„Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University Iași Faculty of philosophy and social -political sciences East Asia after the rise of China Scientific Coordinator :… [627974]

„Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University Iași
Faculty of philosophy and social -political sciences

East Asia after the rise of China

Scientific Coordinator : Student: [anonimizat], 2019

‘The world is neither unipolar, multipolar, nor chaotic —it is all three at the same time.’
Joseph S. Nye (The Future of Power)

‘International cooperation among the advanced industri alized countries since the end of World War II has
probably been more extensive than international cooperation among major states during any period of
comparable length in history.’
Robert O. Keohane (After Hegemony)

‘The United States has been at war for 2 out of every 3 years since the Cold War ended, we have fought 6
different wars. We are addicted to war. When you come to Washington, it’s like going to a place that is
constantly thinking about who the next target is.’
John J. Mearsheimer (Can China Ris e Peacefully?)

‘The relative strengths of the leading nations in world affairs never remain constant, principally because
of the uneven rate of growth among different societies and of the technological and organizational
breakthroughs which bring a greate r advantage to one society than to another.’

Paul Kennedy (The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers)

‘Facts are rarely self -explanatory; their significance, analysis, and interpretation – at least in the foreign
policy world – depend on context and relevanc e. (..) Information, to be truly useful, must be placed within
a broader context of history and experience to emerge as actual knowledge. And a society is fortunate if
its leaders can occasionally rise to the level of wisdom.’
Henry Kissinger (World Order)

‘Market forces and capitalism by themselves aren't sufficient to ensure the common good and to limit the
concentration of wealth at levels that are compatible with democratic ideals. Once constituted, capital
reproduces itself faster than output increase s. The past devours the future.’
Thomas Piketty (Capital in the twenty -first century)

Contents

Introduction ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………….. 2
John J. Mearsheimer: Can China rise peacefully? ………………………….. …………… 9
Joseph Nye: The Rise of China and American Power ………………………….. …….. 29
Recent developments in the Pacific
North Korea ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……… 51
Taiwan ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……………… 61
Senkaku/ Diaoyudao/ Diaoyutai Islands ………………………….. ……………………… 71
Conclusions ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …………. 86
Technical Annex ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …..94
Bibliography ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……… 104

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Introduction

Will the rise of China cau se an inevitable clash with the United States? For many scholar s, this
will be the most important question of the 21st Century. Without having the ambition to settle the
debate on this topic, as we don’t think that this is possible, our paper aims to under stand and explain
what are the consequences of China’s rise in East Asia, focusing on the last thirty years, but we
also want to anticipate what are the most probable outcomes that might occur and affect the
international system as a result of this interac tion.
Why is this subject so important? Firstly, because the rise of China is a remarkable development
in itself, and has no equal in contemporary history. There are many useful lessons that can be
learned from the formidable challenges that Beijing has ma naged to surpass, but also numerous
insightful conclusions that can be made base d on their mistakes. Comparison represent one the
most simple and helpful methodological approaches in social sciences. Secondly, because the
study of international relations h as revealed countless examples where the rapid ascension of a
great revisionist power led to a n inevitable conflict with the hegemonic status quo establishment.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that if a major war would take shape until 2050, this will
implicate China and the United States. Thirdly, even if a violent conflict is avoided, the Pacific
and by extension East Asia, remains the region of the world with the biggest concentration of
wealth, trade volume and value, military power and population. The intricate politic, economic
and demographic dynamics that arise between developed and developing countries, democracies,
flawed democracies and authoritarian states, placed in a wider context of new transitional
challenges and growing nationalist movem ents, makes this topic worth studying, even if we would
conclude that war between major powers has become obsolete.
Our work is divided in t hree chapters , followed by a technical annex that will illustrate the most
relevant statistical data in the form of charts, and some maps that offer a better overview about the
strategic landscape . The chapters are: John J. Mearsheimer: Can China rise peacefully?, Joseph
Nye: The R ise of China and American Power, Recent developments in the Pacific . To the question
addre ssed in our thesis, John Mearsheimer concludes that the answer is most probably yes, whilst
Joseph Nye thinks that the answer is most probably no. Why from all the gifted authors from the
international relations scholarship, have we picked those two? One o f the reason s is that both of

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them are the leading figures of the theoretical paradigm that they represent and they have tackled
this complex problematic without any hesitation, being invited at organized public debates held in
prestigious universities fro m all over the world. John Mearsheimer is the founder of the neorealist
offensive theory, and Joseph Nye is the founder (together with Robert Keohane) of the neoliberal
theory, and the inventor of the Soft Power and Smart Power concepts in international re lations.
The main motivation is given by our belief that in relation to the rise of China, John Mearsheimer
and Joseph Nye represent the two faces of the same coin. Mearsheimer is the most prolific
neorealist scholar that is still active, and his radical power politics position is maybe one of the last
courageous stands against liberal hegemony, belonging to a long and old argumentative tradition.
Still, Mearsheimer is also very open to criticism and is willing to have a constructive dialogue. In
comparison with other liberal academics that focus a great deal on the individual, civil rights,
NGO’s, international organizations, internal affairs and so on, Nye is a moderate liberal thinker
that is prepared to make many theoretical concession in relation to the realist tradition, but in the
same time he is capable of offering a viable and sophisticated alternative to the realist narrative.
Due to this, our first two chapters won’t be two monologues that will tell us two totally different
stories about the rise o f China. Instead, they will actually be a complex dialogue composed from
a tremendou s amount of up to date facts corroborated with intricate logical argumentation s,
offering new possibilities for future research. As the discussion is enough complicated as it is, we
will refrain from offering any personal opinion about what Mearsheimer and Nye say during the
two chapters. For that matter , in order to make their thesis as clear as possible, we will do our best
to play the advocate’s role and support their cla ims with as many facts and statistics as possible,
and also to explain, develop and follow the narrative into the depths of their reasoning. Even when
it will seem that our intervention might contradict their claims, the purpose of this will only be to
offer more perspectives that can enrich the discussion, and not because we necessary don’t agree
with them. Our own take about the rise of China and about John Mearsheimer and Joseph Nye will
be present on the third chapter and in the conclusion section.
The third part of our thesis will be divided in three subchapters. We totally agree with Mearsheimer
and Nye that those three disputes represent the most substantial source of conflict between the
United States and China and we propose to concentrate our analy sis on them. In addition to
explaining the utmost importance of North Korea, Taiwan and the Senkaku islands for the future
peace and stability of the world, we will also sketch a short overview about other present and future

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possible hot zones of violent conflict and explain why we should take them into account. We will
also introduce and try to prove two hypothesis that we find original. Our first hypothesis is that
even though North Korea, Taiwan and the Senkaku islands represent a strong case for a futur e
casus belli, the last dispute is the heart of the American and Chinese competition in the Pacific. If
a war would ever broke out between the two great powers, and we will have to point out to a
specific place on the map, it would most probably be over th e Senkaku islands. Our second
hypothesis is that the three disputes are closely linked to each other and by consequence, the
emergence of one dispute has the real potential to create a tragic domino effect, not much unlike
the one from World War One. The h ighest probability of war between China and the United States
will be reached if we will witness the simultaneous development of those three crisis in a relatively
very short period of time.
Before passing to the actual discussion, we would like to make so me short preliminary remarks
about the theoretical framework and the main assumptions that are the running engine of this thesis.
We will detail the relevant concepts in the next chapters, but we want to make a very short
introduction into the realist and liberal tradition, so even the readers who might not be familiar
with the international relations theory scholarship, would have a clearer image about the essential
ideas that are the pillar for this debate. To better understand the differences between the se related
theories , we must first look at how this field of study is conceptualized. The theoretical part of
international relations scholarship supposes a multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and
transdisciplinary incursion into political philosophy, phi losophy of morals, political anthropology,
political economy, strategic studies, sociology, social psychology , universal history and so on .
Although international relations scholars are divided on many matters, t hey all agree that we can
simplify the polit ical reality by using t hree levels of analysis that were first introduced by the realist
paradigm .
The individual level tries to understand the political world, starting from the roots of any society
and focusing on the traits of human nature. Is there an y universal human nature that can be defined
and quantified? Is man evil or good by nature? Is h e able to surpass his significant flaws by the
means of education and morals? Is universal history heading towards progress or is it just an
illusion? Can a soc iety be governed and reorganized in a radical way by purely rational means or
can it be ruled by its old and outdated traditions? A re political interactions motivated mainly by

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strategic calculations or are they driven by unpredictable emotions? Should a s ociety be organized
in a way that prioritizes the development of the individual or the growth of the community as a
whole? How can we reach an optimal balance between security and freedom? The previous
examples represent only a small fraction of the main c oncerns debated in the academic arena.
The second level wants to explain the behavior of the political actors like national states,
international organizations, NGO’ s, multinational companies, secessionist factions or any other
substantial forms of politi cal organization. Institutions, diplomacy, statecraft and the decisions of
political leaders are discussed in detail. Some academics are focusing more on internal politics and
on highlighting the local cultural and institutional context, while others take internal events into
consideration only if they are directly relevant for the foreign policy of that country. Here we can
find a process where we investigate the social phenomena firstly by examining the relevant
political actors, then we look at the relat ions and connections of those actors with each other, and
then we finally return to the social phenomena in order to make conclusions based on that
theoretical and empirica l experience. The logical framework on which we build the argumentation
for explaini ng the main causes of World War One is the same as if we will try to explain the causes
for the expansion of terrorism. Scientists that interact with this second image of research are also
borrowing profound assumptions from the first level.1
The third wa y of explaining international relations was born from an epistemological belief that
originated from Auguste Comte, the father of positivism in social sciences. Rejecting the
traditional speculative way of reasoning promoted in social sciences, the 19th century French
philosopher proposed a bridge between theory and empirical tests that will bring the humanities
closer to natural and physical sciences. Developed much later, international relations study firstly
borrowed this ideal in the late 70’s and 80’ s in the context of the Cold War and was also influenced
by the dominant social science behaviorist paradigm from that time.2 Translated into the political
universe, the third image rejects the previous theories as inherently subjective and overly complex.
Limiting the goals of the research and simplifying the reality on purpose, these new families of
theories stated that we should explain the most import ant developments in global politics by
observing the system as a whole. Like cells and organs that exist i n a human body, v arious

1 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis , Columbia University Press, New York, 2001
2 Idem, Theory of International Politics , Waveland Press, United States, 2010

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individuals and political actors live within a system. The way that the system works overall
influences in a much greater way the fate and decisions of its different parts in comparison with
less important variables like th e particu lar traits of a supposed human nature or the development
of a specific domestic institutional structure. By means of this reasoning, some liberals concluded
that obtaining peace in this world is closer than we think because the global commercial and
instit utional network develope d in the last century made us dependent on each other and the costs
of a conflict would exceed by far the risky gains of a total war.3 Other realist thinkers claimed the
opposite, stressing on the fact that in the absence of an enti ty stronger than national states that will
guarantee peace, the parts of the system , regardless of their good or bad intentions, will be trapped
in a security dilemma that will create an inevitable circle of violence and war. At the same time,
some neo-Marxists concluded that the real political competition is given by a capitalist global
system with core countries , semi periphery countries, and periphery countries , which was born in
the 15th century, together with the European exploration and colonization age.4
From this short summary we can identify several main characteristics of the international relations
study . Mearsheimer theoretical stand is that only the third imagine really matters. Like many other
liberals, Nye acknowledges the validity of the thre e images of international relations, but he also
explains that things are much more complicated than that. Neoliberalism is much more
preoccupied to understand how the interactions between the three images work and conclud es that
the study of international relations is not limited, nor decisively marked, only by power politics.
Most of them recognize that the state is the most important political actor from the global arena
and that the system is anarchical, but liberalism also highlights that many other no n-state actors
are very influential. The most used examples are state leaders, individuals that militate for their
rights , large groups of protesters, multinational companies, NGO’s, international organizations,
terrorist organizations, international crime , and guerrilla movements of secession. Transnational
problems like climate change or pollution can’t be solved by a national state alone, no matter how
powerful it is, because the causes and effects of those issues are by definition global in scale. On
many issues, other political actors might be much stronger than a national state, and might
constrain countries into making compromises. Also, due to the changing nature of the international

3 This has a long tradition, from Normal Angell to Robert O. Keohane. Norman Angell, The Great Illusion , Cosimo
Classics, New York, 2007; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy, Princeton University Press, United States, 2005
4 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World -System I, University of California Press, London, 2011

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system, military power and conquest is less important than in the p revious centuries. Institutional
organization and domestic politics in general can also determine the foreign policy of a state in a
decisive way. Since the political agenda is not stunned into an eternal security competition between
states, but actually i s always changing due to numerous unpredictable factors, states won’t be so
obsessed to maximize their relative power, as many realists believe. Transnational issues,
transportation, communication and economic interdependence are strong incentives for
nego tiation, compromises and cooperation. One of the most significant difference s between
realism and liberalism relate to a basic assumption that influences the development of the whole
theoretical narrative. Both agree that humans are flawed selfish rational actors that try to follow
their interests but the general frame where humans make decisions is understood in a very different
way. In the words of Mearsheimer’s explanation, realists think that humans are, first and foremost,
social beings in search of th eir individuality, when liberals reason that humans are individuals that
sign a social contract. If you understand the individual as a part of a community, then the chances
of conflict increase because groups have stronger reasons to clash than isolated in dividuals. If you
understand that defending the inalienable rights of an individual is the fundamental purpose of a
society, then the chances of collaboration are automatically increasing because those rights are
universal. This epistemic belief explains w hy realists are placing so much focus on conflict, groups
and are always relating to national states, and why liberals are much more sensitive in regards to
human rights, and are more optimistic about the possibilities of a healthy competition and
collabor ation.
A productive dialectic can blossom from the interaction of the two paradigms. We should also not
forget that both realism and liberalism are the product of the Western Civilization and that their
origin lies in the combination of the Greco -Roman ide al, Christianity, and a particular type of
rationality from the Enlightenment era. How could ever a theoretical family that has such a
background be immoral or amoral? We argue that the moral tension between realism and liberalism
can be observed throughou t the specialized literature, especially when the thesis of a realist or
liberal scholar starts with criticizing the other paradigm, like in a mirror. The option of a realist
scholars to shift towards a more conservative or liberal discourse depended much on the historical
context, on their personal experience, and on their own sense of morality.

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Because liberalism has been the core American ideology since its beginning, neoliberal theories
in international relations receive much more appreciation and finan cial support in the United States
and Western Europe, although realism has dominated the academic debates for decades. Realism
is much more appreciated in other parts of the world, including China. As the gap between the two
families of theories has become wider, many experts consider that realism was excellent in
explain ing the history of international relations up to the 20th century, but is now outdated , and
liberalism is much more adequate to explain the world that we live in. John Mearsheimer has a
different opinion. ‘ The claim that realism has bitten the dust is wrong. In fact, realist theories are
likely to dominate academic debates about international politics for the next century, much the
way they have since at least the early days of the C old War.’5

5 John J. Mearsheimer, Realism, The Real World, And The Academy, Conference, International Studies Association;
Millennial reflections on international studies; 2002; University of Michigan Press, Lo s Angeles, p. 24

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John J. Mearsheimer: Can China rise peacefully ?

John J. Mearsheimer argues that China cannot rise peacefully and that this will have a profound
impact on the international system. His prediction in regards to China can be divided in three p arts.
The first part is composed from the main principles of offensive structural realism, a theory that
he introduced in the famous book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics .6 The second part is much
more empirically driven, as Mearsheimer analyses the his tory of the United States from the
founding fathers, up to present days. The point of this historical analysis is to understand the rise
of the United States, from its meagre colonial past up to first power of the world. The author then
returns to the main principles of his theory and claims that they explain the foreign policy of
America in the past three centuries and that there is a very high possibility that the rise of China
will be very similar. Finally, the third part is purely speculative, as Mearsh eimer himself
recognizes, because it tries to predict how the international system will look in 2050 , assuming
that China will continue to develop and grow with the same relative rate as in the past 30 years .7
In order to realize this, he takes the main ar guments from the first two parts and correlates them
with recent events in trying to predict how the great powers will behave and what kind of coalitions
will b e formed. He also admits that his theory is not without flaws, discussing the main critics in
regards to his assumptions and conclusions.
Offensiv e realism has 5 main principles:
1) States are the principal actors in international relations and the system is anarchical,
meaning that there is no higher authority than the states and that no one above the states
can impose an international order.
2) Although military capabilities might vary greatly from one state to another, every state in
the international system has an offensive capability that can threaten the survival of other
states.

6 Idem, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, Updated edition, New York, 2014.
7 Mearsheimer is not claiming that China will have an economic growth rate of 15% like in the ’80 and ‘90, those
rates were so high becaus e China was starting from a meagre level of development. However, most of the economic
forecasts predict that China will grow at an average annual rate of 6 -7% for the next 10 years. This will mean that
China will double its GDP in the next two decades. Me arsheimer also admits that respected economists predict that
China’s growth will be halted by structural problems and that his theory is solely based on the assumption that China
will continue to rise.

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3) States are can never predict with 100% accuracy what other states will do, especia lly if we
consider future intent ions.
4) States have a great variety of goals but their priority is to survive because without survival
they can’t follow any other aims.
5) States are rational actors that will try to maximize their power by following comp lex
strategies in order to pursue their egoistic interests.8
Mearsheimer extrapolates three conclusions from those principles. The first conclusion of
combining the five principles is that states, esp ecially great powers, fear each other. Fear in foreign
policy is most present when a country has a neighbor that has both considerable offensive
capability, but also serious intent ions to expand. If we take this to the level of the international
system, th en fear is much more intense when two or more great powers have both considerable
military capabilities, but also the political will to increase their sphere of influence. Furthermore,
because military capabilities can be estimated and even hidden offensiv e weapons can somehow
be quantified by using espionage, the incapability of predicting what other states will do is a more
important variable as a source of conflict than physical capabilities per say.9 Besides the problem
of not having access to perfect i nformation, even if we can somehow, for the sake of argument,
understand and completely anticipate what a political actor will do in the present and near future,
it is impossible to predict with absolute certainty what a state will do in the long run, when the
geopolitical, geoeconomic and domestic political context will be different. In addition to facing a
possible completely different strategic context, the leaders of those countries will be also different
persons, and not the diplomats, prime ministers, president and kings that you personally know
from your official visits (assuming that you are an impor tant policy maker ). Mearsheimer point is
that states don’t automatically have aggressive intent ions, but the fact that you can’t be sure of
what others w ill do creates international political tensions.
Fear is also accentuated by the anarchical political system because a state can only rely on itself
and other possible allies if its security is threate ned. As alliances are contextual, and there are no

8 Mearsheimer also reinforced his belief in regards to the importance and relevance of those principles in his latest
book: The Great Delusion. Liberal Dreams And International Realities. Yale University Press, United States, 2018.
9 The fact that perception is a key element of Mearsheimer’s theory is often u nderestimated. If his structural
offensive realism theory, which is quite simple and straightforward, is insisting on the importance of how political
actors perceive each other, we think that this suggests that the realist tradition is not a merely materia listic paradigm
and that ideas matter in the realist world. This should leave room for future research.

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eternal friends or eternal enemies in the political arena, then the only certain solution is self -help.
The second conclusion is that self -help is another major form of behavior in the international
system.
Finally, the third idea that can be deducted from a ll of the above is that states understand their
situation and conclude that their survival is assured if they become the strongest political actor in
the world or at least as strong as possible in relation to any rival.10 This brings us to a very
interestin g hegemonic theory that Mearsheimer proposes.
Hegemony in world politics was often understood as dominating all the regions from the globe.
The American scholar borrows a theoretical element from the traditional geopolitical school of
thought and names it the blockading power of water. Although the navy and air force are the core
elements of projecting military power abroad, especially in the Contemporary era, the field army
remains the most important one because even if you defeat your enemy using superio r technology,
you still need troops on the ground to occupy the territory. However, as continents are separated
by oceans, it is very difficult to train, send and sustain (from a logistic and economic point of view)
huge numbers of troops overseas. ‘First, land power is the dominant form of military power in the
modern world. A state’s power is largely embedded in its army and the air and naval forces that
support those ground forces. Simply put, the most powerful states possess the most formidable
armies. Therefore, measuring the balance of land power by itself should provide a rough but sound
indicator of the relative might of rival great powers. Second, large bodies of water profoundly limit
the power -projection capabilities of land forces. When opposing armies must cross a large expanse
of water such as the Atlantic Ocean or the English Channel to attack each other, neither army is
likely to have much offensive capability against its rival, regardless of the size and quality of the
opposing armies. ’11 Beca use of this, on the long term, the defenders will have a decisive
advantage.12 Even if you man age to finally win the war, you will have to experience a completely

10 Power in this case is understood in terms of relative gains. To make this clear, according to this thinking, for
security reasons, it is better to onl y grow at a 5% rate if your principal rival grows with 2% per year, than to grow at
a 10% rate when your rival grows at 20% per year. Even if in the second case you are more powerful in absolute
comparative terms, you security is much more threatened and y ou risk losing everything that you have gained. For
example, the military and economic strength of Netherlands was much more pronounced in the 17th Century than in
the previous one, but its relative power was shaded by the rise of neighboring great powers like Great Britain and
France.
11 Idem, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, Updated edition, New York, 2014, p. 85
12 Mearsheimer highlights here the American experience in Korea and Vietnam.

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different geography and climate, alongside with populations with various institutions, religio ns,
mentalities, economic inequalities and social clusters that will make the implementation of policies
that can bring stability very complicated.13 This is especially hard if we take all of those elements
together, and we combine them with the revival of radical nationalism in the 21st Century.14 The
United States has such a secure position because is surrounded by two weak neighbors (Canada
and Mexico) and by two oceans (Pacific and Atlantic). All of those led to the conclusion that the
world is simply to o vast and complex to be conquered by one single hegemon. On the other hand,
due to better material and ideological conditions that are simply caused by proximity, regional
hegemony is possible. Regional hegemony means that a state has an undisputed sphere of influence
that it can control without having to face any serious security threats. Since that great power
understands that global hegemony is not possible, then its top security priority is to project and
concentrate its power (military, diplomatic, ec onomic) outside its area of influence in order to
make sure than no other great power will reach regional hegemony in the other parts of the world.
Defined in this way, a regional hegemon is also the most influential state in the international system
but is not a global hegemon because its interests are always challenged (often with success) outside
its immediate area of influence. In this case, why would a regional hegemon care so much if
another power obtains regional hegemony? Wouldn’t it be wiser just t o commit its resources in
order to develop the region that it’s already dominated? Mearsheimer argues that the reason is a
strategic view that favors relative ga ins. I f another power obtain s regiona l hegemony, the regional
hegemon won’t be able to free roa m in other parts of the world. A regional hegemon is able to
impose a significant amount of its interests within the international system because the other great
powers have numerous local problems and security challenges that they have to tackle. However,
if one of them reaches regional hegemony, the first hegemon will have to face a much stronger
resistance and in time, its own very secure region might be threatened.15

13 Again, the more recent examples of Iraq and Afghanistan speak for themselves.
14 For Mearsheimer, nationalism is the strongest political ideology in the world. We have to make two observations
here. Firstly, this statement is backed by hard empirical data. If we consider the special circumstance s of the Cold
War, nationalism was a driving political force from the 19th century up to present times. Following this logic, the
revival of nationalism in Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union is a completely natural social phenomena.
Secondly, we wan t to emphasize again that a closer analysis of this theory brings us to the conclusion that ideas
seem to be much more important in the realist world than at first glance.
15 For example, up to some extent, this was the case with the development of the Col d War and the Cuban Missile
Crisis. Once Moscow became strong enough, not only that they have challenged the American supremacy in Europe,
the Middle East and the Far East, but they have also placed a serious security threat close to the American border.
The fact that the Soviets were forced to retreat and overall this was a defeat for them is explained by the theory, as

13
Thanks to its special position, in the Contemporary era, this kind of regional hegemony was obtain
by the United States in the Western hemisphere. In order to prove this, the American scholar makes
a historical synthesis and explains what the last three centuries meant from an international
relations perspective. ‘The United States aggressiv ely pursued hegemony in the Western
Hemisphere during the nineteenth century, mainly to maximize its prospects of surviving in a
hostile world. It succeeded, and it stands as the only great power in modern history to have
achieved regional hegemony. The Un ited States did not attempt to conquer territory in either
Europe or Northeast Asia during the twentieth century, because of the great difficulty of projecting
power across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Nevertheless, it acted as an offshore balancer in
those strategically important areas. The stopping power of water also explains why the United
Kingdom never attempted to dominate Europe in the nineteenth century.’16 The first observation
is that the United States immediately took advantage of its position and engaged in a brutal and
constant campaign of conquest in order to reach regional hegemony. The American behavior on
the international arena was completely contrary to its speech in regards to promoting liberal and
democratic values. ‘When one consider s America’s aggressive behavior in the Western
Hemisphere, and especially the results, the United States seems well -suited to be the poster child
for offensive realism. (…) The United States established regional hegemony in the nineteenth
century by rele ntlessly pursuing two closely linked policies: 1) expanding across North America
and building the most powerful state in the Western Hemisphere, a policy commo nly known as
Manifest Destiny and 2) minimizing the influence of the United Kingdom and the other European
great powers in the Americas, a policy commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine .’17
The Manifest Destiny was represented by a series of conquests and territorial acquisitions that had
the final objective of obtaining regional hegemony, acts that were also motivated by a moral
argument that said t hat it’s the American destiny to liberate those regions (again, ideas played a
secondary, but important complementary role) . It started with the wars against the native tribes
(that were almost completely wipe d out) and with the acquisition of Louisiana from France in 1803,
continued with the war s with the United Kingdom and Canada (1812 -1815), the Texas annexation
from 1845, the war with Mexico (1846 -1848: when California, together with large areas of New

the defender had many more advantages and global hegemony was not obtainable (Khrushchev only planned with
this move to renegotiate the ba lance of power in other parts of the world).
16 Idem, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, Updated edition, New York, 2014 , p. 158
17 Ibid, pp. 214 -215

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Mexi co, Arizona, Nevada, Colorado and Utah were annexed ), the Gadsden Purchase from 1854
(when the United States bought from Mexico the southern parts from Arizona and New Mexico in
order to build a continental railroad) the Alaska purchase from Russia in 1867 , and ended with the
American – Spanish War from 1898, when the last European colonial power was expelled from
the Western Hemisphere. The American – Spanish War was initially motivated by the support of
the Americans for the independence of Cuba. This did n’t stopped the Americans to offer to buy
Cuba from the rebels in 18 97 and to incorporate Cuba as a protectorate at the end of the war. Cuba
gained its formal independence in 1902, but Washington supported the Island of Cuba Real Estate
Company , which had the clear objective of control ling Cuba’s economy. They have also forced
Cuba to sign the Platt Amendment that said that the United States can interfere in the internal
politics in the island country. The only reason s that explain why the Americans didn’t also annex
other Caribbean islands were related to internal consideration. The United Kingdom controlled
them and their relations were greatly improving, and in the same time the islands required a huge
amount of slave labor that brought upon several polit ical and social problems that were not worth
the price. On the Pacific side, i n 1893 Washington already extended its dominance west, past the
American continent towards Asia, bringing Hawaii to its control. In the aftermath of the American
– Spanish war, the Treaty of Paris from 1 898 specified that the Spanish control over the Philippines
will be transferred to the United States. In the next year, a strong movement of independence
started in the Philippines that culminated with a war. By 1902, their resista nce was crushed by the
Americans.18 On a historical scale, in just one century, the 13 modest American colonies that
settled on the Atlantic Coast of North America conquered most of the continent up to the Pacific
Coas t, obtained unchallenged contro l over this region of the world and projected its interests into
South and East Asia , becoming a veritable empire.
The Monroe Doctrine expressed in 1823 was also very relevant in relation to the above narrative.
This doctrine was proclaimed in the context of Lati n America wars of independence and it sounded
like the United States were ready to support countries like Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador,
Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia to obtain their independence19. In

18 Although the military casualties were limited to 25.000 – 30.000 soldiers, the co nflict caused famine and a cholera
epidemic that led to the death of almost 1 million civilians.
19 The Monroe Doctrine can also be understood as an effective soft power strategy, as defined by Joseph Nye. The
declaration had a profound effect on the histo ry of the region long before the United States had the actual economic
and military power to implement it.

