Eu Turkey Relations, 2019 [621259]

EU-TURKEY RELATIONS
Mapping landmines and
exploring alternative pathways

Eduard Soler i Lecha
Senior Research Fellow, CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs )

Abstract
Turkey will be a persistent headache for EU leaders in the years to
come. The deterioration of Turkey’s political, economic and
security dynamics will raise pressure. EU leaders will need to make
decisions on the continuation of the accession negotiations, the
modernisation of the Customs Union and visa liberalisation. The
EU may need to react to cris es and provocations. The most likely
scenario for the future of EU –Turkey relations for the next f ive
years is the continuation of some sort of fragile, conflictual or
uneasy cooperation. There is a need to think about the best way
to deal with this uncertainty , as EU–Turkey is a minefield. In o rder
not to suffer an unwanted and mutually damaging accident we
should know where those min es are laid and ho w to circumvent
or disarm them. Different options and alternative pathways l ie
ahead of us.

FEPS
Policy Paper
September
2019

EU–Turkey relations: mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways
Eduard Soler i Lecha
FEPS | Rue Montoyer 40, B -1000 Brussels | Tel + 32 2 234 69 00 | Fax + 32 2 280 03 83 | info@ feps-europe.eu
2

Table of Content s
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……….. 3
1. INTRODUCTION ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……………… 4
2. WHERE ARE WE AND WHERE ARE WE COMING FROM? ………………………….. ……………….. 4
4. THE KEY PLAYERS ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …………… 8
4. THE LANDMINES ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………….. 12
5. THREE SCENARIONS AND FIVE OPTIONS ………………………….. ………………………….. ………. 16
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ………………………….. …………………….. 19
FURTHER READING ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………….. 22
ABOUT THE AUTHOR ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……….. 23

EU–Turkey relations: mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways
Eduard Soler i Lecha
FEPS | Rue Montoyer 40, B -1000 Brussels | Tel + 32 2 234 69 00 | Fax + 32 2 280 03 83 | info@ feps-europe.eu
3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 The relations between the European Union (EU) and Turkey have a long history. I nstitutional
inertia , unmet expectations and accumulated frustrations all play their part. Relations have been
at a low point since 2013 .
 Many actors intervene in EU –Turkey relations. Inside Turkey , power is concentrat ed in the
Turkish presidency. While the opposition does not influence Ankara’s decisions , it does shape the
views and positioning towards Turkey of European political and social counterparts.
 In the EU, the European Commission has been push ing to maintain or even intensify the current
level of cooperation. In contrast, the European Parliament has called for the suspension of the
accession negotiat ions. Not all Member States are equally involved : larger countries, immediate
neighbours and those hosting large Turkish, Kurdish and Armenian diasporas have a higher
profile in the debates.
 The key players seem to be aware that there are some limits that should not be crossed. A strong
network of mutual interest might provide a buffer for most episodes of tensions. However,
precisely because the different players have got use d to test ing the limits without paying a price,
they may wrongly assume that they can always go further .
 Relations may be negatively affect ed by: democratic backsliding, political opportunism, territorial
disputes, the Kurdish and Armenian issues, a troubled North Atlantic alliance and the political
sensitivities attached to technical cooperation (e.g. migration) . Unexpected security or politic al
crises in Turkey or Europe, exogenous factors and miscalculations could provoke an accident.
These situations can be managed if there is some level of trust but trust is at an all -time low.
 In the coming years the EU will need to take decisions on the continuation of the accession
negotiations, the modernisation of the Customs Union and visa liberalisation. The EU may need
to react to crises and provocations of very different kinds.
 The report presents th ree scenarios (cooperation, conflict, convergence) arguing that the most
likely scenario for the future of EU –Turkey relations for the next five years is the continuation of
some sort of fragile, conflictual and uneasy cooperation.
 This report presents fi ve options when dealing with Turkey: postponing decisions, opting for a
purely transactional relation ship, insisting on the idea of membership and the incentives -based
approach, banging a fist on the table , and making candid but constructive criticism.
 It indicates seven concrete proposals through which the EU could further engage with Turkey
despite the hostile political environment : (1) upgrading the mechanisms to reinforce people -to-
people contact; (2) developing program mes to further associate Turkey’s municipalities in
cooperation projects; (3) offer ing Turkey the possibility of setting up a consultative expert group;
(4) leaving the veto in place on start ing the negotiation of the upgraded Customs Union,
reminding Turkey that in order to conclude these negotiations it will have to meet certain
political criteria; (5) b eing specific and blunt in condemning human right s abuses and democratic
backsliding; (6) assess ing the security, environmental and economic aspects in which Turkey is
most vulnerable and offer ing the EU’s full cooperation and support to address those potential
risks before they materialise ; and (7) being openly self -critical , accepting part of the responsibility
for the current stalemate in relations .

EU–Turkey relations: mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways
Eduard Soler i Lecha
FEPS | Rue Montoyer 40, B -1000 Brussels | Tel + 32 2 234 69 00 | Fax + 32 2 280 03 83 | info@ feps-europe.eu
4 1. INTRODUCTION
Turkey will keep th e EU busy in the years to come. It is not just another neighbour with whom
relations are complicate d. It is not one among many partners. Turkey is more than that. Turkey is an
issue that generates so much controversy in many European countries that it beco mes part of
electoral debates. Bilateral disputes with some EU members – including those over territor y and
sovereign ty – are still to be resolved. Turkish cooperation (or the lack of it) significantly impacts
Europe’s security. Its geographic al position, as a sort of buffer zone between the EU and the hottest
conflict scenarios in the Middle East, is no minor issue. The recent warming of Ankara’s relations with
an assertive and defiant Russia, which many perceive as a threat to Europe’s security and a strategic
rival, and the tensions in Eastern Mediterranean have added to an already complicate d picture.
This report aim s to provid e the keys to understand ing where we are coming from, who the key
players are in these relations, wh at issues may lea d towards more conflict and tension , and which
alternative pathways can be taken in the years to come. Certainly , not everything depends on what
the EU does or does not do. But while the EU is not in control of the decisions taken by the Turkish
President , nothing prevents it from evaluating the strategy so far, the alternative s before it, and
taking actions to move relations closer to a situation that may be advantageous to both parties.

2. WHERE ARE WE AND WHERE ARE WE COMING FROM?
One of the peculiarit ies of EU –Turkey relations is their long history . Perhaps inevitably, i nstitutional
inertia , unmet expectations and accumulated frustrations all play a part . It all started with the signing
of the association agreement in 1963 , which was already seen as a preparatory stage for full
membership of the then European Economic Community . Critical moments were faced in 1974 (after
Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus), 1980 (after Turkey’s brutal coup d’état and the subsequent wave of
repression) and 1997 (when Turkey decided to unilaterally cancel the political dialogue with the EU
because it was not granted the status of candidate for accession).
The current situation does not look like a temporary crisis from which relations will soon recover. The
current period of backsliding started at least as far back as 2013. If we look at EU –Turkey relations
since Turkey became a candidate count ry in December 1999 – that is, twenty years ago – we can
identify three different phases separated by major turning points.

