elites wi thin the Syrian regime, international
support was critical to ensure a chance of success and legitimize the movement. While many
statements and action of support were relatively minor in the period covered for this analysis,
some gestures of support, such as the United States’ decision to implement sanctions, the
Security Council’s condemnation of the violence, and further statements of disapproval from
important regional powers, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, fuelled optimism that the movement could be s uccessful, or at the very least, the events were being monitored by the
global community, unlike the absence of international condemnation after the massacre of Hama in 1982. The importance of foreign allies can be understood in several ways. For example, international support may reinforce and further legitimize the claims and tactics of the local opposition. Also, such support may help to frame and re -frame the opposition’s demands,
particularly in the face of how the Syrian government has tried to depict the opposition – as
terrorists, religious fanatics, and foreign agents (The Economist, August 13, 2011). Foreign support offers an important challenge to this view.
In Syria , repressive government policies increased at the same rate as the growth of the
protest movement. As seen above, the relationship between prot est and repression is not clear.
But what is clear in the Syrian case is that repression certainly did not lessen protest. In fact, it
may have increased it. While governments typically elect to use protest to increase the costs of
protest, activists may perceive the policy of repression differently.

39 While repression is often conceptualized as a constraint (McAdam, 1996), the
information it conveys about the regime may transform it into an oppor tunity. The Syrian
government’s repressive way of handling the ac tions of the teenagers in Daraa made it clear to
those who privately opposed the regime two important factors: 1) that the government’s
repressive measures to deal with the teenagers was arbi trary and quite severe, which prompted
potential dissidents to sympathize with the youths, and 2) that even such a minor offense was
evidently seen as quite threateni ng by the regime, which in turn offered some support for the idea
that protest could also be effective in Syria. Both the arrest of the teenagers , as well as the
government’s repressive response to the subsequent protests in Daraa, can both be seen as
instances of “cognitive liberation ” (McAdam, 1982) which fuel a sense of collective injustice
which is often critical to propel people into action.
Repression, as well as concessions, must be understood in terms of its dynamic
interaction and the sometimes complementary, sometimes competing me ssages that it sends to
challengers. While governments m ay assume that such tactics deter further dissent in the way
which repression increases the cost of dissent and concessions may co- opt some dissidents,
particularly moderate ones, protesters do not necessarily perceive such responses in the same way. Rathe r protesters may perceive concessions as signaling the improved chances of success,
while repression may propel some individuals to join in collective action, not necessarily only out of opposition with the regime, but also due to sympathy with the fallen protesters.

40 4.3 RESOURCE MOBLIZATION THEORY
Like political opportunities, resources and mobilizing structures appeared to have been absent,
especially in the early stages of the protest. In Syria, activists utilized a similar point of
coordination and mobili zation that had also been utilized during the protests Eas t German (Opp
and Gern, 1993): sites of worship, one of the rare locations in which large numbers of people
could gather without gaining much attention (New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology ).
Networks that gradually emerged though in the early stage s tended to be lacking a central
command. One of the earliest mentions of the emergence of networks was the National Initiative
for Change , which called for a democratic transition in April 2011 . It was said to have 150
members and represented “a broad spectrum of groups opposing” Assad including most of
Syria’s e thnic and religious communities as well as Syrians both within the country and abroad
(New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology; Al -Jazeera, April 27, 2011). Aside from this
organization, protesters were reportedly mainly organized within s mall groups. I t was believed
that activists were organizing themselves in cells of roughly 20 individuals connected by only
one leader (The Economis t, July 2, 2011).
In August, the level of organization and coordination among opposition networks
increased. A group of "revolutionary blocs" announced they were forming a new coalition called
the Syrian Revolution Commission (Al -Jazeera,"Syria Uprising: Key Events). On August 23rd,
opponents of the Assad regime met in Istanbul to launch a "national council" (Al -Jazeera, Syria
uprising: Key events). The emergence of organizations representing the opposition movement gradually bega n to attract the support of other parties (the majority of which operated outside of
the country). More organized networks, however, did not necessarily do a better job of
coordinating protest and presenting a unified front. While disunity and fractionalization

41 continued among the two largest opposition coalitions – the Syrian National Council and the
National Coordination Committee – local networks of activists were reportedly more effective in
presenting a unified front and coordinating through Facebook, mobile phones, and channels
established through personal and work connections (Al -Jazeera, "Syria: The People Awake").
Such occurrences conveyed the message that regardless of how the revolution was
“professionalized” , the Syrian revolution seemed destined to remain an organic re volution that
emerged on the streets with no central command and continued to flourish in much the same
way.
Communication, such as social media and Internet, were frequently shut down by the
government throughout much of the protest wave (New York Times, Events in Syria: A
Chronology). While the role of the internet and social media has been emphasized as critical in
understanding the spread of the prote sts (Blandord, April 8, 2011), i nternet and social media play
a limited role in the lives of most Syria ns, with only 1 in 5 Syrians online (The Economist, July
2, 2011;Internet World Stats, 2010; CIA World Fact B ook, 2011), while only around 1 percent
using Facebook as of December 2010, one of the lowest rates among Arab countries (see Figure 1)(Arab Social Media Report, January 2011). Therefore , it seems unlikely that the majority of
Syrians regular utilize such resources, particularly older Syrians or those in early protest hubs such as Daraa. Furthermore, due to both decades of repression and the governme nt's pervasive
control over media, Internet, and phone lines, the Syrian activists initially struggled to collaborate both online and in person (Khamis, Gold and Vaughn, 2011, 9). For this reason, communications seems to have been facilitated primari ly thr ough “traditional bonds” such as
tribal, profess ional, and social relationships, given the government’s constant interference with
phone lines and internet (The Economist, July 2, 2011).
Figure 1: Access to Facebook

42

(Source : Arab Social Media Report, January 2011)
However, technology still played a role, particularly several months into the protest wave
when activists received training from the diaspora and improved their skills. Communication
improved as some Syrian activists in the diaspora managed to smuggle cell phones, cameras, and
laptops into Syria so the protesters could document the events that helped the Syrian opposition
movement relay events to the global public as well as Syrian society (Khamis, Gold and Vaughn,
2011, 9; BBC, September 14, 2011). The diaspora also aided in helping to train activists to use
Skype and other online tools to further facilitate communication (Khamis, Gold and Vaughn,
2011, 10). Also, social media was an important asset to help the protest ors organize and recruit
others. The Facebook page, The Syrian Revolution 2011, boasted 120,000 followers (though
many were in the diaspora) and was used to coordinate and publicize protests (YaLibnan, April
19, 2011).
Activists also relied on more traditional methods such as posting flyers and using graffiti
calling for protest to spread information, while other activists relied more heavily on word- of-
mouth networks of carefully vetted activists (Macleod and Flamand, 2011). In order to better
communicate their message beyond the borders of S yria, activists were innovative while trying
to ensure participants’ safety. After realizing the perils of filming protests (as the regime began to watch the videos to identify the participants), activists began to film protestors either from

43 above or behind (Macleod and Flamand, 2011; Al -Jazeera, "Syria: The People Awake").
Protesters, however, began to carry banners and signs backwards so their demands could still be
filmed (Macleod and Flamand, 2011; Al -Jazeera, "Syr ia: The People Awake").
4.4 PROTEST WAVES
The protest wave in Syria was characterized by evolving demands, as well as significant spikes
in the number of protests. For example, the movement experienced significant declines in May, though later in the month, t he protest movement regained its momentum (New York Times,
Events in Syria: A Chronology). By the beginning of July, protest gatherings attracted hundreds of thousands of Syrians (The Economist, July 2, 2011). As the government continued its
repressive res ponse to protests and reforms fell short of the protesters' demands, the opposition
movement, skeptica l of any genuine reform process under Assad, shifted to demand the removal
of the President (Council on Foreign Relations, June 14, 2011).
4.4.1 HEIGHTENED CON FLICT
Like Tarrow’s (1993) model predicts, the wave of collective action in Syria was characterized by “heightened conflict” both in terms of the level of violence and the degree of public dissent. By
early April 2011, more than 10,000 protestors took to the streets in several cities, including
Damascus, Baniyas, Bayda, Homs, and Aleppo (New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology). Protest increased, both in terms of the number of participants and the spread of protests throughout the week and country. Most waves reach heights in which the movement

44 attains mass and challenges the elites. T his process, according to Tarrow (1993), triggers a
process of “institutional adaptation or collapse” . The Syrian regime chose adaptation, and its
preferred method was coercion and violence as security forces continued their repressive
response, accompanied by limited concessions (New York Times, Events in Syria: A
Chronology).
The increase in violence, however, was not simply one sided. After the Interior
Ministry’s wa rning that protest “under any banner whatsoever” would not be tolerated, 75
protesters were killed in a single day on April 23, 2011 (Al -Jazeera, "Syria Uprising: Key
Events; Al -Jazeera, "Syria: The People Awake"; New York Times, Events in Syria: A
Chronol ogy). On the side of the opposition, some members of the protest movement decided to
take up arms, ultimately leading to Syrian security forces ’ deaths as both sides began to clash in
an increasingly violent manner (Rosen, February 13, 2012). Although it is not entirely clear at which stage in the uprisings, some protesters began to substitute a strictly non- violent approach
to the incorporation of some defensive tactics (Rosen, February 13, 2012) . Also, the inc reasing
defections of soldiers marked a criti cal turning point in which the largely peaceful uprising had
the potential to take a violent turn. The first acts of armed self -defense among the opposition
were believed to have taken place in late April, as demonstrations were increasingly met by live fire and individuals in Bab Amr and Bab Sbaa in Homs, as well as some groups in Idlib, Daraa,
and Damascus that utilized defensive measures (Rosen, February 13, 2012). In Homs, gun prices rose sharply in June 2011, and in Tel Kalakh, near the border with Lebanon, protesters were believed to be using rocket -propelled grenades and guns (The Economist, June 18
th, 2011).
However, the desire to keep both foreign and local opinion on their side made many members of the opposition reluctant to employ violent tactics least they feed into the regime’s continual

45 depiction of them as “armed gangs” (The Economist, June 18th, 2011). Consequently, the
government decided to employ more severe methods through the period of intensified conflict,
including the use of warships t o try to quell the uprising in coastal districts and the placement of
tanks in Deir al Zour (The Economist, August 20, 2011). The stronger offensive measures resulted in a spike of the death toll, with 350 casualties reported between August 1
st and August
20th (The Economist, August 20, 2011).
4.4.2 GEOGRAPHIC AND SECTORAL DISPERSION
The movement in Syria has differed slightly from the pattern predicted by Tarrow (1993) in terms of sectorial and geographic dispersion. While Tarrow (1993) predicts that protest ty pically
originates in urban areas, then gradually spreads to the periphery (i.e. agricultural, and less
industrialized areas), the protest movem ent in Syria originated in the periphery and spread to
more central, urban areas. While protest did break out in the city of Daraa, the surrounding
region depends heavily on agriculture and is far less industrialized or heavily populated as major cities in the country, most notably Homs, Damascus, and Aleppo. Protest reached the third largest city in the co untry, Homs, relatively quickly. However, protest did not reach a critical
level in Damascus or Aleppo until towards the end of the period analyzed in this paper.
Dispersion among different sectors of society was fairly prevalent in this period, though a
lack of i nformation about the demographics of the protesters makes it difficult to ascertain.
Despite the fact that the original protests had primarily emerged in rural, predominantly -Sunni
areas and continued to attract a large proportion of the rural and working class Syrians, the movement attracted the support of a significant proportion of the Sunni Muslim establishment (The Economist, July 2, 2011), as well as some Christians and Alawites (The Economist, June 4,

46 2011; BBC, April 6, 2012). In the absence of det ails regarding the degree to which Syrians are
religious, it is difficult to be sure of this fact, but it does appear th at protest has spread from the
“more” religious areas to the “less” or at least “less” overtly religious areas in Syria. Regions like
Daraa, Homs, Hama, and even smaller locations like Douma in Damascus , are known for being
religious (The Economist, June 4, 2011; Dumper and Stanley, 2007; The Christian Science
Monitor, February 7, 2012; BBC, February 12, 2012). This is not to imply that mo re devout
individuals were more likely to protest in Syria or that the protest movement was a strictly Sunni
phenomenon but rather that, in the absence of networks or “safe” mobilizing structures, it may
make sense that the most religious areas experienced protest early in the wave because they had
fewer coordination problems to overcome as they were already together after Fr iday prayers. As
Tarrow (1989) notes , movement activity tends to be stronger in some areas than others (as
quoted by Snow and Oliver, 1995, 575).
By July, almost all poorer, working class suburbs or agricultural villages had been
affected, while the more prosperous areas had failed to mobilize against the regime (The
Economist, July 30, 2011). This is likely the case due to three primar y factors. First, agricultural,
rural areas had not benefited from the government’s economic liberalization policies (The Economist, June 11, 2011). While in the early years of Baath rule, rural areas tended to receive preferential treatment to some degree because many officials utilized their new position of power
to bestow preferential treatment to the poor villages from which many originated (The Economist, June 11, 2011). However, under Bashar al -Assad, such policies were largely
neglected, and instead , the regime shifted preferential treatment to other targets, namely
urbanites, merchants, and religious leaders (The Economist, June 11, 2011). Syrians from poor,

47 mainly rural villages have suffered from “drought, rampant unemployment, and the corruption
and bulling of state officials” (The Economist, June 11, 2011).
Another factor that has not been deeply analyzed, but seems plausible, is that agricult ure
and working- class areas may also have featured stronger inter -personal relationships. The
presence o f such bonds , which tend to be less pronounced in larger, urbanized settings, may have
helped to overcome the lack of organizations and networ ks. Protest has been closely linked to the
presence of such bonds , which may serve to aid in coordination and recr uitment ( Opp and Gern,
1993). Furthermore, ties of families and friends were not the only factors in agriculture -based
and working -class based communities , but also ties that form between co -workers and those
engaged in similar livelihoods.
Finally, some analysts have pointed out that both Damascus and Aleppo, areas that have
recently received more benefits from the regime ( Abdulrahim, August 7, 2011), also tend to be
under greater security surveillance ( Abdulrahim, August 7, 2011). While the sheer size of both
cities and their role in the country’s economics may have motivated such policies, the
government failed to assess the degree to which discontent may have been present in other areas.
The government employed a rather lopsided policy, both before and during the protests, as both co-optive and preventative measures (strong presence of security forces) were employed in other
areas where the government may have already enjoyed considerable support, as seen in the large
and frequent pro- Assad rallies ( New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology; The
Washington Post, May 3, 2011; Doucet, October 6, 2011; Alarabiya, October 12, 2011).
However, there is a considerable problem of causality here. It is difficult to determine, without further investigation if t he government enjoyed support and misinterpreted what areas were most

48 at risk of rebellion or if the support and relative lack of opposition in these areas was actually a
function of the government’s policies.
Furthermore, given both the duration of prot est in Syria and the relatively rapid spread,
protest spread may be largely self -sustaining. As more people are both involved in the protest
movement and become victims to the government’s coercive policies, it becomes more difficult
to maintain a distance between “us” (the opposition) and “them” (the regime and its supporters).
In the early weeks of protest, a middle -class, secular individual in Damascus may have felt like
he/she had little in common with the working -class and agricultural -class protesters in Daraa, but
as the protest spread and more people became involved, diverse segments of society began to recognize that the protesters were not merely from one region or one socio- economic segment of
society. In this way, organizations and networks may h ave played a role, but the networks and
organizations were largely informal; those based on work, family, and acquaintances. In this
sense, protest diffusion is not merely a question of whether or not the activists’ claims resonate with the general public , but it also depends on who is making the claims. Protest becomes a more
valid possibility if observers and bystanders come to realize that they have something in common with the claimants and they were not simply the “rural illiterates” or “religious fana tics” (The
Economist, June 4, 2011). Protest is interactive. Regions build on their own experiences and
influence one another. Protest waves are not simply the waves of a country but rather a major wave comprised of smaller waves that reinforce one another .
The diffusion of protest across sectors of society, however, was not as pervasive as
predicted by Tarrow ’s model (1993) as the least “traditional” participants did not play in active
role in the movement, at least not during this period of analysis. The re were very few political
elite defections. Secondly, the movement continued to struggle to attract support among the

