Fabbrini (2020) The Future Of The Eu After Brexit, And Covid 19 [621324]

Working Paper

Federico Fabbrini
The Future of the EU After
Brexit, and Covid -19

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604111

BRIDGE Network – Working Paper 3
April 2020

The European Commission's support for the production of this publication does not constitute an
endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held
responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604111

1
The Future of the EU after Brexit, and Covid -19

Federico Fabbrini

Abstract
The paper examines the prospects of European integration after Brexit. It discusses a number of old
and new crises faced by the European Union (EU) – including most recently the Covid -19
pandemic – and highlights how these have profoundly shaken the unity of the member states. In
particular, the paper claims that three visions of integration are increasingly competing with each
other – a first that sees the EU as a po lity, a second that sees the EU as a market, and a third which
instead uses the EU as a vehicle to entrench authoritarian governance at home. Given these
unresolved tensions, it is unsurprising the EU governance system has been unable to effectively
tackle subsequent crises, and as such efforts to rethink the EU constitutional architecture –
including through a Conference on the Future of Europe – are to be welcome. However, many
challenges still surround this defining moment, and therefore the question whe ther the EU will
integrate further, or rather disintegrate, still remains open.

Table of contents
1. Introduction
2. Old Crises
2.1. Euro -crisis
2.2. Migration -crisis
2.3. Rule of law crisis
3. New Crises
3.1. Enlargement
3.2. Multi -annual financial framework
3.3. Covid -19
4. Competing Visions
4.1. Polity
4.2. Market
4.3. Autocracy
5. Alternative Prospects
5.1. The shortcoming of intergovernmental governance
5.2. The potentials of the Conference on the Future of Europe
5.3. The challenges of a defining moment
6. Conclusion

Keywords
European Union – Future of Europe – Brexit – Covid -19 – integration

 Federico Fabbrini is Full Professor of EU Law at Dublin City University (DCU) and the Founding Director of the
DCU Brexit Institute. He is the PI of the BRIDGE Network, funded by the European Union Erasmus+ programme.
This paper is forthcoming in Federi co Fabbrini (ed), The Law & Politics of Brexit. Volume 2: The Withdrawal
Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2020)
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604111

2
1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on the future of the European Union (EU) after Brexit – as
an entity of 27 member states (EU27). The withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU
on 31 January 2020 represented a turning point in the history of European int egration, as for the
first time ever the EU lost a member – rather than add one.1 At the same time, a much noticed
feature of the Brexit negotiations was the unity with which the EU27 approached the UK in the
withdrawal process. T he EU27 never divided during the almost 3 -year Brexit negotiations. Rather
the EU27 remained consistently u nited , delegating all talks with the UK to the ad hoc European
Commission Article 50 Task Force, and backing the work of Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier.2 In
dealing with a member state that had decided to leave, therefore, the EU27 proved able to stick
together and jointly defend the common interests, including of its smaller member states.3
However, one would be mistaken to believe that the unity of the EU27 vis -à-vis the UK
reflects a generally high level of harmony within the EU. In fact, as this chap ter claims, the EU27
have faced an increasing number of crises which have profoundly challenged their unity and
resolve. Some of these crises – including the euro -crisis, the migration -crisis and the rule of law
crisis – pre-dated Brexit. But others have f ollowed Brexit, most notably the explosion of the
coronavirus , a new, se vere acute respiratory syndrome – known also b y its medical acronym Covid –
19 – which has resulted in the largest pandemic the world has experienced, at least since the 1918
Spanish inf luenza. Originally emerged in China in December 2019, the virus has slowly but s teadily
spread across the globe, reaching Europe in February 2020 – just after the UK withdrawal from the
EU – and seeding chaos in the EU27 responses to this existential healt h emergency.
As this chapter argues, the subsequent crises shattering the EU and climaxing with Covid -19
have exposed deep divisions among the EU27 and brought to the surface competing visions of the
project of European integration. In particular, as the c hapter suggests, three alternative ideas of what
the EU is and ought to be are increasingly taking shape: a first that sees the EU as a polity, which
requires solidarity and a communion of efforts towards a shared destiny; a second that sees the EU
as a ma rket, designed to enhance wealth through commerce, but with as limited redistribution as
possible; and a third which instead sees the EU as a vehicle to entrench state authoritarian rule,
based on national identity and sovereignty claims, but with crucial transnational financial support.
While these alternative visions often coexist within each state (reflecting the conflicting preferences
of different social, political and economic constituencies), increasingly they have become hallmarks
of states, or bloc s thereof, which are openly facing each other in the EU arena.
As a result, the chapter posits that the prospects for European integration remain uncertain
and unsettled. In particular, given the structural shortcomings of the EU governance architecture
dominated more and more by inter -governmental decision -making it seems unlikely that the EU27
will be able to reconcile these conflicting visions – a fact pitifully exposed by their inability to solve
once and for all any of the ongoing crises. In this conte xt, the plan to launch a Conference on the
Future of Europe to rethink in depth the powers and institutions of the EU may seem a wishful
thinking – but is really more needed than ever. However, the success of the plan remains in doubt –
not least because t he process was due to start right after Brexit but Covid -19 has now delayed it. So
questions persist whether the EU after Brexit will continue to integrate or rather disintegrate, and in
what form that may happen.

1 See Federico Fabbrini, “Brexit and EU Treaty Reform” in Federico Fabbrini (ed), The Law & Politics of Brexit (OUP
2017) 267
2 See European Council Conclusions, EUCO XT 20015/18, 25 November 2018, §3 (thanking 'Michel Barnier for his
tireless efforts as th e Union's chief negotiator and for maintaining the unity among EU27 Member States throughout the
[Brexit] negotiations').
3 See Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar, “Thank you to the People of Europe”, Op -Ed, Irish Times , 31 January 2020.
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604111

3 As such, the chapter is structured as fol lows. Section 2 examines three long -standing crises
the EU has faced besides Brexit – the euro -crisis, the migration crisis and the rule of law crisis.
Section 3 analyzes three recent crises challenging the EU after Brexit – the debates on enlargement,
on the next EU budget and, crucially, on how to deal with the Covid -19 pandemic. Section 4
explains how the old and new crises shattering the EU have brought to light three competing visions
of integration and conceptualizes the alternative ideas of polity, m arket and autocracy at play.
Section 5 discusses the prospects for the EU27, reflecting on the new EU institutional cycle, the
plans for a Conference on the Future of Europe and the challenges that lie ahead – notably in the
context of Covid -19. Chapter 6, finally, concludes.