15
reality, despite making a spe ech that proclaimed noble intent ions, the Monroe Doctrine was a
message for the European colonial powers (Portugal, Spain, France, Netherlands, United
Kingdom) that they should leave the Western Hemisphere and that even though the United State s
is not yet strong enough to take their place (the Monroe Doctrine was initially implemented by the
United Kingdom that had the military power to do so) , it is its destiny to dominate the region. This
destiny was fulfilled at the end of the Spanish Americ an war. ‘We owe it, therefore, to candor and
to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we
should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere
as dangerous to our peace and safety. (…) It is impossible that the allied powers should extend
their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and
happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves , would adopt it
of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition
in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and
those new Governments, and their distance f rom each other, it must be obvious that she can never
subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in
hope that other powers will pursue the same course.’20 If we read between the lines of this speech,
we can observe some clear underline messages. Firstly, why is the presence of the European
colonial powers perceived as a security threat for the United States? The answer is simple: because
Washington believed that the Western Hemisphere is their rightfully area of influence. This
becomes even clearer when Monroe mentions an argument that has to do more with power than
morals. The European powers should leave and never return because they are too far away and not
strong enough to suppress Latin America. But who then is powerful enough to impose order?
Again, the answer is straightforward: The United States.
Once the United States reached regional hegemony by the end of the 19th century, the main purpose
of their foreign policy was to make sure that no other p ower will reach regional hegemony.
Mearsheimer’s argues that the Americans entered World War One and World War Two with the
main goal of stopping Imperial Germany21, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in their path of

20 Monroe Doctrine December 2 1823 , 2008, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/mo nroe.asp , accessed on 21st
of May 2019
21 The American President Woodrow Wilson expressed on several occasions his sympathy for Germany and
explained that the United States entered the war against them due to their need to balance the power structure in
Europe. If a state from the Triple Entente had the objective and capability to dominate Europe, then the United

16
obtaining regional hegemony in Europe and Asia and uses numerous historical examples to
illustrate that. The same happened when the Soviet Union became too strong and the Cold War
was represented by the United States attempts to contain Moscow. This policy of containment
(Marshall Plan, Thurman Do ctrine) was not an attempt to promote democracy, liberalism and
capitalism, but a clear plan that aimed to stop the Soviets to obtain regional hegemony in Asia or
Europe. Washington promoted free trade and liberal democracy because it strengthened its own
position within the international system.22 When necessary, the American presidents supported
dictatorships and assassinations and without any hesitation.23 Alliances shifted accordingly with
this main objective, as the Soviet Union became an ally against Na zi Germany and Imperial Japan.
After the war, Germany and Japan became allies in order to contain the Soviets. China was
supported during the 1931 -1945 period, when they fought against Imperial Japan , but shortly after
became an enemy because the communist s won the civil war in 1950 and the regime change could
have represented an opportunity for Moscow to reach hegemony in Asia. During the Korean War
(1950 -1953) China was again a mortal enemy for the Americans but once it has become clear that
the Chinese communist regime is opposing the Soviets, then the relation between Beijing and
Washington improved in the ’70 and both collaborated to contain the Soviets. Vietnam represented
the most humiliating American defeat in the 20th century, but now they are alli es in order to contain
China. To sum up, Mearsheimer concludes that the United States behaved exactly according to his
theory. He then explains why China can’t raise peacefully by returning to the present times.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the inte rnational system became unipolar, as the United States
remained the only real great power in the world. However, the only temporary vacuum of power
that was created made the American leaders foolishly believe that the United States can become a
global hege mon. ‘There were a variety of factors that led the United States to pursue liberal
hegemony. First, the coming of unipolarity meant that the United States did not have any great

States would have entered the war on the side of the Central Powers (some underestimated reasons for the US initial
neutrality were that the Germa n minority in America was very influential and it was also not clear what alliance has
the upper hand).
22 Free trade represents a huge advantage when you are the main manufacturing power in the world. Once Japan, the
Asian Tigers, Western Germany, and la ter on the EU and China developed means of competing on the international
markets, protectionist measures were imposed.
23 This represents a traditional behavior in the foreign policy of the United States, from the 1953 Iranian coup d’état,
continuing with its implication in Latin America and with the training of Afghani freedom fighters in the ‘80 (that
later produced Al Qaeda and ISIS) and up to present times, when they are supporting Saudi Arabia against Iran
(including in the ongoing Yemen war that is cu rrently the most catastrophic humanitarian crisis from 2019).

17
power rivals, because the United States was by definition the only great power in the system. Given
its tremendous power, the United States did not have to engage in balance -of-power politics. It did
not have to act according to the dictates of realism, and thus it was free to pursue an ideological
foreign policy. That was not possi ble in either a bipolar system, like we had during the Cold War,
or in the multipolar world that we are now moving into. Unipolarity, in short, enabled the United
States to pursue liberal hegemony. Second, the United States is a profoundly liberal country that
believes liberal democracy is the best possible political regime and that if all the countries on the
planet were liberal democracies, the world would be a much better place for everyone. That kind
of thinking provided a powerful impetus to go on a cr usade to spread liberal democracy across the
globe. ’24 This belief was translated in to an unnecessary interventionist foreign policy that tried to
impose liberal democracy in all the corners of the world. The consequence of this was that the
United States p restige was greatly affected, as their actions destabilized many regions in the world.
It has also convinced many states to resist the American influence or to pursue long term strategies
that will allow them to contest their economic supremacy, accelerati ng the relative decline of the
United States.25 Mearsheimer , together with his friend and realist scholar Stephen Walt, repeatedly
criticized the American intervention in Iraq.26 Washington also made a great mistake in trying to
interfere in Syria (where Rus sia has a military base) and Ukraine, which was perceived by the
Russian Federation as a vital space of its own security and survival. ‘Putin’s pushback should have
come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threate ning
its core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly. Elites in the United
States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed view of
international politics. They tend to believe that the l ogic of realism holds little relevance in the
twenty -first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal

24 Roberto Vivaldelli, Interview With Mearsheimer , 22nd of March 2019, https://lobelog.com/interview -with-
mearsheimer/ , accessed o n 21st of May 2019
25 By the same line of thought as in the Netherlands example, the United States has continued to sustain an overall
healthy economic growth since the Second World War but in comparative terms, the quota of the world trade and
production i s now less than half than it was after 1945. Even though no single state can compete with the American
military supremacy, this simple fact has created serious security concerns within the ranks of the Washington policy
makers.
26 Stephen M. Walt, What Woul d a Realist World Have Looked Like? From Iraq and WMDs to Israel and Palestine
to Syria and Russia, how the United States could’ve avoided some of its biggest mistakes , Foreign Policy, 8th of
January 2019, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/08/what -would -a-realist -world -have -looked -like-iraq-syria -iran-
obama -bush -clinton/ , accessed on 22nd of May 2019

18
principles as the rule of law, economic interdependence, and democracy. ’27 Although Russia has
many interests in Asia and by consequence many reasons to contain China, those two acts taken
in conjunction with the Western economic sanctions, forced Moscow to pursue a closer relation
with Beijing. In the same way, the failure to keep healthy relations with Iran, the cancell ation of
the Nuclear Deal and further economic sanctions, in addition with their almost unconditional
support for Israel28 and Saudi Arabia forced Iran to open a dialogue with China.
From Mearsheimer’s perspective, we are already living in a multipolar wor ld with three great
powers: The United States, The Rus sian Federation and China. Beijing is not strong enough to
challenge the United States military supremacy, but i n 30 years, the system will be composed from
a coalition formed around the United States t hat has the objective to contain China (that will still
have a huge population supported by a significant economic development, and by consequence a
much stronger army than they have today). The structural economic and demographic problems of
Russia will m ean that the United States and China will remain the only great powers in the system.
Even though the unwise recent actions of the American presidents made Putin open serious talks
with Xi Jinping in regards to future cooperation, on the long term, the gro wth of China will pose
a security threat to Moscow and the Russian Federation will most probably join the coalition
against China because a Russian -Chinese alliance will automatically make them an insignificant
political actor (losing their influence in As ia), while a neutral path will be impossible due to the
common border and conflicting interests that the two countries share. T he initial steps of
coagulating this alliance can already be identified in the relations between the United States and
Japan, Sou th Korea, India, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia, Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia and
Malaysia.29 For example, Mearsheimer invokes the five principles of his theory and observes the
most important secondary political actors from the region, Japan and India, po sitioned on one side
and another of this security complex, have greatly improved their bilateral relations (and their
relations with the United States) and signed several trade and economic deals, an even participated

27 John J. Mearsheimer, Why t he Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault. The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin ,
Foreign Affairs, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ru ssia-fsu/2014 -08-18/why -ukraine -crisis -west-s-
fault, accessed on 22nd of May 2019
28 Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt believe that the Israelian lobby in the US is so strong that it convinced the
Americans to support Israel beyond any strategic interest. John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby
and U.S. Foreign Policy, Farrar, Straus and Giroux Publishing, New York, 2008
29 Mearsheimer believes that Pakistan, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia are the most likely states that will support
China

19
together in military exercises in resp onse to the rise of China because both realize that they are in
the proximity of China and that they will not be able to resist alone against it in the future.30 Their
main concern is not the recent aggressive activity of China, but the future capabilities and very
probable malign intent ions of Beijing in the future.
Mearsheimer offers an interesting insight about how the rest of the world will look like. He starts
by highlighting that in the past century the number one priority for the United States outside their
hemisphere was Europe. Even when Imperial Japan directly attacked the Americans at Pearl
Harbor, the American policy was Europe first. They understood that Japan can’t defeat them in a
prolonged war, and that the concentration of wealth and power ma kes it more likely that a regional
hegemon will raise in Europe or Eurasia. However, for the first time in the United States history,
this priority is about to change. First of all, the American scholar points out that Obama’s pivot to
Asia policy means th at they top geostrategic priority has already changed. Viewed from a historical
scale, this can have a similar impact to the Monroe’s doctrine. Leaving aside the generous speech ,
to pivot towards something also means to pivot away from something else ( in our case, Europe).
Brexit can also be understood as an option of the United Kingdom to support the United States and
partially abandon Europe. The EU understood that and is already looking for possible solutions in
bilateral deals with the US (TTIP negotiat ions), with Japan (EU -Japan Economic Partnership
Agreement), with China (the Belt and Road talks and various investments), and with the Russian
Federation (many EU states take into consideration a rapprochement with Moscow). The United
States will mainly f ocus on Asia because the concentration of wealth and power has gradually
shifted (a trend that will continue in the next decades) from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
The need to contain the rise of China means that they will develop two main strategies. Fir stly,
they will pursue the strengthening of their alliances with China’s neighbors and continue to
increase their military presence in the region. The protection of Taiwan and the control of
Malacca’s straight will be of utmost importance. Due to geographi cal and cultural reasons, an
Asian NATO is very unlikely and the coalition against China will be based on numerous bilateral
relations between the United States and other Asian countries. Secondly, they will try to manage

30 His argume nt is backed by empirical data. The largest proportion of Japan’s budget for development aid goes to
India. Both prime ministers exchanged numerous officials visits between 2006 and 2019, many of them ending with
signing treaties in regards to free trade o f raw materials, investments in bullet trains and military technology, or with
the exchange of experience and information in relation to military activities.

20
and if necessary, cut of China’s s upply of oil, gas and raw materials from the Middle East and East
Africa. Imposing a protectorate over the Middle East countries, alongside with controlling the Suez
Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb strait will be vital for the American grand strategy. China’s inve stments
in the rest of the African continent will not play a key role because the Americans will try to disrupt
their trade, and because the structural problems from Africa are stopping the rise of any powerful
state in the foreseeable future. Africa will be important only as an extent of the United States and
China’s economic strength.
According to this scenario, the United State can’t become a global hegemon and in order to avoid
the trap of imperial overstretch, they will have to prioritize the way they will spend resources in
overseas adventures. This will always be a complex issue, because retreating from some regions
can encourage revisionist powers to further push their claims beyond their actual power, while
trying to be present in all the places of the world will cripple the economy, and on the long term,
can have disastrous consequences. As a result of this strategic thinking, during the next decades
the Pacific will be come the first priority for the Americans, the Persian Gulf the second, and
Euro pe will only be the third. If his assumptions are correct, the probability of better European –
Russian relations rises , as a compromise between EU without the US military support and a
weakened Russia will make much more sense. The EU will have to decide if they will support the
US against China, if they will support China or if they will remain neutral. The first idea is unlikely
because the EU countries have a very low offensive capability and a low appetite for future
investments in the military sector. This will mean that they won’t be able to actively support the
US containment strategy in Asia and even if they could, they will have little to gain and much to
lose from this approach, as the Chinese investments in Europe can sustain economic growth. The
same argument can be used for a possible EU – Chinese alliance. In addition, the EU shares a
general common culture with the United States and has less in common with China. Taking into
consideration its strategic position, the most probable path that the EU will take is neutrality.
Neither the US, neither China have the capacity to force Europe to pick a side, so the most sensitive
policy is to keep neutrality, trade with both sides and ‘get rich’.31 The same neutral path might be
taken by other states in similar strategic positions like Canada or Mexico . Mearsheimer also adds
another variable into his story: the possible rise of Brazil. Although Brazil is no match for the

31 John J. Mearsheimer, Why China Cannot Rise Peacefully , Conference at the Centre for Internationa l Policy
Studies Ottawa, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXov7MkgPB4&t=2s , accessed on 24th of May 2019

21
United States in the Western Hemisphere, the country is big enough, has a large popul ation and a
huge economic growth potential. If they manage to solve their domestic issues and reach a level
of sustained economic development, Brazil could contest the American influence in Latin America,
an action that won’t be tolerated by Washington. If this happens, the containment of China will
become even more complicated, and the ir presence in Europe will be even less important.
Like we have mentioned at the begging of the chapter, Mearsheimer also talks about the main
weak points of his theory and acknowledges that the accuracy of his theory is no greater than 75%
because no social science theory can aspire to be 100% accurate. Mearsheimer expresses one of
his main epistemological beliefs by highlighting the fact that theories should simply a very
complex reality. In order to properly explain intricate connections between causes and effects,
many variables have to be left out from the theory. However, in some contexts the variables that
you are ignoring are far more important that you first assumed a nd the theory that you have
proposed is invalidated by empirical facts. This not automatically means that your theory is not
useful or interesting, it only point s out to the inevitable fact that any theory is a limitation of an
almost unlimited pool of dyn amic factors. Out of his 5 guiding principles, the realist thinker also
points out that the assumption that political actors are rational is the weakest and that in many
cases the political and social reality proves him wrong.32
The author believes that the most important objection against his theory is related to nuclear
weapons because even if we take all the 5 principles together, no power will risk another world
war that they have no chance of winning. Considering that so many great powers have nuclear
weapons (the United States, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France, China, Pakistan,
India, maybe Israel), a world war will most probably end up in a stalemate with all the major
powers suffering unacceptable casualties. Moreover, nuclear weapons ex plain why the United
State s of America have never tried to provoke a preemptive war with China. Classical realism says
that if a great power will slowly decline, while another one will gradually rise, the first one should
provoke an preemptive war and stop the rise of the second one as soon as possible because in this
scenario the possibility of winning the competition in the future decreases with the passing of time.
Mearsheimer argues that Imperial Germany provoked World War One because they were afraid
of the future rise of Tsarist Russia and that the same can be said about Nazi Germany in relation

32 John J. Mearsheimer, Reckless States and Realism , International Relations, 2009 , Vol 23(2), pp. 241 –256

22
to Operation Barbarossa. Returning to the 21st century, he concludes that time is on China’s side
and that the neighboring countries know that and that they ar e trying to provoke Beijing in border
disputes. If we look closely to the diplomatic tensions in the last decade in regards to the Pacific
area, most of them were provoked by China’s neighbors because they realize that they need to
settle border disputes b efore Beijing will become too powerful. The wisest think that China can do
is to not get involved in those disputes , wait until their strength grows and then they will be able
to impose a new order in Asia, as no one could oppose them. On the other hand, t he United States
can’t provoke a total war with China mainly because of nuclear weapons and even if, for the sake
of the argument, the nuclear arsenal would have been annihilated, the Americans won’t be able to
occupy and control China. Starting from the d efinition proposed by Carl von Clausewitz, a war is
a political tool that has as the main objective to impose you will upon the other.33 Not only that a
total war would be extremely risky and have enormous human and material costs, but even if
everything go es according to plan, the Americans have no guarantee that they will be able to
impose their will on a long term basis and that the Chinese growth will be stopped. The structural
factors of growth will still be there and China’s rise will only be delayed a nd the war could even
have a positive impact because it could motivate the Chinese society to develop even faster (as we
have already seen it happen with Germany and Japan). In defense of his theory, Mearsheimer
believes that the principles of mutual nucle ar deterrence will make nuclear weapons less important.
Nuclear weapons are political decisive tools if only a state has them. When several great powers
possess nuclear weapons, they will greatly hesitate before using them because they know for
certain tha t once they launch a missile, they will automatically be hit in repose and the price for
this is just too great. In this case, limited conventional warfare between great powers is still
possible, as the states implicated will limit themselves by using only the tools of conventional
warfare.34 Even if a great power is about to lose a limited war, they will most likely prefer to sign
a disadvantageous treaty than to open the Pando ra’s Bo x and use nuclear weapons. In this case,

33 Carl von Clausewitz, On War , Jazzybee Verlag publishing, United States, 2017
34 According to the Budapest Treaty from 1994, the United States, China, United Kingdom and France should have
declared war to the Russian Federation bec ause they have annexed Crimea but this never happened and the Russians
even occupied parts of East Ukraine. As the costs of a nuclear war would have been enormous, the response was
limited to conventional weapons used by Ukraine, military exercises organiz ed by NATO as a form of deterrence,
and economic sanctions. This kind of scenario can also unfold in Asia -Pacific.

23
wars will be limited in scale and objective, much like the ones that we have seen during the Cold
War or even like the “duels” from the 19th century.35
The second challenge to his theory is economic interdependence , a factor that he thinks that brings
peace in many situations. If the capit alist system is mainly based on the amount of foreign
investments, international loans and on the volume and value of trade, then states like the United
States and China will never go to war because they have so much to lose and the pressure coming
from th eir own citizens and from the business community will be huge. Thus, he argues that this
is the most robust theory that can challenge neorealism and in some cases even manages to reflect
reality in a better way. In response to this, he points out that hist ory is full of examples w here
economic interdependence was very high and this didn’t prevent the ou tbreak of war , including
World War One. In some cases, the reverse is rather more accu rate as economic interdependence
only managed to create higher stakes w ithin the political arena and a gamble of type “the winner
takes it all” become even more tempting. Secondly, even if economic interdependence would only
create incentives for peace, what will happen during a possible economic crisis where some states
are more advantaged than others by the situation? It is very possible that some countries will see
this as an opportunity to get rich by taking advance of the context and that the more affected states
and their frustrated population will see this as a threat. Those who will be advantaged by the
situation will consider that they are not doing anything wrong, as they are pursuing their economic
interests and will not fully understand the reaction of the affected states, thus paving the road for
a future conflict.36 Thirdly, he argues that at the end of the day, politics trumps economics. Leaving
aside the realist arguments, this happens because Mearsheimer firmly believes that nationalism is
the strongest ideological force of the 21st century. When the strategic ca lculations of power balance
are combined with the emotional reaction of nationalism, both at a leadership level, but also at a
popular level, the probability of conflict rises even though the decision to go to war is maybe not
the wisest and won’t usually happen in a perfect rational world. Nationalism is extremely important
for the Chinese leaders because neither Communist, neither the so call Confucian Culture, are not

35 If we look at military history, despite its long record of massacres, the idea of a total war that will annihilate
populations is rather a n ideological construct of the Contemporary era. Great crimes happened, but this was due to
certain complicated contexts. From a statistic point of view, in most battles from universal history, warfare was
mostly limited to the warrior class and if an army started to lose 20 -30% of their soldiers, the whole army would
retreat, route or surrender.
36 To some extent, this is exactly what happened between the EU states that favored austerity measures (a group led
by Germany) and those who preferred to extend t heir welfare state (with France and Spain as main actors).

24
strong enough on a long run to keep the Chinese people loyal to the state. Due to this, nationalism
will be encouraged with every occasion. Furthermore, the example s of Taiwan and
Senkaku/Diaoyudao/ Diaoyutai islands disputes speak for themselves. Even though their relations
relatively improved over the years and their cultural and economic connections are very strong,
Beijing has clearly declared that they will go to war if Taiwan declares its independence. ‘C hina
must be, and will be reunified,” Chinese President Xi Jinping declared in a speech in January. Xi
spoke of “peaceful reunificatio n” with Taiwan, but he warned, “We d o not forsake the use of
force.’’37 Likewise, China is Japan’s first trade partner while Japan is China’s second trade partner
(after the United States) but this didn’t stop them to almost go to war for some inhabited isl ands.38
Also , the nature of the relations between South Korea and North Korea means that this is also
another possible area of conflict.
The third serious argument that Mearsheimer thinks can challenge his theory is the rise of
nationalism. This ideology ca n increase the chances of war, as we have already explained, but it
can also work as a very strong deterrent because ‘n ationalism makes conquest difficult ’.39 Let’s
return to the preemptive war argument. Even if the United States would win a decisive war wi th
China, the likeliness for actually subduing the Chinese is very small because nationalism is an
incredible force. Even with the most advanced military technology in the world, resistance though
guerilla warfare and unrestricted methods of war is still p ossible and can even be considered to be
very efficient, as the recent cases of Iraq and Afghanistan has shown us. To sum up, in his opinion,
the combination of nuclear w eapons, economic interdependence and nationalism represents the
strongest case against offensive realism.

