NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. Prepared for: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office… [627712]

NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE

Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr.

Prepared for:

Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Advanced Systems and Concepts Office

Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum
Contract No: DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02

This report represents the views of its author, not necessarily those of SAIC, its sponsors, or
any
United States Government Agency

31 October 2006

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An Overview of North Korea ’s Strategic Culture:

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

NORTH KOREA ’S STRATEGIC CULTURE DESCRIBED
More than any other nation today, the strategic culture of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the product of the personal dreams and ambitions of a single
individual—Kim Il-sung. Kim was the world’s lo ngest reigning leader, having assumed power in
the northern portion of the Korean Peninsula du ring 1948 and maintaining that position until his
death in 1994. This has resulted in a worldview and strategic culture built upon six central and
interrelated and overl apping principles,
• The survival of the Kim clan (i.e., “the cen ter of the revolution”) and its power and
influence. This is the primal principl e to which all others are subordinate.
• Elimination of all internal threats to the power of the Kim clan by the establishment
and ruthless maintenance of an extremely small, privileged and powerful military and
power-holding elite—all of whom owe ab solute allegiance to the Kim clan.
• Reunification of the Fatherland (i.e ., the entire Korean Peninsula).
• Establishment and maintenance of overwhelming conventional military strength to facilitate the reunification of the Fatherland.
• Acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles.
• Deterrence of the United States and the Re public of Korea (ROK) by the maintenance
of overwhelming conventional military st rength and the acquisition of WMD and
ballistic missiles.
These six principles are themselves pro cessed through the DPRK’s political ideology
known as Chuche and what is termed as a “lens of self deception” composed of four elements,1
• Historical world view
• Political indoctrination
• Hatred for the U.S.
• Authoritarian cultural rules

1 See Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Information and the DPRK’s Military and Power-Holding Elite in Hassig, Kongdan
Oh. North Korean Policy Elites, IDA Paper P-3903 (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2004) ,
available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/fellows/oh20040601.htm
3

The result of this “lens of self deception” is that it often distorts and misrepresents the
reality of a situation.
Although he is better educated and better info rmed about world events than his father,
Kim Chong-il—who assumed absolute leadership of the DPRK following his father’s death—
has not significantly deviated from the worldview or strategic culture es tablished by his father.2
Despite minor efforts to address economic issu es Kim Chong-il has vigo rously emphasized the
strengthening of the military and the continued development of WMD through his “military
first” policies. He has proven himself ruthless an d dispassionate in dealin g with disloyalty of
those individuals whom he perceives as a threat—including member s of his own extended
family.3
By all accounts Kim Chong-il is a workaholic, micromanager, “information junkie,”
technologically savvy, impatient, quick-temper ed, intelligent, and ruthless. By his own
admission he surfs the internet daily, regularly watches NHK (Japan), CCTV (China) and CNN,
and has foreign books and articles (especially an ything written about himself) translated and
summarized for him. He prefers to manage almost everything directly, down to the most minor
of details. Without his personal approval, no thing of significance can be initiated or
accomplished. He insists on numerous detailed repor ts from all organizations and then spends
long hours at his office reading them. He doesn’t necessarily trust any single source for
information but rather compares the information he receives from several different organizations
and sources (apparently including the internet). It is not unusual for him to order specialists and
technocrats from throughout the government to app ear before him so that he might directly
question them concerning a partic ular matter. Finally, he believes that the decisions and choices
he makes are better than those of the people around him. It is towards Kim Chong-il that all
important information streams, and from him that all power, significant or ders and directions
issue forth.4 Ominously, much of the information and analysis he bases his decision making

2 Merrily Baird, Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic Culture in Schneider, Barry
R. and Jerrold M. Post , editors. Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: USAF Counterp roliferation Center, July 2003, 2nd ed.), at
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/know_thy_enemy/cover.htm .
3 For two excellent analyses of the Kim family and power-holding elites see: Kenneth E. Gause, The North Korean
Leadership: System Dynamics and Fault Lines; and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Inside North Korea’s Black Box:
Reversing the Optics , both in Kongdan Oh Hassig, North Korean Policy Elites , IDA Paper P-3903 (Alexandria:
Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2004).
4 Peter Maass, “The Last Emperor,” New York Times Magazine , October 19, 2003; “Interview with defector Hwang
Jong Yop [Hwang Jang Yop]: A Rare Portrait Of North Korea,” Time [Asia] , September 7, 1999, Vol. 152, No. 9,
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upon is fundamentally distorted by the strategic cultu re that his father esta blished and he operates
within.
The net effect of these factors is a strategic culture that is rudimentary, familial and
possess few, if any, objective internal checks and balances. It views the United States as the
primary enemy, a duplicitous and deceitful enemy who, if it perceive s any weakness, is likely to
initiate a war of annihilation employing WMD against the DPRK. Internally it views any
disagreement with policies or criticism of the Kim regime—no matter how insignificant—as a
direct threat to Kim Chong-il a nd is dealt with harshly. Even loyal dissent amongst the highest
levels of the military and power-holding elite is discouraged and constructive variations to the
implementation of Kim Chong-il’s thoughts on strategi c issues are reported as being rare. In a
very real sense Kim Chong-il’s thoughts and desires are the DPRK’s strategic domestic and
international policies.

