Eva Polonska -Kimunguyi and Marie Gillespie [618116]

Eva Polonska -Kimunguyi and Marie Gillespie
Terrorism discourse on French
international broadcasting: France 24 and
the case of Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris

Article (Accepted version)
(Refereed)

Original citation:
Polonska -Kimunguy i, Eva and Gillespie, Marie (2016) Terrorism discourse on French
international broadcasting: France 24 and the case of Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris. European
Journal of Communication , 31 (5). pp. 568 -583. ISSN 0267 -3231

DOI: 10.1177/0267323116669453

© 2016 The Authors

This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/68291/

Available in LSE Research Online : December 2016

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Corresponding author:
Eva Połońska-Kimunguyi, Department of Media and Communications, London School of
Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
Email: E.Polonska -[anonimizat] Terrorism discourse on French international broadcasting: France 24
and the case of Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris
Eva Połońska-Kimunguyi
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

Marie Gillespie
Open University, UK
Abstract
This article offers an inquiry into the discursive construction of
‘terrorism’ by France 24 , the French international broadcaster, in the
aftermath of the attacks on Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine in January
2015. The article argues that the broadcaster seems to employ a
relatively narrow definition of terrorism linking it to Islam and Muslims.
France 24 portrays the attacks as an external phenomenon coming to
France from outside . The blame is assigned to non -French factors,
mainly to foreign extremist organisations, Islamist ideologues and
overseas training. No reasons for violence are sought inside the
country. Internal developments, such as discrimination, youth
marginalisation , lack of educational and work opportunities, relations
between law enforcement and the Muslim community that could
potentially contribute to the acts, are not explored by the broadcaster’s
investigative journalism. This narrow interpretation of ‘terrorism ’ that
assigns responsibility to Muslims, Islamic indoctrination and overseas
training may further alienate Muslim communities in France’s already
divided society. It points to narrow policy responses that focus mainly
on stricter monitoring of Muslim mino rities, on limiting combat and
cross -border movement. This type of discourse excludes long -term
policy solutions that address broader socio -politico -economic
conditions in which ‘terrorism’ might flourish.
Keywords
Charlie Hebdo , France 24 , international b roadcasting, media and
terrorism, terrorism discourse

Introduction
This article offers an inquiry into the discursive construction of
‘terrorism’ by France 24 (F24), the French international broadcaster, in
the aftermath of the attacks on the satirical mag azine, Charlie Hebdo, in
January 2015. Totally, 12 people were shot dead in the attack. The
majority of the victims were cartoonists, employees of the magazine,
known for making fun of politicians, religions and famous personalities.
It became the deadlies t assault on human life to have been committed
on the French soil in the preceding two decades. The cartoons of
Prophet Mohammed published by Charlie Hebdo , considered offensive
by followers of Islam, were the reason behind the attack. However, this
was no t the first time the magazine had published pictures of
Mohammed. Earlier in December 2012, French Muslim communities
sued Charlie Hebdo over the publication of similar images. The
magazine later received numerous threats from radical Muslims which
led the French police to allocate security officers to protect the
magazine’s journalists and their right to free expression.
This article focuses on the othering process of terrorists by F24. It
poses three questions with regard to the broadcaster’s narrative of
Charlie Hebdo attacks: (1) What makes a ‘terrorist’ in the eyes of the
broadcaster? (2) Which drivers, root causes and permissive factors
contributed to the attacks? and (3) What broader debate does this
discourse enable? It is argued that the broadcaster employed a
relatively narrow definition of terrorism linking it solely to Islam and
Muslims. It portrayed the attacks as an external phenomenon and
assigned the blame to non -French factors, mainly to foreign extremist
organisations, Islamist ideologues an d overseas training. No reasons for
violence were sought inside the country. Internal developments, such
as discrimination, youth marginalisation, lack of educational and work
opportunities, relations between law enforcement and the Muslim
community that c ould potentially contribute to the acts, were not
explored by the broadcaster’s investigative journalism. This narrow
interpretation of ‘terrorism’ may further alienate Muslim communities
in France’s already divided society. It reinforces the ‘Us’ and ‘The m’
divide creating animosity between the West and Islam and sustains the
climate of fear of terrorism.

