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International Studies Capstone R esearch P apers Senior C apstone P apers
4-24-2015
ISIS: Trends in T errorist M edia and P ropaganda
Kyle J. Gr eene
Cedarville U niversity, kylegreene362@gm ail.com
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Greene, Kyle J., "ISIS: Trends in T errorist Media and P ropaganda" (2015). International Studies Capstone Research Papers. 3.
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Running head: ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 1

ISIS: Trends in Terrorist Media and Propaganda
Kyle Greene
Cedarville University

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 2

Abstract
This paper explores the rise of ISIS in the realm of terrorist media and propa ganda. It starts off
by first examining trends and goals in terrorist use of media in the past, with em phasis on al
Qaeda as a particular example. The main differences between al Qaeda and ISIS are reviewed,
before a lengthy exploration of major examples of ISIS propaganda is given. S trategies in the use
of social media are explored, as well as in-depth analysis of several issue s from two online
publications, the Islamic State Report and Dabiq. Several major video releases are also analyzed,
focusing on “Flames of War,” the execution video featuring the immolation of Jordani an pilot Lt.
al-Kaseasbeh, and videos from the series “Lend Me Your Ears” featuring captur ed British
journalist John Cantlie. Finally, trends and themes from these resources are ga thered and
analyzed.
Keywords: media, propaganda, ISIS

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 3

Media and the Islamic State: The Forefront of Muslim Extremist Propag anda

Among current global events and topics in the international community, few have bee n
covered for quite as long and with as much attention as the various rebel uprisings, poli tical
turmoils, and terrorist groups which are establishing themselves across the M iddle East and
Southeast Asia over the past several years. Of particular interest to a cademics and intellectuals in
the western world has been the analysis of the continued refinement in the area o f media and
propaganda techniques used by these extremist organizations. Only five yea rs ago, al Qaeda was
a forerunner at the center of this topic, but now a new group has risen up to rival it with t he
broadest, most sophisticated, and modern propaganda machine at its fingertips. The Is lamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or the Islamic State (IS), now holds a signifi cant portion of the two
countries in its name, and has for the most part held it for over a year now despite a sus tained
bombing effort by coalition forces and enemies on multiple fronts. Now it continues t o draw
personnel, monetary resources, and equipment from around the world, and many experts would
attribute that to the equal emphasis the organization puts on media projection compare d to
military effort. But what is the background of media and propaganda interaction in the realm of
terrorism in the past, and how does the Islamic State differ? What are some e xamples of the extra
efforts which ISIS has utilized in propaganda? How have these methods helped their cause, and
how have they hindered it?
Terrorism and Media in the Past
The Islamic State is certainly not the first extremist organizati on to pursue use of modern
media tools to draw attention towards its agenda. As early as 1999, Hamas began operating the
Palestinian Information Center (PIC) in a variety of languages onli ne, a sort of “gateway”
website which served as a link to other online information sources which cast a favorable light

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 4

on the organization. In a 2010 study, the different versions of the website could be disti nguished
both in their apparent linkage to Hamas, and the amount of violence in the images portra yed
(Jihadist Media, 2014). For example, the English version had no apparent links to the
organization or pictures of extreme graphic nature, while the French version did not at tempt to
hide the Hamas logo or violent pictures at all, and targeted its emotional appea l for vengeance
towards the sizeable minority population of North African immigrants living in the country. In
2008 Hamas launched AqsaTube, a sort of knockoff website based on the functions of YouTube,
but used for sharing jihadist videos (Jihadist Media , 2014) instead. Although authorities forcibly
shut down AqsaTube soon after, it is an instance where one terrorist organizat ion sought to bring
its use of media up to par with modern tools before the rise of the Islamic State overs hadowed it.
But Hamas is just one case. Al Qaeda provides a more opportune and deeper example of a
terrorist organization which utilizes its own local propaganda as well as f oreign media sources to
make its presence known and its voice heard. Before investigating al Qaeda’s pr opaganda
methods, however, it is beneficial to cover the differing perspectives held by te rrorist
organizations in regards to the nature of media in general, as well as past cla ssifications of their
various motivations for its use.
Motivation for Media Coverage
According to a study by Tanja Milosevska and Nenad Taneski (2014), terrorist
organizations do not even need to source their own media in order to use it as a weapon in their
own interest. Indirect use of the public media’s desire to gain viewers often aut omatically draws
nationwide and sometimes even global attention towards small acts of terrorism . The authors
note:

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 5

The structure and competitiveness of the news industry appear to influence medi a
attention to terrorism. As the media environment becomes more decentralized and
competitive, news outlets may try to maintain market share by devoting more at tention to
terrorist attacks that employ novel tactics or that are particularly viol ent. Such a
development could pose new challenges for the media relations of homeland security
agencies by giving the public a distorted picture of the threat from terrorism and reducing
the ability of the authorities to explain their policies and to put the problem of terror ism
in an appropriate context. (Milosevska et al., 2014, p. 58)
Thus, small, individual acts of focused and extreme violence can be used to manipulate
the fears of a large population and turn national policies towards a direction which might favor
them. The public attention is especially favorable for terrorist organiza tions when the groups can
use it to garner sympathizers who otherwise would never have given support, as has bee n the
case with the Islamic State (Milosevska et al., 2014, p. 58).
The symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media. It is no news that
terrorism and the media have a particular symbiotic relationship. As revea led in the information
just discussed, the two entities can both directly and indirectly feed off of e ach other, especially
as mainstream news media is more often than not drawn to violence (Torres Sor iano, 2008, p. 3).
In their study, Milosevska et al. found several relevant models to classify th e various type of
relationships seen between terrorism and the media. In the first model, the media encourage more
terrorist attacks to occur by reporting on them. Labeled the “culpable-media m odel,” this trend
places part of the fault in terrorism on the media, as terrorists would have less of a motivation to
go to such drastic measures if they knew it would be less consequential in the public’s eyes
(Milosevska et al., 2014, p. 59). This model is probably more accurate when applied to “lone

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 6

wolf” terrorist attacks, as opposed to acts which are carried out by ideologica lly motivated
terrorist organizations which may or may not have carried out their attacks re gardless.
The “vulnerable media model” is a second model, which acknowledges the difficult
position the media is placed in when a terrorist attack is carried out (Milosevska e t al., 2014, p.
59). In a reality where multiple decentralized and independent media agenci es compete, one
television station may choose to not cover an attack, but will lose viewers to all of t he others that
still do. This is especially the case in western countries which hold a high value for free speech,
and governments do not hold a heavy hand of censorship. In such scenarios, the media has to
make the difficult choice between being perceived as “covering up” a piece of important news by
not reporting it, or giving terrorists a voice.
Models of behavior towards the media by terrorists. Another notable section of the
study listed the differences in perspectives and attitudes seen by terrori sts held towards external
media. First is that of “complete indifference.” As noted earlier, act ions which sensitive cultures
view as terrorism can be disregarded by ideologically or locally motivate d groups which simply
do not care what the rest of the world thinks about their actions, and hold different views as t o
the methods of conducting their wars, politics, or civil governorship practices. Second is the
position of “relative indifference,” where “terrorists are not concerned w ith being on the news,
even though they are conscious of the power that explaining their cause in currently existing
media can provide them” (Milosevska et al., 2014, p. 60). Thirdly is the “media-oriented
strategy,” where terrorists are aware of the media’s impact on their go als, and alter their actions
in order to affect political changes in their favor through either indirect or di rect manipulation of
the press. Both al Qaeda and ISIS strongly operate according to a media-ori ented strategy. Lastly
is the “complete breakaway” attitude, where terrorists “see journalist s and reporters as enemies

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 7

that must be destroyed, putting them on the same level as other direct adversarie s.” As the
authors agree, it does not take long investigation into terrorist activities to re alize that terrorist
organizations do not have to fall into individual categories, but can either shift between t hem as
time progresses or share multiple perspectives simultaneously (Milosevs ka et al., 2014 p. 60).
Al Qaeda
When investigating use of media and propaganda by the Islamic State, al Qa eda provides
the best example for a specific terrorist organization to compare to, as this group and its various
offshoots have long held similar goals and derive from an extremist version of funda mentalist
Islam. Al Qaeda has also been at the top of NATO’s list of enemies in the war against terrorism
for the past decade. Before ISIS, this terror group also had perhaps one of the best known
“organized” media fronts, including heavy influence of messaging through its media arm known
as “as-Sahab” (Seib, 2008). As-Sahab grew steadily throughout its operati ons during the last
decade. It is reported to have released “16 videos during 2005, 58 in 2006, and produced more
than 90 in 2007” (Seib, 2008, p. 74). Most of these videos are available to watch on the internet.
But as-Sahab is just one piece of al Qaeda’s propaganda network. An organizati on called the
Global Islamic Media Front also operates under their influence, and has create d documentaries
such as “Jihad Academy” which film such things as the assemblage of IEDs, a s well as speeches
reasoning jihadist’s motivations to fight the United States and other allied forc es. An online
magazine called Zurwat al-Sanam (The Tip of the Camel’s Hump) was started by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi in 2007 (Seib, 2008) and many other decentralized offshoots have hosted other media
products related to al Qaeda’s cause and operations. In analyzing the various sources of media
used by al Qaeda, researchers have come up with several apparent strategie s and themes used by
the organization in their propaganda.