37 Peter Gries and Tao Wang, Will China Seize Taiwan? Wishful Thinking in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington Could
Spell War in 2019 , 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019 -02-15/will -china -seize -taiwan ,
accessed on 25th of May 2019
38 Franz -Stefan Gady, US, Japan Conduct Military Exercise Near Senkakus, 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/us -japan -conduct -military -exercise -near-senkakus/ , accessed on 25th of May 2019
39 Mearsheimer’s latest book looks at the relation between liberalism, realism and nationalism. John J.
Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and the co -director of the
Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, gave a series of three lectures in November
on “Liberal Ideals & International Realities” for the Henry L. Stimson Lectures on World Affairs at the Whitney and
Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale. “The Roots of Liberal Hegemony,” November
13, 2017 https://youtu.be/bSj__Vo1pOU , “The False Promise of Liberal Hegemony,” November 15, 2017
https://youtu.be/ESwIVY2oimI , “The Case for Restraint,” on November 16, 2017 https://youtu.be/TsonzzAW3Mk ,
accessed on 26th of May 2019

25
The American political thinker also talks about four other less significant arguments against his
theory. In simplified words, the democratic peace theory says that democracies don’t fight other
democracies. He acknowledges that strong empirical evidence can be found to support this
statement and in the event of China also becoming a democracy, a conflict with the United States
is less probable. Mearsheimer refuses to build a strong defense against this because the democratic
peace theor y tells a completely different story. In other words, both his theory and this theory is
based on some core basic assumptions that are impossible to prove, and thus, it’s impossible to
properly argue against it, because from an epistemological point of vie w, it’s like arguing about
how the future will look like by comparing two parallel universe s.40 The ultimate conclusion of
democratic peace theory is that the state of anarchy will be transcended and the system will become
hierarchical. On the other hand, i n his opinion, this theory was never tested in the event that two
great powers are democracies, as even if they had many things in common, the incentive for
conflict would be much stronger. Besides, the combination of realism and nationalism means that
a hierarchical international system is not going to form in the predictable future. ‘ This conventional
wisdom is wrong. Great powers are rarely in a position to pursue a full -scale liberal foreign policy.
As long as two or more of them exist on the planet, th ey have little choice but to pay close attention
to their position in the global balance of power and act according to the dictates of realism. Great
powers of all persuasions care deeply about their survival, and there is always the danger in a
bipolar or multipolar system that they will be attacked by another great power. In these
circumstances, liberal great powers regularly dress up their hard-nosed behavior with liberal
rhetoric. They talk like liberals and act like realists. Should they adopt liberal policies that are at
odds with realist logic, they invariably come to regret it. ’41
A second objection comes from within the realist tradition: the geography of peace. ‘Pessimism
suggests that America prepare for the prospect of Chinese expansionism and dev elop a
containment -like policy whereby it maintains high military readiness and responds to each Chinese
challenge with immediate and costly retaliation. But whereas such a policy may have been

40 Mearsheimer mainly refers here to the liberal assumption that humans are more individuals that sign a social
contract than social beings that search for their individualit y, and that all humans have inalienable rights. Due to
progressive liberalism that won the competition, the inalienable rights are both negative and positive, encouraging
social engineering.
41 John J. Mearsheimer , The Great Delusion. Liberal Dreams And Int ernational Realities, Yale University Press,
United States, 2018, p. 12

26
appropriate during the Cold War, when Soviet capabilities chal lenged vital U.S. interests, the
combination of geography and structure in post –Cold War East Asia suggests that Washington
does not have to be hypersensitive to relative gains issues or to the prospect of Chinese milita ry
expansionism. In the twenty -first century, at current levels of defense spending and regional
presence, the United States can promote its regional security interests and develop cooperative
relations with China on a wide range of security and economic issues, contributing to a relatively
peaceful and cooperative great power order. ’42 What Robert S. Ross is saying is that Central
Europe and mainly Germany was the balancing point between the Soviet Union and the United
States during the Cold War. Due to this, both coalitions did their best to contain each other by
concentrating their power in that point and creating the prospects of conflict. No such strategic
point exists in North – East Asia and thus due to geography, there is no vital space where the
United States and China will focus their military, and so a conflict is less probable. Mearsheimer
agrees with this view, but claims that the consequence of this is that war between the United States
and China is even more probable than it was between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Because both the Americans and the Russians concentrated their armies in Central Europe, a
stalemate was reached and this balance discouraged any rash action. This is not the case in Asia,
where there is no single point where a great power can block the other . On the other side this also
means that geography lives more place for maneuver and daring expeditions. The possible sources
of conflict are multiple: North Korea, Taiwan, Senkaku islands. Also, conflict is much more
probable because the force of national ism is stronger both in America and in China, and it
represents a much more serious catalyst for an emotional -irrational response than the more benign
competition between democracy and communism from the Cold War. Finally, Imperial Japan and
Nazi Germany r epresented only a small fragment of the US economy. Even the Soviet Union at
its height only reached one third of the United States economic power. For the first time in its
history, the United States faces a possible threat that is almost on an equal foot ing from an
economic point of view, and the prospects are that China will surpass them. The historical record
shows that the Americans will have to respond, as they have more reasons than ever before.
The third idea is that like the United States and the United Kingdom in the 19th Century, China
will grow so strong than the United States will have no chance of containing China, regardless of

42 Robert S. Ross, The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty -First Century , International Security
Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring, 1999), pp. 81 -118

27
what coalition they will try to build against them. The response to this is that his theory starts from
assuming tha t China will grow at the same rate and won’t become invincible. However, even if
China will further develop beyond any expectations, or even if China’s growth flattens, the source
of conflict for the next decades is still there because neither side will ac cept to abandon their main
interests without trying to obtain or keep the better position at the table .
The fo urth argument against Mearsheimer, that he considers the less important one, is that C hina
is a Confucian peaceful civilization .43 He replies to th at by saying that the combination of realism
and nationalism weight s much more in international relations, and that the historical evidence from
the last decades shows us that China has behaved like any other raising power. Religion and culture
is importan t for him, but their influence fade in the face of the structural arguments and instinct of
survival. The world is just too complex and he states that Samuel Huntington failed to realize
this.44
In conclusion, it can a lso be said that China cannot r ise peac efully because the United States won’t
let them. On one hand, the theory clearly shows that China will try to obtain regional hegemony
by maximizing their relative power and by proclaiming their own Monroe doctrine. They have
already started to develop the ir military and intensively used propaganda and soft power tactics to
attract more states under their own sphere of influence. Not only that the structural arguments will
push them towards this path, but also their own historical past. The Chinese remember very well
what happened to them when they lacked power, especially during the Century of National
Humiliation, when the European colonial powers crushed their resistance, and during the first part
of the 20th Century, when the Japanese massacred them and the Americans talked about using
nuclear weapons against the Communist regime. In the same time, the Americans will respond and
the concept of security dilemma will come alive. ‘The United States has been at war for 2 out of
every 3 years since the Cold Wa r ended, we have fought 6 different wars. We are addicted to war.
When you come to Washington, it’s like going to a place that is constantly thinking about who the

43 Out of all the critics coming fr om the general public, and not for the academic sphere, this is the most prevalent.
We can observe than numerous people claim that his theory is invalid because international relations scholarship is
mainly based on conclusions taken from the experience of the last 200 years of Western history, that was especially
violent and cruel, and that in the case of the Chinese civilization, this is irrelevant. We think that the pure numbers
of people who believe this makes it worth to pursue and test this idea in fu ture research projects.
44 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order , Simon & Schuster Publishing,
New York, 2011

28
next target is.’45 The security dilemma means that when a state builds defensive capabilities , those
actions are always perceived by other states like offensive cap abilities and because intentions and
actions cannot be anticipated, they will expect the worse and arm themselves to a higher degree.
This circular argument then concludes that the init ial state that had defensive intent ions will see
the actions of the second one as purely offensive in nature, and so the arming racing will escalate
until conflict erupts. The p rocess can already be observed if we look at the behavior of the United
States and China. The Americans are more and more worried that the Chi nese are developing their
army (although the Chinese are thinking that are modernizing their army to defend their country)
and send aircraft carries on the Chinese border to contain them (a purely defen sive measure). This
is perceived by the Chinese as an offensive attempt to start a war from advantageous positions,
and thus they continue to invest more into the military and send their navy to intercept (at a safe
distance) the American and Japa nese forces. Some Chinese neighbors will then fear this show of
force and j oin a coalition or another opening more and more possible future fronts. Mearsheimer
emphasizes that this is the tragedy of power politics (the name of his most known book) and that
no one is evil or good in this story. The structural factors will always push great powers in a ruthless
competition for domination and survival. For the sake of humanity, he hopes that his theory wi ll
be proven wrong by the future .

45 John J. Mearsheimer, University of Chicago. Harper Lecture with John J. Mearsheimer: Can China Rise
Peace fully? , 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0DMn4PmiDeQ , min 45, accessed on 24th of May 2019

29
Joseph Nye: Th e Rise of China and American Power

Joseph Nye agrees that China will continue to grow and wants to answer the same big question,
but from a different perspective. How the Chinese and American relations will look like in the next
years and will they clash in an inevitable conflict ? His answer is negative. Unlike Mearsh eimer,
Joseph Nye starts to analyze the political situation first, and although his theoretical assumptions
are present in the background, the theoretical framework starts to take shape only a fter describing
the social and political realities . However, in order to keep the same structure of our work, we will
start by presenting the main principles of complex interdependence that Joseph Nye originally
presented in 1977.46
Liberal institutional ists agree that the international system is anarchic in the way that neorealism
describes but also argue that realists fail to observe that this anarchical trait is much more complex,
and is not limited to a security competition between states. In other words , Nye and Keohane
believe that the international stage is now “very crowded”. When looking at international relations,
the political system is composed from multiple channels of interactions. Societies interact with
each other at an interstate level (diplo matic relations between two countries), but also on a
transgovernmental (relations between international institutions like the UN and The World Bank)
and transnational level (climate change or human rights issues). The interstate dimension is the
one descr ibed by realists. The transgovernmental and transnational ones become much more
relevant if we assume that states are not black boxes (as Mearsheimer argues), and that their actions
might be influenced, in a significant way, by the events linked with internal politics and institutions,
by the rules produced by international treaties and institutions, by the activity of individuals, by
the soft power of NGO’s and so on. One one hand, the power and foreign policy of a state is
determined to a much higher degr ee by those elements than the realists assume, and on the other
hand, those other actors are affected by the governmental decisions, creating a c ircle of complex
interdependence . All the implicated political actors have some influence over the development of
rules, institutions and policy. T hey communicate and interact with each other in regards to a wide
arrange of issues. Because the issues are different, some political actors have more influ ence than

46 Joseph Nye and Robert O. Keohane, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition , (4th E dition),
Longman Classics in Political Science, New York, 2011

30
others, and even though the state remains the main pol itical entity from the system, other forms of
political organization should also be taken into consideration, especially because there are areas or
contexts where the state is a secondary player. The technological revolution from the last century
also mean s that the ability of the state to control the individual has diminished, but also the power
to be unchallenged in its capacity to formulate policies has been affected, due to a diffusion of
power .47 Moreover, the dimensions from above produce a varied netw ork of interests and
procedures, so there is no objective hierarchy of goals and strategies when we talk about world
politics. Another important conclusion is that the dynamics of the 21st century correlated with the
relative decline of the state, means th at military force and coercive measures will also have less
influence in shaping the political system. The complex lines of communication between varied
actors with varied goals, but a lso the economic interdependence between states and the more
sophisticat ed soft power strategies will be more important than the traditional realpolitik view.
Military power will still be relevant, while competition and even conflict will continue to exist,
but now states have a very strong incentive to co operate on several vi tal points, especially the ones
that can only be solved at a transnational level.
Another essential theoretical principle that Nye brings to the table is the distinction between Hard
Power, Soft Power and Smart Power.48 The first two concepts were introduce d from 1977, but the
last one was proposed in 2003. In short, Hard Power means the use of military and economic
strength to impose your will over another, to force or pay him to do what he otherwise he won’t
do. Soft Power is the use of attraction to convi nce the other to do what he otherwise won’t want to
do. This means that a state could use diplomatic talks, institutions, cultural values and so on to
attract another state on a project that both will benefit from. For example, Germany and Japan have
a lon g record of harsh competition on the automobile market but this was not an obstacle for the
implementation of a joint project that had the objective of producing hybrid cars. Another example
is that the democratic values and the great American universitie s are attracting brilliant minds from
all over the world. Some of them will return home and become influential political leaders who
will have a favorable view about the United States and will be more inclined towards cooperation.
Smart Power is the foreig n policy that combines Hard and Soft Power, and was conceptualized by

47 Other scholars propose an opposite analysis, highlighting that technology actually increased the capacity of the
national state to control the individual, up to dystopian dimensions. We sugge st you to think about how ineffective
any political form of organization was in collecting taxes, in comparison with the national state of the 21st century.
48 Joseph Nye, The Future of Power , Public Affairs, New York, 2011

31
Nye because he b elieved that many misunderstood his previous works , and that he never
proclaimed that Soft Power on its own is enough to solve the great issues of this century. ‘The
majo r elements of a country's soft power include its culture (when it is pleasing to others), its
values (when they are attractive and consistently practiced), and its policies (when they are seen
as inclusive and legitimate). (…) Of course, soft power is not the solution to all problems. The fact
that the No rth Korean dictator Kim Jong -Il likes to watch Hollywood movies is unlikely to affect
his country's nuclear weapons program. And U.S. soft power got nowhere in drawing the Taliban
government away from al Qa eda in the 1990s; it took hard military power in 2001 to end that
alliance. But broader goals, such as promoting democracy, protecting human rights, and
developing civil society, are not best handled with guns.’49 Nye concludes that the international
system is unipolar only in regards to the military dominance of the United States, multipolar in
relation to the economic competition, and chaotic in relation to transnational issues like terrorism.
The United States is the most powerful actor from the system, b ut is not a hegemon because it’s
unable to control the world. What the Americans can hope for is to influence the world and to
assume the responsibility of the greatest power from the system in order to provide public goods.
‘The United States can become a smart power by once again investing in global public goods –
providing things that people and governments in all quarters of the world want but cannot attain
on their own. Achieving economic development, securing public health, coping with climate
change , and maintaining an open, stable international economic system all require leadership from
the United States. By complementing its military and economic might with greater investments in
its soft power, the United States can rebuild the framework it needs to tackle tough global
challenges. That would be true smart power. ’50
Considering the theoretical framework that we have outlined , the American scholar has a totally
different answer to the main question of this paper: the rise of China will not le ad to a major
conflict at all. He presents many arguments to support his claim, but his main point by far is that
the rise of China will never happen. By consequence, the whole story formulated by Mearsheimer
is invalid (the neorealist thinker also recognized that if China will not rise, then his theory is not
applicable). Moreover, Joseph Nye is much more confident that states can correctly estimate power

49 Joseph Nye, Get Smart. Combinin g Hard and Soft Power , 2009, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009 -07-
01/get -smart , accessed on 29th of May 2019
50 Ibid

32
and the issue of understanding the future inten tions of the other is solved by encouraging constant
communicat ion, building agreed rules and institutions based on repeated interactions between the
various political actors and by applying an efficient soft power strategy. The specialized literature
that predicts the rise of China is based on the assumption that the United States is in decline, on an
oversimplification in relation to what overall power really means, and on a belief that the Chinese
growth rates will remain the same in the future.
The core thesis of his latest book is that the American century, and by extent the global liberal
hegemony will continue to thrive.51 Although the United States was the strongest country from the
world even from the beginning of the 20th century, Pax America only started in 1941, when the
Americans entered the Second World War at Pearl Harbor. This moment is taken as the symbolic
starting point for the American Century because it represented Washington’s decision of assuming
the role of the world leader. They have also tried to keep the balance of power right after World
War On e, but president Woodrow Wilson failed to convince the Congress to ratify the Treaty of
Versailles and take a leading role within the League of Nations, returning to a period of isolation.
Nye then makes a brilliant observation by claiming that the Great D epression was mainly caused
by the incapacity of the United Kingdom to keep up with the demands of the global financial
market due to its declining power, while the United States, the only country that had the capacity
to prevent this, preferred to take th e path of protectionism and isolation. This is exactly the
argument that Paul Kennedy makes his his analysis that combines strategic considerations with
political economy.52
After the Interwar period, the Americans finally pursed a foreign policy directed towards providing
‘public goods’. The results were astonishing: The Nazi Germany and Imperial Japanese threats
were eliminated, Europe and Japan were reconstructed with the direct American support, the
Soviet Union was contained and another global war was avoided. In the end, the Berlin Wall fell
due to the crumbling economy of the communist system and due to the superiority in terms of soft
power in regards to democratic and liberal values. In the same time the Americans were the main
architects of the dip lomatic institutions and rules of conduct in international affairs, promoting free
trade , guaranteeing the stability of the financial and monetary markets, and also enhancing

51 Joseph Nye, Is the American Century Over? Polity P ress, Cambridge, 2015
52 Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to
2000 , Vintage Publishing, New York, 2010

33
prosperity at home. They were also behind the establishment of the main political institutions like
the United Nations or World Bank. Many predicted the decline of the American power during the
rise of the Soviets or the Japanese, but this never happened. In the 90’ the United States remained
the uncontested world power. This seem to h ave changed in the meantime, due to the rise of several
states with great potential of growth and further development. Some scholars believe that like
Great Britain the 19th century, the United States will no longer be able to provide those public
goods, w hile China will not take its place, creating a great crisis, much like the one from 1929 –
1933. Likewise, many are now fearing the rise of nationalism, populism and internal strife within
the domestic affairs of the United States. Nye argues that this fear is not justified by correlated
facts from the social reality that we currently live in . Nationalism, populism, and internal problems
are temporary and have a cyclical life. Regardless of what problems the Americans have to face at
home today, they a much l ess dramatic than the ones from the 60’, when an American president
was assassinated, the public unrest due to the segregation movements was much more disruptive
and the overall social and political situation was much more complicated. In the same way many
analyst s are interpreting a trend of growth an d wrongly believe that this trend will have a linear
form of development, failing to see the cyclical nature of world politics and failing to anticipate
that this growth might flatten out. It’s something close ly related to the American psychology to
believe that they are in decline, as they have strongly believed that when Moscow sent the first
man on the Moon in 1961 and when the Japanese amazing economic growth from the ’80 seemed
like it would surpass everyo ne. This also happened during the economic crisis from 2008 – 2011,
when several analysts rushed to conclude that the Americans are in decline and that the Chinese
will outrun them. In reality, the American economy recovered and now continues to register
economic growth and stability. The neoliberal scholar mainly responds to this speech of fear by
returning to the three points that we have already mentioned above: the proportion of China’s rise
in the recent past is not correctly estimated, the United Stat es relative decline in relation to the rise
of others will not have such a profound impact like some anticipate, and China’s growth will slow
down . ‘Even if China suffers no major domestic political setback, many current projections based
on GDP growth are simple linear extrapolations of current growth rates that are likely to slow
down in the future. Moreover, economic projections are one dimensional and ignore US military
and soft power advantages, as well as China’s geopolitical disadvantages in the inte rnal Asian
balance of power, compared to America’s likely favorable relations with Europe, Japan, India, and

34
others. Imagine how different the American situation would look if, instead of oceans and two
friendly neighbors, it bordered a score of states, so me (like Japan or India) both skeptical and
powerful. ’53
Firstly, when analyzing the American power, Nye also makes the distinction between absolute
decline and relative decline. Absolute decline means that the United States is now in a worse
condition than fifty, twenty or ten years ago. This is not the case by any objective forms of
measurement. In comparison to the height of the Cold War, in terms of percentages, the United
States is spending half on a military force that has no equal. The economy has con tinued to
constantly grow, and is one of the most developed from the world. The demographic situation is
also stable, while in terms of soft power, America is still very appealing for most of the world.
Thus, the common comparison between the United States and the Roman Empire is not justified.
The Roman Empire was confronting, first and for emost, with an absolute decline in terms of
political unity, economic development and military power, and it took almost three centuries for
the western part of the empi re to break down.54 In economic terms, the American GDP from 2018
is 71.8% higher than the one fr om 1990, and the average growth rate on this period was a healthy
one for a developed economy, at 2.56%.55 The concept of relative decline brings in quite differ ent
results. Like we have previously explained, relative decline means that the United States is still
as strong as it ever was, or even stronger, but the others have raised to a much higher level and are

53 Joseph Nye, Is the American Century Over? Polity Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 91
54 Although the point might be entirely correct in regards to the United States absolute power, we would like to add
an observation here. The fall of the Roman Empire understood in terms of an absolute decline was a thesis
motivated by a romantic view over the H ellenistic ancient history. Since Edward Gibbon’s incredible opera written
in the 18th century, many contemporary historians are considering that the relative decline was just as important.
Corruption, major civil wars, great economic problems were part of the Roman history since its foundation. Its
military actually was very advanced and disciplined up to the last days of the empire. What changed was the relative
power in relation to demography, economy, weapons, and soft power. The so called ‘barbarian in vasions’ were
composed from tribes that had a much bigger population than the Celtic tribes that the Romans previously
conquered, and thus had a great economic production and trade capacity, they were better armed and disciplined,
while Christianity, the v arious forms of paganism and the variety of new cultures that they introduced challenged the
Greco -Roman civilization. No single tribe could have been a match for Rome on its own, but the introduction of so
many strong competitors that were not even coordi nated (many tribes fought each other and their alliances against
the Western Empire were rather contextual and short lived) caused the slow downfall of the empire. The fact that
this process lasted for almost three centuries gives witness to the greatness of Rome, but it was also caused by the
technologic limitations of the era. Our observation that in terms of relative decline, the comparison between Rome
and the United States, at least at a theoretical level, is still valid and the present process might b e much more
dynamic.
55 Christof Baron, Real GDP growth of the United States from 1990 to 2018 , 2019,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/188165/a nnual -gdp-growth -of-the-united -states -since -1990/ , accessed on 1st of
June 2019

35
starting to surpass the hegemonic power. Defined l ike this, relative decline migh t also mean the
rise of others.
Who can challenge the American supremacy? The Russian Federation is the rightful heir of the
Soviet Union but faces serious economic and demographic problems. Their economy is still
dependent o n oil and gas exports. The lower birth rate and the aging of the population will also
greatly diminish their economic and military strength in the future. Japan is the third economy in
the world but their growth rates were stagnant for the last twenty yea rs. Out of all the power states
from the international system, Japan faces the greatest demographic decline. The EU has an overall
economy that could compete with the United States, but Europe also faces serious economic
problems and demographic decline. T he offensive military capabilities are limited, and the
Europeans were never close of reaching a genuine political unity that would be translated in a real
political competitor for Washington. India will become the world’s most populated country by
2030 , but their economy is still far behind. A rapid significant increase in population is not always
a positive thing. Correlated with the high levels of corruption in the political and administrative
sector, and a modest access to basic education, India will ha ve to face tremendous issues in regards
to poverty and inequality . They have a long road to take in order to reach their real potential and
promote their talents. Brazil is in a somehow similar situation, being a country with a constant
demographic and eco nomic growth that faces structural problems: unstable institutions and overall
political climate, poverty, inequality, access to education, improper healthcare and so on. Iran
struggles to keep its status of regional power, being kept in check by Saudi Ara bia and Israel. In
this context, only China has the potential of becoming a real pretender.
Although the figures might be a little exaggerated by the Commun ist party, the Chinese GDP from
2017 is 265.9% higher than the one from 1990, and the average growth rate was breath taking,
being estimated at 9.84%.56 This difference in relation to relative power becomes even more
obvious if we consider the share of the global GDP. Because the other great powers destroyed each
other during the Second World War , the Unit ed States obtained an incredible strength in terms of
relative power. Its global economy share was almost 40%. This has changed dramatically. There
are two principle ways to measure this, either by taking into account the purchasing power parity
criteria t hat advantages the developing economies, or the nominal value criteria that favors the

56 The World Bank, GDP growth (annual %) , 2019,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.M KTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN , accessed on 1st of June 2019

36
developed countries. For example, if we look in comparative terms at purchasing power parity
from 1995, China’s share of the world GDP was just 6%, and only 2% if we add the nominal value
of the exchange rate, while the United States had around 20% and 24%. Similarly, i f we take the
criteria of power parity, the American share in 2013 was 19%, while China ’s was at 15%. If we
consider this by taking into account the nomina l value, the Americans have 23%, while the Chinese
12%.57 Even more interesting are the future projections . ‘In 2018, the United States accounted for
15.16 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) after adjusting for purchasing power parity
(PPP). Thi s share was expected to decrease to 13.71 percent by 2024, which is roughly a seventh
of the global total.’58 What we can observe is that in terms of absolute power, the United States
had no real issues and registered an overall healthy level of growth. The problem is if we look at
the numbers in relation to relat ive decline, where the others managed to close the economic gap
by a significant margin. What we can observe is that in terms of absolute power the Americans
remained constant, while in terms of rel ative power, China’s growth is astonishing . According to
new data , Beijing overcome Washington in terms of purchasing power parity somewhere between
2014 and 2015. ‘ Both the IMF and the World Bank now rate China as the world’s largest economy
based on Purc hasing Power Parity (PPP), a measure that adjusts countries’ GDPs for differences
in prices. In simple terms, this means that because your money stretches further in China than it
would in the US, China’s GDP is adjusted upwards. And it won’t be too long b efore China’s
economy surpasses the US’s by other measures, too. The Centre for Economics and Business
Research (Cebr) predicts it will happen in 2029. To a certain extent this is not surprising: China’s
population of 1.4 billion is around four times highe r than that of the US at 320 million. Despite the
recent slowdown, China’s economy is still growing at almost three times the rate of the US –
around 7% over the last couple of years, compared to less than 2.5%. ’59 Joseph Nye acknowledges
that all of the ab ove figures are correct, but he then explains how overall power should be
understood by analyzing the intertwined links between economic, military and soft power. Nye

57 Steven Barnett, China: Size Matters , 2014, https://seekingalpha.com/article/4089436 -exami ning-expected -long-
term-s-and-p-500-total-returns , accessed on 1st of June 2019
58 Marlene Greenfield, United States' share of global gross domestic product (GDP) adjusted for purchasing power
parity (PPP) from 2014 to 2024 , 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/270267/united -states -share -of-global –
gross -domestic -product -gdp/, accessed on 1st of June 2019
59 Andrea Willige, The world’s top economy: the US vs China in five charts , 2016,
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/the -world -s-top-economy -the-us-vs-china -in-five-charts/ , accessed on 1st
of June 2019

37
also argues that some facts that might look like strong points, could also hide systemic weaknesses
that might prove much more serious on the long run. 60
If we measure the economic size of a country by taking into account the principle of exchange rate,
then the United States are still by far the biggest economy in the world. The global financ ial,
monetary and trade market is still heavily influenced by the value of the dollar that is significantly
influenced by the American treasury. Even if China’s economy wi ll continue to grow and reach a
higher nominal value than the American one by 2030, t his is only a quantitative variable. It’s
perfectly normal than a country that has a much bigger population to also have a bigger economy.
However, if we look at the qualitative indicators, China is still way far behind the United States.
The wealth of a c ountry should be measured by taking into account the GDP per capita. In terms
of precentral growth, the American one was stable, while the Chinese one was incredible. On
average, the Americans were 38.8% wealthier in 2017 than in 1990, with an average grow th of
1.43% per year. On average, the Chinese were 242.3% wealthier in 2017 than in 1990, with an
average growth of 8.97% per year.61 Still, the difference of average income is overwhelming. The
American GDP per capita in 2017 was $59.927, but the Chinese G DP per capita in 2017 was only
$8.826 , almost seven times smaller .62 Thus , the American economy is far more developed,
sophisticated and adapted for the incoming changes on the global market. The United States is the
greatest power on the field of research and development investments and is leading in key strategic
sectors as nanotechnology and biotechnology. E ven though the United States has a trade deficit
and the Chinese a trade excess, the first economy is mainly based on the production of high quality
goods and services, with a capacity to add plus value and increase profits, whereas the second one
is based on mass production of goods that are exported with less additional value, and the demand
on their internal market for sophisticated products is much lower. Nye highlights that in the near
future, from a demographic point of view, India will be the most populated country in the world,
followed by China and the United States. Due to a higher birth rate and immigration, the United
States of America are th e only developed country in the world (that is also a major power) that has

60 Joseph Nye, Does China Have Feet of Clay? 2019, https://www.project -syndicate.org/commentary/five -key-
weaknesses -in-china -by-joseph -s–nye-2019 -04, accessed on 31st of May 2019
61 World Bank, GDP per capita growth (annual %) , 2019,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG , accessed on 5th of June 2019
62 Idem, GDP per capita (current US$) , 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD , accessed on
5th of June 2019

38
a stable flow of population. In comparison, much like the Japanese previously experienced , the
Chinese labor force will continue to shrink due to a lower birth rate and overall agi ng of the
population. The advantage of a cheap labor force will diminish due to the economic growth that
will bring an increase in terms of wages, and the increasing number of old people will stress the
pension and social contribution system. Economic grow th will amplify the demographic decline
up to a point, and then the demographic decline will also put pressure on the future economic
development. On the energy sector, the United States has become self -reliant and the Middle East
will become less importan t for them.63 On the other hand, the Chinese economy will continue to
be dependent on the imports of oil and gas from the Persi an Gulf.
Even more important is the debate around inequality. The United States has some inequality issues
because their economy became much more sophisticated. In the 60’s it was enough to become a
mechanic and to prosper. Nowadays, the complexity of the labor market demands advances studies .
Nye also admits that the United States has major educational problems on the primary and
secondary level . Moreover , the access to college is limited and this facilitates inequality in future
income.64 Because they are a liberal democracy, the Americans can defuse this social and political
tension due to political participation and elections. Ind ia has also managed to contain the inequality
issue until now because it’s a democracy. China is not and the more they will grow from an
economic standpoint, the more the inequality rate will increase. Historically, China has only know
a cyclical process o f centralization, civil war and again centralization around an emperor that
gained the mandate of heaven. In the 21st century, their unprecedented economic growth will
facilitate the rise of a middle class , and the structure of their society will no longer be divided
between peasants and the Confucian aristocracy. The strong presence of Chinese nationalism

63 Simon Lack, American Energy Independence Is Imminent , 2019,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonlack/2019/01/28/american -energy -independence -is-imminent/#5f182cad2870 ,
accessed on 5th of June 2019
64 Nye argues that an increasing demand for higher education is the main cause for the inequality within the United
States. Thomas Piketty, maybe the most influential contemporary economists that tackles the problem of inequality,
argues that indeed higher salaries justified by a better education caused some inequality in America, but the main
cause is given by the higher growth rate of capital than the overall economy. The two causes are certainly linked
because someone who owns cap ital can have a better education and a better paid job, but inequality is first and
foremost based on passive income. In other words, the wealthy of our time can do nothing and thrive based solely on
dividends, bringing us closer to the landlord society of the 19th century Britain. The fact that the American economy
was 71.8% bigger than the one from 1990, and the average growth rate was 2.56%, whereas the Americans were
only 38.8% wealthier in 2017 than in 1990, with an average growth of 1.43% per year, se ems to suggest that our
estimation is correlated with Piketty’s theory. The increasing gap between the 1% or 0.1% rich and the rest might
explain why most of the Americans think that the United States is in decline.

