PHD Thesis Plan [627976]

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PHD Thesis Plan
– Sadowski Armand

The main purpose of this thesis is to understand and explain the consequences of the rise of China and measure the
impact of the power shift on East Asia and on the international system as a whole in the last three decades, attempting
to analyze this by using the lens of the realist tradition in international relations but also taking into consideration the
relation of the paradigm with the other major theories from this field of study. To try to achieve this goal, t he thesis
will have to construct a clear theoretical framework backed by hard empirical facts. However, as facts in history and
foreign affairs are rarely self -explanatory, a qualitative approach is also necessary. Because the discussion has to take
place both on an abstract epistemological level, but also on a more practical examination of the actors who interact in
international relations, this plan will be divided in at least in two parts.

Keywords: Classical realism, structural realism, neoclassical r ealism, realist constructivism, China, United States

1. The limits of structural realism and other perspectives for the
realist tradition:
a) The relation between realism and morals:
It is widely acknowledged that classical realism began with the wo rks of E. H. Carr and Hans
Morgenthau. Other significant authors are Reinhold Niebuhr, Raymond Aron, and Kenneth Waltz
(Man, State and War). George Kennan, who also played an important role in universal history as
a diplomat and a scholar that inspired the Truman Doctrine and who also coordinated the Marshall
Plan; is often labeled as one of the most influential realists. Considering his actual experience and
the actions that he has taken as a secretary of state, but also taking into account his writings, s ome
even consider adding Henry Kissinger on the list. Hedley Bull and Martin Wight are also regarded
as the founding fathers of the English school in international relations scholarship. Although
clearly defined as a separate school of thought, the histori cal and judicial approach, but also the
main points stated by at least a significant part of the English school authors makes them related
with realism and part of a wider realist tradition. Furthermore, considering the realism inclination
towards military power and statecraft, we think that geopolitics (Robert D. Kaplan), strategic
studies (Colin Gray), up to a point security studies (Barry Buzan) should be included here. Most

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of the scholars enumerate Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Carl von
Clausewitz as precursors of the realist tradition and they are often quoted either in an argument,
either as a source of inspiration for an idea. Many have tried to create a complete definition or to
identify the main traits of the realist traditi on, but no complete consensus was achieved until this
date. Our hope here is to prove that all those authors mentioned above, although separated by many
things, have at least three strong points in common. Taken together, they have the potential to set
the basis for the theoretical framework that we will try to develop in the next chapters.

– From an epistemological point of view, all of their works are focused on the first and second
image in international relations. Sometimes the third image is mentioned or can be identified, but
it is never the key factor in the enounced theory. The interactions from international politics are
explained by looking at what leaders do and at how states and other significant political actors
behave. It’s a combina tion of selecting internal political phenomena that is relevant for foreign
politics and explaining external politics in relation with both internal and external causes. For
example, some argue that Thucydides referred to the third imagine when he stated t hat the (bipolar)
power structure between Sparta and Athena inevitable led to war and that this pattern will repeat
until the end of history. We cannot deny that this idea exists in his work, but to highlighting it as
Thucydides legacy is committing a hist orical anachronism from the bipolar perspective of the Cold
War. The History of the Peloponnesian War is a record that tries to portray the events in detail and
to explain the conflict by identifying a sum of different causes that only cumulated led to tha t
outcome. The underlying idea of a political system that dictated the fate of Sparta and Athena gives
witness of Thucydides brilliant intuition and reconfirms the fact that neorealism was born from
this paradigm of thought, but his method was completely d ifferent from a contemporary structural
theory that was unknown at that time. Structural realism is the result of a wider scientific ideal that
started with Auguste Comte, a need to borrow and convert the means of exact sciences in order to
improve and pro duce a social science that is objective and as free as possible of ideological
interpretation and intellectual speculation.

– The tool that they use to understand reality consists in a dialectic holistic approach that starts
from particular things that are analyzed and synthesized in order to produce a global perspective
that returns to particularism to explain specific events an d socio -political developments. The

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description might seem contradictory in its terminology because a holistic theory states that the
whole can’t be reduced to the sum of its parts, but this is also true for realism. To be more precise,
a realist thinker u ses a relative pessimistic vision about human nature and the possibilities of
historical progress (meaning that like any theory, the core premise is based on non -demonstrable
principles) and though that glasses he looks at various social phenomena, constru cting a world in
its own image, almost like in the continental philosophy paradigm (remembering us of the
arguments presented by Wilhelm Dilthey in Introduction to the Human Sciences: An Attempt to
Lay a Foundation for the Study of Society and History ). Be cause the methods are relaxed and the
objective is so vast, as opposed to scientific positivism, their thesis depends on the intuition,
knowledge, erudition, religious -ideological -educational background and personal experience of
the author. Even when the book is limited to a certain topic, the methodology embraced gives their
thesis an universalistic nature. Even when the Italian wars from the sixteenth century ( The Prince )
or the political events interwar period ( The twenty years crisis ) are discussed, th e comparisons,
causes and effects that were identified can be extrapolated into universal history and this is more
or less the conscious intention of the realist thinkers (having also a clear connection with
historicism). This manner can explain why realis m is considered until today the most robust
paradigm in international relations and why the worlds created by the likes of Hans Morgenthau
or Reinhold Niebuhr created such fascination. The progressive attempt to explain international
relations by adopting interdisciplinary theoretical concepts that are applied to a wide set of
empirical knowledge was almost a nostalgic and romantic pursuit of the enlightenment ideal. In
the same time, by publishing world -explaining writings, the subjective generalizations t hat are
inevitable when you pursue this scientific road, caused factual inaccuracies and theoretical
ambiguities that brought many critics, and made realism so controversial. What many critics
coming from neorealism, liberalism and constructivism failed to understand is that either you like
the work of a classical realist, or you don’t. A world -explaining opera is neither completely
provable, neither completely demolishable, but its exercise helps others to create their own critical
apparatus and develop th eir original ideas. This also can explain why so many variations of realism
and neorealism appeared, up to the point that several critics pointed out that the new realist theories
are becoming degenerative by adding new elements just to protect the paradig m as a whole (John
A. Vasquez). Going even further with this thought, if realism depends so much on historical
context, we wonder if the exercise of rationality in international relations that is proclaimed as one

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of the main principles of realism is also contextual. Looking at the main realist authors, they are
certainly emphasizing the importance of rationality and strategic calculation when it comes to the
everyday power struggle. However, this observation is almost always followed by the footnote
that p olitical actors should behave rationally, not that they actually do. Furthermore, political
actors are almost never rational in an objective way, as their rationality can be conditioned by
countless variables. Even if a political actor wanted to be rationa l, fair and objective, the lack of
perfect information and the unforeseeable chaotic way of how socio -political events very often
unfold makes this tasks impossible. This fact is frequently ignored and downplayed when realism
is discussed in both the acade mic world, but also in less formal mass media articles, making
classical realism far more simplistic than it actually is. We will try to prove in another chapter that
a consequence of the idea that rational choices (even when the main purpose of the strate gy is the
increase of power or survival) depend on context and perception is that realism has the often
underestimated potential to be compatible with constructivism due to this inclination towards
cultural relativity when it comes to world politics. It al so means that the resolution of classical
realism to focus on political -military strength, and on the state as the main political actor in
international relations was more a decision of context, rather than an absolute epistemological
belief. This means th at realism is flexible enough to include many other factors and actors in its
balance of power research in the context of a changing world, an idea that started to be
implemented by more recent authors. The pillar principles of realism are that power is st ill and
will remain the molding factor in international relations and that what is perceived as rapid changes,
looked upon from a detached historical perspective, are actually slow and superficial developments.
The actors and the means of expressing power might gradually change, as it always have, but the
circle of fighting for dominance will never end. Finally, the last common element that we believe
is relevant is the misunderstood relation of realism with morals.

