UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea USA United States of America USSR Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics WWII World War II [625323]

UNIVERSITATEA BABEȘ-BOLYAI CLUJ-NAPOCA FACULTATEA DE STUDII EUROPENE Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene The race to the Arctic : A normative European Union against other world powers
Coordonator științific: Absolvent: [anonimizat]-Maria Herța Rachieru Pablo-Adrian Cluj-Napoca 2018

Declarație Prin prezenta declar că Lucrarea de licență cu titlul The race to the Arctic: A normative European Union against other world powers este scrisă de mine și nu a mai fost prezentată niciodată la o altă facultate sau instituție de învățământ superior din țară sau străinătate. De asemenea, declar că toate sursele utilizate, inclusive cele de pe Internet, sunt indicate în lucrare, cu respectarea regulilor de evitare a plagiatului: -toate fragmentele de text reproduse exact, chiar și în traducere proprie din altă limbă, sunt scrise între ghilimele și dețin referința precisă a sursei; -reformularea în cuvinte proprii a textelor scrise de către alți autori deține referința precisă; -rezumarea ideilor altor autori deține referința precisă la textul original. Cluj-Napoca, 6 ianuarie 2017. Absolvent: [anonimizat]………………………………………………………………………………… List of abbreviations……………………………………………………………………….. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………. 1 . Theoretical basis 1.1 What is the Arctic ? 1.2 Is there an Arctic regulation ? 1.3 EU as an Actor 1.4 Military power Europe 1.5 Civilian power Europe 1.6 Normative power Europe 1.7 EU’s normative basis 1.8 How the EU diffuses its norms and values 1.9 Soft Power 1.10 The limits of soft power and normative power 2 . Evolution of Arctic policies in the European Union 2.1 2008 European Parliament Resolution on Arctic Governance 2.2 2008 European Commission Communication 2.3 2009 Council Conclusions on Arctic Issues 2.4 2011 European Parliament Resolution on a Sustainable EU Policy for the High North 2.5 2012 Joint Communication: Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: Progress since 2008 and next steps

2.6 2014 European Parliament Resolution on the EU strategy for the Arctic 2.7 2014 Council Conclusions on developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region 2.8 2016 Joint Communication: An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic 2.9 How such EU policies translate in terms of Normative Power 3 . Other powers’ Arctic policies 3.1 Russia’s Arctic policy 3.2 Denmark’s Arctic policy 3.3 Canada’s Arctic policy 3.4 Summary and analysis Conclusion Bibliography Annexes

List of figures

List of abbreviations EC European Commission EEA European Economic Area EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone EP European Parliament EU European Union GDP Gross Domestic Product IR International Relations NGO Non-Governmental Organization NSR Northern Sea Route NWP North West Passage R&D Research and Development UN United Nations

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea USA United States of America USSR Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics WWII World War II

Introduction The Arctic area has evolved as a global concern on the international stage in an unprecedented short time span. The ongoing climate changes particularly affecting the region imply a new set of opportunities for stakeholders. Potential access to tremendous reserves of natural, mineral and fishing resources as well as shorter navigational routes that could accelerate an already omnipresent global trade are the main reasons that push more actors to get involved in the Arctic. This region also represents potential threats, not only to the local populations and environments but to the entire planet as the receding ice condition that saw the Arctic lose more than a quarter of its polar ice over the four last decades is considered by many as the primary issue that today’s and tomorrow’s generations have and will have to deal with. Once desolate, the Arctic emerged as a new boundary in international relations and it is therefore a strategic necessity for Arctic nations in their quest for the North Pole to implement a comprehensive Arctic policy that meets their needs in terms of economic gains but also responds to security and sovereignty challenges as well as respecting the local peoples. The main objectives of this thesis are to analyze how various powers place themselves in the race to the Arctic region and differentiate the policies they implement to do so. First of all, we will define key theoretical concepts essential in order to understand the logic of our research. Moreover, we will establish a chronology of the European Union’s (EU) Arctic policy and comment on its normative nature. Then we will provide a comparison of other nations’ policies regarding the Arctic region and answer in which way it is different than the European Union’s one. The methodology used in our thesis will mainly consist of a qualitative research approach based on case studies which will allow us to understand the situation and its specific characteristics focusing on its more relevant aspects. To do so, we will analyse articles, official publications and journals of various fields of studies. Moreover, news articles will also represent a part of the bibliography in order to deal with up-to-date information. Reports will also be a key component in order to provide numbers and figures related to the consequences of evolution of the Arctic region. Unfortunately, the constantly and quickly evolving situation in the targeted region also affects the related publications. What was true one year ago may not be true one year from now 8

and it is both an advantage, as we deal with updated information but can also limit the bibliography and affect the smooth development of this thesis. As a result of the above discussion, the problem formulation for this thesis is: How can the EU and its normative power nature towards the Arctic be understood as opposed to other powers in the region? The first chapter will consist of a theoretical framework and an explanation of concepts relevant to our research. We will first define what is the Arctic, who are the nations or blocs involved in this region and how cooperation within the area is currently regulated. Concepts such as the EU as an actor, civilian power, normative power and soft power and their limits will also be discussed in order to understand the European Union’s strategy towards the Arctic. In the second chapter, we will chronologically detail and examine the development of Arctic policies in the EU starting from 2008 and going until 2016. This overview will be accomplished through an analysis of the Union’s official documents and the previously discussed theoretical framework and will enable us to comment over EU’s normative nature in the high North. The last chapter will complete the second one and we will there highlight Russia’s, Denmark’s and Canada’s Arctic policies, what forms they take in comparison to the EU and judge over their security and sovereignty oriented behaviours for some or individualistic trends for others. The main motivation for focusing on this research topic is undoubtedly its multidisciplinary nature. The Arctic region and the race that powers started to claim their parts of it can be tackled from various angles and many correlated fields of research are implied, from Geopolitics to Economics, from Environment to Maritime Law and many more. I believe that writing about the Arctic was the perfect occasion to use the knowledge I’ve been accumulating at our Faculty of European Studies throughout the three years of my bachelor’s degree and during my semester at Sciences Po Paris where the class of Geopolitics of the Oceans was the one that interested me the most. It is also important to point out that the Arctic region, even though I feel that many people do not consider it as crucial as it actually is, represents to me the most vital challenge that the twenty first century will have to address. The consequences of eventual bad cooperation or decisions related to the area would add to the already devastating results of human action on the Arctic environment and the repercussions it represents for the entire planet. That explains why I 9

consider this zone, vector of today’s globalization, where so much individual gains for states and non-states actors can be attained but also so much potential common losses for mankind, as deserving more interest from both the public opinion and the academic fields.
10

1.Theoretical Basis 1.1.What is the Arctic? There exist various debates about how to clearly define the Arctic area. The simplest and most often used one states that the Arctic is the region above the Arctic Circle ((latitude 66 degrees, 32 minutes North). We can observe on Map 1 that the Arctic Circle crosses the northern 1parts of the United States, Canada and Russia. It also passes through the North of Iceland and the South of Greenland, Norway, Sweden and Finland. This definition is the one acknowledged by the European Commission, which includes the Arctic Ocean but also territories that belong to the Arctic 8: Canada, Russia, the United States (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Finland, Sweden and Iceland Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark (Greenland), USA (Alaska), Canada and Russia. However, only five of the above-mentioned Arctic countries have a coastline that borders the Arctic Ocean: The US (Alaska), Russia, Canada, Denmark (Greenland) and Norway.
11 “An Integrated EU policy for the Arctic – Frequently Asked Questions”, European Commission, April 27th 12016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1540_en.htm, accessed 14.05.2017.

MAP 1 In our thesis, we will take into account the circumpolar Arctic mainly because it can be considered as more relevant for EU strategies and policies. The Arctic area will therefore be acknowledged in accordance to the boundaries established by the Arctic Human Development Report (See Map 2), which represents a wider definition than the one coined by the European 2Commission. MAP 2
12 Artic Human Development Report, Akureyri: Stefansson Arctic Institute, 2004, pp.17-20, https://2oaarchive.arctic council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/51/Arctic%20Human%20Development%20Report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 14.05.2017.

1.2 Is there an Arctic regulation ? There is no existing organization or single state that can pretend to hold an exclusive control over the Arctic territories. Apart from the sovereign portions of land that belong to Arctic states, the various zones within the Arctic are regulated in accordance to international law. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regulates the Arctic region. The territorial seas of the Arctic countries extend up to twelve nautical miles from the coast. In their 313Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay: United Nations General Assembly, 1982, http://3www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf, accessed 16.05.2017.

territorial waters, states possess complete rights in matters related to fishery and other sea resources and also benefit from expanded administrative rights over foreign shipping. Moreover, the area located between 12 and 200 nautical miles from a state’s shore represents the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In this portion, states keep an unlimited right over fishery activities and 4other sea resources but have in this case limited powers over foreign shipping. When the 200 nautical miles limit is passed, states lose their rights over fish resources but can keep rights over the seabed minerals only if they are able to scientifically prove that the ocean soil is the natural prolonging of their landmass. 5The Arctic Council, established in 1996 in Canada is the only forum where we can observe a governmental cooperation between Arctic states. It is composed of the eight Arctic states, granted with the status of Permanent Members of the Arctic Council. Six organizations that represent the Indigenous Arctic Peoples benefit from the Permanent Participants Status, meaning that they need to be fully consulted during all the Arctic Council’s discussions. Additionally, it is also a possibility for non-Arctic states, inter-parliamentary assemblies, inter-governmental groups and Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to obtain the Observer Status, which gives them the right to bring a contribution to the Council’s work through an engagement organized in working groups. It is needed to highlight the fact that that the Arctic Council is only a forum and not a legislative or regulatory institution. Its main roles are to establish guidelines and recommendations but without actually having the power to implement or enforce them, this remaining the role of each single Arctic state. However, two agreements with a legally binding nature were negotiated under the authority of the Arctic Council and all eight Arctic states are signatories. Climate mutations and their consequences on the Arctic allows the Council to have an increasingly significance to non-Arctic states and many other actors such as the EU. Seven EU countries: Germany, France, The Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, Italy and Poland, as well as six non-EU countries: Switzerland, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore benefit from the Observer Status in the Arctic Council, which proves that the forum is globally and actively developing. However, the eight Permanent Members are cautious about granting Observer Status to both non- Arctic states and other actors in the last years, causing a feeling of 14 Ibidem, pp.40-41.4 Ibidem.5