39
makes the dissolution or division of the state highly improbable. It is not clear that China will
become a democracy, but their new middle class will sur ely put pressure on the government to
facilitate more political participation of some sort. We will also like to add one more concept that
will support Nye’s idea: regional inequality. Up to a point, inequality is a natural phenomenon for
a developing coun try. The greatest problem is that China has a huge inequality and development
gap between the rich urbanized North -East and South China, and the much poorer countryside
from North and West China (the Han majority is concentrated in the rich parts, and the rest of the
ethnic minorities, including a significant Islamic community, leave in the poorer regions ).65 In the
future, this difference can create systemic social and economic issues, and can greatly impact
China’s capacity of mobilizing its resources in c ase of a conflict.
In the military sector, the United States has no competitor. In 2007, the United States spent 464.86
billion dollars on its military , more than the next nine great powers combined . The next significant
players in line were the United Kin gdom (53.22), France (43.65), China (38.85), Germany (35.42) ,
Japan (34.53), Italy (31.78), and Russia (27.10).66 In 2018, the military expenditure increased up
to significant margin , giving witness to the increasing diplomatic tensions. According to the
concept of relative power, The United States share has slightly reduced but the Americans are still
spending much more than the other states: 648.8 billion dollars. This top is followed by China with
250 billion dollars (more than six times higher than in 20 07!), Saudi Arabia 67.6 billion dollars,
India 66.5 billion dollars, France 63.8 billion dollars, Russia 61.4 billion dollars, United Kingdom
50 billion dollars, Germany 49.5 billion dollars, Japan 46.6 billion dollars, and South Korea 43.1
billion dollars .67
Again, the difference between the military force of the United States and China is ever wider if we
analyze the qualitative variables. Most of the American spending on research is actually directed
towards the military sector. In the real world, milita ry spending is not automatically converted in
military power. The Global Firepower index uses 55 different variables in order to estimate the
military power of 137 countries and their list for 2019 is the following: United States, The Russian

65 Again, the data shows that the overall inequality in China is actually much lower than first perceived, and that the
main issue is the inequality between regions. The Chinese economy from 2017 was 265.9% higher than the one
from 1990, and the average growth rate was 9.84%. The Chinese were 242 .3% wealthier in 2017 than in 1990, with
an average growth of 8.97% per year.
66 Max Roser and Mohamed Nagdy, Military Spending , 2014, https://ourworldindata.org/military -spending ,
accessed on 6th of June 2019
67 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database , 2019,
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex , accessed on 6th of June 2019

40
Federation, C hina, India, France, Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany.68
Taking into account the balance of power, with the exception of the Russian Federation, the rest
of the great military powers are allied or have good relations with the United State s. The air force
and navy coordinated from Beijing started to expand into the South and East China Sea, but they
are no match for t he American sophisticated war machine. In the Pacific, the most important
military asset is having aircraft carriers supporte d by many airplanes and other types of warships.
Taking together offensive aircrafts, helicopters, but also transport and support air forces, China
currently has 3187 such weapons at its disposal , Japan has 1572, South Korea 1614, and the United
States 133 98.69 Not only that the numbers are not on the Chinese side, but the technology and
quality of the American planes (the recent developed F -35 that was also sold to its allies is just an
example) is superior. The Japanese also have a project to build their o wn stealth aircraft by 2025
(Mitsubishi X -2 Shinshin , which should be hybrid between F -22 and F -35). Looking at the navy,
China has barely managed to build one aircraft carrier and its capacity is put under questions by
the military experts. On the other s ide, the United States has 24 aircraft carriers (13 of them heavy) ,
and even Japan produced 4 aircraft carriers (2 heavy and 2 light ones) .70 Even more surprising is
that the Americans reached unipolarity by spending 3.1% of its GDP on military affairs (hav ing
an average of 3.5% in the last two decades). China is now spending 1.9% and for the last twenty
years has struggled to pass the 2% barrier.71 Starting from those statistics, Joseph Nye concludes
that the thesis of an American imperial overstretch is sim ply not valid. Nevertheless , the American
scholar agrees that some American military bases are bad investments and should be closed. Other
vital bases should continue to be supported, like the Okinawa military base (this is the biggest
external American mi litary base, with over 50.000 permanent military personnel) . The American
military presence there discourages any Ch inese possible aggressive intent ions, and Japan is

68 Global Firepower, 2019 Military Strength Ranking , 2019, https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries –
listing.asp#additionalNotes , accessed on 6th of June 2019
69 Ibid
70 Felix K. Chang, Japan’s New Aircraft Carriers: Reviving Japanese Naval Aviation , 2019,
https ://www.fpri.org/article/2019/02/japans -newish -aircraft -carriers -reviving -japanese -naval –
aviation/?fbclid=IwAR39Yf8iVhqDB_a7wxTeyn7l5yzT5IywIUlcIZqfFnkshlpSppNgmxVg_bU , accessed on 6th of
June 2019
71 World Bank, Military expenditure (% of GDP) , 2019,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=US -CN, accessed on 6th of June 2019

41
welcoming the Western presence there, supporting them with funds (80 -85% of the entire co sts
are sponsored by Tokyo).72 This brings his argument to the Soft Power element.
The Chinese civilization has 5.000 years of history behind it and it’s without any doubt very
attractive to almost any country, organization or individual . Together with the development of the
economic and military sector, Beijing recognized the importance of soft power and seriously
invested in this. Confucian learning centers were built all over Asia and Chinese manufacturing
products were exported all over the world. More a nd more tourists are visiting the country and
their universities and research centers made huge progress, attracting more people to study there.
Still, the soft power of China is sabotaged by its aggressive foreign policy. Their great artistic and
religiou s heritage that is promoted with the sponsorship of the state matters little if their navy is
entering the territorial waters of all its neighboring countries. This is why countries like Japan,
South Korea and India, despite their differences, welcomed the American military presence in the
region. The most important setback of the Chinese soft power is related to their civil society. Why
is the American Hollywood and the Indian Bollywood so successful? Are the Chinese incapable
of producing popular culture? The answer is because although little remains from the communist
ideology, the Communist party still imposes a very strict system of censorship. For example, a
brilliant Chinese writer or painter could organize an international conference in China that wi ll
greatly improve their image all over the world, but all this effort is useless if that personality is
imprisoned the next week. The complicated human rights record is also an issue. On the other side,
although the American popular culture suffered some setbacks in the past years, its position is far
better, particularly because the United States is a liberal democracy. Another significant difference
is that out of the first twenty universities in the world, fifteen are in America. The most brilliant
mind s of future leaders are educ ated there. In the end, Nye ask s us: if you would have to move to
Washington or Beijing, which one you would choose?
To recapitulate, his main argument is that a major clash between great powers is unlikely to occur
in the pred ictable future because China’s current rise is overestimated, the American relative
decline is underestimated, and the Chinese growth will flatten out, as it already it slowed down.
His second argument as importance is related to the concepts of soft power and smart power. 73 A

72 Ayako Mie, How much does Japan pay to host U.S. forces? Depends on who you ask , 2017,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/31/national/much -japan -pay-host-u-s-forces -depends –
ask/#.XPqUytIza01 , accessed on 6th of June 2019
73 Joseph Nye, The Future of Power , Public Affairs, New York, 2011

42
limited military and diplomatic competition would most probably continue in the South and East
China Sea, but transnational challenges will become more important in comparison with the hard
power elements. Both countries have to face difficult challenges in the 21st century that can only
be managed by cooperation . Some relevant examples are climate change, financial cooperation,
cybernetic warfare, epidemics, and terrorism. The foreign policy guiding principle should
gradually change f rom power over others to power with others. China is the main producer of CO2
but also the champion of green energy investments and as the biggest economy in the world, the
United States should led by example. Pollution is affecting people in Beijing and N ew Work, but
it also affects the direct interests of the state. On long term, this is a serious security issue, meaning
that climate change will be on the top of the political agenda, reaching an equal footing with what
realists call hard politics .74 The co operation between the two states could have a huge impact over
the globe, because their joint soft power, technological expertise and power to invest could attract
almost any state to join the project. Not only that the individual citizens and the nature w ill greatly
benefit from this, but their prestige in the world would increase, a factor that could facilitate further
trade deals and investments (thus, bringing a relevant contribution to the traditional military –
economic power). This success would facili tate the creation of new international institutions
(strengthening the existing ones), enhancing future dialogue.
The same can be said by financial cooperation. Some observers are worried that the significant
foreign American debt, especially if we consid er that the main creditor is China, would mean that
the United States is in danger of losing its economy independence. This fear is not motivated by
facts. Any state that makes serious investments has to loan money and the loan rate is very
advantageous fo r the Americans, because the American economy is developed and offers strong
guarantees that even long term debts will be paid. The economic interdependency of both countries
makes any sabotage very hurtful for both sides and provides no real advantage. With the exception
of the EU, the biggest trade partners of the United States are China, Canada, Mexico, Japan,
Germany , South Korea, United Kingdom, France, India and Italy . In 2017, the value of exports
towards China reached 129.894 million dollars, and th e imports from China had a value of 505.470

74 Anatol Lieven, The Only Force That Can Beat Climate Change Is the U.S. Army , 2018,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/09/the -only-force -that-can-beat-climate -change -is-the-u-s-army/ , accessed on 7th
of June 2019

43
million dollars. 75 In 2015, the main trade partners of China were the United States, Japan, South
Korea, Germany, Australia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Canada, United Kingdom and Thailand.76 A
security coalition between t he United States, Japan and South Korea was already formed. Germany
will probably keep its neutrality, and Australia, Canada, United Kingdom have close relation with
the Americans. Malaysia has a border dispute with China because both claim territorial rig hts in
the South China Sea.77 Due to the increasing power of China, Vietnam has also switched sides and
restarted its relations with the United States.78 Out of those, China has sound diplomatic relations
only with Thailand! This is why the Chinese will most probably not start a cybernetic warfare on
the financial market . Their exports will suffer greatly if the American purchasing power decreases
and if a trade coalition will be formed against them . On the long term they will hurt themselves
more. The only v irtual battlefield that the Chinese will continue to use is intellectual property .
Because the costs of those operations are small, and the benefits are much bigger, Beijing is
embracing this policy. The United States should counteract this action by a pol icy of stick and
carrots. It should impose significant sanctions to discourage this practice, but it should also offer
reasonable deals to the Chinese. The most obvious example is selling technology or cooperating
in joint technological projects related to transnational issues that they both have interests in.
Likewise, terrorism is growing not only in the Middle East, but also in Asia. The joint American
experience in the Middle East and the Chinese experience in dealing with the rise of terrorist
attacks in the western part of their country could prevent the rise of Isis in Philippines and
Indonesia79 and could improve the Chinese relations with its neighbors.
Cooperation will also be improved because in the information age, China will not be able to isola te
itself like in the past. As social media rises on the continent, censorship will become increasingly
hard for the government. Considering that more and more Chinese citizens are traveling abroad,

75 International Trade Administration, Top U.S. Trade Partners Ranked by 2017 U.S. Total Export Value for Goods ,
2017, https://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf ,
accessed on 7th of June 2019
76 China Statistical Yearbook 2016, Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation , 2016,
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm , accessed on 7th of June 2019
77 Felix K. C hang, A Question of Rebalancing: Malaysia’s Relations With China , 2014,
https://www.fpri.org/article/2014/07/a -question -of-rebalancing -malaysias -relations -with-china/ , accessed on 7th of
June 2019
78 Carl Thayer, Obama’s Visit to Vietnam: A Turning Point? , 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/obamas -visit-
to-vietnam -a-turning -point/ , accessed on 7th of June 2019
79 Bilveer Singh, Southeast Asia Braces for the Post -Islamic State Era , 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2 017/07/southeast -asia-braces -for-the-post-islamic -state-era/, accessed on 7th of June 2019

44
as their middle class is rising, their business sector fu rther develops overseas, and also anticipating
that their future leaders will be educated in the United States, sharing sympathies for their culture
and values, it’s possible that their society will open up. Nationalism will prevent any form of
secession, but internal tensions and reforms towards more political participation will become a
reality, boosting the chances for a future cooperation with the United States.
Joseph Nye also understands that soft power has its limits. Soft power alone will never conv ince
China to give up its diplomatic position on North Korea, Taiwan or Syria. This is why the
American strategy should be patient and balanced: competitive and cooperative in the same time .80
The Americans should remain competitive on the economic and rese arch sector, discouraging any
aggression in key strategic areas, but also keep in mind that under the coordination of a wise
foreign policy, the rise of the Chinese power might be beneficial for the US and the rest of the
world .81
Besides the strong incent ives for positive cooperation, fear should also be managed because unlike
Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, the Chinese pose no existential treat to the Western world.
Their Communist ideology is now more a name than a reality. The Chinese are not claiming that
their way of life is inherently superior and should be imposed on the whole globe and they don’t
have the ambition to annihilate populations or to conquer vast territories of land. Thus, Washington
should not overreact when Beijing will promote some expansionist policies and should be opened
towards concessions, but in the same time should discourage from the start any possible Chinese
military adventure. What the Chinese really want is to become rich and obtain a better position at
the table of world politics. There are many ways that a strategy of cooperation and competition
could benefit both powers to reach this goal peacefully.
Nye responds to the critics that say that another Cold War has started in the Pacific by denying
that the Americans are p ursuing a policy of containment in Asia. To put it in his own words, only
China can contain China . Behind this subtle game of words, Nye is actually saying that China
should abstain itself from pursuing an aggressive foreign policy in the Pacific because t hey will
have much more too loose if they challenge the American supremacy. Article 5 of the United and

80 Joseph Nye, The Rise of China and American Power , Harvard Kennedy School of Government Conference, 10th
of April 2012, min 37, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BwWT0kbYSZs , accessed on 27th of May 2019
81 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics , 2004,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule -review/2004 -05-01/soft -power -means -success -world -politics ,
accessed on 30th of May 2019

45
Japan security treaty provides a strong deterrence. If the Chinese continue to pursue this strategy,
they will antagonize all of their neighbors who wil l join the American cause. As long as Beijing
will recognize the American right to free roam in the world’s oceans, Washington will also not
expand to the Chinese border and will be inclined to cooperate on some common causes, and they
will even be opened on the possibility of offering compromises. If th e Chinese will stay away from
the East China Sea, which belongs to the Americans and their allies, the issues that appeared in
the South China Sea could be solved in the Chinese favor. Washington recognized that in the South
China Sea many of the Chinese neighbors have bad territorial claims and they are the ones that
provoked a response from Beijing. If China is willing to solve all its border issues with its
neighbors by negotiating peacefully, and they wil l stay out from the East China Sea, then the
United States will remain neutral and not interfere with the regional sovereignty issues , even if the
Chinese will continue to build artificial islands in the South China Sea . By arguing for this strategy,
Nye f alls within the trap of the neorealist logic more than he likes to recognize.
Although Nye considers that the possibly of war is much lower, he agrees with Mearsheimer that
the most probable point of conflict between China and the United States are North K orea, Taiwan
and Senkaku/ Diaoyudao/ Diaoyutai Islands . On the first issue, he thinks that Trump has made a
grave mistake by accepting the deal from Singapore. The deal was less an actual solution, and
more a spectacle for the masses. Kim Jong -un might ac cept foreign experts to visit North Korea
and inspect some facilities, but there is no actual guarantee that he will keep his word and that
future tension won’t escalate because of this. Instead, the economic sanctions of the United States
should have cont inued in North Korea, and Beijing should have been attracted into joining the
containment of the Pyongyang regime. Actually, in most of his recent lectures Nye dedicates a lot
of time for criticizing the Trump administration for its climate change policy, for sabotaging the
soft power of the United States, for underestimating the importance of diplomacy and
understanding foreign policy as a game of winner takes at all, and for its protectionist measures
targeted towards trade deals and immigration. 82 Trump also undermined the American web of

82 Joseph Nye, Oxford Union Conference , 6th of August 2018,

dpblqAB9TU6xL96MQEr8 , accessed on 1st of June 2019

46
alliances by insisting that they should pay more for the American military assistance and
protection.83
Taiwan was a security issue since its birth in 1950. Still, the tense but peaceful relations between
China and the U nited States means that there is room for compromise. Since Mao’s regime and
the Taiwan Strait Crises that occurred in 1954 – 1955, and 1958 and the more recent on from 1995
– 1996, a direct confrontation is much less feasible. If China is not insisting in taking Taiwan by
force, the Americans will not claim that Taiwan needs to remain an independent country. With the
passing of time a peaceful reunification is possible, as a result of increasing economic ties and
constant diplomatic dialogue. Mao declared that the Chinese will wait even one hundred year s
until they will get Taiwan back. With patience, maybe they will.
The same framework is applied in the case of the Japanese – Chinese island dispute. The possibility
of conflict was real in 2012, when Americ an-Japanese forces were very close to the Chinese ones,
but the United States brilliantly deescalated the tensions by following the principles of smart power.
In order to discourage a Chinese aggression, they have immediately and clearly stated that if Chi na
goes to war with Japan over the Senkaku Islands, the United States and its allies wil l join the
Japanese with all their might. Their speech was not unidirectional. They have also added that don’t
necessary believe that the Senkaku Islands belong to the Japanese and that they will remain neutral
if Beijing and Tokyo can set aside their differences peacefully, by the means of negotiation.
Deterrence was used in conjunction with offering concessions, and the American geopolitical
position improved because t he Asian allies felt that they can count on their help in the future, while
their prestige increase because their diplomatic position looked objective and reasonable. The later
rephrasing of the American foreign policy in the Pacific from ‘Pivot to Asia ’ to ‘Rebalance in Asia’
was also inspired because it reassured that Washington will not abandon its other allies. 84
The situation from the other regions of the world is also addressed. In his opinion, the resource
competition in Africa and in the Middle Ea st is overstated. At a closer look, the Chinese

83 In suppo rt of his argument, Trump insisted that Japan should pay for the American defense in the Pacific even
though Japan already pays for 85% of the upkeep of the American troops. He also disregarded the Trans -Pacific
Partnership, even though this was the most i mportant econo mic project of containing China and even though the rest
11 countries continued to pursue this and formed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific
Partnership, a deal that represents 13% of the world’s GDP and is now the third economic free trade space after the
EU and NAFTA. It has become effective from 1st of December 2019.
84 Joseph Nye, Is the American Century Over? Foreign Policy Association Conference, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vdkT1ey66 -g, accessed on 30th of May 2019

47
investments in Africa and the competition with the United States will be in the benefit of all. Africa
is not a vital strategic point for neither country, but the development of Africa would bring
significant profits for both sides. The local population will also make use of this opportunity, and
even Europe will be much better having more developed states on its southern border. In the same
time, the energetic American independence makes the Arab oil less imp ortant. And even for the
sake of the argument, if the oil from that part of the globe would not be under the Western control,
there are other sources to buy this resource from the much more dynamic global market.
Nevertheless, China is far more depend on t he import of oil, and the Americans should continue
to pursue a foreign policy of containing the states from the Middle East without sending soldiers
on the ground. Nye agrees with Mearsheimer that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were a great
mistake and although the Americans should keep their military bases in the Pacific as a policy
insurance against China, they should retreat from the ones from the Middle East countries that are
unstable and should not try to impose liberal democracy there. Even if a m ilitary occupation will
be successful, the reconstruction of the country is doomed to fail due to the rise of nationalism.
Joseph Nye explain that the Arab Spring resembles what happened during the French Revolution.
The citizens from those countries shoul d figure out on their own what type of political system is
better for them. This process will take time and unlike the European powers that invaded France
and provoked several wars that devastated the continent for twenty years, the Americans should
wait, balance the power between the competing states, support Saudi Arabia and Israel, and only
contain any expansionist attempt that could endanger even more the stability of the area. In
exchange, better human rights conditions could be negotiated with Saudi A rabia, and a
compromise in relation to Israel’s expansions claims in regards to the Gaza Strip can be reached.
Both Mearsheimer and Nye also agree that Iran poses no existential threat to the United States and
that breaking the nuclear deal and imposing ne w sanctions was a huge mistake.
The Russian actions in Ukraine were unacceptable and the economic sanctions were important,
justified and they were effective because they have shown that territorial conquest in the 21st
century has a great economic price. Nye denies that the Western Powers are responsible for the
Ukrainian crisis and disregards the argument that the United States – EU position forced Putin into
an alliance with China. Like in the Chinese – American example, Russia has many shared interests
with the United States and could cooperate in the development of the Arctic , or on Moscow
facilitating a new deal between Bag hdad and Washington. T he economic sanctions should

48
continue, but a diplomatic door should remain open and a hand should be offered to the Russians.
In the future, their relations might greatly improve, especially because Nye believes that the rise
of nationalism and populism in Europe is just a passing phase. Much like the previous cyclical
domestic crisis in America, the rate of Euro enthusiasm and Euroscepticism will vary from one
decade to another, but neither trend will achieve a decisive victory.
The realist paradigm is also challenged. Having in mind Mearsheimer’s argument, the comparison
between the rise of Germany and the fear o f the United Kingdom that produced World War One
can’t be applied to the relations between China and the United States.85 The reason is that the
German economy and industrial sophistication was already superior to the British one from 1890,
and the war only started many years after, in 1914. In present times, as he has already illustrated,
China is still far behind in economic and technological development. Far more interesting is Nye’s
perspective and interpretation of the Peloponnesian War and the parallel s that he makes from it.
The standard belief is that the growing power of Athena and the fear that was caused in Sparta
inevitable led to war. The professor from Harvard argues that ironically, the conviction of the
Hellenistic leaders that war is inevitab le was one of the main causes. On one hand, Sparta was
worried that the growing naval and trade power of Athena will inevitable led to a future war so
they tried to build a coalition that would balance that naval power and would start a preemptive
war. On the other hand, Athena was worried that the naval forces of the Peloponnese coalition will
grow stronger so they have also calculated that starting a war as soon as possible would be their
best option. In short, this is the prisoner dilemma that Mearsheime r presents. ‘ When you believe
war is inevitable, you are very close to the last move. If you suspect your opponent will cheat, it

85 To be completely fair, Mearsheimer argued that the main cause is different: Imperial Germany starter a
preemptive war because they feared the future rise of Russia. Many historical facts back this narrative. Since Otto
von Bismarck, Germany tried to attract Russia in the League of the Three Emperors that was formed in 1873 and
keep their good relations through the Reinsurance Treaty from 1887, hoping to avoid any conflicts with them . When
Bismarck was forced to retire, Germany refused to renew the treaty in 1890 and immediately after France signed an
alliance with Russia in 1894. Due to this geopolitical failure, the plan from World War One was to strike fast and
take out France, and then have a prolonged war in the east, because they feared that Russia, even though lacked
industrial development, was much stronger than it actually was at that moment. However, the next years
demonstrated that their concerns were correct. During Hitler’ s conversation with Mannerheim from 4th of June 1942,
the only survival audio recording in which Hitler speaks in confidence, the German Fuhrer justifies Operation
Barbarossa as a preemptive attack out of fear, because he anticipated that it will be imposs ible to stop the Soviet
Union if its further development is left unchecked. He also declares that the Soviet industrial sector (production of
tanks) was much stronger than he anticipated, and that it might already be too late. In conclusion, history has pr oven
Bismarck right. In less than a century, Russia turned from one of the weakest great powers (only Austria -Hungary
and the Ottoman Empire were weaker), to a hegemonic power in a bipolar world.