2. Old crises (besides Brexit)

Brexit was by no means the only crisis the EU had to deal with. In fact, well before the UK decided
to leave the EU, the EU27 had been weathering a number of other crises – in particular the euro –
crisis , the migration crisis and the rule of law crisis. Moreover, each of these continued to sour for
the whole period of the Brexit negotiations, leaving a lasting legacy of tensions among the EU27.4

2.1. Euro -crisis

The euro -crisis represented a major stress t est for Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
– with protracted economic and political consequences. The EU and its member states responded to
the Eurozone financial instability of 2009 -2012 by introducing a battery of legal and institutional
reforms:5 strengthening the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), establishing a new
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to financially support states, and centralizing bank
supervision and resolution. Moreover, the European Central Bank (ECB) took decisive steps to save
the Eurozone.6 However, the measures adopted to respond to the euro -crisis left a trail of
divergence in the macro -economic performances of the member states, with low growth and high
unemployment in some countries: a fact visible in Greece, where the end of the third b ailout
program in 2018 was accompanied by commitments to maintain “a primary surplus of 2.2% of gdp
on average in the period from 2023 to 2060”7 – a target which most observers regarded as
impossible to meet.8 Moreover, the management of the euro -crisis fueled nationalist movements in
a number of member states, which openly started calling for leaving the Eurozone: a fact visible in
Italy, following the 2018 parliamentary elections.9
At the same time, the euro -crisis tainted inter -state relations, complicating efforts to deepen
EMU. In fact, despite a series of high -level reports from the EU institutions and their leaders calling
for completing EMU,10 the EU27 have been unable to overcome national divisions to this end. In
particular, while Southern states – Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta and Cyprus:
caucusing together as the Med7 – vocally pushed for the establishment of a central fiscal capacity

4 See also Federico Fabb rini, “The Future of the EU27” in Federico Fabbrini (ed), Special Issue: The Brexit
Negotiations and the May Government (2019) European Journal of Legal Studies 305, from which this section draws.
5 See further Federico Fabbrini, Economic Governance in Europe (OUP 2016).
6 See ECB President Mario Draghi, speech at the Global Investment Conference, London, 26 July 2012 (stating that the
ECB will “do whatever it takes to save the euro”).
7 Eurogroup statement on Greece, 22 June 2018.
8 See Je romin Zettelmeyer et al., “How to Solve the Greek Debt Problem” Peterson Institute for International
Economics Policy Brief 10/2018.
9 See Roberto D’Alimonte, “How the Populists Won in Italy” (2019) 30 Journal of Democracy 114.
10 See Four Presidents, Final Report “Towards a Genuine EMU”, 5 December 2012 ; Five Presidents Report
“Completing Europe’s EMU”, 22 June 2015; and European Commission reflection paper on “The Deepening of
Economic and Monetary Union”, 31 May 2017
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604111

4 with stabilization function, as well for a Europea n deposit insurance scheme (EDIS),11 Northern
states – assembled at the behest of the Netherlands in a new Hanseatic League – resisted any step
towards more burden -sharing, calling rather for greater ESM surveillance of national budgets .12
And while France managed to convince on paper Germany to support a Eurozone budget,13 this was
stalled in the Euro Summit.14 In the end, after much debate, the Eurogroup in an inclusive format
(also open to non -Eurozone member states) reached in June 2019 a minimalist con sensus on a
package deal of reforms, which included an enhancement of the ESM and the creation of a
budgetary instrument for competitiveness and convergence, but not stabilization .15 Plus it made no
progress on the EDIS,16 suggesting that the ideological d ivide between risk -reduction vs. risk –
sharing remains a stumbling block towards completing EMU.

2.2. Migration crisis

The management of migration has also remained a continuing cause of contention among the EU27,
putting under severe strain the functioning of both the Schengen free -movement zone and the
European Common Asylum System (ECAS).17 The EU27 divided heavily at the pick of the
migration crisis in the summer of 2015 on how to deal with the sudden arrival of 4m people fleeing
war and pover ty. Responding to this emergency situation, the Council of the EU in September 2015
adopted by majority a temporary relocation mechanism to the benefit of Greece and Italy which
foresaw the relocation of 160,000 asylum seekers to the other EU member states pro-quota.18
However, a lthough this number was ludicrous , Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic
– a group known as Visegrad – vehemently opposed this course of action. Hungary and Slovakia
challenged the Council decision in the European Court o f Justice (ECJ). And although the ECJ in
September 2017 confirmed its full legality,19 Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic bluntly
refused to comply with it. As a result, even though the ECJ later confirmed that refusal to
participate in the relocation mechanism was a breach of EU law,20 no concrete support was offered
by the Eastern member states to the worse -hit coastline EU countries.21
In fact, the question of how to deal with the ongoing arrival of asylum seekers to the border –
line EU member states has continued to divide the EU27. While the EU attempted to outsource to
third countries (with dubious human rights records) the task of controlling the EU’s external
borders,22 it failed to make any progress on overhauling the ECAS – with the Commission’s

11 See Declaration of the summit of the Southern European Union countries, Madrid, 10 April 2017.
12 Shared views from the Finance Minister of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands
and Sweden, 6 March 2018.
13 See Franco -German Proposal on the architecture of a Eu rozone Budget within the Framework of the European Union,
16 November 2018.
14 See Euro Summit statement, 14 December 2018, PRESS 790/18.
15 Council of the EU, Term sheet on the Budgetary Instrument for Convergence and Competitiveness, 14 June 2019.
16 See al so European Commission Communication “Deepening Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union: Taking stock
four years after the Five Presidents’ Report”, 12 June 2019, CO M(2019) 279 final, 10 (stating that “regrettably, the
impasse that characterized the past seve ral years has persisted and no tangible progress has been made” on EDIS ).
17 See generally Cathryn Costello, The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law (OUP 2015).
18 See Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of
international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece, OJ [2015] L239/146 and Council Decision (EU)
2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establis hing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit
of Italy and Greece OJ [2015] L248/80.
19 See Case C -643/15 and C -647/15 Slovakia & Hungary v. Council of the EU , ECLI:EU:C:2017:631
20 See Joined Cases C -715/17, C -718/17 and C-719/17, Commission v. Poland, Hungary & the Czech Republic ,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:257
21 See European Commission, “Thirteen report on relocation and resettlement”, 13 June 2017, COM(2017) 330 final
(describing the implementation of the relocation scheme as utte rly “insufficient”).
22 See EU -Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, Press release 144/16.
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604111