frustration, especially for the EU which hasn’t been allowed to be an Observer member yet, principally due to a conflict between the Union and Canada’s Indigenous Peoples about regulation 1007/2009 on the trade of seal products. 61.3 EU as an Actor The EU is not a state. It is therefore impossible to have a unique voice when Arctic matters are debated. As previously stated, three EU Member States (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) are Permanent Members of the Arctic Council and all have created and implemented their own policies and strategies towards the Arctic region. Other non-Arctic EU Member States have also developed independent Arctic policies and were granted with the Observer Status in the forum. All that raises the question of EU’s legitimacy in the region and what it wants to achieve in this specific scenario and if the Union is reliant on normative, civilian or realist (military) power? Academics such as Ian Manners consider that EU’s role on the international stage primarily consists of normative power. Manners’ elaboration on the notion of “Normative Power Europe” followed the debate between the differing understandings of the EU, being either a 7“Military Power”, as coined by Hedley Bull, or a “Civilian Power”, as stated by François 8Duchêne. It is necessary to detail these two concepts of EU-actorness if we want to properly get 9the idea of EU as a normative power. 1.4 Military power Europe
15 “Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on trade in seal products” 6in Official Journal of the European Union, L.286/36, October 31st 2009, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/november/tradoc_145264.pdf, accessed 16.05.2017. Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” in Journal of Common Market 7Studies, 40 (2), 2002, pp. 235-258, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-5965.00353/pdf, accessed 22.05.2017. Hedley Bull, “Civilian Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?” in Journal of Common Market Studies, 821(2), 1982, pp.149-170, http://www.academia.edu/30133797/Bull_H_1982_Civilian_power_Europe_-_a_contradiction_in_terms, accessed 22.05.2017. François Duchêne, “Europe’s role in World Peace” in R. Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen 9Europeans Look Ahead, London: Fontana Collins, 1972, pp.32-47, http://lists.exeter.ac.uk/items/7673B2AB-57AE-C716-B220-08DCBCDC28AA.html, accessed 27.05.2017.

The military power (realist) approach uses a state-centric structure to explain EU’s power in the Arctic and its strategy in the area. The realist perspective implies in this very case that the EU has to employ military mechanisms if it wants to increase and guard some influence in the Arctic, which suggests in a second time that the Union should possess some characteristics comparable to a nation -state. Giving the fact that the Arctic is mainly an untroubled area to this day and that powerful cooperation between the Arctic states and other concerned parties exists, it is therefore not accurate to say that the EU uses military tools in order to implement its Arctic policies. Ian Manners also refuses to acknowledge that this military power approach is relevant to describe EU as an actor but it is still important to elaborate on this framework as the concept of Normative power Europe partly emerges from the limits of other notions. The realist approach asserts that the EU will lack independence until it resolves its limits of common military capabilities and without a central decision-making institution to administrate it. This claim is funded by the fact that realists assume that nation-states are the principal acting 10forces in an international system characterized by anarchy. Realists also advance that states act rationally with the main objective of surviving by the means of military tools within their territory. According to realism, international organizations are therefore considered as instruments at the disposal of central governments, meaning that in their mindset, the EU is critically powerless as an actor on the international stage. Some radical opinions reach the conclusion that EU is not a global actor at all, doubting or ignoring that it should play a role in the specific case of Arctic. British scholar Hedley Bull was a known critic of the concept of EU’s civilian power in global affairs and adopted the realist approach on topics related to EU and common defence and security policy. He argued that Western Europe would remain exposed to threats as long as they could not have the instruments to provide for its military security. Bull went on and stated that 11Western Europe was unable to protect itself without being dependent on the United States of America (USA). In other terms, his advice was for Europe to increase its military capability for defence purposes and start to become more self-sufficient in this particular domain. It can be pointed out that the EU nowadays shares partial elements with the realist angle in relation with the Arctic. The union is developing an updated International Strategy on Foreign 16 Nick Wright, “The European Union: What kind of international actor?” in Political Perspectives, 5(2), 102011, pp.8-32, http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/PPV olume5-Issue2-2011-Wright-1_final.pdf, accessed 27.05.2017. Bull, op.cit. 11

and Security Policy and there was consensus that the Arctic should be considered as an area of priority, showing that it has some considerations over security matters in this very zone. However, these discrete security and defence concerns are not enough to state that EU’s actions towards the Arctic should be defined according to realists’ military terms. 1.5 Civilian Power Europe To link the notion of Civilian Power EU and its actions towards the Arctic, a focus needs to be made on the union’s capability of dealing with security, principally using economic means and not military ones. In order to talk about the European power and strategy in the Arctic according to this approach, we need to analyse the diplomatic and economic tools that the Union possesses to face the other Arctic powers and its ability to act like a nation state in the case of Arctic. Political and Economic writer François Duchêne, important adviser to one of the fathers of European unification Jean Monnet, stated that Western European countries already developed into vastly pluralistic societies with strong civilian values and that Europe will not become a military power. He went on and defined Civilian Power as the necessity to balance the security 12when a state wants to develop civilized politics. Initially, EU’s civilian power came as a consequence from the conflicts and war that occurred in the 20th century. In Duchêne’s opinion, such violent events happened as a direct result of the failure of European nations to deal with an increasing interdependence. Like the Military Power Europe approach already discussed, the civilian power Europe assumption is primarily a state-centric one and emphasizes the necessity for functional effectiveness in the decision-making process in order to achieve influence. 13 However, the central opposition between the civilian and realist perspective lies in their assumption that military power has only a limited relevance in comparison to other sources of influence. The civilian approach demonstrates that EU’s important soft power and legitimacy are direct consequences of its lack of military capabilities. In addition, the use of diplomatic and economic tools also allowed the Union to face the challenges that interdependence on the global stage implies. 17 Duchêne, op.cit.12 Wright, op.cit. , p.13.13

Princeton University Political Sciences teacher Andrew Moravcsik also criticizes the realist approach on how to consider the EU as a world actor. In opposition to Duchêne, Moravcsik defends that we can think of a duality in this case, Europe being both a civilian power and a military power. However, he places the emphasis on Europe’s capacity to exercise a certain “power of attraction” and civilian mechanisms such as continuous democratization, economic impact, neighbourhood policies and promotion of international law as explaining reasons to Europe being the world’s number one civilian superpower. Moravcsik later asserts that the EU 14appeared as being the most ambitious and successful organization to this day and that the union’s civilian framework constantly gained utility in opposition to hard military power. In his 15opinion, elements of liberal theory of International Relations (IR) are relevant to explain the nature of EU’s power. One of the key components of liberal theory in IR is the emphasis on the positive-sum feature, according to which the interests of more than a single country appear to be complementary instead of divergent, having a positive-sum interaction as consequence. 16This shift in the sense of more positive-sum cooperation allowed to forge considerable advantages for Europe, European integration being one of the best examples. In Moravcsik’s perspective, although Europe has military assets, its real comparative advantage relies in its capacity to diffuse civilian influence and not military one. 17Civilian power is thus characterized by economic power, promotion of international law, institutions and growing democratization instead of military strength. The goal is therefore both to maintain and de-emphasize the security balance, this creating an environment for civilian politics to appear and gain in influence. In Duchêne’s thoughts, a lack of military power isn’t necessarily the disadvantage it once implied, as the European military weakness is in fact the basis to employ influence. According to Moravcsik’s vision, Europe does not have to be characterized as military weak, but EU’s genuine power is found in the civilian power mechanisms it uses. This development about Civilian Power raises the question of whether the EU is mainly employing its economic apparatus to protect its interests in the High North or if the Union adopts
18 Andrew Moravcsik,“Europe: The quiet superpower”, in French Politics, V ol. 7, 3/4, 2009, pp.403-422, 14https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/french_politics.pdf, accessed 28.05.2017. Ibidem.15 Ibidem.16 Ibidem.17

several mechanisms from the contrasting power approaches previously detailed in order to attain its aspirations. The European Union is the most important consumer of both mineral and fishery resources in provenance of the Arctic, it has therefore strategic interests in the potential economic development in the Arctic area. The Union is also one of the first actors coming to mind if we think about research and new technologies and also one of the major Arctic-research funders. We can, in this sense, observe that the EU seeks for various means to increase its legitimacy in the Arctic, trying to keep a stable security balance by using economic civilian measures. 1.6 Normative Power Europe The next step of our research consists of scrutinizing the innovative functioning of EU in the Arctic region and how it goes further in its actions than simply using civilian or military components to diffuse its influence. In other terms, we will focus on why and how the Union can be entitled as being a normative power in the High North. Following our previous development, it can not be refuted that the EU adopts an association of apparatuses from the different approaches, which does not contradict Ian Manners’ vision of a normative Europe. He considers EU’s normative basis as an important complement to the others. To detail Manners’ statement related to the normative advantage that the EU possesses, we first need to define the Union’s normative basis. Manners’ idea of a normative power Europe is a derivation from Bull and Duchêne’s notions. For him, EU as an actor implies something that has to be re-evaluated in both realist power and civilian power perspectives in order to be able to consider EU’s role as a normative power in global politics. Manners rejects the common perception of Bull’s realist power and 18Duchêne’s civilian power, which is the shared emphasis of explicit physical power in the form of actual empirical capabilities, either long on economic power or need for military power. H e 19later points out the major issue with the military and civilian power concepts, which is the belief that the EU needs to be identical to a nation state. In his work, Manners details what he means when talking about a normative power Europe: 19 Manners, op.cit. 18 Ibidem.19