Profile of North Korea’s Strategic Culture
Development
To understand the basis for the strategic cult ure developed by Kim Il-sung it is necessary
to go back to the pre-Second World War period.5 Following Japan’s victory in the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-05, it became the dominant power in Asia and annexed Korea in 1911.
Japan would rule Korea with a cruel and often inhumane hand un til the end of the Second World
War. The Japanese were then, and still are, view ed by the majority of Koreans as foreigners and
oppressors.6 During the late 1930s, the Japanese military developed a small chemical and
biological warfare (CBW) capability that it used against the Chinese. The Japanese also
conducted an exhaustive regime of experimentation on Allied prisoners-of-war, Russians, and

www.time.com/time/asia/ , “DPRK’s Kim Chong-il’s Position on Retaliation,” Choson Ilbo , October 17, 1996, pp.
8-11, as cited in FBIS-EAS-96-231; “Defector to ROK on Kim Chong-il’s Control of DPRK Military,” Win, June
1996, pp 161-167, as cited in FBIS-EAS-96-197; “Articles by Defector Kang Myong-to Reported,” Chungang Ilbo ,
April 21, 1995, p. 5, as cited in FBIS-EAS-95-097; “North Korean Defectors 27 July News Conference,” Choson
Ilbo, July 28, 1994, pp. 3-4, as cited in FBIS-EAS-94-145; and “Newspaper Profiles Kim Chong-il’s Supporters,”
Sindong-a , February 1994, pp. 421-439, as cited in FBIS-EAS-94-050.
5 Adrian Buzo, The Guerrilla Dynasty (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999); Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il-sung: The North
Korea Leader (New York: Colombia University Pr ess, 1988); and Sydney A. Seiler, Kim Il-song 1941-1948 (New
York: University Press of America).
6 These sentiment have been repeatedly expressed to the author in private conversations, during the past twenty-five
years, with ambassadors, ministers, representative and private citizens fr om both the ROK and DPRK. It does,
however, appear to be moderating amongst the younger generations in the ROK.
5

Chinese civilians.7 The general nature of these chem ical and biological operations and
experimentation were known to the Chinese government, the Allies, and, to a lesser degree, the
general population. At that time Kim Il-sung and the majority of the DPRK future leadership
were young peasant guerrillas who were sporadic ally fighting the Japanese, first with the
Communist Chinese, and then with the Sovi et Army. Although only fragmentary evidence is
available, it is apparent that th ey were influenced by what they would learn of these chemical
and biological operations.8 At the time of the U.S. nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in 1945, Kim and his fellow guerrillas had been fi ghting the Japanese for 5-10 years. As the
reality and the rumors of the events at Hirosh ima and Nagasaki spread throughout the world, the
nuclear bomb was viewed as the ultimate “doo msday” weapon. This attitude was reinforced by
the experiences of those Koreans returning from Japan who had been in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
at the time of the bombing.9 This fear became even more pronounced among Communist
guerrilla leaders such as Mao Zedong and Kim Il -sung. By the end of the Second World War,
both Kim Il-sung and a number of soon-to-be influential Koreans had an uneducated
appreciation of, and indirect expos ure to, the effects of nuclear, ch emical and biological warfare.
This awareness shaped their developing vi ews of the world, warfare, and politics.
Combined with these early appreciations of WMD four additional factors during the
subsequent Fatherland Liberation War (i.e., Ko rean War) would help coalesce both Kim Il-
sung’s worldview and form the foundations of th e strategic culture then developing within the
nation,
• The U.S. intervention in the Fatherland Liberation War was interpreted by Kim and his
contemporaries as the prime reason the war of reunification failed. From this point
forward the United States would be viewed as the primary enemy and as a bully “kicking the door in” and interfering in the purely internal affairs of nations of which it did not
approve.
• During the war both the DPRK and People’s Republic of China (PRC) suffered from
repeated, and to them, unexplained outbreaks of infectious diseases such as influenza,
Dengue fever, and cholera. These outbreaks caus ed large numbers of civilian and military

7 Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: Japan’s Secret Biological Warfare in World War II (New York: The
Free Press, 1989), p. 45 ; and Harris, Sheldon H. Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare 1932-45 and the
American Cover Up (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 67-73.
8 Author interview data.
9 Peter Hayes. Pacific Powderkeg (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 241-246.
6

casualties. While the leadership knew that it was untrue, they fabricated the story that the
United States was employing biological, and to a lesser degree chemical, weapons against
their units in Korea and against villages within the PRC itself.10 Furthermore, they
claimed that former Japanese soldiers we re cooperating with the United States in
perpetrating these attacks.11 For the uninformed masses of the DPRK it became a
bedrock of “truth” and these claims are still repeated.
• The United States on numerous occasions (the earliest being President Harry S. Truman’s
public statements on 30 November 1950) thre atened to employ nuclear weapons against
Korean People’s Army (KPA) and “Chinese Pe ople’s Volunteers” (CPV) units in Korea,
and if necessary against the PRC proper, to end the war.12 These threats struck a raw
nerve since the leadership of both nations remembered the bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, and neither the PRC nor DPRK coul d withstand a nuclear attack or had the
capability to respond in kind. In combination with other factors the desired effect was
achieved and a truce agreement was r eached, thus ending the hostilities.
• While appreciative of all the support receiv ed from the Soviet Union and PRC, Kim
expressed disappointment with the Soviet Union’s pressure to sign the Armistice
Agreement. This would provide a context for Kim to view future Soviet actions (e.g., the
Soviets backing down during the Cuban Missile Crisis, etc.) and fostered the belief that
the DPRK must become self-sufficient.