5 proposals to introduce a permanent mechanism of relocation going nowhere.23 As a result, France
launched a coalition of the willing to break the deadlock at EU level , convening 13 EU member
states to set up a solidarity -based system to manage the disembarkation and relocation of asylum
seekers on a voluntary basis.24 However, the legacy of the crisis combined with the inequities of the
system fueled across Europe xenophobic political movements which called in t he North for the
suspension of Schengen,25 and in the South for the outright pushback of migrants.26 Moreover, the
ideological cleavage in dealing with the migration soured East -West relations in the EU, to the point
that Luxembourg Minister of the Interio r Jean Asselborn even suggested that Hungary should be
expelled from the EU for the way it treats migrants.27

2.3. Rule of law crisis

An ever more dramatic crisis the EU has faced is the rule of law crisis. Although Article 2 TEU
proclaims that the EU “is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights” , since the early 2010s a number of member
states have experienced legal and political developments that have openly challeng ed basic
constitutional principles such as the independence of the judiciary, separation of powers, and the
fairness of the electoral process.28 This backsliding is particularly acute among those states who had
joined the EU in the 2004/2007 enlargements, and is part of a broader right -wing, populist political
trend at play in former Communist countries – including also in Eastern Germany. Threats to the
rule of law constitute a major danger for the EU.29 Yet Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán
proudly de fended this path, explicitly arguing that his country was intent on establishing an
authoritarian democracy.30 The Hungarian example has increasingly served as a template for other
new EU member states, notably Poland and Romania, but rule of law issues ha ve emerged also in
Slovakia and Malta.31
Although arguably with excessive delay, the EU institutions have started to take action
against this phenomenon. In particular, in preparation for the next multi -annual EU budget, the
European Commission proposed t o introduce a mechanism to freeze structural funds for EU
member states which failed to respect the rule of law.32 In addition, in December 2017 the
Commission activated the Article 7 TEU procedure against Poland, calling on the Council to

23 See European Commission communication, “A European Agenda on Migration”, 13 May 2015, COM(2015) 240
final.
24 French Government, Réunion informelle sur le migrations en Méditerranéé : Conclusions de la Présidence, 22 July
2019.
25 See European Commission communication, “Preserving and strengthening Schengen”, 27 September 2017,
COM(2017) 570 final.
26 See also Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Dunja Mijatović, Letter to European Commissioners
Margaritis Schinas and Ylva Johansson, 9 March 2020 (emphasizing that the EU should respect the prohibition of non –
refoulment).
27 Madeline Chambers & Marton Dunai, “EU should expel Hungary for mistreating migrants, Luxembourg minister
says”, Reuters , 13 September 2016.
28 See Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, “Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU” (2017) 19
Cambridge Yearbook of Eu ropean Legal Studies 3.
29 See European Commission Communication “A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law”, 11 March 2014,
COM(2014)158 final
30 Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, speech at the XXV . Bálványos Free Summer University and Youth Cam p, 26
July 2014 (stating that “ the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non -liberal state”).
31 See European Parliament resolution of 28 March 2019 on the situation of the rule of law and the fight against
corruption in the EU, specifical ly in Malta and Slovakia, P8_TA(2019)0328.
32 European Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of the
Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member State s, 2 May 2018,
COM(2018) 324 final.
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604111

6 determine that t he country faced a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law.33 And in
September 2018 the European Parliament (EP) approved a resolution to initiate the same process
against Hungary.34 Nevertheless, despite support from several states,35 limited progress has been
made by the Council in deciding whether correct ive action against Hungary and Poland wa s
necessary. In fact, in the first semester of 2019, when the Presidency of the Council was held by
Romania – a member state which had been st rongly criticized by the EP for its rule of law record
and limited efforts to fight corruption36 – the discussion of the Article 7 TEU procedure against
Poland and Hungary was even removed from the agenda of the General Affairs Council meeting.37
In this context, a major role has been taken by the ECJ. Ruling in preliminary reference
proceedings, the ECJ held that rule of law backsliding – if this resulted in the reduction of the due
process rights of a convicted person, to be assessed cases by cas e – could justify a court decision
not to execute a European Arrest Warrant from Ireland toward Poland.38 And ruling in infringement
proceedings brought by the Commission, the ECJ stopped Poland from giving effect to a highly
controversial law which altere d the composition of the state Supreme Court in breach of EU
principles on the independence and impartiality of the judiciary,39 and also struck down Polish
legislation instituting disciplinary proceedings against judges.40 Moreover, the ECJ also invalidat ed
Hungarian laws infringing the independence of the academia and the freedom of non -governmental
organizations.41 Yet, while the ECJ has so far managed to command respect, its ability to halt the
erosion of the rule of law based system at the national lev el is likely to face challenges in the
medium term, given the absence of EU coercive power ,42 and the unwillingness by the other EU
member states to mobilize against threats to the rule of law in forms analogous to what was done at
the time of the Ha ider a ffair.43 In fact, the rule of law and democratic backsliding seems to be
worsening, rather than receding, across many new EU member states.

3. New crises (after Brexit)

Since Brexit, the EU has been facing a new wave of crises. Some of these are directly c onnected to
Brexit – such as the tense debate on the new EU budget, which was precipitated by the funding gap
left by the UK departure – while others were fully exogenous – such as the Covid -19 pandemic.
However, all these new crises also profoundly divide d the EU27, shedding dark clouds on its future.