‘‘What I am suggesting here is that conceptions of the EU as either a civilian power or a military power, both located in discussions of capabilities, need to be augmented with a focus on normative power of an ideational nature characterized by common principles and willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions. This is not to say that the EU’s civilian power, or fledging military power, are unimportant, simply that its ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations needs to be given much greater attention.’’ Manners adds that the notion of normative power needs to be treated as a relevant addition to both military and civilian power of the EU in global politics. By shifting apart from the discussion about the EU as either a military or civilian power, it is now thinkable to consider EU’s international role as being representative of normative power. Ian Manners argues that Europe differs from pre-existing political structures, and he dismisses the statement that the use of force in an instrumental aspect is a necessity to strive for power. The idea that the EU is different from conventional political forms is what gives the Union a predisposition to behave in a normative way. The EU has to be regarded as an innovative type of global actor, primarily 20because of its non-threatening nature but also as a “magnet” to eventual opponents within the international structure. This represents what allows the analysis to surpass the state-centric conception of the EU as defined within the first two approaches on how identical to a state the EU appears to be. This implies that the normative angle considers the conventional model of international relations inadequate to explain the real complexity of the global system, which is why the EU must be scrutinized as an international actor that differs, innovates and is more than the sum of its parts. 1.7 EU’s Normative Basis In order to get all aspects of EU’s power and strategy in the Arctic the reasoning needs to take account of the normative basis of the EU, which actually provides the Union with its pre-disposition to represent itself and gain legitimacy as a normative force in the High North. According to Manners, such normative basis was created and strengthened during the past fifty years thanks to a succession of EU treaties and policies. He goes on to identify five major norms (Human rights, Liberty, Democracy, Rule of Law, Peace) and four secondary ones 20 Ibidem.20

(Good governance, Social solidarity, Sustainable development, Anti-discrimination) to define such basis. The five principal norms constitute the extensive normative basis of the Union and they can be linked to historical events, for example the notions of liberty and peace were aspects of West European politics after World War II (WWII). Human rights, democracy and the rule of law came later when a differentiation needed to be made between democratic Western Europe from communist Eastern Europe. 21The four minor norms can found their origins through the constitutions and practices of the EU. The principle of good governance is frequently mentioned in Commission papers such as the White Paper on European Governance. Manners focuses on the fact that these norms can 22be reinforced fortified and fostered, which will permit the EU to represent and legitimize itself as being more than the sum of its parts. The normative perspective, when thinking about the idea 23of values, identity and principles, claims that what the EU symbolizes can be considered as equally important as what it accomplishes with its actions and the example it sets. However, 24acknowledging such a normative basis for the EU does not make it a normative force by definition. It is therefore necessary to analyse how the norms previously discussed are diffused in this case in order to understand EU as a normative power in the Arctic. 1.8 How the EU diffuses its norms and values Following Ian Manners’ work about a normative power Europe, we are able to identify five key factors that contribute to the diffusion of EU norms on the global stage. These factors will enable us to understand how the EU as an actor can be characterized in the case of Arctic and more precisely what the Union’s strategy towards this very region looks like. 1- The first factor, contagion, refers to the unintended diffusion of EU ideas to other political entities.
21 Ibidem.21 European Governance: A White Paper, Official Journal 287, Brussels: European Commission, 2001, 22http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-01-10_en.htm, accessed 30.06.2017. Manners, op.cit. 23 Wright, op.cit.24

2- The second factor is information and is linked with all the policy initiatives, public and strategic declarations and official communications used by the EU. 3- The procedural factor implies the institutionalization of relations between the EU and a third party, it can be accomplished through various cooperation agreements or memberships. 4- The Physical factor is tied with EU’s presence in external states or global organizations through the means of officials, delegations. 5- Transference is when the Union provides aid or any form of assistance, trades goods or uses financial methods to or against a third party. Economic rewards or sanctions can be an illustration of such factor. By putting these factors into evidence, Manners allows us to have a clear view on how EU diffuses its norms internationally. A crucial point in his work is that, when talking about EU as a normative power, the Union should be characterized into an entity that evolved to become a combination of international and supranational forms of governance, which permits the EU to set standards about what can be the norm in international affairs. 1.9 Soft Power The notion of Soft Power can be tied to Manners’ idea of normative power in the sense that soft power also implies the use of culture, political ideals, policies and values as opposed to exclusively economic and military methods. This also indicates that soft power can be defined as being different from functional capabilities. An analysis of the EU as a normative power in the Arctic region advocates that the Union relies on its soft power assets as an actor in the area. Therefore, the notion of soft power has to be further developed for us to include it in our research. Joseph S. Nye developed this idea of soft power in the 1990s. It is relevant to notice that this concept was initially introduced to explain American power. However, Nye admits that his concept of soft power can be employed by other actors and in fact makes Europe the closest opponent to the United States in soft power potential. In more precise terms, Nye’s definition 25of soft power is:
22Joseph S.Nye, Soft power: The means to success in world politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004.25

“The ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.’’ 26The interest of soft power is in this sense, to get others to envy your ideals and to hold an influence on the other actors’ actions in order to obtain the outcomes you desire. If you use soft power strategy successfully, it is not necessary anymore to spend on other tactics to get other actors to converge in your direction and it is a possibility to get the outcomes you wish without any sort of sanctions or threats. Nye also claims that seduction is more effective than coercion. 27Soft power is not about force nor money, there are other methods to produce cooperation. Soft power is about an unobservable attraction that convinces someone to go along with others’ ideas without any obvious threat or exchange being made. However, there is a common feature between soft and hard power, they both imply the ability to achieve an objective by influencing the behaviour of other actors. The key difference between soft and hard power consists of degree, both in terms of the nature of the action and in the tangibility of the resources. Co-optive power, namely the ability to shape what others desire, can rest on the attractiveness of one’s values and culture or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a way that makes others not to express some preferences. Command power refers to the ability to change what others do: it can rest on coercion or inducement. The types of behaviour between command and co-optive must be seen in a spectrum from coercion to economic inducement and from agenda setting to pure attraction. On the one hand, soft-power resources tend to be linked with the co-optive end of the spectrum. On the other hand, hard-power resources are usually associated with command actions. 28Nye assets that the resources that create soft power often arise from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, but can also come from the examples it sets in internal policies and most importantly in the way it interacts with others. This converges with 29Manners’ thought of the EU as a normative force in the sense that his concept also relies on the
23 Ibidem.26 Ibidem.27 Ibidem.28 Ibidem.29

assumption that the EU can be defined as something that differs from an actor that uses hard power mechanisms. 1.10 The Limits of Soft Power and Normative Power As previously mentioned, the EU still has not been granted with the Observer Status in the Arctic Council which illustrates that the Union failed to reach a desired outcome in this case. According to Nye, even if soft power and normative power are likely to lead to desired outcomes, it is not a certainty in every situation. Soft power is more reliant on the existence of willing receivers and with a comparable culture than hard actually power is. If you want to influence with soft power apparatuses, you will have a higher probability to fail if the receiving actors are not open and willing to be attracted to your ideals, which implies that not every objective can be attained through the means of soft power. The same can be claimed about normative power, with the exception that Manners does not entirely reduce the importance of realist power, but regards normative power as a relevant addition to the pattern. Nye does not entirely dismiss hard power but considers the combination of hard and soft power as being smart power. 30Manners states that what the EU symbolizes is as important as what it does. However, this claim can be contested because it is not a certainty that the EU can achieve influence in the Arctic simply by existing. Maybe the solution for the Union is to accomplish more than just relying on its values and identity because not every actor has the will or the possibility to align itself on the European model. The crucial point to remember is that not all situations can be dealt by only using soft power because there will always be factors that will cause the failure of such concepts. In the case of the EU and Arctic, the combination of normative power and soft power can be used to largely define the power of the Union, but these notions are not enough in order to explain every single issue that this thesis implies. 2. Evolution of Arctic Policies in the European Union The European Union has over the last decade become aware of its interests in the Arctic region and started to create and develop its own Arctic policy and strategy. It is now time to 24 Ibidem.30

analyze EU’s strategy towards the Arctic and try to understand the EU as a normative power in the region. The EU is in various ways connected to the Arctic area. Three Member States, Sweden, Finland and Denmark (Greenland/Faroe Islands), possess landmass in the Arctic. Norway and Iceland, which also are Arctic states are linked to the EU with their membership of the European Free Trade Agreement and are part of the European Economic Area (EEA). The EU is not a major geographical Arctic power but benefits from strong competences to act in the region by the means of its Arctic Member States, and through Iceland and Norway. The EEA agreement expands the geographical scope of EU laws beyond the simple territorial jurisdiction member states. This Agreement also puts in place a single market related to the four fundamental 31freedoms: free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. The EEA Agreement also covers policy areas with Arctic concern such as research and development and environment. Such agreement, forces Iceland and Norway to implement all necessary EU legislation in order to ensure a compatible legal model and the smooth functioning of the common market. Reports proved that roughly half of the overall fish resources caught in the Arctic are consumed by the EU and that one-quarter of oil and gas extracted in the Arctic goes to the Union, thereby contributing to its energy safety. Moreover, the EU represents the largest trading power and 32holds control over 40 percent of world commercial shipping, which implies a strategic interest in securing a direct access to the crucial Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest Passage (NWP). The EU uses many factors to justify and legitimize its presence and engagement in the Arctic. Since 2008 all three principal EU institutions, the Commission, the Parliament and the Council of the EU, have been involved in creating and developing efficient Arctic policies. In addition, many Arctic stakeholders have a presence in Brussels, whether they are EU or non-EU states, companies, associations or lobby groups. The Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy recently published a Joint Communication about the Arctic, which allegedly is an integrated European Union policy for the Arctic.
25Timo Koivurova et al., “The present and future competence of the European Union in the Arctic” in Polar 31Record, Cambridge University Press, V ol. 48 (4), 2012, pp. 361-371, http://www.arcticcentre.org/loader.aspx?id=a9db8fc6-feaa-4caf-8f5e-6528148c7b84, accessed 03.06.2017.Steffen Weber and Iulian Romanyshyn, “Breaking the Ice: The European Union and the Arctic” in 32International Journal, 66(4), 2011, pp. 849-860, http://eu-arctic-forum.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Steffen-Weber-Iulian-Romanyshyn.pdf, accessed 03.06.2017.