49 Syrian business class. Unlike Egypt, where the educated middle class and business class used
their knowledge of social media to contribut e to the overthrow of Mubarak, in Syria, the protests
have primarily been led by those in the agricultural sector, as well as working class Syrians
(Time, May 27, 2011). Syria’s business class remained largely undecided on anti -Assad
demonstrations and som e argued that the busi ness community’s ties to Assad “cronies” in
gove rnment contributed to this indecisiveness as the community attempted to assess the impact
of a post -Assad Syria (Time, May 27, 2011). Other segments of Syrian society, whose decision
to side with the opposition would have further undermined President Assad, were the security
forces, though most analysts predicted that, unlike Tunisia and Egypt, they would remain loyal to the President (Council on Foreign Relations, June 14, 2011).
4.4.3 EMERGI NG ORGANIZATIONS
In terms of Tarrow ’s (1993) third feat ure of protest cycles – the emergence of new organizations
in later periods, with “older” organiza tions dominating early stages – Syria differs. As mentioned
earlier , there were no established organiz ations on the ground in the early stages of the protest
cycle. However, as Tarrow’s model (1993) predicts, new organizations did emerge, s uch as the
FSA, the variety of “revolutionary blocs" , the SNC, etc. In the case of Syria, it seems as if
networks did not create the movement, but that the movement ultimately created the networks.
As the protest wave progressed, networks of activists were formed in order to coordinate protest ,
but this seems to have been almost a necessity to ensure the survival of the movement rather than a development that helped to spark and coordinate the protest in the early stages. Although the initial steps to form a national council abroad included the involvement of many former opposition figures, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood, none of these organizations

50 were directly responsible for sparking the protest movement. W hile they may have provided
logistic support and articulated the platform of the opposi tion (RT, March 20, 2012), their
positions did not always line up with positions that emerged on the street (Seelye, Kate,
September 1, 2011). The Syrian revolution seems to be a genuinely organic revolution, initiated and sustained by the people, as opposed to any one particularly organization or group.
This is not to s ay that networks and linkages did not play a role, but as analysis of other
authoritarian regimes have found (Opp and Gern, 1993), in the absence of established networks
and organizations, personal ties may function in a similar way. This is specifically r elevant in the
case of the first region to experience sustained, large- scale protest, Daraa, where strong bonds
and connections among families led to demonstrations and protest on behalf of arrested youths.
However, even if personal ties played a role it i s important to note that “ mobilization does not
just depend on social ties; it also creates them" (Gould, 1991, 719 as quoted on Snow and Oliver, 1995, 576). The protest movement in Daraa was initially dismissed by some other segments of
Syrian societ y (Th e Economist, June 4, 2011). But as the claims and demands of the initial
protests were embraced by Syrians from other religious, regional, and socio- economic
backgrounds bonds were created and fostered throughout the wave. In this way, Syrians with very di fferent backgrounds were able to unify under the umbrella of greater freedom and the goal
of achieving the removal of President Assad.
4.4.4 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES
The fourth feature of Tarrow’s (1993) model is the emergence of collective frames of action. Activists primarily framed their struggle through their use of familiar symbols of Syrian identity;
some were reinforced while others were undermined. As mentioned previously, frames serve to

51 “dignify claims, connect them to others, and help produce a collec tive identity among claimants”
(McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001). Protesters challenged the Assad legacy and role in Syria’s
history. Activists renamed streets, bridges , and boulevards that carried the Assad family name
through the Google c rowdsourcing prog ram, Map Maker. S ome street names were also
physically changed through graffiti and paint throughout Syria (Khamis, Gold and Vaughn,
2011, 12). Demonstrators in Daraa set fire to the ruling Baath Party’s headquarters (New York
Times, Events in Syria: A Chr onology).
The Ba’ath Party, as well as the regime’s p an-Arab, anti -imperial, pro- Palestinian
ideology, was not the stabilizing force that President Assad had predicted them to be. The
president asserted in an interview that such factors made Syria immune t o the kind of revolt that
occurred in Tunisia and Egypt (Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011). Instead, the Ba’ath Party,
through the eyes of the protestors, had been de -legitimized. R ather than serving as a unifying
force in the country, the Party now symbolized unwelcome authority. As Polletta and Jasper (2001) note, “Even identities that are familiar, longstanding, and enforced by law and custom frequently need to be re -imagined by movement activists. At the very least, they must be
integrated with a movement identity . . .” (289).
Framing is utilized both by the opponents of the regime as well as the regime itself. The
Assad government and the opposition movement were engaged in a continual tug -of-war to
determine what it was to be “Syrian” and who had a legitimate claim to the symbols that defined
the country’s history. For example, Assad accused the protesters of being driven by foreign forces that wanted to restore colonialism; the protest movement called such claims into question
and carried banners and placards that denounced President Assad’s own foreign allies, particularly Iran and Hizbullah whose leader, Hassa n Nasrallah, had spoken out in support of

52 Assad (The Economist, June 4, 2011). On April 17th, the day marking the end of French colonial
rule large, crowds turned out to protest (New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology). This
challenged the regime’s former self -identification as “anti- imperial” or “anti- Western” and the
mobilization served to demonstrate that, at least in the eyes of some Syrians, Ba’ath Party and
Assad family rule had become synonymous with a largely illegitimate imposition of power.
The regime continued to rely heavily on their narrative regarding the “true” identities of
the protesters, later referring to them as “armed gangs” and “terrorists,” thus attempting to
distance the movement from mainstream Syrian society. The movement attempted to challenge
such accusations by referring to itself as “the people” or “Sy rians” (‘Knight of Hama’, 2011).
This is a fairly common example of framing in protest trajectories as the usage of broad,
inclusive labels such as ‘the people’ help to both inspire greater participation while also preventing the regime from attacking participants as “outsiders” (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, 294).
The protesters also tried to frame their struggle in such a way as to break with any
accusations of being violent . During protests aimed to break the siege on Homs , protesters
carried olive branches as a symbol of peace (New York Times, Events in Syr ia: A Chronology).
The activists also found creative ways to depict the repression they faced in Kafr Nabel, in Idlib, by wearing gags over their mouths (Khamis, Gold and Vaughn, 2011, 11).
The regime would continue to frame the conflict and attempted to l ink the movement to
religious radicals and extremists certain repressive measures made it evident that not only religious fanatics and foreign agents were involved in the flourishing opposition movement. In
May, the discovery of a video of the mutilated body of a 13- year-old boy, Hamza Al -Khatib, was
discovered . Al-Khatib had been taken, tortured, and killed by government forces (New York
Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology) further fueling outrage and disillusionment with the

53 regime. Even for those who be lieved the protest movement was truly the work of “armed gangs” ,
high death tolls and the killing of children (estimated to be around 187 by the October 2011)
(BBC, October, 14, 2011) undermined the regime’s attempt to portray itself in a favorable light.
While the impact of the government’s repression impacted nearly every region of Syria – with
targets included women and children, which undermined the narrative that the re gime was
engaged in a war with “armed thugs” outside of mainstream Syrian society – the fact that
repression did not impact minoriti es to the same degree as Sunnis meant that sympathy for the
movement may have been greater across regions, but not necessarily among minorities.
Religion played another important role, both in terms of colle ctive identity and the
government and protest movement’s attempt to frame the ev ents in a way that favored its own
positions. President Assad chose to dismiss surges in the protest moving during the holy month of Ramadan as “religiously inspi red unrest wit h foreign backing” (New York Times, Events in
Syria: A Chronology). Such a position was fairly common, as the Syrian regime had c onsistently
used the threat of radical Islam to justify repression, including the severe response to a Muslim
Brotherhood upris ing that had occurred in 1982 (Wieland, 2006). The government’s seizure of a
landmark mosque in Daraa contributed to the perception that the government was not only aiming to crush the protest movement, but may have also led some to believe that the regime was
directly attacking religious institutions, and more specifically Sunni Islam.
Although the role of religion has been continuously debated in understanding both the
origins and trajectory of the protest movement, the increased level of protest during Ramadan
seems to indicate the activists were using religion to support and further invigorate the
movement. Furthermore, the use of mosques as a point of mobilization and the invocation of religious terminolog y, such as the use of the word “martyr” (Eurone ws, April 1, 2011;

54 Blomfield, June 3, 2011) contributed to at least some degree of religious undertones. Later, FSA
brigades took names with strong connotations with Sunni Islam (Rosen, February 13, 2012).
The protest movement, for their part, has largel y attempted to convey that the protest was
not an exclusively Sunni or even Muslim phenomenon. Through the Facebook page, The Syrian
Revolution 2011, activists posted a message that "Jesus Christ rejected injustice, hatred and sin and brought a new revolut ion of human and spiritual values and human dignity" calling for
Christians and other minorities to join the movement (YaLibnan, April 19, 2011). They also
posted that "We are Christians, Sunni Muslims, Alawites, Druze, Shiites, Arabs and Kurds, it is
our duty to revolt in the face of Baathist vampires" (YaLibnan, April 19, 2011). By August 2011,
a common refrain during protests was “We have no problem between us” (The Economist, August 27, 2011).
This follows what theori sts of social movements predict: when representing themselves
to the public, protest groups “may cast themselves as more unified or homogeneous than they would in a setting of fellow activists” (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, 294). This strategy is critical to attract support and further part icipation in the cause and not to exclude potential dissidents.
However, though presenting themselves as more unified and homogeneous is a strategy ,
it was not without a degree of truth. The first attempt at creating a platform for the opposition, on April 22, 2011, was the creation of “ Local Coor dination Committees” (LCCs) compri sed of
activists of key cities, which offered a statement of demands including Syria’s transition from
dictatorship to democracy, with a “multi- national, multi -ethnic, and religiously tolerant society”
(Weiss, July 5, 2011).

55 4.4.5 REPERTOIRES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
The f inal feature, the expansion of “ repertoires of collective action” (Tarrow, 1993) is present
throughout the entire protest wave in Syria. Continually evolving tactics is crucial in protest
cycles because patterns of protest are marked by the ongoing dynamic interaction between
protesters and the regime: its tactics and counter -tactics. The emergence of new tactics among
the opposition allowed the protesters to more effective ly challenge the government, draw greater
attention to their cause, and attract new recruits. An example includes protests organized at night ,
which aimed to both evade security forces and protect the identification of protesters (New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology; Macleod and Flamand, 2011).
Other examples of evolving tactics also include s strategies that were less costly,
including a boycott of brands and companies distributed or owned by people with ties to the regime (Malas, July 8, 2011). S mall, brief protests was another tactic th at emerged; smaller
protesters were harder for security forces to target as they tended to conclude as quickly as they
had appeared and were particularly common in areas under heavy surveillance (‘The Ajnabi’, Augu st 30, 2011). Other tactics included using fake IDs to bypass security forces in order to
participate in protest or document human rights abuses carried about by security forces (Macleod and Flamand, 2011). The opposition also utilized high attendance at dawn prayers during Ramadan , as well as other traditional religious celebrations, to demons trate in order to mask the
purpose of gatherings (Macleod and Flamand, 2011).
Activists also were innovative in terms of non -violent tactics throughout the protest
wave. For example, protesters dyed the water in seven of Damascus's largest fountains red to
symbolize the blood of fallen protesters, aimed laser lights at the presidential residence, used stickers with the names of killed pr otesters on street signs, sent “ freedom balloons ” loose over

56 cities, and created training videos of non -violent tactics (Khamis, Gold and Vaughn, 2011, 10).
Music also played an important role in the uprising , as anti -Assad songs were sung during
protests and activists put cassette playe rs with speakers in trash cans which would play famous
anti-Assad songs (Khamis, Gold and Vaughn, 2011, 10). The Syrian opposition also borrowed
other tactics from abroad, such as several stagings of “Egyptian -style sit -ins” in Homs (New
York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology).
The further evolution of tactics seen in this period confirms Tarrow’s (1993) idea that
protest waves are marked by “expanding repertoires of contention” (286). “Each society has a
stock of familiar forms of action that are known by both potential challengers and their
opponents which become habitual aspects of their interaction” (Tarrow , 1994, 19). Movement
leaders invent, adapt, and combine various forms of collective action to stimulate support from people who might otherwise stay at home (Tarrow, 1994, 19; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 15). The evolution of tactics, particularly insofar as they improve the success of the movement and reduce the costs, is extremely important in explaining the corresponding surges in protest seen in this period and the ability to attract more risk -adverse individuals. However, the ability of
such tactics to attract new participants is typically short- lived, as the regime, also innovating and
transforming their tactics, finds ways in which to circumvent these new tactics (Tarrow, 1993). As more protesters are arrested, killed, or injured , the movement is expected to temporarily
decline until, either due to some internal or external factor that makes protest eithe r more
appealing or less costly, the movement overcomes the obstacles created by the regime (Tarrow,
1993).

57 5.0 CASE STUDIES OF REGI ONS
In order to improve the internal validity of the model, I s elected five regions to analyze: Daraa,
Homs, Aleppo, Damascus, and Hama . Each was selected for several reasons. Given prior
findings that protest tends to vary at different points of the wave and cycle, I selected regions that
were both involved in the protest movement from the early stages (Daraa and Homs), as well as regions in which large -scale pro test emerged later (Damascus and Hama). Also, so as not to
select on the dependent variable (King et al, 1994), I chose one region that had very few protests
throughout most of the wave, with increased protest activity only at the tail end of the protes t
period examined in this study: Aleppo. While it would have been ideal to have selected a region
that had seen no protest activity at any point, this was not possible due to the fact that every
region in Syria saw at least several protests (my data), including the sparsely populated region of Quneitra whose capital only has 150 residents (Population and Housing Census, 2004).
Also, the regions represent the diversity of Syria. Aleppo has significant population of
Christians, Hama is known for its devoutly re ligious Sunni population, Homs has a sizable
Alawite population, and Aleppo has a sizable Kurdish population. The final reason for this specific selection of cases is the variation in o ne of the explanatory variables: repression. Protests
in Homs, Hama, an d Daraa were consistently met with relatively high numbers of both deaths
and arrests (my data, Al -Jazeera interactive map), while Damascus and Aleppo’s p rotests led to
far fewer deaths; the number of arrests, however, were quite high (my own data).

58 Figur e 2:Map of Syria

5.1 DARAA
The governorate of Daraa is in the southwest of Syria, bordered by Jordan to the South and
Damascus to the north. The capital, also called Daraa, is roughly 60 miles from Damascus and the population of the region is estimated to be roughly one million people. Daraa was formerly
considered an area of stalwart Ba’ath Party support (Sterling, March 1, 2012;Van Dam, 1996),
which resulted in substantial “government favoritism” (Van Dam, 1996). Daraa experienced
“disproportionate growth” from the 1960s to the 1990s (Van Dam, 1996). The population is
predominantly Sunni Muslim, though a few areas, such as Ezraa, are predominantly Christian (Anderson, March 14, 2012).
This loyalty, however, has not helped the region recently. Daraa, the heavily populated
capital, is one of Syria’s poorest cities, and has been hit particularly hard by the water shortage ,
which affects the entire country (UPI, April 1, 2011; Olmert, March 21, 2011). Daraa had also recently experienced drops in subsidies and declining wages (Sterling, March 1, 2012). As the

59 region primarily relies on agricultural production, the event of what has been called “the worst
long-term drought and most severe set of crop failures since agricultural civilizatio ns began in
the Fertile Crescent" (Femia and Werrell, February 29, 2012), has devastated the region. The
deteriorating situation of farmlands in Syria has been compounded by the Assad government ’s
"mismanagement and neglect" (Femia and Werrell, February 29 , 2012). The government has
relied on a policy of subsidies for water -intensive wheat and cotton farming and "encouraged
inefficient irrigation techniques" (Femia and Werrell, February 29, 2012). In the south of the
country, nearly 75% of the farming popul ation experienced "total crop failure" (Femia and
Werrell, February 29, 2012). In 2009, the UN announced that over 800,000 Syrians had their
entire livelihoods demolished as a result of the droughts and over one million Syrians became
food insecure, while the UN estimates that between two and three million people now live in
extreme poverty (Femia and Werrell, February 29, 2012). Poverty, however, has been a pressing problem for this re gion for some time (see Figure 3 ).

Figure 3: Percentage of total population at or below the poverty line

60 5.1.1 PROTEST AND OPPOSITION HISTORY
There is little knowledge of the involvement of the people of Daraa in past uprisings or protest,
though one scholar writes that along with Hama, Daraa also suffe red considerable repression in
the early 1980s due to opposition with the regime (Abd- Allah, 1983).
5.1.2 CURRENT EVENTS
The first large -scale, significant showing of opposition occurred in Daraa in mid -March, at least
partially in response to the recent arrest and torture of 15 youths who had written anti –
government graffiti on walls (Al- Jazeera, "Syria Uprising: Key Events; Al -Jazeera, "Syria: The
People Awake "). The Syrian government swiftly and severely cracked down on this showing of
dissent (Al -Jazeera, "Syria Uprising: Key Events; Al- Jazeera, "Syria: The People Awake "). The
crackdown in Daraa resulted in nearly 30 deaths within only a few days (Human Rights Watch, 2011), and consequently sparked outrage both within Daraa and throughout the country (New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology). The day after protests erupted in Daraa, women led a sit -in Damascus, demanding the release of prisoners “unfairly jailed” (Sterling, March 1,
2012). On April 25th, the Syrian government launched an 11- day siege on Daraa while also
cutting off food, water, and other crucial supplies to some of the towns and neighborhoods with the largest protests (Al- Jazeera, "Syria Uprising: Key Events; Al -Jazeera, "Syria: The People
Awake"; New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chr onology). The Syrian military, using tanks,
helicopters, and snipers, seized a landmark mosque that had become a center or protest in Daraa on April 30th (New York Times, “Events in Syria: A Chronology”).