49
is better to take the risk of defecting rather than cooperating. That is what Athens did, and one sees
a similar dynamic as European states debated whether to delay mobilization in July 1914. ’86 He
then continues to explain that the Athenian power was actually not growing, and the main Spartan
issue was internal: a possible slave revolt. The leaders of both coalitions made rushed decisions
under the pressure of time in conditions of imperfect information. ‘ The security dilemma made
war highly probable, but highly probabl e is not the same as inevitable. (…) Let us distinguish three
types of causes in terms of their proximity in time to an event. The most remote are deep causes,
then come intermediate causes, and those immediately before the event are precipitating causes.
An analogy is building a fire: The logs are the deep cause, the kindling and paper are the
intermediate cause, an d the actual striking of the match is the precipitating cause. ’87 Human will
and the misjudgment of leaders is just as important as systemic causes. The same story repeated
itself at the start of World War One. Sure, the rise of Germany and the response of the United
Kingdom is one important cause for a conflict that ruined Europe. Still, in history it is impossible
to limit the cause of a major event by limiting the exp lanation to just one main cause . A systemic
interpretation of the events is insufficient because the other main causes were related to the internal
affairs within the Austro -Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Also, the German elite feared that
socialist reforms will destroy the unity of the country, so they have pushed an expansion foreign
policy to distract the attention of the general public from the economic and social issues that came
with rapid industrialization. The military experts from France and Germany wrongly estimated
that their rapid and mobile forces will bring a quick end of the war so their political leaders believed
that the overall cost of the war was worth it. The truth is that most of the other causes were
connected more to the emotions of the moment, insufficient information, miscalculation and poor
judgments. An exercise in cou nterfactual history can easily prove that without a decisive spark,
any war is not inevitable. For example, maybe if Franz Ferdinand would not have been assassinated,
Germany would have never started a war in the coming years because the alliance between F rance,
United Kingdom and Russia would have been strengthened, and maybe the military experts would
have had time to actually do more detailed tests and realize that the new technology does not favor
an offensive war. In the same time, without a total war that consumed so many resources, maybe

86 Joseph Nye, Inevitability and War , 2014, https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/12308566/Nye –
InevitabilityWar.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y , p. 4, accessed on 1st of June 2019
87 Ibid, pp. 5 and 1 1

50
Germany would have become t oo strong from an economic point of view and the other European
powers could have hesitated before committing to a suicidal war. In short, Nye’s message is that
the whole concept inevitabili ty of war is a romantic myth, and thus the whole neorealist paradigm
can’t explain the relations between China and the United States. To this he brings one final
argument. The prisoner dilemma facilitates war because the interactions are very limited in ti me
and space. However, nowadays, the Americans and the Chinese had experienced repeated
interactions over several decades and until the Chinese power might grew so strong and could
challenge the American position, their interaction and cooperation would ma ke both players better
understand each other and the game that they are playing, avoiding rushed or unwise decisions.
This process would not make the possibility of war obsolete, it will only significantly decrease the
chances that the future leaders will plunge into an irrational clash. But if a conflict will start, it
won’t be because war is inevitable, but because human nature is subject to error.

51
Recent developments in the Pacific

North Korea

The Korean Peninsula was ruled by strong and develop ed states since antiquity. The Chinese
empire tried to prevent the unifi cation of the Korean state. T his finally happened in 918 AD, under
the Goryeo dynasty. Their long reign was ended in 1392, when after a stage coup, the leadership
of the Korean realm was assumed by the Joseon dynasty. The golden age of Korean medieval
history was achieved in the 15th century, under the reign of Sejong the Great . Between 1592 and
1597, a Japanese invasion devastated the country and it was only repelled with the Ch inese support.
Starting from this moment , a slow decline followed and by the end of the 19th Century, the Joseon
dynasty ruled only in name, as the Chinese Qing dynasty was directly dictating the internal affairs
in the peninsula, and due to this Korea rem ained a poor and undeveloped country. With the rise of
the Japanese imperialism, Korea was annexed and became a province of the empire in 1910 .
Koreans supported the Japanese war effort and after 1945, Korea was divided in North Korea
(under the Soviet occ upation), and South Korea (under the American occupation). Fearing that the
reunification of the country would mean that the communists would win the future elections, as
the general social and economic context made them quite popular in Korea, the United States
negotiated a compromise with the Soviets. Starting from 1948, two separate governments were
formed. Supported by the Soviets, but especially by the Chinese army, the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea invaded the Republic of Korea in 1950. Initia lly successful, the North Korean
forces were pushed back by the Americans. After 3 years of conflict that produced 1.2 million
casualties, an armistice was signed. North Korea remained a communist dictatorship, while South
Korea continued its road towards a capitalistic military dictatorship. In the 50’, the South Korean
economy was below the levels of many Africa n states and even below North Korea. With the
Western support, South Korea experienced one of the most spectacular economic and demographic
miracl e in universal history . Nowadays, South Korea has a population of 50 million people, while
North Korea only 24 million. ‘North Korea's GDP was estimated to be $40 billion in 2015, while
that of South Korea was $1.92 trillion for the same period. South Kore a's GDP per capita in 2015
was estimated to be $37,600, while North Korea's was $1,700. South Korea’s trade volume was a

52
gigantic $1.07 trillion in 2013. By comparison, North Korea reported a relatively minuscule $7.3
billion. ’88 In the meantime, the Soviet Union collapsed and China gradually moved away from
supporting North Korea. Without any support, the North Korean line of dictators, that inherited
the position from father to son, invested most of the country’s resources in its military and in
developing nuclear weapons. Their first nuclear reactor was built in 1963 and the actual nuclear
weapons project started in 1980. They have also repeatedly repressed their own population by the
means of aggressive propaganda, censorship, forced labor, torture and ma ss executions. Although
not on the scale that was practiced in the 50’ (when 400.000 people died in concentration camps) ,
this way of dealing with internal political problems is still in use. Due to this, North Korea became
more and more isolated and econo mic sanctions were imposed by the most countries of the world.
Those sanctions had little effect on the ruling elite. On the other hand, during the famine from
1994 to 1998, between 300.000 and 3.5 million died due to starvation and illness produced by the
lack of basic products.89 The main causes are represented by the fall of the Soviet Union that
exported a significant amount of goods, a series of floods that destroyed the rice cultures, the
Western economic sanctions and trade embargo, but also by the re fusal of the Communist
government to receive any support and their effort to cover up the disaster. The food situation has
slightly improved since then, but many North Koreans are still living in poverty. ‘Droughts, floods,
typhoons and heatwaves continue to affect the country every year, causing soil leeching, erosion,
landslides and damage to crops and infrastructure. ’90
South Korea also experienced periods of bloody dictatorships and political assassinations . Like in
many other cases, the United States ha d no issue in supporting Syngman Rhee in his dictatorship
from 1948 to 1960, when his government violently repressed and massacred civilians during
several attempts o f popular uprising. After a short popular democratic rule, Park Chung -hee
dictatorship was established. He was an army officer that served under the Manchukuo puppet
state, using the name Okamoto Minoru , and actively supported the capture of any Koreans soldiers
who wanted to deflect from the Japanese imperial army in 1944. He returned to Korea and initially

88 Prableen Bajpal, North Korean vs. South Korean Economies: What's the Difference? , 2019,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/040515/nort h-korean -vs-south -korean -economies.asp , accessed on 8th
of June 2019
89 Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, Tao Wang, Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures ,
https://piie.com/publications/wp/99 -2.pdf , accessed on 8th of June 2019
90 World Food Programme, Democratic People's Republic of Korea , 2018,
https://www1.wfp.org/countries/democratic -peoples -republic -korea , accessed o n 8th of June 2019

53
supported the communists, being captured and sentenced to death. Then, due to his connections,
he was pardoned and served in the Korean War. By the end of the conflict, he became one of the
most influential general s in South Korea. He ruled from 1963 to 1979, when he was assassinated
by one of his closest foreign intelligence agents. His place was taken by another dictator, Chun
Doo-hwan , who massacred 2000 peaceful protesters in 1980, when he took power. Since 1992 ,
with the election of Kim Young -sam, South Korea undertook a series of institutional reforms that
left the dictatorships and corrupt regimes behind. His successor Kim Dae -jung, held office from
1998 to 2003, and during his short presidency he won the rename Nelson Mandela of South Korea.
When he died in 2009, he was given a state funeral and even North Korea sent a symbolic mission
to pay homage to him. By all accounts, this step towards democratization happened as a natural
result of the increasing pressure of the Korean civil soci ety, and not due to any Western implication
that played only a minor role. I n 2013 , all the major newspapers headlined with enthusiasm that
South Korea elected their first female president in the person of Park Geun -hye, without taking
into account that sh e was the daughter of the former dictator Park Chung -hee.91 Park Geun -hye
presidency ended in 2017, when she was arrested for corruption in a scandal that directly involved
the multinational company Samsung . In the same year, Lee Jae -yong was convicted (the heir of
the Samsung empire) to 5 years of prison for bribery and embezzlement . In 2018 Park Geun -hye
was finally sentenced to 25 years of prison. Her predecessor, Lee Myung -bak, who was the
president of South Korea from 2008 to 2013, was also sentenced to 15 years of prison for another
famous case of corruption. Despite the increasing nationalist political movements and some civil
rights and censorship issues, South Korea is now one of the few Asian states that achieved a
political organization that comes closer to the Western liberal democracy.92 Moon Jae -in, the
current South Korean president, is committed towards new set of reforms.
On the foreign affairs domain, South and North Korea never signed a peace treaty after the Korean
War and limited border ho stilities constantly erupted between them, with the Communist regime
launching rackets that were intercepted by the advanced South Korean defense system that also

91 Choi Hye -jung, Park Geun -hye’s political career goes from “election queen” to suspect in jail , 2017,
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_ national/788903.html , accessed on 8th of June 2019
92 In 2013, the Korean historian Park Yu -ha wrote the book Comfort Women of the Empire , claiming that the Korean
local authorities also bear some reasonability for the Japanese crimes during their occupati on, and that some local
Korean officials and soldiers directly aided or committed the crimes. She was convicted by the South Korean
Supreme Court and she had to pay a fine for defamation. Under international pressure, she was found not guilty in
2017.

54
sent missiles in reply . Maybe the most serious episode of this nature in recent years happene d in
November 2010, during t he bombardment of Yeonpyeong , when a South Korean military exercise
that entered the North Korean territorial waters was received with artillery shelling over their
border, killing 4 South Korean civilians. Although the conventi onal forces of North Korea are
modest from a technological point of view , the fact that they have continued nuclear tests continues
to pose a serious threat to international security. Up to this date it is not completely clear if the
Pyongyang regime manag ed to develop a nuclear arsenal, but specialist conclude that they main
problem is actually developing middle and long range missiles systems that the can use to launch
nuclear weapons that could hit the American territory. Several conventional middle rang e missiles
were launched towards Japan but they all fallen in Japan’s sea, creating fear in Tokyo, and
providing further justification for Abe’s plan to remilitarize the country. ‘ In remarks to reporters
on Monday morning, Yoshihide Suga, the chief cabinet secretary to Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo
Abe, said the missiles appeared to have fallen into the sea in an exclusive economic zone around
Japan. Mr. Suga called the missile launch a “serious threat to our security” as well as “extremely
problematic beh avior from the viewpoint of security of aircraft and ships.” He said the government
had protested to North Korea. ’93
During Obama’s presidency, tensions with North Korea escalated on several occasions. As a
reaction to North Korea’s nuclear activity and hu man rights infringements, the United States
gradually increased the economic sanctions and patiently used their secret services to keep a close
observation on the Korean nuclear project. In 2011, when the former dictator Kim Jong -il died,
many have hoped t hat younger Kim Jong -un (educated in Berlin) would start a gradual process of
economic reform and political liberalization. In 2012, the United States reached a deal with North
Korea. If they will denuclearize, the Americans will provide food aids.94 This deal never
materialized , and the Communist country followed the same traditional path and even launched
cybernetic attacks against the United States . In 2017, his elder half -brother, Kim Jong -nam, was
assassinated in Malaysia by North Korean agents.95 Proba bly due to his experience from 2012,

93 Choe Sang -Hun, North Korea’s Launch of Ballistic Missiles Raises New Worries , 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/05/world/north -korea -ballistic -missiles.html , accessed on 8th of June 2019
94 Jack David, Obama's 'Victory' with North Korea , 2012, https://www.hudson.org/research/8765 -obama -s-victory –
with-north -korea , accessed on 8th of June 2019
95 David Alexander, U.S. sanctions North Korea for killing of leader's half -brother with VX chemical , 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us -northkorea -malaysia -kim-usa/u -s-imposes -sanctions -on-pyongyang -over-
slaying -of-north -korean -leaders -half-brother -idUSKCN1GJ031 , accessed on 8th of June 2019

55
Obama’s position was that the United State will restart their diplomatic and trade relations with
them only if North Korea will completely give up their nuclear ambitions. Diplomatic
compromises were previously searched by Bill Clinton and George W. Bush and both seriously
considered the possibility of an official visit at Pyongyang but because the North Koreans were
willing only to compromise on stop selling and producing weapons, but not giving up the ones
they had, th e American presidents cancelled their plans. Bush even tried to organize multilateral
talks between the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and the The Russian
Federation, but with no success. Frustrated by this, Bush included North Kore a into his ‘Axis of
evil’ speech.
From his very first months, Trump’s presidency started on the wrong foot with North Korea , as he
criticized Obama’s policy of strategic patience . Initially, h is declaration were even more firm when
it came to the possibili ty of negotiating with the Communist regime. On 4th of July 2017 (the
Independence Day of the United States), North Korea successfully tested Hwasong -14, its firm
intercontinental ballistic missile. It is also possible that on the 3rd of September 2017, th ey have
also successfully produced their first hydrogen bomb. Many were concerned in November 2017,
when they managed to launch a missile that had the range of 13.000 km, theoretically being capable
of hitting Washington. In response, the United States imp osed new economic sanctions, placed
again North Korea on the list of terrorist states and organized new military exercises in cooperation
with South Korea and Japan. Some newspapers even titled that a war might broke up. In the same
time, Kim Jong -un sent athletes to the 2018 Winter Olympics and engaged in bilateral
conversations with South Korea . Although he invited Moon Jae -in to visit North Korea, his clear
aim was bringing the United States to the table of negotiations. Pyongyang was looking for a
bilateral meeting with the Americans since the 90’. Between the second half of 2016 and the end
of 2017, North Korea undertook more missiles tests than ever in its history.96 Looking back at
those recent events, it has become clear that the main purpose of those tests were to attract the
attention of the international community and to force the hand of the Americans. The North Korean
newspapers were already preparing for the visit, ceasing the Anti -American propaganda and
naming Trum p a ‘wise ruler’. Donald Trump actually responded by using a sticks and carrots
strategy. He accepted the invitation but also organized joint South Korean – American military

96 Nuclear Threat Initia tive, The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database , 2019,
https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns -north -korea -missile -test-database/ , accessed on 9th of June 2019

56
exercises as a symbolic position in relation to the ongoing nuclear tests, and the meeting was one
step away fr om being cancelled.
Preparatory talks were held by both parties. The United States, Japan and South Korea consulted
with each other, and Kim Jong -un visited China twice, between the 25th and 28th of March 2018,
and on the 7th of May 2018. Xi Jinping then stresses the importance of collaboration between the
two communist countries. The diplomatic dialogue had little effect. In exchange of giving up its
nuclear weapons, North Korea demanded guarantees that they will not be attacked by South Korea
or the Unit ed States, they required to sign a peace treaty with South Korea and requested the
establishment of permanent diplomatic relations with Washington. The only important step that
was made in this direction was the meeting between the Korean presidents on 27th of April 2018,
when both promised to sign a peace treaty by the end of the year. In exchange to this concession,
North Korea released three American prisoners 10th of May , returned the remains of some
American soldiers from the Korean War and claimed to have destroy ed their nuclear base from
Punggye -ri on 12th of May . The Americans replied to the North Korean claims by saying that the
economic sanctions will be partially lifted only after the meeting takes place, and only if they will
receive strong guara ntees that North Korea will abandon its military programme. The leaders of
the two countries eventually met at Singapore, on 12nd of June 2018. However, the me eting
concluded with no genuine deal. North Korea promised to dismantle its nuclear programme and
the United States promised to retreat 30.000 of its military from South Korea. 97 China proposed
that some economic sanctions should be raised. On the 24th of July 2018, North Korea also
dismantled its satellite launcher base from Sohae but the United Stat es declared that the embargo
will be lifted only after complete denuclearization. North Korea never agreed to that, as their
position was for a gradual disarmament with the condition that the United States will also make
concessions. 98 American media alrea dy started to report that the North Koreans restarted their
military activities but Trump denied everything, asking to receive a Nobel Prize for peace. Because
neither side was willing to back down, another North Korea – South Korea meeting was held

97 Even if for the sake of argument, North Korea would have kept its word, we doubt that the American forces would
just retreat from South Korea. Their main purpose of their presence there is the containment of China. Despite the
media coverage, discouragin g a North Korean aggression is only a secondary objective.
98 David C. Kang, Why Should North Korea Give Up Its Nuclear Weapons? , 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/ 22/opinion/north -korea -nuclear -trump.html , accessed on 9th of June 2019

57
betwee n 18th and 20th of September 2018, and Moon Jae -in guaranteed that the Communist regime
is committed to demobilizing its forces . Again, Kim Jong -un meet with Xi Jinping on 8th of January.
A second North Korea – United States bilatera l meeting was held at Hanoi, between 27th and 28th
of February 2019. This proved to be a diplomatic disaster, as the negotiations were interrupted.
The United States claimed that North Korea demanded the lift of all economic sanctions, while
North Korea said that they only clai med a gradual lift for dismantling their main nuclear base in
Yongbyon and that Trump proposed a full unilateral denuclearization of their country. The
proposed measures from the Singapore summit never materialized.99 Despite the spectacular
historical meet ing between Kim Jong -un and Moon Jae -in, no peace treaty was signed and the
main actor that opposed such initiative was the United States. In the meantime, Kim Jong -un
developed six other nuclear camps. On 4th and 9th of May 2019, North Korea launched agai n
several missiles, the first offensive activities since the meeting from Singapore.
What is the Chinese position in relation to this story? The main trade partners of North Korea are
China (91%), Pakistan, India, Ghana and Mali. China supported North Kore a even since the
Korean War and without their support, the Pyongyang regime would have probably collapsed.
From an economic point of view, their relations became even more significant. On the political
field though, a historic shift began to emerge in the last decade. ‘ But strains in the relationship
surfaced when Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006 and Beijing backed UN
Security Council Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on Pyongyang. With this resolution
and subsequent ones, Beijing si gnaled a shift in tone from diplomatic support to punishment. After
North Korea’s missile launch test in November 2017, China called on North Korea to cease actions
that increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula. ’100 In order to prevent any North Korean
immigration, China built a strong defensive wall at its border. Reports also say that since 2018,
the border control might have been relaxed, as more Western type of products are smuggled out
and into North Korea. The periods of cooperation coexisted with som e diplomatic tensions.
Beijing ’s stances in proposing a gradual lift of sanctions or the repeated visits between the two
leaders are just some examples. The fact that North Korea has nuclear weapons represents a

99 Kim Ji -eun, Noh Ji -won, North Korean foreign minister releases statement denouncing unilateral
denuclearization , 2018, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/856443.html , accessed on 9th of
June 2019
100 Eleanor Albert, The China –North Korea Relationship , 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china -north –
korea -relationship , accessed on 9th of June 2019

58
problem to the Chinese, because they don’t w ant an unstable and unpredictable neighbor that could
start a war or even implicate them in a war that they are not ready for. Still, Xi Jinping refused to
use its economic advantage in order to blackmail North Korea and declared that only the United
State s can solve this issue by offering guarantees that the Pyongyang regime won’t be attack ed.
Considering the foreign policy of the United States, the Chinese leader conclude d that Kim Jong –
un’s fears are reasonable. Partially because of this response, the Un ited States imposed new
protectionist taxes on Chinese products, starting what many labeled as a new trade war.101
Although the current presidents of North Korea and China never met until 2017, five official visits
were held since then. In reality, this is n ot why Xi Jinping is focused so much on North Korea. The
traditional Chinese opinion about this issue is that the Korean Communist regime might crumble
and be replaced by a government friendly to South Korea and to the United States. A second
scenario woul d be the unification of Korea backed by the Americans. Beijing ’s foreign policy vital
goal is stop this from happening. ‘ Imagine this scenario from China's perspective: the prospect of
serious instability, and massive military intervention by two powerful armies, right on its border.
Because China intends to intervene as well, this scenario has the potential for dangerous escalation.
This – not a North Korean intercontinental strike capability – is Beijing's nightmare. ’102 Looked
from those lens, North Kore a is no longer only a transnational problem on the agenda of world
politics, as liberals might suggests, but starting with the rise of China it has become a traditional
strategic concern in the power politics sense. Other sc holars have even suggested that Washington
should concentrate its efforts on guaranteeing that a North Korean state in the context of the rise
of China is no longer needed, because the Chinese can now defend themselves from any
aggression.103 We think that this is an interesting suggestion , but not a practical one. It’s highly
unrealistic to assume that China will simply accept this unilateral outcome and will have no
objection to the presence of American troops at its border, as Washington will also never accept
any state to interfere or e ven compete with its core interests in the Western hemisphere. This idea
is already contested by recent events. To strengthen his position, Xi Jinping did his best to make

101 Brad W. Setser, U.S.-China Trade War: How We Got Here , 2018, https://www. cfr.org/blog/us -china -trade -war-
how-we-got-here, accessed on 9th of June 2019
102 Jennifer Lind, Will Trump's hardball tactics work on China and North Korea? , 2017,
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/07/opinions/china -north -korea -opinion -lind/index.html , accessed on 9th of June
2019
103 Isaac Stone Fish, Robert E. Kelly, North Korea Is Ultimately China's Problem , 2018,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018 -06-08/north -korea -ultimately -chinas -problem , accessed on 9th of
June 2019

59
sure that the relations between China and South Korea are repaired (visiting Seoul i n 2014) ,104 and
by 2018, their trade relations were boosted (in terms of value, China is South Korea’s main trade
partner, with 26.8%).105 Xi Jinping understood that nationalism amplified the South Korea – Japan
tensions, and he hopes to take advantage of that by trying to divide, but also attract into its sphere
of influence, the two main American allies in the Pacific. Both China and South Korea has
expressed concerns in regards to Japan’s remilitarization and only Obama’s intervention convinced
Seoul that a compromise should be accepted. ‘Moreover, Japan’s maritime difficulties with Beijing
were seen as a source of common interest with others in Southeast Asia. But the Yasukuni visits
are not only unpopular in China and Korea; they create concerns about Japan ese ambitions across
Asia, reminding all of a different era in regional history. ’106 Beijing would gladly welcome a future
deal between North Korea and the United States, where the first will disarm, and the second will
lift the sanctions and provide aid. Ho wever, if they those changes will be followed by pressures
towards liberalization, or only if they will sense any imminent danger that the North Korean
government might collapse due to this, their position might change in a drastic way. Theoretically
the 1961 Sino -North Korean Treaty of Friendship Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, forces
China to go to war for North Korea but the Chinese diplomacy never made a clear statement ,
mentioning if they would respect or reject this legal obligation and in what ci rcumstances. In other
words, even in this optimistic scenario, a denuclearized North Korea would continue to remain a
critical source for instability.
Despite heavy criticism coming from the Western media, we rate the Singapore and Hanoi
experience as ave rage. Yes, the United States already made a huge concession by agreeing to
bilateral meetings between the two presidents without obtain any clear deal and most of it was just
spectacle. It also looks like North Korea has returned to its practices from 2016 -2017. Still, the
fact that Pyongyang ceased its operations for almost two years and pursued several diplomatic
channels in order to open a dialogue, shows that they are willing to negotiate. It is impossible to
say for sure if North Korea would have gradu ally gave up its nuclear arsenal if more concessions

104 Scott A. Snyder, Can Beijing and Seoul Become Strategic Partne rs?, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/can –
beijing -and-seoul -become -strategic -partners/ , accessed on 9th of June 2019
105 Daniel Workman, South Korea’s Top T rading Partners , 2019, http://www.worldstopexports.com/south -koreas –
top-import -partners/ , accessed on 9th of June 2019
106 Sheila A. Smith, Abe’s Yasukuni Visit: The Consequenc es?, 2013, https://blogs.cfr.org/blog/abes -yasukuni -visit-
consequences#cid=soc -twitter -at-blogs -abes_yasukuni_vis it_the_conseq -123013 , accessed on 9th of June 2019

60
would have been made and if their recent activity proves that they were never sincere, or if this is
just a response to the unwillingness of the United States to compromise. The deadlock that was
reached tested their positions and also proved that neither side will accept a unilateral deal, leaving
room for further negotiations. Kim Jong -un’s visit in Russia from 24th of April 2019 represents
another hint that North Korea is searching for an advantageous deal.107
In our opinion, neither realism, nor liberalism can’t explain North Korea. Both paradigms are based
on the assumption that political actors are rational, at least to some reasonable margin . For this
very reason international relation theory has a h ard time in explain ing what happened with Nazi
Germany under Hitler. In the case of a personal dictatorship in an isolated country i t’s very difficult
to say if the main goal of the state is to survive, or if the main goal is that the dictator must remain
in power and to what extent the possible internal strife determines foreign politics or how external
events might trigger specific domestic policies, or even how all of those add up into a coherent
strategy . The balance between maximizing the relative powe r of the state and strengthening the
personal regime of the dictator is difficult to discern. In those circumstance s, is North Korea a
rational or irrational actor and to what extent ? The few people that escaped from there clearly had
an attachment towards liberal democracy but in the same time reports from Western visitations in
North Korea tell us that many are supporting the Communist regime. The truth is that we have no
idea about what the North Koreans really want. NGO’s and International Organizations can be
enemies because they pressure the government for its nuclear and human rights record, but they
can also be useful because they can provide humanitarian aid and can represent a channel of
communication with the United States. Because we have no actu al way of anticipating what No rth
Korea will do in the future, our position is that we should focus on figuring out what the other
major actors will do in different plausible scenarios.
The only thing that we are sure is that Pyongyang has little bargaini ng power and that the real stake
is the growing geopolitical conflict between China and the United States in East Asia. From this
perspective, North Korea represents little danger in itself , as an actor that could actually threaten
directly the security of any country because if they would do that, they will lose any little advantage
that they have and the security of both their state and their regime would be compromised .