– Realism was often criticized for its lack of morals and was defined by most realist scholars
like amoral. Since power and the survival of the state are the most important things in international
relations, foreign policy should have, first and foremost, practical aims and should put moral
impediments aside. In our opinion, the critics from outside the realist paradigm highlighted this
because the so called lack of morality is an emotional argument that can easily discredit the theory,
especially in the eyes of the US and even Western Academic sphere, where the liberal values and

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the protection of human rights are placed in high regard. Moreover, we think that many realists
classified how a political actor should act as amoral because of their need to simply the theory and
in order to p rescribe political actions in a way that is clear and easy to comprehend. In reality, we
think that realist scholars believe that power can’t really be separated from moral aims, but since
no moral aim can’t be obtained without power, they have instead avo ided to insist on this vicious
cycle and focused directly on power. In his 2016 article The Collapse of the Liberal World Order ,
Stephen M. Walt confessed: ‘I may have a realist view of international politics and foreign policy,
but I take no pleasure what soever from these developments. Like Robert Gilpin, “if pressed I
would describe myself as a liberal in a realist world,” by which I mean that I appreciate the virtues
of a liberal society, am grateful to live in one, and think the world would in fact be a better place
if liberal institutions and values were more widely — even universally — embraced. (I’m deeply
skeptical about our ability to accelerate that process, and especially with military force, but that’s
another matter). So it would have been perfe ctly fine with me if the liberals’ earlier hopes had been
realized. But they weren’t, and it’s important to consider why.’ A closer look at the classical works
of the realist tradition would lead us to the conclusion that realism holds a highly complex rel ation
with morality and that focusing on this subject could help us further develop our own theoretical
scheme. In a sense, realism includes elements of absolute morality and relative morality in the
same time. As this affirmation might seem strange at fir st sight, we will try to explain it as best as
we can.
First of all, classical realism in international relations started as a reaction towards the liberal
idealism from the interwar period. Carr tried to find a balance between the realist and liberal
arguments. His rather pessimist conclusions in regards to the League of Nations, together with the
critics of how naive the status -quo powers were at that time in relation to Nazi Germany, were not
the result of cynicism, but were morally driven by a wish to a void another total war, the loss of
human life, and to protect human dignity. This theme is repeated thought all realist literature,
including the precursors. It was never about putting morality on the second place, but how to best
adapt the means in order to obtain a morally reasonable outcome in a political action, when the
resources are limited and the outcome is not always predictable, rather than blindly following and
imposing a specific kind of morality and self -righteousness, without really understan ding the
context and the possibilities from the field. Machiavelli’s concept that the morality of the common
man can’t be compared with the morality of the man of state, referred exactly to that. A leader has

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responsibilities beyond the comprehension of an individual. He has a responsibility towards his
own sense of morality, and his has to protect and enhance the interests of his own citizens (that
voted for him or not), taken as both individuals and as a community, the interest of the state and
its instit utions, to understand and respect the interests of the other states, other populations, and
other political actors like international institutions and NGOs. The limitation of resources means
that any political action will advantage one side and disadvantag e the other. The key is the ability
to see policy making in context and how can political measures relate to one another in order to
maximize the benefits and keep the losses up to a minimum. In point of fact, on most occasions
the nature of the political world causes antithetical loyalties and the only reasonable decisions that
can be taken are compromises that can seem unscrupulous from an individual level. When John
Mearsheimer argued that the Ukrainian crisis was first and foremost produced by the West (in his
2014 article: ‘ Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault ’), and that in our quest to promote liberal
democracy we were not capable to understand that Ukraine represented a vital security safe zone
for the Russian Federation, asking us to put your self in their shoes (how would we have felt if
Russia would have interfered in Latin America, for example), he indirectly used a moral argument,
recognizing the moral right of a foreign power to act as it sees fit in order to protect its vital interests
and to pursue its own traditional political philosophy. In the same article, Mearsheimer proposed
diplomatic negotiations resulting in a neutral Ukraine that is economically assisted by both the
West and by the Russian Federation. In exchange, the West will stop promoting there liberal
democracy, the EU will not accept Ukraine’s candidacy and the cultural Russian minority rights
will be protected, while Russia will retreat from Eastern Ukraine and would recognize an
Ukrainian government that is autonomous. Th is deal would be acceptable for both parties, as both
want to see a thriving Ukraine at their borders. Yes, this solution might seem cynical as this would
mean that Ukraine will not become in the near future a liberal democracy as part of the EU,
corruptio n will still thrive and the individual rights of its citizens will be limited. On the other hand,
the region will be stable, relations between US -EU-Russia will improve and the economic
sanctions will stop, leading to growth in trade and with foreign econo mic and technical support,
the overall quality of life of the Ukrainian people will increase. Maybe in time even the political
institutions will slowly adapt to the liberal ideal, once the Ukrainian society matures. In conclusion,
the logic behind Mearshei mer’s argument follows the same tradition as above. This is the best
morally possible solution given the political context and that the alternative is a very risky path

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that could lead to war, diplomatic tensions, and economic protectionism, the dissolutio n of the
Ukrainian state and the worsening of living conditions in the region. As the greatest enemy of a
good plan is the perfect plan (Car von Clausewitz), the liberal discourse if often criticized for this
very reason. Furthermore, Hans Morgenthau’s sta nce in Scientific Man vs Power Politics is another
representative example of how the epistemological belief of classical realism is that politics can’t
be reduced to statistical data or to an abstract scheme, but it’s also a moral stance, remembering as
that politics is a part of a wider family of social sciences that has to take into account that their
main object of analysis are the complex relations between human beings, and even though political
actors should try to behave in rational manner, history is full of examples to the contrary. In theory
and in practice, statecraft is both a science, but also an art ( “Politics is an art and not a science, and
what is required for its mastery is not the rationality of the engineer but the wisdom and the moral
strength of the statesman.” – Scientific Man versus Power Politics ) To sum up, we think that behind
the harsh geopolitical discourse, realism is marked by a subtle morality inspired by a moderate
conservative ideology that can be traced back to Edmund Burke. This means that change is
compatible with the realist paradigm. The only issue here is to be able to detach from the strong
emotions when you analyze a social phenomenon that is still very close to you (like the French
Revolution from Burke’s time), to see the patterns of change that really have an impact on history
and to accept that real change comes only with the passing of time. Let’s not forget that both
realism and liberalism are the product of the Western Civilization and that their origin lies in th e
combination of the Greco -Roman ideal, Christianity, and the rationality from the Enlightenment
era. How could ever a theoretical family that has such a background be immoral or amoral? We
argue that the moral tension between realism and liberalism can be observed throughout the
specialized literature, especially when the thesis of a realist or liberal scholar starts with criticizing
the other paradigm, like in a mirror. The option of the realist scholars to shift towards a more
conservative or liberal dis course depended much on the historical context and personal experience
of the authors and on their own sense of morality. The differences between the realist -liberal
scholars from the English school is maybe the best example.
Second of all, both their oper a and personal life is marked by moral stances in relation to social
and political events. Even more important, the realist scholars recognized and highlighted on
repeated occasions the importance of shared common values in international relations. Hans
Morgenthau advocated for the stability established by the Holy Alliance after the Congress of

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Vienna from 1815 especially because the elitist close diplomacy, the French culture and the
Christian values of the sovereigns made them respect each other interest s even when they were
competing for domination. Despite being repressive and unjust, this order preserved peace and
prosperity on the continent. This fell apart when the irrationality of extreme nationalism appeared.
Henry Kissinger (Diplomacy) even argued that one of the main causes of WW1 was the blind
worship of principles and the conviction to respect treaties with any price. Any kind of reasonable
diplomatic compromise became impossible because the two coalitions were so keen to respect
their treaties (the irony is that if Prince Franz Ferdinand would not have been assassinated, from
his feature position of emperor he would most surely offered rights and liberties to the minorities
from the Austro -Hungary Empire). The partially rational voice of soverei gns were replaced by the
completely irrational voice of the crowds. As many other examples can be offered in detail, we
will only name a few: Machiavelli’s hope that a prince will unify Italy (maybe Cesare Borgia),
Hobbes aim to create a stable and just so ciety, Hans Morgenthau stance on the Vietnam War and
his interest in the just war theory, Reinhold Niebuhr’s commitment to Christianity and how to
combine theological arguments with politics, his both conservative and left wing sympathies
(Obama, recognize d for his moral driven speeches quoted Niebuhr in repeated instances as his
favorite thinker), his fight with the KKK clan, his stance on the Vietnam war, Raymond Aron’s
left wing views and his critics towards the hypocrisy of the French intellectual class , and all the
way to Mearsheimer’s critic on the Iraq war and on the US policy in regards to the Middle East.
The ideological background of the realist scholars is as diverse as any other but what they all have
in common is a utilitarian argument in relati on to how politics should work. But does the realist
morality limits itself to a material form of utilitarianism? We think not.
To better understand this stance, we have to return to our main affirmation: realism includes
elements of absolute morality and relative morality in the same time. By absolute morality in
realism we understand the main principles that we have described above: a pessimistic view in
relation to human nature, power as the only real mediator between goals and actions, a conservative
position in regards to the evolution of history (reforms should always be built based on a
combination of past experiences and rationality), a traditional imagine in conjunction with how
politics should be theorized and practiced, and an attachment towards d efending the sovereignty
of the political actors to pursue their own security agenda and their interests as they seem fit. To
this we must add one more observation. The realist thesis that humans are evil in their nature is