61 By May 2011, Daraa, especially the neighborhood of al -Balad, had been on “lockdown”
for a month, surrounded by the Syrian army (Clanet, June 10, 2011). The Al -Balad neighborhood
saw the most unrest on the first days of the region’s protest movement (Clanet, June 10, 2011).
In May, troops pulled out of Da raa but the protests and subsequent government crackdown
continued, resulting in the arrest, torture, and death of 13 year old, Hamza Al -Khatib (New York
Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology; Sydney Morning Herald, May 5, 2011). Throughout the
course of the protest, Daraa remained active in the opposition movement (my own data)
gradually spreading from the capital to Al- Harraq, Dael, Tafas, Bosra, Nawa, Busr al -Harir,
Othman, Kafr Shams, and Jassem (my own data; Anderson, March 14, 2012).
5.1.3 POLITI CAL OPPORTUNITIES
While many scholars consider political opportunity as domestic features (McAdams, 1996), there
seems to be no reason why this could not also pertain to external developments in the region as well. The uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia not only showed that segments of other Arab countries’
populations were dissatisfied with the status quo and the relative lack of freedom, but also demonstrated that protest was not only possible , but also had the potential to be successful in
removing authoritarian leaders. Even in countries, such as Jordan, where protest did not reach a significant scale or overthrow the King, protest and unrest did result in considerable government concessions (The Guardian, February 23, 2011). Such events may also have partially contr ibuted
to an idea, however mistaken, tha t President al -Assad would offer concessions and avoid
utilizing severe repressive measures, as had occurred in Tunisia. The presence of Al -Jazeera and
other alternatives to state -controlled media in Syria relayed su ch information (Freedom House,
2011), allowing the people of Daraa, and Syrians throughout the country, to remain abreast wi th

62 such events and developments. This likely influenced, at least to some degree, the perception that
protest was possible and could be successful. The protest movement in Daraa, however, also
obtained some important support within Syria. In late April, 200 members of the Ba’ath party,
mainly from the province of Daraa and the surrounding regions, resigned in order to protest the attack by government forces (Reuters, April 27, 2011).
Another side of polit ical opportunity is constraints. A lthough the severe repression
inflicted on Daraa would seem to serve as a significant obstacle to protest, another possibility
should be considered – that the brutal response clearly illustrated that the regime felt threatened
by the strong showing of collective dissent. It is also crucial to note that repress ion actually
created the first opportunity for collective action against the regime in Daraa a fter the arrest of
the youths who had written anti -regime graffiti. Furthermore, repression did not occur in
isolation, and the regime offered several concessions (pay raises for state employees, the release
of some activists, etc. ), as well as a statement from the government’s spokeswoman that the
people of Daraa had “legitimate” complaints (Landis, March 25, 2011). This offered conflicting messages, and also may have conveyed to protesters that they could be successful in extracting concessions from the r egime.
5.1.4 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY
Another element that has been found to be influential for both the on- set, as well as further
surges of protest, is the role played by mobilizing structures and networks, components of
resource mobilization theory (McA dam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Scholars who subscribe to this
view argue that protest activity, particularly prolonged collective action, requires a significant base of resources (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Dalton et al, 2009). Daraa like the rest of

63 Syria, however, lacked significant organizations both in terms of established networks and
organizations, while the repressive state apparatus made communicating dissent difficult. The
few existing organizations on the ground of opposition are primarily sma ll, human rights
organizations. Daraa, however, prior to the protest, had no known opposition groups or
organizations.
However, as was argued for the larger developments in Syria, the protest movement in
Daraa, while lacking established opposition groups or organizations, likely relied on the pre sence
of personal networks and mobilizing structures . For example, since most of the major towns and
cities in Daraa are relatively small, some have drawn attention to the fact that residents of the region are rel atively inter -connected (Sterling, March 1, 2012). Thus, it is possible that personal
networks have, to some degree, facilitated mobilization, as well as helped to increase the size and scale of the protests. The idea of personal networks being influential in sparking protest is also
linked to the fact the arrested teenagers were from “almost every large family in Daraa (Al –
Jazeera, April 19, 2011). It has been noted that the “largely tribal society of Syria’s south, family loyalty and honor (sic) run deep” (Al-Jazeera, April 19, 2011). Such personal networks offered
several important resources for the people of Daraa – modes of communication, trusted links,
and bases for further recruitment. The idea that personal ties may facilitate mobilization follows the notion that recruitment tends to take place “primarily through preexisting solidarities through
norms of obligation and reciprocity” (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, 290).
Also, in the absence of such networks, other sources were utilized for coordination, such
as mosques. L ike the rest of Syria, in Daraa protest initially occurred after Friday prayers (Al –
Jazeera, April 9, 2011; Al -Jazeera, Apri l 19, 2011). In the absence of “safe” areas for gathering,
the mosque provided a good guise for the protesters’ ga thering, as well as sites to share

64 information and recruit additional protesters. The Omari mosque, which was later seized by
Syrian government forces, was transformed into the center of the protest movement and a site to
re-group (New York Times, March 20, 2011; Newcomb, April 30, 2011). Religious sites gained
further legitimization as a site from which to launch collective arrest due to the fact that shortly
after the arrest of the youths, local religious leaders marched alongside the parents and families ,
confronting the governor, Faisal Kalthoum, after Friday prayers (Al -Jazeera, April 19, 2011).
Such acts added legitimacy for the protesters’ d emands and provided important, influential
support.
Another important resource, the transmission of information, presented a considerable
obstacle in Daraa, like most of Syria. Although some analysis of the situation tends to focus on
the central role of media – like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter – in both sparking and
sustaining the revolution (Kennedy, February 11, 2011; Titlow, November 18, 2011; Kocaoglu and Russel, June 28, 2011) this fails to capture the entire picture, as well as the mechanisms by which these tools can be influential. While such sources may facilitate communication, this ignores several impo rtant caveats. First, access is very limited (Internet World Stats, 2010; CIA
World Fact Book, 2011). Furthermore, even among those who regularly utilize Internet and social media, the government intermittently blocked the se resources and protesters experi enced
power outages and interference with mobile phone networks (BBC, October 24, 2011; Reporters without Borders, March 2011; Derhally, April 13, 2011), so they are not necessarily reliable methods of coordination or communication. Secondly, while social media may serve to aid coordination and communication, the messages transmitted only have value insofar as they are capable of igniting dissent and reaching a receptive audience. For example, previous calls for protest on Facebook failed to materialize (US A Today, February 1, 2011).

65 5.1.5 PROTEST WAVES
5.1.5.1 HEIGHTENED CONFLICT
In terms of Tarrow’s (1993) description of protest cycles, the protest wave in Daraa has exhibited
similarities and significant differences. With regards to the first feature, heightened conflict, Daraa experienced high levels of conflict early in the protest trajectory with the government’s
immediate repressive response and the opposition’s subsequent resistance. Government forces
quickly responded to the mobilization in Daraa, using tear gas to break up public gatherings and
"excessive force" against protesters (Razzouk, March 21, 2011). In April 2011, the government
imposed a blockade on the town, cutting off electricity and water, which amounted to what many
human rights organizations c alled "a major humanitarian crisis" (NPR, April 30, 2011).
5.1.5.2 GEOGRAPHIC AND SECTORAL DISPERSION
The second element, broad sectorial and geographic extension fits the case of Daraa, although a
lack of clarity regarding the demographics of the protesters make s it difficult to verify. In terms
of geographical extension of the protests, the capital of Daraa, with a population of 177,200 residents (Syrian Government Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004) was one of the first areas in which protestors emerged, but wa s later followed by nearby towns, such as Al -Sanamayn and
Nawa (my own data). Like Tarrow (1993) predicts, protest diffuses from larger to more rural areas. Although all of Daraa relies on agriculture, the fact that the prot est waves spread from the
more i ndustrialized areas, such as the capital, and gradually spread to smaller areas
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zUgl1elV8U
, my data), confirms this theory.
Unfortunately, due to lack of information on individual protesters, it is not certain that in Daraa
the first people to participate in protest were those who have a greater tendency, at least

66 historically speaking, to engage in protest, like activists and students. Given the fact that the
arrest s of the youths affected most of the major families of Daraa , it appears that significant
segments of the population in Daraa were already involved in the movement, though throughout
other stages of the wave, it is less clear.
5.1.5.3 EMERGING ORGANIZATIONS
Like the protest movement throughout Syria, the uprising s in Daraa fail to demonstrate Tarrow’s
third element: the emergence of new social movement organizations and the empowerment of
older ones. Across Syria, especially in the first several months, most analy sts described the
Syrian protests as “leaderless” (Sly, July 28, 2011). It seems as if the uprisings in Daraa were primarily spontaneous in the sense that they were not planned by any known or ganization or
network. In Daraa networks may have played a role, but personal networks are more likely to
explain coordination and the dispersion of information. As one analyst points out, in Daraa most
people know one another and relationships are close both in the city of Daraa and nearby villages and towns (Sterling , March 1, 2012). However, the s econd element of the prediction, that new
social movements emerge, is applicable. Although the degree to which protesters were organized
seems to have been limited, especially in the early stages, protesters were believed to be
organized into small cells of roughly 20 people to facilitate coordination and planning (Economist article).
5.1.5.4 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES
Tarrow’s fourth element, new “master frames” of meaning , can be seen in the case of Daraa.
Collective identity often utilizes familiar symbols and ideology, such as religion and tribal identity. In Daraa, the use of the term “martyr” was used early on ("The blood of martyrs is not

67 spilt in waste!") and terms invoking religion ("Allah Akbar") (Al- Jazeera, March 24, 2011).
While some, including the regime, have attempted to use the prevalence of religious symbolism
and languag e to dismiss the protesters as “religious fanatics” (The Economist, June 4, 2011), the
use of religious symbols and words serve an important purpose. Religion, in its familiarity and
links to Syrian identity, can offer a source of comfort and support to resource -poor groups.
Moreover, terminology such as “martyr” help to frame t he protest movement as a quasi -religious
struggle against “good” and “evil” , expanding the struggle beyond pure political ideology.
Protest was further framed through the use of funerals to express collective dissent (Al -Jazeera,
March 24, 2011), reinforcing the notion that the deceased had died f or a particular cause and
were “martyrs” to the struggle. To use funerals to voice opposition to the regime, the protesters
in Daraa signified the political nature of the deaths. The framing of such events and terms were reinforced beyond Daraa. A Syrian Facebook groups called for a "Week of the Martyrs" protests in honor of those killed in Daraa (Middle East Online, April 4, 2011).
Only a week into the protests, activists utilized framing to legitimize their claims, calling
Friday demonstrations a “Day of Dignity” (Karam, March 25, 2011). The protestors gathered in the city’s central square, Assad Square, which, named after Hafez al -Assad , was a symbolic
gesture in and of itself (Karam, March 25, 2011). The protesters capitalized on clear symbols of the regime to express their dissen t. Protesters burned party headquarters, as well as a branch of
SyriaTel phone company, which is owned by the president’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf (The New York Times, March 20, 2011). On several occasions the protesters chanted “freedom” while
carrying olive branches and Syria n flags (Karam, March 25, 2011) , both highlighting their
peaceful tactics, while dispelling the notion that they were somehow less loyal to Syria than other residents or that they were agents of foreign influence. Like many of the regions analyzed

68 more in detail, Daraa’s demonstrations and protests have capitalized on the people’s collective
identity, primarily in terms of tribal affiliation, as well as an emphasis on the region’s central role
in the protest wave (‘Knight of Hama’, 2011).
5.1.5.5 REPERTOIRES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
Finally, the invention of new forms of collective action is the final feature Tarrow (1993)
highlights. While protesters in Daraa initially relied on fairly traditional forms of collective
action, there were some important innovations as the protest waved progressed. By October
2011, protesters in Daraa utilized night protests and other tactical innovations that had been
gaining popularity throughout the country ( YouTube video, 3/05/2012 and October 13. 2011). In
Daraa, str ikes were utilized periodically, including an extremely wide spread strike in October
2011 (Oweis and al -Khalidi, October 26, 2011).
5.1.6 HOW DO PATTERNS IN DARAA COMPARE TO SYRIA?
Figure 4: Protest Pattern in Daraa and Syria

While Syria’s revolution has been described as increasingly sectarian in nature ( Arango,
February 28, 2012), Daraa, particularly in the early days of the protests, served as one clear

69 instance in which inter -communal cooperation was present. When the security forces entered
Daraa, the town’s Christian residents opened their homes to wounded protesters after the Friday
prayer demonstrations (Anderson, March 14, 2012). A critical difference between the people of
Daraa and the rest of Syria is the presence of indivi duals with a relatively low -threshold to
engage in collective action ( Lohmann, 1994); any society is comprised of a full spectrum
individual responses to protest. Comparatively speaking, in Daraa, it took very little to set off the
first protest – the arrest and torture of several young boys – while similar events, historically,
were not met with the same response. The events in the region helped to foster the notion that
dissent and opposition should be given an outlet through protest and collective action, while prior to the uprising, such sentiments may have been concealed.
In the same way that the uprising in the Arab world served to confirm the possible
efficacy of protest, the events in Daraa, as well as the government’s brutal response, helped to fuel a broader protest movement. First, the events demonstrated there were at least some
individuals who found fault with the regime while also finding protest to be a worthwhile avenue
through which to express their dissent. The key here is that the events in Daraa were within
Syria, which helped to draw attention to the fact that there was viable opposition to the regime within Syria, as opposed to the idea that the waves of uprisings were merely, for example, an Egyptian or North African phenomenon. Secondly, the government's harsh repression in response to the protests in Daraa, fueled sympathy with the protesters (likely, even among those that did not necessarily agree with either their opposition or their way of expressing it).
Early on, however, questions emerged regardin g both how representative the protesters in
Daraa were, as well as what were the chances that the small mobilization could actually spark further showings of dissatisfaction. As one analyst put it, "The centrality of Dara a in the uprising

70 may have limited appeal to the urban elites. The dusty border city marked by tribal loyalties,
poverty, and Islamic conservatism may inspire Syria's rural masses who suffer from poverty, a
prolonged drought and joblessness, but mass demonstrations there have frightened Syria's urban
elites. Even those who share anger at repression and hope for liberation with their rural counterparts still fear the poor and the threat of disorder" (Landis, March 25, 2011).
5.2 HOMS
The province of Homs is the largest , geogra phically , in Syria and borders Lebanon in the west
and Iraq in the east. Nearly 75% of residents are Sunnis, while Christians make up about 5% , and
Alawites, many having migrated to the capital in recent decades, comprise roughly 2 0% of the
population (Bassel, December 15 -21, 2011). For this reason, Homs has been called a
“microcosm” of Syria, because, like the country , it is home to a Sunni Muslim majority and
significant minorities of Christians and Alawites (Shadid, October 1, 2011). The city of Homs is the third largest city and major industrial center of the country. Also, the city is part of an important hub of a road and rail network, serving as a key link between interior cities and the coast (Homsonline.com).
5.2.1 PROTEST AND OPPOSITION HISTORY
The his tory of Homs is marked by significant periods of uprisings and dissent, first against
French colonial role and later as a center of resistance to the Ba’ath monop oly on power (Van
Dam, 1996). In 1925, Homs joined Damascus and southern Druze tribes in a revolt against

71 French rule (Cleveland, 2000). Opposition to the Ba’ath party in Homs can be traced back to the
1960s, shortly after the Baathists seized power in a military coup (Lipin, November 15, 2011).
After the coup, business owners, along with religious conservatives, organized protests in 1964,
primarily in response to the socialist and secul ar agenda of the Ba’ath party. H owever, the
uprisings were quickly crushed by security forces , which ultimately were effective in keeping the
city and surrounding a reas quiet for the following decades (Lipin, November 15, 2011).
5.2.2 CURRENT EVENTS
It seems fitting that Homs and Hama have play ed important roles in the 2011 – present uprising
as they are commonly called “the two sisters” (Abd -Allah, 1983). Homs has com e to be known
as the “capital” of the Syrian revolution since it was one of the first cities to join the uprisings.
Other factors that contributed to this moniker include certain areas, namely Al -Rastan, Talbisa,
Talclakh, and Al -Hawla, which have become h avens for revolutionaries fleeing regime forces
(Bassel, December 15 -21, 2011). Bab Amr has served as a primary base for the Free Syrian
Army (Al -Jazeera, "Interactive: Timeline of Syria Unrest", March 23, 2012). The city of Homs
has presented some advanta ges to the protesters. The presence of a large number of defecting
soldiers, as well as the complicated, circuitous geography of the city and surrounding areas
(BBC, March 12, 2012), both offered a marginal advantage to the opposition movement in
Homs. Ho ms’ large population was thought to present an additional advantage: the province
shares a border with Iraq and Lebanon, “making any attempt to impose military control over it a difficult and expensive venture” (Bassel, December 15 -21, 2011)
Being the “cap ital” of the revolution, however, comes with a high price. Homs suffer ed
severe repression early on, with a high causality toll of 50 deaths in a singl e day in April 2011.