 The golden years (1999 –2006): Two elements allowed Turkey to become a candidate for
accession in the European Council of Helsinki in 1999: the victory red–green coalition in
Germany one year earlier and the momentum behind Greek –Turkish reconciliation after
the two consecutive earthquakes in Ath ens and Istanbul that triggered a sense of
solidarity between the two societies . Helsinki marks the beginning of a virtuous circle:
Turkish governments – before and after the victory of the Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi , AKP) in 2002 – started focusing on the reforms needed for
harmoni sation with the EU criteria. The “EU anchor” was perceived as an element that
contribut ed to Turkey’s political stability, creating incentives and g iving energy and
arguments to a loose coalition of pro -reform entrepreneurs that includ ed member s of
parliament, civil society, the business sector and opinion -makers. All in all, reforms such

EU–Turkey relations: mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways
Eduard Soler i Lecha
FEPS | Rue Montoyer 40, B -1000 Brussels | Tel + 32 2 234 69 00 | Fax + 32 2 280 03 83 | info@ feps-europe.eu
5 as the abolition of the death penalty and the a uthorisation to broadcast in languages
other than Turkish enabled the country to start meeting the Copenhagen Criteria that are
required to become a member (functional democratic governance, the rule of law,
respect for human rights and protection of minor ities, functioning market economy and
harmonisation with the acquis). In the case of the political criteria, they are a pre –
requisite for start ing the negotiations , particularly if, as happened in the case of Turkey,
EU Member States may ask the Commission to further assess its compliance. For a while,
the Turkish government kept the pace of reforms high. The interplay of the EU’s
credibility and Turkey’s willingness to incur the costs of adaptation to EU rules made
political reforms possible. Although ther e were controversies, the constitutional reform
packages that started in 2001 after Turkey’s adoption of the “National Program for the
Adoption of the Acquis” (NPAA) augured a more pragmatic, democratic and inclusive
Turkey, closely in tegrated into the European order. Some of the visible changes of those
constitutional reforms and other legal changes included the abolishment of the death
penalty in peacetime or the permission to broadcast in languages other than Turkish. All
those reforms allowed the Eur opean Commission to, albeit ambiguously, state that
Turkey fulfilled the political criteria to start negotiations in the progress report of
October 2004. The European Council also gave its green light in December that year and
negotiations started in 2005 . This was a moment of joy, particularly among reformist
segments in Turkey, but hopes dissipated soon after .

 Stagnation (200 7–2013) : Political changes in both the EU and Turkey put the brake s on
this virtuous circle , but i t was a gradual process. A non-unified Cyprus be came a full
member of the EU after the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek Cypriots in 20 04. From
then on Cyprus was able to impose its own conditions. The new conservative leaderships
in Germany ( Merkel ) and France (Sarko zy) were far more reluctant about Turkey’s EU
membership than their predecessors (S chröder and Chirac). The EU Council blocked
several chapters of the negotiation in December 2006 and afterwards Cyprus and France
announced the veto on additional ones. In Turkey , polit ical tensions were on the rise due
to the AKP’s political strategy of shunt ing aside social and political actors perceived to
constitute a threat to the AKP’s ideological project: the series of court cases (Ergenekon
and Sledgehammer , among others ) that fo llowed its sweeping victory in the 2007 general
elections were effective in changing the power balances in Turkey. The more the AKP
consolidated its power in Turkey , the less it need ed the EU anchor. In the past, the AKP
resorted to the EU as an argument t o justify reforms that, on some occasions, also
helped them to weaken political or social rivals (e.g. the army). From 2007 onwards they
did not feel the need to invocate the EU ’s requirements and t his allowed Ankara to
pursue reforms more selectively. Turkey’s disillusionment with the EU also gave leverage
to the AKP to gauge the benefits of the reform process for itself in a political climate
increasingly captive to political tension and polarisation. Moreover, the E U’s economic
crises and the Arab Spring infused the idea that Turkey could try to play its own game
and that the EU needed Turkey more than the other way around .

 Backsliding (2013 –present ): This new phase is mainly characterised by a degradation of
the p olitical situation in Turkey. The repression of the Gezi protests in 2013 and
Erdoğan’s victory in the first presidential election in 2014 by receiving more than 50

EU–Turkey relations: mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways
Eduard Soler i Lecha
FEPS | Rue Montoyer 40, B -1000 Brussels | Tel + 32 2 234 69 00 | Fax + 32 2 280 03 83 | info@ feps-europe.eu
6 percent of the votes amp lified the majoritarian rule and put Turkey under the spotlight.
The EU voiced its criticisms in the areas of human rights, justice, and freedom s of speech,
press and assembly, among others . However, as the accession process had already
ground to a halt, the EU was left with little leverage over the Turkish government. The EU
could therefore not prevent t he Turkish government incrementally resort ing to
authoritarian practices. The repression of the Gezi protests, the purges and detention
following the 15th July 2016 coup attempt, and the erosion of the separation of powe rs
with the entry into force of the sup er-presidential system in 2017 were among the many
elements that raised concerns among large segments of the population in Turkey and
also in the EU. The EU also followed attentively the local elections in 2019 and
questioned the reasons behind the repetition of the vote in Istanbul. In light of all those
shortcomings, c ould the EU pretend to carry out the accession process as if nothing was
happening ? An increased number of voices start ed saying that the EU should do
something . In November 2017 the European Council decided to cut Turkey’s pre –
accession funds and in March 2019 the European Parliament (EP) urged to suspend the
negotiation process . The decision of the Parliament is the result of a process in which
part of the traditional supporters of the accession negotiation process had lost faith in
the willingness of the current Turkish government to reform. It is worth noting that while
the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) group supported the idea of suspension they also
opposed an amendment backed by part of the European People ’s Party (EPP) that
advocated for termination. Although the decision of the EP is not binding at this stage , it
was indicative of the state of mind among European mainstream parties . These kinds of
decisions and statements are often instrumentalised by the Turkish President, who
increasingly presents himself as a victim of an international -scale conspiracy and
expresses his distrust of European and Western partners . On some occasions, he has also
threatened to hold a referendum on putting an end to the accession process , though this
has never materialised. D espite the generally negative turn since 2013 there have been
very clear signs that Turkey and the EU realise that they need each other and that, when
facing a risk of destabilisation , they have been able to leave political differences aside .
The 2015/2016 migration crisis and Turkey’s currency crunch in 2018 are two examples .
In such critical moments, reassuring messages become more freq uent and pragmatism
gain ed ground.

The 2019 Commission Report

In line with the report published one year before, rather than taking note of the progress towards
accession, the Commission underlined areas where the political backsliding is manifest. The report
acknowledged that “accession negotiations have effectively come to a standstill, no further chapters
can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernisation of the
Customs Union can be currently foreseen. The Turkish g overnment’s repeated commitment to the
objective of EU accession has not been matched by corresponding measures and reforms since then,
and the EU’s serious concerns on continued negative developments in rule of law, fundamental rights
and the Judiciary ha ve not been addressed”. The report also touched on recent political
developments. For instance, ¡t mentioned that “the decisions by the Supreme Election Council to re –
run elections in Istanbul as well as to grant the mayorship of individual municipalities in the south –
east to second -placed candidates are a source of serious concern regarding the respect of the legality
and integrity of the electoral process and the institution’s independence from political pressure”. The
idea of Turkey’s backslid ing was mentioned 29 times in the report.

EU–Turkey relations: mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways
Eduard Soler i Lecha
FEPS | Rue Montoyer 40, B -1000 Brussels | Tel + 32 2 234 69 00 | Fax + 32 2 280 03 83 | info@ feps-europe.eu
7

Figure 1: 20 years of EU -Turkish relations: from optimism to mutual disappointment

Source: CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs)
In 2019 Turkey and Europe ’s vulnerabilities affect the way in which they perceive each other. The EU
seems to have a formidable capacity to accumulate crises without really solving any of them and yet
being resilient to their effects. However, its image and reputation are suffering from this state of
permanent crisis . Signs of EU weakness – or even worse , desperation , as with the so -called “refugee
crisis” in 2015/2016 – were interpreted in Ankara as an opportunity to chang e the terms of the
relationship for its own benefit. The huge and visible differences between Member States also sends
the signal to Turkey that exploring bilateral relations rather than following the EU track could be
more advantageous.
Turkey’s political deterioration and its economic weaknesses are also affecting the way in which the
EU look s at Turkey . It is seen as an increasingly unpredictable and unreliable partner and as a
container of risks that might spill over into the EU. In recent years many have referred to
enlargement fatigue , but in this case an additional Turkey fatigue has grown up with a strong
Erdoğan component. Moreover, the direct communication between Erdoğan and the top leadership
of the EU became less frequent and more tense, particularly after 2016. Will the new appointments
at the top of the Commission, the European Council and the Parliament reset the relations or will this
trend persist?