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 8

Strategy characteristics. Carl J. Ciovacco at Harvard University formed a list of nine
strategy characteristics perceived being used by al Qaeda in media publications from
organization head leadership leading up to 2009, specifically focusing on speeches and medi a
releases by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri (Ciovacco, 2009). The study concluded
that:
1. Al Qaeda’s top leadership exploits local sensitivities with tailored sta tements for
specific audiences around the world. (Top al Qaeda leadership refers to Osama bin
Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.)
2. Anniversaries serve as “message projection opportunities” for al Qaeda’s c ause.
3. Al Qaeda’s top leadership emphasizes Koranic and historical justification to pr ovide
legitimacy for its actions.
4. Seven platform themes are reinforced in nearly all media releases. In des cending
order of frequency as observed in media releases, these themes are: call to j ihad,
clash of civilizations, United States–Israel connection, Muslim unity, Unite d States
is weakening, apostate Muslim leaders are betraying Islam, United State s is stealing
Muslim oil.
5. Release timing trends show that the time interval between a geopolitical event
of significance and subsequent media release is shorter following an al Qaeda
“loss” than an al Qaeda “win.” Following geopolitical events that tend to hurt Al
Qaeda’s cause (loss), bin Laden and Zawahiri release transmissions soone r than
after geopolitical events that tend to favor al Qaeda’s cause (win).
6. Al Qaeda’s top leadership attempts to prompt local al Qaeda affiliates int o action
by providing specific guidance in their media releases. The efficacy of the se “calls

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 9

to arms” is fairly high with a strong correlation between initial guidance a nd a
resulting attack.
7. Al Qaeda’s top leadership attempts to influence American foreign policy wit h
targeted messages directed toward Americans at critical moments in time .
8. Video releases are normally of greater significance than audio recordings, a lthough
this disparity is decreasing with al-Sahab’s direct posting of videos to the Internet.
9. The degree of top al Qaeda involvement in an attack and the actual results of the
attack itself figure prominently in whether bin Laden or Zawahiri ultimate ly claim
responsibility. (Ciovacco, 2009, p. 868-869)
Of these nine characteristics to the al Qaeda voice in media, perhaps the mo st important
to understand when comparing the organization to one like ISIS are the seven platform themes
under characteristic four on the list, as the majority of these themes are ve ry often seen repeated
in other Muslim extremist groups, and continue to be seen in themes used in propaganda by the
Islamic State. In the case of al Qaeda, the most important recurrent the me was that of a call to
jihad, using the Quran as a basis. As for the clash of civilizations, their messa ges make clear that
the Islamic world and the culture of the Western world are incompatible, and this incompatibility
is what is leading to current conflicts. This second theme leads naturally int o the third, which
denounces as apostates the many Muslim leaders who take a more moderate stanc e and do not
support acts of terrorism and violence in jihad. They have renounced their duty to the fai th as
interpreted in the scriptures. The fourth most stated theme, which brings up the connect ion
between the United States and Israel, helps carry Muslim audiences back to the first theme, that
of jihad. According to Zawahiri’s book, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner ,

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 10

the one slogan that has been well understood by the [Muslim] nation and to which it has
been responding for the past fifty years is the call for jihad against Is rael. In addition to
this slogan, the nation in this decade is geared against the U.S. presence. It ha s responded
favorably to the call for the jihad against the Americans. (Ciovacco, 2009, p. 858)
Once convinced of the need for jihad against the State of Israel, it is a short st ep away to
be swayed into believing in the need to fight the United States as well, especial ly with how easy
it is to convince said persons with the belief that the initial and continued establishme nt of the
Israeli State was impossible without US intervention and support. The fifth theme, M uslim unity,
is used with the support of Islamic scripture to reinforce it. The continued clai m that the United
States is weakening as a world power is a necessary one, and whether tru e or not, is used to
encourage both jihadi morale and will to fight, as well as to encourage would-be r ecruits
regarding the viability of their end goal. Lastly, the theme that the United S tates is “stealing”
Muslim oil is the least used because it is already so prevalent around the world even i n western
media. The truth behind many of the claims made in these seven themes is irrel evant in real-
world outcomes, as it is the believability of the claims which makes the most change in the social
sphere.
ISIS Differs From al Qaeda in its Propaganda
While both al Qaeda and ISIS are ideologically and religiously motivated b y Islam,
further investigation reveals that there exist quite a few differences, a nd even hostility, between
them. A visible split occurred when Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of what was the n called
ISIS, declared the insurgent and terrorist group Jabhat al Nusra li Ahl al Sham t o be subordinate
to him in April 2013 (Barrett, 2014, p. 12). This did not go over well with al Nusra’s leader, A bu
Mohammed al Golani, and Abu Bakr betrayed his true connections to al Qaeda when he

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 11

requested for bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to make a ruling on the s ituation. This
did not work in his favor however, and Abu Bakr officially broke off connections between I SIS
and al Qaeda in February 2014 (Barrett, 2014, p. 13). On June 29, 2014, Abu Bakr announced
the reestablishment of an Islamic Caliphate, with himself as the elect ed Caliph. Barrett says,
“The declaration was also a direct challenge to the authority of Zawahir i and the role of Mullah
Omar, who until then had been the undisputed Amir al Mu’minin (Leader of the Faithful)”
(2014, p. 13). Not only was this an attempt to draw away recruits from al Nusra and al Q aeda,
but showed that the groups did not have quite the same goals. This also opened the door for more
public criticism between the groups, especially when it came to differen ces in media preferences.
Al Qaeda has banned beheading of captives. One area in which ISIS visibly differs
from Al Qaeda is its penchant for beheadings and public executions. The filmed exe cutions of
American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff in 2014 were not the last to be used as
propaganda by ISIS, and were just a small example of the multiple executions w hich they
perform daily. With its extreme, publicized brutality and acts of violence, even ma ny Arab
Muslims who support organizations like Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood hold an
unfavorable view of ISIS. In a poll by The Washington Institute in Egypt, Saudi Ar abia, and
Lebanon,
only 5 percent of Saudis and 3 percent of Egyptians expressed a favorable opinion of
ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham). In Lebanon, not one Christian, Shi ite, or
Druze respondent expressed a positive view of ISIS, and only 1 percent of Sunnis
expressed approval of the Sunni jihadist group that has overrun portions of neighboring
Syria and Iraq. (Parker, 2014)

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 12

Al Qaeda realizes realities such as this, and in an effort to disassociate itself and maintain
a “good” image in the Muslim world, it banned beheadings in late 2014. Nasr Ibn Ali al-Ans i, a
senior spokesman for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), made this clea r in a press
interview soon after. Some of his most notable comments include calling the beheading s
“barbaric,” and that “filming and promoting it [beheadings] among people in the name of Islam
and jihad is a big mistake and not acceptable whatever the justifications are… Shei k Osama bin
Laden used to say anyone with sound instincts cannot stand watching scenes of killing s” (Masi,
2014). He went on to say, “Therefore, I assert that whoever does such actions [beheadings ], he
has violated the command of Sheikh Osama” (Coghlan, 2014). Is this new policy sincer e on the
part of al Qaeda? Most likely it is simply a political move, as al Qaeda has be en known to film
its beheadings of western captives before on multiple occasions, including Ame rican journalist
Daniel Pearl in 2002 (Masi, 2014). However, al Qaeda’s leadership does not see this as t he
correct way to move forward now, at least publicly, and the new policy serves as an example of a
source of tension between them and the Islamic State.
Key distinctions in social media already noted by journalists. Journalists have already
noted a few other major differences in use of social media by ISIS and al Qaeda for propaganda
purposes. While separate writers will point out different individual details , most of the primary
differences can be combined into three main distinctions, as Laura Ryan outline s in “Al-Qaida
and ISIS Use Twitter Differently. Here’s How and Why” (2014). Essential ly, the differences
come down to the fact that ISIS more effectively gains new recruits by use of social media, takes
advantage of newer web platforms, and glorifies extreme violence to a level w hich arguably is
without modern precedent. According to Ryan,

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 13

both groups use social media to target and recruit foreigners, but ISIS is much bet ter at it.
The number of Westerners fighting alongside ISIS in Syria and Iraq could numbe r in the
thousands, thanks in large part to Twitter and Facebook, and this spooks the West”
(2014).
Use of the newest social media platforms enables ISIS to reach out to the young, m ore
impressionable age groups, which also happen to be more desirable because of their fi ghting age.
In addition, every new recruit gained through social media becomes an additional as set in their
propaganda campaign, as “the American public is most familiar with ISIS’ s graphic images, but
recruits also share messages and images of daily life in Syria as pea ceful, purposeful, and
orderly” (Ryan, 2014). The “newness” of the nature of social media such as Twitte r and
Facebook also enables IS recruits to network with others and become unified, in contras t to al
Qaeda’s strategy to create worldwide “lone wolf” terrorists through it s media such as online
magazine Inspire , founded by Anwar al-Awlaki before he was killed by a US drone strike. For
example, the twelfth issue of Inspire, published in spring 2014, contained instructions on how to
make a car bomb out of basic household items, and another issue was used as a source of
inspiration for the bombers at the April 2013 marathon in Boston (Ryan, 2014). Essentially, thi s
comes down to a difference in tactics between the two organizations. While al Qae da focuses on
the “far enemy,” such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and other “crus ader” states,
the Islamic State currently focuses on the “near enemy,” located in pla ces such as the Syrian and
Iraqi governments, the Kurds, and “apostate” Shia Muslims.
As for online video sharing websites such as YouTube, both organizations routinely
upload their own propaganda videos. But those of ISIS are far more blatantly violent, whil e al
Qaeda’s restrain themselves. “For ISIS, all attention is good attention… Whi le most people react

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 14

with disgust to ISIS’s graphic videos, there are some who are inspired by it—a nd that is exactly
whom the group is trying to reach” (Ryan, 2014). As was said earlier, al Qaeda shows m ore
visible concern with presenting a palpatable image to the Muslim world. As for ISI S, they seem
to be either so entirely ideologically driven that they just don’t care, or it i s a part of their overall
recruitment strategy, as many journalists speculate. “They’re a bit mad to post video and photo
of executions. But it’s their way of showing they’re more daring, more extr eme, than anyone
else,” said Ghafar Hussain in an interview to NBC News (Pepitone, 2014). Some analy sts
speculate that it is a tactic mainly meant to draw recruits from foreig n nations. Charles Lister
from the Brookings Institute’s Doha Center told reporters, “By underlining a sense of constant
progress and success, ISIS can challenge the viability and value of rival movem ents” (Pepitone,
2014). If so, it appears that has been successful, at least in the area of stealing recruits. ISIS has
already gathered many of its fighters from al Nusra and other rebel groups who were previously
fighting in Syria in order to redirect them towards their main target of I raq (Barrett, 2014, p. 13).
Main Outlets of ISIS Propaganda
It is already apparent that the Islamic State has become a new phenomenon i n the world
of terrorist propaganda and media production. But what are some examples of ways in whi ch the
organization has either surpassed its competitors in this area, and in which it stands out for use of
ingenuity? What are a few of the biggest actions taken in this area so far by IS IS, and why are
they notable? Although the Islamic State is far spread in the diversity of i ts media campaign, in
this study, we will examine three core areas of propaganda aimed at the We st. These will consist
of social media, hard copy, and video sources, and set the stage for a further evalua tion of trends
in ISIS media which can be assessed on their own level.