In the years that followed the Fatherland Liberation War, public statements by U.S.
officials, the continued U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula, and the inclusion of the
ROK within the U.S. nuclear umbrella, have cont ributed to peace. To the DPRK leadership, this
U.S. presence has also reinforced the belief that the DPRK has little choice but to comply with
the 1953 Armistice Agreement or face de vastation from nuclear attack.

10 John Cookson and Judith Nottingham, A Survey of Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1969), 57-63 and 297-308; and U.S. Army. “Bacteriological Warfare Charges Against the United
States: A Strategic Weapon in the Communist Propaganda Warfare,” FEC Intelligence Digest , No. 32, 2 October
1952, 6-10.
11 Author interview Data; A Survey of Chemical and Biological Warfare , 57-63 & 297-308; and U.S. Army.
“Bacteriological Warfare Charges Against the United States: A Strategic Weapon in the Communist Propaganda
Warfare,” FEC Intelligence Digest , No. 32, 2 October 1952, 6-10; and David Tharp, “The Brutal Secret of Japan’s
WWII Unit 731,” United Press International, August 8, 1995.
12 San Diego Tribune . “Papers Show Eisenhower Weighed Nuclear Attack,” March 26, 1988, A5; and San Diego
Union . “Nuclear Attack Reportedly Would Have Taken Week,” March 29, 1988, A29.
7

In the immediate post-war years the DPRK possessed neither WMD, nor the capabilities
to produce them. Combined with the perceive d threat poised by th e United States, this
contributed to a DPRK belief that possession of such weapons was a requirement to deter
U.S./ROK aggression and set the stage for reunification of the Fatherland.13
In a December 1955 speech Kim Il-sung set fo rth a new political ideology known as
Chuche that would quickly change the nature of DPRK society.14 While generally defined as
meaning “self-reliance and national identity” it has developed into a unique belief system that
permeates every aspect of life in the DPRK. It has been used by both Kim Il-sung and Kim
Chong-il to justify almost anything:
major policy initiatives, including elim inating factional enemies, widening
diplomatic activities, neutralizing attempts by China or Russia to exert influence
over Korea, questioning the legitimacy of the South Korean government, and
relentlessly attacking U.S. imperialism.15

Today Chuche is a national id eology with distinctly relig ious overtones. With Kim Il-
sung and Kim Chong-il at the center of the unive rse, being omnipotent and incapable of doing
wrong. Because of its pervasiveness throughout soci ety the DPRK’s strategic culture has become
a emanation of the Kim’s Chuche thoughts.
Kim Chong-il was raised in and, since the 1970s, participated in the subsequent
incremental evolution of the stra tegic culture established by his fa ther. In this both he and his
father were accompanied by a small group of m ilitary and power-holding elites. This group
consisted of trusted friends and relatives (mos tly men)—many of whom had fought either as
partisans with Kim Il-sung against the Japanese during Second World War or as officers during
the Fatherland Liberation War. Since Kim Il-sung’ s death in 1994, the composition of this small
group of older generation elites has changed considerably as members have died, become
enfeebled with age or were gradually replaced by Kim Chong-il’s trusted contemporaries.16 To

13 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai. China Builds the Bomb (Palo Alto: Stanford Univers ity Press, 1988), chapters 1
and 2. These two chapters present an insi ghtful discussion of the origins and effect of the PRC’s fear of U.S. nuclear
weapons usage.
14 Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institute Press, 2000), Chapte r 2 provides an excellent and understandable explanation of Chuche (Juche). See also:
Cummings, Bruce. “The Corporate State in North Korea,” in Koo, Hagen ed., State and Society in Contemporary
Korea (Ithaca: Cornell Un iversity Press, 1993), pp. 197-230.
15 Defense Intelligence Agency. North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Of fice, December 1995), p. 1.
16 For the most part this was done in a manner consistent with traditional Confucian values of respect and honor for
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date, neither Kim nor his appoint ees have deviated si gnificantly from the basic worldview or
strategic culture estab lished by Kim Il-sung. Notably, however, the majority of these new power-
holding elites possess even less e xposure to international arena than their predecessors, and none
have experienced the realities of war. What l ong-term effect this will have on DPRK strategic
culture, especially when Kim C hong-il is eventually succeeded by one of his sons, is unclear.
Even with the possibility of Kim Chong-il soon appointing on e of his sons to succeed
him, for the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that there will be any signi ficant changes to Kim
Chong-il’s worldview or the DP RK’s strategic culture.