72 Certain neighborhoods were hit particularly hard, such as the Bab Amr district of the city, as well
as the nearby town, Rastan (BBC, March 12, 2012; BBC, September 23, 2011). The province has
suffered roughly 44% of the casualties that have occurred since the uprising bega n (Al -Jazeera,
"Interactive: Timeline of Syria Unrest", March 23, 2 012). Additionally, most of the “scores” of
Syrians who had been reported missing by April 2011 were from Homs (New York Times,
Events in Syria: A Chronology).
Figure 5: Map of Homs (areas in yellow are those with most frequent protests)
(source Al -Jazeera, April 9, 2012 )
5.2.3 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES
The events in Homs should be viewed through the lens of developments in the region, as well as
the early collective action of opposition in Daraa. While not the “political elites” to which
McAdams (1996) refers, the high number of defections from the security forces, and their consequent decision to make Homs one of their main bases of operation, should also be viewed
as a political opportunity for the opposition movement. The presence of the soldiers helped to
sustain and increase the movement in two important ways: 1) through the validation of the
civilians’ efforts to mobilize and 2) through the soldiers’ role in protecting the protesters from

73 the Syrian security forces (Al -Jazeera, "Syria: The People Awake"). On the other hand, the
presence of the FSA could also be understood as a constraint as it could invite the presence of the
Syrian security forces and warrant a more repressive government response. Moreover, the
incorporation of soldiers in the movement could also have turned off more moderate protesters,
given the fact that the likelihood for violence was likely to increase. “One of the chief causes of movement decline is that collective identity stops lining up with the movement” and participants
may cease to believe that the movement represents them (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, 292).
However, even with the presence of the soldiers in Homs, it seems as if the protest movement
managed to remain largely non -violent well into the pro test wave (Dixon, February 19, 2012).
Another fact or which may have served as an opportunity is the fact that the protest wave
in Homs followed the events in Daraa. While it could be argued that the people of Daraa did not anticipate the scale of the gove rnment’s coercive policies, those who elected to participa te in
collective action in Homs likely were at least somewhat aware of the potential consequences.
Know ing more or less what to expect provided the protesters some advantage in terms of
coordination and the ability to strategize in the face of potential government policies of
repression. Furthermore, they could learn and adapt tactics and strategies used in Daraa, such as the use of mosques as a point of mobilization.
In terms of the political constraints, as we have seen the policies of repression in Homs
have been quite high, particularly in terms of casualties. Beginning in June, the demonstrators in
Homs faced security forces, often with live ammunition on a daily basis (Bassel, December 15 –
21, 2011). Costs, however, particularly with regards to the areas which have been under siege by
government security forces for prolonged periods, must be understood as more than just repression in its more measurable, easily quantifiable terms (arrests, disapp earances, deaths). In

74 Homs, other “repressive” responses that limited the protesters ability to participate in collective
action included shortages of basic necessities such as food and water, as well as frequent power
outages (Ferguson, February 8, 2012; The Economist, June 30, 2011). As mentioned previously,
repression, however, should not only be considered as a constraint, but also a factor that may
serve to actually legitimize the struggle of the opposition in some ways. T he invocation of terms
such as “martyr” conveys this; the demonstrators in Homs often shouted “To heave we are going,
martyrs of millions” (Mcevers, August 30, 2011). Even facing mounting repression, activists
often insisted that they would “ protest under any circumstances” (Mcevers, August 30, 2011).
5.2.4 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY
While, as we will continue to see, Syria as a whole, as well as individual regions, lacked
resources – both in terms of networks and methods in which to coordi nate and transmit
information – the regions that began to protest after Daraa did have one usef ul resource at their
disposal: knowledge regarding what the expected response from the regime would be.
MOBILIZING STRUCTURES: In the absence of formal networks, the resident s of Homs likely
utilized other less formal ties to coordinate and recruit. Strong tribal bonds exist between Sunnis
in rural areas of the city, especially in the districts of Baba Amr, Al -Khalediya, Bab Al -Sebaa,
Al-Bayada, Deir Baalba, Bab Hud and Bab Al -Dreeb (Bassel, December 15 -21, 2011) .

75 5.2.5 PROTEST WAVES
5.2.5.1 HEIGHTENED CONFLICT
Applying Tarrow’s (1993) description of protest waves to Homs, we see that, like in Daraa, the
capital of Homs (as well as most of the re gion) exhibited the feature of “heightened conflict” as
the protests grew a nd the Syrian regime, increasing their coercive response, entered into a highly
confrontational exchange with the opposition movement. The Syrian government attempted to
quell the uprising through repression, as well as cutting off electricity and food supplies (BBC,
March 12, 2012). Homs is the third largest city and an important link to modes of transportation
in the country, so this fact explains, to a degree, the regime's heavy -handed approach. The
confrontation, however, continued to escalate as the pe ople of Homs remained resilient, and
increasing numbers of defecting soldiers began to make the city and surrounding areas one of the their primary bases (BBC, March 12, 2012). The intensification of the conflict in Homs led many analysts to describe the s ituation as resemblin g a “civil war” by October 2011 (Shadid, October
1, 2011).
Protesters called themselves “revolutionaries” and, in some cases, took up arms for self –
defense (Shadid, October 1, 2011). As the conflict escalated, assassinations (on both s ides)
became more common and the price of arms skyrocketed; in some areas of Homs rifles cost as much as $2,000 apiece (Shadid, October 1, 2011).

76 Figure 6: Intensified Conflict: Civilian deaths in Homs by month

(source Huma n Rights Watch, November 2011)
5.2.5.2 GEOGRAPHIC AND SECTORAL DISPERSION
The second feature, broad sectorial and geographic extension, seems to be applicable, at least in
terms of the geographic scope of the protests. The first protest in Homs was on March 18th, just
shortly after protest erupted in Daraa (Human Rights Watch, November 2011) and like Tarrow's
model (1993) predicts, protest first erupted in major urban centers and gradually spread. Protest initially spread to other urban centers like Tal Kala kh and Rastan (Human Rights Watch,
November 2011; my data), and later to less urbanized areas including Tadmor (Palmyra) (my data). However, as in the previous case, lack of information regarding the demographics of the protesters makes it difficult to as certain whether protest diffusion also spread through different
segments of society.
5.2.5.3 EMERGING ORGANIZATIONS
Tarrow’s third element, the appearance of new social movements and the strengthening of older ones, is not entirely applicable due to the absence of organizations at the start of the protest

77 cycle. Homs, however, is one case where organizations began to emerge relatively quickly. In
Bab Sba', for example, residents be gan to organize themselves in “ local defense committees” and
worked to obtain arms, and in some cases rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) (Human Rights
Watch, November 2011). The explanation of this may be based on the degree of repression the
capital and surrounding areas faced, as well as the fact that defected soldiers tended to gravitat e
to this region (Bassel, December 15 -21, 2011). Therefore mounting repression, as well as the
presence of soldiers who were accustomed to operating within the framework of an organization,
may have facilitated this early emergence of organizations. The pr esence of the FSA in Homs
also served as an important coordinating mechanism, offering at least some protection to protest
and thus making it less costly. Its presence may have initially been important in convincing some
Syrians who had previously not joined with the opposition due to the high costs (i.e. risk of death and capture). Although Syrian forces gradually gained the upper hand in their clashes with the FSA, the protection provided with the FSA may have triggered a cascade effect, allowing more risk-adverse individuals to join the protest.
5.2.5.4 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES
In terms of new “master frames,” identity, symbols and ideas played a critical role in Homs as
they did elsewhere throughout the region. Identity has also been at the for efront of protests in
Homs, particularly in terms of emphasizing the peaceful nature of the (majority of) protesters
(Al-Jazeera, December 28, 2011), in light of the government's continual accusations that they
were “terrorists” and “armed thugs” (Bassel, December 15 -21, 2011 ). In this way, a continual
tug-of-war is evident between how the government attempted to depict the people of Homs and
how they simultaneously attempted to configure their own identities.

78 While attempting to both establish and defend t heir non- violent tactics of dissent, the
opposition movement also tried to emphasize that, in Homs at least, the uprisings were not
disintegrating into sectarian conflict. In fact, some analysts have pointed out that citizens of
diverse religious and ethni c backgrounds have maintained considerable “social cohesion” (BBC,
March 12, 2012) and protesters chanted, “Muslims, Christians and Alawites are one” and waved
crosses (The Economist, July 21, 2011). In July 2011, several prominent Alawite figures
distribu ted statements condemning the damage done to Sunni shops by security forces (The
Economist, July 21, 2011). Additionally, while the opposition in Daraa emphasized tribal
identity, protesters in Homs have capitalized on their Arab and Islamic identity, part icularly their
links to important Islamic sites (‘Knight of Hama’, 2011). In this way, protesters utilized familiar symbols and identity to justify their struggle against the regime.
Homs was also one of the first cities where pictures of Assad were comm only torn and
defaced (Bassel, December 15 -21, 2011); a particularly grave crime in a country where Assad's
image is ubiquitous. By utilizing symbols that were imposed on Syrian society, protesters challenged the regime’s legitimacy to serve as representat ives of the Syrian people. Critical
events al so provided an opportunity for framing the struggle. After the death of Hamza al –
Khateeb, the boy became a potent symbol of the government’s repressive response and activists circulated a video of the discovery of his body on YouTube (Stack and Zoepf. June 4, 2011). Such events gave the movement leverage, and protesters chanted ''We won't forgive, we will kill the child killer'' and warned that ''We will continue until your end.'' (Stack and Zoepf. June 4,
2011) .

79 5.2.5.5 REPERTOIRES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
The final feature of Tarrow’s characterization includes innovative forms of collective action. In
Homs, activists utilized tactics they had learned from abroad, such as “Egyptian- style sit -ins”
(New York Times, Events in S yria: A Chronology). They also utilized other tactics to avoid
confrontation with the security forces, such as shouting "Allahu Akbar" (God is Great) in unison
from balconies at night (The Economist, June 4, 2011). In Homs, strikes were also used to
expres s opposition to the regime and their policies in October 2011. S ome strikes even included
the participation of public employees, a very rare occurrence in Syria (Oweis and al -Khalidi,
October 26, 2011).
5.2.6 HOW DO PATTERNS IN HOMS COMPARE TO SYRIA?
Figure 7: Protest Pattern in Homs and Syria

Given the high number of casualties (Figure 6), Homs stands apart from the uprisings in
other regions and the country as a whole. Homs has seen greater degree of repression as well as
great er participation in protests; participants frequently numbered in the tens of thousands
(Bassel, December 15 -21, 2011).

80 As we saw earlier, Homs is also distinct from the rest of Syria, particularly interior
regions, because it shares a border with Lebanon (where many Syrian refugees have fled and
some FSA soldiers operate ), making it somewhat harder for the government to control. The
presence of the FSA in Homs has been an advantage to the protestors (providing them with
resources, protection, and an alr eady established network of opposition) , but has also made the
region a target for the government’s repressive efforts to crush the uprising. Furthermore, the
government can argua bly be more “ justified ” in its severe respon se and use of violence because
it can monopolize on the fact that in this region it is, in a sense, in conflict with armed protesters
(the FSA), regardless of the fact that the FSA, at least for some periods, was not launching an
offensive campaign, but rather trying to protect the protes ters (Al -Jazeera, "Syria: The People
Awake").
Finally, like in Daraa, the people of Homs can be distinguished from their Syrian
counterparts in terms of the threshold level required to propel them to engage in collective
action. In Daraa the arrest of yo uths sparked protest, while the people of Homs began to protest
only days after the initial mobilization in Daraa, driven by both opposition to the regime and solidarity with their fellow countrymen and women in Daraa (Al-Jazeera, "Interactive: Timeline
of Syria Unrest", March 23, 2012). Lower thresholds in both of these regions helped set off a
spiral of co llective action throughout the country. Other regions, however, remained largely
immune to large -scale mobilization for longer periods, as shall be illustrated below.

81 5.3 ALEPPO
The city of Aleppo, the capital of the province, was est imated to have a population of four
million people (Bsyria, February 21, 2012) and is the largest city in Syria. Along with Damascus,
Aleppo is considered Syria's economic cent er, home to both a large business community and a
prosperous merchant class (CBS, February 10, 2012). The city is known historically for its important trading role, both in the country and region (Abd- Allah, 1983). The economy of
Aleppo is driven by textil es, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, agro -processing industries, electrical
manufacturing, alcoholic beverages, engineering, the manufacturing of metals and stones, and
tourism. I t is also the country's dominant manufacturing center, with more than 50%
manufact uring employment (Aleppo City Development Strategy, November 14, 2010).
While other regions of the country have struggled economically more recently , Aleppo is
distinct for its economic revival partially due to its proximity to Turkey (Abdulrahim, August 7,
2011). Due to the province’s fertile lands, the region has also been known for being a highly productive agricultural zone (Aleppo City Development Strategy, November 14, 2010), though recent droughts have taken a toll there as well. Outside of the cit y and within the province of
Aleppo, crop failures and drought have had a powerful impact, resulting in the exodus of more
than 200,000 villagers from the region into various cities (Femia and Werrell, February 29,
2012).
During French colonial role (1920- 1946), as well as the following two decades, local
Sunni landowning families dominated the city, as well as the region’s politics, though this monopoly on both economic and political power was undermined due the land reforms initiated by the Ba’ath Party (Dumper and Stanley, 2007). Like most regions of Syria, the population is
predominantly Sunni Muslim, Aleppo also has significant Christian and Alawites minorities

82 (Dumper and Stanley, 2007). Although it is commonly stated that Christians comprise about
12% of the population in Aleppo, some have argued the number is probably closer to 3%
(roughly 100,000 Christians) (Ehsani, February 18, 2012).
5.3.1 PROTEST AND OPPOSITION HISTORY
Despite the region’s relatively minor showing of dissent against the Assad regime, the capital
has traditionally played an important role in various opposition movements, including resistance to French colonial rule . Throughout the period of 1920 – 1923, the French were faced with
significant insurgency movements in Aleppo (saylor.org, 2012). When the Syrian Revolt erupted in Southern Syria in 1925, the French held elections in Aleppo aimed at leading to the break- up
of the union with Damascus and restoring the independence of the Aleppo State. After pro-French politicians of Aleppo led t he French to believe that the people of Aleppo were supportive
of such a decision, the French came to believe that they could successfully exploit traditional rivalries between the two cities (Abd -Allah, 1983). When a new council was elected, however,
they voted to maintain the union with Damascus due to the efforts of Syrian nationalists who had
conducted a large anti -secession campaign, mobilizing the people of Aleppo against the plan
(saylor. org, 2012).
Historically, the region of Aleppo has been perceived throughout Syria as only being
second behind Hama as one of the most rebellious areas of the country. Aleppo was central in the revolt against Hafez al -Assad's regime in the early 1980s and came in only behind Ha ma as the
region with the most “disappearances” by the security forces (Bsyria, February 21, 2012). In this
period, residents of Aleppo protested against the regime and in support of the Muslim Brotherhood, though the Syrian security forces quickly repressed such acts, and cordoned off the

83 city of Aleppo in search for Sunni Muslim extremists resulting in numerous deaths, injuries, and
arrests (Van Dam, 1996). During the massacre of Hama in 1982, merchants in Aleppo attempted
to strike in solidarity with their fellow citizens in Hama, th ough the strike was called off after
Hafiz al -Assad personally threatened to hang them outside of their shops (Abd- Allah, 1983).
5.3.2 CURRENT EVENTS
Aleppo has been one of the quietest regions of Syria during the uprisings, with the exception of
a few protest s at the governorate’s main university and several small Friday protests (Bsyria,
February 21, 2012). The most active areas in Aleppo, with the exception of the protests at the University, have been mainly concentrated in the region's poorer neighborhoods, such as
Fardous, Marjeh, and Sakhour where people have been protesting on a fairly regular basis (Bsyria, February 21, 2012). Kurdis h regions have also been fairly active (my data).
Nevertheless, the region still trails significantly behind protest hubs s uch as Homs, Idlib, Daraa,
and Hama.
A common explanation of why the opposition of Aleppo failed to mobilize significant
numbers of protesters is linked to the prosperity the region enjoyed under Bashar al -Assad's rule.
The government’s recent policies of economic liberalization have benefited Syria's "economic capital" (Bsyria, February 21, 2012). As one analyst explains, "A growing Aleppan elite felt it owed its prosperity to the stability the regime provided. Given Syria's rampant corruption, money and politics are intertwined – and most of Aleppo's upper crust, especially those who have
become rich in recent years, have ties to the government that the revolution threatens to shatter" (Bsyria, February 21, 2012).