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analyzed by many as a natural in clination towards individualistic selfishness. The individual as a
rational actor tends to think in terms of relative gains, planting the seeds of a perpetual conflict.
Even though this might be correct up to a point, many fail to see that realism, from a moral position,
favors the wellbeing of the society as a whole instead of the individual. The problem is not that
the individual is evil from birth, but that he is a social animal (zoon politikon) that depends on
others. Humans and their selfish acts are t he result of a continuous combination of natural
inclinations that enter in contact with the brutality of the society (bringing the realist tradition
closer not only to the Hobbesian world, but also to the Rousseau’s worldview that society corrupts
the goo d intentions of the individual). However, individuals rarely pursue their goals only for their
own benefit. In reality, individuals are part of a family, communities, institutions, tribes, states and
so on. On one hand, in order to pursue individualistic d reams, a person has to depend on others.
On the other hand, individuals have varied and sometimes conflictual loyalties towards their own
hopes, the family and the other forms of community or clashing loyalties within several very
different groups. Almost in all the cases the social pressure overwhelms individualism or at least
limits it in a significant way, conditioning the rationality and the actions of the individual. The
society as a system with intricate parts is more important than any individual bec ause only a group
can offer the security and the conditions for the development of the individual, but also because
the core values of the society can be found in hearts of the most individuals from that community
(this is a very slow but continuous dialec tic process where the individuals define what they find in
common as a group and the group as a whole defines how an individual should be). Again, this
also means that a society can be extremely oppressive and a political organization can be criminal,
but in most cases this happens when the main founding principles are abandoned (usually after a
revolution that declares that it can radically change the world in a rational way; French Revolution,
Bolshevik Revolution, Nazi Germany, Iranian Revolution, Arab S pring and so on; in contrast, The
Glorious Revolution from 1688 and the rise of Prussia and Germany under Otto von Bismarck are
maybe the greatest examples of how realists think change should be handled). In response to this
injustice, realism offers a com promise that is adapted on how the world is, not on how the world
should be. “The philosophy of rationalism has misunderstood the nature of man, the nature of the
social world, and the nature of reason itself. It does not see that man's nature has three di mensions:
biological, rational, and spiritual. By neglecting the biological impulses and spiritual aspirations
of man, it misconstrues the function reason fulfills within the whole of human existence; it distorts

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the problem of ethics, especially in the po litical field; and it perverts the natural sciences into an
instrument of social salvation for which neither their own nature nor the nature of the social world
fits them.” – (Scientific Man versus Power Politics ).
Unlike liberalism, realism has also a con nection with moral relativity because the theory
recognizes the right of the political actor to pursue his interest, but also acknowledges that no
system of values is superior to another. This highly important element leaves room for a healthy
political di alogue, tolerance and compromise. Even if political actors seek to destroy each other in
their pursuit of power, the minimum recognition that the other can do the same in the name of
interests and values I might not agree with, but are at least partially l egitimate, combined with an
actual balance of power, can create a political climate that contains total war in a way that
liberalism fails (that only seeks to promote Western values and impose them using a wide array of
methods). It can also provide soluti ons, at least at a hypothetical level, in relation to important
modern events like mass migration and neocolonialism. By acknowledging that international
politics can be practiced using different rules and systems, and that great powers have natural
sphere s of influences (that should also be limited by the understanding that the core interests
regional and small powers should be at least partially respected and taken into account in the
benefit of all parties), the competition between status quo and revisio nist powers can also be
limited. Rather than looking at this from the perspective of the human rights doctrine, it can start
suggesting reasonable measures that protects the interests and ideals of different communities
(understanding cultures by the means of political anthropology; Franz Boas). Instead of offering
magical solutions by composing abstract rational institutional experiments, justified by self –
proclaimed universal principles, realism prescribes the pursuit of reasonable strategies specific to
any political art. In the spirit of John Rawl’s article The Law of Peoples , criminal regimes that are
neither democratic, neither hierarchical, should be stopped by any means (even though a text from
the liberal tradition, many of the arguments are compati ble with realism). In practice, this only
happens when the main powers from the political system, despite their grave differences, reach a
minimum common understanding (United States – Great Britain – Soviet Union alliance against
Nazi Germany). This means that cultivating a political climate like the one that we described above
increases the chances for an international intervention against a criminal state or organization (for
example, if US and the Russian Federation coordinated their efforts against ISI S and compromised
on the future of Syria) in contrast with the less effective activity of international organizations (As

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brilliantly explained by John Mearsheimer in his article The false promise of international
institutions ).

b) Structural realism and the balance of power (Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, Kenneth
Organski, George Modelski, Morton Kaplan, Robert Gilpin, Stephen Walt, Colin Elman)
This chapter will have as a starting point the book Realism and the Balancing of Power: A new
Debate , a work that was published in 2002 and was edited by John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman.
The book is a collection of 17 articles, 7 in favor of the structural realist theories, 7 articles that
criticizes neorealism, and 3 conclusive articles that leaves the problemati c open for dialogue. The
discussion is focused either on the epistemological aspects of neorealism, either on the historical
evidence that can support the theory or not. Considering that testing structural realism in regards
to how it explains major develo pments from universal history is not the subject of our thesis and
that the well-known historical events were discussed in detail in other works, we would like to
focus more on the theoretical analysis and to introduce new texts that could help us bring th e debate
up to date.
First of all, we aim to understand the self -imposed limits of neorealism because many of the
criticism directed towards it fails to understand that structural realism is a theory that tries to be as
positivist as possible. However, like Kenneth Waltz highlighted on many occasions, in order to
reach this ideal the explanatory scope of the theory is very limited on purpose. Neorealism tries to
explain the hegemonic struggle for power in the international system. This theory has neither the
tools, neither the intention to explain anything else. His book represented a critique addressed
towards classical realism and the first and second image, ignoring the analysis of internal politics
and any particular interactions between states. But e ven though, for the sake of the argument, we
presume that this theory is entirely correct, we can’t understand the convoluted international
relations simply by explaining the basic structure. There are countless vital questions left
unanswered by neorealis m. This is why going back to the origins still makes sense.
Second of all, we intend to emphasize the fact that structural realism produced an interesting
variety of theories that should be classified with clarity. Here we would like to discuss the critici sm
from inside this family of theories and their relation with classical realism and neoclassical realism.
Are states balancing power or threats? Is the regional proximity more relevant than the
international system when balancing? How can defensive and of fensive capabilities influence this?

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Can conventional warfare between great powers or their intermediaries be possible in a nuclear
era? What is the role played by the new technology, asymmetric warfare and terrorism when we
analyze the balancing or lack o f balancing in the international system? Besides military power,
economic strength and prestige, what are the elements that we should include when we measure
power? When political actors think in terms of relative gains and in what circumstances are they
inclined to accept an absolute gains solution? What is the mechanism that makes states balance
power or threats, or pass on the responsibility to other powers, when are they trying to stay neutral,
or decide to align with the revisionist powers because they are afraid for their own security and
when they do this in order to take advance of the situation like a wolf? Should we include other
political actors (besides states) in this power structure? If yes, who and under what conditions?
Since classical realis m and neoclassical are considered subjective, having sometimes an incoherent
set of principles or lacking historical accuracy, while structural realism is sterile and incapable of
explaining the complexity of the political world, we think that a theoretica l analysis, based on the
latest works from this field of study, has the potential to surpass the deadlock that the realist
tradition has reached after the fall of the Soviet Union. The main problem in international relations
study can be found in social sc iences in general. In order to explain reality, you have to create a
theory that simplifies relations that are very complex and unpredictable, subject to human reason
and emotion. The more you simply, the more you obtain an objective theory. On one hand, t he
more you simply, the more redundant the theory becomes, self -limiting it up to the point of failing
to grasp the network of variables that can usefully explain a phenomena and maybe even create
predictions based on probabilities. On the other hand, keep ing to introduce elements in the theory
tends to make it far to elaborate in order to pass varied empirical tests and it could tempt the author
to introduce new variables just to protect his thesis, making the theory degenerative, as Vasquez
suggests that happened with neorealism. In addition to this, we would test how all of those
theoretical assumptions can explain the political relations and power distribution in the Pacific
region. Why this particular area? Because the Pacific already represents the col d battleground
between the United States and China, the part of the world with the fastest growing developed and
developing economies. The motives will be addressed directly in the second part of our thesis.
Not really separate from this, there are those s tructural realists who propose a larger and original
theoretical framework that is outside standard classifications. We are referring to authors that can
be placed at the border of structural realism and neoclassical realism, to be more precise, the ones

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related to the theoretical family of hegemonic stability. One great is example is Robert Gilpin that
argues in favor of a realist structural theory where economy matters to a much larger degree than
in the case of other related authors. According to his Wor ld System, international relations are
characterized by continuity and that real cyclical changes occur only when the fight between status
quo and revisionist powers occurs. He argued that the US promoted a liberal order after WW2
mainly because Washington wanted to maximize its economic, military and political power and
behind the generous rhetoric, they have followed a strict security agenda. Gilpin predicted a 21st
century where the American power will became to fade, and the unipolar system will shift t owards
multipolarity. In contrast with Francis Fukuyama, Gilpin considered that the liberal order was just
a passing phase in history and that we will return towards a world with several great powers and
regional powers competing for domination, each havin g a sphere of influence, thus returning to
power politics as a guiding principle, not much unlike the 19th century Europe. We find that both
the economic variable and Gilpin’s predictions are worth pursuing, so we propose to continue this
by researching ho w the international system would like in this case and if we can find any basis in
reality for it. Another powerful example is George Modelski. In The Long Cycle of Global Politics
and the Nation -State , he proposes an international system at a 500 years hi storical scale that firstly
appeared somewhere between the 15th and 16th century. The international arena was always marked
by several great powers and a temporary hegemonic power that dominated the system for around
100 years. He also observes that the tr ansition between one hegemon to another was always
peaceful and it happened between states that were allied and had similar interests in relation to
revisionist powers or even shared some cultural affinities (Netherlands – UK; UK – US). For the
sake of the argument, we want to extend this and wonder if a similar transition will happen between
US and China, if the other major powers will accept China as a hegemon, and if China will act any
differently as a hegemonic power that the previous ones or in compari son to the US. Our initial
hypothesis is that there will be many similarities that can be explained by realism, but also
significant differences caused by how China understands the world and by how the rest of the
world perceives China. We will also add in to the discussed the contributions of Paul Kennedy with
the Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (and try to see if US is an empire that overstretched its
capabilities and faces the dilemma of partially retreating – offering the chance for other states to
takes its place and challenge the current order – or sacrificing economic strength on a long term
basis in order to keep its military presence intact) and A. Organski with Power Transition Theory