Military and Power-Holding Elite
The “keepers” of the DPRK’s strategic culture are a extremely small group of military
and power-holding elites. All power within the DPRK originates with Kim Chong-il, who is
simultaneously Chairman of the National Defens e Commission, General Secretary of the Korean
Workers’ Party (KWP), and Supreme Commande r of the Korean People’s Army (a unified
armed force consisting of the ground, navy and air fo rces). Therefore what really matters within
the DPRK is not so much an individual’s schooling, personal achievements, employment,
position within society, rank within the KPA, KWP, etc. but how close—physically and
emotionally—that individual is connected to Kim Chong-il.
To implement their rule the Kim’s have cultivated and mercilessly maintained a
diminutive class of military and power-holding elites. The primary qualification for membership in this class is absolute alle giance to the Kim’s. Such allegiance is rewarded by access to the
Kim’s and the attendant privilege and power th at it conveys. Until the mid-1990s these elites
were primarily contemporaries of Kim Il-sung who had repeatedly demonstrated their personal loyalties and shared his worldvi ew. Since Kim’s death in 1994 this older generation is being
slowly supplanted—primarily through attrition—by contemporaries of Kim Chong-il. All current
members of the military and power-holding elite ow e their status, privilege and literally their
lives and the lives of their families to the Kim clan. Any hint of disloyalty is dealt with harshly, with the offender—and often their extended fa mily—being exiled from the capital P’yongyang
to mountain work camps. In more extreme cases offenders are executed.

elderly and powerful individu als. See Paul S. Crane, Korean Patterns (Seoul: Hollym Corp., 1968).
9

Kim
Chong-il
Ca binetMinistry of
People’s Armed
Forces (MPAF)Kim Chong-i l’s
Family and
Close
Associates
Korean Workers’
Party (KWP)
Intel ligence and
Internal Security
ServicesMilitary EliteNational Defense
Commission (NDC)
Power-holdi ng
Elite

Figure 1: Military and Power-holding Elite
This power structure can best be illustr ated by viewing Kim Chong-il as the center—
physically, politically, and socially—of the DPRK, as shown in Figure 1. Immediately
surrounding him are a group of individuals—prima rily men—and their subordinates who come
from five broad societal gr oupings: Kim Chong-il’s extended fa mily and close confidents,17
Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF); KW P; Cabinet; and intelligence and internal
security services. The convergence of these grou pings represents the pow er-holding elite within
the DPRK. The pinnacle of the power-holding e lite is the National Defense Commission, which
consists of approximately ten individuals, most of whom hold military rank. Therefore, the
military elite within the Na tional Defense Commission should be understood to be among
highest power-holders within the DPRK.

17 Information on the Kim family may be found in Sarah Buckley,. “North Korea’s Secretive ‘First Family’,” BBC
News , October 29, 2003, accessed October 30, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3203523.stm ;
and Peter Carlson, “Sins of the Son; Kim Jong Il’s North Korea Is in Ruins, But Why Should That Spoil His Fun?,”
Washington Post , May 11, 2003, p. D1. See also, Gause, Kenneth E. The North Korean Leadership: System
Dynamics and Fault Lines ; and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Inside North Korea’s Black Box: Reversing the Optics ,
both in Kongdan Oh Hassig,. North Korean Policy Elites, IDA Paper P-3903 (Alexandria: Institute for Defense
Analyses, June 2004).
10

A noteworthy characteristic of the National Defense Commission specifically and the
power-holding elite in general is that members occupy multiple l eadership positions within the
MPAF, KWP, and intelligence and internal security services. In fact, all the military members of
the National Defense Commission are also members of the Central Military Committee. This
cross-pollination and concentration of power within the hands of a few individuals enables Kim
Chong-il, through the National Defense Commission, to easily maintain extremely firm control
over all aspects of DPRK society and the flow of information. It also means that the decision-
making process and poles of political power apparent in most nations are not present within the
DPRK.
An additional aspect of the military and power-holding elite that has become an integral
component of the DPRK’s strategi c culture is what would be termed in the West as corruption.
In fact, this corruption should be viewed as being institutionaliz ed and the means by which many
of the military and power-holding elite have attained and maintained their positions. It is manifested in the access elites have to info rmation, foreign manufactured goods, opportunity to
have their children travel abroad for schooli ng, their own greater oppo rtunities to travel,
nepotism, etc. Thus, favoritism and cronyism are endemic among the elite. Given this vortex of institutionalized corruption, fear of disple asing Kim Chong-il and a convoluted flow of
information, it is certainly within the realm of possibility that Kim Chong-il is at times being
deceived or misled at some level by subordinates. Exactly how this occurs is unclear but it may
manifest itself in a manner similar to the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein.
18 Thus this may be
manifested by managers or leaders of program exaggerating the achievements or potential
capabilities of their prog rams or systems. This may account for some of the stories related by
defectors concerning Kim Chong-il’s surprise at tim es concerning the true conditions in military
units or factories and the excessive remedies that he initiates to address these conditions.
Within such an environment of corruption it would serve an individua l’s interest (and by
extension those who ally themselves with that individual) to have higher quality and greater
diversity of information than a political rival. Th e corollary to this is that limiting a rival’s access
to information is of significant benefit to a member of the military and power-holding elite.

18 James Risen, “Ex-Inspector Says C.I.A. Missed Disarray in Iraqi Arms Program,” New York Times , January 26,
2004, < www.nytimes.com >, accessed January 26, 2004.
11