EU–Turkey relations: mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways
Eduard Soler i Lecha
FEPS | Rue Montoyer 40, B -1000 Brussels | Tel + 32 2 234 69 00 | Fax + 32 2 280 03 83 | info@ feps-europe.eu
8 4. THE KEY PLAYERS
The Turk ish Presidency has more power than ever . Constitutional reform formalised a practice that
had already been observed: Erdoğan makes all the important decisions . Some years ago , members of
the cabinet with strong views on the EU had some impact on Turkey’s European policy . This is no
longer the case. Probably, the last time this plurality was visible in the decision -making process was
with Erdoğan and the then Pri me Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu ’s distinct approaches when negotiating
the refugee deal with the EU in March 2016 . Davutoğlu was more constructive and prone to
compromise tha n the Turkish President, who was far more sceptic al regarding the incentives offered
by the EU in terms of reviving the accession process and visa -liberalisation. T he entry into force of
the hyper -presidential system , together with Erdoğan ’s strategy of ridding himself of critical and
independent voices , explains why the situation in which different Turkish views manifest have
become increasingly rare . Moreover , the formal and informal circle of advisors (sometimes referred
to as the Pelican group) are often more decisive than the cabinet of ministers or the Parliament .
The interest groups able to influence decisions ha ve also changed . Traditional business holdings
(above all the members of the Turkish Industry and Business Association – TÜSIAD), liberal civ il
society and intellectuals have been increasingly sidelined but still benefit from robust international
connections . Small and medium -sized companies, many of which are owned by pious Muslims
politically aligned with the AKP , became more influential in the early 2000s but even they seem to
have lost some clout. On the one hand , this is related to the fact that some of the members were
also affiliated with the G ülen movement and its business organisations (e.g. TUSKON) . This religious
and social movement, now listed as a terrorist group by the Turkish government, forged an alliance
with t he AKP when the goal was to side -line the Kemalist political, economic and security
establishment but their paths started to diverge in 2013 and the movement has been accused of
being the driving force of the coup attempt in 2016. On the other hand , small and medium size
businessmen have gradually been overshadowed by bigger holdings that are intimately connected
with AKP circles. In fact , businessmen that have become richer and more powerful thanks to the ir
proximity to the AKP – and even more so if they a re close to Erdoğan himself – are those likely to be
granted a greater say. But even in this case it is a very asymmetrical relation ship. They need the
support of the government more than the other way around .
Turkey’s opposition forces do not influence governmental policy but are key to shaping the views of
European political and social counterparts. In the last decade , the role of the pro -Kurdish Peoples'
Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi , HDP ) has become even more influential than that of
main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi , CHP ). This is due to
HDP activism in many European countries as well as Brussels, and amplified by the incarceration of
its charismatic leader , Selahattin Demirtaș , along with other party leaders. However, the local
elections in 2019 added a new factor to this equation : Ekrem İmamoğlu, the CHP mayor of Istanbul ,
who has the potential to shape international views o n Turkey. The potential formation of new
centre -right p arties by Ali Babacan, Ahmet Davutoğlu or other politicians currently abandoning the
AKP as well as a possible split between the AKP and the right -wing Nationalist Movement Party
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi , MHP) could alter opposition politics in Turkey and indirectly affect the
relations with the EU.

EU–Turkey relations: mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways
Eduard Soler i Lecha
FEPS | Rue Montoyer 40, B -1000 Brussels | Tel + 32 2 234 69 00 | Fax + 32 2 280 03 83 | info@ feps-europe.eu
9 The impact of the 2019 local elections: the opposition is back
On 31 March Turkey h eld municipal elections but there was much more at stake than municipal leadership.
The pro -governmental coalition lost i n most cities including the capital, Ankara, and Istanbul, home to 16
million people. The controversial decision of the Electoral Commission to rerun the Istanbul mayoral
election indicated that there was a lot at stake. On June 2019 the citizens of Istanb ul wen t back to the polls
and the opposition candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu succeeded in widening the margin of its victory by more than
800,000 votes. He became the political surprise of the year, reenergising the opposition after successive
electoral defeats a nd offering a political alternative to large segments of society. İmamoğlu presented
himself as approachable, transparent, conciliatory, and attached to the diversity of this great metropolis. He
successfully gain ed the trust of most Kurdish voters and als o capitalised on his reputation as a good
administrator, which he built up during his successful management as mayor of the middle -class district
of Beylikdüzü . Above all, he stood out as an excellent orator who went out among the people and
campaigned in the neighbourhoods, speaking with residents about local problems. The attention he has
captured, in Turkey and abroad, is an unwelcome development by Erdo ğan. He has not only lost Istanbul but
gained a strong political rival. Speculations about whether the new mayor could dispute the presidency in
the future intensified. What is certain is that Turkey no longer has one single political face.

The European Commis sion ’s technical decisions can have major political consequences. The
Commission experiences this on daily basis when implementing the Instrument for Pre-Accession,
the EU facility for refugees in Turkey , and when it has to prepare the annual reports on the progress
(or lack of it) of candidate countries. Several voices and opinions coexist with in the Commission .
Those most directly involved in dealing with Turkey form part of the Directorate -General for
Neighb ourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) . Yet, due to the importance of Turkey and
the intensity of the relations many other DGs play a significant role. The same can be said when it
comes to political leadership. Turkey is one of the issues on which presidents of the European
Commission tend to have a n opinion . Moreover, in addition to the Commissioner in charge of
accession negotiations, other members of the College deal directly with their Turk ish counterparts on
key topics (e.g. migration, trade and energy ) and may voice their opinions on the future of relations.
Although different opinions may coexist inside this institution, in general terms the Commission is an
actor that pushes to keep or even intensify the current level of cooperation and is not supportive of
the idea of putting an end to the accession process .
The European External Action Service (EEAS) has a fairly large team dedicated to Turkey. Ankara is a
crucial and not always easy partner when it comes to foreign and security policy . Syria is the clearest
example of this . The role of the EEAS in this constellation of European actors is to reinforce the
strategic dimension of the EU’s relations with Turk ey and to enable decision s on Turkey to be read in
light of the ir potential implicat ions for EU interests in the Middle East, in the Balkans o r in NATO. The
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission is a
figure with the capacity to lead EU policies on Turkey b ut also one that struggle s to be recognised as
a key interlocutor by the Turkish leadership.
The European Parliament proudly presents itself as the EU’s democratic conscience and, indeed, it is
the stage on which Turkey’s political developments are discussed most vividly. However , it has also
been a platform for right -wing populist parties to voice anti -Turkish narratives along identity and
cultural lines. The European Parliament does not have the capacity to halt the accession process but
it can shape the debate , and its position s and gestures from time to time provoke harsh reactions
from Turk ish officials. The European Parliament is where we can observe one of the key
developments of the last decade: individual politicians and political groups that were once

EU–Turkey relations: mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways
Eduard Soler i Lecha
FEPS | Rue Montoyer 40, B -1000 Brussels | Tel + 32 2 234 69 00 | Fax + 32 2 280 03 83 | info@ feps-europe.eu
10 supportive of Turkey ’s accession process because they saw it as the best way to consolidate Turkey’s
democratic consolidation but have become far more skeptical . In this hostile environment, the
European Parliament Turkey Forum , a cross -party non -partisan platform, has remained one of the
few channels to promote engagement with Turkey. It will be interesting to see the composition of
the new Parliament after the May 2019 European election and which M embers of the European
Parlia ment (new and old) decide to focus on Turkey and from which angle.