14
(during the Cold War, he predicted that the US will ally with th e Soviet Union against China
despite their ideological compatibility; although this never happened because China was not yet
strong enough in the 70’, we want to explore this possibility, but also considering what recently
happened in Georgia, Syria and Uk raine, we want to enquire if the opposite, a Russian Federation
– China alliance or at least closer collaboration in the detriment of the US and European powers is
more plausible).
Third of all, in our ambition to find a breakthrough within the realist tra dition, we find very helpful
to also tackle the most important critics coming from the other major traditions in international
relations scholarship and to see how other paradigms respond to the questions above and if realism
can resist them. (Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, John A. Vasquez, Jack S. Levy, Richard
Rosecrance, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Zeev Maoz, Michael Barnett, Immanuel Wallerstein,
Robert W. Cox, David Held, Alexander Wendt etc.).

c) Civilizations and the nature of cooperation
In this c hapter we would like to link the realist argument that the anarchical international system
is marked by a rational struggle for power with the constructivist idea that speech and perception
also very important (from the famous article by Alexander Wendt Anarchy is what what states
make of it ). We have already talked about the fact that realist scholars recognize the limits of
rationality and that realism has also an inclination toward tolerance in relation to other cultures
and ideas, refusing to recognize the possibility of building universal guides of moral principles.
The compatibility aspects between the two traditions have been brilliantly stated by Samuel Barkin
in his article from 2003: “Realism constructivism”. We will attempt to analyze his argument s in
detail in the next chapter. For this part, we aim to test if culture can influence the way how China
and other states from East Asia -Pacific perceive each other when they initiate political relations,
and how they perceive the other Western powers and their allies. By consequence, we will try to
test if culture can condition foreign policy and even the international system by focusing only at
this region. Our main assumption is that the rational struggle for power in the Pacific area is marked
by a wid e gap of perception in relation to how international politics should be conducted, what are
the rules that should be followed. Moreover, our initial hypothesis is that the states will try to
increase their power and make strategies considering relative gai ns, but they will also take into
account the recent history and cultural background of the region when they will decide the road of

15
their foreign policy, meaning that the result will be a mixture of those two key elements. By
affirming this, we return to t he classic idea (and move away from structural realism) that internal
politics should be taken into account by international relations literature as long as it is very
relevant for external politics. As the idea of civilization can be quite vague (and can be applied
more in philosophy of culture than in international relations scholarship) and many other works
have failed to grasp the full complexity of this problematic (Samuel Huntington – Clash of
Civilizations ), we propose using a quantitative approach s pecific to comparative politics.
– The first thing that we want to measure is if the states from Asia -Pacific are closer to liberal
democracy or to authoritarianism and hierarchical societies. We will take into survey the
democracy index, civil ri ghts, political freedoms, corruption levels, the security and stability of the
country and we will use as a database independent sources like Freedom House, Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International and so on. The point of this is to see if the internal re gime is relevant
for how the states will collaborate. Is there a tendency for authoritarian states to support each
other? Can we find strong tendencies of states that are going from democracy towards
authoritarianism or the reverse? Are those tendencies ab le to destabilize the region and to shift the
current balance of power?
– The second element that we will measure is economic development and economic inequality
by using variables and HDI, GDP and GDP per capita and correlate the results with the ones from
above. On one hand, we anticipate that in some cases the economic growth from developing
countries is followed by an increase in inequality and we want to test if this tendency can shift the
democratic road towards authoritarianism. On the other hand, we think that economic increase has
also the potential to create a middle class that will place a larger pressure on the state towards
democratization. Also the great discrepancy between regions within a country has the potential to
create problems in relation to cohesion. We wonder if the great differences between West -North
China and South -East China will have any relevant impact on Beijing’s capability to reflect its
power in international relations in the incoming decades. Overall, we are interes ted on how those
internal elements can affect the balance of power and the political stability of the region, and also
how it can determine the choice of a state to enter a coalition or another, or to try to remain neutral.
– Another very importan t phenomenon that we will like to take into account is the rise of
terrorism in East and South Asia. Can this be correlated with the figures from above and can this
really threaten the stability of some states? We can measure this by looking at the frequen cy of

16
attacks, the number of casualties and the overall power of the terrorist organizations from each
state (especially in Philippines and Indonesia). As the „War on Terror” will slowly shift from the
Middle East towards Asia (the arguments in favour of t his tendency are numerous: demography,
religion, economy, society and culture), we have to ask ourselves if the US will also move some
of its military operations in Asian countries and if this change can determine them to either improve
their relations, or if the reverse will happen and this will be perceived as an infringement of their
sovereignty, and in this case several states will ameliorate their tense relations with China as a
result of that. Another possible scenario would be that the US will chose to stay away or to limit
its implication from those conflicts, especially because of past experiences and also because there
is an increasing pressure to limit the military expenditure. Will China take the role played by the
US for some of those states in this case? How the affected states will react?
– Maybe the most important part of this chapter is the rise of nationalism. Many Western
analysts are focusing on the rise of nationalism and populism in Europe and the United States, and
they seem to speak with an unanimous voice about the revival of those two. If we can speak of
revival of nationalism in Europe, we think that we should also talk about the hegemony of
nationalism in Asia – Pacific. Sun Yat -sen's historical speech on Pan -Asianism from 1924 in Kobe
is still relevant today. In comparison with other regions of the world, nationalism is here closer to
what nationalism meant for Europe in the 19th century. Why is that? Because many developing
states are facing an industrial transition not m uch unlike the one that Western countries once faced.
This transition comes with poverty, inequality, demographic imbalances, corruption and
institutional instability. The same states are also pressured by developed states (who grievously
polluted the worl d in the past) to embrace green development policies with the price of
unemployment and more (at least initial) poverty (we find the case of India as very illustrative).
Even more important is that most of the Asian states just obtained their independence a couple of
decades ago and the memory of their past experiences are still very strong. China is also perceived
by many neighbours as a real threat, particularly after they have decided to heavily militarize the
East and South China Sea, creating artificia l islands and violating the marime space of several
states even after Beijing lost all the international trials on this matter. Finally, the Japanese war
crimes and crimes against humanity during WW2 are still affecting the diplomatic relations with
its neighbours. The US is determined to impose even more protectionist economic measures that
will be perceived by many as arbitrary and even hostile, they also want to take more steps towards

17
balancing the military presence of China in the area, and fully sup ports the military rise of Japan
who changed the famous 7th article of the constitution. Territorial claims and
secession/independence movements are also a big issue in the area. We will measure this in two
steps. We will be looking at the pools and statis tics that offers us information about public opinion.
How determined are the people to follow their leaders in a war or to face economic depression due
to protectionist measures or even trade embargos? Is the public pressure able to determine a state
to be come a more aggressive player on the international system? Can this favour the rise of more
populist leaders? The second step is to centralize the main declarations of state leaders that have a
clear nationalistic, aggressive and militaristic message and w e will like to count both the number
of state leaders who practice this as their standard foreign policy, but to also see if their messages
were followed by any escalation of diplomatic tensions or even more. When attempting to analyse
this, we also consid ering borrowing some elements from political communication or even from
political psychology and social psychology, sketching the profiles of the state leaders. Furthermore,
we plan to see how terrorism and nationalism correlates with the religious distrib ution in the region.

To sum up, we believe that all of those cultural/social/political elements will determine a coalition
not much unlike we have seen during the Cold War: A Western -driven coalition behind US -Japan –
South Korea, with many democratic stat es and some authoritarian states (that decided to join this
side because of the elements mentioned above); a second coalition behind China with several
authoritarian states and some democratic states (that decided to join this side because of the
elements mentioned above); a third coalition of neutral states who either have cultural reasons to
remain neutral, either they are not in a position that forces them to pick a side right away, so they
try to gain as many benefits as possible from both sides. We als o anticipate that some states will
switch sides and some neutral states will join a coalition only in the event that strategic interests
(realism) are combined with a foreign policy act of the US or China that deeply affects the prestige
(constructivism) o f the two great powers, as perceived by the very different cultural backgrounds
in Asia. Politicians and diplomats that have a profound knowledge about the region will play a key
role in this game.