Lens of Self Deception
One of the more notable aspects of the DPRK’s strategic culture is that it is processed
through a “lens of self deception.” In what may be viewed as either “circular verification” or
“self-fulfilling prophecy” this lens is both a product of Chuche and th e strategic culture that it is
filtering. This “lens of self deception” is composed of four layers: historical world view, political
indoctrination, hatred for the United States, and authoritarian cultural ru les. This lens is so darkly
colored that instead of focusing and illuminating, it most often misrepresents and distorts the
reality of the information.
As noted above, until the mid-1990s the real power within the DPRK rested within the
hands of Kim Il-sung and a small group of milit ary and power-holding elites. As a group these
individuals possess a narrow and di storted worldview that is ba sed not upon the free flow of
ideas, questioning of facts, and exposure to diffe rent cultures and philo sophies, but rather upon
their limited personal experiences, Communist ideology, KWP propaganda and Chuche. This
worldview places world events and the actions of other nations within a distinctly historical context. In this view, Japan is not only a neighb or and important trading partner, it is also the
nation that occupied Korea and brutally oppresse d the Korean people for many years. Because of
this, any actions undertaken by Japan, benign as the might be, are viewed with suspicion.
The DPRK has never attempted to conceal the fact that it believes the United States is its
principal enemy and the ROK is its “puppet.” In this view it was the United States that interfered in a purely internal dispute—the Fatherland Li beration War—and threatened to employ nuclear
weapons. Since that time the United States has c ontinued to both prevent the unification of Korea
and threaten the existence of th e DPRK with the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it is the
United States that “controls” the United Nations and directs world atte ntion against the DPRK
and other countries that it opposes. The DPRK leader ship views U.S. actions in countries such as
Grenada, Iraq, Panama, Somalia and Vietnam as analogous to their own situation, with the
United States acting as a bully “kicking the door in” and interfering in purely internal affairs. Therefore all actions undertaken by the United States are viewed with distrust and as attempts to
both prolong the division of the Korean people and directly thr eaten the existence of the Kim
regime.
Korean society within both the ROK and DP RK has a strong underpinning of Confucian
12

philosophy.19 One notable aspect of this are stringent authoritarian hierarchal rules. Within
government organizations this is expressed by the fact that subordinates will rarely, if ever,
disagree with their superiors. In fact, they are encouraged not t o. Therefore, if a superior is
known to possess a particular view on a subject their subordinates—whether they believe the
view correct or not—will tend to work new inform ation into that view. These authoritarian rules
are also manifested in deep institutional loyalty that results in a frequent refusal to share
information and detrimental inter-agency compe tition. While such submission to superiors and
institutional loyalty are witnessed in some form throughout the business, military and
intelligence communities in the world it is quite evident within the DPRK they are taken to
extremes under the umbrella of Chuche. The dis tinct possibility exists that this dynamic may
manifest itself in a desire by the subordinat es and support staffs to Kim Chong-il and the
National Defense Commission to not present information that displeas es them or is at variance to
their stated opinions.

NORTH KOREA ’S STRATEGIC CULTURE IN ACTION
Whether consciously or subcons ciously the above characteristics suggest that the manner
by which information is processed by individual s and institutions results in it passing through a
lens of self-deception and exiting in a fundamenta lly flawed state. It is upon these assessments,
however, that decisions within the DPRK are made. When co mbined with Kim Chong-il’s
apparent beliefs, that he “knows better” and can arrive at better decisions than those around him,
this often leads to ill-advised courses of action and unanticipated outcomes. A prime example of
this was evidenced by Kim Chong-il’s 2003 public admission that DPRK intelligence agencies
had kidnapped Japanese civilians ov er the past 30 years. Kim’s apparent analysis of the situation
was that the Japanese would appr eciate his magnanimous admission of guilt, view it as a sign of
a new level of openness, and open themselves to th e DPRK. It apparently never occurred to him
that it would ignite deep emoti ons from a broad spectrum of th e Japanese population and harden
their feelings towards him and the DPRK. It should be anticipated that such a dynamic will be present during any future dealings with th e DPRK—especially duri ng times of crisis.
Within the military this dynamic can be illu strated by how the Mil itary Training Bureau
evaluated U.S. operations against Iraq during Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM .

19 Paul S. Crane, Korean Patterns (Seoul: Hollym Corp., 1968).
13

According to defectors international news broadcasts concerning Operation DESERT STORM were
taped and, “Videos of the Gulf War were watc hed everyday in the Operations Office, and
assessments of the military power of the United States and the multinational forces, and studies
of their strategy and tactics, were re-assessed from new angles.” 20
In one of those paradoxes resu lting from a flawed strategic culture that are so common
when dealing with the DPRK the same defector i ndicates that what they witnessed in the videos
was shocking and disturbing, yet the final analysis was,
…the Gulf War was, in short, that it wa s “child’s play.” Should [the DPRK] face
such circumstances, they concluded, it co uld easily deal with the United States
and the multinational forces. The reasons fo r this were that: unlike in the past, a
U.S.-led military block, even if it is fo rmed, would be unable to act without the
consent of its allies; in the event of another Korean war, neighboring powers
would not go along with the U.S. position as they did in the Gulf War; [the
DPRK’s] asymmetry in conventional and high-tech weapons; and [the DPRK’s]
new confidence in electronic warfare.21

Other defectors recount that following Operation DESERT STORM officers above
regimental commander were required to watch videotapes of the war to familiarize themselves with U.S. tactics. The videotapes, however, had a negative effect upon the commanders who
realized that modern war depends on modern weapons and that the weapons possessed by the
KPA were obsolete.
During the 2003 buildup to and earl y combat phases of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Kim
Chong-il is reported to have gone into seclusi on for 50 days beginning in mid-February and
extending to the end of March. He even misse d the traditional openi ng ceremonies of the
Supreme People’s Assembly in P’yongyang. The gene ral assessment of this behavior was that
Kim and the intelligence community interpreted media reports concerning U.S. attempts to decapitate the Iraqi leadership and the subsequent deployment of additional U.S. combat aircraft
to East Asia, as indications that he might also be the target of a similar decapitation attack. Yet,
no such attack was contemplated by the U.S.
22
A recent example containing many of the elemen ts of the strategic culture established
years ago under Kim Il-sung remains valid under Kim Chong-il can be seen in the 10 February