3.1. Enlargement

33 European Commission reasoned proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) Treaty on European Union for a Council
Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law, 20
December 2017, COM(2017) 835 fi nal.
34 European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to
Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values
on which the Union is founded, P 8_TA(2018)0340.
35 See French Assemblée Nationale, resolution relative au respect de l’état de droit au sein de l’Union européenne, 27
November 2018, n° 194; Benelux Prime Ministers’ Summit Joint Declaration, Luxembourg, 2 April 2019.
36 European Parliament resolution of 13 November 2018 on the rule of law in Romania, P8_TA(2018)0446.
37 See General Affairs Council, Outcome of meeting, 8 January 2019, Doc 5039/19. See also European Parliament
resolution of 16 January 2020 on ongoing hearin gs under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Poland and Hungary,
P9_TA(2020)0014.
38 See Case C-216/18 PPU, LM, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586.
39 See Case C -619/18 R, Commission v. Poland , Order of the Vice -President of the Court, 19 October 2018,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:910; and Judgment of the Court, 24 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531
40 See Case C -791/19 R, Commission v. Poland , Order of the Court, 8 April 2020
41 See Case C -66/18 Commission v. Hung ary,
42 See Andras Jakab and Dimity Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values (OUP 2017).
43 Wojciech Sadurski, “Adding Bite to Bark: The Story of Article 7, E.U. Enlargement, and Jörg Haider” (2010) 16
Columbia Journal of European Law 385.
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604111

7
A first taste of the continuing tensions among the EU27 post -Brexit emerged prominently in
October 2019: at the same European Council meeting which approved the Withdrawal Agreement
re-negotiated between the European Commission and the UK Government led by Boris Johnson,44
the EU27 split on the controversial issue of enlargement.45 In particular, a major row erupted among
member states on whether to authorize accession talks with Alba nia and North Macedonia. While
during the 2014 -2019 European Commission term, then President Jean -Claude Juncker had clarified
that no new member state would join the EU under his watch,46 the accession process had been
subsequently relaunched – particular ly in the context of the Prespa Agreement of 12 June 2018.
This treaty, concluded between Greece and the then Former Yugoslav Republic of North
Macedonia solved a 30 -years old dispute on the name of North Macedonia – and the prospect of
accession to the EU (and NATO) had been put forward as an incentive to conclude the deal.
However, the EU27 divided heavily on the course to take, with especially France – with the
backing of Denmark and the Netherlands – objecting to any bureaucratic automaticity in the
accession process, and calling for greater political steering on decisions about enlargement.47 In the
absence of the necessary unanimity within the European Council, the issue was referred back to the
European Commission. This on 5 February 2020 put forward a new methodology for accession
negotiations – confirming a credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans, but also subjecting
the enlargement talks to further conditionality, with negotiations on the fundamentals, including the
rule of law, to be opene d first and closed last, and with the possibility to or suspend tout court the
accession talks.48 On this basis, in March 2020, the Council of the EU gave its green light to the
start of the enlargement, stabilization and association process with North Macedonia and, with
greater caveats, Albania.49 However, it remains to be seen if how far this will proceed.50

3.2. Multi -annual financial framework

After Brexit, the EU27 also experienced another tense confrontation in the context of the
negotiations on the EU budget – the multi -annual financial framework (MFF). Admittedly, clashes
among member states h ave always characterized EU budget negotiations – mostly because, despite
the letter and the spirit of the EU treaties, this is mainly funded by state transfers, with the
consequence that member states aggressively measure the difference between what they pay to, and
what they get from, the EU budget.51 However, it was easy to anticipate that talks on the MFF
2021 -2027 would be particularly challenging, because of Brexit.52 Given that the UK, despite its
rebate, represented the fourth largest net contributo r to the EU budget, the funding gap left by its
departure was inevitably going to pose a stark choice – either an increase of payment from the net
contributors or a decrease of revenues for the net beneficiaries.53 In preparation for the new MFF
2021 -2027, on 2 May 2018 the European Commission put forward a draft proposal which foresaw a

44 European Council Conclusions, EUCO XT 20018/19, 17 October 2019
45 European Council Conclusions, EUCO 23/19, 18 October 2019, §5
46 European Commission President -elect Jean -Claude Juncker, “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth,
Fairness and Democratic Change. Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission”, 15 July 2014, 12
47 See French non -paper, “Reforming the E uropean Union Accession Process”, November 2019
48 European Commission Communication “Enhancing the Accession Process – A Credible EU Perspective for the
Western Balkans”, 5 February 2020, COM(2020)57 final 2 -3
49 Council of the EU, Doc. 7002/20, 25 March 20 20
50 See Andi Mustafaj, “Plaidoyer pour une vraie réforme du processus d’élargissement de l’Union européenne”,
Fondation Robert Schuman, April 2020
51 See Luca Zamparini & Ubaldo Villani -Lubelli (eds), Features and Challenges of the EU Budget (Elgar 2019)
52 See Fabbrini (n 1) 276
53 See also the chapter by Michele Chang in this volume.
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604111

8 budget worth 1,11% of EU gdp – with a slight decrease compared to the prior MFF and a
significant re -allocation of resources towards new policy priorities.54
However, whil e the real negotiations on the budget only started after the EP elections of
May 2019,55 the Council of the EU failed to make any progress on the MFF negotiations during the
Finnish and Croat presidencies – due to the intractable divisions among member sta tes. In
particular, a group of four Nordic nations which self -proclaimed themselves frugal56 – Austria, the
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden – staunchly called for further budget cuts with a smaller
envelop for the traditional EU policies, while an alliance of 16 Eastern and Southern member states
caucusing as the friends of cohesion57 – including the Visegrad and Baltic countries, Bulgaria,
Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, Greece, Italy, Malta and Portugal – insisted for maintaining proper
funding for agricultur e and cohesion. As a result, a special European Council meeting convened on
21 February 2020 ended in a fiasco.58 Exactly three weeks after the UK had left the EU, therefore,
the same dynamics of selfishness that had characterized the budget negotiations during the years of
UK membership in the EU remained vividly at play – with the EU27 unable to compromise on the
new MFF, as a result of its members’ focus on the just retour .59

3.3. Covid -19

The EU27 was just adjusting to the UK withdrawal, when “a human tragedy of potentially biblical
proportions”60 fell upon them: the Covid -19 pandemic. As the virus started spreadin g rapidly across
Europe , and indeed the world , EU member states’ governments rushed in February and March 2020
to take unprecedented public policy measures. In particular with death tolls spiking to shocking
numbers, notably in Italy, Spain and France, authorities impos ed war-like lock -downs, closing
schools, factories, and public facilities, banning the movement of persons, prohibiting public
gatherings and requisitioning properties essential to address the health crisis . The immediate action
by the EU mem ber states revealed a remarkable lack of coordination, with some countries
unilaterally suspending the intra -EU export of medical devices, or introducing intra -EU border
checks, also on goods – in blatant disregard of EU law. In fact, Hungary even abused C ovid-19 to
adopt emergency legislation which allowed the government to rule indefinitely by decree –
effectively codifying into law authoritarian governance.61
Eventually, a more European response to Covid -19 started to take place – especially in
tackling the socio -economic consequences of the pandemic. In particular, after some hesitation, the
EU supranational institutions mobilized to support member states worse hit by the health crisis. The
European Investment Bank (EIB) developed a special Covi d-19 investment scheme of 40bn€ to
support SMEs.62 The ECB launched a new pandemic emergency purchase program, committing to