18
d) Realist Constructivism (Samuel J. Barkin)
In this chapter we want to summarize Barkin’s theory, to see how other authors viewed the
possibility of a realist constructivist theory and to test if from a theoretical and empirical point of
view, realism is compatible with constructivism. Finally, if the answe r is yes, we would like to test
how this theory can explain the rise of China and the political situation in the Far East, and if we
can relate it to our own hypothesis and findings from the previous chapters.
In essence, Barkin claims that most of the sch olars believed that realism is at an opposite pole in
relation to constructivism because realism is perceived as rationalist and materialist, while
constructivism is defined as intersubjective and in favor of idealism (understood as a theory that
states th at ideas are much more important than physical elements in determining a cause in social
sciences). Barkin makes a great cause for arguing that this perception is false. Also, our first glance
analysis of classical realism has revealed that the realist tra dition includes all of those
methodological perspectives. They are not that opposite as it looked when they have been
oversimplified or caricatured by the opposite scholarship. Understood in this way, constructivism
is no longer a separate paradigm that ex plains how politics work, but a methodology and ontology
that explains how we should analyze the political world. In order to support our claims, we will
test realist constructivism assumptions by interpreting the most important events of the past decade
in the Far East
We will test this theory by highlighting that the calculations of power politics simply cannot be
separated from the subjective perceptions of a political elite educated in the spirit of particular
values. This does not mean that culture is a sufficient ca use to provoke an important political
decision, but it’s always a necessary cause. Nor does it mean that misunderstandings and lack of
real communication caused by differences of perception would inevitably lead to an endless
conflict. Also, unlike other u topian liberal constructivists, we don’t think that a mutual
understanding towards a definitive peace project can be reached by surpassing the social constructs
and prejudices of the daily interactions in international relations. Power relations is the cen tral
element of any meaningful political action. What we do imply is that political tensions in the
Pacific may get worse or be improved, depending on how flexible these countries will be in relation
to the claim that their values are universal. This princ iple applies to both the relations between the
very different states of the Far East, but also in the contacts between the Western World and Asia.
Again, this does not mean that we should oversimplify the problem, looking at the the West and

19
the Orient as two opposing blocks, but rather as two different and highly complex regions that
must be understood in order to explain the international dynamics. Our initial objective is to show
that nationalism is far wider in Asia than in Europe and it works at two di fferent levels. On one
hand we have a more or less nationalistic phenomenon at the level of each state in the Far East that
strengthens animosities between the countries of Asia beyond an objective calculus of power
politics. On the other hand we can ident ify a vague, but much larger Pan -Asian sentiment driven
towards the Western powers (and partially Japan). This sentiment is given by an objective factor,
but also by a subjective one. From an economic and political perspective, the Asian states are fast
developing countries or already developed nations like Japan, Taiwan and South Korea that want
to play a higher political role in the region. Up to a limit, this creates a normal tendency towards
revisionism. The subjective part is fueled by the colonial pas t and by the repeated unwise insistence
of the Western powers that only their values are rational, moral and efficient. We intend to analyze
how these interactions influence power structures.

e) Neoclassical realism (Thomas J. Christensen, Jack Snyd er, Randall L. Schweller, William
Wohlforth, Alastair J. H. Murray, Gideon Rose, Fareed Zakaria, Robert Jervis, Colin Dueck,
Steven Lobell, Asle Toje, Tom Dyson, Jeffrey Taliaferro Nicholas Kitchen, Robert Wishart).
Our main goal here is to understand the different theoretical frameworks proposed by neoclassical
realist authors (some of them are not even specialized scholars), and to classify them in relation to
classical realism, structural realism and realism constructivism. As most of their works are qui te
new, a second objective will be to search for as many authors as possible, and also to bring new
perspectives from outside the traditional Western academic world. One of the examples that we
want to propose is Yan Xuetong ( Ancient Chinese Thought, Moder n Chinese Power ), maybe one
of the most respected political scientist in China. In simplified terms, Yan claims the following:
The international system of the post WW2 period remains “hegemonic” and has not yet
fundamentally changed. However, Western liber alism is no longer leading international norms,
and we are moving to a state where international norms are no longer respected. Power will be
redistributed around the world instead of focused in the West. Protectionism and economic
sanctions will be the pr imary means of competition among major powers, as nuclear weapons will
continue to successfully deter conflict. U.S. supremacy is ending, and the unipolar state of the post
Cold War period will be replaced by a bipolar system, possibly within five years. Y an believes a

20
multipolar world is not possible: China and the U.S. are the only players, and the world is destined
to be bipolar. Western countries are ceasing to influence international politics in a unified manner,
and at some point, “the political conce pt of ‘the West’ will no longer objectively suit the study of
international relations.”
This chapter will also have a conclusive role for our theoretical endeavor. Considering that were
are the incipient phases of our thesis, we are unable to state a clear definition for the theoretical
framework that we have promised in the abstract of our plan. We don’t even have a title. However,
we are confident that going through all the steps that we have described will help us reach our
main goal. We are proposing a theory that is capable of explaining international relations at the
individual, state and systemic level by adopting the plain and simple approach of structural realism
when it explains the dynamics of the system, but also adding the logic -argumentative co mplexity
of classical realism, the innovations from neoclassical realism and the cultural/perception variable
from realism constructivism. Starting from the premise that realism actually represents a huge
philosophical tradition, which is neither limited, neither obsessed by rationalism, military power,
speculation or positivism, our theory should be efficient in tackling delicate ethical problematics
(just war theory and international intervention for example) and to include totally new variables
and actor s (that were not fully taken into account by realism in the past) if necessary, but in the
same time keeping the core theoretical integrity intact.
The difficulties that might occur during this research project are many and not easy to surpass.
There is a significant amount of specialized literature and quantitative data that we have to go
through, analyze and synthesize in an as objective manner as possible. Like we have already
mentioned, theoretical logical incoherence might occur when you start adding n ew elements into
a theory that can become degenerative. Firstly, understanding the Asian and Western histories and
cultures is a long life process that can never be complete. Secondly, observing ongoing political
events and constantly be up to date with th em, supposes a huge amount of information to be
synthesized and this process in inevitable subjective. Realizing this fact, we have to read about the
same subject from numerous publications, in order to identify their bias and to make a summary
about the k ey points. Although we believe we have managed to be equidistant, this kind of research
goes through our inner self, making the selection of the relevant information (and even the
selection of the authors that we find relevant) and the interpretation inesc apable subjective. Also,
we might find ourselves in a position where we discover that our theory is not suitable for

21
answering our research questions or we might be tempted to subjectively add empirical data just
to protect our assumptions. Another complic ation appears when we try to formulate a realist
constructivism theory because critical theory in international relations began to rise only recently,
with the first works appearing in the nineties. In other words, there is still a lack in the constructivi st
academic literature. The same can be said about neoclassical realism. This problem is deepened
by the fact that there is very limited honest debate between realist, liberal and constructivist
scholars. As you may have seen in the previous sections, they often criticize other traditions by
oversimplifying them, thus collaborating to the logical and terminological confusion. The
prejudices related to a linear evolution of science contributes to the idea that any form of non –
structural realism is outdated a nd hinders a real debate. Furthermore, although realism is still
considered the most important paradigm in international relations, in practice, after the fall of the
Iron Curtain, most of the media and the academic sphere prefers a liberal approach. The d ominant
intellectual class in the West is in majority either liberal, either with left wings sympathies. This
is a problem for realism scholarship in general. John Mearsheimer observed this even from 2002
(and the situation is now worse) in his article Realism, The Real World, And The Academy ,
concluding that liberal scholars are unfairly promoted by scholars, specialized publications and by
the mass media in comparison with realism. After all, what we are trying to do is to revitalize a
conservative way of understanding human existence within society and to bring it into the 21st
Century.
To all of those fair objections, we simply have two short answers. This thesis has a clear
exploratory research approach and it’s normal to be confronted with great theore tical,
methodological and empirical difficulties. However, we want to express our old belief that the very
purpose of science, in its most meaningful way, is exploration and that the success of the expedition
depends not only the tools that are used, but a lso on the dedication and quality of the explorer.
Assuming a reasonable subjective perspective should make us remember that statecraft is not only
a science, but also an art where the inspiration of the moment can make all the difference in the
world. A p ositivist approach or a niche case study can prove to be much more feasible, but past
experiences has taught us that in the end they will also be sterile and only relevant in a very limited
context. The realist tradition needs to adapt to the realities of our world by continuing to embrace
its rich intellectual heritage, but to also assimilate with confidence the new dynamics of
international relations that can be added on its robust theoretical backbone. Our second argument

22
is that even if all our hypothes is will fail, the thesis won’t be a failure. By testing the numerous
variants of the realist tradition and trying to link them together, by process of elimination, we can
identify what are the theoretical perspectives and possibilities of realism for futur e research. We
should be able to better place them in relation with other paradigms and by consequence, should
offer a closer image of how international politics work.
2. East Asia after the rise of China

The second part will be dedicated to under standing, explaining and synthesizing the most relevant
political events from the Far East and by trying to correlate them with the theories discussed in the
first part. We expect to find a theory that understand what happened in the region in the past thr ee
decades, to also explain the dynamics of the international system, and even to make reasonable
predictions for the development of international relations in the 21st Century. This part is on in its
incipient stage, so we expect that major changes will b e made along the way.