20 “Ex-DPRK Major Unveils KPA Military Plan,” Pukhan , February 1, 2000, pp. 92-99; and “Anti-Kim Front:
DPRK Military May Revolt,” Chugan Choson , December 2, 1993, pp. 32-34, as cited in FBIS-EAS-94-028.
21 Ibid.
22 “Kim Jong II Reportedly Feared Being Next Target,” Houston Chronicle , May 12, 2003, p. 12.
14

2005 statement issued by the DPRK Foreign Ministry,
We have already resolutely withdrawn from the NPT and have manufactured
nuclear weapons for self-defense to cope with the Bush administration’s policy of
isolating and crushing the DPRK, which is becoming stronger. Our nuclear
weapons will remain a self-defensive nuc lear deterrent under any circumstances.
Today’s reality shows that only strong pow er can protect justice and defend the
truth. As the United States’ imprudent rash acts and hostile attempts become more
blatant, we only feel great pride in havi ng strengthened, in every way from early
on, the single-hearted unity of the entire army and all the people and self-
defensive national defense capability while holding high the military-first banner.
23

SUMMARY
More than any other nation t oday, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is
the product of the personal dreams and ambiti ons of single individual—Kim Il-sung. Kim was
the world’s longest reigning leader, having assume d power in the northern portion of the Korean
Peninsula during 1948 and maintained that positi on until his death in 1994. The DPRK is an
extension of Kim’s thoughts, ideas, strengths, wea knesses and fears. The net effect of this is a
worldview and strategic cultu re built upon six central and interrelated principles,
• Survival of the Kim clan
• Elimination of all domestic threats
• Reunification of the Fatherland
• Establishment and maintenance of overwhelming conventional military strength
• Acquisition of WMD and ballistic missiles
• Deterrence of the U.S. and ROK
These six principles are themselves pro cessed through the DPRK’s political ideology
known as Chuche and what has been termed as a “lens of self deception.” In what may be
viewed as either “circular verifi cation” or “self-fulfilling prophecy ” this lens is itself a product
strategic culture that it is filtering. Th e four elements of this lens are,
• Historical world view
• Political indoctrination
• Hatred for the U.S.

23 “DPRK ‘Manufactured Nuclear Weapons,’ To ‘Suspend’ 6-Way Talks for ‘Indefinite Period’,” Korean Central
Broadcasting System, 10 February 2005, as cited in FBIS.
15

• Authoritarian cultural rules
This “lens of self deception” is so darkly colored that instead of focusing and
illuminating, it most often misrepresents and distorts real-world reality.
The repeated threats by the U.S. over the pa st 50-plus years have contributed to the
maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula, but they have also fostered a strategic culture
within the DPRK that it must absolutely possess WMD (especially nuclear weapons) as a means
of countering the U.S. nuclear threat a nd thus ensuring thei r national existence.24 This belief is
not only rooted in strong emotions, but also in years of political, military and intelligence
analysis. Raised within the strategic culture developed by K im Chong-il propagates this view.
The 1994 statements by Kang Myong Do, a defector and son-in-law of then DPRK Prime
Minister Kang Song-san, provide rele vant insight into this conviction,
North Korea’s nuclear development is not intended as a bargaining chip as seen
by the Western world, but for the maintenance of its system under the
circumstances in which it is faced wi th economic difficulties and a situation
following the collapse of Eastern Europe. ..The re is a firm belief that the only way
to sustain the Kim Chong-iI system is to have nu clear capabilities.25

According to defectors, Kim believes that if the KPA is weak, the state cannot exercise
its power in international affairs and its surviv al will be in jeopardy. He emphasizes that, “…only
when our military force is strong, can we take th e initiative in a contact or dialogue with the
United States or South Korea.”26
The DPRK’s strategic culture not only view s nuclear weapons as “decisive weapons” and
its primary means of deterring U.S. aggre ssion, but as also providing the DPRK with
international prestige, allowing them to take their rightful place am ong a select few world
powers with all the respect and political power commensurate to such a position.
From Kim’s perspective U.S. actions, unilaterally and through the UN, are attempts to
impinge upon his ability to rule the DPRK, threat s to his complete authority and autonomy, and
are ultimately designed to overthrow him. These attempts directly affront the strategic culture