However, it appears that until today, no clear strategy on EU-Arctic issues has been in place. It can be perceived as delicate to understand exactly what the EU desires to achieve in the Arctic and what its concrete interest in the High North is. In order to respond to the issue of EU’s strategy towards the Arctic, it is relevant to detail precisely the steps that the Union accomplished regarding the development of an EU-Arctic Policy in the last decade. We will therefore necessary establish a chronological overview of the policies that have been adopted by the EU in this specific case. 2.1 2008 European Parliament Resolution on Arctic Governance Placing the Arctic on the agenda of the EU presented challenges such as reaching coherence and consensus within its internal institutional bodies and to have its interests and position recognized by other relevant Arctic actors outside the EU. The shaping of an EU-Arctic Policy must be seen as a continuous debate between actors and stakeholders with differing interests from inside and outside the EU institutional scheme. The European Parliament started the EU-Arctic Policy process with the 2008 resolution of Arctic governance and pointed out four matters that it wished the Commission will address in future Communication: 1. The state of play in relation to climate change, and adaptation to it, in the region; 2. Policy options that respect the indigenous populations and their livelihoods; 3. The need to cooperate with our Arctic neighbors and cross-border issues, in particular maritime safety: 4. Options for a future cross-border political or legal structure that could provide for the environmental protection and sustainable orderly development of the region or mediate political disagreement over resources and navigable waterways in the High North. 33The Parliament further suggested a new multilateral convention for the Arctic relying on inspiration from the existing Antarctic Treaty from 1959. By suggesting this, the Parliament 34expressed doubts over the rights of the Arctic coastal states as stipulated under the Law of the Sea as described earlier. This proposal was entirely refused by the Arctic states. It wasn’t 26 European Parliament Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance, Brussels: European Parliament, 33October 9th 2008, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+20081009+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN, accessed 03.06.2017. Ibidem.34

necessarily the wisest proposal from the EU especially considering its goal of becoming an Arctic power. In this resolution, the Parliament urges the Commission to adopt a proactive role in the Arctic by asking for the Observer Status in the Arctic Council. To summarize, the Parliament’s resolution on Arctic governance was the first official document to set the stage for further development of an EU-Arctic Policy. Arguably, the EU did not start on the best possible course with proposals that were not well received by some of the other Arctic states and in particular Canada and its Indigenous Peoples. 2.2 2008 European Commission Communication Following the 2008 Parliament resolution, the European Commission adopted its first Arctic Communication. The institution identified 49 proposals for potential measures and placed them under three different key policy objectives. The Commission identifies some realist issues such as the eventuality for international instability as a consequence of changing geostrategic equilibrium in the Arctic because of climate shift, but moves on to suggest three liberal or normative solutions: 1. Protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population. 2. Promoting sustainable use of resources. 3. Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance. 35These three policy objectives listed by the Commission can be defined as liberal answers to realist problems, which implies that the Commission uses a mixed approach in its development of an EU-Arctic Policy. 1.Protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population For the first policy objective about protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population, the aim is to prevent the negative impact of climate change and to support the
27 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The European Union 35and the Artic Region, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, COM(2008) 763 final, November 20th 2008, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/arctic_region/docs/com_08_763_en.pdf, accessed 04.06.2017.

transition to inevitable changes. The Commission sets out several proposals for action but many of them can be declared as unclear. The rights of Indigenous Peoples is also a topic in the Communication. The Commission is clearly declaring its respect for Indigenous Peoples based on core principles as human rights and democracy and as the Commission specify: “Hunting marine mammals has been crucial for the subsistence of the Arctic population since prehistoric times and the right to maintain their traditional livelihood is clearly recognized.” On the other hand, the Commission expresses its 36concern for animal welfare and indicates the eventuality of banning seal products under the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning trade in seal products. The EU simultaneously vows for the respect of the rights of Indigenous Peoples in 37the Arctic but proposes a regulation that challenges the indigenous way of life by going against seal products, which seems controversial and makes the EU appear as in contradiction with itself. 2.Promoting sustainable use of resources The second policy objective about the promotion sustainable use of resources focuses on resources such as fisheries, hydrocarbons, transport and tourism as areas where the EU needs to act. The Commission claims an interest for securing EU energy demands through the resources present in the Arctic, but also ensures its respect for international law and environmental norms. Here the EU actually has some proposals for action that are more concrete than usual, including improving maritime surveillance capabilities in the North and keeping the competitive lead of European shipyards in the development of technologies required for Arctic conditions, which the EU regards as important assets for the future. 3.Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance The third policy objective about enhancing Arctic multilateral governance relies on the Commission’s doubts about what they perceive as a division of the legal framework. 28 Ibidem.36 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning trade in seal 37products, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, COM(2008) 469 final, 2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52008PC0469, accessed 04.06.2017.

There is no concrete treaty regime concerning the Arctic. No country or group of countries have territorial sovereignty over the North Pole and the surrounding Arctic. Many maritime borders exist for which Arctic coastal states have no consensus upon the delimitation of the EEZ. Moreover, differing interpretations of the conditions for passage of ships in some Arctic waters, especially in the Northwest Passage exist and concern the EU. Yet, the Commission refuse to embrace the proposal for an Arctic Treaty inspired by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty as requested by the Parliament. Instead, the Commission recognizes UNCLOS as the relevant international legal framework that is legitimized to regulate Arctic issues. In other terms, the EU criticizes the already existing legal model, but does not state on how it plans to improve the situation, other than to continue further cooperative Arctic governance relying on UNCLOS. In fact, despite the rather explicit critique of the functioning of the legal framework, the EU does not propose new legal instruments but instead assures full implementation of already existing obligations. The first step that the Commission wants to do in order to support its third policy objective is through its application for the Observer Status in the Arctic Council. To put it in a nutshell, the Commission asserts that the suggestions made in its Communication are created with the goal of reaching a more detailed reflection, implying that this Communication constitutes the first step of an EU-Arctic Policy. In the early stages, the EU has a strategy in its policy development that is heavily based on norms which the EU traditionally represents. At the same time, the EU challenges the Arctic communities by proposing a regulation that would ban seal products from its internal market. This proposal touches upon a sensitive topic for the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic which traditionally rely on seal hunt and trade. Only the Permanent Members of the Arctic Council are empowered to grant the EU with the Observer Status, a decision that must be taken on consensus, which imply that the EU may be risking its chances of being granted such status by proposing to implement this kind of regulation. Moreover, the EU is very explicit in its critique about the functioning of the international legal framework on Arctic matters but fails to give specific proposals on how to solve the problems. 29

Overall it can be said that the EU has not been capable after these two communications of achieving its desired outcomes in relations to Nye’s idea of soft power. The EU failed in getting Canada and its Indigenous People to embrace its values and still suffers from the consequences of their conflict with indigenous people. The Communication is a good example of a norm diffusion from the EU in international relations. Developing this kind of official Communication can be identified as the “Informational” factor previously described, in which the EU wishes to diffuse its ideas and norms for the Arctic at the global level. However, the policy objectives of the Communication remain unclear and lacks a specific plan of actions on how to move forward on the declared three goals. Finally, it seems that the Commission tries there to answer to realist security threats with normative mechanisms, which raises the question of the adequate development of this Communication. 2.3 2009 Council Conclusions on Arctic Issues In 2009 the Council expressed several conclusions on Arctic matters and welcomed the Commission Communication of 2008 mentioned above. The Council felt that EU policy towards the Arctic should be based on effective implementation of relevant measures to alleviate climate change through UNCLOS and elements of multilateral governance. The Council stipulates 23 38steps that need to be taken into account in the development of an EU-Arctic Strategy including: 1- Support for sustainable development for indigenous peoples’ subsistence. 2- Increased collaboration with the Arctic Council in which the Council is recognized as the major competent body for circumpolar Arctic cooperation. 3- Increased support for research on Arctic related issues. The Council also expresses its support for the Commission to become an Observer in the Arctic and ends its conclusion by demanding the Commission to issue a report on progress made on Arctic matters with June 2011 as a deadline. It appears that the Council is less critical on the international legal framework than the Commission and we can conclude on this point by recognizing the Council as having more positive attitude towards cooperation in the Arctic. 30 Council Conclusions on Arctic issues, Brussels: Council of the European Union, December 8th 2009, 38https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/files/docs/body/arctic_council_conclusions_09_en.pdf, accessed 04.06.2017.

However, the Council conclusions were not enough to persuade the Permanent Members of the Arctic Council to allow the EU as an Observer. Even if the Union is active in the Arctic Council on an ad hoc basis, an institutionalized relationship still remains to be achieved. In other words, the EU is physically present in the Arctic Council, but still lacks the official Observer Status. Surely the EU desires to benefit from a full range of instruments in order to place itself around the Arctic table, and so far it has not entirely managed to do so. 2.4 2011 European Parliament Resolution on a Sustainable EU Policy for the High North Following the Council Conclusions in 2009, the EP came ready with a new resolution on sustainable EU Policy for the High North in 2011. The resolution recognizes the EC Communication as the first layer towards an EU-Arctic Policy and the Council Conclusions as a complementary step in defining an EU-Arctic Policy. Like the Council, the Parliament argues 39that the progressive formulation of an EU-Arctic Policy should have for basis the recognition of the multilateral international legal framework already in place (UNCLOS) and stated: "The legitimate interest of the EU and other third countries as stakeholders by virtue of their rights and obligations under international law, its commitments to environmental, climate and other policies […] thus concludes that the Arctic region is not to be regarded as a legal vacuum, but as an area with well developed tools for governance; nevertheless points out, due to the challenges of climate change and increasing economic development, those existing rules need to be further developed, strengthened and implemented by all parties concerned.’’ 40As a deduction, the EP follows the same course as set forward by the Council and strongly advises for the development an EU-Arctic Policy by recognizing the existing international law despite the doubts expressed by the EC back in 2008. This implies that the EU is shifting towards an even more normative guidance, while the potential thought of geopolitical concerns in the Arctic is absent from the resolution or in the previous Council Conclusions.
31 European Parliament resolution of 20 January 2011 on a sustainable EU policy for the High North, 39Strasbourg: European Parliament, January 20th 2011, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0024+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, accessed 04.06.2017. Ibidem.40