The 2018 report on Turkey approved by the European Parliament in March 2019
Point 21 of this report is the most critical one. 370 MEPs voted in favo ur of the decision to suspend Turkey 's
EU negotiations while 109 voted against and 143 abstained. The report “recommends that the Commission
and the Council of the European Union, in accordance with the Negotiatin g Framework, formally suspend
the accession negotiations with Turkey; remains, however, committed to democratic and political dialogue
with Turkey; asks the Commission to use the funds currently allocated under the Instrument for Pre –
Accession Assistance ( IPA II and the future IPA III) to support, through a dedicated envelope directly
managed by the EU, Turkey’s civil society, human rights defenders and journalists and to increase
opportunities for people -to-people contacts, academic dialogue, access for Tu rkish students to European
universities, and media platforms for journalists with the objective of protecting and promoting democratic
values and principles, human rights and the rule of law; without prejudice to Article 49 of the Treaty on
European Union, expects the relationship between Turkey and the EU to be redefined in terms of an
effective partnership; underlines that any political engagement between the EU and Turkey should be built
on conditionality provisions concerning respect for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights”.

The Member States that play a major role in shaping EU relations with Turkey are determined by a
range of factors . A country’s weight in EU discussions as a whole , the presence of a large Turkish,
Kurdish or Armenian diaspora population and sharing a border are all significant . The United
Kingdom was the only large country to consistently support Turkey’s integration in to the EU , but
since the Brexit debate started it has ceased to be an actor in this field . The positi ons of France and
Germany have changed over time and have been largely influenced by domestic political dynamics.
Changes of government and elections are key factor s in explaining the changing attitudes of
Germany while in France, particularly from 2002 to 2007, Turkey became a key topic in the public
debate and was weaponised in intra -party quarrels, both in left and right wing parties. At the same
time both Paris and Berlin have proved to be highly pragmatic, particularly when it comes to bilateral
relati ons with Ankara. For instance, France managed to preserve and even intensify the economic
and security cooperation with Turkey. Counter -terrorism became particularly central from 2015
onwards. Due to the other criteria mentioned above , a few smaller countries play significant role s,
such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, Greece, Cyprus and Bulgaria. The Bulgarian government is
one of the few voices advocating for the revitalisation of the accession process, largely due to the
willingne ss to preserve or even intensify already good neighbouring relations. For Greece and Cyprus
these relations are more conflictual but both believe that keeping the membership gives them
leverage and fear that an eventual termination of the negotiations coul d trigger more aggressive
moves by Turkey . The Austria n government is the one voicing its opposition to Turkey’s EU
membership more vocally . Sweden is known for combining its support to the accession negotiations
and a human rights agenda. In the case of t he Netherlands, relations with Turkey have become
tense r, but the economic ties have prevented an escalation.

EU–Turkey relations: mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways
Eduard Soler i Lecha
FEPS | Rue Montoyer 40, B -1000 Brussels | Tel + 32 2 234 69 00 | Fax + 32 2 280 03 83 | info@ feps-europe.eu
11 Europe’s interest groups play a role both in Brussels and in the Member States, generally pushing to
maintain Turkey anchored in the EU and avoid ing a train wreck in its relations with the EU which
could compromise long -term investments in Turkey. A quick look at the ranking of foreign direct
investment in Turkey by country reveals the intensity of EU –Turkey relations . As shown in Figure 2,
two EU countries top the list (the Netherlands and United Kingdom with 11% of the total each), and
five out of the 10 largest investors are EU countries. Austria invests as much as Russia and Spain’s
investment is five times that of China. Moreover, most ar e long -term investments in strategic sectors
such as banking or the car industry. Many corporations in Europe therefore have a key interest in
Turkey’s stability and prosperity and are likely to push their national governments to k eep or
reinforce these re lations , for example via the negotiation of a modernised Customs Union .

Figure 2 : FDI Inflows to Turkey by Country

Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey .

Public opinion in most European countries is not particularly keen on further enlarging the EU .
According to the Eurobarometer data, this opposition is particularly high among the six founding
members as well as in Austria and Demark. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer no longer asks the
question about Turkey but those surveys that did so show that the leve l of opposition is even higher
and growing. In Turkey this question has been frequently asked by several polling companies. When
looking at the evolution since 2004 we o bserve Turkey’s public opinion to be very volatile (levels of
support reached more than 70% in the golden years and have fallen below 50% at the most critical
moments ). What is relevant is that despite the deterioration of the relations and the fact that h opes
for membership faded away, a significant part of Turkey’s population is still supportive of the idea of
becoming part of the EU . While p ublic opinion in Turkey tend to reflect rather than explain the state
of the relationship , the strong opposition to Turkey’s membership in some EU countries is a factor
that national policy makers have taken into account when defining the position of their countries.
The case of Austria, whose government opposes any progress in the accession track and qualifies it
as a “diplomatic fiction” , is one of the best examples.
Willingly or unwillingly, external players also have an impact on EU –Turkey relations. The way they
line up on this issue is not a determining factor but, under certain circumstances, they can play a

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12 role. For instance, when Turkey’s relations with the US and Russia deteriorate, the EU anchor
becomes more attractive. However, if relations with the US deteriorate to the extent that it is
perceived as a wider crisis between Turkey and all of its Western all ies, this indirectly affects the EU
track negatively.
Figure 3: European public opinion position vis -à-vis enlargement

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 89 , Spring 2018

When it comes to Russia, there is no doubt that Moscow is consistently working to weaken the
cohesion of the Western alliance and that the warming of relations with Turkey since summer 2016 is
part of this project . Specific decision s regarding the anti -missile S -400 (see below) or the
development of energy in frastructure have to be analysed from that particular angle. Turkey -EU
relations are, thus, interconnected with Turkey -NATO, Turkey -US, NATO -Russia, and EU -Russia
relations. In this phase, Russia is exploit ing Turkey’s mistrust and frustration towards the EU and
NATO to bring Ankara closer to its positions . In other words, Moscow benefits and tries to take
advantage from the stalemate in EU –Turkey relations.

4. THE LANDMINES
Turkey –EU relations have been on a very long and tortuous journey and there is no reason to think
that the pathway will get any easie r in the years to come. This will be a process that is full of
obstacles and landmines. Until now, neither of the two parties has seem ed willing to put a halt to the
accession proc ess and bear the responsibility for the damage that it may inflict on both parties. That
being the case, it is crucial to know where the landmines may be planted so that they may be
circumvented or, even better, disarmed.
Democracy and human rights make up one of the most evident landmines . The continued abuse of
the rule of law and the number of cases opened against dissident voices – including journalists, civil