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 15

Social Media
Outside of social media sites such as Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram, Twi tter is
considered to be one of the largest sources of decentralized media and propaganda output by the
Islamic State (Vitale, Keagle, 2014, p. 7). They are not alone in this, as most other terrorist
organizations make wide use of the tool as well (Altman, 2014). The main appeal to mil itants
towards using Twitter, however, is how it is so difficult for both site and governmenta l
authorities to permanently eliminate extremist messages. As soon as one ac count is shut down or
a post is blocked, the same message or post will spark up on several others (Altman, 2014). I n
one example case with the hour long video “Flames of War,” links were
tweeted out to tens of thousands of online supporters, who then re-tweeted the links, and,
importantly, created new pages and links on justpaste.it. The video was also uploaded to
YouTube on many accounts in order to overcome the inevitable suppression of the video
for violating YouTube standards of use. Just one randomly selected page promoting the
video among dozens of others, recorded 18,034 views within seven hours on 18
September 2014, showing the ease, breadth, and speed with which The Islamic State i s
able to spread its message directly to the intended audience. The problems of censor ing
such a decentralized distribution system were well illustrated by the two d ays it took the
mainstream social media to notice what was happening. (Barrett, 2014, p. 51-52)
Posts can include memes, photos, or links to videos showing progress by ISIS in Iraq and
Syria. Sometimes, posts will show cartoons.
A popular tactic to spread ISIS propaganda across social media is to use “twit ter bombs,”
which target the most popular hashtags of the week and use them in IS-related posts , thereby
gaining a larger audience. And “most pages owned or related to The Islamic St ate tend to follow

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 16

each other, so that the number of tweets and readings increases more rapidly” (B arrett, 2014, p.
55). When not “twitter bombing” and hijacking other conversations, hashtags will read as l ines
such as “#Baghdad_is_liberated” and “#Iraq_is_liberated” (Irshaid, 2014). On June 20 th of 2014,
ISIS also launched a local Twitter campaign in which it requested that support ers film
themselves waving the ISIS flag, hash tagging in Arabic, “#theFridayofsuppor tingISIS” (Irshaid,
2014). Many times, thousands of ISIS supporters will simultaneously coordinate t o post many
tweets featuring the same hashtag, and repeat this throughout the day so as to ge nerate a larger
online presence than the number of supporters actually is (Berger, 2014). Up until June 13, 2014,
Al I’tisam operated as the most important page on Twitter controlled by ISI S. At the time it was
shut down, the page had at least 50,000 followers, most of which just went on to continue
obtaining and sharing ISIS propaganda through other channels. Despite the low impact w hich the
closure of Al I’tisam had, however, “one supporter of The Islamic State was s ufficiently
incensed by the closure of accounts in September 2014 as to threaten lethal retali ation against
Twitter employees” (Barrett, 2014, p. 54). In addition, as sites like Twitter have started cracking
down on IS-related content more and more, “other less known social media platforms such a s
Quitter and Diaspora are increasingly used by The Islamic State to bro adcast its messages”
(Barrett, 2014, p. 54).
One of the ways in which ISIS has tried to create mass tweets was through the “Dawn of
Good Tidings” app for Android and PC, which came out in April 2014 and was taken down from
the Google Play store on June 19 th of that same year (Marks, 2014). In addition to obtaining
access to the user’s photo and media files, Wi-Fi connection information, and other person al
information, the app had the ability to remotely post tweets from the user’s acc ount on their
behalf and without their interaction. This allowed the app’s owners to decide what conte nt to

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 17

send and when to post it across “Dawn’s” user base. The brilliant part about the “Dawn o f Good
Tidings” app, however, is that it was programmed to randomly select only a portion of app
owners’ Twitter accounts to post from at a time, thereby circumventing Twitt er’s spam detection
(Berger, 2014).
Magazine and Hard Copy Propaganda
Social media is not the only media front on which the Islamic State fights its propaganda
war. Perhaps the most influential establishment in terms of targeting its western audience is the
Al Hayat Media Center (Barrett, 2014, p. 55). Along with creating many of the offic ial messages
which are shared on social media sites like YouTube and Twitter, Al Hayat is re sponsible for
publishing online newspapers and magazines in a variety of languages other than Arabic ,
including English. While Al I’tisam and Al Furqan also serve as “official” ISIS channels for
media distribution, Al Hayat provides arguably the most lengthy and polished of propa ganda in
foreign languages. This includes a six page pdf file version of a newspaper cal led the Islamic
State News , or ISN, as well as a short magazine named the Islamic State Report , or ISR. Both
sources provide regular updates on ISIS progress and important events occurr ing in Syria and
Iraq. In addition, Al Hayat started producing a much more lengthy digital maga zine called Dabiq
in July 2014 (Barrett, 2014, p. 56). All of these publications are dated according to the Isla mic
calendar, as opposed to the Gregorian one. In this section, we will explore the first couple issues
of the Islamic State Report , but spend the most time digging into the content of Dabiq .
The Islamic State Report . There can be no mistake that Al Hayat is behind the
publishing of the Islamic State Report . At the top right corner of each issue in bold white, capital
letters against a black background lie the words “Al Hayat Media Center.” It i s meant to be a
very colorful, visually appealing, and professionally organized newspaper. High def inition

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 18

photographs plaster the backgrounds of most pages, with boxes of text covering them. Each i ssue
is six to seven pages long, and focuses on current events in the war in Iraq, explains the goal s of
the Islamic State, why it is justified in its cause, and what it is doing to get t here. An effort is
made to show readers why and how the Islamic State is making the places it cont rols a better
place for the people living there, even as it slaughters those who do not live up to its st rict
religious ideology. The magazine also places emphasis on spreading a “corre ct” version of Islam.
The first issue of the ISR is a great example of the effort Al Hayat is m aking to explain
its ideology and present a good image in the area of governorship. It contains only tw o articles,
entitled “Propagating the Correct Manhaj” and “Consumer Protection” (Propa gating the Correct,
2014). Scholars and politicians may debate as to what represents the “correct” view of Islam, but
ISIS has decided to enforce its interpretation of scriptures such as the Quran and Hadith in the
areas it controls through force. It also makes clear that motivation for the m ovement is entirely
founded in its religious beliefs. The first page of the magazine reads:
Spreading Islamic knowledge, correcting the people’s understanding of the rel igion, and
clarifying the truth are all from among the most important goals of the Isl amic State of
Iraq and Shaam… All this in order to clarify the fundamental truth on account of which
the heavens and the earth were established, for which the Messengers were sent, and
which many men have fought to establish, proving truthful to their covenant with Allah.
This fundamental truth is Tawheed – worshipping none but Allah, may He be glorified .
(“Propagating the Correct,” 2014).
In keeping with this stated motivation, the article goes on to detail a seminar which was
held just days before the publishing. “I’m happy to inform you that we now have 45 imams
who’ve participated with us in the seminar, all of whom will be giving bay’ah (al legiance) within

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 19

the next few days, insha’allah (if God wills),” a quote box on the side of the second page r eads
(Propagating the Correct, 2014). From the article, the reader will find tha t seminars such as this
one are based on a new book called “The Essence of Islam: Tawheed (the Onene ss of Allah) and
the Message.” In essence, such seminars are meant to educate new imams (I slamic leaders) and
khateebs to teach and lead the people according to the religious doctrine of the Isl amic State. The
article continues by answering potential questions that readers might have suc h as: What kind of
work will they [attendees] do after graduating from the seminar? Who is respons ible for funding
the mosques, and the salaries of the teachers and khateebs? When will the third semi nar take
place? The authors do not want the reader to take their word for it that the seminar w as beneficial
and of great spiritual value; a quote sits next to the article, taken from an anon ymous sheikh who
attended the religious seminar: I will sum up the benefit with just a few words: “I feel like
someone who has come out of darkness into light, out of fire into Jannah (paradise), and out of
kufr (disbelief, blasphemy) into imaan (belief)” (Propagating the Correct , 2014).
The second article in the magazine seeks to put forth the image the Islamic State cares
about the welfare of the people of Iraq and consists largely of an interview wit h Abu Salih Al-
Ansari, “the head of the [newly created] Consumer Protection Office” (“ Propagating the
Correct,” 2014). It starts off,
Caring for the residents of Wilayat Ar-Raqqah is a goal of the Islamic S tate, and because
of this, the Islamic State sought to open service offices all over the wilaya h through an
Islamic services committee comprised of multiple departments, among whic h is the
Consumer Protection Office.” (Propagating the Correct, 2014).
For further the effect, the article contains photographs of ISIS workers completing
bookkeeping operations, as well as of inspectors in white robes conducting physical

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 20

investigations. According to the interview, these inspectors are meant to make s ure that no
spoiled foods are being sold at market, slaughterhouses are free of “harmful substances,” and that
everything proceeds in according to the edicts of Islam. “We will soon be holding a s eminar, bi
idhnillah, to teach the proper Islamic method of slaughter,” Al-Ansari adds (“Propa gating the
Correct,” 2014, p. 5). Undoubtedly, checks for “harmful substances” at market would include the
prohibition of things like alcohol, drugs, and cigarettes, and Al-Ansari (2014) says that t here will
be “surprise inspections on a daily basis at varying times” (p. 5). To the outside reader, it may
become quickly obvious that this type of propaganda is meant to present a positive ima ge of
health and welfare, when in fact ISIS is making way for an institutionalized w ay to control each
facet of everyday life according to its own interpretation of Shariah (Islam ic) law.
The effort to put forth a positive face floods into the second issue of Islamic State Report
as well, which primarily focuses on the giving of “Zakah” (also known as Za kat, one of the five
pillars of Islam), as well as attempting to put good light on the new IS police which patrol Ar-
Raqqah. It consists mainly of captions next to pictures of workers operating John D eer
harvesters, and piles of bags of food alleged to be donated to the poor and needy. The first
caption, set against a backdrop of bags of food, reads, “The residents of some of the villa ges
voluntarily gathered the Zakah and piled it up in front of the masjids of their respect ive villages
and invited the Zakah committees to come and collect it” (Farmers Reap, 2014, p. 1). F urther
down, however, is a picture captioned “Informing the Community: At the start of the seas on,
land owners were informed of the obligation to pay Zakah, which would be collected by t he
Islamic State” (Farmers Reap, 2014, p. 3). The impression is intended to be given that since ISIS
control, members of the community have been eagerly volunteering to donate thei r crops
according to Islamic law, but it is no surprise that the civilian populace woul d give up its