It is also relevant to notice that the Parliament’s stated that the EU has to endorse a leading role in fighting climate change, while the EU holds a special responsibility in this area as a highly developed region in the world. We assisted here for the first time to the EU stipulating 41something concrete about what role it should adopt in the Arctic area, even though it is not clearly articulated how this duty of being a leading fighter against climate change should be accomplished. In general, this resolution focuses more on the role of non-Arctic states, which they hope will be highly included in the decision-making process of the Arctic Council. We can thereby observe that this document contains some desired goals that the EU expects to be successfully attained. The identified need for a coordinated and united EU-Arctic Policy, in which EU’s priorities and strategy are clearly coined, is again mentioned by the Parliament in this resolution, but the imperative urgency for coherence in every EU policy regarding he Arctic is also pointed out. 2.5 2012 Joint Communication: Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region. Progress since 2008 and further steps In 2012 the Commission and the newly created European External Action Service published a late Joint Communication, which was initially due by June 2011. This document was given the title of a progress report of an EU-Arctic Policy and represents the logic following of the first Commission Communication of 2008. It also answers to the 2009 Council Conclusions and the 2011 European Parliament resolution. The Communication establishes a way forward on the manner that the EU should act in the Arctic based on three key words: engagement, knowledge and responsibility. Following the words of the 2008 Communication, this document 42can be regarded as the second step of an EU-Arctic Policy. In the executive summary, the emphasized priority clearly is fighting climate mutations and intensifying cooperation with fellow Arctic partners. The EU sees itself as the world’s most
32 Ibidem.41 Joint Communication tot the European Parliament and the Council: Developing a European Union Policy 42towards the Artic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps, Brussels: European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, JOIN(2012) 19 final, June 26th 2012, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/arctic_region/docs/join_2012_19.pdf, accessed 06.06.2017. Ibidem.43

prominent force in terms of effort to fight climate change. The EU knows that this represents a 43serious opportunity that can be used to gain influence and to legitimize its presence in the Arctic. Beside the executive summary, this Joint Communication details the EU’s contributions to the Arctic, with actions such as countering climate change, being a funding force in relation to research, investing in sustainable development, providing support to Indigenous Peoples, shipping and maritime safety. For example, it is indicated that the EU has contributed with 44more than 1.4 billion euro in financial support for sustainable development of the Arctic from 2007 to 2013 and granted around 200 million euro of EU funding to global research activities in the region through the Seventh Framework Programme. For the 2014-2020 financial timespan, 45EU officials have promised to increase Arctic research through eight different Innovation Programs, Horizon 2020. These contributions and intentions are a serious sign of how the EU relies on its fundamental norms with sustainable development being one of the most the prominent illustrations. In addition to the detailed description about the progress done concerning the first three policy objectives presented in the 2008 Communication, this document also presents a way forward for the future EU engagement with Arctic partners and once again points out the need for a targeted and coherent EU-Arctic Policy towards the Arctic. The policy development is based on three new policy objectives: 1.Support research and channel knowledge to address the challenges of environmental and climate changes in the Arctic; 2. Act responsibly to contribute to ensuring economic development in the Arctic based on sustainable use of resources and environmental expertise; 3. Intensify the Union’s constructive engagement and discussion with Arctic States, indigenous peoples and other concerned partners. 46We can observe a change in the manner the EU presents its policy goals to the international community in comparison to the first Communication, with new central ideas of
33 Ibidem.44 Ibidem.45 Ibidem.46

Knowledge, Responsibility, and Engagement. Former criticized allusions to multilateral governance in the Arctic are here replaced by value-free headings of international cooperation. Perhaps shaped by the negative reaction of some Arctic States to previous statements and the need to make more friends in support of the Commission’s bid for Observer Status, in which the Arctic Council was to decide on in 2013. With regards to the actual policy, the objectives are almost unchanged comparing to the 2008 Communication. The main objectives of this Joint Communication are similar to the ones presented in the first Communication with emphasis on climate change, cooperation with the people living in the Arctic and research. The EU desires to engage more with its Arctic partners in order to become aware of their concerns and also to address common issues in a cooperative approach. Compared to the 49 proposals for action in the 2008 Communication, the new Joint Communication has no indication of any benchmarks and no action plan is presented or mentioned. This suggests that the document lacks a strategy on the way forward and proposals for action on how the EU can reach its goals in the Arctic. However, the form in which the new document presents the objectives to the international community is radically different from 2008. The Joint Communication provides a balanced report of EU’s engagement, contributions, interests and details about the progress made since 2008, but lack some precise propositions for action and vision. The new document is closer to the idea of the Parliament resolution, maybe due to previous critics from Arctic states on EU’s insistent rhetoric, and presents knowledge, responsibility and engagement as ideas that underlies the principles of EU’s approach. In other words, the previous claims for better multilateral governance, which caused some resistance, have been replaced by beliefs of global cooperation. Without any doubt, this Joint Communication also sends a message to the Arctic Council and continues to add legitimacy to EU’s presence in the Arctic. The EU is relying on the Joint Communication as representing values that will be appealing and will attract other Arctic stakeholders and once again uses elements of soft power in order to achieve its desired targets related to the Arctic. 2.6 2014 European Parliament Resolution on the EU strategy for the Arctic 34

The EP published a new resolution on EU strategy for the Arctic in 2014 in the continuation of the Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative of 2012 discussed above. The Parliament accepts the Joint Communication, but defines it as a building block and still calls for coherent strategic components and a more concrete plan on EU’s engagement in the Arctic. The ban of seal products remains once again on the list of 47concerns, as the EU did not obtain Observer Status in 2013 at an Arctic Council Ministerial meeting in Sweden. However, The Arctic Council decided to positively receive EU’s application only if the seal products issue between the EU and Canada is solved. The Parliament requested the Commission to follow up on the seal situation with Canada and repeated its regrets over the effects that the EU regulation has caused for the indigenous populations and their cultures. The Parliament also calls for more coherence in EU policies and emphasizes: ‘‘The need to bear in mind the interests of the EU and the European Arctic states and regions when utilizing, amending or developing EU programs or policies that do or can affect the Arctic, so that they serve the Arctic region as a whole.’’ 48In general, the Parliament admits the progress made since 2008 but still asks the Commission to pursue the development of an EU- Arctic Strategy. 2.7 2014 Council Conclusions on developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region The European Council welcomes in 2014 the Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative and takes account of the 2014 Parliament resolution. The Council agrees that the EU should amplify its contribution to Arctic cooperation and views the region as one of growing importance. Concerning the seal issue between the EU and Canada, the Council 49advises Canada to take advantage of the positive momentum in EU-Canada relations in order to solve the conflict and allow the full implementation of the decision taken in Sweden about
35 European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the EU strategy for the Arctic, Strasbourg: 47European Parliament, March 12th 2014, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-0236&language=EN, accessed 06.06.2017. Ibidem.48 Council conclusions on developing a European Union Policy towards the Artic Region, Brussels: Council 49of the European Union, May 12th 2014, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142554.pdf, accessed 06.06.2017.

granting the EU Observer Status when the issue is resolved. Later in 2014 it was declared that the EU and Canada had sorted out a deal. The EU would exempt indigenous seal products from the European market ban and Canada should in return agree to lift its reservations concerning EU’s bid for Observer Status in the Arctic Council. Canada honoured its promise and lifted its 50veto at the 2014 Iqaluit ministerial Arctic Council meeting. However, Russia prevented the EU from gaining its formal status as Observer in the Arctic Council. Moscow had its own strategic motivations related to the bad relations between EU and Russia as consequence of the Ukrainian conflict. The situation did not change as no progress were made at the Fairbanks ministerial meetings on May 2017. 2.8 2016 Joint Communication: An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic The Commission and the High Representative recently presented their Joint Communication to the Council and the Parliament. After two policy Communications with no clear and coherent direction, it could be said that the time came for the EU to precise its strategy and role in the Arctic area. Therefore, we will now analyse the third layer of the policy development and examine whether the EU succeeded in developing a more specific EU-Arctic strategy. First, the headline of the Communication stands out from the previous ones, while this one is titled as: an integrated European Union policy for the Arctic. The focus on integration is 51interesting because it is not defined in the Communication what is considered as integration in relation to EU-Arctic Policy. The understanding of the word integrated would mean that the policy is more than just a sum of its parts and somehow represents Arctic-related cross-actions supporting each other. This is unfortunately not the case and in the Communication there is no longer allusions to common policy objectives, now called priority areas, which basically display
36 Duncan Depledge, “The EU and the Arctic Council. European Council on Foreign Relations” in Wider 50Europe Forum, April 20th 2015, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_eu_and_the_arctic_council3005, accessed 06.06.2017. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An Integrated European Union Policy 51for the Arctic, Brussels: European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, JOIN (2016) 21 final, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/arctic_region/docs/160427_joint-communication-an-integrated-european-union-policy-for-the-arctic_en.pdf, accessed 08.06.2017.

EU presence in the Arctic. However, these priority points need further examination to see if they contain more specific measures for action in relation to the Arctic. The introduction of this document sets out the case for an EU-Arctic Policy with an emphasis on international cooperation, a response to the consequences of climate change and promoting and contributing to sustainable development with a particular focus on the European portion of the Arctic. This illustrates for the first time that the EU his more conscious of its own 52strategic priorities in terms of where it should act in the Arctic zone and addresses the European Arctic as an area of central priority. The Communication notes that dealing with climate change in the Arctic is part of EU’s harder efforts to combat climate shifts and its consequences. According to the Commission and the High Representative, the EU-Arctic Policy will be an important feature in successfully implementing the global agreement reached in Paris at the 21st Conference of the Parties under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2015, which sets out a global action pattern with aim the limitation of global warming to below 2°C. The EU views itself as a leader in such issues and expresses its duty to protect the Arctic environment by the means the Paris Agreement. Moreover, the focus in the introduction of this document is on developing the European Arctic with funding in sustainable growth and job creation that can see potential benefits emerge across the EU. It looks like this Communication is more detailed about engaging in the European part of the Arctic, whereas the former focus was wider. Finally, the introduction highlights the increasing strategic importance of the High North and underlines the higher profile of the Arctic area on the global stage with countries like China, Japan and India having Observer Status within the Arctic Council, and stresses that it is of crucial importance to ensure that the Arctic remains a zone of peace, prosperity and constructive international cooperation based on dialogue. Following this introduction, the Communication establishes three areas of priority: 531. Climate Change and Safeguarding the Arctic Environment; 2. Sustainable Development in and around the Arctic; 3. International Cooperation on Arctic Issues.
37 Ibidem.52 Ibidem.53