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13 society activists and members of the political opposition – raise many concerns in the EU. When EU
nationals are affected – as has been the case wit h several journalists – the alarm is greater still . This
has often been depicted as Ankara resorting to hostage diplomacy to put more pressure on its EU
interlocutors. The EU has channelled its disapp roval through a number of political declaration s or
specific decision s such as cutting pre -accession funds. And yet, the democratic backsliding has not
been a strong enough factor to put an end to the relationship. In other words, the political situation
remains an obstacle to moving forward but does not seem to prevent a certain level of cooperation.
The European Commission stated in its 2018 enlargement report that “Turkey has been moving away
from the EU” but did not present any alternative framework of relations in case it moves too far. For
its part, Turkey’s authorities seem interested in constantly checking where the limits are. For
instance, when President Erdoğan claimed victory after winning the constitutional referendum , he
mentioned that he would review Turkey's suspension of the death penalty. Voicing the position of
the EU leaders, Jean Claude Juncker repeatedly mention ed in May 2017 that this would imply
crossing the “the reddest of all lines” (see, for instance, Poli tico, 8 May 2017). The fact that despite
some rhetorical escalation the death penalty has not been reintroduced proves that both parties
know that there are some limits that should not be overstep ped. On the same token, the EU’s
awareness that it needs Tur key’s cooperation in fields such as migration or counter -terrorism has
cooled down tensions relating to human rights issues despite the consta nt pressure of advocacy
groups.
Politicisation and electoral opportunism are a major concern. In the last two dec ades there have
been many episodes of acute politicisation of Turkey in elections in Europe and of relations with the
EU and/or specific Member States in Tu rkey’s elections. Elections are often periods when those
dynamics become more visible and salient. O ne of the clearest examples was in 2017 when Turkey’s
constitutional referendum coincided with a crowded electoral cycle in Europe (Netherlands, France,
Germany and Austria , among others). Tension s reached a peak when several European countries
banned the organisation of rallies in favour of a yes vote to Turkey’s constitutional reform and in the
Netherlands the Dutch police stopped a Turkish minister, Betül Sayan Kaya , when she tried to reach
Rotterdam . This triggered riots by pro -Erdoğan protesters. The Turkish leadership compared the
position of Mark Rutte’s government with the Nazi period and this also forced many EU countries to
express solidarity with the Dutch government. Yet, this case is illustrative that r hetoric al escalations
do not necessari ly lead to full -fledged confrontation : the depth and breadth of interests, parti cularly
at bilateral level , have preserved the existing cooperation. Moreover, once the elections are over,
gestures are often made to bring the relations back on track. But th e risk in the future is that one of
the parties could, at some point, cross an invisible threshold from which turning back would be far
more difficult. The tricky thing here is that it is impossible to know where this threshold is until it is
being crossed .
Territorial disputes and problematic neighbourhood relations have been a major obstacle for many
decades, particularly when it comes to Greece and Cyprus. Both governments claim that it is in their
interest s for Turkey to remain associated with the EU project. They are afraid that without the EU
anchor, Turkey could become more aggressive. Despite the good words, in practice these
neighbouring relations have become a major burden for EU –Turkey relations and beyond. Turkey
being a NATO member while Cypru s is not further complicates this picture by affect ing EU–NATO
cooperation as a whole . When it comes to Greece , the main issues to be resolved concern the
extension of maritime and air spaces, the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf, the
sovereign ty of several islets and rocks and the controversies regarding the range of application of the

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14 Montreux Convention on demilitarisation. Since 1999, Turkey and Greece have been exploring ways
to settle all these disputes but they are still far from finding them. The case of Cyprus is of a different
magnitude. The presence of Turkish military troops in the north of the island and the fact that Turkey
does not recognise the government of the Republic of Cyprus is a major obstacle for EU –Turkey
relations. Recen tly, drilling in the eastern Mediterranean has been added to the list of contentious
issues and triggered a series of retaliation measures by the EU (see box below) . This connects with a
broader geopolitical rivalry in the eastern Mediterranean. Greece and Cyprus have formed closer t ies
with Egypt and Israel , leaving Turkey feeling increasingly cornered. Energy is a key factor in these
diplomatic realignments , but the consequences go much further . In fact, t hrough At hens and Nicosia
the EU is becoming part of a game of alliances in the Middle East in which Turkey is on the opposite
side.

The Council conclusions on the Turkish drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean (15th July
2019)
The EU decided to downgrade, once more, its relations with Turkey. “In light of Turkey’s continued and new
illegal drilling activities, the Council decides to suspend negotiations on the Comprehensive Air Transport
Agreement and agrees not to hold the Association Council and further meetings of the EU -Turkey high -level
dialogues for the time being. The Council endorses the Commission’s proposal to reduce the pre -accession
assistance to Turkey for 2020 and invites the European Investment Bank to review i ts lending activities in
Turkey, notably with regard to sovereign -backed lending”. The timing of this catalogue of measures is
significant as it came right after the first shipment of S -400 to Turkey and the increased risk of US sanctions.

The Kurdish is sue and the war in Syria. These two issues are increasingly connected. The idea of the
Kurdish issue encapsulates the idea that this is a multi -layer ed factor . Locally, t he way Turkey has
dealt with its domestic Kurdish affairs (human rights, cultural and linguistic diversity and political
expression) has been watched attentively by the European institutions and by certain individual
politicians. Coinciding with the collapse of the peace process in 2015 this issue gained prominence
once again. The fact that the HDP is an associated member of the Party of European Socialists should
also be taken into consideration. It is worth noting that the EU’s statement after the announcement
of the electoral rerun in Istanbul also contained criticism of the decision by t he Supreme Election
Council to declare some elected mayors and members of municipal councils ineligible to take office
in south -east ern Turkey. The Kurdish issue is also a domestic concern in many EU countries. Kurdish
diasporas are politically and socially very active and the Turkish government constantly puts pressure
on European counterparts to stop activities that they argue support or exalt terrorism. In addition ,
there is a regional dimension to the Kurdish issue that affects the positioning of Turkey and some EU
Member States vis -à-vis northern Syria. Some EU governments have backed the Kurdish militias in
Northern Syria in the fight against ISIS, in the case of France with a military presence on the ground.
Turkey claims that th ose groups are just an offshoot of the PKK and thus that this support implies
backing a terrorist organisation. The three layers (Kurds in Turkey, Kurds in the EU and Kurds in Syria )
are interlinked and a clash between the EU and Turkey on any one of them is likely to af fect the rest.
The Armenian issue has lost prominence, but may re surface . Despite some progress in Turkey when
it comes to critically revisit ing its own history , the official position of the Turkish authorities is that
the forced displacement and the mass killings of Armenians during the First World War was not
genocide. Armenian groups, in response, have been actively engaged in positioning this issue in

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15 parliamentary debates abroad , generally by asking parliament s to formally recognise the events as
geno cide. France – home of the largest Armenian diaspora – is the country where this issue has
gained mo st prominence and which has served as the example for similar lobbying activities in other
countries. In the case of Germany, the almost unanimous vote in t he Bundestag in June 2016 ,
recognising the Armenian genocide , pushed Turkey to recall its ambassador and Erdogan also
qualifies as traitors those MPs with Turkish heritage who had backed the vote. Despite some political
victories , the Armenian lobby has been unable to transform the recognition into a prerequisite for
Turkey to become a member of the EU or to implement legislation condemning genocide denial. In
recent years, this issue has lost some visibility in national and European debates but it may resu rface
again. The fact that the AKP government needs the support of the right wing Nationalist Movement
Party ( Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi , MHP ) in the Turkish Parliament is not a good sign in terms of
favouring reconciliation .
The West ern alliance has seen better days. A valid statement in general , but even more so when it
comes to Turkey. Turkey’s grievances relate to what it perceive s to be a disloyal attitude among
several NATO members, including the US, when it comes to northern Syria , but also regarding the
lack of support when the country suffered a coup attempt in 2016 that involved Turkish offi cials
posted in NATO. Turkey ’s determination to complete the purchase of the Russian -made S-400 air
missile defence system is likely to irrit ate relations even further. It is worth mentioning that many
central and eastern European countries – some of which are fairly supportive of Turkey’s accession
process – see Russia as a major security threat. The perceived rapprochement between Ankara and
Moscow therefore risks eroding some of the remaining support for Turkey in the EU. Until recently,
Turkey’s membership of NATO was able to buffer tensions between Turkey and some of its
members. In the months to come we will see whether this is still the c ase or whether frictions in the
alliance spill over to the EU.

S-400: What’s next?
Frustrated by the lack of success in purchasing an air defence system from the US, Ankara decided in 2017
to opt for the Russian alternative. Despite repeated warnings from the US, Turkey seems determined to
deploy the Russian -made S -400 missile defen ce system. NATO and US officials warned against such a move,
explai ning that this would be incompatible with the NATO system. As a result, Turkey shall be excluded from
the F -35 stealth fighter program. This may be just the first consequence of the deal and further sanctions
are not excluded. A spokesperson of the State d epartment said that Turkey could be exposed to sanctions
under the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Turkey seems to believe that
at the end this can be resolved at the highest level by Erdogan and Trump themselves. This was the message
conveyed after the G -20 meeting in Osaka. Time will tell if Ankara miscalculated and underestimated the
animosity of members of the US administration and the Congress that may seize this opportunity to send a
strong message to Turkey’s leadersh ip. If this happens, t his is likely to further irritate Turkey -NATO relations
and this may negative ly affect EU-Turkey relations as well.