84 Another factor may be the size of the ci ty and surrounding areas. With a population of
four million, Aleppo lacks the kind of social cohesion that existed in smaller areas such as Daraa,
which facilitated organization and some protection against the government's ubiquitous
intelligence service ( Bsyria, February 21, 2012). As has been demonstrated for other regions, in
the absence of established networks and organizations, personal networks play a critical role in recruiting more protesters and in coordinating collective action. The sheer size of the city may
put a strain on the trust necessary for such personal networks to facilitate protest. This issue was
made evident when Aleppo's local coordination committees, the grassroots networks which help
to organize the protests, were infiltrated and br oken -up (Bsyria, February 21, 2012).
There is another explanation linking the size of a city to the amount of protest activity.
While Tarrow (1993) predicts that protest tends to move from the city to the less urbanized areas, both the factors discussed above, as well as other findings that support the idea that the stronger the bonds between people the more likely collective action can easily be facilitated (Snow and
Oliver, 1995, 575). Furthermore, Snow and Oliver note that “not only because of residential proximity and network density, but also because people share significant social traits, hold similar beliefs and grievances, and encounter each other during the course of their daily routines” (Oliver and Snow, 1995, 575). It appears that in some case s homogeneity and close bonds may
serve to facilitate collective action, thus further undermining the assertion that protest necessarily spreads from urban to less industrialized areas.
Nevertheless, the explanation of Aleppo’s failure to participate in p rotest cannot be found
entirely in structural or demographic factors, but is also linked to the effectiveness of t he
government’s efforts not to “lose” Aleppo. The government has fought more strategically to
maintain control over Aleppo than they have in other areas. For example, while the shabbiha

85 (loyalist thugs) are predominantly Alawites in other areas, in Aleppo they tend to be Sunni
(Bsyria, February 21, 2012). While loyalty to the regime, in some other regions, has been
associated with Alawites, Christians, and upper -class Sunnis, Aleppo has demonstrate d an
important variation with considerable Sunni support for the regime (New York Times, Events in
Syria: A Chronology; The Washington Post, May 3, 2011; Doucet, October 6, 2011; Alarabiya, October 12, 2011). Furthermore, the region, especially the capital, is believed to be under heavy
surveillance, even prior to the initial outbreak of protest in Daraa (Abdulrahim, August 7, 2011).
5.3.3 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES
While the events in the Arab world provided an opportunity for the people of Daraa to express
their dissent and mobilize , and while the events in Daraa provided the people of Homs with the
crucial information that there were others in Syria who opposed the regime, Aleppo should be
understood as a case of constraints, in which opportunity was either not present or failed to be
perceived as such. Constraints were more important in this case. The idea of uprising was associated with considerable financial costs for segments of the population in Aleppo, na mely
those who had benefited financially from ties to the regime – either indirectly through the
regime’s political liberalization policies, or less directly due to corruption. One analyst points out that the people of Aleppo have “been made complacent by government enticements”
(Abdulrahim, August 7, 2011). Other important pay -offs to deter dissent include d: “Construction
code enforcement has all but disappeared as the city witnesses an illegal construction boom; electricians, plumbers and tile workers who have been unemployed for years are now barely able
to keep up with the work. Roads in need of repair for years have been repaved. Traffic laws, which had become more strict, are no longer implemented. People steal electricity with no

86 repercussions” (Abdul rahim, August 7, 2011). In Aleppo, basic food stuff also tended to be
cheaper, bribery was far less common than in other regions, and restrictions on street vendors
were very lax (Abdulrahim, August 7, 2011).
However, financial payoffs do not explain the entire picture. As mentioned before,
Aleppo has been tightly controlled by heavy surveillance and the presence of security forces for
some time (Abdulrahim, August 7, 2011). This trend increased after the initial mobilization in
Daraa. As one resident note d, "The security people out on the streets now outnumber the regular
people." (Abdulrahim, August 7, 2011). Furthermore, factory and business employees were
faced with the threat of losing their jobs if they joined the protests (Abdulrahim, August 7, 2011) . Thus, the people of Aleppo may have perceived the government’s preventative, heavy –
handed policies of interference on any attempt to mobilize , which further served to discourage
public displays of opposition. In fact, perhaps the most likely indicator of what the regime’s
response to an Aleppo uprising would be can be seen in the extremely high costs suffered by the
people of Homs. Many analysts have pointed out that while places like Daraa present a threat to the regime, the Assad government would likely not survive if faced with large -scale opposition
movements in the country’s three major cities – Aleppo, Damascus and Homs (Black, March 19,
2012; Abdulrahim, August 7, 2011).
One could also argue that Aleppo was even more important to the Assad regime t han
other cities, not only due to its size, but also due to the fact that it is undeniably the "economic center where much of the money flows" and is home to most of the country's factories, textile plants, and pharmaceutical companies (Abdulrahim, August 7, 2011). Another factor that served
as an i mportant constraint in Aleppo was the absence of eli tes siding with the opposition
movement. In Daraa, for example, both Ba’ath party members and religious leaders sided with

87 the protesters relatively early on in to the protest trajecto ry, while in Aleppo this wasn’t the case.
In fact, rather than simply st aying neutral, different elites , most notably religious leaders, have
come out in support of the government. Most religious leaders in Aleppo are followers of the
country's Sunni Muslim mufti, Ahmed Hassoun, who has called the protests "mischief"
(Abdulrahim, August 7, 2011).
5.3.4 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY
While Aleppo faced many of the resource shortages as seen elsewhere in the country, both in
terms of establis hed organizations and modes in which to organize and coordinate, the situation
was further compounded by the fact that the city and surrounding areas had an “overwhelming presence” of security agents, informants and spies (Abdulrahim, August 7, 2011). Such a
presence greatly hindered communications and the ability to form organizations or networks of activists. As seen above, because the religious establishment of Aleppo remained largely loyal to
the Assad regime, mosques were not as easily transformed into mobilizing structures from which
to launch collective action, differing significantly from Homs and Daraa.
5.3.5 PROTEST WAVES
Given the fact that there is not necessarily a cycle of which to speak in Aleppo, particularly in my main period of interest (March -October 2011 ) I do not apply this model to Aleppo.

88 5.3.6 HOW DO PATTERNS IN ALEPPO COMPARE TO SYRIA?
Figure 8: Protest Patterns in Aleppo and Syria

While in comparison to Daraa and Homs, it may appear that Aleppo is an anomaly; it is not the
only region to have relatively limited protest activity. The province of Al -Raqqah, in the north of
the country and to the west of Aleppo, also experienced very little protest activity, as well as the
province of Suweida to the south which is primarily populated by Druze and also has a sizable
Christian community (Al- Jazeera, Interactive: Timeline of Syria Unrest. March 29, 2012). For
this reason, rather than being viewed as an exception to the rule, Aleppo should be viewed as a model of the constraints facing the people of Syria in mobilizing in opposition to the regime. The failure to mobilize in Aleppo is crucial for understanding why. This is due, in part, to the failure of large cities, such as Aleppo and Damascus, to rise up against the Ass ad government to the
same degree as the people in Egypt did in Cairo, as well as the fact that Assad, whether through bribery, fear of the unknown, or genuine support, managed to still maintain backing from some segments of Syrian society.
Another way in which Aleppo differs from the rest of Syria, especially the two other
regions previously examined, is in how the government has responded to the protests that have occurred there. Protests in Aleppo have largely ended in significant numbers of arrests (my own

89 data) while protests in Daraa and Homs have been met with high numbers of deaths (my data).
While this refers more to the government’s position in the protest cycle, it is also a reflection of
what was suggested earlier: that t he government cannot afford to “lose” Aleppo. It appears that
the government utilized far more repressive tactics and regions where they doubted they could
either quell the protest movement entirely or win back support (i.e. Homs and Daraa), while in Aleppo arrests may have been u tilized with the fear that more extreme measures (i.e. deaths)
may have cost the regime supporters.
5.4 DAMASCUS
Damascus is the capital of Syria and is also where the Ba’ath party was founded in 1940 (Van
Dam, 1996). Despite this fact, the Ba’ath party struggled to gain popularity in the capital with the party traditionally appealing more to rural segments of the population outside of the capital (Van Dam, 1996). Damascus has experienced extremely high growth rates over the years, largely due to high levels o f rural -urban migration (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2012). Originally known for
the manufacturing of luxury goods, especially textiles, the city has since attracted many new industries, such as chemical industries, cement works, and food- processing factories
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2012). Although the city is primarily comprised of Sunni Muslims, Alawites (mainly through their presence in the army and intelligence services, al -mukhabarat),
Druze, K urds, Ismailis, Christians, and a small Jewish population ar e also present (Encyclopedia
Britannica, 2012).

90 5.4.1 PROTEST AND OPPOSITION HISTORY
Damascus played an important role in the resistance to French colonial rule, and despite the
devastating French bombardment of the city in 1925, the resistance there continued until early
1927 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2012). Later , as discontent with the union with Egypt spread, a
group of Syrian army officers seized power in Damascus, ultimately dissolving the United Arab
Republic (BBC, “Syria Profile”). During the massacre o f Hama in 1982 the merchants in
Damascus , like the merchants in Aleppo, threatened to strike in solidarity with their fellow
citizens in Hama, though the strike was called off after the regime threatened them (Abd -Allah,
1983). The attempted show of solidarity may hav e come as a surprise to some since Damascus
had suffered casualties due to a violent attack by the Brotherhood in the previous year. In August, September , and November 1981, the Brotherhood carried out three car -bomb attacks
against government and military targets in Damascus, killing hundreds of people, according to
the official press. (BBC, Syria Profile).
Damascus was also the central site of a period of intense political and social debate,
prompted by the ascension of Bashar al -Assad to the presidency after his father's death , which
began in June 2000 and continued until later 2001. Activists were inspired by al -Assad's
inaugural speech , which gave them the impression that political liberalization was on the horizon
(Human Rights Watch, October 17, 2007). Numerous forums (known in Arabic as "muntadat")
and groups sprang up across the capital to foster dialogue concerning human rights and reform in the country, eventually producing a set of demands quite similar to the demands of the opposition movement of 2011 – present. These included the cancelation of the state of
emergency, abolition of martial law and special courts, the release of all political prisoners, and the right to form political parties and civil organizations (Human Rights Watch , October 17,

91 2007). However, the movement was quickly repressed, and many activists were arrested
(Wieland, 2006).
There was little activity among opposition figures after this repressive response until
October 2005, when a group of 250 major opposition figures united to launch the “Damascus
Declaration”, led by pro -democracy act ivist Michel Kilo and Riad Seif. The Damascus
Declaration was critical of the Assad regime but still relatively moderate in the degree in which it
stipulated the strategy of a “gr adual, peaceful” reform (Spyer, October 27, 2011). It was unique
as well as it brought together both leftist activists as well as Islamic activists and was supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, the Kurdish Democratic Alliance, the Syrian Future Party and a number of smaller opposition groups all of which primarily operated abroad (Spyer, October 27, 2011). Although delayed, this action was also met by further repression, when twelve prominent supporters of the declaration received prison sentences in 2008, t hough the Declaration did at
least make clear that opposition, however muted, still did exist in S yria (Spyer, October 27,
2011).
5.4.2 CURRENT EVENTS
Even prior to the events in Daraa, there were some public displays of discontent in Damascus.
On March 15, a sm all gathering of individuals marched in the Syrian capital after a Facebook
page cal led for a “Day of Dignity” followed by a silent gathering the following day when
protesters held up pictures of imprisoned relatives and friends in Marjeh Square in Damascus (Al-Jazeera, "Syria Uprising: Key Events”). This early gatherings were extremely small,
however, and failed to attract the attention of the regime or the international media and it was not

92 until the larger -scale mobilization in Daraa that the idea of a Syrian uprising became more
plausible.
After the first protests in Daraa, protests grew in Damascus and protesters cited one of
their reason s for participating in collective action as a showing of support for the “martyrs” of
Daraa (New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology; Al -Jazeera, "Syria: The People
Awake"). Protests in Damascus continued in the following months, but failed to reach the same
levels as they had in Daraa or they were beginning to reach in Homs. In fact , in the early months
protests and demonstrations in the capital usually did not attract more than several hundred
participants, while rallies in favor of the Assad regime attracted thousands of supporters around
the same time (Muir, M arch 25, 2011). Certain suburbs of Damascus were particularly active,
most notably Douma in the early months of the uprising (New York Times, Events in Syria: A
Chronology).
While the casualties in Damascus were far below the number in other ar eas, especially
Homs and Hama, “disappearances” became common throughout April and May (New York
Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology). In a single night, 300 people were reportedly arrested in a suburb of Damascus, while shortly afterwards, in another suburb, Muadhamiya, another 200 were arrested (BBC, May 5, 2011; BBC, May 9, 2011). Like Aleppo, university students were
active in the opposition movement, and in May 2011 students from the Economics Department staged a sit -in (BBC, May 4, 2011). In Damascus, even as demonstrations of opposition
gradually become more common, several large gatherings in support of Assad continued to
occur, signaling that the President still enjoyed considerable support in the capital (New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology). In July, pro- government demonstrators, as a result of the

93 actions of the ambassadors, attacked American and French embassies in Damascus (New York
Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology ).
Later in the protest cycle more and more individuals began to join anti -regime protests in
the capital, with reports of ten s of thousands of protesters gathering becoming more common by
July 2011 (BBC, July 15, 2011). Nevertheless, the gatherings in Damascus tended to be
extremely brief, with visitors to the capital often failing to find any visible signs of dissent (NPR,
April 25, 2011). The mukhabarat has a strong presence in Damascus and protesters , both in the
city and suburbs , often gathered for only 30 minutes before dispersing as soon as the security
forces appeared (Folkeson, July 17, 2011). Protests were more prevalent in certain suburbs. In
Midan, protesters turned out every Friday without fail, even in the face of security forces who used tear gas, batons, and electric cattle prods to break up the protests (BBC, June 18, 2011). During the month of Ramadan 2011 (Augus t), protests that were once more common primaril y
in the suburbs of the capital became more common in the center of the city (Joshi, August 30,
2012). While protests continued to grow during Ramadan, after having lessened briefly in some areas, Damascus continued to fail to have a critical mass of opposition with some analysts pointing to the business class's re luctance to join the opposition as one of the principal causes
(Joshi, August 30, 2011).