The EU considers research, science and innovation as primarily important and predicts these to have a central role across all three areas of priority mentioned above. At a first sight, these priorities appear to be somewhat resemblant to the areas of the 2012 Joint Communication with a strong insistence on cooperation and climate change. However, they have a different form, from being previously named policy objectives and now becoming priority areas. 1. Climate Change and Safeguarding the Arctic Environment In the first priority about climate change and safeguarding the Arctic environment, matters related to the area are identified. The Communication points consequences of climate change with the summer sea ice having decreased by more than 40 % since 1979. The melting permafrost allows land to subside, impoverishing habitats and harming infrastructure. The global rise of temperatures contributes to the melting of the Greenlandic ice, which implies the rising Ocean levels and play a role in modifying precipitations schemes in the northern part of our planet. The thawing permafrost releases carbon dioxide and methane in a broad scale, which has an influence over the Arctic but also well the global climate. 54The policy answers to these problems are mainly based on research. The EU is a major contributor to Arctic research and believes that a better understanding of the developments in the area as a key response to such issues. The main policy responses regarding research are: – The EU wishes to maintain its current funding levels for Arctic research, which has been around 200 million euro in the past decade, under the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (2014-2020); -The EU-PolarNet initiative will be a central plank of EU’s Arctic research efforts. The plan is that 22 European research institutions will develop and deliver an integrated European polar research program; -EU space programs will support EU research on climate change in the Arctic through the operational infrastructure and services of Copernicus. In supplement to research as a policy answer, this Communication puts other objectives into evidence, which are in compliance with the Paris agreement to limit global average temperatures increases below 2 °C and make an effort to limit the temperature increase to 1,5 °C. 38 Ibidem.54

The EU is therefore committed to reduce its total greenhouse gas emissions by 40 % until 2030 and 80 % by 2050, in comparison with 1990 levels. Moreover, the EU has committed itself to spend 20 % of EU budget on climate-related goals. In other terms, the policy objectives presented in this Communication, which is 55supposed to correspond to the Arctic, is in fact a copy of the engagements made by the EU in the Paris agreements. It can be understood as an expression of the EU building on its own broader policies, already existing frameworks and actions. It can also be seen as a way of integrating EU-Arctic policies into a wider EU policy context. Finally, in the first area of priority the EU encourages an entire respect of UNCLOS and aims at protecting, preserving and improving the Arctic environment. The EU declares itself ready to collaborate with Arctic states and other international actors to develop an apparatus under UNCLOS for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in zones located beyond national jurisdiction. 2. Sustainable Development in and around the Arctic In the second area of priority about sustainable development in and around the Arctic, the EU puts a special spotlight on the European Arctic, a region that has a low and dispersed population over a wide zone and can be defined by its lack of transport connections, which is viewed as a major challenge. To resolve this specific challenge, the EU states that it can play a key role in shaping the future development of the European Arctic with the help of Member States and its close links with Iceland and Norway but also Greenland. The EU then continues to list its already existing polices and funding programs such as the EU’s Cohesion Policy that supports investments in the European Arctic or the Northern Periphery Program and Arctic Program. The issue here is not the quality of these existing programs but the fact that instead of creating new proposals for action the EU simply lists existing schemes and fails to express how it plans to use these in order to resolve the issues related to transportation. The EU wishes to support sustainable innovation and deployment of innovative technologies in the Arctic and asserts that in addition to the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme, the European Structural and Investment Funds grants funding for research and 39 Ibidem.55

innovation actions in the European Arctic. No new proposals for actions are put forward and 56the Commission is keen on continuing to support activities through mainly its funding programs and already established networks. Thus, the EU is once again building upon an existing policy framework, which could be a way of integrating the Arctic policy. 3. International Cooperation on Arctic Issues The third area of priority about global cooperation on Arctic matters is primarily a listing of the places where the EU is already cooperating with other international organizations, while it is listed that: – The EU recognizes UNCLOS. – The EU will continue its active participation within the Arctic Council. – The EU will continue to support regional and sub-regional cooperation. – The EU wants to cooperate with all Arctic partners, including Canada, Russia and the United States and engage with all states that take interest in the Arctic such as China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore. – The EU will continue to engage with Arctic indigenous peoples and local communities. 57The EU views itself as a global force in terms of science and considers it to be the most relevant mechanism to promote a common understanding about solutions and preserve peaceful cooperation in the Arctic. The EU uses this third area of priority in order to promote its fundamental norms such as the respect for the rule of law, promotion of global cooperation and dialogue rather than to provide new propositions for action. To summarize, the EU-Arctic Policy appears more as a list of previously existing EU-Arctic strategies and activities rather than new proposals. The main role of this Document is to communicate the range of EU’s presence in the Arctic area and to prove to the rest of the Arctic actors that the Union has a smart understanding of the region. This communication also states the major principles and norms which the EU desires to follow in its different Arctic activities. However, we can have the feeling that this Joint Communication is more a list of facts rather 40 Ibidem.56 Ibidem.57

than commitments to action. On a more positive aspect, it seems that the EU has become more conscious of the European part of the Arctic as a region of central importance and has augmented its references to the European Arctic in comparison to the first two Communications, which implies that the EU has come a step closer of defining a clear strategy towards the Arctic. The Joint Communication is not an action plan on how to move forward and this can be explained by the caution that the Commission and the High Representative have about not offending any of the Arctic States, which has been the case with previous policies. Yet, it does represent a slightly more precise strategy with the increased focus on the European Arctic. The overall result of this policy can be considered as not so integrated but not so disappointing. 2.9 How such EU policies translate in terms of Normative Power EU’s quest to become an Observer in the Arctic Council has affected the discussion for several years. As mentioned, the EU application for Observer Status was affirmatively received at the 2013 Arctic Council meeting in Sweden and agreed in theory but had to wait until the issue concerning the ban of seal products was solved with Canada, and it was agreed that the EU should continue its engagement in the Council as an ad hoc observer. After many years 58focusing its attention to the issue, the EU has to choose how much energy it is willing to spend on obtaining a symbolic Observer Status, while EU’s participation in the various Working Groups of the Arctic Council is not obstructed by the lack of formal status. In complement, EU representatives have been participating on an ad hoc basis in the meetings of the Arctic Council during the last decade. The EU has in this way an already active presence in many ways when it comes to the Arctic Council and maybe the Union should try to move past the question of Observer Status and use its influence in other facets of its Arctic engagement. The EU is also active in other Arctic bodies and has contributed to develop and pursue rules that influence the Arctic, such as the Northern Dimension, the Polar Code, and the Integrated Maritime Policy. It is a certainty that the EU has a role to play in both the Arctic Council and in many other forums for Arctic cooperation, and this regardless of any official status. Despite the exemption in the regulation regarding the seal hunt of Indigenous Peoples, the EU possesses no kind of normative power in this specific case. This has been shown 41 Steffen Weber, “The development of an EU Arctic Policy: Interests, objectives, and initiatives” in Andris 58Sprūds and Toms Rostoks (eds.), Perceptions and Strategies of Arcticness in Sub-Arctic Europe, Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2014.

numerous times by Canada in the Arctic Council when using their veto against EU Observer Status and it illustrated EU’s failure to attain its objectives in this particular matter. The Commission and the Directorate General for Environment ordered a report about EU’s footprints on the Arctic environment based on current EU policies, which were published in 2010. This 59report proved that the EU has not secured an indigenous component into its policy-making process, which could explain why it has failed to be granted the Observer Status: ‘‘A strong Arctic indigenous component is also lacking in EU trade and environmental policies and because of this, the rights and interest of indigenous communities are often not included in the policy-making process.’’ 60If the EU had included the interests of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and all Arctic sealing communities in the policy-making process about banning seal products off the European market, the situation for the EU in the Arctic Council could have evolved and EU’s legitimacy as an actor in the High North may have benefitted. EU’s normative power would most likely have 61been stronger if they had included all concerned stakeholders and indeed if they had included the Arctic Indigenous Peoples in the policy-making process. Arctic research may be the area where the EU has the most important leverage and possibility for diffusing its ideals regarding the Arctic, while the EU is an economic power and has so far proven its desire to provide funding to Arctic research. Being a leader in science, research and innovation permits the EU to shape what is normal in international relations, which is a central point in Ian Manners’ normative approach. When the Union promotes science and research as key instruments for collaboration, it also sends a message to the rest of its fellow Arctic partners that science and research is the way to adopt in order to move forward and hence science diplomacy could become another important norm for the EU to rely on in international affairs. By setting global standards and commitments, the EU is relying on the cultural factor as the one that shapes EU norm diffusion internationally, while these climate standards can be viewed as a kind of political learning to adaptation of the initiatives set forward by the EU.
42 EU Arctic Footprint and Policy Assessment: Final Report, Berlin: Ecologic Institute, December 21st 2010, 59http://arctic-footprint.eu/sites/default/files/AFPA_Final_Report.pdf, accessed 10.06.2017. Ibidem.60Nikolas Sellheim, Legislating the blind spot. The EU seal regime and the Newfoundland seal hunt, 61Academic Dissertation, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, 2016.

When the EU sets a good example in fighting climate change by creating policies with goals and commitments, its normative power is amplified. When the EU is perceived as a leading force concerning climate change, it makes the other actors and stakeholders attracted to this example, which is in compliance with Joseph Nye’s notion of soft power, as the idea of soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion and to get other to admire your ideals. 3. Other Power’s Arctic Policies All eight Arctic nations have well-established and concrete plans for action in the Arctic area. Based on the changing environmental conditions, potential economic gains, and the chance to create High North sovereignty, Arctic nations such as Canada, Denmark, Finland, and Russia have developed Arctic policies to secure their nation’s safety, security, access to natural resources, and sovereignty. All eight Arctic states are part of the Arctic Council and advocate for it as a tool for discussion and cooperation. However, the Council’s decisions are not binding and remain yet to be challenged. The recent addition of the non-Arctic observers could be an example of such challenge and could foster the group’s ability to work together on common answers. 3.1 Russia’s Arctic policy Russia is the most active country in the Arctic so far. This can be explained by the fact that Russia holds the greatest territorial interest in the region with more than 6400 kilometers of Arctic coastline. Although most of the Russian Arctic is still undeveloped, Russia views great security and economic potential in the area. In February 2013, Russia revealed its long-term strategic program related to the Arctic. Signed by President Vladimir Putin, the plan includes the creation and development of an integrated transport system in the Arctic, the establishment of a research and development centre, more focus on the technological domain, improved global cooperation, and the preservation of peace in the Arctic. 6243 “The development strategy of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation”, The International Expert 62Council on Cooperation in the Arctic, April 14th 2013, http://www.iecca.ru/en/legislation/strategies/item/99-the-development-strategy-of-the-arctic-zone-of-the-russian-federation, accessed 14.06.2017.