Customs Union , visas and refugees : technical cooperation can also be politically sensitive . At a time
when the accession process is not likely to be revitalised , the efforts to safeguard and eventually
strengthen EU –Turkey cooperation on technical issues of common interest are continuing . Yet,
technical cooperation is not immune to political turbulence. The cl earest example is the upgrading of
the Customs Union ’s suspen sion for political reasons. Although experts seem to agree that this
upgrade would benefit both economies, some EU countries have refused to start the negotiations

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16 pointing at political rather th an technical obstacles. After the European Parliament elections there
may be attempts to revamp this initiative but many politicians interpret this as a “gift to Erdoğan ”
and oppose any step in this direction. Those voices do not take into consideration th at the
modernisation of the Customs Union would mean Turkey needed to tackle public procurement and
other sectors that require meaningful governance reforms. They do not seem attracted by the
potential benefits of this for the economies of both Turkey and the EU. The other concrete
cooperation that is significantly suffering from political pollution is visa liberali sation , which faces
opposition on both sides. Turkish politics do not favour compliance with some of the c onditions
imposed by the EU (mainly reform of the anti -terrorism legislation) , and in Europe the rise of populist
and xenophobic movements may push several European countries and perhaps the European
Parliament to object even if Turkey fulfil s the prerequi sites. Finally, a third leg of this politically
sensitive cooperation concerns refugees as well as border and maritime surveillance . Unilateral
move s from Turkey or the EU to review the terms of the current cooperation could trigger spiral ling
tension .
These seven issues are known l andmines. The EU, Turkey or both may move towards them but, being
fully aware of the cons equences of stepping on them , they are able to stop before it is too late. The
real danger may arise from hidden landmines that remain un identified. In other words, unexpected
security or political crises in Turkey or Europe, exogenous factors and miscalculation s could provoke
an accident. These situations can still be managed if there is some level of trust. The problem here is
that trust is at an all-time low.

5. THREE SCENARIONS AND FIVE OPTIONS
As we have seen in the first pages of this report, there have been ups and downs in EU–Turkey
relations and the changes of cycle may be the result of decisions taken on either side . So far,
relations have proved to be quite resilient due to two factors: the key players seem aware that there
are some limits they should not overstep, and a solid net of mutual interest exists that is able to
buffer those episodes of tensions. However, precisely beca use the different players have got use d to
testing the limits , they may wrongly assume that they could always go further. In order to avoid
miscalculations and be fully aware of the consequences of the decisions to be made we should know
what is at stake, what the game -changing situations are and what the different scenarios look like . In
this section, three different scenarios are outlined while envisaging five different options for the EU
when dealing with Turkey in the years to come .
Before outlining tho se scenarios and options, it is worth remembering that the EU did reflect on the
future of this relationship in the European Union’s Global Strategy from 2016. This document
conveyed four clear messages: challenges such as migration and terrorism are to be addressed
together ; the resilience of Turkey cannot be taken for granted ; the EU’s influence is unique ; and it is
in the EU ’s interest to promote political reform, the rule of law, economic convergence and good
neighbourly relations. The fact that the str ategy elaborates on this particular country is indicative
that Turkey is not an ordinary neighbour. Its size (82 million people, the world’s 17th largest
economy), location ( at the crossroads of Europe, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Middle East)
and the intensity of already existing relations in terms of trade, investment, security and people -to-
people contacts, explain why decisions on Turkey are particularly important and why crises in EU –
Turkey relations attract so much attention . Previous research (see for instance the FEUTURE project

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17 and the recommended readings at the end of this r eport) has outlined three alternative futures for
EU-Turkey relations and identif ied the key drivers that could push relations in one direction or
another. This could b e simplified in three ideal -type scenarios :
 Convergence : this implies Turkey becoming a member of the EU or getting close r to it;
 Cooperation : Turkey and the EU would work together in different sectors and with different
intensity but independent from th e accession negotiations ;
 Conflict : understood as a s ituation in which Turkey and the EU would not only compete but
would actively work to undermine each other ’s interests .
For the next five years, c onvergence is off the agenda – mainly due to political reasons – and the
choices made by the EU and Turkey will largely determine whether cooperation or conflict prevail s.
The most likely scenario is one in which cooperation coexists with episodes of tension that do not
escalate to a situa tion of full -fledged conflict. Both parties might normalise an easy, conflictual and
fragile cooperation. There seems to be a consensus that Turkey’s geopolitical and strategic
importance, given its large population, the intensity of its e conomic and investment links with the
EU, and their common interests in issues such as security, mobility and energy, particularly in the
shared neighbourhood, are likely to continue buffering the risks of relations completely breaking
down.
Taking into co nsideration that this is the most likely scenario, the report suggests five different ways
in which the EU could approach Turkey. In other words, th ere are different ways to advance in this
minefield and t he incoming EU leadership will need to decide – and perhaps test – which of these
five options is able to produce the best results:
Option 1 . Comfort zone : keep pretending . The easiest of all options is not to make major decisions,
to stay the course and see how things evolve. The probabilities of taking this path are quite high
because of institutional inertia and because with so many positions to reconcile making no decision
may be the minimum common denominator. Those advocating for this atti tude may also believe that
time can solve almost everything and that it is better if others are the ones to make the difficult
decisions. One of those difficult decisions relates to the continuation or suspension of the
negotiation process. From this stand point, it would be unwise to assume responsibility for a decision
that may provoke satisfaction in the short term but could severely damage cooperation with Turkey.
It is not in the EU’s interest to see the economic collapse of Turkey and a decision to sus pend the
accession negotiation process would only add uncertainty to an already fragile situation. This passive
attitude has been the dominant one in the EU and may not change in the years to come. When
important decisions are approaching, EU leaders may o pt to delay or circumvent them , asking for
additional assessments and transferring the responsibility to technical bodies . However, this attitude
entails a major risk. Turkey is likely to react to European passivity by continuously testing its limits
and t he pressures on the EU to act are likely to increase.
Option 2 . Resignation: a purely transactional relation ship : This position has many similarities in
terms of results to the previous option but there is a major difference: it implies that the EU and its
institutions should stop pretending Turkey is an ordinary candidate and that the goals of the
accession process are to transform the country and converge with the EU. It involves what may be
called “endin g the hypocrisy” or “put ting an end to the fiction”. Eventually this may not necessarily
mean withdraw ing from the accession negotiation process but rather forget ting that it exists. While
in the previous option the EU is still required to voice its critic isms of Turkish government actions