24 Paul Shin, “Korea-Defection,” The Associated Press, September 13, 1991.
25 “North Korean Defectors 27 July New Conference,” Choson Ilbo , 28 July 1994, 3-4, as cited in FBIS-EAS-94-
145, 28 July 1994, 59-63; James Sterngold, “Defector Says North Korea Has 5 A-Bombs and May Make More,”
The New York Times , July 28, 1994, A7; and Don Kirk, “D efector: N. Korea Eyes 10 A-Bombs,” Newsday , July 28,
1994, A14.
26 “Defector to ROK on Kim Chong-il’s Control of DPRK Military,” Win, June 1996, 161-167, as cited in FBIS-
EAS-96-197.
16

developed by his father and embraced by himsel f. The strategic culture that surrounds him
fosters the idea that the DPRK is morally stronge r than the United States and that by resolutely
standing firm and threatening America he can outlast each administration.
The net effect of these factors is a strategic culture that is rudimentary, familial and
possesses few—if any—objective internal checks and balances. It views the United States as the
primary enemy, one that is dece itful in practice, and willing to use WMD against the DPRK.
Internally it views any disagreement with policies or crit icism of the Kim regime—no matter
how insignificant—as a direct threat to Kim Chong-il and ar e dealt with harshly. No
constructive criticism is allowed, even from loyal members of the military and power-holding
elite.
Within such an environment the actions of the DPRK which are routinely evaluated by
outsiders as “unpredictable,” “irr ational,” “illogical,” or simply “crazy,” if viewed from within
the context of its strategic cult ure can be understood as being qu ite rational and understandable.
17

RECOMMENDED READING

Baird, Merrily. Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Maki ng and North Korea’s Strategic Culture in
Schneider, Barry R. and Je rrold M. Post, editors. Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary
Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: USAF
Counterproliferation Center, July 2003, 2nd Edition), www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-
pubs/know_thy_enemy/cover.htm , accessed March 28, 2006.
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. and Sharon A. Richardson. A North Korean View on the Development
and Production of Strategic Weapon Systems , in Sokolski, Henry, ed. Planning for a
Peaceful Korea (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001).
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Unconventional Weapons ,
in Wirtz, James, Scott Sagan, and Peter Lavoy, eds. Planning the Unthinkable (Ithaca, New
York: Colombia University Press, 2000).
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. Information and the DPRK’s Military and Power-Holding Elite in
Hassig, Kongdan Oh. North Korean Policy Elites , IDA Paper P-3903 (Alexandria: Institute
for Defense Analyses, June 2004), available at
www.brookings.edu/views/papers/fellows/oh20040601.htm
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. SIGINT, EW and EIW in the Korean People’s Army: An Overview of
Development and Organization . This paper was prepared for presentation at the APCSS
conference Bytes and Bullets: Impact of IT Re volution on War and Peace in Korea , 8-10
October 2002, Honolulu, Hawaii.
Hassig, Kongdan Oh. North Korean Policy Elites , IDA Paper P-3903 (Alexandria: Institute for
Defense Analyses, June 2004) , available at
www.brookings.edu/views/papers/fellows/oh20040601.htm
Hodge, Homer T. “North Korea’s Military Strategy,” Parameters , Spring 2003, pp. 68-81
Hunter, Helen-Louise. Kim Il-song’s North Korea (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999).
Oh, Kongdan and Ralph C. Hassig. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2000).
Scobell, Andrew. North Korea’s Strategic Intentions (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army Strategic
Studies Institute, July 2005), available at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/
Scobell, Andrew. Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System (Carlisle Barracks:
U.S. Army Strategic Studies Inst itute, July 2005), available at
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/

Movies
Kim Jong Il , VHS video, 50 min., (New York: A&E Television Networks, 2001).
Inside North Korea , VHS video, 70 min., (New York: A&E Television Networks, 2001).
A State of Mind [Wide Angle] , VHS video, 90 min., (Arlington: Public Broadcasting Service,
2003).
18

Shiri, DVD, 125 min., (Seoul: Kang Je-Kyu Film Co. Ltd., Samsung Entertainment, 2003).

Additional Readings
“Anti-Kim Front: DPRK Military May Revolt,” Chugan Choson , December 2, 1993, pp. 32-34,
as cited in FBIS-EAS-94-028.
“Articles by Defector Kang Myong-to Reported,” Chungang Ilbo, April 21, 1995, p. 5, as cited
in FBIS-EAS-95-097.
Baird, Merrily. Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Maki ng and North Korea’s Strategic Culture in
Schneider, Barry R. and Je rrold M. Post, editors. Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary
Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: USAF
Counterproliferation Center, July 2003, 2nd Edition), <
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/know_thy_enemy/cover.htm >, accessed
March 28, 2006.
Ball, Desmond. “Strategic Culture in the Asia -Pacific Region,” Security Studies, no. 1 (Autumn
1993), pp. 44-74.
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK (Monterrey:
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterrey Institute for International Studies, Occasional
Paper No. 2, 1999), < http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/index.htm. >
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. and Sharon A. Richardson. A North Korean View on the Development
and Production of Strategic Weapon Systems , in Sokolski, Henry, ed. Planning for a
Peaceful Korea (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001).
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Unconventional Weapons ,
in Wirtz, James, Scott Sagan, and Peter Lavoy, eds. Planning the Unthinkable (Ithaca, New
York: Colombia University Press, 2000).
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. Information and the DPRK’s Military and Power-Holding Elite in
Hassig, Kongdan Oh. North Korean Policy Elites , IDA Paper P-3903 (Alexandria: Institute
for Defense Analyses, June 2004).
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. North Korean Special Forces: Second Edition (Annapolis: U.S. Naval
Institute Press, 1997).
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. SIGINT, EW and EIW in the Korean People’s Army: An Overview of
Development and Organization . This paper was prepared for presentation at the APCSS
conference Bytes and Bullets: Impact of IT Re volution on War and Peace in Korea , 8-10
October 2002, Honolulu, Hawaii.
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. Terrorism: The North Korean Connection (New York: Taylor &
Francis, 1990).
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. The Armed Forces of North Korea (London and New York: I.B. Tauris
Publishers, 2001).
Bracken, Paul. Fire in the East (New York: HarperColl ins Publishers, 1999).
Bradner, Stephen. North Korea’s Strategy, in Sokolski, Henry, ed. Planning for a Peaceful
19