a) The systemic economic transition from Japan to China
After WW2, Japan and China were devastated by the conflict, as most of East and South Asia. The
region was far behind the Western hemisphere. In this context, under the pr otection of the United
States security umbrella, the Japanese economic miracle (which is up to this day the fastest
economic development in universal history) was realized and in just three or four decades, Japan
became from a country that faced total anni hilation to the state with second economy in the world,
surpassing even the Soviet Union and being perceived by some Americans (including respected
scholars) as a competitive threat to their own economic superiority. Learning from the Japanese
model, the A sian Tigers also reached incredible growth rates in terms of development (not only
from an economic point of view, but also in terms of education, science, democratization and
quality of life). Before submitting to the Asian economic crisis from 1997, Japa n has created a
complex economic and diplomatic network of developed and developing states in the Pacific. If
we detach ourselves and try to understand this in comparative terms, the network coordinated by
Japan will have an impact on the history of the 21st Century comparable to the network created by
the European colonial powers in the 15th Century. In geo -economic and geopolitical terms, the

23
center of the world has shifted from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. The 21 of the Asia –
Pacific Economic Cooperation represent 60% of the World’s GDP and almost 50% of its trade.
From 1970 to 2010, the average GDP growth for East Asia was 4,6% and for South -East Asia was
5,9%. It’s almost enough to look at this numbers to understand that the future of the int ernational
system in the 21st century will be decided in the Pacific region, as most of international relations
scholars argue in that sense. The trade market in the region is marked by a wide variety of
developed economies like the US, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, The Asian
Tigers, and by developing countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippine, Laos, Thailand,
Myanmar, Cambodia, Mexico, Peru and Chile. The fast uneven growth rate and the inequalities in
the living standards will surely amplify the tensions. Although the Chinese economic
accomplishments were incredible, the fact that China (it’s not surprising that the speed of the
sustained economic growth rate of China is the second in universal history) also benefited from
this network is often misrepresented. By the end of 2010, China surpassed Japan as the second
economy in the world an inherited a privileged position within the economic system from the Far
East. Having the capability to export raw materials and very cheap products, but also high quality
goods (that adds a considerable plus value to the product) at a very competitive price, while
providing a huge diverse internal market that demands the imports of both raw materials but also
high tech products, China has th e potential to assume the leadership of the most important trade
network in the world. In this chapter we would like to understand the economic and political
position of China within the system by understanding the whole process. What was the role played
by China in 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020 and what is the role that Beijing is going to play by 2050?
Since many scientists predict that China will surpass the US economy in just a couple of years,
will China become a hegemonic power in a unipolar system or we wou ld look at a bipolar system
with two coalitions? A third scenario will be multipolarity, where the world is dominated by
several spheres of influence and the Pacific will also be divided accordingly. Considering that
China’s economy is slowing down (many e conomists predict a Chinese economic bubble that will
create a great world financial crisis) and it faces great internal problems (demography, pollution,
inequality between regions etc.), can we learn something from the example offered by Japan’s
economic rise, stagnation and slow decline? How can China deal with this structural difficulties?
As China is much more aggressive in its foreign policy, but also applies many smart soft power
policies, will Beijing be able to fully inherit the economic network of the Pacific and can its

24
leadership be recognized by the other Asian states? With the support of the United States, will
Japan manage to act as a vital diplomatic intermediary that can balance the odds and attract many
states in forming an economic coalitio n against China, especially considering that Japan originally
inspired the economic and social development of the Pacific? Will the economic ties, trade
agreements and protectionist measures be followed by political and military alliances?

b) The connection of the Pacific with the rest of the world
Although we have stated that we will focus on the Pacific area, this chapter will include three
elements from outside the region that we consider that will greatly influence the balance of power
in the F ar East, but also within the international system.
Number one is analyzing the spheres of influence in Africa and how the competition between the
United States, China, (and even to some extent Japan) will unfold. We want to see if the strategies
adopted by the US and China are different, why and how. Can the Chinese soft power compete
with the American one? Africa is a significant new trade market and investment market (is the
region with the fastest grown rates in the world, although we should also conside r that those states
still have many decades to catch up and the general social, demographic and military instability
can hinder this in the future), it also holds huge amounts of raw materials and countless very rare
resources that can be used in the produ ction of new technologies, and the area between East Africa
and the Arabian Peninsula is a vital strategic point as from there the export of oil and gas goes to
Singapore and from there to the rest of Asia. A blockade of the Bab -el Mandeb strait (Yemen) ca n
prove to be a great (if not fatal) blow to the economy of China and other developed states from
East Asia. We will also support this by adding comparative tables with the situation in each state,
the investments until the present and the perspectives, an approximation of the prestige of China
and US in Africa and so on.
Number two is analyzing the feasibility of China’s Belt and Road project as an attempt to revive
the Silk Road. Can it be implemented and will the continental trade income be significant e nough
to boost further economic growth and to balance the Trans -Pacific Partnership and other economic
coalitions formed against China? Even more important, in the context of tense relations between
Russia and the West, will this project attract Moscow, br inging into this Central Asia (Eurasian
Economic Union; their added GDP results in almost 3 trillion dollars and the potential of growth
is still considerable) and improve the relations between the two countries? Will this finally led to

25
an alliance of Chi na and Russia against the West? Will the EU support this and reach a compromise,
resulting a Europe divided between the US -UK interests and France – Germany -Russia interests?
Number three is the possible Trans -Atlantic Partnership. Discussed for more than t wo decades, a
privileged trade agreement between US and EU looks like a farfetched scenario. However, if it
realized, it will become the greatest trade market in the world, capable to compete with the Pacific
trade network. Given the threat represented by China, and a highly possible massive migration into
Europe from Sub -Saharan Africa (most probably the biggest migration that will happen in this
century), we can’t exclude the possibility that the Western powers will manage to surpass their
objections and even the majority of the public opinion might shift in favor of a deal (until this day,
most of the citizens from both sides of the Atlantic opposed a Trans -Atlantic treaty). In order to
answer these questions, in addition to a qualitative analysis that wi ll try to determine if the political
decisions will incline in one way or another, we also want to sketch a quantitative overview of the
economic and demographic figures implicated in this and create hypothetical projections based on
that. By taking the tw o perspectives into account we increase the probability of better
understanding the possible international developments and have an overview over them that is also
rooter in the material world.

c) Between democratic and hierarchical societies
Here w e will correlate the statistical data from part 1, chapter c, and analyze the internal variables
that are relevant for the international relations in Asia. We think that the rise of nationalism in the
particular context explained above has the potential to stimulate internal strife, public protests,
revolts, and even revolutions (strong secession movements like the ones from West Papua should
also be examined). The result of those clashes may establish some democratic systems in Asia, but
it is also very po ssible that the final result of those interactions would be the creation of entirely
different political organizations than in liberal democracies. Irrespective of the results, the public
turmoil will legitimize and encourage political leaders to act more aggressively in external politics
than they normally would in a perfect rational world. This phenomenon can be observed both in
their attitude towards their immediate neighbors, but also in their relations with the United States
and China. For now we will give only the examples of South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
South Korea is a liberal democracy only in appearance. This state was created and sustained with
the direct implication of the United States. Until recent times, the country was ruled by

26
authorit arian presidents that were actually military dictators. For example, the ex -president of
South Korea was Park Geun -hye, the daughter of general Park Chung -hee, a general who ruled the
country from 1963 to 1979. The Western media was delighted with the prem iere choice of a
woman as head of state, without thinking about her past. Park Geun -hye was impeached in 2016
for a grave corruption case that involved major companies like Samsung. Elections were held and
Moon Jae -in became president in 2017. Under the pr essure of the younger generation who wanted
further democratization reforms, Moon Jae -in started to have a more nationalistic approach
towards the US and entered again in conflict with Japan on the matter of comfort women. From a
strategic realist point of view, it was a mistake to do so because the coalition against China and
North Korea is now weakened. Even though the former president was corrupt, she represented the
traditional political system in Korea and she had a more balanced approach in foreign po litics. It’s
normal that big companies from South Korea or Japan have a bigger influence over politics
because they represent the natural heir of the aristocratic families who ruled those countries for
centuries. Foreign pressure towards a fast paced democ ratization stimulated this unpredictable
political imbalance.
Speaking of which, the protest in Taiwan were even more destabilizing. After decades of tensions,
their government, ironically ruled by their nationalistic party, wanted to sign a profitable tra de
with China in 2013. The agreement was suddenly canceled when nationalistic students stormed
the Parliament from Taipei. In response, the Kuomintang party tried to a coup d’état, but they
failed. In just a few days, more than 100,000 protesters occupied the streets of the capital and the
government was forced to resign. Now the tensions between the two states of China are getting
worse by the day, with a significant increasing military presence in the area.
A similar situation happened in Hong Kong, a sem i autonomous city -state. Beijing promised that
they will offer to the citizens of Hong Kong the right to elect their own president but they changed
their mind in the last moment, saying that they should elect a president from the list proposed by
the commu nist party. Thousands of protesters blocked the streets of Hong Kong in a movement
that lasted from 2013 to 2014. They no longer wanted to vote for a new president, but asked, in a
nationalist movement, for complete independence. China ignored their demand s and arrested their
political leaders, torturing them, and crushing any resistance. Our point here is that Hong Kong
have shown that there is a great potential for internal strife in China. There are tremendous
inequalities between East and South China on a side, and North and West China on the other. To