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 21

earnings to a heavily armed militia known for brutally killing all opposition. T here is also little
outside confirmation that all of this Zakah is actually going to the people it is c laimed to be
meant for, rather than to ISIS fighters.
The second issue of Islamic State Report does not stay on the topic of food aid for long.
The last third of the magazine issue seeks to transform the image of the IS police force in Raqqah
from one of conquerors and occupiers to that of protectors and insurers of justice. The plight of
enslaved and murdered Shia Muslim, Christian, and other minorities at the hands of the Islamic
State is nowhere to be seen, instead replaced with pleasant sounding descriptions s uch as the
following:
They [Islamic police] break up disputes and return the rights of the people back to them ,
so no one who’s oppressive is free to behave arrogantly and no one who’s oppressed feels
helpless. They view everyone equally, like the teeth of a comb, with no difference
between rich and poor, strong and weak. Everyone will have their rights returned to them,
and anyone oppressed will have their complaint answered. The people are confident i n
their ability to show justice, and turn to them for help after Allah. (Farmers Reap, 2014,
p. 5).
It is incredibly ironic that an organization known to be enforcing the selling of captur ed
young women and children as sex slaves would write such an article about itself; the description
very well describes the opposite of reports flowing out of the region (Nebehay, 2015). Not only
is reality on the ground a very twisted version of ISIS reports, but the UN has now re ceived
reports that “children, especially children who are mentally challenged… ha ve been used as
suicide bombers, most probably without them even understanding” (Nebehay, 2015). In light of

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 22

these daily events, it would be almost laughable to read such statements about equal ity and
justice as the one above, were not the situation so grim.
Dabiq. Dabiq is a far more fleshed out and informative example of ISIS propaganda in
digital magazine format. It was given its name after a physical locat ion which bears the same
name. According to the introduction in the first issue, “The Return of the Khilafah,”
This place was mentioned in a hadith describing some of the events of the Malahim (what
is sometimes referred to as Armageddon in English). One of the greates t battles between
the Muslims and the crusaders will take place near Dabiq. (The Return of Khi lafah, 2014,
p. 4)
The magazine is standardized, with each issue containing “photo reports, curre nt events,
and informative articles on matters related to the Islamic State” (Th e Return of Khilafah, 2014, p.
3). It is meant to be a final product based on the previous Islamic State Report , and runs about
forty to fifty pages, rather than the previous six to eight. The same style is maintained as before,
with high definition photos taking up sizeable portions of each page. However, Dabiq contains
much more detailed and lengthy articles, rather than just interviews and short descriptions
captioned next to photos.
A noticeable aspect of Dabiq are the recurring sections in each issue which deal with
theology. These sections usually coincide with a green background, and although some times the
articles are more political than religious, there is never a separation of the two in terms of
practical application. To give an example of the kinds of articles these sec tions contain, the first
issue of Dabiq features a ten page article titled “The Concept of Imamah (Leadership) is from the
Millah (Path) of Ibrahim (Abraham)” (The Return of Khilafah, 2014, p. 20-29). This a rticle
focuses on using the traditional Islamic stories of Abraham to spin the concept behind the

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 23

Islamic State’s version of righteousness, stating that part of Abraham’s gift of leadership was
that his descendants would also share in that position of leadership in the world. But, says t he
article, “Allah informed him of a principle condition that must be present in anyone assuming
this position after him. {[Allah) said, ‘My covenant does not include the wrongdoers.’}” ( The
Return of Khilafah, 2014, p. 23). From this point, the article goes on to teach how religious
leadership is inseparable from political leadership, thus fitting in wit h ISIS’ goal of
reestablishing an Islamic Caliphate. It also attempts to justify t he killing of Muslims who go
against this new leadership as “apostates,” saying,
We will continue to obey the imam as long as he orders us to obey Ar-Rahman (the Most
Merciful). But if he orders us to disobey Allah, then we won’t obey those orders.
Likewise, we will strike the neck of anyone – whoever he may be – that attempts t o usurp
his leadership. (The Return of Khilafah, 2014, p. 29)
Multiple issues and articles from Dabiq reinforce ISIS’ proposed vision of a world with
no moral “gray zone” or “freedom of choice” in the realm of religion. The main a rticle from
Issue 2, “It’s Either the Islamic State or the Flood,” uses the story of Nuh (N oah) to make its
point. It lambasts both Islamic scholars and religious teachers from the othe r two Judeo-Christian
faiths who teach that “no one has the right, regardless of whom he may be, to impose any creed
or set of morals on anyone else even if that creed or set of morals is the truth r evealed by Allah
(God)” (The Flood, 2014, p. 5). Its author goes on to say that “every time [religious] c hoice is
allowed it will result in misguidance, either in the present or in the future” ( The Flood, 2014, p.
5). The belief that religious scriptures are unquestionably correct and must be followed
unanimously by all in society is central. Also,

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 24

the da’wah of Prophet N ūh (‘alayhis-sal ām) followed a policy from the very beginning
that was completely opposed to the methodology of choice. In fact, it was characte rized
in contrast to this by a frank, early warning of the consequence of deviation and
opposition to the truth. (The Flood, 2014, p. 6)
“It’s Either the Islamic State or the Flood” also questions the view that re ligious change
must always be peaceful, containing an entire section labeled, “The Flood is a R efutation of the
Pacifists (p. 9). This section argues that the flood was a physical punishment wroug ht in this life
in addition to the flames of hell in the afterlife, and that it stands as an example t hat using force
and fear tactics on wrongdoers is a perfectly legitimate way to scare the ot hers still living into
turning towards the “correct” path found in Islam.
This theme of violence being used to spread religion is also found blatantly express ed in
an Issue 7 article named “Islam is the Religion of the Sword Not Pacifism” (From Hypocrisy,
2015, p. 20). It directly attacks the mantra “Islam is the religion of peace” wi th the assertion that
“Allah has revealed Islam to be the religion of the sword, and the evidence for this i s so profuse
that only a zind īq (heretic) would argue otherwise” (p. 20). To support this, it quotes that Al ī Ibn
Ab ī T ālib, Muhammad’s cousin and son in law, said
Allah’s Messenger (sallall āhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) was sent with four swords: a sword for
the mushrik īn,{And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the mushrik īn
wherever you find them} [At-Tawbah: 5], a sword for Ahlul-Kit āb, {Fight those who do
not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what Alla h and
His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth from those
who were given the Book – [fight them] until they give the jizyah willingly w hile they
are humbled} [At-Tawbah: 29]. (From Hypocrisy, 2015, p. 20-21)

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 25

Likewise, such an enthusiastic view of violence means that the authors of Dabiq do not
shy away from portraying violent and grisly photos in their magazine issues. I n addition to
featuring pictures of ISIS fighters in combat, Al Hayat authors make sure to show pictures of
killed or maimed civilians as victims of the Assad government, Iraqi, US, and coali tion forces. A
particular focus on young children is made in order to elicit an emotional response. E mphasis is
habitually made on how ISIS’ enemies target civilians, with pictures capt ioned by text explaining
how ISIS retaliated against military targets instead.
One of the most profound recurring sections throughout all issues of Dabiq surveyed for
this paper is a section titled “The Islamic State in the Words of the Enemy.” Thi s section is an
example of how ISIS attempts to puts itself on a pedestal using words quoted from w estern
leaders such as Senator John McCain, President Barack Obama, former Secret ary of Defense
Chuck Hagel, and Benjamin Netanyahu. The first issue, published in conjunction with IS IS’
declaration of a new caliphate, strives to add legitimacy to that declaration in its “Words of the
Enemy” section, supporting the announcement with quotes from Douglas A. Ollivant and Bri an
Fishman’s article, “The Reality of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syr ia” (2014). Quotes include
small excerpts like “The group [IS] does not have safe haven within a state. I t is a de facto state
that is a safe haven” (The Return of Khilafah, 2014, p. 33), and
ISIS no longer exists in small cells that can be neutralized by missil es or small groups of
commandos. It is now a real, if nascent and unrecognized, state actor – more akin in an
organization and power to the Taliban of the late 1990s than Al Qaeda.
In the sixth issue of Dabiq , “The Islamic State in the Words of the Enemy” features an
excerpt from former US Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, who allegedly was asked in an

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 26

interview, “The question is do we have the will and the capacity to influence the event s as we
used to?” (Al-Qaidah of Waziristan, 2014, p. 57) He is quoted:
I think it isn’t so much the will, I don’t think. I think our capacity is different because the
threats and the challenges are far more diffuse and varied. I talked about as ymmetric
threats. I mean the sophistication of ISIL – just take that for a moment. We’ve ne ver seen
an organization like ISIL that is so well-organized, so well-trained, so well-f unded, so
strategic, so brutal, so completely ruthless. We’ve never seen anything quite like that in
one institution. Then they blend in ideology which will eventually lose, we get that, and
social media. The sophistication of their social media program is something that we’ ve
never seen before. You blend all of that together, that is an incredibly powerful new
threat. So we’re adjusting to this and we’re trying to – we can’t do it alone. (Al- Qaidah of
Waziristan, 2014, p. 57)
Similarly, issue seven features a quote from British journalist and “crusader ” Patrick
Cockburn, taken from his article “Isis hostage crisis: Militant group stands strong as its
numerous enemies fail to find a common plan to defeat it” (2015). Dabiq quotes Cockburn:
Isis is surviving attempts to defeat it and holds about the same amount of territory in Iraq
and Syria – an area larger than Great Britain – as it did at the end of its blitzkr ieg
offensives last year. Its enemies are numerous, but disunited and without a common pla n.
Neither the Iraqi nor the Syrian armies, its chief military opponents, are s trong enough to
over-run the jihadi state. (From Hypocrisy, 2015, p. 52)
What is important to note here is that ISIS has been making a concerted effort not only to
elevate itself through the comments of important western leaders and spokespe ople, but is also
very aware of how the rest of the world perceives it. It also quickly becomes evide nt that the