The new Arctic policy is very wide ranging and treats with almost every aspect of Arctic concerns. More specifically, it ensures assistance for infrastructure development in the field of transportation, commercial industry, and the energy sector. In terms of military presence in the Arctic, in March 2009, the Russian Federation announced plans in 2009 to create a military force to protect its Arctic interests, due to the increasing importance of the Arctic area. The National Security Strategy stipulates increased defence and border security in the Arctic. Like its Arctic partners, Russia also plans on augmenting infrastructures and deep-water ports and developing a higher icebreaking capability. Like the other Arctic nations, except the USA, Russia is a signatory to UNCLOS. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) first became a signatory in 1982 and UNCLOS was later ratified in 1997 by the Russian Federation. Russia has used the provisions of UNCLOS to claim sovereignty, especially along the NSR, which passes through the northern part of Russia’s EEZ. Russia is using UNCLOS provisions in an attempt to practice control over the NSR by demanding vessels to seek permits and submit themselves to inspection due to the ice conditions. This is considered an overstep of authority by other nations such as the USA. In relation to the Arctic council, Russia has also been an active and, at times, contested member. In 2012, Russia suspended their indigenous group assigned to work with the Council. Besides the eight member nations, there are six aboriginal groups that represent a quarter of million native inhabitants of the Arctic throughout the region. Such groups are not allowed to vote on Council matters, but are consulted on activities and also participate in the meetings. The suspension reflects a strong division between the Russian delegation and its aboriginal group about how to manage Arctic issues. It was the first time in the Council’s history that a party has been suspended of the proceedings. In terms of economic power and resource development, Russia has interests in the rich natural resources, such as oil and gas, present in the Arctic that may lie well beyond the traditional limits of the EEZ. Russia is engaged in various studies to prove the nation’s request for an extended continental shelf to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. A previous claim of this kind was already refuted in 2001. According to the 2009 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, Russian prosperity and global competitiveness rely on the wealth of resources in the Arctic. The 44

document estimates that a fifth of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and twenty percent of exports are due to the Russian Arctic. 63Russia asserts that the NSR, which goes along the nation’s entire northern border, is within the country’s jurisdiction and should therefore be subject to its national rules. The NSR is a potential strategic shipping route as it may tremendously reduce shipping times and distance from Europe to Asia. An eventual control over this route would expand Russia’s strategic position in the world. 3.2 Denmark’s Arctic Policy The Kingdom of Denmark (composed of Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands) has taken a multi-dimensional approach to Arctic policy. The quickly shifting natural environment led to a 2011-2020 National Arctic Strategy relying on key principles such as: a development from which all the Arctic inhabitants are benefiting from, global cooperation, acting in a responsible manner when making decisions about the use of resources and environmental protection. This measures demand for more scientific research, heavier military means 64disposed in Greenland, economic growth, and the recognition of UNCLOS as the needed legal framework in the Arctic area. Concerning security and sovereignty, the crucial objective of the Danish Arctic Plan is to make sure that the Arctic remains peaceful and protected by putting in place maritime safety and surveillance apparatuses. To ensure this goal, the country is planning to broaden its military presence in the area. In this sense, the Greenland Command and the Faroe Command will therefore be combined, becoming a joint Arctic Command. The Armed Forces North Atlantic command will also be modified, all of this hopefully resulting into an improved and smoother control over and defence and security forces in the Arctic region. 65
45 “Dmitry Medvedev, Speech at meeting of the Russian Security Council on Protecting Russia’s National 63Interest in the Arctic”, President of Russia Website, September 17th 2008, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/09/17/1945_type82912type82913_206564.shtml, accessed 14.06.2017. Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 64Greenland and the Faroe Islands, August 2011, p.10, http://library.arcticportal.org/1890/1/DENMARK.pdf, accessed 20.09.2017. Ibidem, p.20.65

The Danish Defence Agreement of 2010–2014 contains clear provisions regarding Greenland and the Arctic. The accord guarantees the establishment of an Arctic Response Force in order to comply with the rising potential security threats in the Arctic. The Arctic Response 66Force will take on diverse tasks, principally with the aim of preserving awareness and sovereignty within the Arctic. 67Denmark also plans to obtain a higher Arctic maritime awareness through a military upgrade of its facilities in Greenland. The plan also demands a detailed study of maritime traffic in the zone around Greenland to tackle issues emerging due to the increasing maritime traffic, implying a higher risk of ship collisions, oil spills and other threatening events. 68As far as the respectful exploitation of resources and environmental protection are concerned, Denmark considers the defrost of the Arctic iced areas as a chance to take advantage of the tremendous resources available in both Arctic land and sea. Greenland contains an abundant reserve of oil, gas and diverse minerals. The agreement highlights Denmark’s desire to exploit the natural resources, but also states the importance of acting in compliance with respectful international behaviours and lead the way in terms of transparency and environmental standards. 69The exploitation of resources can only be achieved alongside a solid understanding of the delicate and prone to quick changes nature of the Arctic environment. Such actions should contribute to overall economic growth, mainly concerning employment and inclusion for Arctic inhabitants. The Arctic also represents a source of growth in terms of renewable energy for Denmark. By means of the multiplication of its hydroelectric power structures, the country’s will is to produce a third of its overall electricity creation through the use of renewable origins by the end of the decade. Denmark has historically been a frontrunner regarding climate change debates and how it affects the global environment. In terms of international cooperation regarding the Arctic, Denmark’s inclination for the future of the Arctic area relies on securing a peaceful collaboration among Arctic states, non-Arctic ones and other relevant actors, with the ultimate desire to guarantee a responsible
46 Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014, Danish Ministry of Defence, June 24th 2009, p.12, http://66merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Denmark2010–2014English.pdf, accessed 20.09.2017. Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020, op.cit. 67 Ibidem, p.24.68 Ibidem, p.30.69

exploitation of available resources within established international standards. The country’s principal way of building sovereignty in the region has been through the UNCLOS framework, ratified in 2004 and its active role within the Arctic Council. 70Denmark’s efforts were pivotal in the advancement of the Arctic Search and Rescue agreement. The country chaired the Arctic Council from 2009 to 2011 and during its mandate, hosted a Foreign Ministers meeting (2011) that resulted in the adoption of the Nuuk Declaration, which highlights the role and criteria for Council observers, installed a permanent Council secretariat in Norway, and formed a task force with the mission of tackling oil spills in the Arctic. In 2010, the Danes firmly advised the Council to be more generous in allowing the observer status for non-Council candidates. In this sense, they claimed that the evolution of the Arctic is a phenomenon that does not only concern the eight nations crossed by the North Pole, and that “giving other nations some kind of formal observer status on the Arctic Council may be the best way to ensure its continuing influence—allowing other countries inside the tent may be the best way to keep it standing.” 713.3.Canada’s Arctic policy In the words of former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, “Canada’s Arctic is central to our identity as a northern nation. It is part of our history and it represents the tremendous potential of our future.” Canada’s Arctic ties are contiguous; the country has taken 72a two way approach based defence and diplomacy towards the Arctic. In 2010, Canada released a new “Statement of Canada’s Arctic Policy,” which confirmed the government’s engagement towards sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic, social and economic advancement, environmental conservation and protection of indigenous peoples living in the area. The Canadian Arctic Policy takes source in the country’s Northern Strategy initially launched in 2007 and later continued in 2009. The four priority domains of this policy are
47 Convention on the Law of the Sea, op.cit.70 "Arctic Council Must Warm to Others: Denmark,” The Canadian Press, May 31st 2011, http://71www.ctvnews.ca/arctic-council-must-warm-to-others-denmark-1.517367, accessed 21.09.2017. “Harper on Arctic: ‘Use it or Lose It”, Times Colonist, July 10th 2007, http://www.canada.com/topics/72news/story.html?id=7ca93d97–3b26–4dd1–8d92–8568f9b7cc2a, accessed 27.09.2017.

ensuring Arctic sovereignty, protecting Canada’s environmental legacy, promoting and active socio-economic development, and improving northern cooperation and governance. 73In 2012, Canada issued its “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad.” The measure principally concerns the exercise of sovereignty over the nation’s North as the preeminent foreign policy priority. 74In this sense, Canada rigidly realizes the crucial nature of securing and keeping sovereignty over its 260 000 kilometres of northern shoreline. Canada has in prevision to increase its military presence in the Arctic and to pursue its actions to secure sovereignty over claimed waters. In 2010, Danish and Canadian leading military representatives jointly agreed on signing a memorandum designed to understand the concept of Arctic security and defence, operational collaboration, a better sharing of information and higher consultations. 75Canada’s quest for increased sovereignty in the Arctic has principally been achieved through the UNCLOS framework (ratified in 2003) and by its active participation within the Arctic Council. In terms of increasing its military capabilities in the area, the country has several projects, the most important ones being the construction of new military bases and a deep-water port in northernmost points of the Canadian Arctic. The Arctic operations being one of the six key components of the Canadian Defence Strategy, the nation committed its forces to Operation NANOOK 12 in 2012. Canadian forces 76engaged in this operation that consists of a joint effort between the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force, all of them acting alongside diverse
48 Canada’ s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, Ottawa: Minister of Indian Affairs 73and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians, 2009, http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns-eng.asp, accessed 27.09.2018. Statement on Canada’ s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’ s Northern 74Strategy Abroad, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa : Government of Canada, August 20th 2010, http://www.international.gc.ca/arctic-arctique/assets/pdfs/canada_arctic_foreign_policy-eng.pdf, accessed 29.09.2018. “Canada and Denmark Sign Arctic Cooperation Arrangement” Marketwire, May 10th 2010, http://75www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/news-nouvelles/story-reportage-eng.asp?id=4391, accessed 02.10.2017. “Canada First Defence Strategy”, Ottawa: National Defence and Canadian Forces, May 2008, p.17, http://76www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/June18_0910_CFDS_english_low-res.pdf, accessed 03.10.2017.