27
these inequalities we add language barriers and countless different ethnic groups and religious
beliefs. The middle class in China is quickly growing, and Beijing promotes building new urban
areas and the movement from rural areas of 300 million people in the next five years. Heavy
industrialization and infrastructure building are seriously affecting the natural environment. The
population is aging, putting pressure on the social system and the incredible e conomic growth rate
is slowing down. The Chinese elite and even the middle class are constantly traveling, seeing other
models of political organization and changing their mentality. Corroborating all the facts stated,
we can identify a serious potential p opular discontent.

d) The shift of traditional alliances?
This chapter will try to find out if we can find states that are either traditionally allied with the US,
either with China, and have the potential to switch sides. On one hand we have the Obama’s
historic visit in Vietnam (traditionally closer to China), and on the other hand the new tensions
between Philippines and the US (traditionally in the American sphere of influence). We would
like to offer a better idea of our incipient perception over this with an example.
Philippine as a national state was created by the colonization of the Spanish Empire. At the end of
the nineteenth century, the United States took the place of their Spanish counterparts, and since
then they had a great political influence in the area. Manila had a special and traditional diplomatic
and economic relation with Washington. Moreover, in the last decade, China has repeatedly
violated the maritime space of Philippines, ignoring any decisions given by the International
Courts. According to any logical geopolitical strategy, this should have strengthened the relations
between the US and Philippines. This normal dynamic happened only up to a point. Things
changed dramatically in 2016, when Rodrigo Duterte was elected as pr esident. Duterte was a
prosecutor which became famous for organizing death squads meant to eliminate drug dealers.
Using his popularity, he became the mayor of Davao city, a position that he held for 22 years. In
this period the town was pacified and the c rime rate dropped, but with the price of the deaths of
thousands of people, some of them innocent collateral victims. Then he became the president of
the country after a populist and nationalistic campaign directed to anything foreign, promising that
he wi ll annihilate all the drug dealers and communists. Soon after he gained office, Duterte has
accused the US of neocolonial practices and used a language that departs a lot from the diplomatic
one, to say the least. Obama’s official visit was canceled, and s ince then the allegiance of

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Philippines has slowly moved closer to China, buying weapons and obtaining significant loans
from the Chinese. US tried to reconcile, using Japan as intermediary but with little success. The
growing alliance with China clearly g oes against the realist principle of balancing the revisionist
powers (that in this case is also an immediate threat with offensive capabilities due to the proximity
of China with Philippines and the difference in military force) and goes against a rationa l and
traditional foreign policy of Philippines. Realist constructivism can better explain the situation.
Philippines is a fast developing country and the economic growth brings many social problems
like inequality, large movement of population from rural to urban centers, the growth of crime
rates and so on. To those social pressures we add the fight between the government and drug
dealers and communist guerillas. Even more worrying is the revival of the ISIS terrorist movement
in Philippines. In the same time, the prestige of the United States as a democratic and peacekeeper
nation in general, has suffered greatly in the last 20 years. Washington is the first to blame because
they repeatedly applied double standards in their foreign policy and interfered w ith the national
sovereignty of other states for the sake of vague liberal values, even though in many times they
had no core interest to begin with. The rise of China in Asia made the US to push even further with
their agenda, infuriating many, rememberin g them of the colonial past and encouraging Pan -Asian
sentiments. In this chaotic and desperate context, the people of Philippines have elected Duterte, a
very unusual candidate, making an emotional choice in hoping to find a national savior. Then he
respo nded according to the historical and cultural framework that we outlined above, pushing
internal and external policies that are more emotional than rational. To conclude, we think that the
current trend continues, there is a great chance that some sort of dictatorial regime will gradually
grow in Philippine. We cannot avoid to observe that there are many similar variables between this
chase and what happened in Japan in the interwar period. Duterte is not to blame, he is just the
effect, not the cause. If t he political environment stays the same, even when he will finish his
mandate, the situation will only become worse.

e) The competition between India and Pakistan
Due to structural problems, India and Pakistan will remain at the status of regional powers. On the
other hand, both of them offer a huge developing market, both of them trained a considerable
active military force, both have nuclear weapons and both are antagonistic (the Kashmir conflict
is still very much alive). Moreover, both of them have trade relations and are buying weapons from

29
the United States, China and the Russian federation. In sum, despite their great internal problems,
India and Pakistan are formidable forces that could tip the balance of power in Asia. Because of
that, we w ant to test what is the most probable scenario. If India and Pakistan are going to remain
relatively neutral (trying to benefit from both sides), or if they will clearly pick a side in the future,
when the protectionist measures and political tensions will rise between the US and China.
Secondly, given the potential for development of India, the past conflict borders with China (Tibet –
Nepal) and their ambition to get rid of what they could perceive as neocolonial Western
influence, we will try to test if N ew Delhi will opt for in for a path that can make them the leaders
of a coalition of neutral states.

f) Terrorism and ISIS in Asia
Again, we will correlate the quantitative date from part 1 and try to understand the dynamics of
terrorism in Asia and to check if the religious cleavages Christian -Muslim -Buddhist can create a
new power center for terror (leaving the obvious Pakistan and Afghanistan aside, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, India, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Bhutan, and West China are especi ally
vulnerable to Islamic terrorism but also to revenge acts coming from radical Buddhists, Hindu –
Saffron terror, and Christians). Despite the great media coverage, the attacks from Sri Lanka were
actually not unusual and given the demographic, social an d economic dynamic; they can only
increase in numbers. We have already specified that we also want to answer the following question:
to what degree are the terrorist acts capable of destabilizing the region and how will the great
powers and region powers r eact to this new threat?

g) North Korea and the possibilities a nuclear war
North Korea is an anomaly within the Pacific system. The lack of information in regards to internal
affairs and the fact that is the only fully totalitarian state in the region that also has the potential to
develop nuclear weapons and the means to project them on middle range missiles makes
Pyongyang’s intentions really hard to read. In this chapter we have two objectives. Firstly, to
analyze North Korea’s position and th e behavior of the United States and China as a response.
Was Obama’s liberal position efficient? Was Beijing ready to occupy North Korea if things went
out of any reasonable control? Will North Korea resist as a state given its internal problems? Is a
Kore an unification possible? What was the role played by South Korea and Japan in the

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negotiations between Trump and Kim Jong -un? Was the American strong implication in North
Korea perceived by China as a direct threat and a diplomatic defeat? What are the act ions that can
be taken by Xi Jinping in response? Secondly, since the discussion about North Korea is driven
towards nuclear weapons, we will try to resume the classical debate of structural realists in relation
to the possibilities of nuclear warfare in g eneral. Will a unipolar/bipolar/multipolar system enhance
the probability of a nuclear war and to what degree of probability?

h) Economy and the Trans -Pacific Partnership
The negotiations for the Trans -Pacific Partnership started in 2005 and ended i n 2016. It was
supposed to be the greatest foreign policy legacy of Obama’s presidency but with the election of
Trump, the United States retreated from the deal. In 2015 we have written an unfinished case study
to measure what impact will this treaty have on international relations and we have concluded that
TPP would become the greatest economic market in the world. We have also anticipated from
back then that even if the United States will retreat from the deal, the rest of the states will ratify
the trea ty. This was later confirmed by the declarations of the ambitious Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe (In 2017, the former Japanese ambassador in Romania, his Excellency Kisaburo Ishii, at a
conference that he held at UAIC, confirmed my impression that the TPP proje ct will continue
without the US). The result was the document called The Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership, which contained almost the same provisions as the
former treaty. Not taking into consideration the United States , it was signed by 11 states: Japan,
Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Peru, Chile, Brunei.
Even without Washington’s support, the combined GDP of the 11 states represents 13.5 trillion
dollars (13.4% of the world's GDP) , and it has become the third single market in the world after
EU and NAFTA. The document has entered in effect from 30th December 2018, as it was ratified
by 7 states: Japan, Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam. This chapter
will have a strong quantitative approach in trying to measure the long term impact of the treaty,
the possible new joiners, including US (maybe after the end of Trump’s mandate), Taiwan (if the
US will join), and South Korea (after the WW2 issues with Japan wil l be properly negotiated). Is
this economic alliance capable of enriching the diplomatic ties between those countries and also
turn into a military block? Also, we will analyze what will China do in this situation, how the
International Bank of China can a ttract other states in its sphere of influence in the Pacific area,

31
but also to compare TPP’s potential with the Belt and Road Initiative and with TTIP (both in terms
of understanding the probability of materializing a deal and measuring what the real econ omic and
political impact will be).