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 27

organization continues to act with no apparent concern for those perceptions. Each insult i t
receives from the outside world, it either turns around towards its enemies in order to unveil their
hypocrisy, or self-justifies by reasoning through the lense of religious dogma.
Pamphlets. Hard-copy propaganda extends outside the realm of the Islamic State Report ,
Dabiq , and other similar magazines and newspapers. In August of 2014, supporters of ISIS in
London are reported to have handed out leaflets and fliers pushing for all Muslims in t he area to
move to the areas in Iraq and Syria controlled by the organization. Titled “The Khil afah Has
Been Reestablished,” these fliers quoted Quran 24:55 as a motivation to do so, with some
claiming that “abandonment of Shariah” and “manmade law” were the cause of the fall of the
original Caliphate in 1924, but its reestablishment in 2014 is cause for a new call to uni fication
of Muslims worldwide. According to the New York Daily News, various passerb y were also
verbally threatened by the people handing out the pamphlets, with one allegedly being told she
was one of the “kuffar (kufr; nonbelievers)” and “should be killed like those Christi ans and
Muslims in Iraq” (Edelman, 2014). This shows that the realm of ISIS-related medi a and
propaganda is not limited to the online world, but has begun taking small steps in the direct ion of
face-to-face interaction in countries outside of Iraq and Syria as well, incl uding in the streets of
western countries like the United Kingdom.
Video
While the production and use of propaganda videos very much coincides with and is
spread through social media tools such as YouTube and Twitter, it is such a big part of ISIS’
media campaign that it very much deserves its own segment in this paper. Some of the ir most
well known videos include Abu Bakr’s declaration of a new Caliphate in July 2014, American
Journalist Stephen Sotloff’s beheading the following September, and a series cal led

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 28

“Mujatweets” (Barrett, 2014, p. 51-55). Others include an hour long documentary calle d “The
Flames of War” aimed at intimidating the West, as well as a twenty-minute video leading up to
the execution of Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh. Another series of videos which have be en
widely viewed in the West were produced by Al Hayat and made use of captured Br itish
journalist John Cantlie. While the videos produced and shared by ISIS are many and incr ease
weekly, perhaps the best examples to examine in detail are “The Flame s of War,” the video
featuring the immolation of al-Kasasbeh, and the John Cantlie videos.
The Flames of W ar. “The Flames of War” is one of the very biggest Al Hayat video
productions. Produced in September 2014, this video made full use of an anonymous narrator,
who because of his flawless English helped make the video a huge talking piece and subj ect in
western media. The video carries many of the same themes as Al Hayat’s Dabiq magazine, but
makes them much more obvious. It consists almost solely of war footage, with backg round shots,
dramatic narration, and excerpts taken from outside media sources to fill in gaps (Mauro, 2014).
The film starts with a brief intro to the plight of the group ISIS against thei r enemies,
claiming, “You are with us, or against us,” and then featuring a video recording of f ormer US
President George W. Bush saying the same. It also shows an excerpt from Bush’s famous
“mission accomplished” speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln during the Iraq W ar, but then
goes on to claim, “They lied: the flames of war were only beginning to intensify” (Mauro, 2014).
This theme that “the flames of war have only just begun” continues to be emphasize d by the
narrator throughout the video. But before the main part of the video begins, the stage i s also set
by a segment which talks about the many Muslims who have fallen away from the corre ct
Islamic faith, with special emphasis on scolding those who say or believe that physical jihad is
not a necessary part of the religion.

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 29

The first main segment follows a group of fighters in their battle to take over a Syrian air
base. Each step in the takeover is recorded and narrated, including reconnaissance, digging of
trenches, covering of advancing troops with artillery, the incapacitation of enemy tanks via use
of shoulder-fired armaments, and the capture of a radar station. The narrator insi sts that the
mujahedeen of ISIS are different from their enemies, in that they fight not for earthly gain, but
for heavenly rewards. Nevertheless, loot and war booty taken in the aftermath of the fighting are
interpreted to be Allah’s reward. The filmmakers would also like the viewer t o believe that their
victories against superior enemies on multiple fronts are a result and sign of A llah’s favor upon
the Islamic State. Several scenes are shown where fighters advance on f oot right up to enemy
tanks. The tank crews try to abandon their vehicles, but get shot on their way out. The narrator
dramatically says,
Allah is with his believers, and it is he who directs the rpg grenade, punishing the enem y
with the hands of the mujahedeen… The tank hunters, equipped only with hand held
rockets and IEDs, represent the epitome of sacrifice… They are the stall ions of life…
(Mauro, 2014).
Like in other propaganda material, “Flames of War” portrays ISIS’ fight as one of “good
versus evil,” where the deaths of its fighters are not a setback, but are rather rewarded with
eternal paradise as a reward. To fight such a war is also to do penance for wrong s committed
against the Creator, as the narrator explains,
In the heat of such fierce battles one recalls his sins and his need for forgivene ss, so he
keenly pursues the noblest of deaths in the most trying of circumstances. Facing down t he
brunt of the enemy’s strength, he and his brothers firmly standing their ground; t he best
of the best, in search of the greatest of rewards… What was on display for the world t o

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 30

witness was that mujahedeen of the Islamic State would only accept victory or Shahada.
(Mauro, 2014)
Both friendly, enemy, and civilian deaths are portrayed with all of their grue someness.
One scene is particularly telling of the ISIS psyche. When one of the ISIS f ighters is shot, the
others do not stop to help him, but continue in their advance across a field in the background
towards their objective. The cameraman likewise does not help, but films the man as he slowly
dies. The narrator portrays his death as glorious; you are watching as his soul g oes to a better
place. In several other instances, ISIS fighters are shown approaching and e xecuting wounded
enemy soldiers with gunshots to the head, as the cameraman films from only a few feet behind.
After the first military victory portrayed in “Flames of War,” the video attempts to show
how grateful the surrounding civilian population is to finally be “liberated” by the Islamic State.
Like in certain articles from Dabiq , it shows them welcoming the fighters into their towns and
villages, and requisitioning food for the people. And like Issue 7 of Dabiq, it denounces as
apostates the many Islamic leaders around the world who came on television to be interviewed
and “spread lies” about the Islamic State. To provide an example, it shows a video cli p of Saudi
cleric Saad al-Shithri saying of ISIS,
Any scholar who says that this organization is from the khawarij is mistake n. This
organization is atheist, and its members are heretics. They wage war ag ainst Allah and
His Messenger. They do not believe in Allah as lord, and they do not believe in Islam as a
religion, and they do not believe in Muhammad (sallallahu ‘alayhi wa sallam) as a
prophet and messenger. Their disbelief is more severe than the disbelief of the J ews and
Christians. (Mauro, 2014)

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 31

The narrator claims that lies such as these have been made to “justify” the aggression by
“apostate” Muslims against the Islamic State. But all opposition to ISIS i n the land of Sham has
proven pointless, he says. Seemingly to demonstrate this fact, the video goes on to show vict ories
against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), Syrian, and Iraqi forces. A clos e range firefight
against “Safawi” (Shia) soldiers is shown, with only about thirty feet separati ng both sides. The
opposition wears body armor and is supported by armored troop carriers, but quickly breaks and
flees from the ISIS fighters. As they flee, ISIS fighters launch RP Gs at the retreating vehicles.
“Despite having American weaponry and armor at their disposal, the Safawis w ere scared to
meet death and did not have the nerve to continue the fight. They turned back on their heels,
fleeing like the cowards they are,” the narrator says. The video switches to the first-person view
of a fighter, who runs up to a wounded soldier lying on the ground and shoots him in the head
with his pistol. In a challenge to the claims of Saad al- Shithri, an anonymous imam of the
Islamic State is heard saying during this footage:
You are allies of Allah. You wage war against his enemies and you fight in Hi s path. He
loves you and you love Him, whereas they fight in the path of the taghut (rebellion) and
are allied to the taghut. Allah helps and supports you and grants you victory, whereas
they are helped and supported by America and Iran. What a difference betwe en the two.
Allah is our protector and they have no protector.
This is yet another instance of proof that ISIS fights from strongly held bel iefs and
religious ideology. At another point in the video after a successful night ambush agai nst an Iraqi
convoy, one especially emotional ISIS fighter is shown kneeled on the ground cryin g in
thankfulness. “Praise be to You, O Allah. O Lord, O Lord, strengthen us against them , O Lord of
creation,” he is translated as saying. “Praise be to Allah, the Lord of c reation (sobbing), praise

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 32

and thanks be to You, O Allah. Praise and thanks be to You, O strong and powerful One, O
Allah.”
Probably the most iconic part of “Flames of War” is its ending scene showing t he
aftermath of the capture of the 17 th Division base in Syria near al Raqqa. Several captured Syrian
soldiers are shown digging in a large ditch, and viewers are led to believe that they are digging
their own graves, just a few hundred meters from some towering apartment building s nearby.
Before their executions, one soldier who is digging is filmed as he gives a very lengthy
statement, saying,
With regards to Bashar (al-Assad), may Allah take revenge on him and do to his chi ldren
as he has done to us. Today we’re digging our graves with our own hands. The Islamic
State captured us while we were fleeing from the 17 th Division base. We were serving
under Bashar. Bashar has abandoned us. Bashar is nowhere in sight. Bashar is despic able.
A despicable man, and the son of a despicable man. Right now we’re digging our graves
with our own hands. Our fate is to be slaughtered. Why? Weren’t we serving under him?
But to [the] regime’s army we’re just numbers. We’re just numbers. To the reg ime’s
army we’re just dogs. The officers fled. The officers fled and left the sol diers here. To dig
here and to die here. To dig their graves here with their own hands. May Allah take
revenge on you, Bashar… I advise… to get… out of the army as quickly as possible. As
quickly as possible. Because it’s as if Allah has blessed the Islamic Sta te. They captured
the 17 th Division base in a matter of seconds… Even though there were 800 of us, and
they only numbered in the dozens…. Like ten or twenty or thirty of them captured the
base when it had 800 soldiers. 800 soldiers. The Free Syrian Army couldn’t capture it. No