Korea (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001).
Buckley, Sarah. “North Korea’s Secretive ‘First Family’,” BBC News , October 29, 2003,
accessed October 30, 2003, at < http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3203523.stm >,
accessed October 30, 2003.
Buzo, Adrian. The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1999).
Cookson, John and Judith Nottingham, A Survey of Chemical and Biological Warfare (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
Crane, Paul S. Korean Patterns (Seoul: Hollym Corp., 1968).
Cummings, Bruce. “The Corporate Stat e in North Korea,” in Koo, Hagen ed., State and Society
in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 197-230.
“Defector to ROK on Kim Chong-il’ s Control of DPRK Military,” Win, June 1996, pp 161-167,
as cited in FBIS-EAS-96-197.
“Defector to ROK on Kim Chong-il’ s Control of DPRK Military,” Win, June 1996, 161-167, as
cited in FBIS-EAS-96-197.
Defense Intelligence Agency. North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update
1995(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1995), p. 1.
Downs, Chuck. Over the Line, North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy (Washington, D.C., AEI
Press, 1999).
“DPRK ‘Manufactured Nuclear Weapons,’ To ‘Sus pend’ 6-Way Talks for ‘Indefinite Period’,”
Korean Central Broadcasting System , 10 February 2005, as cited in FBIS.
“DPRK’s Kim Chong-il’s Position on Retaliation,” Choson Ilbo, October 17, 1996, pp. 8-11, as
cited in FBIS-EAS-96-231.
Eberstadt, Nicholas. The End of North Korea (Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 1999).
“Ex-DPRK Major Unveils KPA Military Plan,” Pukhan , February 1, 2000, pp. 92-99.
Gause, Kenneth E. The North Korean Leadership: System Dynamics and Fault Lines , in Hassig,
Kongdan Oh. North Korean Policy Elites , IDA Paper P-3903 (Alexandria: Institute for
Defense Analyses, June 2004).
Harris, Sheldon H. Factories of Death: Japanese Biol ogical Warfare 1932-45 and the American
Cover Up (New York: Routledge, 1994).
Hassig, Kongdan Oh. North Korean Policy Elites , IDA Paper P-3903 (Alexandria: Institute for
Defense Analyses, June 2004).
Hodge, Homer T. “North Korea’s Military Strategy,” Parameters , Spring 2003, pp. 68-81
Hunter, Helen-Louise. Kim Il-song’s North Korea (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999).
“Interview with defector Hwa ng Jong Yop [Hwang Jang Yop]: A Rare Portrait Of North Korea,”
Time [Asia] , September 7, 1999, Vol. 152, No. 9, < http://www.time.com/time/asia/ >,
accessed October 23, 2003.
Kim Jong Il’s North Korea Is in Ruins, But Why Should That Spoil His Fun?,” Washington Post ,
20

May 11, 2003, p. D1.
“Kim Jong II Reportedly Feared Being Next Target,” Houston Chronicle , May 12, 2003, p. 12.
Kim, Il-sung. With the Century (People’s Publishing House, Pyongyang: 2003), available in
English from the Korean Friendship Association at < http://www.korea-
dpr.com/library/202.pdf >, accessed April 27, 2006.
Kirk, Don. “Defector: N. Korea Eyes 10 A-Bombs,” Newsday , July 28, 1994, A14.
Lewis, John Wilson and Xue Litai. China Builds the Bomb (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press,
1988).
Maass, Peter. “The Last Emperor,” New York Times Magazine , October 19, 2003, <
www.nytimes.com >, accessed October 20, 2003.
Mansourov, Alexandre Y. Inside North Korea’s Black Box: Reversing the Optics , both in Hassig,
Kongdan Oh. North Korean Policy Elites , IDA Paper P-3903 (Alexandria: Institute for
Defense Analyses, June 2004).
Minnich, James M. The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics (Annapolis,
Naval Institute Press, 2005).
National Intelligence Service. Testimonies of North Korean Defectors , <
http://www.nis.go.kr/app/eng/index >
Natsios, Andrew S. The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, and Foreign Policy
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2001).
“Newspaper Profiles Kim Chong-il’s Supporters,” Sindong-a , February 1994, pp. 421-439, as
cited in FBIS-EAS-94-050.
Noland, Marcus. “North Korean External Economic Relations.” Washington D.C.: Institute for
International Economic Relations , 2001, 6-7.
“North Korean Defectors 27 July New Conference,” Choson Ilbo, 28 July 1994, 3-4, as cited in
FBIS-EAS-94-145, 28 July 1994, 59-63.
“North Korean Defectors 27 July News Conference,” Choson Ilbo, July 28, 1994, pp. 3-4, as
cited in FBIS-EAS-94-145.
Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Basic Books, 2001).
Oh, Kongdan and Ralph C. Hassig. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass (Washington,
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Park, Han S. North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom (Boulder Colorado: Lynne
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Paul Shin, “Korea-Defection,” The Associated Press , September 13, 1991.
Risen, James. “Ex-Inspector Says C.I.A. Missed Disarray in Iraqi Arms Program,” New York
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