i) The Japanese dilemma and territorial claims
In his book The rise and fall of Great Powers , Paul Kennedy predicted in 1977 that Japan will not
only plan a major economic and diplomatic, but also a prominent po litical and military role when
Tokyo will decide to militarize itself. Although with a much weakened economy, under Shinzo
Abe’s charismatic rule and with the encouragement of the US, Japan seems ready to do this historic
step. With only 0.9% of its GDP i nvested in military sector (46 billions), Japan is already in the
top 10 military powers of the world. If this is increased up to 3% (150 billions), and with the
support of the US military expertise, the country of the Rising Sun will become the facto the third
military power in the Pacific. Due to this, we believe that the claims of Japan, China and Taiwan
on the tiny and uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu/ Diaoyutai islands is the most important source of
conflict between China and US -Japan -South Korea in terms o f conventional warfare. The conflict
has reignited in 2011, when Japan wanted to privatize the islands and a Japanese businessman tried
to buy them. From China’s perspective, this act was seen as a subtle attempt to take control of the
South China Sea. Sin ce then, the entire zone has become very militarized, with Japanese and US
battleships and airplanes going dangerously close to the Chinese ones. The conflict can be
explained through the logic of power politics because Senkaku represents an important stra tegic
point and experts estimate that under the islands there are important gas and oil reserves. What
cannot be explained by a narrow realist simplification is the reaction of the Chinese population
regarding to this matter. In 2012, when the political le aders tried to negotiate through this situation
of crisis, many Chinese workers destroyed Japanese factories in China, attacking Japanese citizens
and burning Japanese flags in the front of their embassy. In response, Japanese citizens started to
wave the imperial flag on the streets of Tokyo and shouted nationalistic slogans. Their nationalistic
behavior legitimized and influenced the Chinese and Japanese officials, making their public
declarations more aggressive as they become less inclined to reach a po litical compromise. In the
meantime, Japan has reacted to the economic rise of China by trying to modify its pacifist
constitution, starting a militarizing process, and passing a law on education that encourages
national pride, Shinto myths being again tau ght from the first grades, and by the official visit of

32
Shinzo Abe to the Shinto shrines in order to pay homage to their Second World War heroes. China
and her allies have reacted with propagandistic declarations, claiming that Japan has returned to
their imperial ambitions. Remembering the imperial past of Japan, many Asian countries
responded in the same way and sided with China. In a later phase, and with the diplomatic
arbitration of the United States, many countries realized that China represents a gre ater danger,
and shifted their allegiance towards the US -Japan coalition. Leaving the considerations of power
politics aside, many Asian countries sided with Japan because Japan was the nation that created
the general trade framework from the Pacific in th e in the seventies and eighties. Tokyo has been
a development model for the Asian tigers, and this is why they perceived Japan as a more reliable
ally. The combination of rational power calculations and cultural perceptions seems to us to be
obvious in the Far East. For example, we have the case of South Korea in 2015. They made a deal
with Japan regarding the comfort women problem, an unresolved dispute for decades. In December
2017 the conflict reappeared when Moon Jae -in, the new populist president of So uth Korea, has
claimed that the deal must be renegotiated because Japan needs to offer additional historical
apologies to the Korean citizens. Tokyo responded that the deal is not negotiable, that they have
already apologized many times and that enough tim es has passed since the last war (they have
delivered, on several occasions, significant funds to both the Korean State, but also to the victictism
and their relatives). This kind of toxic and pointless interactions only creates a void in the US –
Japan -South Korea coalition, making it incapable to firmly react to the intrusions of China in the
Pacific Ocean or to North Korea’s nuclear tests.
In addition to Senkaku, other focal points where the probability of conventional warfare is higher,
is represented by Taiwan (in his memoirs, Kissinger highlighted that Mao told him that the Chinese
Civilization is patient, and will wait even one hundred years to retake Taiwan) and by the conflicts
of China with its immediate neighbors from the South China Sea and East Ch ina Sea in regards to
the rights of territorial waters).

j) Between Soft Power and Unrestricted Warfare
This chapter will examine the other strategies implemented by the Pacific states and seek to
understand power not only from the limited nuclear warheads/conventional military –
resources/economy. Instead we will focus on measuring the relative prestige of the US and China
in the eyes of the other states and citizens from the region and how can they be attracted through

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diplomacy, propaganda and persuasion. We will also want to include the new strategies of
unrestricted warfare (we have recently found a book written by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui
with this title and we find the terminology as very appropriate), looking at the possibilities of the
political actors to reflect power through a limited war using intermediaries, high tech weapons that
can influenc e the balance of power, guerrilla tactics using soldiers that are not officially enrolled
in any army, cybernetic warfare, espionage and so on.

k) International institutions, NGO’s and multinational companies
In order to be completely fair with the numerous critics that will come from liberal or constructivist
perspectives, we would to test if we should include other actors in a balance of power theory,
putting them on equal footing with states, or at least if we can affirm that they have a significa nt
influence on the power struggle (either at the level of the third image, or at the level of the second
image). Will their influence be just contextual, as a result of one state using and manipulating the
institutions and different groups as a tool for i ts own strategies, or because prestige is an important
element of power recognized by realism, ignoring a treaty or an agreement that was taken within
an organization that holds both states and other political actors, could cause costs that will make
state leaders reconsider their position, as David Held suggests?

l) The balance of power in Asia – Pacific
The chapter will try to synthesize all the elements of power mentioned in the previous chapters
and try to see if our theory and main assumptions from the first part can pass the tests of logical
connections and empirical evidence. This will have a conclusive role where we will try to explain
why the international system and the political dynamics from the Pacific are the way they are, and
what are the most likely short and mid term scenarios.

m) A vision for the future?
A final chapter will be composed from taking the findings from the previous one and try to make
broader predictions and offer new perspectives for how the the international syst em will develop
and how the realist tradition can evolve.

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Conclusions:

One of the reasons we want to review sever al authors and variants of reali sm is to illustrate that
the realist tradition is much more complex than at first glance, and that a work centered on these
principles is still relevant in relation to more and more critics coming from the other paradigms.
Finally, we wanted to emphasize some features t hat we believe that will support our theoretical
approach:
1) The moral character of r ealism, its ability to adapt to the complex moral problems of the
21st century, the fact that the authors recognize the importance of common values in
international relations.
2) The f act that realism is not limited to military -economic factor s; or to state actors when
measuring power, the preference for these elements was more contextual and not an
absolute epistemological belief.
3) The various forms of structural realism and neoclassical realism show that a realist theory
that combines the three images of international relations is possible and is in accordance
with scientific norms.
4) In connection with point 1, realism constructivism demonstrates that the factors of
irrationality -perception -culture -ideas are perfec tly compatible with the basic principles of
realism.
5) Beyond a very general synthesis of these authors, and accentuating the four points from
above , we would like to see what other lesser -known specialists have to say , even if it’s
just at the introductory level (for example, a realist Chinese author Yan Xuetong) . This is
important because there are more and more accusations that the theories of international
relations strictly reflect a Western perspective.

Starting from here, our central hypothesis is the follow ing:

The international system will be multipolar, characterized by the areas of influence of the great
powers and regional powers, a system not much different from the 19th century Europe. In the
Pacific region , China's rise will slow down , while the relative decline of the United States will be
limited and will not lead to a total collapse, thus r eaching a strained balance o f power. In this

35
struggle, the main weapons will be: economic protectionist measures, free trade treaties limited to
certain states only, manipulation of international institutions, rule of law and NGOs f or the benefit
of the great powers , more or less conventional (limited intensity) warfare through intermediaries
(states, non -state actors ) . The liberal order will be just one of many other models of political
organization. There will be two major c oalitions (that already exist but t hey are not yet fully
formed) . The first one will be composed from Western, democratic states organized ar ound the
United States, but also including a few authoritarian countries (who have chosen this path from a
combination of strategic and cultural reasons). The coalition around China will be on the opposite
pole, more autho ritarian states and several democratic states (idem reasons ). A third coalition will
be formed from neutral states that have not yet been forced by geographical proximity to choose a
camp and / or try to maximize their power by collecting as many benefits as possible from both
sides. In addition, we also think that some countries will change the ir allegiance or give up their
neutrality only when the strategic -rational considerations will be joined by the cultural -emotional
ones.
In practice, this means a structural realism based on a balance of threats where economy and
prestige are much more important elements of power ( we have planned a subchapter in the second
part where we want to compare TPP -TTIP -Belt and Road) and the rational calculation of the power
struggle is marked by the culture / per ception / emo tional decision variable . These v ariables should
explain why the balancing of power does not always occur and should adapt the simplicity of
neorealism to the complexity of this age. To avoid the speculative path taken by Huntington , we
will quantify the c oncept of culture by analyzing much simpler data such as the rise of nationalism
(the perception of others about the rise of China, the historic al past of Japan and militarization, the
European colonial past, etc.) and terrorism in the region, inequality, economic d evelopment,
political culture and institutional structure. Finally, we wo uld like to add that many chapters from
the second part might suffer changes, as we have only aimed to highlight as ma ny possible
directions (that are worth exploring ) as possible .