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 33

one was able to capture the base… I advise all of the families of the soldiers to g et their
sons out of Bashar’s army. (Mauro, 2014)
While we do not know the actual events of the taking of the 17 th Division base in detail,
we do know that the filming of such a speech as the one above makes for a very strong
propaganda piece meant to intimidate ISIS’ enemies. To make it even more drama tic, the
narrator is shown reemphasizing the theme that “the fighting/war has just begun” before taking
part in a mass execution of the prisoners who had just been filmed digging. Their bodies roll
down into the ditch, and “Flames of War” ends with a challenge to America.
The execution of Lt. al-Kaseasbeh. Besides “Flames of War,” the execution video
featuring the burning of captured Jordanian pilot Lt. al-Kaseasbeh is one of the mos t
professionally orchestrated of propaganda films produced by ISIS. Lasting tw enty two minutes
long, it is heavily edited using computer software and video effects, so much so tha t it looks like
it was produced for something akin to a multi-million dollar budget Hollywood spy film . The
beginning and the end closely follow the themes seen at the same parts of “Fla mes of War,” even
though the central plot is different.
For example, the first few minutes consist of a wide range of video excerpts t o prove al-
Kaseasbeh’s guilt as a war criminal. A piece from a video interview with Jor dan’s King
Abdullah shows him saying,
The chief of staff and my brother stepped forward and said to all the pilots, liste n there
are four strikes against ISIS, we are looking for volunteers, so anybody who want s to
volunteer, please step forward. Every single pilot raised his hand and stepped forward.
(Fox News, 2015)

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 34

Still more footage shows Abdullah interacting with western leaders like P resident
Obama, as further proof of Jordan’s alliance with the kafir. In a public politic al speech, he is
shown also saying, “I hope that there will be a global call to action to support countr ies like my
own, at the forefront of the fight” (Fox News, 2015).
The next ten minutes consist of footage of Lt. al-Kaseasbeh sharing coaliti on military
information with his captors, his orange prison jumpsuit standing out against a black
background. The information shared includes the naming of Arab states allied wit h the United
States and participating in the bombing of ISIS, as well as the various aircraf t used by each of
those countries. After confessing to his participation in airstrikes against ISIS, gruesome
photographs are shown of dead and wounded civilians, particularly women and children. This
footage is accompanied by audio recording of a baby wailing inconsolably, with t he intent of
making the viewer feel uncomfortable. Video footage is also shown of emergency cr ews
extracting wounded civilians from collapsed buildings and rubble, and although there is no pr oof
these events coincided with al-Kaseasbeh’s bombing mission specifically, it is implied that he is
at least responsible for events similar to the ones shown.
Finally, leading up to his execution, Lt. al-Kaseasbeh is shown walking through a
bombed out area surveying the aftermath of his (implied) work. Well-equipped and identic ally
dressed ISIS militiamen stand guard on each side of the street, silently wa tching him walk by.
The whole scene was specifically set up ahead of time for this propaganda video. “F lashbacks”
switch between footage of an anonymous fighter pilot in his cockpit, intersperse d with more
scenes of injured civilians. Every aspect is meant specifically to implic ate Lt. al-Kaseasbeh as a
war criminal, before finally showing him meet his grisly fate of being burne d alive in a large,
square steel cage.

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 35

British photojournalist John Cantlie. Another noteworthy effort in video propaganda
by Al Hayat is a series of video reports by photojournalist John Cantlie. Captured by ISIS in
Syria in November, he has since been used by the group in a “Lend Me Your Ears” video se ries
in which he was made to talk about the “good deeds” and “normalcy” of ISIS operations on the
ground in various cities like Mosul, Kobani, and Aleppo, in addition to the reports he was made
to make from confinement. (Barrett, 2014, p. 57). Cantlie’s situation is truly a trag ic one.
According to freed Spanish journalist Javier Espinosa, who at one point was held prisoner w ith
both Cantlie and the now deceased James Foley, Mr. Cantlie has tried unsuccessfully to escape
his ISIS captors at least twice thus far, after which both he and Foley wer e horribly beaten and
water boarded for weeks. During the second escape attempt, Foley was alrea dy through a
window and waiting for Cantlie to follow when Cantlie was caught. Rather than le aving to
escape by himself, Foley let himself be recaptured, allegedly telling Espinosa, “I couldn’t leave
John on his own” (Culbertson, 2015). On August 19, 2014, James Foley was executed.
The “Lend Me Your Ears” propaganda series began late 2014, with the earlier inte rviews
of John Cantlie taken with him obviously still in confinement and wearing orange prison er
clothes similar to the ones in which Foley, Sotloff, and al-Kaseasbeh were exec uted in. In these
videos, it is very obvious that everything is scripted, both from the way in which Foley sp eaks, as
well as from how he looks straight behind the cameraman for the entire duration of the videos. In
the fourth episode of “Lend Me Your Ears,” focuses on the abandonment of Foley of himself and
other British and American prisoners by their governments, as well as on emphas izing the
“warmongering” of western media and governments. For example, Foley says ,
Way back on the 7 th of August when Obama pressed the button on US airstrikes over
Iraq, he cited Islamic State’s attacks on Yazidis, a religious minority , as the reason for

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 36

billion dollar intervention using aircraft carriers and F-18 hornets. But since whe n has
America cared about the fate of a minority in Muslim lands? Modern history is sadly
littered with examples of religious minorities being crushed, and neither the US nor
anyone else said a thing… Obama is terribly busy insisting US ground troops won’t be
going back into Iraq, but even the Pentagon admits air strikes are a stopgap mil itary
measure that will not disrupt Islamic State activities. Meanwhile, Ame rica puts 1,200
troops into Baghdad to protect their embassy and the airport. Surely sounds like troops on
the ground to me. It’s not too hard to see where this is headed. Once again the western
media are drip-feeding the public until, what a surprise, we are embroiled in a full-scale
war. (War on Islamic State, 2014)
But while these early videos consist more of criticism of the West, lat er ones in the series
focus more on presenting the rule of ISIS in the areas it controls as a legitimat e one, where, in
contrast to what western media portrays, the civilian populace is getting a long as good as ever.
These later episodes of “Lend Me Your Ears” have also garnered more attenti on than the first
ones, as Foley no longer appears in his orange prison garb, but in civilian clothes, made to look
as if he is touring the area freely. In one such episode, Cantlie is filmed repor ting from the “top
of the world” in the city of Mosul, Iraq. In the video, it is emphasized how Mosul is a Sunni
province “as much of Iraq used to be before the American-led invasions and pro-Iranian
governments changed the political map” (Canale 25 News, 2015). It is an unapologetic eff ort to
counter global criticism of ISIS. Claims that trash lies uncollected, t here is limited electricity,
and that prices for basic items have skyrocketed are refuted, as Cantlie wal ks through one of the
central marketplaces in the city. One intermittent clip shows Cantlie buy ing candy from a street
shop while his narration continues in the background. “I am reminded of one quote from Saudi-

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 37

owned television channel Al-Arabia,” Cantlie states, “[which] says the peopl e of Mosul are
living in very hard conditions, [and] it is very difficult. I look around, and really, that doesn’ t
seem to be the case at all” (Canale 25 News, 2015).
This episode continues to try to provide a sense of legitimacy to ISIS oversig ht of the city
by taking Cantlie on a tour of the main city hospital. Interestingly, although he s ays he will
interview the doctors and nurses at the hospital, none are seen the entire time. Onl y two young
children are filmed, and only one section of the hospital is visited for this part. In t he video,
Cantlie stresses,
The room we are about go into is for children with psychiatric problems as a direct r esult
of bombs and explosions falling from above… Now I have to talk quite quietly, because
these kids are so… very adverse to loud noises because of the explosions. But as you can
see, they’re very young, and their mothers are here, and they’re clearly not happ y, but
despite all this, there is plenty of electricity. We spoke to one of the doctors ea rlier, and
he told us they are getting the medicines they need. So despite the bombs that are raini ng
down – and we’re told that just two days ago an ambulance was hit by a bomb, or an
aircraft – despite these things, the doctors are getting what they need, and t he Islamic
State is prevailing. They can take it. (Canale 25 News, 2015)
He stutters quite a bit during the paragraph above, and it is unknown whether this is due
simply to trying to find the right words, or due to unsettled mind. However, there is quite an
amount of emphasis placed on the words “bombs,” “aircraft,” “explosions,” and “falli ng from
above,” insinuating that the children’s’ conditions are a sole result of US and allie d air
bombings.

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 38

As in the Islamic State Report , this video episode also makes an effort to give a good
picture of the ISIS police patrolling the streets of Mosul. Cantlie points out that in both 2004 and
2014, police forces in Mosul abandoned their posts in the face of danger, whereas the IS poli ce
have a “firm” control of the city. He goes on to repeat, “There’s really ve ry little crime being
committed, from what I can see. It’s just people going about their business, and nothi ng like the
police before who would run at the slightest sign of trouble” (Canale 25 News, 2015).
The latest episode of “Lend Me Your Ears” is particularly worrisome, as C antlie says it
will be the “last of this series” (Today Islam, 2015). After the executions of many other captured
journalists like Foley and Sotloff, one can only wonder if Cantlie’s time is al so running out. But
the rest of the video runs with the same ideas as the last one mentioned, this time in A leppo (also
known as Halab), Syria. Al Hayat this time makes no effort to make Aleppo seem like a
“normal” city, but heavily emphasizes that many of the people previously living i n it have fled to
other areas due to the heavy fighting. This is blamed on the “indiscriminate bombing” of the
Assad Air Force, as well as of America. But the Islamic State is pr aised yet again by Cantlie in
this video, who says near the beginning, “The advance and stretch of the Islamic s tate is in fact
remarkable, and breathtaking. Driving into Halab, one can truly appreciate fir sthand the large
swathes of territory liberated and in control by the mujahedeen” (Today Islam, 2015) . Like in the
previously explored video, the economy and market prices are praised, in contrast to the
admission only minutes ago that much of the city had emptied.
At one point, Cantlie points out an American drone circling high above. The video cuts to
a location in a marketplace which was allegedly just recently hit by Assa d’s bombs. He says,
we’re in the middle here of a market which is a completely civilian area, a nd there has
just been a large bomb strike on that building behind me… The Islamic State fire brigad e