107 Choe Sang -Hun, Kim Jong -un Arrives in Russia for Meeting With Putin , 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24 /world/asia/kim -jong-un-vladimir -putin.html , accessed on 9th of June 2019

61
Complete irrationality is possible, but very unlikely (Kim Jong -un actually looked as a skillful
politician) . Yet i ts actions can influence a future major confrontation. Even if they will do nothing,
the simple geographical position of North Korea in conjunction with the political, economic and
military tensions between China, the United S tates, South Korea and Japan , makes this place one
of the most important points on the globe. In this sense, North Korea can become the Balkans of
the Pacific.

Taiwan

The island of Taiwan (or by its old name, Formosa), was colonized by the Chinese empir e on the
13th century. Due to local resistance, Taiwan was fully annex into the Chinese Ming Empire only
in the 16th century. From 1624 to 1683, Taiwan was under the Spanish and Dutch colonial rule,
but then Taiwan was recaptured by the Chinese Qing dynast y. By that time, the inhabitants were
in majority Chinese. The 19th century is known in the Chinese history as the Century of
Humiliation. It was the period when China was colonized by the major European powers. In the
same spirit Taiwan is annexed by Japa n, as a result of the First Sino -Japanese war from 1894 –
1895, when China suffered a humiliating defeat. Any form of rebellion was brutally crushed and
Japan even tried to settle into Taiwan, sending almost 300.000 Japanese civilians to colonize the
islan d. During the Second World War, among other places, the Japanese committed crimes against
humanity in Taiwan. In the meantime, due to corruption, economic bankruptcy and total incapacity
to solve any major political problem, the Qing Dynasty collapsed afte r the famous 1911 Revolution
(that was actually a bloody civil war) . After the revolution, China tried to implement a democratic
presidential republic, an even elected Sun Yat -sen as their first president. However, in practice,
the many regions of China re mained under the effective control of the former feudal lords that
ruled the country during the Qing dyna sty. Sun Yat -sen was forced to resign . During this chaotic
period , China moved its capital from Beijing to Nanjing, from Nanjing to Beijing, then from
Beijing to Guangzhou , and then later to Nanjing . Sun Yat -sen (he is considered as the father of the
Chinese modern nation) led a government that only controlled South China, and tried to conquer
North China by the means of military force . The leading party was Kuomintang (The Nationalist

62
Party of China). After his unexpected death in 1925, the symbol of Pan Asianism108 was replaced
by his right han d, the general Chiang Kai -Shek. The Kuomintang party split into half: the
nationalist party led by Chiang Kai -Shek, and the communist one led by Li Zongren, that had also
indirect Soviet support. China entered a stage of constant civil war from 1927 to 1950, with
tremendous human and material consequences (it is estimated that 15 million Chinese died due to
the civ il war alone). In the same time Japan invaded and annexed Manchuria in 1931 and launched
a full scale invasion in 1937 (by the end of the war, the Japanese will commit grave war crimes
and crimes against humanity, and up to 20 million Chinese will die). Offi cially, the communist
and nationalist parties signed an armistice in order to fight off the Japanese. In practice, the two
parties continued to fight each other while the Japanese were occupying East and South China.
The nationalist party was favored by th e Chinese urban population and decided to face the Japanese
forces head on, suffering huge casualties. The communist party avoided any pitched battle with
the Japanese, preferring to commit to guerrilla warfare in the countryside. Because of this wise
choice, when Japan surrender in 1945, the communist forces were superior in number to the
Kuomintang ones, although the balance of power was never in their favor before that . In 1950, the
nationalist forces were decisively defeated and Chiang Kai -Shek retreate d to Taiwan, where he
established the Republic of China , with the capital at Taipei . The mainland China became the
People ’s Republic of China, led by Mao Zedong , who placed the capital at Beijing .
From that moment onwards , the two Chinese countries became sworn enemies and experts called
the interactions between the two states as the Cross -Strait relations . Same as North and South
Korea, no peace treaty w as signed and Beijing only talked about the rival government as the
authority from Taipei. Because the United States feared that communist will spread all over Asia,
they have supported and recognized Chiang Kai –Shek ’s regime as the rightful government of
China.109 During the Korean War that followed, some generals from the Washingto n establishment
even serio usly considered using 34 nuclear bombs against China , with the purpose of severing a
possible Communist assistance directed to any state from South and East Asia .110 Mao’s

108 Sun Yat -sen, Sun Yat -sen's speech on Pan -Asianism delivered in Kobe, Japan on November 28, 1924 , 1992,
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Sun_Yat -sen%27s_speech_on_Pan -Asianism , accessed on 10th of June 2019
109 Even it represented less than 1% of the historical China, The Republic of China held the Security Council Chair
within the United Nations until 1979, when it was finally replaced by the People’s Republic of China.
110 Robert Farley, What If the United States had Used the Bomb in Korea? , 2016,
https: //thediplomat.com/2016/01/what -if-the-united -states -had-used-the-bomb -in-korea/ , accessed on 10th of June
2019

63
declaration terrified the world. In a national television broadcast from 1957 h e claim ed that China
would embrace a nuclear war if they will be pushed to the limit , even if this would mean that three
hundred millions (half of their population at that time) Chinese will perish. Also , the US -backed
camp was far from reaching any kind of democ ratic ideal. The military dictatorship coordinated
the "white terror ", which meant the imprisonment of 140,000 Chinese suspects allegedly
symp athetic to Beijing , and 4.000 of them were executed (most of them without any kind of trial) .
Taiwan and the Unit ed States also supported 12.000 guerilla KMT soldiers that escaped into
Myanmar (and were launching frequent raids into China ) but the troops were retreated in 1953,
when the government of B urma requested the support of the United Nations in this matter.
Diplomatic tensions escalated during the First Strait Crisis from 1954 -1955, and the Second Strait
Crisis from 1958, when China and Taiwan exchanged artillery barrages from the tiny islands that
divide d the mainland from Taiwan, and when the American navy b lockaded the strait. More than
2000 soldiers died during the two crises, and the United States and China were one step away from
going to war over Taiwan , especially when China tried to invade some of the islands between them
and Taiwan (Beijing even conqu ered Yijiangshan and Dachen Islands ). To prove their continuous
and unwavering support, president Dwight D. Eisenhower held an official visit in Taiwan in 1960.
After the famous "rapprochement" from 1972 , China and the United States greatly improved their
relations in their common cause of containing the Soviet Union .111 As a sign of good will, the
United States retreated its army from Taiwan in 1979 and T aiwan's situa tion remained frozen until
the fall o f the Soviet Union. The two Chinese states even made im portant progress, when their
unofficial negotiations led to the 1992 Consensus, a political compromise that said that both
countries should recognize that only one China exists, even though both of them are claiming
legitimacy. The Third Taiwan Strait Cris is emerged between 1995 and 1996, when mainland China
launched several missiles that fell just a few kilometers away from Taiwan, with the clear aim of
intimidating Taipei’s government and trying to test the American commitment in the area. This
move also happened because the main declared objective of Taipei suddenly changed from taking
back China (which was propagandistic and totally unrealistic) to declaring its independence from
China (a real possibility tha t was perceived as disaster for Beijing). The United States responded

111 Moscow and Beijing also almost went to war in 1969, after two to three hundred soldiers died and dozens of light
armored vehicles were destroy ed in two borders conflicts that started after some Chinese units ambushed the Soviet
ones. Both powers concentrated their numerous armies on their eastern and western borders, and both had nuclear
weapons.

64
in full force, blocking the Taiwan Strait and sent a huge navy at China’s borders (the most powerful
navy in the Pacific since the Vietnam War) . Beijing backed dow n, but Taiwan remain ed one of the
main sources of great tension betwe en the Americans and the Chinese.112
Recapturing Taiwan is considered by the leaders of the communist party as one of the most
important goal s set up by Mao’s legacy. The Americans have also considered the independence of
Taiwan as a core foreign policy obj ective. Taiwan was never a vital strategic point in itself and
maybe Washington would accept a compromise in a scenario where Taiwan is unified with China
through peaceful means, but the idea that Beijing will conquer Taiwan is simply unacceptable
because it might encourage China to pursue other expansionist goals, and because the American
loss of credibility and prestige in the region would be irreplaceable. Is it reasonable to expect a
peaceful unification in this case?
Let’s firstly look at the numbers. Like South Korea, Taiwan made huge economic progress with
the American support. In 1960, the nominal GDP per c apita was 163 dollars. The forecast for 2019
is 24.827 dollars.113 In 2018, Taiwan’s top trade partners were China (28.8%), Hong Kong
(12.4%), Unit ed States (11.8%), Japan (6.9%), Singapore (5.2%), and South Korea (4.8%).114
Considering that Hong Kong is not an independent state, it is fair to assume that Beijing control s
almost 40% of Taiwan’s trade (Taiwan’s population of 23 million people is also de pendent on
water imports for their very survival !). At a glance, the honorable place that Taiwan has taken
between the Asian tigers was favored by the consistent American security, financial and technical
support, and by the models of development offered b y Japan, South Korea and Hong Kong.
‘Between 1979 and 2017, Taiwan ranked as the ninth largest recipient of arms globally. During
the same period, the United States supplied more than three -quarters of Taiwan’s imported
weapons .’115 In the meantime, Taiwan l ost many of its partners due to China’s lobby that has

112 The existence of Taiwan is recognized only by 1 6 countries and with the rise of China, they are losing more and
more trade partners. Timothy S. Rich, Can the US Help Taiwan Keep Its Remaining Diplomatic Relationships? ,
2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/can -the-us-help-taiwan -keep -its-remaining -diplomatic –
relationships/?fbclid=IwAR0jREpWL7xVl_1ZV_cKpjVpLZ5ejzagS -PvsS3k3 y4pUB8dTrJ4SAFAN14 , accessed on
10th of June 2019
113 National Statistics. Republic of China (Taiwan), Per Capita GDP (US dollars) , 2019,
https://eng.stat.gov.tw/point.asp?index=1 , accessed on 10th of June 2019
114 Daniel Workman, Taiwan’s Top Trading Partners , 2019, http://www.worldstopexports.com/taiwans -top-import –
partners/ , accessed on 10th of June 2019
115 Eleanor Albert, China-Taiwan Relations , 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china -taiwan -relations ,
accessed on 10th of June 2019

65
become considerable stronger in the past two decades, but also because of a partial American
retreat from supporting Taiwan. In this dire context, Taipei has the option of trying to keep its
partnershi ps intact and attract more foreign investments (a move that will irate Beijing even more),
or make a risky compromise with China and engage in much closer economic relation (that will
make them even more dependent on the mainland), or try to walk on a thin diplomatic line and do
both in the same time. A closer analysis shows us that all of those three options were put in practice
and the results were modest.
The country made steps towards democratization only in the early 1990s , martial law being
imposed in the island from 1949 to 1987. The current political system is bipartite, divided between
the historical KMT nationalist party and the DP P democratic progressive party. It is now in fact a
presidential republic. This apparently not so very important detail (from a structural international
relations theory), had a substantial impact on the recent relations between the island and the
mainland. After the The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, the relations between China and Taiwan
remained tense. Taipei’s policy was to seek international support and recognition and Beijing tried
to do the opposite, pressuring other states to cease their diplomatic and trade relations with Taiwan.
This changed in 2008, when the KMT party won the elections and Ma Ying -jeou became presid ent.
Ironically, because the KMT nationalist party always wanted to recapture China, they are now
advocating for closer r elations with China and are willing to embrace the 1992 Consensus. The
democractic party was in opposition and they are only accepting an independent Taiwan. Ma Ying –
jeou made important steps in trying to facilitate better relations. Both sides made important
compromises in three key areas: transportation, trade and communications. The amount and value
of exchanges increased, and some tra de tariffs were relaxed. Chinese investors gained limited
access to Taiwan’s internal market and some form of controlled tourism was allowed. Yet some
issues remained in place, as Ma Ying -jeou repeatedly tried to convince China to retreat its ballistic
missiles that could hit Taiwan, but with no result. In reality Beijing only offered compromises that
integrated Taiwan in their sphere of influence, and made not concessions on the
sovereignty /military issue. Ma Ying -jeou’s plans also suffered a setback in 20 12, when Xi Jinping
replaced the former Communist leader, Hu Jintao. Xi Jinping was even less willing to compromise
on political matters, and declared that Beijing will only accept the One China Two Systems policy,
an arrangement similar to the one that th ey have in place with Hong Kong, where China is unified
from a political perspective, and in return offers some limited autonomy to Taiwan in regards to

66
economic and civil rights matters. Ma Ying -jeou did his best to avoid this provocation and
eventually t he two state leaders held an official meeting (a historical premiere) in Singapore on 7th
of November 2015. The most important deal that resulted from the meeting was the establishment
of a direct line of communication between the two state leaders.
Ma Yi ng-jeou’s diplomatic efforts crumbled in 2016, when his term in office ended and was
replaced by Tsai Ing -wen. The DPP party won a comfortable majority and the main point on Tsai
Ing-wen’s agenda was the factual independence of Taiwan. ‘First, I must empha size that we have
never accepted the "1992 Consensus." The fundamental reason is because the Beijing authorities'
definition of the "1992 Consensus" is "one China" and "one country, two systems." The speech
delivered by China's leader today has confirmed o ur misgivings. Here, I want to reiterate that
Taiwan absolutely will not accept "one country, two systems." The vast majority of Taiwanese
also resolutely oppose "one country, two systems," and this oppositi on is also a Taiwan
consensus.’116 On the other sid e, Xi Jinping truly believes that the reunification with Taiwan is his
lifetime goal, and that this accomplishment will make him comparable with legendary Chinese
Communist leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. He stated this publicly and through
official and semi official channels. His message was clear. If Taiwan declares its independence,
Beijing will declare war. ‘Xi said peaceful reunification is in the best interests of compatriots
across the Straits as well as the Chinese nation. "We make no pro mise to renounce the use of force
and reserve the option of taking all necessary means," he added. ’117 This position was already
legally put in place by the 2005 Anti -Secession Law, a document that clearly stated that China will
invade Taiwan as a consequenc e of any secessionist act ions.118 His threats were backed by a
consistent military show of force. The artillery pieces and the presence of conventional weapons
on the tiny islands occupied by China increased in number, and their navy and air force started to
engage in military exercises right on the limit of Taiwan’s territorial waters.119 Washington
declared its support for Taipei, but instead of sending more units in the area, they have preferred

116 Tsai Ing -wen, President Tsai issues statement on China's President Xi's "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" ,
2019, https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5621 , accessed on 14th of June 2019
117 China Daily, Highlights of Xi's speech at Taiwan message anniversary even t, 2019,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/02/WS5c2c1ad2a310d91214052069_1.html , accessed on 14th of June 2019
118 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, Anti-Secession Law , 2005,
http://www.china -embassy.org/eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm , accessed on 14th of June 2019
119 Bonnie Girard, Will Xi Jinping Blockad e Taiwan? , 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/will -xi-jinping –
blockade -taiwan/ , accessed on 14th of June 2019

67
to sell more weapons to Taiwan.120 Nonetheless, this measure infu riated Beijing and they were
even less willing to compromise on other important subjects like Syria or North Korea.
One might say that the recent tensions are caused by the current Taiwanese president and that the
recent developments are not so relevant. A ccording to this view, this is just a small part from a
long cycle of political relations that varied from one segment to another. This optimistic speech
anticipates a gradual diplomatic normalization in the future. We do not share this opinion because
many systemic causes are contradicting this narrative. Maybe the best example is what happened
during the Sunflower Movement. Social tensions have intensified following the signing of the
China -Taiwan trade treaty in June 2013, which involved trade liberaliza tion. The document had to
be ratified by the legislative power, following 16 public debates, 8 for each party. The KMT was
the first to express its opinion. When the DPP was about to oppose the KMT thesis , the nationalists
gave a coup, claiming that the ag reement should be adopted without amendments or any other
speeches. On the 18th of March 2014, several hundred protesters, mostly students and intellectuals,
occupied the parliament building that remained blocked for 23 days . The number of participants
that sieged the legislative soon reached 10,000. Soon after the streets of Taipei were filled with
protesters who feared that this trade treaty with Beijing would put Taipei into a position of
dependence. In the initial phases , the protesters only requested r evision of some articles that they
considered disadvantageous. Faced with the authorities' refusal, they changed their minds, wishing
to abolish any economic relations with Chin a and amend the constitution. Any foreign policy
interaction with Beijing shoul d be placed under a strict control, and the society as a whole should
be consulted . On March 23, the police attacked the protesters, and 150 of them were injured.
President Ma Ying -jeou was inclined to negotiate, but the protesters declined. The peak of th is
movement was reached on March 30, when more than 100,000 protesters came out on the streets
of the capital. ‘ A coalition of students and civil groups behind the demonstration said that around
500,000 people had massed in the streets near the Presidentia l Palace and the parliament building
that had been occupied by protesters for nearly a fortnight. Pol ice put the figure at 116,000.’121

120 Alan Hao Yang and Jeremy Huai -Che Chiang, Despite China’s To ugh Talk, US Should Move Forward With
Taiwan , 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/despite -chinas -tough -talk-us-should -move -forward -with-taiwan/ ,
accessed on 14th of June 2019
121 Michael Gold, James Pomfret, Over 100,000 protest in Taiwan over China trade deal , 2014,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us -taiwan -protests/over -100000 -protest -in-taiwan -over-china -trade -deal-
idUSBREA2T07H20140330 , accessed on 14th of June 2019

68
Finally, the government agreed to renounce ratification of the treaty, and the protesters withdrew
on 10th of April .
This trend continued with the Formosa Alliance, a political coalition that has three objectives.
Followed by the success of the 2018 Taiwanese referendum122 (composed from 10 questions), the
Formosa Alliance wants to use the same tool in order to solve the indep endence problem. The first
one is to hold a national referendum asking the Taiwanese citizens if they want to become
independent from China. Their initial proposal was to organize this referendum on 6th of April
2019. Secondly, they want to include in the referendum the question if the people want to change
the official name of the country from Republic of China to Taiwan. Thirdly, they want to obtain
the international recognition of the United Nation in regards to the Republic of Taiwan. Because
the DPP re fused to organize the referendum, the Formosa Alliance formed a new party in April
2019 and they are planning to enlist for the next elections. Will this mean that China will simply
go to war if Taiwan declares its independence, as Mearsheimer claims? We t hink that most
probably not.
It is not clear if Taiwan will make this step at all. Even though over the years con stant polls has
shown us that more than 75% of their citizens consider themselves as solely Taiwanese, but only
a minority would embrace a dec laration of independence. On the other hand, new studies indicated
surprising results. If a war would start, the will of the Taiwanese to fight and accept the prospects
of heavy casualties is remarkable for the standards of a developed country in the 21st century .123
Even if a declaration of independence would become a reality, China won’t risk a suicidal war that
might culminate with a confrontation with the United States and its allies. Their own real short –
term strategic option would be a swift invasion an d occupation of Taiwan, before the American
forces could react. This would create a new status -quo and place Beijing in a position of strength,
similar to what the Russian Federation accomplished during the occupation of Crimea. Then the
United States will have no choice that to settle for peace and just impose economic sanctions and

122 Even if the majority of the population would prefer a declaration independence, there are a lso limits of what
referendum can do. Even though 67% of the population voted against it, Taiwan’s legislative has taken some
controversial measures. Julia Hollingsworth, Taiwan legalizes same -sex marriage in historic first for Asia , 2019,
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/17/asia/taiwan -same -sex-marriage -intl/index.html , accessed on 14th of June 2019
123 Yao-Yuan Yeh, Charles K.S. Wu, Austin Wang, and Fang -Yu Chen , Are Taiwan’s Citizens Willing to Fight
Against China? , 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/are -taiwans -citizens -willing -to-fight -against -china/ ,
accesse d on 15th of June 2019

69
the Chinese will survive this. If they would continue with a full scale war they would look like the
aggressor and the overall human and material price would be too great. The problem is that this
plan has many flaws. Unlike Crimea, the Taiwanese nationalism is extremely hostile to any kind
of Chinese occupation and would most certainly resist, no matter the costs. Moreover, the margin
of error and maneuver is much more limited because the American presence in the region is
intimidating, and because the Chinese offensive capabilities haven’t yet reached the quality of the
Russian capabilities. Even the Chinese military experts are recognizing that such an endeavor is
not realisti c in the next couple of years.124 The better alternative for Beijing is to sit back and wait.
A declaration of independence will isolate Taiwan even more. On the long term, they will have t o
face diplomatic isolation , economic and demographic stagnation and slow decline. Maybe this
perspective would have been acceptable in the past, but in a world where the capitalist myth of
unlimited progress has become a widespread religion, the social tensions in Taiwan would most
probably increase and their nationalism w ill reach a historical peak, boosting the domestic chaos
that the Chinese wait for as an excuse for a future invasion. The actual plan is to recapture Taiwan
by 2050, and their officials even published a document that says exactly that.125
We also don’t agre e with Joseph Nye’s statement that war over Taiwan is much less probable
today than it was fifty, thirty or twenty years ago. China reconsidered their position during the
Third Taiwan Strait Crisis from 1995 -1996 because they had to concede in the face of the
American show of force. Since then China has accumulated, by all possible measures, a great deal
of absolute and relative power and if a forth crisis would emerge in 2030 for example, we don’t
fight that the power gap will be so big in order to work as a sufficient deterrent on its own .
Washington promised to send more military forces in support of Taiwan by until now they we re
reluctant to provoke Beijing on this matter. If the United States will not match this by directly
presenting a constant signifi cant amount of military force in the aid of Taiwan, China will be
encouraged to gamble on a bold move in the future . If the Unite d States will bring a huge amount

124 Deng Yuwen, Is China planning to take Taiwan by force in 2020? , 2018,
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight -opinion/article/2126541/china -planning -take-taiwan -force –
2020?fbclid=IwAR0kwhGZD7J0LZ7X6xZjZ6Eu2YrhIMRII__E3eriV4BAgD4oYdmzyhMn_is , accessed on 15th of
June 2019
125 Xi Jinping, Secure a Decisive Vi ctory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for
the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era , 2017,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping%27s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf ,
accessed on 15th of June 2019

70
of troops at China’s southern borders, Beijing might respond in full force, fearing that the stakes
are not only taking Taiwan, but also their own national security. This means that the systemic
changes will increase the chances for conflict and will continue to do so in the future, regardless
of what good or bad intent ions they might have. In add ition, s ince 1990, nationalism was on the
rise in China, but this phenomena has known an even faster increase in Taiwan. In order to keep
their authority intact, the Communist party leaders will encourage nationalism and the idea of
taking back Taiwan even to larger degree than until now. Likewise, the increasing isolation of
Taiwan and their economic slump might steer nationalist sentiments up to a level that would make
any diplomatic compromise impossible, even if the KMT party would win the presidential
elections from 2020. From a political perspective, the situation in Taiwan resembles with the one
from North Korea because both of them represent a perfect diplomatic deadlock. Like we have
previously explained, China will only accept a peaceful solution i n accordance with the principle
one China, two systems. This is unacceptable for Taiwan, but in the same time they desperately
need foreign support, and would like a better trade deal with China. Beijing would accept that only
if they will also make signif icant steps towards integrating Taiwan into their empire. The United
States would prefer that the situation remains frozen, or even settle for a peaceful unification,
hoping that this will appease Beijing , and they will give up on their claims in relation to the East
China Sea. Since this is not possible, they will either have to build up their military presence around
Taiwan and risk an open war with China over an island that has no vital importance for them,
either prepare for a slow retreat and hope that China will not use force against a Taiwan that has
no incentive to accept Beijing’s proposal, especially after what happened in Hong Kong, where
the more active civil society pushing for reforms and more autonomy was ruthlessly repressed by
the central go vernment. In sum, the choices that all the third parties have are quite limited, and not
very advantageous. ‘But peaceful reunification has proved elusive. After Taiwan elected Tsai Ing –
wen, of the pro -independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to th e presidency in 2016,
many Mainland Chinese lost patience with the idea. Some Chinese nationalists now argue that
China has only a brief window of opportunity to seize Taiwan. Talk of “forceful reunification” is
ascendant. China has already begun to tighte n the noose. It has forced Taiwan out of international
bodies, such as the World Health Organization; required airlines to replace “Taiwan” with

71
descriptions such as “Taiwan, Province of China”; and induced five more countries to sever
relations with Taipe i.’126
We also argue that if this was the only main source of total disagreement between the United States
of China, a wise and patient foreign policy coming from both sides would have had a great chance
in containing any dangerous escalation , as Nye would recommend . However, looking at the wider
context and at the numerous external causes that might interfere with this local struggle , we can
conclude that Taiwan represents a powerful seed placed in a fertile land that might bloom into a
hegemonic war.