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18 that go against the Copenhagen Criteria , in this case those criticisms would be kept at a minimum or
used as a bargaining chip. This attitude does not exclude cooperation but it would be a very
particular kind of cooperat ion: a purely transactional one, with no normative dimension attached to
it. In practice , this would mean entering negotiation s on a modernised Customs Union or a new
refugee deal with them emptied of politically sensitive conditions. In fact, this is a de velopment
Turkey may welcome and some in the EU and its Member States may silently approve. Before
adopting this stance , the EU should also calibrate the costs it would entail. The EU would lose all
credibility among the sectors of Turkish society that have been the major support ers of strengthened
relations. In addition, t he EU would be setting a precedent for other candidate countries, its
neighbours and other global partners. Precisely because Turkey is a topic that raises so much interest
worldwide, any step in that direct ion will be duly noted inside and outside Europe.
Option 3. Idealism: keep hoping . This is the exact opposite of the previous option. Many of those
who could have identified themselves with the idea that the EU could positively trans form Turkey
have lost hope about the willingness of the Turkish authorities to reform or about the effectiv eness
of EU incentives. However, some resist giv ing up, among other reasons , because disengagement
means abandoning those segments of society that suffer the consequences of democratic
backsliding , which would give Erdoğan an even freer hand. The results of the Istanbul elections could
reinforce those claims. This position is often reinforced by strong emotional ties with Turkey and also
by the idea that accepting defeat would mean all past efforts have been useless. This is why those
positions tend to be more frequent among people and institutions that have invested lots of energy
in Turkey. Their idea s may not resonate strong ly at the very top of the decision -making process but
they are still heard in the EU circles where Turkey is being discussed. When it comes to concrete
suggestions, these voices are likely to suggest that the EU must put more incen tives on the table and
regain the trust of both the Turkish authorities and even more important, Turkish society. If the EU
decides to again explore an incentive -based strategy, it should look very carefully at two elements:
substance and timing. The incen tives offered should meet the expectations of the counterpart;
otherwise mistrust and frustration will only grow . The EU should avoid offering these incentives
immediately after a round of threats from Turkey as this could be misinterpreted as a sign of
weakness and the whole exercise would be counterproductive. Instead, the right moment to offer
them – if there is ever the consensus to do so – is when Turkey is in a delicate situation and even
more so if other allies are not offering Ankara the help it needs. In the future some occasion s may
arise to give this a try.
Option 4 . Testosterone: banging a fist on the table . This may be the natural reflex if Turkish
authorities keep testing where the EU ’s limits lie. Enough is enough, some voices may say , time to
send a strong message, to strike back and be taken seriously. This attitude is likely to gain traction
after an escalation of tension with Turkey, either with the EU as a whole or with some of its Member
States. The EU could unilaterally decide to terminate the negotiation process. Some may even go
further and call for sanctions. The EU should be prepared to face this kind of situation, to identify in
advance the elements that could prompt such a reaction and to be fully aware of the consequences
of ente ring a conflict zone . The risks are of a very different kind. Th e purpose of these punitive
actions is not self -satisfaction but rather to force a change of attitude in Turkey. Yet, Erdoğan is
unlikely to publicly backtrack . What is more, he may try to take advantage of the situation. He will
blame the EU for any problem Turkey face s (starting with the economic crisis) and will say that this
confirms that some in the EU have been conspiring to get rid of him and weaken Turkey. He will
appeal to the nati onalist sentiment and will build on the long -term frustration with the EU and the

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19 West. He may retaliate , remembering that refugees have become Europe’s Achilles heel. The
position of the Turkish diasporas in Europe, some of which are politically aligned with Erdoğan , is
another sensitive issue . The other risk is the lack of unity and solidarity in the EU. Any action of this
kind may end up being a flash in the pan and the threat of termination may not mate rialise. The costs
of an abrupt divorce are very high – this would not only be about accession as it could even affect the
viability of the Customs Union – and lengthy bureaucratic processes may be another major deterrent
factor in the face of a decision t o institutionally detach from one another, particularly if the two
parties are not able to agree on the alternative framework of relations.
Option 5 . Candid but c onstructive criticism: the art of the possible . There is always a middle ground
between doing nothing and full escalation, between pure idealism and blunt cynicism. This is an
option for those who have lost faith in Erdoğan but not in Turkey ; those who believe the EU can have
an impact on Turkey but are aware that this impact will be limited and that timing will be crucial for it
to be effective . Assuming that the game is not over also means conveying the message in Europe that
the EU should keep engaging with as many actors as possible in Turkey and, above all, treat Turkey
different ly from other neighbour s. This may mean being more vocal in expressing criticism about
political development s or legislation in Turkey. When Turkish authorities react by saying that the EU
has double standards, Europe could reply that indeed its standards on Turkey are different from
those on, say, Egypt or China because the EU considers Turkey part of the family and many in Turkey
see Europe as family too. European leaders may convey the message to the Turkish authorities and
the population that they are willing to list en to the ir criticisms of the EU and to tackle those
deficiencies together. For the EU to be credible on this, it will have to overcome internal resistance
and approve the start of a modernised Customs Union and review the issue of visa facilitation. It
should also increase funding for civil society and people -to-people exchanges to convey the message
that it cares about Turkey. One of the things Turkey’s current leadership cares about most is
recognition . It is well -known that the Turkish Preside nt misses the times he was invited to join the
family picture after EU summits. There is room to think up imaginative solutions to make Turkey feel
included in discussions of issues that affect it directly . In fact, these platforms may be the best place
for thi s con structive criticism to be convened. As with the previous options, this one comes wi th risks
attached: if Turkey receive s candid message s from the EU institution s and softer or contradictory
ones from some Member States there is a risk to EU consistency , and patience may run out when
immediate results are not produced . Constructive criticism is a long -term investment aimed at
preserving some bridges while not losing credit.

6. CONCLUSION S AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
When it comes to Turkey, t he European Parliament constituted after the 2019 elections and Von der
Leyen’s Commission will inherit a long story of frustration and missed opportunities. EU –Turkey
relations are strained and will not improve any time soon. It is therefore crucial to preve nt it from
getting worse and that any damage cause d by this deterioration is not irreversible . EU decision –
makers should be reminded that Turkey is more than Erdoğan, that breaking a long and intense
relationship is obviously more difficult and harmful tha n a superficial or recent affair and that a
sustained conflict would be costly for both Turkey and the EU.
In the coming years the discussion on whether the EU should suspend the accession negotiations will
resurface. The modernisation of the Customs Unio n and the visa liberalisation issue will also be

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20 waiting on the table. And the EU may need to react to crises and provocations of very different kinds.
Gas drilling , for instance, has become the most immediate challenge. EU leaders will be asked to
make decisions and, certainly, one possibility is to postpone them. Some times this will not be
possible and e vents in Turkey or in the EU may increase p ressure to be more explicit . Democracy and
human rights will be a recurrent topic. Concerns about Turkey ’s economy may intensify , with
Europeans increasingly aware that a collapse would be very bad news for the EU. And let us not
forget the regional situation. It is important to remember who Turkey’s southern neighbours are:
Syria (the war is not over and we could see a new humanitarian crisis), Iran (the US sanctions and the
mounting tension in the Gulf are very bad news for both Turkey and the EU) and Iraq (a country that
seems to be recovering but which is squeezed by destructive regional and global rivalri es).
This report argues that the most likely scenario for the future of EU –Turkey relations for the next five
years is the continuation of a cooperative environment in areas of common interest amidst political
drivers that will have a high and mostly nega tive impact on the relations. This situation may be
referred to as a fragile, conflictual or uneasy cooperation. EU –Turkey relations have a long history
behind them and in the next five years they are sure to face critical moments. Independently of how
things evolve in Turkey , this report propose s seven concrete actions that could improve the EU’ s
capacity to engage in more productive terms with the Turkish authorities and with Turkish society as
a whole.
(1) Upgrade the mechanisms to reinforce people -to-people contact . This is easier said than done
but the EU should appreciate the fact that Turkey is a very diverse society and that despite the
hostile circumstances, a significant part of its citizens are still willing to preserve or even upgrade the
links with the EU. The EU should capitalise on the resilience of those ties. From the EU side this will
require a more robust budgetary line and specific visa -facilitation mechanisms for people involved in
these cooperation mechanisms . The EU could al so ask the European Union delegation in Ankara to
identify mechanisms to reach out to segments of the population or the civil society that have been
less exposed to the EU and should make an additional effort to connect with younger generations.
(2) Devel op program mes to further associate Turkey’s municipalities with the EU . Although local
governments have already taken part in decentralised cooperation efforts there is room to go
further . The new political scenario, with the opposition governing most citi es, may increase the
attractiveness of such cooperation programmes in the eyes of some EU policy -makers . However,
these efforts could be counterproductive if they are perceiv ed by the Turkish leadership as an attack.
This is why the EU should make additional effort s to persuade municipalities that are governed with
the AKP (Gaziantep, a city that has made a tremendous effort in hosting Syrian refugees, is a good
candidate) to engage in this endeavour . This cooperation should start focusing on urban issues but
could include a broader political dialogue on the future of EU -Turkey relations and it should also
involve EU municipalities as equal partners in this new agenda for cooperation.
(3) Offer Turkey the possibility to set up a consultative exper t group to provide continuous advice
to both parties . Both the EU and the Turkish government rely on their own technical expertise and
they have well -trained specialists working for them. What would be new and ground -breaking would
be the creation of a joi nt body made up of Turkish and EU experts ready to support either Turkey or
the EU (or both of them) by proposing technical solutions, conducting studies or coming up with new
ideas. This expert group could be asked to suggest ways to bring the two parties closer when
positions differ greatly and to come up with constructive proposals. An example could be the
controversy on territorial waters in Cyprus and drilling rights. The studies produced by this