5.4.3 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES
If opportunities, as conceptuali zed by McAdam (1996), existed in Damascus, they were far more
prevalent in the mid -2000s when the opposition still remained relatively active and some high
level officials broke with the Assad regime (Wieland, 2006). By the time protest emerged in

94 Daraa in March, Damascus had experienced nearly six years devoid of any significant opposition
or disse nt. While in other cases I argued that opportunities in the region must also be considered,
the burgeoning protest movement that was spreading through Arab count ries seemed to fall short
of producing anything similar in the capital, particularly when a call to mobilize in Damascus
failed to attract participants in February 2011(Al -Jazeera, February 9, 2011). Even once protest
spread to Syrian towns and cities, protest in Damascus remained sporadic, brief, and largely
concentrated either outside the capital or in certain suburbs. There are several factors that
explain this, and in Damascus constraints seemed to be far more prevalent than opportunities.
Damascus, l ike Aleppo, was starkly divided between pro -regime and anti -regime
individuals with pro- Assad demonstrations often attracting far greater participation (New York
Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology; The Washington Post, May 3, 2011). Reporters often
noted that in Damascus residents, even those who were against the regime, were under the
impression that Assad still enjoyed broad popular support (The Washington Post, May 3, 2011). This may be seen as a constraint not only because it erodes trust, making it m ore difficult to
coordinate and mobilize , but also because a potential dissident may never be sure if he is
confronted with an Assad supporter or not. Secondly, if individuals do have certain thresholds
when it comes to the individual choice to protest, la rge showings in support of the president and
smalle r gatherings against the regime may have done little to persuade individuals currently on
the fence to support the opposition movement.
Another critical constraint in the case of Damascus, like in Aleppo, has been a significant
security presence (Folkeson, July 17, 2011). Even when anti -regime protests in Damascus were
muted, it was common to see a bevy of security men standing on street corners, dressed in riot gear and carrying batons, while plain- clothe d intelligence forces, known as the Mukhabarat,

95 were prevalent in buses, holding clubs or guns (FT, June 2, 2011). Additionally, while the
presence of state -controlled media is present throughout the country, journalists pointed out that
the media seemed to have a stronger presence in Damascus and appeared to be more influential
(The Washington Post, May 3, 2011).
On the part of the regime , such a decision was log ical; they could not afford to “lose”
major cities such as Damascus and Aleppo. This policy m ay also be reflected in a tactic
employed by the regime – a high number of arrests in Aleppo and Damascus, and a high number
of deaths in other others (my data). While I argued earlier that repression may be a type of
opportunity insofar as it transmits important information both about the movement as well as about the regime, perhaps arrests and deaths differ in their effect because high levels of arrests did not seem to set off the same sort of domino effect (my data). There are several possible explanati ons for this: 1) arrests of political dissidents is fairly common in Syria (Al- Jazeera,
February 9, 2011; Wieland, 2006) , therefore they may not have the same shock effect as the
killing of protesters, and thus, not create the same sense of rage or solidar ity; 2) arrests like
“disappearances” is “uncertain harm”; and 3) the regime’s policy of arresting and then pardoning political prisoners (New York Times, Events in Syria: A Chronology) may have caused arrests to have a very delayed effect. Friends and fam ilies may have decided to wait and see the outcome
of the arrested protesters before acting in fear and staying home or in outrage and continuing the protests.
5.4.4 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY
Unlike many of the other regions previously analyzed, Damascus, es pecially the capital, did have
some active organi zations that opposed the regime. It is worth noting, however, that most of

96 these organizations are human rights organizations which are quite small and do not exert much
influence, like the Damascus Center f or Human Rights Studies and the National Organization for
Human Rights in Syria. While useful insofar as they provided coverage of the events, there is no
evidence that they were active in launching or organizing protest.
Personal networks and linkages be tween friends, family and co -workers seemed to have
played an important role in both Homs and Daraa; Damascus, however, like Aleppo, did not
seem to exhibit this phenomenon. This may indicate that more densely populated areas were not
able to foster the cr ucial inter -personal ties that helped to overcome the lack of established
networks and organizations. However, the protest movement in Homs (the city) and Hama (the
city) seemed to overcome this problem , therefore it is worth questioning why the people of
Damascus were not also able to overcome this obstacle. It was not as if efforts were not made to overcome this obstacle. Protesters from Douma would come door -to-door attempting to recruit
more protest participants (The Washington Post, May 3, 2011). The s heer size of the population
in and of itself does not provide a convincing explanation, but rather, the strength and size of
pro-Assad supporters (as well as extensive surveillance) may have further discouraged people to
actively oppose the Assad regime or join protests. This raises an important question: is
preemptive repression more effective than coercion after the fact? Both Aleppo and Damascus seem to give weight to this notion.
Like elsewhere, mosques have provided a site for coordination, as well as recruitment, in
the absence of well -established networks of activists. The Ummayad mosque in Damascus was
important and served as one of the first venues for demonstrations directly after Friday prayers (Pierret, 2012). Though the interplay between government and opposition can be seen h ere, as
mosques were gradually “neutralized” (sic) as the Assad regime created “mosque committees” –

97 groups recruited to fill mosques and break up subsequent demonstrations on Fridays (Pierret,
2012). Such individuals were drawn from the city’s vast civil service sector and were ordered to
attend prayers and after the conclusion of the prayers, shout pro- regime slogans, while others
were assigned to guard outside to break up any potential demonstration (FT, June 2, 2011). In
Damascus, however, some mosques escaped the vigilance of the regime, particularly al -Rifai in
Kafr Souseh and al -Hasan in Midan (Pierret, 2012). In fact the Hasan mosque would eventually
become a key symbol of anti -regime resistance (Pierret, 2012). This factor may be key in
explaining the failure of th e people of Aleppo and Damascus. I n the absence of both established
networks and organizations, as well as the ability to utilize personal ties in their place,
mobilizing structures were critical. If most mosque s, however, were robbed of the safety they
offered in other regions, it would have been very difficult to launch large -scale collective action.
Like other protest movements throughout the country, the activists in Damascus attacked
stalwart symbols o f Assad and Baath Party control. For example, hackers managed to take
control of the website for Tishreen, a state -owned newspaper that had been towing the regime’s
line concerning the nature of the protests (The Washington Post, May 3, 2011). By attacking one
of the regime’s mouthpieces, the protesters tried to seize the upper -hand in the tug -of-war of
collective identity that we have seen elsewhere. Hackers also managed to broadcast revolutionary music and songs on the website for the Syrian parliament, a gain seizing a symbol
of Ba’ath and Assad control (The Washington Post, May 3, 2011). In Damascus, protesters also transformed the Baathist mantra: “God, Syria, Bashar – that’s enough” into “God, Syria,
freedom —that’s enough” (Foreign Policy, March 18, 2011).
The framin g tug-of-war in Damascus was not only between the regime and the
opposition, but also among the opposition and pro- Assad supporters. This can be seen in how

98 both sides defined “freedom” . While anti -Assad protesters commonly chanted “Freedom! ” along
with the common refrain of “Down with the regime!” (Doucet, October 6, 2011), pro- regime
demonstrators painted a “free Syria” is one free of foreign intervention, chanting “America, out,
out, Syria will stay free,” and warnings to the European Union not to intervene while carrying
pictures of Assad and the Syrian flag (Alarabiya, October 12, 2011). Amid accusations that the anti-Assad protesters were armed gangs and terrorists, people waved mobile phones in the air,
shouting , "The camera is our weapon."(Doucet, October 6, 2011), while other protesters held
signs saying "No Terrorism, we want freedom" (FT, June 2, 2011).
5.4.5 PROTEST WAVES
5.4.5.1 HEIGHTENED CONFLICT
Much like the case of Aleppo, Dama scus failed to clearly exhibit heightened conflict during the
region’s protest wave. However, during the month of Ramadan (as well as the preceding month-
(Holmes, July 22, 2011), protest did spread to a degree (Joshi, August 30, 2012). The increase of
protest that occurred in this period was also accompanied with an increase in repressive tactics as
violence escalated (FT, August 28, 2011). For example, at the Al -Rifai mosque in Kafr Souse,
security forces, in an attempt to break up a burgeoning protest in the mosque and nearby square,
fired live rounds and teargas, w hile beating the mosque’s imam (FT, August 28, 2011). The
violence, towards the end of the period of analysis for this study, threatened to escalate further as
defections from the Syrian army was reported in Damascus (Al -Ahram, September 29 -October 5,
2011).

99 5.4.5.2 GEOGRAPHIC AND SECTORAL DISPERSION
The second feature of Tarrow’s (1993) model was not evident in the case of Damascus.
However, patterns indicate that protest did disperse among sectors of society to a degree. Early
protests were primarily in workin g-class neighborhoods (Rosen, February 13, 2012) and at
universities (Kunkle, April 11, 2011), examples of “traditional” protest participants. Protests, as
they gradually spread, began to include more diverse groups of individuals, including middle –
class professionals (FT, June 2, 2011). Geographically, protest di d spread from the city to towns.
However, the protests in the cities were not concentrated within the capital, but rather more
common in several suburbs , such as Douma (FT, June 2, 2011), and gradually spread to smaller
towns outside of the capital, such as Yabroud, al -Kiswah, and Darayya (my data).
5.4.5.3 EMERGING ORGANIZATIONS
There is little evidence of old organizations being involved in the early stages of protest, and a
lack of information of ‘new’ organizations emerging later. While personal networks and ties
were relevant in the case of Homs and Daraa, there seems to be little evidence that this was the case in Damascus.
5.4.5.4 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES
The mobilization that did occur in Damascus appeare d to rely heavily on fostering a sense of
collective identity and framing the collective action in a way in which protesters hoped would
attract broader support. While protesters in Homs had often emphasized their religious identity ,
and in Daraa there was a stronger emphasis on tribal identity, the protesters in Damascus
emphasized s olidarity with other protesters, especially those in Daraa. In late March, protestors
chanted “Our souls, our blood, we sacrifice for you, Daraa!” while several activists insis ted that

100 they would not “forget the martyrs of Daraa” (Karam, March 25, 2011). The protest movement
in Damascus was more likely to embrace a broader collective identity, emphasizing the inclusive
nature of the protest movement and unity among disparate groups. At the Umayyad Mosque
protesters carried signs with a crescent and a cross (Weiss, July 5, 2011).
5.4.5.5 REPERTOIRES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
As seen above, the protest movemen t in Damascus resorted to both conventional and
unconventional tactics as the movemen t’s strategies evolved. The movement hacked both state –
owned newspapers and government websites (The Washington Post, May 3, 2011). Night protests, an evolving tactic prevalent elsewhere, appears to have originated in Damascus and
were frequently utilized by August 2011 (Macleod and Flamand, August 22, 2011). This tactic emerged in response to the fact that secret police, like most government employees, tend to work until 3 P .M. in Syria (Macleo d and Flamand, August 22, 2011) . For this reason, protesters w ould
use the afternoon to rest and emerge for more sustained protest activity in the night (Macleod and Flamand, August 22, 2011). Such tactical innovation is important because , as Tarrow (1993)
notes , protest movements must often make -up for their relati ve disadvantage in the face of the
regime through tactical innovation.

101 5.4.6 HOW DO PATTERNS IN DAMASCUS COMPARE TO SYRIA?
Figure 9: Protest Patterns in Damascus and Syria

Despite the fact that the capital failed to gather crit ical mass at either early or intermediary points
in the protest trajectory, it is actually, for this same reason, relatively representative of the
patterns in Syria. In the same way in which Syria has pockets that have been extremely active in the protest movement (Homs, for example) , the country also has areas that have seen very few
protests (i.e. Suweida, al -Hasaqah). Damascus is symbolic in this sense with reporters who have
visited the city, often noting on how life seemed relatively “normal” in the ce nter of Damascus,
while some suburbs were under complete lock- down (FT, June 2, 2011). Douma and al -Midan,
for example, have both been quite active during the protest period (FT, June 2, 2011; BBC, June 18, 2011).
Damascus, however, is different than othe r regions in several important respects.
Damascus is wealthier than most parts of the country and property prices in some areas are similar to those in large European cities (The Washington Post, May 3, 2011). Furthermore, there is also a prevalent tendenc y for upper -class families in Damascus to “look down on country
folk.” These are opinions that existed even prior to the formation of the state while families were
still divided into tribes (The Washington Post, May 3, 2011). While such sentiments certainly do

102 not permeate all societal segments of Damascus, dismissing protesters as “rural” or “uneducated”
(The Economist, June 4, 2011) does little to inspire a sense of solidarity or facilitate the abilit y to
see how their claims could come to be shared by S yria as a whole. As mentioned previously, the
diffusion of protest is as much about accepting the claimants as it is about accepting the claims.
Furthermore , those in the country’s larger cities have tended to benefit economically to a greater
degree from recent economic liberalization and government reforms than those in rural areas
(FT, June 2, 2011), thus effectively co -opting dissent to some degree. Other analysts have noted
that even among those who harbor opposition to the Assad regime, stability is preferable to the
uncertainty of a post -Assad Syria (FT, June 2, 2011).
5.5 HAMA
Hama, the capital of the province by the same name, is Syria's fourth largest city with a population of nearly 700,000 people. Hama is reputed to be the most conservative Sunni Muslim city in Syria since French Mandate times. During that period there was an old saying reflecting this characteristic: "In Damascus, it takes only three men to make a political demonstration, while in Hama it takes only three men to get the town to pray (Dumper and Stanley, 2007, pg.
164). Some have chosen to explain the region’s religious tendencies as an extension of the relative isolation in which the inhabitants live, surrounded by the Orontes Val ley (Dumper and
Stanley, 2007). In the province, durin g the mid -1990s, Sunnis comprised about 67% of the
population, while there were also sizable Isma’ilis (13.2%) and Greek Orthodox Christians (11%) communities (Van Dam, 1996). There are some areas of the province that are almost
entirely Christian (Dumper and Stanley, 2007). Hama has been most well -known historically for

103 agricultural production (Dumper and Stanley, 2007). The area has also been a site of some
manufacturing, particularly of textiles.
5.5.1 PROTEST AND OPPOSITION HISTORY
Historically, Hama was als o associated with some of the greatest latifundias (estates) in the
country , which were controlled by several wealthy families (Dumper and Stanley, 2007). In the
1930s, of Hama's 114 villages, only four were owned by the local cultivators who owned the
land, while the rest were owned by several families (Dumper and Stanley, 2007). This significant
disparity in land holdings resulted in conflict starting in the late 1940s as agricultural workers began to mobilize, led by Akram Hawrani, and demanded land refo rm and better social
conditions (Dumper and Stanley, 2007). The party he founded, however, was eventually subsumed under the Ba ’ath umbrella.
The city of Hama, and the surrounding areas, has been a central site of anti -Ba'ath
opposition since the 1960s. By 1964, as some Muslims began to see specific Ba’ath policies as anti-Islam, protests led by local leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood broke out in Hama and
maintained momentum for nearly a month, though they were ultimately crushed by the government who re sponded by sending in tanks and troops (Dumper and Stanley, 207; Ziaden,
2011; Pipes, 1996). The government’s response ultimately increased the polarization between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime, particularly when the s ecurity forces decided to break up a
sit-in in the al -Sultan mosque, violating the sanctity of the space (Ziaden, 2011). The
government, in the hopes that future unrest could also be crushed, decided to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood that same year. T he decision, however, was followed by strikes and mass

104 demonstrations throughout many of Syria’s major cities, especially in Hama, though such acts of
civil disobedience were again quickly crushed (Seale, 1988).
5.5.2 CURRENT EVENTS
A protest movement in Hama did not directly take root, even af ter collective action in Daraa,
Homs, and other areas of Syria. In fact, the first large -scale mobilization in Hama did not occur
until April 22, 2011, nearly a month after the initial outbreak of protest in Daraa (Macleod and
Flamand, July 10, 2011). The protest movement gradually grew in Hama, and the regime’s
initial attempts to enter the capital of the governorate, Hama, was thwarted, forcing the security forces to withdraw in early June 2011, after only several days (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011; Shadi d, July 1, 2011). The reasons for the government’s swift withdrawal remain unclear
(Shadid, July 1, 2011). Analysts suggested that the government was concerned with giving the international community the perception that they would conduct another large -scale massacre o f
civilians as they had in 1982. H owever, repressive tactics were still the norm in their “brief
military operation” in the city. For example, a crowd of 50,000 protesters carrying flowers was
shot at with live ammunition, resulting in the death of 67 individuals in a single day on June 3, 2011 (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011).
The protest movement in Hama has been unique not only in respect to the absence of
security forces, but also in its ability to attract some of the largest crowds that Syria has seen in
this period of analysis, from tens of thousands to half a million participants (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011; Estrin and Furst, July 19, 2011). The already s ubstantial crowds
received a boost in June and July 2011 as the lack of security personnel and the tacit support of
the governor, Ahmed Abdul -Aziz, lessened the costs of mobilization. President Assad removed

105 Abdul -Aziz, however, in July 2011 (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011). It was commonly
believed that the governor’s refusal to condone repressive tactics and his practice of going door –
to-door to meet residents, combined with the increased growth of protest in Hama, led to his
dismissal (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011). The opposition responded with large
demonstrations of 400,000 protesters in the city’s central square (Macleod and Flamand, July
10, 2011). This was believed to be the largest protest gathering since the start of the protest
wave (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011). In the same month, the protest movement received
a boost in morale when U.S. ambassador, Robert Ford, visited Hama (Al -Jazeera, August 3,
2011). Ford’s actions, which broke with official protocol, were condemned by Syrian officials
who accused him of “inciting instabilit y” (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011). The buoyant
mood in Hama did not, however, last long, and by the start of Ramadan in late July, the Syrian
army entered Hama and began what would become a prolonged assault on the city and
surrounding areas (Al -Jazeera, August 3, 2011).
The following months were marked by intensified conflict and clashes with the Syrian
government relying on mass arrests, killings, and house raids in an attempt to squelch the movement (Reuters, September 1, 2011). The death toll mounted and arrests were estimated to be in the hundreds (Reuters, September 1, 2011). After it was reported that 420 bodies were found in mass graves in public parks, the attorney general of Hama, Adnan Mohammad al –
Bakkour, resigned from his post in oppositi on via a YouTube video (Reuters, September 1,
2011) , as the protest movement continued to spread and grow, peaking in September, briefly
dying down, and spiking again at the end of this period of analysis (my data),