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 39

are here trying to clear up the mess, but there is absolute pandemonium. And all of this
follows a drone which we saw five minutes ago, and then Assad’s air force comes in and
drops bombs on the market. Now as far as I know, the Syrian air force does not have
drones. That must have been an American drone, but that was definitely Assad’s bomb
dropping here on the market. So, what’s going on? Someone is working with someone
around here to drop bombs. Look around! It’s smashed there! It’s smashed there! The
people are absolutely terrified from bombs being dropped by Assad’s aircraft, but with
American drones flying overhead. OK, we’ve been told we’ve got to get out of this area.
Because that drone’s in the sky they might hit this area again, so we’ve got to get out of
here. Everyone’s been told to clear the streets, so we’ve got to go. Come on, let’s go.
(Today Islam, 2015)
But per usual, Al Hayat seeks to portray a sense of calm in the city, as if s uch destructive
scenes do not at all interfere with the daily activities of those living there. I t shows scenes of the
construction of new buildings and homes using expensive stone, as well as of ISIS fight ers
gathering around for afternoon tea. It then switches to the topic of Sharia law, “ one of the
absolute principles for why they [ISIS] fight” (Today Islam, 2015). The video does not s hy away
from presenting the realities of the harsh penalties enacted in Sharia. Rat her, it boasts that they
are much more simple than the justice system of the West. Cantlie narrates,
For example, if you are convicted of robbery, with the correct number of witnesses, and
such forth, you have your hand cut off. Sounds harsh, but you’re not going to commit the
same crime again, and it will dissuade others from doing the same. (Today Isl am, 2015)
Al Hayat also makes the claim in this video that ISIS is protecting the c ity against outside
aggression, with Cantlie saying,

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 40

As we saw with the attack on the market here, with US drones flying overhead and ve ry
possibly coordinating the bomb attack on the market itself, it is the West who are acting
aggressively. The people of Halab just want to get on with their lives in peace, and t hat is
more possible now since the Islamic State took over. (Today Islam, 2015)
What we see here is the result of several themes that run throughout not just the “Le nd
Me Your Ears” series, but throughout most of ISIS propaganda as a whole. But what wil l be
John Cantlie’s fate at the hands of ISIS in the next few months? Will they cont inue to use him in
some of their media productions as they have been, or is their use for him coming to an end? The
situation continues to be a matter of interest to both his family and many British a nd Americans.
Trends in ISIS Propaganda
As seen from the examples just surveyed, the media and propaganda arm of ISIS is quite
refined, and arguably has taken a step forward beyond other terrorist organiz ations like it in the
areas of both violence and ambition. While a more lengthy research effort would uncover
countless other media productions of the group, these provide some of the best primary sources
for analyzing trends and themes common across all or most of their propaganda effort. H ow do
these trends and themes in the media produced by ISIS compare with the ones seen earl ier in al
Qaeda? In addition, what are the ways in which these propaganda techniques are succe ssful for
ISIS, and how are they counterproductive?
Trends and Characteristics
While many trends and characteristics may be found throughout ISIS media and
propaganda, there are five main ones which are particularly apparent throughout t he material
surveyed in this paper, some of which closely mirror the themes earlier discusse d in al Qaeda
propaganda.

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 41

Western education. The first trend is that many of the writers and organizers behind
ISIS propaganda have received western and/or foreign education outside of Southwest Asia.
Good technical quality in media tool production and formatting alone are not enough to indica te
this. But there are a variety of factors involved. First, many if not most of ISI S propaganda is
produced either with clean English subtitles in the videos, or multiple versions of printe d and
electronic media are produced in multiple languages, as is the case with Al H ayat (Barrett, 2014,
p. 55). In the case of online publications like the Islamic State Report and Dabiq , they are written
in perfect English, meaning the authors not only have a grasp of the language, but have had
extensive training in English grammar and writing, most probably in Western countr ies. In
addition, some video productions are so heavily edited with graphical and video editing tools as
to give more reason to support such a claim. “Flames of War” and the video featuring t he
execution of Jordanian pilot Lt. Kaseasbeh are prime examples. Ahmad Abousamra, an
American-educated man, is a verified example of such a trend. According to t he FBI, Abousamra
“grew up in Stoughton [Massachusetts] and attended schools in the Boston area” (Vale ncia,
2014). Now, he is on its Most Wanted Terrorists List, and the FBI has very good reason to
“believe Abousamra may be using his computer and social media skills to support ISI S”
(Valencia, 2014). Prior to traveling overseas in search of terrorist training t o fight the United
States, Abousamra received a notable college education, making it onto the dean’s list at
Northeastern University in Boston for his accomplishments in computer science (C oghlan,
2014). Then there is the example of the narrator for Al Hayat’s hour long production “Fl ames of
War,” an unknown man who speaks perfect English. Finally, there is the fact that IS IS is making
a continual effort to recruit western-educated Muslims to its cause, as is seen in the first issue of
Dabiq :

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 42

The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Musl ims. O
Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic
State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory…
A call to all Muslim doctors, engineers, scholars, and specialists: Amirul- Mu’minin said:
We make a special call to the scholars, fuqaha’ (experts in Islamic juris prudence), and
callers, especially the judges, as well as people with military, admi nistrative, and service
expertise, and medical doctors and engineers of all different specializa tions and fields.
(The Return of Khilafah, 2014, p. 11)
ISIS is by no means the only terror organization to use Western-educated people in its
media production. US citizen Anwar al-Awlaki produced the online magazine Inspire in English
for al Qaeda in similar fashion to ISIS’ magazines. Yet ISIS has many m ore repeat examples of
this trend than other terror organizations.
ISIS strives to portray both political and religious legitimacy. A second trend is that
ISIS continually strives to effect images of both political and religious le gitimacy through its
media. Politically, ISIS began its transformation to the so called “Islam ic State” by spreading a
video recording of Abu Bakr’s announcement widely enough to be picked up by international
news agencies (Barrett, 2014, p. 51). In most of its major propaganda video releases featuring
prisoners, the prisoners are featured wearing orange jumpsuits. This includes t he executions of
Lt. al-Kaseasbeh, James Foley, Stephen Sotloff, Egyptian Coptic Christians, and Et hiopian
Christians in Libya. John Cantlie was also seen wearing an orange jumpsuit duri ng the initial
episodes of the “Lend Me Your Ears” series. While the jumpsuits do serve a functional purpos e,
it is just as likely that they are being used to give the image that the prisoner s are convicted
criminals. The same is true of the dress used by ISIS fighters in execution phot ographs and

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 43

videos, with each one using carefully matching gear and clothing, usually in new condit ion.
While the majority of ISIS fighters are not uniformly dressed in their day- to-day jihad, it is
obvious that the organization is striving to create an “official” presence by shapi ng the image in
which they are seen in key events in the media.
Political legitimacy is also sought to be portrayed at the local level. I n the Islamic State
Report , Dabiq , and “Flames of War,” there are parts dedicated to showing how the Islamic State
is working with tribal leaders throughout Iraq and Syria. The first issue of Dabiq features such a
section which focuses on Halab, and claims that ISIS is
returning rights and property to their rightful owners, pumping millions of dollars i nto
services that are important to the Muslims… ensuring the availability of fo od products
and commodities in the market, particularly bread, reducing crime rate, [and] flour ishing
relationship between the Islamic State and its citizens. (The Return of K hilafah, 2014, p.
13)
Religious legitimacy is sought to be portrayed through a variety of ways ac ross different
sources of propaganda as well. ISIS especially emphasizes that it is enf orcing Zakat, one of the
five pillars of Islam. Various sources also show that ISIS enforces daily prayer in the places it
occupies, although this is less important strategically for them to show in thei r media than Zakat.
Religious legitimacy is also portrayed through extensive quoting of Islam ic scriptures and
religious leaders, especially in magazine publications where an abundance of information is
written. Stories and analogies using traditional figures from the Abrahami c religions are used as
religious examples in Al Hayat articles, with both Abraham and Noah being used in t he earliest
issues of Dabiq . Even at times when ISIS’ enemies surrender, they will throw in scripture nex t to
the corresponding article, with quotes like, “and Allah turns in forgiveness to whom he w ills; and

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 44

Allah is knowing and wise” (The Return of Khilafah, 2014, p. 49). Lastly, even when script ure is
not directly quoted, many articles still include referral to religious ide as.
The Islamic scriptures are used to support violence. Closely related to the theme of
religious legitimacy is the use of religious literature to support the le vel of violence currently
employed by the organization. This is because a large amount of the scripture used is employed
in a violent context, sometimes even when others might not interpret it in the same w ay. The
story of Noah’s flood, for example, is used to justify earthly punishment for sins, as well as to
reject the idea of pacifism. And as shown earlier, one of the most blatant examples comes from
Issue 7 of Dabiq , in an article titled “Islam is the Religion of the Sword not Pacifism” (Fr om
Hypocrisy, 2015, p. 20). An article in another issue examines the hadith which states, “My
provision was placed for me in the shade of my spear.” The article explains:
This hadith indicates that Allah did not send His messenger to endeavor to seek the
dunya, nor to gather the dunya and its treasures, nor to strive to seek its ca uses, rather He
sent him as a caller to His tawhid with the sword. What is implied by this is t hat he kills
Allah’s enemies who refuse to accept tawhid, legitimizes the spilling of t heir blood and
the taking of their wealth, and enslaves their women and children, and thereby his
provision becomes what Allah has given him of spoils from the property of His enemy.
(The Failed Crusade, 2014, p. 10)
One incident which caught a large amount of condemnation from the entire world was t he
method of execution of Lt. al-Kaseasbeh, a brutal death by fire in which he was burne d while
still alive, then crushed in rubble from a bulldozer. Many Islamic scholars quoted Muha mmad in
opposition to the act, who said, “None should punish with fire except Allah.” But ISIS clai ms
this to be a dishonest misinterpretation of the broader context of the verse, citing multiple