EU–Turkey relations: mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways
Eduard Soler i Lecha
FEPS | Rue Montoyer 40, B -1000 Brussels | Tel + 32 2 234 69 00 | Fax + 32 2 280 03 83 | info@ feps-europe.eu
21 consultative expert group could focus on very technical issue s on specific sectors but they could be
asked to look at the broader picture. For instance, they could be asked to quantify the benefits of EU –
Turkey relations , the potential impact of the entry into force of an upgraded customs union or, why
not, estimat e the costs of a rupture. This new platform coul d also be tasked to propose modalities to
better anchor Turkey in the institutional mechanisms where issues that directly affect Turkey are
discussed , which is a long unresolved issue that created gri evances in Ankara .
(4) Lift the veto in place on start ing the negotiation of the upgraded Customs Union . The General
Affairs Council of 26 June 2018 stated that “no further work towards the modernisation of the EU –
Turkey Customs Union is foreseen” . In light of ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean,
reviewing this stance has become even more difficult. Timing matters but, in any case, the option
should remain on the table. There are compelling arguments to initiate the negotiations or express
the willingness to do so . One of them is that this is something on which those who want to suspend
the accession process and those who want to revamp it could eventually agree. A second powerful
idea is that if this Customs Union 2.0 ever comes to force, it will benefit both economies in a moment
in which both also need a perspective of growth and will be a powerful message directed to th ose
that advocate for protectionism and trade wars. A third key argument is that for this upgrade to
happen, Turkey will have to make politically -meaningful reforms , among other s, on judicial reform
and public procurement . In a moment in which the accessio n incentives have lost their appeal, the
Customs Union negotiations could be the basis (the only one left) to recuperate part of the leverage
lost after years of paralysis and mistrust and to reenergise the relations in a constructive manner.
Finally, the EU should think that it has little to lose. If once the negotiations start Turkey does not
reform , or adopts a more conciliatory attitude, the upgrade would not happen and the negotiations
could be stopped.
(5) Be specific and vocal in condemning human r ights abuses and democratic backsliding . Some
may be tempted to soften the criticism a s a sign of good will. This would send the wrong message.
On the contrary, the new EU leaders and institutions should denounce abuses and ask Turkey to
address them , whil e acknowledging that the bar is higher for Turkey than for other neighbours
because it is treated as part of the European family and because it already proved not so long ago
that progress is possible . In that sense, if there are some positive developments , they should also be
praised and encouraged.
(6) Assess the security, environmental and economic areas in which Turkey is mo st vulnerable and
offer the EU’s cooperation and full support to address potential risks before they materialise . It is
important t o convey the message that it is not in the EU’s interest to see a politically unstable,
economically weakened and socially polarised Turkey. This assessment should be done in
cooperation with the Turkish government and it could be one of the tasks assigned to the
consultative expert group proposed above. The goal is to jointly assess the vulnerabilities and design
mechanisms of support to increase Turkey’s resilience. Some of the issues on the immediate agenda
include the humanitarian situation in Idlib, th e long -term challenge of integration of Syrian citizens,
the impact of the US sanctions on Iran (and eventually on Turkey itself) or Turkey’s energy
dependence.
(7) Being openly self -critical . Last but not least, the EU should accept part of the responsibi lity for the
current stalemate in relations and be specific about what it can do better. For instance, if the EU
institutions were more vocal in denouncing human rights violations and the deterioration of
democratic conditions inside the union, its critici sms of Turkey would be far more legitimate. It

EU–Turkey relations: mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways
Eduard Soler i Lecha
FEPS | Rue Montoyer 40, B -1000 Brussels | Tel + 32 2 234 69 00 | Fax + 32 2 280 03 83 | info@ feps-europe.eu
22 should also acknowledge that Turkey may have felt abandoned by the EU at critical moments such as
the attempted coup .
EU–Turkey relations are a minefield. Tension may increase because of different views on democracy
and human rights, political opportunism, territorial disputes, the Kurdish and Armenian issues, a
troubled North Atlantic alliance and the political sensitivities attached to technical cooperati on as it
happens with the upgrading of the customs union, visa facilitation or cooperation on refugees and
border surveillance. One of the assets of this old and well -researched relationship is that we know
where the landmines are and , to a certain extent, key players have learnt to avoid them. But this may
not be satisfactory. Both parties should work to jointly disarm those landmines or at least some of
them. There is a need to regain trust and come up with ideas to increase the resilience of the
relation ship. The risk of some sort of accident is apparent and trust is at an all -time low. The EU and
Turkey are already surrounded by too many problems. Adding a new one to the list does not seem to
be a wise option.

FURTHER READING
Arısan -Eralp, Nilgün (2018) , “The Unique Nature of Modernizing the Customs Union ”, Turkish Policy
Quarterly , September 28 .
Aydin -Duzgit, S. & Tocci, N. (2015) , Turkey and the European Union, London: MacMillan .
Aydıntașbaș, Aslı (2018) , The Discreet Charm of Hypocrisy: An EU -Turkey Power Audit , European
Council on Foreign Relations, March.
Beche v, Dimitar (2019) , “Is it time to for the EU to get tough on Turkey? ”, Ahval , May 9 .
European Commission (2018), Turkey 2018 Report , 17 April 2018.
Kirișçi, Kemal & Toygür, Ilke (2019) , “Turkey’s New Presidential System and a Changing West:
Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey -West Relations ”, Turkey Project Policy Paper No.
15, Foreign Policy at Brookings, January .
Müftüler -Baç, Meltem ( 2017) , “Turkey ’s Future with the European Union: An Alternative Model of
Differentiate d Integration ” Turkish Studies, 18:3, 416 -438.
Nas, Çiğdem (2018) , “Turkey -EU Customs Union: Its Modernization and Potential for Turkey -EU-
Relations ”, Insight Turkey, no. 20 (3): 43 -60.
Saatçioğ lu, B. Et al. (2019) , “The future of EU -Turkey relations: a Dynamic Association framework
amidst Conflictual Cooperation ”, FEUTURE synthesis paper .
Soler i Lecha, E., Tekin, F. Sökmen, M.J. (2018) , “It Takes Two to Tango : Political changes in Europe
and their Impact on Turkey’s EU bid ”, FEUTURE Online Paper No. 17 .

EU–Turkey relations: mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways
Eduard Soler i Lecha
FEPS | Rue Montoyer 40, B -1000 Brussels | Tel + 32 2 234 69 00 | Fax + 32 2 280 03 83 | info@ feps-europe.eu
23
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Eduard Soler i Lecha , Senior Research Fellow, CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for
International Affairs).

Holder of a PhD in International Relations from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona , at
CIDOB his main areas of research are Turkey, North African and Middle Eastern political
dynamics , and EU foreign policy . He coordinated the MENARA Project (2016 –2019) on
geopolitical shifts in the MENA region and was part of FEUTURE, another EU -funded res earch
project focus sing on EU –Turkey relations. He also teaches at the IBEI, Ramon Llull -Blanquerna
University and the College of Europe (Hiwar Project ).