54 See European Commission Communication “A Modern Budget for a Union that Protects, Empowers and Defends:
The Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021 -2027”, 2 May 2018, COM(2018)321 final
55 But see European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2018 on the nex t MFF: Preparing the Parliament’s position on
the MFF post -2020, P8_TA(2018)0075
56 See Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, “The ‘Frugal Four’ Advocate a Responsible EU Budget”, Op -Ed, Financial
Times , 16 February 2020
57 Mateusz Morawiecki, “ Polish PM: EU budget is about more than arithmetic”, Op -Ed, Financial Times , 19 February
2020
58 See European Council President Charles Michel, remarks, 21 February 2020.
59 See also Peter Becker, “A New Budget for the EU: Negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021 –
2027”, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik research paper 11, August 2019.
60 See former ECB President Mario Draghi, “We Face a War Against Coronavirus and Must Mobilize Accordingly”,
Op-Ed, Financial Times , 26 March 2020
61 See Act XII of 30 March 2020 on protecting against coronavirus (Hu.).
62 See EIB Press Release, “EIB Group Wil l Rapidly Mobilize up to €40 billion to Fight Crisis Caused by Covid -19”, 16
March 2020.
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604111

9 buy public bonds and commercial papers in the financial markets up to 750bn€.63 And the European
Commission suspended the applicati on of state aid rules;64 called on the Council to trigger the SGP
general escape clause putting on temporary hold fiscal rules;65 activated the EU Solidarity Fund;66
put forward a coronavirus response investment initiative to mobilize 37bn€ of available cash
reserves in the EU Structural and Investment Funds;67 and also proposed the establishment of a
European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency
(SURE) – a re-insurance system designed to support the heavily under -pressured national
unemployment insurance regimes through loans backed -up by member states’ guarantees.68
However, joint action by the EU intergovernmental institut ions was much less
forthcoming.69 In fact, the EU27 split heavily on what new measures to put in place to sustain the
economy during the pandemic and relaunch it afterwards. In particular, on 25 March 2020 a group
of 9 Eurozone states – France, Italy, Spai n, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia, Belgium, Luxembourg and
Ireland – requested in a letter to the European Council President that the EU start “working on a
common debt instrument issued by a European institution to raise funds on the market on the same
basis and to the benefit of all Member States.”70 Yet, this proposal was fiercely rejected as an
unacceptable effort of debt mutualization by the Netherlands and Germany – which rather called for
using the ESM as a crisis response tool.71 In this context, the Eu ropean Council, meeting by video –
conference for the third time in two weeks, failed to reach a deal72 – and hence kicked the can to the
Eurogroup. Yet, the Eurogroup, meeting in an inclusive format (open to non -Eurozone states), did
not have an easier time either: after three days of negotiation, on 9 April 2020 it came up with a
half-backed compromise, which envisioned tackling Covid -19 with both the ESM and a new
Recovery Fund.73 However, details on the latter were scant at best, suggesting that tough tal ks lie
ahead if the EU is to find a consensual way out of the Covid -19 crisis.74

4. Competing visions

The crises that the EU has weathered in recent years have exposed deep fissures in the fabric of the
union. The euro -crisis caused a cleavage between Nort hern and Southern states; the migration crisis
between Western and Eastern states; the rule of law crisis, and partially the enlargement crisis,

63 See ECB Press Release, “ECB Announces €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme”, 18 March
64 See European Commission Communication “Temporary Framework fo r State aid measures to support the economy in
the current Covid -19 outbreak”, 20 March 2020, 2020/C 91 I/01
65 See Council of the EU, statement, 23 March 2020 (agreeing with the assessment of the Commission that the
conditions to suspend the SPG were fulfilled)
66 See Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending C ouncil
Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to Member States and to countries negotiating
their accession to the Union that are seriously affected by a major public health emergency OJ 2020 L 99/9
67 See Regulation (EU) 2020 /460 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending
Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to mobilise
investments in the healthcare systems of Member States and in other sectors of their economies in response to the
COVID -19 outbreak (Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative) OJ 2020 L 99/5
68 See European Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of a European instrument for
temporary support to m itigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE) following the Covid -19 outbreak, 2 April
2020, COM(2020)139 final.
69 See also Italian President Sergio Mattarella, statement, 27 March 2020
70 See Joint letter by Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux embourg, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain to European
Council President Charles Michel, 25 March 2020.
71 See Dutch Finance Minister Wopke Hoekstra , statement at the Twedde Kammer, 7 April 2019, available at.
https://debatgemist.tweedekamer.nl/debatten/eurogroe p.
72 See Joint statement of the Members of the European Council, 26 March 2020.
73 See Council of the EU, Report on the comprehensive economic policy responses to the Covid -19 pandemic, 9 April
2020
74
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10 between New and Old states; the budget crisis between rich and poor states; while Covid -19
exposed a diagonal d ivide between states in the South and West of Europe – which are mostly
Catholic – and states in the North and East of Europe – which are mostly Protestants. While the
preferences of each member state in all these crises sometimes differ – and therefore na tional
stances did not map neatly one crisis onto another – it is possible to identify a number of recurrent
positions that the EU27 have articulated across these separate crises -related debates. These
positions effectively reflect alternative visions of w hat European integration is, and ought to be.
Therefore, it is worth attempting to conceptualize these competing visions, with the aim to
explain their consequences on the future of the EU. For analytical purposes, I suggest in particular
that three visio ns are currently competing: a first that sees the EU as a polity project; a second that
instead sees the EU as mostly a market project; and a third that see the EU as an autocracy –
enhancing tool. Two caveats are obviously in order here. First, in some case s these visions are
explicitly articulated, but often they are under -theorized, and thus have to be uncovered from the
words and deeds of key political actors. As such, these conceptual frames are scholarly constructs,
designed to reveal, and make sense of , a complex reality. Second, while some EU member states’
governments have become the embodiment of these alternative visions, all of these visions really
co-exist and compete within each member state – with different social, political and economic
constit uencies embracing alternative preferences and promoting them. As such, the categorization
advanced here inevitably operates an over -simplification of reality, and should not be interpreted
rigidly as permanently boxing states. Yet, distinguishing between t hese three alternative visions of
Europe is crucial to understand the EU27’s direction of travel, and the daunting challenges ahead.