106 5.5.3 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES
Hama is one case where political opportunities, as conceptualized by Tarrow (1993) are
applicable, seen in both the presence of a relatively sympathetic governor, Abdul -Aziz, and later,
in the resignation of attorney general, al -Bakkhour (Yacoub Oweis, September 1, 2011; Macleod
and Flamand, July 10, 2011). As Tarr ow (1993) suggests, such events help to further legitimize
the protesters’ claims and offer important allies. Another important opportunity, though distinct
from the opportunities as conceptualized by Tarrow (1993) and McAdam (1996) is the fact that
security forces did not have a sustained presence in Hama until nearly three months into the
protest wave. This presented a crucial opportunity because it reduced the cost of protest and
allowed the movement to both coordinate openly and more easily recruit other participants. The critical obstacle of Hama – the massacre of 1982 – seemed less likely to repeat itself due to such
favorable developments.
However , opportunities eventually morphed into constraints, as the Syrian army entered
Hama on July 31, 2011, killing dozens and wounding hundreds (Abouzeid, August 1, 2011).
While such actions marked the increase of significant obstacles to mobilization, as mentioned previously, such a response on the part of the governm ent may serve as an opportunity insofar as
it conveys information about the regime’s true nature. Furthermore, in the case of Hama, such policies of severe repression may have contributed to greater out rage based on the region’s past
experiences with gover nment policies of repression.
Finally , regional events, including both the downfall and eventu al killing of President
Qaddafi of Libya , injected new -found enthusiasm and hope in the protest movement; after
Qaddafi’s death protests surged in Hama as partici pants chanted "Gadhafi is gone, your turn is
coming, Bashar," (Kennedy, October 21, 2011). Such events were critical to the oppos ition in

107 Syria during this time -period. Other influential regional events, such as the uprisings in Tunisia
and Egypt, had res ulted in far more rapid, and arguably less costly , protest trajectories for the
oppositions movements. In Syria, the prolonged nature of the movement threatened to dampen
enthusiasm and commitment as the outcome remained uncertain. When the Libyan opposit ion
movement achieved its short-term aims of ousting Qaddafi after a prolonged struggle , which had
led to a civil war, to the opposition movement in Hama, and throughout the country, such an
outcome further reinforced the possible efficacy of the movement in Syria.
5.5.4 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY
While opportunities played a significant role in facilitating the uprising in Hama, especially in the early months of the region’s protest wave, resources were not as prevalent. In terms of mobilizing structures , mos ques were commonly utilized as both sites from which to mobilize, as
well as recruit participants for Friday protests (Abouzeid, August 1, 2011). The fact that the protest surge in Hama closely corresponded to the month leading up to Ramadan (when attendan ce at mosques tends to be higher) further enabled the protest movement to grow
(Abouzeid, August 1, 2011). Participants of collective protest have commonly cited that they first learned about the events and were recruited through mosques (Macleod and Flama nd,
August 14, 2011). In Hama, mosques played another role as well in the transmission of information. M osques made announcements regarding protest events, as well as a call that
hospitals were in need of blood as injuries inc reased during the government’s “operation” in the
region in August (Macleod and Flamand, August 14, 2011). This role of the mosques was increasingly important, especially as electricity and phone lines tended to be cut off throughout

108 the period in which the Syrian security forces were in the region (Macleod and Flamand, August
14, 2011).
5.5.5 PROTEST WAVES
Heightened conflict: The protest wave in Hama grew in intensity, as predicted, both in terms of
turn out and the government’s response to the events. By July 2011, turn out in Hama had
reached crowds between 500, 000 and 600, 000 (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011). This
was a significant increase from the first protests in the region, which tended to attract around 10,000 participants (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011). When the security forces entered Hama in late July 2011, both the death toll and number of arrests skyrocketed (my data). The precise number of deaths and arrests, however, remained unclear for some time, until the discovery of various mass graves in and around the cit y (near al Hamra and Sreheen in Khalidya)
(Strategic Research and Communication Centre, October 16, 2011). The protesters of Hama continued to clash with security forces, attacking tanks with stones, their hands, and sticks (Abouzeid, August 1, 2011).
5.5.5.1 GEOGRAPIC AND SECTORAL DISPERSION
Protest followed Tarrow’s (1993) model, originating from the city of Hama and gradually
impacting less urbanized areas (my data). However, little is known about the demographics of
the protesters in Hama so it is difficult to ver ify whether dispersion was also relevant across
different sectors of society. Regardless, the fact that protests later in the wave in Hama reached 500,000 (in a city of 700,000) indicates that diverse segments of the population were involved in the mo vement, included less traditional participants.

109 5.5.5.2 EMERGING ORGANIZATIONS
There is little information available.
5.5.5.3 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES
In Hama, traditional symbols of Syrian identity were frequently employed, such as the pre-
Ba’ath era Syrian flag (Mahmu d, February 16, 2012) to both emphasize Syrian identity, while
also distancing this identity from the omnipresence of the Baath Party. Key locations were re –
named to reflect the protesters’ demands and aspirations. Protes ters renamed the governorate
capital's Aasi Square to “Freedom Square” (Shadid, July 1, 2011).
The framing tug -of-war, between protesters and the regime, was evident throughout the
protest wave in Hama. While the regime tended to characterize the activists as “Islamist
extremists”, “foreig n agents” and “armed gangs” , the protesters frequently capitalized on
symbols that undermined this narrative, such as flowers and rose petals (Macleod and Flamand,
July 10, 2011), the pre -Ba’ath Syrian flag (Mahmud, February 16, 2011, ) and utilizing patrio tic
chants (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011). The movement also attempted to undermine th e
regime’s take on the protests by frequently calling themselves “the people” (i.e. “the people
want to topple the regime!”) (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011). In this way, it was not
“armed gangs” or “terrorists” attacking the regime, but rather the “people” of Syria. We have
seen elsewhere that this position is critical, not only to ensure that the government cannot distance the movement from mainstream society , but also to attract greater participation in the
movement. As seen throughout Syria, as repression impacts increasingly more people, this
framing of the movement comprised of the “people” is reinforced.
In fact, while the regime attempted to depict the p rotesters as deviant or at least outside
the mainstream, the protesters attempted to turn the table on the regime’s response through the

110 popular anthem "Yallah Erhal Ya Bashar" ("Come on, Bashar, Leave" ) in which they called
Assad a “wanted man” and linked him to widesprea d corruption (Mackey, July 21, 2011- really
from video not anything he wrote). This served to undermine the legitimacy of the regime,
particularly with respect to how representative the Assad regime still w as. The ability to turn the
table s and put Assad in the place of the protesters was further symbolized when an effigy of
President Assad was carried through the stree ts of Hama hanging from gallows (Macleod and
Flamand, July 10, 2011).
When the protesters declared Hama a “liberated city” (Abouzeid, August 1, 2011) they
highlighted the fact that freedom met an absence of security forces, as well as the fact that
freedom was not synonymous with anarchy or danger. Hama was declared a liberated city when
security forces withdrew and residents made efforts to demonstrate that even without security
forces Hama was still safe and functioning by having residents put up check points, directing
traffic, and cleaning up the squares after protests (Shadid, July 1, 2011; Abouzeid, August 1,
2011).
Critical events were also used to frame the movement and attract support. Like the death
of Hamza al -Khatib in Daraa, who ultimately became a symbol of “martyrdom” and “resistance”
(Mahmud, February 16, 2012), the alleged death of Ibrahim Qashush, who wrote a popular
protest anthem , provided support for the opposition’s narrative. Shortly after Qashush was
filmed performing the anthem in front of a large crowd of protesters, his body was reportedly found in the River Orontes (Mahmud, February 16, 2012). His de ath was particularly symbolic,
not only because it also fed into the narrative of martyrdom and resistance to the regime, but the condition of his body; his throat had been cut and vocal chords ripped out (Mahmud, February

111 16, 2012). His death did not sile nce the movement and his anthem remained popular throughout
the protest wave in Hama (Mahmud, February 16, 2011).

5.5.5.4 REPERTOIRES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
While in other regions tactics related to protest and demonstrations evolved, the protest
movement in Hama relied heavily on civil disobedience as residents refused to pay electric and
water bills and burnt them in a symbolic gesture declaring that “we will not pay for the bullets
you shoots us with” (Macleod and Flam and, July 10, 2011). Like other regions, str ikes were
prevalent as well (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011). As mentioned above, evolving tactics
can also be seen as a part of framing as Hama became a “liberated” city, protesters forced the
closure of government offices, created check points, and directed traffic, essentially “running the
city out of the state’s hands” (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011) and demonstrating that a Assad -free Syria was possible. A hand- painted sign conveyed this : “Hama is safe without the
presence of Bashar's army or security forces" (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011). Other tactics included meetings declaring a boycott of all Baath Party officials in the city of Hama, as well as letters demanding the release of all political prisoners and the right to protest peacef ully,
and only under these conditions would the makeshift checkpoints and civil disobedience cease (Macleod and Flamand, July 10, 2011).

5.5.6 HOW DO PATTERNS IN HAMA COMPARE TO SYRIA?
Figure 10: Protest Patterns in Hama and Syria

112

The protest movement in Hama, like in Daraa and Homs, met with government policies of
repression, thus presenting a variety of both constraints and obstacles. However, the fact that
government security forces, after their initial withdrawal, did not ent er Hama for nearly two
months, presented an opportunity for the protesters to organize, coordinate, and develop some
tactical innovations. While perhaps only a small advantage, this differed from Homs and Daraa where government troops entered almost direct ly. Furthermore, the protests in Hama exhibited a
fairly broad showing of inter -religious cooperation as Alawites and Sunnis marched side by side
(Weiss, Michael. (July 5, 2011).
The sheer size of protests in Hama also marks an important explanation as to why in
which the protest movement differed with collective action attracting hundreds of thousands of participants (USA Today, July 8, 2011). While Hama did not experience protests until more than a month into the country’s protest wave, when protests erupted they quickly escalated in terms of
the number of participants far more quickly than other regions i n Syria and exhibited signs of
“heightened conflict” (Tarrow, 1993) fairly early in region’s specific protest wave.

113 6.0 DATA
My analysis is based on dat a collected daily on the number and locations of protest, deaths, and
arrests in Syria, gathered primarily from Al -Jazeera (English and Arabic), the BBC, and the
Syrian -based website chronicling the protest events, www.syrianrevolution.org (in Arabic). In
some cases, however, values were missing and a LexisNexis search was conducted to obtain the
missing information. When faced with two conflicting numbers, I consistently selected the lower of the two in order to not overestimate the effects of any of the variables. The data set is
structured in a region- week format with 416 observations (13 regions and 32 weeks). (See Table
1 for a breakdown of the descriptive statistics for the continuous variables across reg ions and for
Syria)
6.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Protest, for the purpose of this analysis, is considered any event that challenges the regime, such
as picketing or a march (Rasler, 1996), in which 20 or more people participated, in a public space (Figure 8). In th e case of Syria, this has most often occurred in the form of protests,
demonstrations, and strikes. Such events had to explicitly express political grievances or opposition to the regime , which was assessed based on comments from participants in the
newspa per articles I read, as well as determined through images and videos of the event. In order

114 not to overestimate the number of protest events, when protest occurred in the same location on
two consecutive days it was counted as a single event of protest (as suggested in Inclán, 2009, to
avoid data inflation). Also, due to the fact that the governorates, as well as their capitals, share
the same name, when unclear if an event occurred in both the governorate and its capital, it was also counted as one event. This may have negatively impacted the above analysis of dispersion, but occurred infrequently and was rectified by comparing two different sources to obtain more
specifics about an event.
Protests are aggregated to the weekly level and the unit of analysi s for this variable is the
region. This variable was aggregated on the weekly literature based on a common trend in social
movement literature (Rasler, 1996; Earl and Soule, 2010; Davenport, 2007). Also, since current
protest is closely linked to past prot est and there tends to be auto -correlation, R -squared (which
explains the variance of the dependent variable explained by the independent variable) tends to be high due to this shared relationship. Therefore, I estimated this variable using first differenc es.
In this way, protest in the current period is subtracted from protest in the previous period (protest[it] -protest[it -1]), in this way time -constant unobserved heterogeneity is no longer an
issue (Brüderl, March 2005, 6).
Figure 11: Number of Protests Per Week in Syria (Country -wide)

115 Figure 12: Trends for Protests and Death Toll Across Protest Wave

6.2 EXPLANATORY VARIABLE S
Davenport (2000) defines any government act aimed at dissent as repressive if its target is to
“bring about political quiescence and facilitate the continuity of the regime through some form of
restriction or violation of political or civil liberties” (6). Although repression ca n refer to a wide –
range of responses from restrictions on free speech to torture and imprisonment, I chose to
concentrate on the number of deaths and arrests due to both their links with government policies of severe repression and the relative ease in whi ch they can be measured . Other actions such as
phone taps, surveillance, and the banning of opposition groups are fairly common in Syria
(Blanford, 2011) and reliable statistics on such tactics and their enforcement is difficult to obtain.
I use two va riables to capture repression: the death toll and number of arrests aggregated to a
seven -day period. However, I acknowledge that as Francisco (1995) aptly notes, “no single
indicator of coercion can capture the full measure of its application to a population” (270). Due
to issues with auto -correlation, as seen above, first differences estimator will also be used to
estimate this variable. Deaths and arrests are region -specific. (See Figure 9 for protest and death
toll trends across the protest wave).

116 Concessi ons are represented by a binary variable, and are considered any instance in
which the government offers some form of accommodation, ranging from the closure of casinos
to the announcement of future elections. Information regarding concessions were widely
available and were broadcast widely on state sponsored television and in local newspapers so the news of such events did not take long to spread. While aggregated on the week -level,
concessions are not region- specific and are coded the same for all regions .
Finally the two additional variables meant to also measure the likelihood of success are
instances of foreign support (i.e. sanctions, condemnation of the Assad regime by foreign countries and international organizations) and victories of protest moveme nts in neighboring
countries, both of which will be binary variables and will not be lagged due to sources (various YouTube videos that showed participants with banners and chanting slogans that showed that
they were aware of the regional developments). Li ke concessions, these variables do not differ
across regions and are aggregated on a weekly level.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Syria

Variable Mean Standard
Deviation Minimum
Value Maximum
Value
Protests
5.6 8.4 0 66
Deaths
4.8 13.18 0 195
Arrests
53.1 694.24 0 2,440

117 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Aleppo

Variable Mean Standard
Deviation Minimum
Value Maximum
Value
Protests
3.44 2.15 0 9
Deaths
.78 1.24 0 4
Arrests
235.56 1235.74 0 7,000

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, Damascus
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation Minimum
Value Maximum
Value
Protests
20.97 11.86 0 49
Deaths
6.78 7.65 0 35
Arrests
246.28 496.17 0 2,113

118 Table 4: Descriptive Statistics, Daraa
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation Minimum
Value Maximum
Value
Protests
9.09 7.07 0 33
Deaths
10.28 20.66 0 100
Arrests 72.09 300.31 0 1,700

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics, Hama
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation Minimum
Value Maximum
Value
Protests
4.81 3.6 0 15
Deaths
10.19 21.19 0 100
Arrests 9.59 38.86 0 214

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics, Homs
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation Minimum
Value Maximum
Value
Protests
11.97 11.77 0 40
Deaths
18.66 23.94 0 115
Arrests 45.63 139.81 0 700

119 6.3 CONTROL VARIABLES
My analysis of the data also includes two control variables. One is the presence of the Free
Syrian Army (FSA). The FSA is comprised of military defectors and civilian recruits; while the
original aims of the FSA was to protect civilians protesting the regime, they have increasingly
begun to employ offensive means, such as an attack on a government military base in Harasta (Weiss, January 6 2012; Al -Jazeera, March 2, 2012). This variable is important to include
because it may affect protests positively or negatively, thus explaining some of the variance in
the number of protests. On one hand, this variable facilitates collective action as it provides some protection to the protest movement. On the other hand, the Syrian government has tended to use
high levels of repression in areas that are considered FSA strongholds. Regardless of the effect , it
is necessary to include this important variable in the analysis . The final variable is the presence
of the Syrian government’s security forces. While there have been defections that rose as the
months of protest continued, the Syrian army, police, and Mukhabarat have largely remained
loyal to the regime (The Economist, October 29, 2011). Like the presence of the FSA , this
variable could have a variety of effects since the presence of the security forces would make
protest more difficult, but also because it may create a sense of rage and ange r among the civilian
popula tion or invite the presence of the FSA. Both of these variables are aggregated on the
weekly level an d differ across regions. Also, “presence” was defined as a sustained “operation”
of several days or more. Therefore, instances in which the FSA or security forces (more common
in the latter case) entered a location for only several hours to either facilitate protest or deter it, was not counted.

120 6.4 RESEARCH DESIGN
I use panel data with fixed effects and first differences estimator to estimate the following mo del:
Protests(it) -Protests(it- 1)= ∝ + β1deaths(it) -deaths(it -1) + β2 arrests(it) – arrests(it -1) + β3concessions(t) +
β5foreign support(t) + β6 regional opposition success(t) + β7 presence of FSA(it) + β8presence of pro- gov forces(it)
+ ∈
The data is a balanced panel. Panel data helps to e liminate the effect of omitted variables
that differ across entities but are constant over time (Stock and Watson, 2011). In the case of
Syria, this is important because some factors , which may be relevant (i.e. the percentage of the
population which is Su nni), were not available. Standard errors are clustered because this
approach allows for standard errors to have an arbitrary correlation within the various groupings (Stock and Watson, 2011).
The panel data set is structured in a region -week format with 416 observations (13
regions and 32 weeks). Using first differences estimator, the change in the number of protests is
the dependent variable and the change in the number of deaths and arrests, as well as concessions, foreign support, and regional events of opposition success from the current week,
are independent variables. The latter three variables are binary variables in which zero signifies the absence of any significant event and one signifies the occurrence of the variable.