Senk aku/ Diaoyudao/ Diaoyutai Islands

Without sketching a mechanic ranking, according to Joseph Nye and John Mearsheimer, the
Senkaku islands represent the third important source of conflict. In our opinion, thi s is actually the
future power center of the Ame rican -Chinese security competition. We are referring to five
inhabited islands and three rocks located between Taiwan, China and the Ryukyu Islands (that are
part of Japan). Why are seven square kilometers so important for the future of the international
order?
The islands are named Senkaku by the Japanese, Diaoyudao by the Chinese, and Diaoyutai by
Taiwanese. As we find Senkaku easier to remember, we will refer to the islands in this way (not
because we believe that they should belong to Japan). The first historical record that we have about
them comes from the 15th century, when the Ming dynasty occupied the islands in order to
discourage any pirate or Japanese incursions and used them as a supply point on their road to the
Ryukyu Kingdom. The Qing dynasty annexed the Diaoyudao into their empire, and they were
treated as a part of Taiwan’s province. Japan controlled the islands between 1895 and 1945. Until
1972, the islands were administrated by the United States as an integrated part of their strategy to
support Taiwan against China. Since an agreement was reached with Beijing, the Americans
signed the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement, returning the Okinawa province (including the

126 Peter Gries and Tao Wang, Will China Seize Taiwan? , 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019 –
02-15/will -china -seize -taiwan , accessed on 15th of June 2019

72
Senkaku islands) to Japan. In return, the United States will keep their milit ary base s in Okinawa,
their soldiers won’t be directly prosecuted by Japan for any crimes in Okinawa, Japan will pay 320
billion dollars over a period of 5 years, and they will partially support the American military
upkeep for the forces that will be plac ed on the territory of Japan .127 Truth being told, the Senkaku
islands were quite irrelevant for all the involved parties until that moment. During all of their
history, they remained inhabited, and were occasionally used for fishing. This changed after the
signing of the treaty. Another key moment was 1969 , when the United States discovered large
quantities of oil and gas reserves in depths of ocean around the islands. ‘ The bounty beneath the
sea is potentially rich. Untapped oil reserves are estimated at 10 0 to 160 billion barrels, according
to the US Energy Information Administration. Estimates for the South China Sea, where a host of
nations, including China, claim territory, vary from 28 billion to 213 billion barrels of potential oil
reserves. ’128 Tokyo in vokes the 1971 treaty and the fact that the Americans were the rightful
owners that passed the sovereignty of the inlands to Japan. Beijing claims that the islands were
historically a part of China and that after the Second World War, Japan relinquished an y territorial
acquisitions during their imperial period. Under this interpretation, the Diaoyudao islands should
belong to Taiwan now. To clarify this slightly confusing situation, Japan claims sovereignty over
the islands, Taiwan considers that this belon gs to them, and China declares that the islands should
be a part of Taiwan and Taiwan a part of China. Obtaining those islands would also mean a
significant increase in terms of an exclusive economic zone and the enlargement of the water
territorial rights . In other words, if Japan would successfully claim them, the United States –
Japanese military could be legally concentrated at China’s doorstep, controlling and eventually
blockading a vital trade route for China , and could also respond almost instantly if Taiwan is
invaded. The reverse is also true. If China would obtain them, it could partially secure its oil
imports from the Middle East and could hit Okinawa, the biggest American overseas military base
complex in the world.129 Initially China didn’t react to the 1971 treaty because it had other
priorities and because even though the islands were theoretically passed the Japanese state, in

127 Mark E. Manyin, The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations , 2016,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf , accessed on 15th of June 2019
128 Cary Huang, Diaoyu Islands dispute about resources not land , 2012,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1096774/diaoyu -islands -dispute -about -resources -not-land, accessed on
15th of June 2019
129 The distance between the Senkaku islands and Taiwan is just 70 kilometers, the di stance between the Senkaku
islands and the Chinese mainland is 300 kilometers, and the distance between the Senkaku islands and Okinawa is
400 kilometers.

73
practice the owners were the private Kurihara family. This changed in 2012, when Japan bought
the islands and nationaliz ed them, firmly placing the Japanese flag. This was perceived by the
Chinese as a direct threat to their national sovereignty and tensions escalated immediately.
The Chinese, Japanese and American forces were positioned around the Senkaku islands within
hitting range, and their navies and airplanes came dangerously close to each other. During those
operation from 2012 -2013, many experts and scholars feared that an all -out war will commence.
‘The action -reaction pattern of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is accelerating, and the
initiative seems to be more often than not with the Chinese side, while the Japanese side is in a
defensive position. The danger of a military confrontation is looming increasingly larger in what
could be called a ‘chicken game’. At the same time, the internal and external dynamics are
undermining the environment which is required for a peaceful solution as well as for maintaining
the number of positive options. ’130 The Chinese and Japanese leaders made bellicose declarations,
and th e Japanese factories from China were closed. Some of them were even burnt to the ground
by angry Chinese mobs, and many Japanese f eared for their lives and tried to obtain shelter at the
Japanese and Western embassies. 131 In parallel, Japanese ultranational ist imperial marches were
held and Chinese flags were burned one the streets of Tokyo.
Obama’s administration brilliantly applied the smart power policy descri bed by Joseph Nye and
the crisis was deescalated. The Americans discouraged the aggression by cle arly stating that they
will go to war if China attacks Japan, but they have also explained that they don’t claim that the
Senkaku islands should belong to Japan and would accept a peaceful resolution. Deterrence was
combined with the perspectives of future fruitful negotiations. Xi Jinping even had to threaten the
Chinese who were violently protesting against the Japanese in order to calm the spirits.
Japan and China share strong reasons to avoid an open conflict. In an international joint poll from
2018, 86% of the Japanese declared that their view in regards to China is unfavorable but both the
Japanese (74%) and the Chinese (71%) labeled the bilateral relations between the two countries as

130 Reinhard Drifte, The Japan -China Confrontation Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – Between “shelving” and
“dispute escalation” , The Asia -Pacific Journal, Volume 12, Issue 30, 2014, p. 42
131 Michael Martina and Terril Yue Jones, China struggles to curb anger as protesters denounce Japan , 2012,
https://www.reuters.com/article/china -japan/update -5-china -struggles -to-curb-anger -as-protesters -denounce -japan –
idUSL3E8KG02T20120916?type=marketsNews , accessed on 15th of June 2019

74
important.132 Japan’s main trade partners are China with 144 billio n dollars (Japan is China’s
second trade partner) , The United States with 140.6 billion dollars, South Korea with 52.5 billion
dollars, Taiwan with 42.4 billion dollars, Hong Kong with 34.7 billion dollars, Thailand with 32.3
billion dollars, Singapore wit h 23.4 billion dollars, Germany 20.9 billion dollars, Australia with
17.1 billion dollars, Vietnam with 16.4 billion dollars.133 This statistic shows and interesting fact:
the first seven trade partners of Japan are directly involved in the security competit ion from East
and South Asia. Economic in terdependence played a significant role in improving the relations
between the second and third economies in the world. ‘D uring the Cold War, the United States
and the Soviet Union carefully avoided triggering a nuc lear war because of the assumption of
“mutual assured destruction”: each knew that any such conflict would mean the obliteration of
both countries. Today, even though tensions between China and Japan are rising, an economic
version of mutual deterrence is preserving the uneasy status quo between the two sides. ’134 A
second incident happened in May 2014, when in a coordinated military exercise that implicated
China and Russia, the Chinese and Japanese airplanes were one step away from opening fire. The
nationa list movements from both countries reacted and used a rhetoric that brought forward the
dark historical past between the two nations . The American smart strategy and the economic
deterrence led to a slow normalization of Sino -Japanese relations.
After thos e delicate situations , Shinzo Abe visited China in 2014, 2016 and 2018. Also, because
Trump started a trade war with China and also retreated from the Trans -Pacific Partnership in 2018
(that was Obama’s biggest foreign policy legacy), Tokyo and Beijing sta rted to collaborate more
on the economic field. To this we must also add the strong cultural ties, as many historians consider
that the Japanese civilization emerged from the Chinese one, and that rapid Japanese
modernization represented a model for the de clining Qing dynasty and gave them hope that an
Asian country can keep up with the Western state s in the i ndustrial era. In 2018, out of the 31
million tourists that visited Japan, 8.3 million were Chinese , 7.5 million were from South Korea,

132 Japan: Public Opinion Research Center and China: Horizon Research Consultancy Group, Japan -China Public
Opinion Survey 2018 , 2018, http://www.genron -npo.net/en/a rchives/181011.pdf , accessed on 15th of June 2019
133 Daniel Workman, Japan’s Top Trading Partners , 2018, http://www.worldstopexports.com/japans -top-import –
partners/ , accessed on 15th of June 2019
134 Richard Katz, Mutual Assured Production. Why Trade Will Limit Conflict Between China and Japan , 2013,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/article s/china/2013 -06-11/mutual -assured -production , accessed on 15th of June 2019

75
4.7 million fr om Taiwan, 2.2 million from Hong Kong and 1.5 million from the United States.135
Speaking of the fairly modest soft power of China, i n comparison, the huge People’s Republic of
China that has a population of 1.4 billion people only attracted 31.5 million for eign tourists in
2016, most of them from South Korea, Japan, Myanmar, the United States, and Vietnam .136
Having those considerations in mind, some readers might fairly agree with our assumption that the
Senkaku dispute is a serious starting point for a possi ble military clash, but will object to our idea
that this is the core geostrategic point between the United States and China. In this situation, why
do we claim that the Senkaku islands are the most important source of conflict in the Pacific? In
order to better understand our reasoning, we will have to explain that this subject should be
analyzed by explaining the effective raise of China and the relative decline of the United States, in
conjunction with the perceived rise of Japan.
The starting point is P aul Kennedy's book ‘ The Ascension and Decline of Great Powers. Economic
Transformation and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 ’. First published in 1987, the fundamental
thesis of the book was simple. The American historian tried to prove that there is a v ery strong
causal link between the military and the economic dimension when it comes to the rise and collapse
of great empires. At the end of the 1980s, Japan was the world's second largest economic power,
many observers claiming that Japan will overtake t he United States. The academic and media
interest in this topic exploded. In this context, the chapter "Japanese Dilemma" has attracted the
attention of the general public. Kennedy has refrained from making such drastic verdicts, noting
that Japan has the real potential of becoming a great power when it rearms itself and actively
engages in global politics. The author admitted that the exact date when Article 9 of the
constitution (the one that prohibits the sending of troops abroad) cannot be predicted because the
Japanese society is resistant to change. Even though the Yale professor was very cautious in his
statements, hi s readers interpreted his speech as an attempt to prove that Japan would reach the
status of hegemonic power at the beginning of the 21s t century. We believe that Paul Kennedy was
much more subtle than that, looking for some historical patterns that involve inevitable speculation
that cannot be fully demonstrated. However, seeing the success of the book, he preferred to indulge

135 JBT Tourism Research & Consulting Co., Overseas Residents' Visits to Japan by country, 2018 , 2019,
https ://www.tourism.jp/en/tourism -database/stats/inbound/ , accessed on 15th of June 2019
136 China Power Team, Is China attracting foreign visitors? , 2016, https://chinapower.csis.org/tourism/ , accessed on
15th of June, 2019.

76
in the euph oria of the moment. The economic stagnation and the fall of the Soviet Union that was
not anticipated by him made the American historian's thesis fall into relative oblivion. Japan was,
until recent times, a great economic power that preferred to confine i tself to an almost neutral
diplomatic policy. The attitude was motivated by a multitud e of perfectly rational causes.
Economic stagnation, demographic and social issues, China's rise and dependence (at least from a
security perspective) on the United State s security umbrella have prompted Tokyo to change its
approach.
Having a popular and fairly stable leader in the person of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a
conservative -liberal, Japan seems determined to contradict those who say that her bright future has
already come to an end. The economic reforms (the 3 arrows of Abenomics) have been matched
by intense diplomatic activity and by the amendments aimed at modifying the pacifist constitution.
The government's intentions are best illustrated in Abe's 2012 speech when he won the election
campaign: "Japan's beautiful seas and its territory are under threat and young people are having
trouble finding hope in the future amid an economic slump I have promised to protect Japan's land
and sea and the lives of the J apane se people, no matter what. "137
From the beginning, we feel compelled to say that Abe is a special man of state for our time, being
the descendant of a large family that engaged in politics . His father, Shintaro Abe, was the foreign
minister between 1982 and 1986, and also the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, the
political party that has almost monopolized power over the past 60 years. Abe's wife is the daughter
of Nobosuke Kishi, prime minister between 1957 -1960 (former governor of the Manchukuo
colony and member of the Tojo government in the Second World War, obtaining the nickname
‘the devil ’ for his brutality). Kan Abe, the grandfather of Shinzo Abe, was a parliamentary from
1937 -1946. Shinzo Abe firstly became Prime Minister during the mandate fro m 2006 -2007, being
the youngest Prime Minister (52 years at that time) in the history of post-war Japan. Because of
some serious scandals, (Minister of Agriculture Toshikatsu Matsuoka committed suicide, being
investigated in a corruption cas e), Abe resigne d, motivating that his declining health is not
allowing him to remain in office . Following the nuclear disaster from Fukushima and a due to
stagnant economy, the peoples trust in the Democratic Party reached a historical low. In this

137 Justin McCurry, Japanese nationalist tipped to be PM, raising fears of tensions with China , 2012,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/s ep/26/japanese -nationalist -tipped -pm-china , accessed on 15th of June
2019

77
circumstances Abe returned as prime minister on September 26, 2012. Currently, he is the most
long-lived prime ministers of Japan . Beyond his great ambitions, at the state level, Japan is also
encouraged by the United States to assume a greater responsibility in international r elations by
investing more in its military capabilities. The diplomatic d ialogue on this issue has a long history.
During the Cold War , the Americans have realized that they committed an error by imposing a
fundamental pacifist constitution on their main a lly in Asia. Washington's insistence reached new
dimensions d uring the Obama administration. Washington encouraged a close r partnership
between the two countries. The best example is the great deal of effort that the two countries put
into solving their Wo rld War Two difficult ies and into reassuring their allies that Japan is not
returning to imperialism. This was materialized by Obama's visit to Hiroshima138 and Abe's visit
to Pearl Harbor. 139 The situation has changed even more when President Trump has asked Japan
to contribute more to the defense budget of the alliance . He even considered the possibility that
Japan and South Korea could possess nuclear weapons. 140 In spite of obvious political tensions at
Abe's first visit to the United States after the presi dential elections (Abe supported Hillary Clinton) ,
Trump reaffirmed his commitment to Tokyo. 141 Since 2017, Trump has also accused Japan of
unfair trade practices. Still, the leaders of the two states exchanged several visits and reassured the
world that th e American in Japanese partnership is stronger than ever. This trend of a more active
Japan continued. Abe was also used as an intermediary that tried to attract more Asian states into
the American sphere of influence. Japan signed a significant free trade deal with the European
Union on the 17th of July 2018 (it has become effective from 1st of February 2019) .142 Tokyo has
also kept the legacy of the Trans -Pacific Partnership alive and ratified the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific Pa rtnership (that is the third largest free trade area after

138 Doug Mills, Text of President Obama’s Speech in Hiroshima , Japan, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/world/asia/text -of-president -obamas -speech -in-hiroshima -japan.html?_r=0 ,
accessed on 15th of June 2019
139 Allie Malloy, Abe, Obama affirm alliance in ceremony at Pearl Harbor , 2016,
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/27/politics/shinzo -abe-pearl -harbor -obama/ , accessed on 15th of June 2019
140 Stephanie Condon, Donald Trump: Japan, South Korea might need nuclear weapons , 2016 ,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald -trump -japan -south -korea -might -need -nuclear -weapons/ , accessed on 16th of
June 2019
141 Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Pete r Baker, In Welcoming Shinzo Abe, Trump Affirms U.S. Commitment to Defending
Japan , 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/asia/trump -shinzo -abe-meeting.html , accessed on 16th of
June 2019
142 The European Commission, Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Free Trade Agreement between the
European Union and Japan , 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/may/tradoc_154522.pdf , accessed on
16th of June 2019

78
NAFTA and the EU) , effective from 30th of December 2018. In domestic politics, the prime
minister desperately tried to surpass economic stagnation and confront ed the considerable
challenge of an ag ing population by implementing fiscal and monetary reforms , rising the taxes
on consumption, encouraging natality, encouraging women to return to work even after they have
their first child, integrating more females in leadership roles, and rising the age of retirement. The
apparent friendship between China and Japan must be understood by taking those facts into
consideration. In order to keep up the momentum of growth, Beijing needs economic partnerships,
especially after the United States started a trade war with them, so Japan is one of the best solution s.
Likewise, Tokyo was also affected by the American protectionist measures and searched for all
the available options that they had. Our first point here is that the improving cooperation between
Beijing and Tokyo is contextual and only temporary.143 Our second point is that in the Chinese –
American power game, Japan is a second player, but is also the key second player that could be
decisive in tipping the powe r balance. In 2017, the Japanese military expend iture was as percentage
of was GDP 0.9% and this was also the average military spending since 1975!144 With this budget,
Japan is now ranked as the sixth military power in the world after The United States, The Russian
Federation, China, India and F rance (th is list is also taking into consideration the demographic
problems of Japan, and their lack of nuclear weapons) and the third power in East Asia .145 Despite
rising domestic protests, the process of increasing the role that Japan will take in external politic al
and military affairs is irreversible. ‘ Since returning to power in September 2012, Abe has pushed
through a series of institutional, legal, diplomatic, and military reforms that are reshaping Japan’s
national security posture and that promise to enhance Japan’s regional role over the coming decade.
Responding to rapid changes in the region, particularly the dramatic increase in China’s power,
Japan’s prime minister has distanced his country from its postwar pacifism —which was predicated
on a benign view of the international system —and unveiled a new, more realist foreign policy. ’146
With this being said, we believe that Senkaku is the most relevant point on the map that could stir

143 Ankit Panda, China Patrol Ships Sustain Presence Near Senkaku Islands: Report. A 57 -day continuous presence
is the longest since the Japanese government purchased the disputed islands, 2019,
https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/china -patrol -ships -sustain -presence -near-senkaku -islands -report/ , accessed on 16th
of June 2019
144 World Bank, Military expenditure (% of GDP) Japan , 2019,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=JP , accessed on 16th of June 2019
145 Franz -Stefan Gady, US, Japan Conduct Military Exercise Near Senkakus , 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/us -japan -conduct -military -exercise -near-senkakus/ , accessed on 16th of June 2019
146 Michael Auslin, Japan's New Realism. Abe Gets Tough , 2016,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/japans -new-realism , accessed on 16th of June 2019

79
up a direct confrontation between China and the United States. There are thre e strong arguments
that support our thesis, but they are really relevant only if we think about them as interconnected.
Firstly, the systemic argument. The Senkaku dispute attracts the greatest concentration of military,
economic and soft power in the Pac ific and the Pacific represents the greatest concentration of
overall power in the world. The actors that are directly involved in this are the United States, China,
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and may other states might join one side or the other. Ironi cally,
although Japan is in absolute decline, the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States
will increase Japan’s relative power in the incoming decades because for the first time since World
War II, Tokyo will be forced to invest all tha t it has in order to maximize their relative power. The
Chinese – American competition for regional hegemony will be overlapped by the rise of Japan.
This means that besides the competition for supremacy, the United States is not risking a war with
China i n the name of a minor power, like in the case of North Korea or Taiwan, buy is risking
being attracted into a conflict with the second economy in the world in order to protect the third
economy from the international system. The geography of the Senkaku is lands is also increasing
the chances for escalation. If the meeting point between China, the United States and Japan would
have been on land (like in the famous example of the Soviet Union and the United States in the
case of Berlin), then the two coalitio ns could build up their military on a static border and thus
reach a stalemate of mutual deterrence. Since the Senkaku dispute is not offering this cha nce, a
military show of force that involves highly flexible forces composed from coordinated navies and
airplanes makes the border much more volatile so the chances of miscalculations increase, and in
the same time crossing the line becomes much more tempting. From this perceptive, this dispute
could represent the future engine for the existential threat that Nye was mentioning in the case of
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.
Secondly, the interstate relation s between the involved actors have a long history of conflict. China
is not only worried by the increasing American presence in the area, but also looks very carefully
at Japan’s gradual remilitarization. Considering Japan’s imperial past, Bei jing is not the only one
that has this position . Even though China was clearly the aggressive rising power in the South and
East China Sea, most of the Asian countrie s were more concerned about Japan’s rise in 2012.147

147 Kim Youngho, Japan -South Korean tensions threaten regional security. Populism -tinged policies damage
defense cooperation with the U.S. and benefit China , 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Japan -South -Korean –
tensions -threaten -regional -security , accessed on 16th of June 2019

80
This fact is often overlook. Actually, Obama’s administration made great efforts in order to assure
their allies from Asia that Japan’s rise is purely defensive and if not for their direct diplomatic
intervention, the relations between Japan and South Korea would still be tense until this date. Even
after the general perception has changed in the American favor, this delicate situation leaves room
for diplomatic maneuver. A great deal of the recent Japanese – Chinese rapprochement is owned
to the strong personality of Shinzo Abe and Xi Jinping. Since Japan faces an inevitable absolute
decline, Tokyo won’t allow the Chinese to concentrate their full force so close to the Okinawa
base, their main security insu rance. From Beijing’s perspective, a coalition placed and coordinated
by the United States in the Senkaku islands means that they will lose any chance of taking Taiwan
as a result of a quick invasion, and in the case of significant disagreements with the U nited States,
they might be blackmailed with a blockade and even might have to face an invasion without having
the possibility of directly hitting back the industrial and military power centers of their enemies.
The whole East and South Asia is a very dyna mic space, composed from developed and developing
states, most of them with political institutions that have no democratic tradition , institutions that
have to face multiple domestic and transnational challenges like inequality, poverty, corruption,
rigged elections, drug wars, secession, pollution, climate change , natural disasters and terrorism.148
In the case of worsening Chinese – American relations, some of the United States allies might
provide limited support, might remain neutral or even deflect to th e Chinese side. What are we
trying to say is that the Senkaku islands dispute involves not only tactical and military
unpredictability, but also that the strategic diplomatic and economic fields provide a lot of room
for bold maneuvers, some of them depend ing on uncertain fast paced developments, complicating
even more the management and containment of any future crisis in the area because the solutions
towards peace depend on highly complex compromises under the heavy pressure of time and
emotions .
In this case, the individual level conditions the rationality of the involved actors in a considerable
way. Nationalism is on the rise in the Pacific region up to unprecedented levels that can only be
compared with what happened in the 19th century Europe. This t ype of nationalism is actually more
peculiar, because it can be divide d into four branches that coexist. Firstly , an increasing national
sentiment of Asian states where the direct target of resentment is their immediate neighbors. This

148 Harsh V. Pant, Kabir Taneja, ISIS’s New Target: South Asia. The Sri Lanka attacks should put the region on
alert , 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/02/isiss -new-target -south -asia/, accessed on 16th of June 2019

81
inhibits diplomatic dialogue, cooperation, encourages protectionist measures and political
isolation. Secondly, movements of secessions within some Asian states, matched by increasing
nationalist sentiments of the ethnical/religious majority, followed by violent clashes. To t his mix
we must include terrorist organizations, drug cartels or communist guerrillas. Thirdly, an
increasing fear felt by the United States, Japan and the majority of the East and South Asian nations
in relation to the rise of China and its aggression. Fi nally, the resentment and hate of China,
corroborated with a Pan -Asian sentiment that can be identified among many countries from the
region, directed towards the increasing American and Japanes e military presence in the area that
remembers them of the Jap an’s imperialism149 and of the Western colonial past.150 The third and
fourth branch encourages the consolidation of diplomatic, economic or even military coalitions
around the United States or China. This might also be translated into smaller states that wil l enter
into conflict with other neighboring smaller states (even though their previous relations were
reasonable) just because they are placed in a block or another. In sum, in the case of a future
Senkaku crisis, the more actors that the United States an d China will have to bring to the
negotiating table, the more conditions they will have to appease and the chances that they will be
attracted in several proxy conflicts that are not vital increases dramatically, as the complex set of
emotions will surely affect their perception and strategic thinking, offering strong incentives for
an unnecessary overreaction.
If North Korea, Taiwan and Senkaku deserve so much attention, what about the Strait of Malacca
(considered very relevant by Mearsheimer), Hong Kong and Tibet (many neoliberals are focus ed
on those two)? In our opinion, the Strait of Malacca is indeed very important for the stability and
peace of the world but the Chinese power is not yet formidable enough to challenge the Americans
there and Beijing has many other priorities. We consider that this is not the key of obtaining
hegemony in the Pacific simply because if China will become strong enough to engage the United
States there, Washington has already lost and Beijing will be just one step away fro m obtaining
regional hegemony. Maybe the discussion about this will become much more important in the

149 Reiji Yoshida, Abe forgoes Yasukuni visit on anniversary of WWII su rrender, sends ritual donation instead ,
2018, https://www.japantimes.co.j p/news/2018/08/15/national/politics -diplomacy/abe -sends -ritual -donation -tokyos –
yasukuni -shrine -wwii -surrender -anniversary/#.XQaWPtIza00 , accessed on 16th of June 2019
150 Jeff Kingston, Understanding anti -base sentiment in Okinawa , 2016,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/05/28/commentary/understanding -anti-base-sentiment –
okinawa/#.XQaX -9Iza00 , accessed on 16th of Jun e 2019