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 45

historical examples of early Muslim leaders who used fire as a tool for punis hment, as well as
quoting An-Nahl: 126 which says, “And if you punish an enemy, punish with an equivalent of
that with which you were harmed” (From Hypocrisy, 2015, p. 7). These instances only touch t he
surface of the vast list of examples which can be gathered of ISIS’ use of Is lamic scripture to
justify violence.
The rest of the world is immoral; the world is divided. Following these themes lies the
trend of portraying that the enemies of ISIS are immoral and their war is a holy jihad for the
cause of Allah. While this one is not as explicitly stated as the previous two, it can be seen
underlying many of the causes behind the motivations and ideology of ISIS. Accordin g to ISIS,
“The world has divided into two camps… The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr
(disbelief) and hypocrisy” (Return of Khilafah, 2014, p. 10). There is a growing “ext inction of
the grayzone” (From Hypocrisy, 2015, p. 54). In addition, as shown earlier, many of the
propaganda videos produced by Al Hayat repeatedly condemn secularism as a forc e of evil to be
combated, with “Flames of War” claiming that the “secular” Iraqi force s fight for land and
monetary reward, while the fighters of ISIS fight rather for holy conviction.
Muslims against or indifferent to ISIS are labeled apostates. Finally, a major theme
found in both the ideology and propaganda campaign of ISIS is their need for labeling all
Muslims who either condemn, criticize, or abstain from aligning with ISIS as heretics and
apostates. This is seen in “Flames of War” when the narrator defends his org anization from the
criticisms of “heretic” Islamic leaders. It is also seen in the theolog ical excerpts in written pieces
such as Issue 7 of Dabiq , where it says, “Allah has revealed Islam to be the religion of the sword,
and the evidence for this is so profuse that only a zind īq (heretic) would argue otherwise” (From
Hypocrisy, 2015, p. 20). In fact, this particular issue is almost completely devoted t o declaring

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 46

the apostasy of rival Imams, as well as to explaining the “correct” inter pretations of Islamic
scripture in ways which line up with ISIS’ ideology. Now, in addition to its anti pathy toward
groups like al Qaeda, ISIS is even waging jihad against the Taliban in Afghanis tan, with Al-
Bagdadi claiming that “Mullah Omar does not deserve a spiritual or political c redibility”
(Khaama Press, 2015).
Ways in which methods are successful
So, do all of these themes and methods employed in propaganda production actually
work out for ISIS? There are both long and short answers to this question. The short answer is
that as stated before, the propaganda machine of ISIS has a “new level of sophis tication in
messaging,” while its “media efforts have effectively silenced mos t other jihadi channels, and
have drowned out all efforts of the West to counter” (HusIck, 2014). The first and most
important success a strong social media and online presence has seen is the organi zation’s
abundance of jihadi recruits from around the world. According to a recent UN report, ISIS has
gained a huge number of foreign recruits, many of them from Western countrie s. It was
estimated in September 2014 that “only 2300 ISIS fighters were from foreign countr ies. In just a
half year that number according to the UN has swelled apparently up to 25000, multiplying more
than ten times” (Hagopian, 2015). A secondary and closely related success is t hat the extreme
violence portrayed in ISIS media attracts the young and violent jihadi crowd that they want and
need to fight their war (Pepitone, 2014). It also closely ties in with objectives s een in
Milosevska’s research (2014). In classification of its model of behavior, ISI S falls into both the
third and the fourth categories (Milosevska et al, 2014, p. 60). This means that the organizati on
has a very heavy media-oriented strategy, while at the same holding a dee p amount of hostility
for foreign reporters, labeling them as “crusaders” the same as their hom e country’s leaders and

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 47

military members. Finally, ISIS’ strong media front has gained it the notoriety it desires,
although the image it seeks to project may differ slightly from the one which is see n by its
enemies. This notoriety, while causing more enemies abroad, may be serving ISIS at home by
appealing to anti-Western sentiment in the populace (Isis Uses Modern PR, 2014).
Ways in which methods are counterproductive
While ISIS appears to be very successfully meeting its goal of attr acting the attention of
potential recruits from around the world, its form and model of propaganda can sometimes be a
double edged sword. In particular, its glorification of extreme brutality h as caused international
uproar overseas as well as at the organization’s borders, causing it to have enem ies on all sides.
Secondly, although for the most part the ISIS media machine is well organized, it s decentralized
nature sometimes leads to mistakes. Lastly, and of prime importance, the publi cation of troop
movements and intentions helps American and allied intelligence agencies in their campaign to
bomb ISIS targets on the ground.
Brutality garners more US and foreign support for the fight against ISI S. As stated
earlier, ISIS’ extreme brutality in its media campaign has led many other similar terrorist
organizations to seek to disassociate themselves with the group. Notably, al Qa eda leadership has
taken issue with the exorbitant amount of publicized executions and beheadings which fit int o
ISIS media and propaganda tactics (Coghlan, 2014). Now, even the Taliban is wagin g jihad
against ISIS elements in Afghanistan (Khaama Press, 2015). In addition, mult iple Arabic
countries surrounding Iraq and Syria have redoubled their bombing efforts against I SIS. A
particular example occurred with the immolation of Jordan’s captured pilot. The ent ire country
reacted with fury and indignation, with King Abdulla pledging a “relentless w ar” in response:

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 48

We are waging this war to protect our faith, our values and human principles, and our war
for their sake will be relentless and will hit them in their own ground,” he said, a nd Jordan
executed four ISIS prisoners soon after (Black, 2015).
Also as mentioned earlier, the majority of Arab public opinion is unfavorable towards
ISIS, according to a 2014 Washington Institute poll conducted in Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi
Arabia, hinting that ISIS propaganda efforts there are not as positive for the organization as
would be ideal for them (Parker, 2014).
Decentralized nature of the ISIS media machine allows less contr ol. The
decentralized nature of the ISIS media machine provides it with an advantage when facing the
filtration systems which occur in most popular social media platforms like T witter, Instagram,
and YouTube. But it also can lead to some confusion among the social media warriors upon
whom the network depends. For example, evidence from communications on ISIS forums
indicate that the original publication of the execution video of Steven Sotloff was poste d
completely by accident and got shared widely online before the organization learne d of its
mistake. It turns out the video had been planned for eventual release, but was leaked before the
planned moment (Kaufman, 2014). But despite small disturbances such as these, analys ts agree
that while decentralized in this aspect, ISIS is still incredible adept at regulating itself.
Perhaps one of the more interesting vulnerabilities to a decentralized media machine is its
ability to be hijacked by opposition. Just as ISIS supporters will sometimes “pi ggyback” onto
trending Twitter hashtags, it is possible for others to do the same to ISIS. For e xample,
“#IslamicStateMedia” was hijacked by a crude photo of someone urinating into a bucket labeled
“ISIS,” with the slogan “The ISIS Bucket Challenge” emblazoned underneath. Anot her one said

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 49

“LET THE BATTLE BEGIN” and pictured photo-shopped “swine rockets” being s hot at ISIS
(Shiloach, 2015).
Social media helps American and allied intelligence agencies find I SIS targets.
Lastly, the large amount of information which ISIS provides about itself in its propa ganda allows
the United States and other allied intelligence agencies to pinpoint personnel and equipm ent
locations for bombing. This means that for the time being, US government official s actually
prefer that social media sites like Twitter not completely filter all ISIS posts. One reporter writes
for Time magazine:
“There is some value to being able to track them on Twitter,” says William M cCants, a
former State Department senior adviser who directs the Project on U.S. Relati ons with
the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution. McCants recalls that a U.S. i ntelligence
official described the site as a “gold mine” of information about foreign-fighte r networks,
better than any clandestine sources. (Altman, 2014).
Because of modern tracking information gathered by many electronic d evices and social
media accounts, unwary fighters may also be giving their locations away and ena bling US drones
and aircraft to target them. This is particularly because of a trend to post twe ets and live updates
about battles in which they are currently taking part in, real time (Masi, 2014) . Many of the
issues from Dabiq feature information and updates on the group’s latest attacks and conquests,
and in some cases reveal troop locations. ISIS also releases a private, quart erly report with even
more exact information on its military escapades, with these ones being e ven more valuable for
US intelligence agencies (Masi, 2014). Interestingly, the amount of photogra phs currently being
spread online by ISIS are enough for civilian organizations to pinpoint their locations and make
that information public. Masi (2014) reports,

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 50

the State Department did not respond to the International Business Times’ reques t for
comment on whether it monitors ISIS’ online presence, but civilians have been doing s o
successfully. The crowd-funded journalism site Bellingcat appears to have done j ust that
without vast intelligence and surveillance technology the U.S. Military has at its
disposal… using only landmarks in videos; Panoramio, which extracts location metadata
from digital images; and Flash Earth, a constantly updated service that compi les
information from Google, Microsoft and other map providers.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the media and propaganda efforts of ISIS do fall into some of the
classifications laid out in prior years for terrorism. However, both the wide array of platforms for
their propaganda, and their extreme measures have brought ISIS’ media machine t o the forefront
of terrorist propaganda. The organization has its differences with al Qaeda , and while the
majority of its propaganda is spread through social media, it does publish online magaz ines as
well as hard-copy pamphlets for distribution as well. Its video production quality greatly exceeds
that of competing terrorist organizations, while at the same time also exce eding them in its
portrayal of violence and extreme brutality. Many involved in ISIS’ media pr oduction have
received some form of western education. Most importantly, ISIS strives to por tray legitimacy in
both realms of politics and religion, and uses Islamic scripture as a tool to do so, port raying itself
as a cause for righteousness against a world inhabited by kufr (nonbelievers) a nd Muslim
apostates who are in need of theological correction.
Finally, the media techniques employed by ISIS are succeeding in gainin g an increasing
number of foreign recruits, yet arguably have some drawbacks to the organization a s well. The
world grows more united against ISIS day by day, and even some terrorist organiza tions with

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 51

similar ideologies to ISIS are in conflict with it. In addition, some of the ta ctics which make ISIS
so successful at making an online presence come back to hurt it in the form of very rea l and
damaging aerial strikes. What is apparent is that the propaganda efforts of ISIS are a very real
presence both in social media and in international news, and will likely continue to be a s long as
the group continues to maintain a strong presence on the ground.

ISIS: TRENDS IN TERRORIST MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA 52

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