territorial, regional, federal and international (Denmark and the USA) associates. Such operation, conducted annually since 2007, has for objective to highlight Canada’s active presence in the Arctic but also to showcase its ability to intervene in case of emergency in a delicate area such as the high North and implies a task force composed by over 1200 operatives. Such action is a 77greatly efficient way of reaching cooperation within various agencies and other multi-level actors and ultimately leads to an increased overall awareness in and towards the Arctic. As an other illustration of its active Arctic nature, Canada acted as chairman of the Arctic Council from 2013 to 2015 and was the first of the eight Arctic states to hold this position back in 1996. The country’s council members clearly stated that “our priorities focus on development for people in the north: responsible resource development, safe shipping, and sustainable circumpolar communities.” 78As a strong sign of Canada’s will to install a long-lasting international cooperation regarding the Arctic, the country entered in 2012 into an international agreement with the USA with the aim of increasing joint actions in the Arctic. The pact points out that the Arctic zone needs to be a region where states are able to function closely in a peaceful manner, and where both countries will not hesitate to provide the needed support to face eventual threats that can emerge in the unstable Arctic. Other domains such as training, Research and Development 79(R&D), communication networks or safety and security are also included in this agreement in order to reach an optimal level of cooperation between the two countries. It goes without saying that the Canadian Arctic, thanks to the immensity of its territory, represents a tremendous potential of growth on the economic standpoint as industrial, financial, commercial and even tourism activities are increasing and could play a larger role in the national economy in the near future. In this sense and due to the quick Arctic ice-melting, Canada started developing first-tier diamond mines and exploiting consequent gas and oil reservoirs. As far as tourism is concerned, the unique Arctic environment contributes to the attraction of a plethora of visitors from various destinations across the planet. To face these new possibilities for growth and dynamism, the government quickly took adapted measures to further future economic gain
49“Operation NANOOK 2012,” Ottawa: Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, August 24th 2012, http://77www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=4981, accessed 03.10.2017. Canada’ s Artic Council Chairmanship, Government of Canada, 2013, http://www.international.gc.ca/78arctic-arctique/assets/pdfs/Canada_Chairmanship-ENG.pdf, accessed 20.10.2017. “U.S., Canada Expand Arctic Cooperation, Military Training,” American Forces Press Service, December 7911th 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118768, accessed 20.10.2017.

and development through the improvement of regulatory systems in the Arctic and investing in other critical infrastructure to draw citizens, investment, and industry in a sustainable manner. The Canadian Arctic is composed of numerous first nation or native peoples. In this way, the governing authority agreed that the aim of their Arctic development policy needs to benefit directly to these tribes and should in no way affect their way of life negatively. In addition to the economic development vocation of the policy, the government proposes an easier access to specialized education, better lodgement conditions, and an improved health care mechanism for the inhabitants of the Canadian Arctic, the ultimate and optimal aim of the measure being the creation and preservation of a dynamic Arctic economy, with secure inhabitants. 3.4 Summary and analysis After analysing its Arctic policy, it appears that Russia’s major ambitions towards the region rely on the potential economic benefit of unused energy resources and the idea of holding a certain control over new maritime routes such as the NSR. Being the largest Arctic-nation, the increasing opening of the area can only expand the country’s significance outside of the Arctic. However, Russia’s behaviours towards its native Arctic peoples is sometimes far from exemplary and brings questions regarding its ability to coordinate and cooperate on the world stage. It can be affirmed that Russia is forward leaning on Arctic matters and has been aggressively and strategically placing resources in the region, including military capabilities in order to secure its sovereignty and control while trying to meet its Arctic aspirations. The Kingdom of Denmark has a more comprehensive Arctic approach as its policy stipulates an expanded sovereignty through the means of an increased military existence in Greenland, an emphasis on scientific research to adapt more efficiently to the quickly-evolving environment, economic exploitation of available gas, oil and mineral resources, and support the use of UNCLOS as the relevant legal framework in the Arctic. Denmark’s holds a particular focus on mineral exploration and plans to create economic growth in a responsible and sustainable way. Greenland’s tremendous reserves of mineral deposits has been at the centre of attention for various interested actors, especially China, who needs to ensure enough supply to comply with the growing demand of rare earth metals. 50

In this sense, Denmark favours the opening up of the Arctic Council to new nations. The Danes also believe in the ability of the Arctic Council to reach cooperative answers to Arctic issues such as rescue operations and oil spill reactions. Canada has been having a growing Arctic Strategy for many years. Recently, the focus has changed due to the only seasonal nature of former permanent ice-areas. The North West Passage becomes therefore more frequently used. The country’s Arctic policy is composed of priority domains such as Arctic sovereignty, the protection of environmental heritage, the promotion of a dynamic socio-economic development, and the improvement of Northern cooperation. Canada firmly took position in favour of the UNCLOS framework as well as the Arctic Council to ensure consensus and obtain fair results for itself, its first nations Peoples residing above the Arctic Circle and its fellow Arctic partners. Canada has a history of having military aircraft, vessels and units based in the Arctic but the recent will is to increase those to answer with better efficiency to eventual safety and security threats in the region. The Northwest Passage, like the NSR for Russia, gives Canada the chance to further its influence on the global stage while strengthening the emerging economy of the frozen north. Conclusions Being a normative force implies that you have the ability to frame the conception of what is considered as normal in international relations. You need to use different tools than the ones proposed by the civilian and realist approach, highlight your divergence from existing political shapes and not practice your power only in an instrumental manner. The EU not being a state, it is therefore not possible to compare it as one, but can be generally considered as a new kind of actor on the international stage. The EU can be seen as a non-threatening force with a firm position taken towards Arctic research and trying to limit climate change and its consequences. Actually, EU’s research component in the Arctic might be the domain where it holds its most important leverage and can be considered as a leading actor on this topic. The EU has therefore developed an Arctic policy that relies on both core and minor norms, giving a paramount importance to issues such as human rights, sustainable growth and the respect of the rule of law. After the development of its 51

eight Arctic policies, being an ad hoc observer in the Arctic Council, bringing an active contribution to the work of the diverse Arctic Council Working Groups, and leading the way in terms of Arctic research and funding, the EU has managed to diffuse its normative nature to the global stage. As far as its soft power is concerned, the Union has sometimes known less success in the use of its power of attraction. The long-lasting hostility between EU and Canada’s Indigenous Peoples is an example of that. Following a detailed analysis of the official EU-Arctic policy documents it appears that the Union has not been successful in developing a definite project with clear aims and concrete proposals for action. The EU therefore lacks a clear and comprehensive strategy towards the Arctic area even though it has for ambition to engage in the region through the means of global cooperation with research and science as the central tools to achieve that. Unfortunately, the EU has for intention to pursue its existing policies strategy without stating the way it wants to move forward. On the legal prospective, the EU-Arctic policy evolved from security concerns to an emphasis on global collaboration by recognizing the existing regulatory framework in place internationally. On the norm-setting end, the EU has proven itself as a normative force in the Arctic as it leads by example in countering issues of general concern, climate change being the most noticeable one. In this area, the EU has the ability to make a difference simply by existing, based on Manners’ statement that what the union represents is as crucial as what it actually accomplishes. As far as combating climate change and the promotion of research in the Arctic, the EU might be the preeminent organization and has known a successful diffusion of its norms to various actors and stakeholders. Thanks to its quality standards, it has attracted others to comply with the European way. However, the EU cannot be considered as a normative force regarding its ties to the Arctic Indigenous Peoples. These factions have surely not appreciated the European actions and after the adoption of Regulation 1007/2009 on trade concerning seal products, the union has been compelled to revise the regulation in order to be granted with the formal Observer Status in the Arctic Council and to be generally recognized within its fellow Arctic counterparts. In this specific scenario, it was the EU that had to adapt its attitude and not the usual opposite, meaning that the Union is a normative power in the Arctic area only to some extent, depending on particular situations. As an international character, the EU is more than just the reflexion of the preferences of the member states that compose it, as the realists would argue. However, if the Union wants to be 52

a preeminent and complete actor in the region, it has the necessity to develop a much more ambitious and competitive behaviour towards the Arctic and create new policies in accordance, ones that include all relevant perspectives, not only qualitative ones but also in terms of economic potential and especially without forgetting the various peoples inhabiting the Arctic. Concerning the future actions of the EU in the area, it would be relevant for Brussels to focus on the European Arctic as this is the zone where it benefits from the most leverage on, thanks to its ties to Arctic member states, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, as well as, good relations with Iceland and Norway. It has been highlighted that it is delicate for Arctic actors to understand the EU as a supranational organization and the complexities it implies but controversies between the Union and Arctic actors such as the EU rule on the banishment of seal product on the internal market, make the necessity for the EU to bring a stronger involvement in the overall Arctic governance. If the EU is accepted as a credible and relevant policy-making body in the Arctic governance, it could pave the way for a mutual learning procedure that would ultimately make the EU more aware of Arctic matters and on the other hand Arctic actors understand and accept better the union as a complex but useful policy-making power needed in the Arctic. CANADA ETC Climate change and its consequences are transforming the Arctic area from a geopolitical secondary concern into an unbelievable opportunity for nations and private entrepreneurs that seek to exploit the available resources. It is in the countries’ best interest to pursue their commitment to the relatively peaceful course they have adopted there so far. A constructive cooperation between states, native Arctic peoples and private actors is required and relevant policymakers need to establish a common vision of how to tackle the matter of the Arctic’s resources. Economic development should not be synonym of environmental catastrophe and the opening up of the Arctic provides a once-in-a-lifetime chance to develop a frontier economy responsibly and in a sustainable manner. For this to happen, countries have to find the delicate balance between exploitation and respect of the environment. One way of mixing capitalism and conservationism can be the valuation of nature as a form of capital and the pricing of the environment into development decisions. As scientific-Arctic researches get more and more accurate, baselines can be 53

established, it is easier for governments to take informed decisions about development and finding a balance between the risks implied by this sensitive environment and their economic and national security realities and ambitions. Even though such balance is always delicate to reach, especially on a crucial topic such as the Arctic that concerns and affects the entirety of the planet. There is no need to turn the Arctic exclusively into a natural reserve but, on the other hand, it would be fundamentally wrong to think of the area in a selfish manner and try to gain the highest quantitative outcome from it, ignoring all the peoples, ecosystems and damages at stake. The Arctic presents an extraordinary chance to redefine the rules in terms of developing a frontier economy and a responsible global cooperation. Nations need to start doing so, urgently, and not lose themselves under mid to long-term sometimes inefficient policies before natural disasters occur more frequently. With the Arctic ice melting faster than a lot predicted, it is a matter of not if but when the summer ice surface will be close to none and the area will therefore be opened up to global development. If treated in a responsible way, the Arctic should be both a carefully protected environment and a primary driver of global economic dynamism, benefiting to the inhabitants of this prime real estate as well as nations and private actors. When using the term race for the Arctic in the title of this thesis, the ideal finish line is not composed of one or a few winners and many losers, but rather of plenty of winners side by side, glad to have managed to adopt a collective and responsible answer to the global challenge that is the Arctic.
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