121 Table 7: Panel Data OLS Regression Results,
Dependent Variable: Protests
Protests Model 1:
Impact of Repression Model 2
Explanatory Variables Model 3
All Relevant Variables Model 4
Damascus dropped
Intercept
3.48 -8.67 -9.47 -10.48
Deaths
.126***
(.044) .116***
(.041) .115***
(.04) .115***
(.041)
Arrests
.0008
(.0005) .0009
(.0006) .0009
(.0006) .0005
(.0003)
Concessions
.843
(.61) 1.07
(.656) 1.48***
(.542)
Foreign Support
2.36***
(.728) 2.35***
(.723) 2.32***
(.758)
Regiona l Events
3.74***
(1.27) 3.57***
(1.22) 3.01***
(1.15)
FSA Presence 2.33**
(1.06) 3.35***
(.839)
Pro-Govt
Presence -1.69***
(.711) -1.64***
(.898)
Adjusted R
squared .073 .112 .118 .15
P-value of F test .02 .036 .008 .00
N 416 416 416 383
Note: The individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.

122 Table 8: Impact of Stage of the Protest Wave on Explanatory and Control Variables
Panel Data OLS Regression Results,
Dependent Variable: Protests
Model 5
(first 12 w ks of protests) Model 6
(second 12 w ks of protests) Model 7
(final 8 w ks of protests)
Intercept -12.81 2.19 5.53
Deaths
.157*
(.082) .043*
(.023) .123**
(.053)
Arrests
.0009
(.0008) -.006***
(.002) .026***
(.008)
Concessions
4.81***
(1.74) -.152
(.800)
–
Foreign Support
3.89***
(1.38) -.481
(.336) 2.32*
(1.18)
Regional Events
-1.41
(.95) -.388
(.617) 6.04
(4.83)
FSA Presence
– .731
(.963) .18
(.172)
Pro-Govt Presence 1.67
(2.63) -1.52
(1.79) -7.83***
(.999)
Adjusted R -squared .133 .008 .767
P-value of F test .021 .021 .00
N 156 156 91

Note: The individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.

123 6.5 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EXPLANATO RY VARIABLES AND TIME S PAN
The regression results for Model 1, which only included the two variables for repression,
regressed on protests, shows arrests to not be significant, either statistically or substantially.
Deaths, however, is significant at the 1% level and positively impacts protest. In Model 2, which includes concessions and the other explanatory factors (foreign support and success of regional opposition movements), the fit improved significantly from an adjusted R -squared of .073 in the
first model to an adjusted R -squared of .112 in Model 2, thus indicating that the inclusion of
additional variables explains around 11% of the variance in the dependent variable. In Model 2, deaths, foreign support , and regional events are all statistically significant at the 1% level ,
positively impacting the change in the number of protests. However, concessions – another
variable I believed to be linke d to the likelihood of success – was not statistically significant.
However, further analysis should take into consideration which types of concessions are offered
and to whom they are aimed to assess the differing impacts of a variety of accommodating policies. Based on the study of Syria, however, it appears that perhaps concessions were not perceived as meaningful and rather than hav ing a positive effect on protest (as I hypothesized)
the ultimate impact was negligible.
In Model 3, in which all of the explanatory and control variables ar e included, the
explanation of the amount of variance in the dependent variable, protest, increase s somewhat
based on the adjusted R -squared. The findings were as expected, with the exception of arrests
that were still not significant. This presents an interesting puzzle. On a theoretical level, it may
be possible that arrests simply do not spark the s ame degree of outrage. Deaths, on the other
hand, may have a multiplier effect. While deaths (physically) eliminate some activists, the outrage they spar k may not only replace the fallen protesters, but also lead to greater overall

124 turnout. Arrests also el iminate protesters , but may not have the same multiplier effect because
they could be perceived as uncertain harm. This is especially true in the case of Syria where
amnesties were occasionally offered to political prisoners. In Model 3, deaths were statis tically
significant (at the 1% level) and had a positive effect on the change in the number of protests in a
given period. Concessions, in this model, were statistically significant at the 1% level and positively impacted the number of protests, as did For eign Support and Regional Successes of
Protest Movemen ts. The two control variables – the presence of the FSA and the presence of
pro-government security forces – were both statistical ly significant (a t the 5 and 1% level
respectively). While the presence of the FSA had a positive impact on the change in the number of protests, the presence of the government’s security forces had a negative impact.
In Model 4, I dropped Damascus, due to the fact that I believe the data may be somewhat
misleading. While qua litative analysis of the events in Syria indicated that regions such a s Idlib,
Homs, Hama, and Daraa experienced more widespread, sustained collective action than Damascus, the data put the number of pr otests in Damascus quite high (a n average of 21 protes ts
per week – see Descriptive Stat istics). This is likely because journalists may tend to report more
frequently on this location, as opposed to others. At the same time, the number may be accurate, but since there was a lack of information regarding the number of participants in each protest, the number of protests in Damascus does not convey the fact that while the region may have possibly experienced higher numbers of protest at a given time than Hama, for example, the crowds may have only been in the hundreds, while in Hama protests often attracted hundreds of thousands of participants. In order to ensure the robustness of my results, I dropped Damascus in Model 4 and found that most of the results were still quite similar. Arrests were not significant. Deaths, foreign support, regional success, and the presence of the FSA were all statistically

125 significant at the 1% level, positively impacting the change in the number of protests. The only
discernible difference was that the presence of the regime’s secu rity forces still had a negative
impact on the change in the number of protests and also was statistically significant but less so
than in Model 3. The most significant difference, however, was that concessions was now statistically significant at the 1% level, unlike in the previous models.
Table 2 takes into account the time dimension an d is divided into three periods : the first
12 weeks, the second 12 weeks, and the final eight weeks. This was done because as Tarrow
(1993) notes, protest cycles are char acterized by surges and declines. I identified spikes and
drops in the data in order to find a period in which to divide the data. This presents an incomple te
picture, however, since the middle and end of the wave are not really representative of the true
events. The protest in Syria is currently in its 15
th month, but the period analyzed here only
covers until October 2011. In Model 5, which covers the first period of 12 wee ks, c oncessions
and foreign support were significant at the 1% level, positively im pacting the change in the
number of protests. Deaths were significant as well, but only at the 10% level, positively impacting the change in the number of protests.
In the second period, some unusual changes occurred. Variables that I had linked to the
likelihood of success were no longer significant, and both deaths and arrests were significant statistically. Arrests were significant at the 1% level, positively impacting the number of protests which is unlike what we previously saw when we took into account the entire protest wave of 32 weeks. In the final eight weeks, both deaths and arrests remained significant, and deaths actually
increased in statistical significance. Foreign support was statistically significant at the 10% level, positively impacting protest and the presence of government security forces was statistically significant at the 1% level, though negatively impacting the change in the number of protests.

126 While the second two periods confirm my hypothesis regarding repression, it is somewhat
striking that repression seems to become more relevant as the protest wave progresses.

Figure 13: Regional Variation

127 Table 9: Regional Variation in Protest
Panel Data OLS Regression Results,
Dependent Variable: Protests
Model 7
Aleppo Model 8
Damascus Model 9
Daraa Model 10
Homs Model 11
Hama
Intercept
-9.84 -10.48 -7.38 -10.01 -9.89
Deaths
.115***
(.041) .114***
(.041) .129**
(.048) .091**
(.038) .152***
(.033)
Arrests
.0009
(.0006) .0005*
(.0003) .0008
(.0006) .0008
(.0006) .0008
(.0006)
Concessions
1.12
(.711) 1.48**
(.542) .72
(.613) 1.05
(.69) 1.15
(.72)
Foreign Support
2.52***
(.771) 2.31***
(.758) 2.06***
(.678) 2.1***
(.73) 2.29***
(.768)
Regional Events
3.74***
(1.32) 3.01**
(1.15) 3.31**
(1.26) 3.57**
(1.35) 3.70***
(1.27)
FSA Presence 2.27*
(1.08) 3.35***
(.839) 2.15*
(1.19) 2.72*
(1.38) 2.19*
(1.18)
Pro-Govt Presence -1.76**
(.709) -1.64*
(.898) –
2.38***
(.406) -1.21
(.749) -1.32*
(.718)
Adjusted R-squared .121 .150 .122 .076 .141
P-value of F test .009 .00 .00 .067 .00
N 32 32 32 32 32
Note: The individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.

128 6.6 REGRESSION RESULTS F OR REGIONAL VARIATIO N
In order to assess if the individual regions I examined were impacted differently by the
explanatory variables I selected, I ran OLS regression on each of the five regions. There were
several important similarities. First, in all five regions the number of deaths was statistically significant, positi vely impacting protest. Arrests were not statistically significant, with the
exception of Damascus. As mentioned before, arrests tended to be higher in Damascus and
Aleppo so this may explain this variation to a degree, but not why arrests had no discernible
impact in Aleppo. Concessions were also only statistically significant in the case of Damascus,
but as mentioned earlier, the data for Damascus may be somewhat misleading given the fact that
journalists’ accounts of the Syrian protest seem t o cover the capital more than other regions. In
terms of other indicators of the likelihood of success (foreign support and regional events) in all
five regions, both were statistically significant, impacting the change in the number of protests positively .
6.7 DISCUSSION
The regression results draw attention to some interesting factors in explaining the sustained protests in Syria. First, the effect of arrests was neither statistically or substantively significant and the sign was the opposite as predicted. I did not expect there to be any significant differen ce
between arrests and deaths; both, I theorized, would reduce the number of dissidents in the short –
term, but both would also be likely to fuel outrage and anger at the regime, thus leading to greater mob ilization of protestors and thus, a greater number of protests. Other studies have

129 found that widespread arrests, such was the case in the First Intifada, lead to backlash (Khawaja,
1993). There are a few possible explanations as to why my findings demons trated the contrary,
including ones mentioned above. First, it is possible that in Syria, where there were estimated to
be thousands of political prisoners prior to the protests (Aljazeera, 2011), arrests may not produce the same level of outrage as deaths and may not work as effectively to mobilize
protestors. Finally, as discussed above, another factor worth considering is that in the case of
arrests, they do not always result in detention as some protestors were released shortly after
being taken into questioning . For example, President al -Assad has, at various points, released
some of the arrested protestors (Sly, 2011), so arrests may potentially have a more delayed effect
while others wait and see if their family members and friends will be released. A s suggested
above, perhaps a more accurate way of measuring arrests would be a cumulative count. Concessions also failed to be statistically significant in most of the models though the fact that this variable was coded as a binary variable may have robbed it of some of its explanatory value.
If the variable had been coded as to reflect who specifically the concessions targeted and how
substantial they were, the variable may be found to be more significant than this analysis showed it to be.
The time dimen sion showed different variables to be more or less relevant at different
stages. However, the time dimension offers an incomplete picture due to the fact that the protest wave is really much longer than represented here. An interesting factor, which also l ines up with
the literature, is that concessions were only found to be relevant in the first period. Setting aside the possible shortcomings in the measurement of this variable, this may indicate that concessions were only taken seriously by the movement i n the early stages, and as some failed to materialize
or were delayed, they ceased to have any discernible effect. This may be linked to the country’s

130 history, and even regional developments; promises to reform have often failed to materialize. As
mentione d earlier, the impact of concessions on protest could be both positive and negative. In
the case of Syria, when having a discernible impact, concessions tended to impact the change in
protest positively. In this case it appears that concessions were taken as a sign that the movement could be successful and thus fueled collective action.
In the later stages, measures of repression (deaths and arrests) , as well as a control
variable that also can be considered a form of repression (presence of government security
forces), increased in statistical significance, indicating that the outrage sparked by repression did
not dissipate as it became more common. The presence of the security forces, however, had a negative effect on the change in the number of protest, and may be linked to an observation made earlier. While the presence of the government’s forces was a form of punishment after the fact, it can also be seen as a preventative tactic which may indicate the preventative measures are more effective in deterri ng protest, at least in the case of Syria based on these results, as well as trends
described in Aleppo and Damascus.
Finally, the regional dimension of protest showed a great deal of consistency across
regions. The one region to exhibit t he most signific ant variation was Damascus, and as explained
earlier this may be due to the extensive coverage this region has received meaning that the Damascus -specific variables may be overestimated. The consistency among regions is interesting
because, as we saw previ ously, the five regions are quite distinct on a number of factors. While
there have clearly been considerable constraints at play in Aleppo and Damascus, the results may indicate that once protest does manage to overcome a variety of obstacles and costs, t he drivers
are very similar, even across regions.

131 6.8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATIO N
The qualitative and quantitative analysis in this paper sheds some light on the events in Syria.
Due to a lack of data, however, certain puzzles remain. First, reg ions such as Aleppo and
Damascus indicated that perhaps preventive repressive measures are more effective in deterring
dissent than repression (even of a more severe nature) after initial outbreaks of collective action. Further analysis should include othe r factors, other than deaths and arrests, to assess the impact
of different types of repression. Furthermore, deaths, instead of being counted individually, could
be coded to assess if different causalities (i.e. women, children, Christians) have differing impact
on the increase in protests.
Also, as mentioned earlier, concessions are not all equal. In some of the models above,
concessions failed to have a discernible impact on protest; however, for this analysis,
concessions were a binary variable. Concess ions may yield more meaningful results if they are
coded in terms of whether they are procedural or substantive (Rasler, 1996) or on the basis of who they aim to appease. The same could be applied to the other variables meant to capture the likelihood of s uccess. Foreign support for a protest movement comes in many forms, not all of
them equal. For example, an indictment to the ICC is not the same as a foreign leader merely giving verbal support to the cause and may, consequently, have different effects. Al so, as
mentioned before, claimants matter as much as claims. In the case of foreign support, it may also matter who is offering the support and what is the perception of this leader or country within Syria (i.e. in terms of credibility). Events of success for other protest movements could also have
been coded differently (to capture the degree to which they may be indicative of foreshadowing the likelihood of success in Syria) but for both of these variables, it is difficult to determine the coding without more information about what public opinion in Syria is concerning such events.

132 The final factor , which would have improved the quantitative model , would have been
more variables that captured individual -level factors. While the qualitative analysis of Syr ia
indicates that mosques, for example, played a central role in the absence of established
organizations and networks, this is difficult to determine by quantitative methods alone . It would
require not only information regarding the percentage of Muslims in each region, but also how
high mosque attendance is (ideally before and after the uprisings) to assess how great a tool
mosques were in terms of recruitment and coordination. Also, personal ties have been
emphasized as another factor that the movement utilized to overcome resource scarcity.
However, even in countries where data is more easily available than Syria, this is difficult to
measure. In the case of Syria, it presented a considerable obstacle.

133 7.0 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, both the qualitative and quantitative approaches used in this paper aimed to
answer the question of what are the relevant factors in sustaining prolonged protest. Repression
was critical in sustaining protest. While repression has been viewed by some scholars as presenting a cons traint, I argue that repression may serve as an opportunity. This is not to
downplay the very significant costs associated with severe repression, but repression, insofar as
it creates a sense of outrage and unity , may serve to fuel a movement. The protest movement in
Syria may have been sparked due to the desire for greater political freedoms, and while this demand remains critical, the high degree of repression which ultimately impacted every region of Syria served to unify large segments of Syrian societ y. This fact is critical. In the same way the
identity of claimants matter as much as the claims, the targets of repression, rather than just
repression in and of itself is critical. The Iranian Revolution was successful, in part, because the Shah chose t o target vast segments of society through repression, thus creating a coalition of
opposition against him that encompassed many regions and segments of society.
While the quantitative analysis found support that repression and possible indicators of
success are critical, the qualitative analysis shed light on some factors were not as easy to measure, but nevertheless very relevant. Dominant approaches to social movement theory tend to emphasize the role of opportunities and resources. While on the surface, Syria seemed to be
lacking such favorable factors, I argue that these factors have been defined too narrowly. In the

134 absence of organizations, activis ts are creative, seizing other mobilizing structures such as
religious sites in order to mobilize and coordinate. While networks are important, personal ties
may also foster greater recruitment and serve to sustain a movement. Personal networks may
actually be even more relevant, especially in authoritarian countries, where suspicion and fear are pervasive. I ndividuals have been conditioned to conceal their political preferences and even
the most close -knit organization or network may not provide the same security that bonds
between families and friends may foster. Such dominant approaches to social movements only
tell half the story – what happens to a social movement in the absence or presence of critical
protest -sustaining factors. The more interesting story, however, is what activists manage to do
without such resources and how they transform even unfavorable conditions into windows for
collective action. Syria is such a case.

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