4.1. Polity

Increasingly detectable in the struggles to address Europe’s multiple crises is a vision of integration
which aspires towards greater commonality of action – on the understanding that EU member states
and their people represent somehow a community of destiny.75 I call this a ‘polity vision’ of Europe.
A recurrent feature of this vision of integra tion is the call for greater solidarity – including burden –
sharing in dealing with the costs of the euro -crisis, with the sudden influx of migrants, as well as
with the unprecedented consequences of the Covid -19 pandemic. Moreover, this vision of
integrati on pursues an ambitious MFF, which must be adequate to achieve a manifold set of
common objectives. At the same time, this vision believes in the idea that the EU must rest on a
number of foundational values such as respect for the rule of law, democracy a nd human rights –
while being skeptical of further enlargements, until the EU has deepened.
Arguably, the epitome of this vision of integration is offered today by France, under the
leadership of its President Emmanuel Macron. Since taking office in 2017, President Macron has
consistently spoken in favor of a sovereign, united and democratic Europe76 – ambitiously calling
for a relaunch of the EU after Brexit.77 In policy terms, President Macron has forcefully positioned
France in favor of devising common, innovative solutions at EU level to tackle the euro -crisis,78 the
migration -crisis,79 and Covid -19.80 Moreover, the French government has pushed for an increase of
the EU budget, so as to make it rise to the height of expectations. And it has taken a firm position
against backsliding in the rule of law, while also pulling the break on the enlargement process until
mechanisms of reversibility and rule of law conditionality were introduced.81 As President Macron

75 See ceteris paribus Ernest Renan, Qu’est -ce qu’une nation ? [1882]
76 See French President Emmanuel Macron, speech at Universitè La Sorbonne “ Pour une Europe souveraine, unie,
démocratique” , 26 September 2017.
77 French President Emmanuel Macron, speech at the award of the Prix Charlemagne, Aachen, 11 May 20 18.
78 See n 13
79 See n 24
80 See n 70
81 See n 47
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11 put it before the EP elections in an open letter addressed to all European citizens ( and written in the
22 official languages of the EU) “Europe is not just a market. It is a project […of] European
civilisation that unites, frees and protects us. ”82

4.2. Market

The position that President Macron appeared to criticize in his letter pour un renaissance
européenne , however, has also the chrisms of a fully -fledged vision of integration – one based on
the idea that EU member states are together as commercial part ners trading with each other to
maximize their national wealth.83 I call this a ‘market vision’ of Europe. A recurrent feature of this
vision of integration is the plea for more individual responsibility – with objections to risk -sharing
in the field of EM U, and to increases in the EU budget which may result in further inter -state
transfers. At the same time, this vision of integration is cold towards common action in the
management of migration, which is a responsibility of borderline member states. Yet, t his vision of
integration is committed to the respect of rules – not only fiscal ones – and as such is vocal against
breaches of the rule of law, and democratic backsliding; and despite supporting the prospects of an
enlarged EU internal market to new coun tries, is also cautious against the accession of new member
states until they have proven their ability to fulfill the preset regulatory criteria.
While the UK government may have historically best represented this vision of integration,
today its face seems to have become the government of the Netherlands – although its leader never
really systematized this stance. In fact, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte openly dismissed as
senseless the idea of articulating a grand vision of Europe, calling instead f or a much more down –
to-earth approach – but one based on the view of the EU “as the ultimate example of the power of
international cooperation and free trade.”84 In fact, the Dutch government steadfastly resisted efforts
to deepen EMU,85 expand the EU budg et,86 and develop common debt instruments to address the
Covid -19 pandemic87 – often cobbling together coalitions of like -minded Nordic states such as
Austria, Denmark and Sweden to defend these positions. At the same time, however, the Dutch
government ha s been uncompromising in demanding respect of the rule of law,88 which it regarded
as essential also for the functioning of the EU internal market, and called for a rethink of the
enlargement process, including of the Schengen zone. As Prime Minister Rutte put it to the EP in
June 2018, “a deal is a deal” – and the EU must rest on rules to prosper in an unruly world.89

4.3. Autocracy

The not -so-subtle target of Prime Minister Rutte’s speech was obviously a third vision of
integration – one explicitly intent into restoring sovereignty, reneging democracy and restricting the
rule of law, but with EU money. I call this an ‘autocracy vision’ of Europe. A recurrent feature of
this vision of integration is the appeal to national identity90 – with objections towards any form of

82 French President Emmanuel Macron, Letter, 4 March 2019, available at: https://www.elysee.fr/es/emmanuel –
macron/2019/03/04/pour -une-renaissance -europeenne.fr
83 See ceteris paribus Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations [1776]
84 Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, speech at the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 13 June 2018 (later dism issing in
the debate the ideas of grand plans by saying that if you have a vision you need to consult a doctor)
85 See n 12
86 See n 56
87 See n 71
88 See Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, speech at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Berlin, 2 March 2018.
89 Rutte (n 84)
90 See Federico Fabbrini and Andras Sajo, “The Dangers of Constitutional Identity” (2019) 25 European Law Journal
457
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12 solidarity in the relocation of migrants which are seen as a threat to the ethnic homogeneity of the
people. Moreover, this vision of integration openly defies the foundational values of the EU –
including respect for the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of
the press – but gladly supports the further Eastward enlargement of the EU, particularly if it allows
for the accession of like -minded nation -states. At the same time, this vis ion welcomes redistributive
policies in the fiscal sector – and therefore fully supports an ambitious EU budget in the new MFF
negotiations, with the resulting financial transfers. In fact, for sponsors of this vision of Europe, the
EU is an essential elem ent of the transformation of the state into an autocracy, as it provides the
resources to maintain national growth and economic wellbeing through a system of crony
capitalism and corruption.
Clearly, the paradigmatic example of this vision of integration is Hungary under the rule of
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán – who has largely been taken as a role -model also by the governing
party in Poland. Prime Minister Orbán clearly positioned Hungary among the friends of cohesion in
the MFF negotiations – calling for greater solidarity and financial transfers in favor of Eastern
states.91 But his Government unrepentantly resisted any solidarity whatsoever when this entailed the
relocation of asylum seekers adopted to tackle the migration crisis – even flouting courts’ order to
this end.92 And he openly spoke in favor of transforming Hungary into an illiberal democracy93 – a
plan he faithfully put into action by packing courts, changing the electoral laws and silencing civil
societies to his direct favor. In fact, by ex ploiting the Covid -19 pandemic to push through
Parliament on 30 March 2020 an emergency law that enables the government to rule by decree
indefinitely,94 Prime Minister Orbán walked the final step to turn Hungary a full -fledged autocracy.