82
future, but we are confident (based on the current figures and various optimistic and pessimistic
projections) that this won’t be the case for another twe nty years.
In comparison, Hong Kong is an ongoing issue. Tensions rose in 2014, during the Umbrella
Movement. Tens of thousands protesters occupied Hong Kong and pressured Beijing in order to
obtain a higher autonomy and the right to elect a president on their own terms, and not from a list
proposed by the Communist party. The movement that lasted 79 days was violently crushed, and
the heads of the movement were arrested.151 On the 27th of March 2017, Carrie Lam (loyal to
Beijing) was elected as the first fe male Chief Executive of Hong Kong with 66% of the votes (the
elections from Hong Kong are based on a system of nominations made by th e electors, most of
them being members of the Communist Party). Protests continued and are ongoin g as this work is
being wr itten, with more than 300.000 people on the streets.152 Our interpretation about this
fascinating development is that Hong Kong is more a domestic than an international issue. Sure,
the United States can frustrate China by the means of propaganda on the subj ect of liberal
democracy, it can take positions within international insti tutions or support NGO s or individuals
who militate for d emocracy, but this type of poking won’t facilitate a serious conflict between
Beijing and Washington. In the same time, Beiji ng has numerous tools to contain any major
domestic escalation, including the spread of those democratic movements from Hong Kong to the
rest o f China.
In this case, can the situation from Tibet influence the Sino – American relations? Again, we think
that this is more a domestic issue. Tibet is also a historical source of conflict between China, Nepal
and India and is one of the reasons for India’s diplomatic efforts to improve their relations with
the United States and Japan. Many scholars predict (inclu ding John Mearsheimer and Joseph Nye)
that India will continue to be a reliable ally for the United States. We don ’t share this optimism.
Even if China and India fought in a short war from 1962 for Tibet, the current border conflicts
between India and Chin a are not existential. The only serious incentives for India from a realist

151 Cal Wong, 2 Years Later: A Look Back at Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement , 2016,
https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/2 -years -later-a-look-back -at-hong-kongs -umbrella -movement/ , accessed on 16th of
June 2019
152 The protests started when a new law was proposed, allowing the extradition of Hong Kong citizens that could
face trial in mainland China. They want judicial independence from Beijing and the resi gnation of Carrie Lam. In
this context, Taiwan is also worried about what is happening in Hong Kong. James X. Morris, Hong Kong Protests:
The View From Taiwan , 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/hong -kong -protests -the-view -from -taiwan/ ,
accessed on 16th of June 2019

83
perspective are the fact that the power of China has increased, and the fact that Pakistan is posing
an existential threat and that Pakistan is now clearly developing a partnership with China. However,
a strictly objective analysis shows us that it’s very difficult to predict if the political situation will
remain the same in ten or twenty years. A liberal might argue that India is a democracy and
democracies don’t go at war against other democracies, but ally against aggressive authoritarian
states. Yet, an honest approach would unveil that India is a democracy in theory.
Finally, is the territorial water conflicts between China and countries like Indonesia or Philippines
relevant f or the power struggle between Washington and Beijing? Our answer is that we should
pay great attention to them, but also understand that in those cases, the options for a peaceful
resolution are more generous than at first glance. We agree with Joseph Nye that some of the
historical and legal claims made by China’s neighbors from the South China Sea are simply unjust
and provocative and that the United States should not make statements in regards to who is right
or wrong, encouraging only that those situati ons should be solved through peaceful negotiations.
However, we think that Nye underestimates the importance of the artificial bases built by the
Chinese forces. Those not only have a military purpose, but they also alter any negotiations from
a legal poin t of view because Beijing is effectively increasing their territorial waters t hrough them.
Many analysts are also underestimating that many territorial claims are also involving other
smaller states, dispersing the concentration of power , and thus releasin g the pressure on just one
point .153 In conclusion, those kind of disputes might attract China and the United States in a proxy
war, but because the stakes for both sides are lower, the room for negotia ting is wider and the
chances for managing the crises ar e higher
In this chapter we have analyzed the competition between the United States and China in relation
to North Korea, Taiwan and Senkaku . Ultimately, we will present another idea that we find original
in addition to our c laim that the Senkaku islands represents the core strategic point between the
American and Chinese competition. By isolating a crisis, we have concluded that war is a serious
possibility, but also agreed that a wise foreign policy has a fair chance of contain every one of
them taken se parately. The greatest example is how the United States managed the Senkaku crisis
from 2012 and 2014. In our opinion, all of those three areas are closely linked together. A conflict

153 The examples are to numerous and their implications exceed the purpose of our current work. We will just
enumerate some of them: Cambodia claims agains t Vietnam, East Timor against Australia, Vietnam claims against
China and Taiwan, maritime border claims made by China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Brunei.

84
in any of those regions would automatically involve the United States, C hina, Japan, South Korea
and even Taiwan in a tragic domino effect , not much unlike the one that led to World War One .
Let us explain.
If in the event of a serious c risis, the United States invaded North Korea and China will stay put,
Taiwan might see thi s as a clear sign for Beijing weakness and declare its independence. Facing
the perspective of two major defeats, China would reply by launching a surprise attack either
towards Taiwan, either aiming to capture directly the Senkaku islands and threaten the Okinawa
base, asking for a unilateral American retreat from North Korea and for the annexation of Taiwan.
In a reverse scenario where the regime from North Korea crumbles, also fairly plausible, China
would invade North Korea, Taiwan might think that they are the next target and declare their
independence, seeking international support . The United States, South Korea and Japan would
concentrate their troops at the border between South Korea and North Korea, fearing a possible
escalation and nationalist pre ssures might temp the Japanese military to come dangerously close
to the Chinese forces placed around the Senkaku islands. Similarly, if Taiwan declares its
independence and China invades them, the United States, Japan and South Korea will firstly move
their troops towards Senkaku in order to support Taiwan. North Korea might think that this is their
opportunity of gaining a profitable deal with the Americans and because of the dire situation
Washington might sign a disadvantageous deal with what they have labeled as a terrorist state.
What was perceived as an acceptable compromise in the past, in this new context might be
understood by Beijing as a provocation, and they might decide to invade North Korea, forcing a
military response from the other side. Aga in, if Taiwan declares its independence and China will
not respond in full force, Japan and the United States might interpret this as a sign of weakness
and advance in the Senkaku area. Since both China and The United States will be distracted by
those eve nts, North Korea will have an opportunity to gable a better deal and would employ the
threat of using nuclear weapons as leverage, precipitating even more the very tense situation and
encouraging a possible war for Korea . By the means of the same logic, if any party will retreat or
lose its strategic position from the Senkaku islands, the other side would obtain a huge advantage.
If the Am erican coalition has th e upper hand, it would have the capacity to dismantle any Chinese
plan of taking Taiwan back by f orce and Washington could directly threaten the Chinese mainland.
This will force Beijing ’s hand that will be under serious emotional pressure. Their response will
be either to risk a bluff and insist on Taiwan, or they will try to compensate by striking i n another

85
important sector and using it as leverage: North Korea. This circular argument also works if China
would obtain a dominant position in the Senkaku. They could threaten to hit the Japanese territory .
The United States, Japan and South Korea might try to release the pressure by using the
independence of Taiwan as an advantage, or they might try to destabilize the fragile North Korean
state and then invade it, using the argument that they are imposing peace and stability, but having
the true aim of c oncentrating their forces at the Chinese land border in order to compensate the
loss in the East China Sea and negotiate from a better position.
In this pe ssimistic interpretation, the main problem will be that negot iations will most probably
become futil e. This kind of development is almost a perfect comparison with the dynamics that
accor ding to Joseph Nye, caused the start of World War One. It was never about the rise of
Germany and the response given by the United Kingdom out of fear. If that was the o nly significant
cause, the war would have been most probably avoided. The real cause was a sum of multiple
linked and unrelated causes that developed almost at the same time and many of them overlap ped
in a very short period of time. T he structural variabl e of China’s rise and the United States relative
decline is connected directly with the causes from the interstate and individual level. Because the
hypot hetical crises that we have described above would be perceived as exi stential threats, all the
relevan t actors will only think in relative terms, thus encouraging conflict. The complex set of
nationalist feelings at the popular and lea dership stage will also facilitate reckless actions. Due to
overalap ping of causes that favour a conflict, leaders will be forced to take hard rational decis ions,
having their backs againt the wall and being under the constraint of strong emotions and very
limited time. This will cut off almost any reasonable action towards de escalation and peace,
tremendously increasing the changes of strategic miscalculations and human error. Comparing this
geopolitical framework with the rational choice theory narrative , the American and Chinese
leaders might think that they are on a car placed on the opposite side of a bridge that has room
only for one car at a time, and might conclude that they must cross it with haste , no matter the
costs. The most probable ca sus be lli between the United States and China in the 21st Century is
the emergence of all of the three crisis taken tog ether simul taneously.

86
Conclusions

In the previous chapter we have reached three conclusions. Although ongoing or possible conflicts
and disputes on topics like Hong Kong, Tibet, Kashmir, Strait of Malacca, South China Sea
territorial waters, are notable events, ha ving a substantial potential to change the future of
international politics, we have established that North Korea, Taiwan and the Senkaku islands are
the places where Chinese and American geopolitical interests clash the most. We have also made
a strong ca se for Senkaku as the new Berlin for the incoming Cold War between Beijing and
Washington and we have explained why we should pay closer attention to this issue that looks
solved only in appearance. Our analysis has led us to believe that the three points that we have just
examined are strongly connected, and a future war between China and the United States will
become almost inevitable if the three cri ses erupt at the same time.
The experience of going through the brilliant minds of John Mearsheimer and Jo seph Nye has
helped us a lot. Their expertise has also been a source of inspiration for gradually shaping our own
perspective on this problematic. Between the two scholars, we think that Nye offers a superior
theory that can better explain the world that w e currently live in, but we also think that
Mearsheimer is right.
Let’s start with the offensive neorealist per spective that we find very limited in many aspects. The
most obvious one is the epistemological assumption that only the third image in internat ional
relations can be decisive, and that it can explain power politics in 75% of the cases , as Mearsheimer
claims. On this matter we totally agree with Nye. The third image , as described in the international
relations specialized literature, might influen ce and even decide the start of a war up to a proportion
of 75%. However, this cause alone can only be a necessary cause, but not a sufficient cause, and
separated from many others elements , it can’t produce a violent conflict, not even in a proportion
of 1%. A second problem here is that Mearsheimer uses historical comparisons without
understanding the factual limits of those comparisons, and without providing sufficient empirical
evidence to support that the same scenario will repeat in the present. Despi te his insistence on
military power, he is also not making any detailed analysis of the military technology or the past,
present and possible future capabilities. He also claims that economic power is almost as important
as military power, but is again not explaining how this mechanism works in practice, offering

87
actual figures and estimating how they will develop. Even though Mearsheimer doubts one of his
core assumptions, that political actors are rational, he constrains the possibilities of his theory by
refusing to take into account the exact ingredients that might explain the limits of rationality in
global politics: domestic affairs , culture, inequality,154 and the importance of non -state actors.
Furthermore, when his narrative construction hits a wall, Mearsheimer actually saves his argument
by using elements and variables that can only be deducted from the second and first image of
international relations, and he does that more often than he likes to recognize.
Nye engages into an economic analysis, as his main argument is that China won’t clash with the
United States simply because China won’t rise. The major problem with this approach is that Nye
uses a great deal of facts and interpretations only to demonstrate this, which we find unacceptable.
When talking about the future, a scholar in international relations or social sciences, or even a man
of state, should make at least three strategies, based on a worst case scenario, best case scenario,
and an average between the two. The neoliberal thinker off ers only the perspectives of an optimist
development even though a tremendous amount of scientific literature, from various fields of
study, predict several possible outcomes. 155 Another issue is that when comparing the United
States with China, Nye uses pr esent day statistical data or borrows estimations only for the next
ten years, and then wrongly concludes that the power gap between the two states will still be
considerable in 2041. Nye also uses a complex set of arguments in trying to prove that a confl ict
between China and the United States is unlikely to happen. He takes one issue after another,
skillfully isolating them from the wider context in order to support his main idea. Moreover, it
seems that he only thinks that solving a crisis will automatic ally improve the relations and the
chances for future cooperation, instead of also reflecting that managing a crisis means making
delicate compromises that can frustrate everyone and create strong and long lasting resentments.
Sure, disputes can be solved through a smart combination of soft and hard politics if we take the
disputes one by one and think that the relevant rational actors will almost always make the best
possible solutions, like in a virtual game. Yet, in the real world, this is rarely the cas e and the

154 Both authors are not analyzing the possible consequences of inequality in relation to the fu ture Chinese and
American interactions. Recent studies have shown that the inequality gap is increasing, slowly returning to historical
levels. Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty -First Century , Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University
Press, Unit ed States, 2014
155 Ian Morris, Why the West Rules —For Now: The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future ,
Picador Publishing, New York, 2011

88
American scholar fails to explain how several issues ca n be managed at once or how this
complicated balance can be kept , especially with the leaders that we have today. If one hundred
crises are managed and deescalated, the world will resume its normal day to day life. War needs
just one wrong step and the consequences might reverberate through centuries.
Both Mearsheimer and Nye are tempted to avoid the questions and facts that challenge directly
their narrative. The difference is that Mearsheime r is much easier to read. If he has no strong
argument against an objection, he just claims that the other party is formulating a totally different
theory that practically creates a parallel universe in relation to his own story. For example, the
democrati c peace theory might be correct, but because the core assumptions are different, there is
no point on debating on the differences, so we should wait and see if h istory will validate one
theory or the other. Another discursive strategy that he uses is bring ing more ad hoc variables into
the discussion, variables that were not included in his initial stated structural theory, subjecting his
theory to Vasquez ’s accuse of degenerative tendencies.156 Nye on the other hand is a much more
subtle intellectual. Challe nged by the delicate question of how China’s military buildup in the
South China Sea, including their increasing projects to build artificial islands, will affect the future
relations between Beijing and Washington, he replied that only China can contain C hina. Even
though Mearsheimer is always referring and identifying himself with the United States (in writing
and public speech he says ‘us’ when describing the American foreign policy), Nye is actually much
closer to the establishment from Washington. If w e look pass his clever game of words, we can
understand that Nye is not always speaking from the perspective of an honest and objective scholar,
but he actually defend s the American interests and is unable or is unwilling to detach himself from
his liberal and transnational universalistic sympathies. He never talks about what China or other
actors should do in a strategic sense , or what is their sincere perspective in relation to what the
United States does . The other actors should do that or the other only as a reaction to the leadership
offered by Washington. He considers that the United States is responsible for the wellbeing of the
world and that the Americans should focus on defending the status -quo and on defending the
natural development of the indivi dual. Washington should use the principles of smart power in
order to manage any crisis and the other states should only respond and collaborate in the name of

156 John A. Vasquez, Colin Elman, Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate , Pearson Publishin g, United
States, 2002

89
peace and prosperity. In this scenario, with the exception of the United States, all the other p owers
are reactive.
Besides being unrealistic, this world view creates the exact double standards that many critics
evoke when they contest the neoliberal discourse. Nye is not explaining why the American
increasing military presence in Asia and the Strat egic Pivot to Asia is not an actual attempt to
contain China, but the same American presence in the Middle East is containment, and that
operation should continue . Is it because Nye is talking on behalf of the American foreign policy,
and he can recognize that the American approach in the Middle East is containment because no
country from that region can seriously challenge the United States, while recognizing the
containment of China will not only contradict his theory, but also further provoke them, which is
against his principle of smart politics? The same double standard can be identified when he claims
that the North Korean nuclear deal that Trump has obtained was extremely bad, but the nuclear
deal that Obama has obtained with Iran was very good becaus e North Korea can’t be trusted, but
Washington should trust Iran. We agree that the Iranian deal should not have been cancelled, and
that the North Korean one had many issues, but his radical stance on this matter shows that Nye is
unable to distance himse lf from the times that he was in office (his influence over the Clinton and
later Obama administration) . In his lecture from 2018 held at Oxford, the liberal scholar presented
his thesis, explaining why China won’t clash with the United States in 37 minute s. Nye used fifteen
minutes from his presentation in order to criticize the Trump administration . We agree that Trump
is a liability for the United States (maybe the most uninspired decision was to forsake the TPP
agreement) , but a grand scholar like Nye t hat bel ieves in complex interdependence should not be
so worried about the negative effects that one individual might cause.157
Finally, his idea that pessimistic trends are reversible because they are a part of a bigger cycle can
be easily used against him, as a great deal of things can change in thirty years and the trends that
he believes to be linear might actually be circular . One example is his argument that because the
soft power of the United States is stronger and because most of the future Chinese l eaders are being
educated in American universities, the chances of future cooperation increases. The scenario

157 We have felt the same disappointed while reading Kissinger’s latest book. After an immersive reading about
international dynamics, and remarkable observations about how the international arena works, totally unrelated to
his line o f reasoning, the very same Kissinger considers that George W. Bush Jr. was a great American president.
Henry Kissinger, World Order. Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History , Penguin
Publishing, New York, 2014, pp. 271 – 274

90
presented by Nye could be entirely correct. However, we will like to illustrate that history has
shown us examples where the reverse happened. Our own historical research revealed that the rise
of the Japanese civilization between the 7th and 9th century AD was decidedly marked by the glory
of the Chinese civilization and by the political administration of the Tang dynasty. Most of the
Japanese elit e was actually educated in China, and many of them lived on the continent for twenty
years. Initially, this fact greatly improved their relations. However, the rise of Japan ended in a
regional security competition and the two countries have been bitter ri vals from that moment until
present days.158 This scenario was repeated by the Japanese elite that was educated in the United
States, United Kingdom and Germany during the Interwar Period. This type of linear optimistic
argument falls in the same category as the ones made by liberals like David Held. Internet will
improve communication like never before and this will facilitate the rise of an international citizen,
who will relate with people from all over the world. Up to a point, this idea has been supporte d by
reality. Still, communication on the internet didn’t had a linear positive effect on the perspectives
for mutual understanding, common identity and future cooperation. The reverse tendency was at
least as strong as the optimist scenario, as countless people from all over the world used
communication only to reinforce their own prejudices and nationalism is also on the rise because
of the increasing instant access to information and communication that the internet has provided.
In the end we think that Mearsheimer is right because he understand the structural potential of
great powers. Simply put, with the exception of the last two centuries, China was one of the greatest
power from the international system in the past five thousand years, and constantly had a huge
population, a rich economy defended by a well -organized army, an elaborate culture and the
capacity to innovate. On a larger scale, the fact that such a nation encounters tremendous
difficulties should not blind us in to thinking that they will never recover. The unification of
Germany from 1870 automatically made Berlin the strongest European power, it was just a matter
of time until they would have reached this potential. Maybe if World War One never happened,
Germany would have been even more formidable and the modern international relations history
would have drastically changed . After their defeat, the other major powers wanted to make sure

158 Our detailed historical analysis on the relations between ancient Japan, China and Korea can be found here.
Armand Sadovschi, Beginning of organized religion and foreign contacts in Ancient Japan , 2017,
https://en.historylapse.org/beginning -of-organized -religion -and-foreign -contacts -in-ancient -japan ; The emerging
national conscience in ancient Japan , 2018, https://en.historylapse.org/the -emerging -national -conscience -in-
ancient -japan , accessed on 17th of June 2019

91
that they will never rise to challenge the status -quo, and limited their army to the bare minimum.
The Republic of Weimar encountered huge economic problems , there is not point to insist on this .
In 1936, when Hitler invaded Rhineland, Nazi Germany virtually had almost no navy or aviation,
and their infantry was backed by a modest number of armor ed vehicles . Four years later, Nazi
Germany was the strongest military power in Europe, and their panzers divisions were crushing
the allied French and British forces in just a couple of weeks. This kind of pattern can be identified
on several occasions in history an d from this we can learn that a country under a huge amount of
stress, with a huge amount of latent power , can employ its national fervor to fill the power gap
with incredible speed and efficiency. Furthermore, economic power can be translated into militar y
power in a short period of time, and because the revisionist power is engaging last in the process
of rearmament , they might also have a technical and technological advantage because the center
of their army will be composed from brand new models of vari ous weapons . We think that until
2050, there is a genuine chance to witness the same historical pattern with China.
At the end of our thesis we would like to sketch a brand new hypothesis that will be developed in
our next papers. Starting from this experi ence, we have strong reasons to believe that the realist
tradition is much more complex than at first glance, and that a work centered on these principles
is still relevant in relation to more and more critics coming from the other paradigms. We have
alrea dy observed that structural realism is a captivating theory, but we have also understood some
of its limits. Even Mearsheimer ’s discourse is now closer to the neoclassical realist perspective,
where all the three images from international relations are rel evant. Borrowing from the realist
constructivist paradigm of J. Samuel Barkin,159 we have also emphasized the relevance of different
types of nationalism in Asia, and the relevance of perception and culture, and how it can shape
geopolitical developments, es pecially in the Pacific.
Finally, we wanted to emphasize some features that we believe will support our next theoretical
approach:
1) The moral character of realism, its ability to adapt to the complex moral problems of the
21st century, the fact that the a uthors recognize the importance of common values in
international relations.

159 J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory , 2010, Cambridge
University Press, New York, 2010

92
2) The fact that realism is not limited to military -economic factors; or to state actors when
measuring power, the preference for these elements was more contextual and not an
absolu te epistemological belief.
3) The various forms of structural realism and neoclassical realism show that a realist theory
that combines the three images of international relations is possible and is in accordance
with scientific norms.
4) In connection with poin t 1, realism constructivism demonstrates that the factors of
irrationality -perception -culture -ideas are perfectly compatible with the basic principles of
realism.
5) We will also investigate what other lesser -known specialists have to say . For example, a
realist Chinese author like Yan Xuetong. This is important because there are more and
more accusations that the theories of international relations strictly reflect a Western
perspective.160

Starting from our current thesis , the next central hypothesis would be the following:

The international system will be multipolar, characterized by the areas of influence belonging the
great powers and regional powers, a system not much unlike the one from the 19th century Europe.
In the Pacific region, China's rise will sl ow down, while the relative decline of the United States
will be limited and will not lead to a total collapse, thus reaching a strained balance of power. In
this struggle, the main weapons will be: economic protectionist measures, free trade treaties limi ted
to certain states only, manipulation of international institutions, rule of law and NGOs for the
benefit of the great powers, more or less conventional (limited intensity) warfare through
intermediaries (states, non -state actors ). The liberal order wi ll be just one of many other models
of political organization. There will be two major coalitions (that already exist but they are not yet
fully formed). The first one will be composed from Western, democratic states organized around
the United States of America , but also will include a few authoritarian countries (who have chosen
this path from a combination of strategic and cultural reasons). The coalition around China will be
on the opposite pole, more authoritarian states and several democratic states ( idem reasons). A

160 The Chicago Project on Security and Threats. University of Chicago, John Mearsheimer and Yan Xuetong
Debate , 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=wBrA2TDcNto , accessed on 17th of June 2019

93
third coalition will be formed from neutral states that have not yet been forced by geographical
proximity to choose a camp and are trying to maximize their power by collecting as many benefits
as possible from both sides. In addition, we also think that some countries will change their
allegiance or give up their neutrality only when the strategic -rational considerations will be joined
by the cultural -emotional ones.
In practice, this means a structural realism based on a balance of threat s where economy and
prestige are much more important eleme nts of power (we have planned future paper based on the
comparison between TPP-TTIP -Belt and Road) and the rational calculation of power struggle will
be marked by the culture / perception / emotion al decision variable. These variables should explain
why the balancing of power does not always occur and should adapt the simplicity of neorealism
to the complexity of this age. To avoid the speculative path taken by Huntington, we will quantify
the conce pt of culture by analyzing much simpler data such as the rise of nationalism (the
perception of others about the rise of China, the historical past of Japan and militarization, the
European colonial past, etc.) and terrorism in the region, inequality, econ omic development,
political culture and institutional structure. We truly hope that this will be developed in our future
research projects.

94
Technical Annex

Map taken from Henry Tricks, The Economist: The Pacific Age , 2014, https://www.economist.com/special –
report/2014/11/13/the -pacific -age?FEATURE_ARTICLES_V1=0 , accessed on the 19th of June 2019

95

Map taken from James McBride and An drew Chatzky, What Is the Trans -Pacific Partnership (TPP)? , 2019,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what -trans -pacific -partnership -tpp, accessed on the 19th of June 2019

96

Map taken from Sergey Balmasov , Battle for Oceania . Asian Military Personnel , 2015,
https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics -and-comments/analytics/battle -for-oceania/ , accessed on the 19th of June 2019

97

Map taken from the Transpacific Project, US Imperialist Expansion in the Pacific , 2019,
http://www.tran spacificproject.com/index.php/european -exploration -and-colonization/ , accessed on the 19th of June
2019

98

Table taken from Thomas Piketty, Technical appendix of the book « Capital in the 21st century » , Harvard
University Press, March 2014, http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/capital21c/en/Piketty2014FiguresTablesSuppLinks.pdf ,
accessed on the 19th of June 2019

Table taken from China Labor Bulletin, Inequal ity rising, even accelerating, in China , 2017,
https://clb.org.hk/content/inequality -rising -even -accelerating -china , accessed on the 19th of June 2019

99

Map taken from Eijas Ariffin, Indonesian terrorist attacks show terrorism is still a threat in Southeast Asia , 2018,
https://theaseanpost.com/article/ind onesian -terrorist -attacks -show -terrorism -still-threat -southeast -asia, accessed on
the 19th of June 2019

Map taken from Institute of Geography & Future Ocean Excellence Cluster, Costal Risks and Sea – Level Rise,
2006, http://www.crslr.uni -kiel.de/en/research -areas/impact -and-vulnerability -assessment.html , accessed on the 19th
of June 2019

100

Map taken from The Economist, America will find it hard to st rike a deal to curb North Korea, 2017,
https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/04/06/america -will-find-it-hard-to-strike -a-deal-to-curb-north-korea ,
accessed on the 19th of June 2019

101

Table taken from the Department of Defense: United States of America: Annual report to Congress, Military and
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017 ,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF , p. 101

102

Map taken from The Economist, The odds on a conflict between the great powers , 2018,
https://www.economist.com/special -report/2018/01/25/the -odds -on-a-conflict -between -the-great –
powers?FEATURE_ARTICLES_V1 =0, accessed on 19th of June 2019

103

Map taken from Jeff Desjardins, China vs. United States: A Tale of Two Economies , 2015,
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/ch ina-vs-united -states -a-tale-of-two-economies/ , accessed on 19th of June 2019

104
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