5. Alternative pro spects

The alternative visions on European integration outlined in the previous section are increasingly
hard to reconcile – and this weights ominously on the future of the EU27. In fact, the EU system of
governance dominated more and more by inter -govern mental decision -making is unfit to manage
the centrifugal pulls unleashed by the competing (polity, market and autocracy) visions of Europe –
as patently revealed by the EU27 inability to solve once and for all any of the multiple crises. In this
context, the call for a Conference on the Future of Europe designed to reflect on the constitutional
architecture of Europe may seem wishful thinking – but is really more needed than ever. However,
the success of this initiative, and the possibility that it may lea d towards a new settlement in the
EU27, remains uncertain – not least due to the disruptive effects that the Covid -19 pandemic is
producing. As such, questions persist whether the EU after Brexit will continue to integrate or
rather disintegrate, and in wh at form that may happen.

5.1. The shortcomings of intergovernmental governance

The EU system of governance has proved structurally incapable to manage the profound tensions
among the EU27 – for reasons that go beyond the responsibilities that may be attribu ted to
individual EU leaders. In fact, the start of a new institutional cycle following the EP elections in
May 2019 has not marked a fundamental change in the EU capacity to steer the ship across rough
waters – although, admittedly, the appointment of Uru sula von der Leyen as European Commission
President in disregard of the Spitzenkandidaten process, and of Charles Michel as European Council
President while he was care -taking Prime Minister of Belgium, did not help in strengthening the

91 See n 57
92 See n 19
93 Orban (n 30)
94 See n 61
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13 legitimacy and pres tige of their offices.95 Yet, the reason for the EU management flaws has to do
with fundamental shortcomings in the EU institutional system, and in particular with its inter –
governmental decision -making regime centered on the EU27 heads of state and govern ment in
European Council, which has increasingly become the normal EU governance mode.96
The subsequent crises Europe faced have further pushed the European Council to the heart
of decision -making – but with the paradoxical consequences of making decisions almost impossible
to achieve.97 Because in the European Council the member states defend national positions – which,
as explained above, reflect opposite visions of integration – unsurprisingly the EU27 have been
unable to find consensus on how t o overcome crises. At the same time, the European Council has
recurrently delegated tasks to the Eurogroup of Finance Ministers. Yet, the decision -making
dynamics in this body are the same – and the fact that the Eurogroup has increasingly met in an
inclus ive format (with representatives of non -Eurozone states), even to deal with EMU and Covid –
19, has further aggravated things. In this context, the only institutions that have been up to the task
are the EU supranational authorities: the ECB was crucial in t ackling the euro -crisis and Covid -19,
the ECJ responded firmly the migration crisis and the rule of law crisis, and – despite being mostly
cut-off from decision -making in policies outside the common market – also the EP has taken strong
positions for insta nce on democratic backsliding and the MFF.

5.2. The potentials of the Conference on the Future of Europe

Given the shortcomings of the EU current governance system, it seems inevitable for the EU to re –
consider in depth its institutional setup and powers’ allocation.98 While undoubtedly challenging,
this was precisely the understanding behind the initiative to establish a Conference on the Future of
Europe. Initially envisioned by French President Macron,99 and subsequently embraced by
European Commission P resident von der Leyen,100 the Conference on the Future of Europe was
conceived as a way to renew the EU and relaunch the project of integration – right after Brexit. In
fact, while in November 2019 France and Germany put forward a common position on the sc ope
and structure of the Conference,101 in January 2020 the EP openly endorsed the initiative, calling it
an opportunity to profoundly reform the EU, including through treaty changes.102 Moreover, while
the Council of the EU103 advanced more cautious position s on the initiative, it both supported its
launch – and engaged in inter -institutional negotiations with the aim to kick -start the Conference in
May 2020 and have it operate for two years.
Yet, the explosion of the Covid -19 pandemic unraveled the original time-frame for the
Conference’s start.104 Moreover, it still remains to be seen how precisely the Conference will be
structured, and what exactly its mandate will be. While the EP and several member states
individually or jointly have pushed for the Confer ence to have an ambitious remit, with a clear role
to revise the EU treaties and institutions along the model of the 2002/2003 Brussels Convention on
the Future of Europe, other institutions and member states are more skeptical, and would rather

95 See European Council Conclusions, 2 July 2019, EUCO 18/19.
96 See Uwe Puette r, The European Council and the Council (OUP 2014)
97 See Sergio Fabbrini, Which European Union? (CUP 2015)
98 See Sergio Fabbrini, Europe’ s Future: Decoupling and Reforming (CUP 2019)
99 See Macron ( n 82)
100 European Commission President candidate Ursula von der Leyen, “A Union that strives for more: My Agenda for
Europe. Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2019 -2024”, 16 July 2019, 19.
101 See Franco -German non -paper on “Key questions and gui delines: Conference on the Future of Europe”, 25
November 2019.
102 See European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Parliament’s position on the Conference on
the Future of Europe, P9_TA(2020)0010.
103 Council of the EU, Doc. 5675/20, 3 F ebruary 2020
104
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14 want the p rocess to serve as a redo of the empty citizens’ dialogue the EU organized in 2017 –
2019.105 Needless to say, tensions around the institutional organization and constitutional mandate
of the Conference reflect the competing visions on the future of Europe. I n fact, this is why
elsewhere I recommended that, to overcome state vetoes that could doom the whole project, the
Conference should resolve to draft a new treaty – a Political Compact – and submit it to a new
ratification rule, which replaces the unanimity requirement of Article 48 TEU with a super -majority
vote.106 However, it is clear that the success of the initiative cannot be assured.

5.3. The challenges of a defining moment

All in all, therefore, the future of the EU27 remains uncertain and unsettled, with several prospects
ahead. Previously, I suggested that three alternative scenarios could be identified for the future of
Europe:107 one of path -dependency, one of increasing differentiation, and another of outright
decoupling – with the emergence of a smaller union within the EU. In a way, all these prospects
remain still possible, as recent developments have proven. For instance – consistent with the logic
of path -dependency – the EU27 muddled -through in December 2019 in putting together a response
to the challenge of climate change by spelling out commitments to climate neutrality that not all
member states agreed to, and coming up with a Just Transition Fund to appease the hold -outs.108
However – consistent with the logic of ever growing differentiation – a group of 20 EU member
states through enhanced cooperation also established and appointed in 2019 the new European
Public Prosecutor Office (EPPO), circumventing the opposition of rule of law backsliding
countries.109 And – consistent with the logic of decoupling – on 22 January 2019 France and
Germany concluded the Treaty of Aachen deepening cooperation between themselves.
However, the competing visions on the finalité of Europe – with the clash between a polity,
a market and an autocracy Weltanschau ung of integration – complicate even further the prospects.
In fact, even the question whether the EU27 will integrate or disintegrate is wide open. After the
Brexit referendum some had worried that with the EU project m ay be about to unravel – but the
embarrassing difficulties faced by the UK in leaving from the EU later reassured many than no
other member state would attempt to trigger Article 50 TEU.110 And yet, withdrawal is just one
among several ways in which disinte gration may actually occur.111 In fact, a slower form of
cancerous erosion of the union is also possible.112 After all, in families like in federations, a union
relies on the assumption that we “sink or swim together”113 – and if this moral bond withers, ther e is
little that laws can do to replace it.114

105 European Commission, “Citizens’ Dialogues and Citizens’ Consultations: Key Conclusions”, 30 April 2019.
106 See Federico Fabbrini, “The Conference on the Future of Europe: A New Model to Reform the EU?” Charlemagne
107 Fabbrini (n 4)
108 See European Council Conclusions, EUCO 29/19, 12 December 2019
109 See Decision 2019/1798 of the European Parliament and the Counci l of 14 October 2019 appointing the European
Chief Prosecutor of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, OJ 2019 L 274/1.
110 See Marlene Wind, “Brexit and Euroskepticism: Will ‘Leaving Europe’ be Emulated Elsewhere?” in Federico
Fabbrini (ed), The Law & Po litics of Brexit (OUP 2017) 221
111 See Mark Dawson, “Coping with Exit, Evasion, and Subversion in EU Law” (2020) 21 German Law Journal 51.
112 See also the chapter by Sionaidh Douglas -Scott in this book
113 See US Supreme Courts, Edwards v. California , 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941) (defining the US as “framed under the
dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several
States must sink or swim together, and that, in the long run, prosperity an d salvation are in union, and not division.”)
114 But see Case C -715/17, C -718/17 and C -719/17, Commission v. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, Opinion
of AG Sharpston, §255 (saying that member states should not sabotage the union recalling “an old sto ry from the Jewish
tradition that deserves wider circulation. A group of men are travelling together in a boat. Suddenly, one of them takes
out an auger and starts to bore a hole in the hull beneath himself. His companions remonstrate with him. ‘Why are yo u
doing that?’ they cry. ‘What are you complaining about?’ says he. ‘Am I not drilling the hole under my own seat?’ ‘Yes,’
they reply, ‘but the water will come in and flood the boat for all of us’.”)
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15 From this point of view, therefore, it will be crucial for those member states’ governments
that have so far maintained a constructive ambiguity on their visions of integration to take a firm
stance on what Eu rope they want. This is particularly true for Germany, which is the largest and
wealthier EU member state. Whereas historically the German government had supported a polity
vision of Europe, since the reunification its position blurred. Under the leadershi p of Chancellor
Angela Markel – and under the pressure of domestic institutions like its Constitutional Court and
Central Bank – the German government dragged its feet and failed to convincingly answer French
President Macron’s call to jointly relaunch the EU. Despite signing in June 2018 the Meseberg
Declaration,115 the German government resisted solving the euro -crisis’ legacy by completing
EMU, and lobbied for a smaller MFF. Moreover, while taking bold measures to deal with the
migration crisis, it pushed for further EU enlargements, and has been mostly silent towards the rule
of law backsliding in Hungary – perhaps because Prime Minister Orbán ’s party is a member of the
European People’s Party, to which also Chancellor’s Merkel Christian Democrats belong.116 After
Brexit, the ways in which Germany deals with the catastrophic Covid -19 pandemic – with its huge
human, social and economic costs – will have momentous consequences on the EU’s future
direction.117

6. Conclusions

The EU27 showed a remarkable unity in their dealings with the UK. And yet, the EU is a house
divided against itself. As this chapter has shown, a series of prolonged and unsolved crises have left
deep scars in the fabric of the union. From the euro -crisis to the migration c risis and the rule of law
crisis – besides Brexit – to the enlargement crisis, the MFF crisis and the Covid -19 crisis – after
Brexit – the EU27 have struggled to find a united course of action. In fact, as this chapter has
explained, this has to do with a competition between three profound visions of what European
integration is, and ought to be: what I called a polity, a market and an autocracy conception of
Europe’s finality. While these categories are not rigid – and usually these alternative visions coe xist
and compete in each member states – the reality is that these conflicting ideas about European
integration have increasingly come to be embodied by member states, or groups thereof, competing
in the EU arena. In this context, the future of the Europe remains uncertain and unsettled. Given the
shortcomings in the EU intergovernmental system of governance, the initiative to launch a
Conference on the Future of Europe rethinking in depth the EU institutional and power structure is
to be welcome. We don’t know whether this initiative will succeed. Yet, we do know that the way
in which the EU27 respond to Covid -19 will define whether the EU can fulfil its messianic
promise,118 or rather – as many other confederal associations have in the past119 – “perish from the
earth.”120

115 Franco -German Declaration, Meseberg, 19 June 2018.
116
117 See Joschka Fischer and Jürgen Habermas, “Nous appelons la Commission européenne à créer un fonds corona pour
aider les Etats membres”, Op -ed, Le Monde, 3 April 2020 (calling on Germany to abandon its reticence and take a firm
stance in favor of Europe an solidarity in responding to Covid -19).
118 See Joseph H.H. Weiler, “The Political and Legal Culture of European Integration” (2011) 9 International Journal of
Constitutional Law 678
119 See Hans V ollaard, European Disintegration: A Search for Explanations (Palgrave 2018)
120 Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, 19 November 1863.
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