Muslims as France’s ‘others’: Orientalising Islam
Western media officially began their onslaught on Muslims in the post –
9/11 era, publicly associating Islam with terrorism, and Muslims with
terrorists ( Nurullah, 2010 ). This trend did not affect other religions as
no connections were made in scholarly debates, or media coverage,
between, for example, Christianity, or Judaism, and terrorism. In his
book Covering Islam , Said argued that the Western media’s coverage
and interpretation of Islam is extremely influential and the success ‘of
this coverage can be attributed to the political influence of those
people and institutions producing it rather than necess arily to truth or
accuracy’ ( Said, 1981: 169). The fall of the Soviet Union in the early
1990s helped the West to discover a new enemy to fight against and
claim their superiority. As Said observed, ‘fundamentalism’, particularly
Islamic Fundamentalism ‘eq uals everything we must now fight against,
as we did with communism during the Cold War’ ( Said, 1981 : xix). This
idea was further supported by Samuel Huntington in 1993. His ‘Clash of
Civilizations’ predicted that ‘the great divisions among humankind and
the dominating source of conflict will be cultural’ and that ‘the principal
conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of
different civilizations’ (Huntington, 1993: 22).
Movies, serials and news coverage followed in the Western medi a
that ‘portrayed Muslims as uncivilized, anti -modern, anti -democratic,
and terrorists, fundamentalists, radicals, militants, barbaric, and anti –
western’ ( Nurullah, 2010: 1022 ). Individual violent incident or any
extremist movement in Islamic countries bec ame quickly attributed to
Islam. The persistent bias in the Western media with regard to the Arab
world was quickly accepted as a fact in the Middle East ( Powell, 2011:
92) and led many Muslims to perceive the media as an enemy and
conspirator against them (Siddiqi, 1999: 204). Research has shown that
terrorism is regularly connected to Islam and as a result, Muslims and
Arabs now represent a negative ‘Other’ ( Nurullah, 2010: 1022 ).
Stereotypes and fear of terrorists have led to sweeping changes in
governme ntal practices in the West, including curtailing of civil liberties
and increased support for racial profiling ( Altheide, 2004 ).
France’s encounters with Muslims and Islam date back to 8th century
when Northern African soldiers established a protectorate a nd mosque
in Narbonne. Muslim settlers continued to arrive throughout the
Middle Ages and early Modern Period ( Clément, 1990 ). In 1830, France
captured Algeria, its first colony with large Muslim populations. World

War I resulted in the first large -scale m igration of Muslim colonial
subjects who came to serve in the Metropolitan army and replace
French workers in factories ( Frémeaux, 1991 ). Post -World War II labour
shortages brought another wave of migrants from the colonies. By
1975, over 1 million of Musl im immigrants from Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia and Turkey were living in metropolitan France ( Noiriel, 1988 ).
Today, France is home to 6 million Muslims, the largest Muslim
population in the European Union. Estimates indicate that 78% of them
are of North Af rican descent and 12% come from the Middle East,
including Turkey ( PEW, 2011 ).
The Muslim community has generally tended to be marginalised in
socioeconomic terms ( Camillieri, 2013 ). A recent study demonstrated
that unemployment rates among immigrants from Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia and Turkey are particularly high and are even higher among the
descendants of immigrants from these countries. Muslims also report
higher rates of discrimination than other immigrant communities in
France. In 2005, a series of ri ots erupted in the suburbs of Paris and
other French cities resulting in three deaths and nearly 3000 arrests.
The unrest was an expression of frustration with high unemployment,
police harassment and brutality among France’s large immigrant
population, mo stly North African ( Canet et al., 2008 ).
Islam did not present a challenge and remained absent from official
and media discourses at the time of large Muslim arrivals in mid -20th
century. However, when migrant workers did not return home as
previously expected, and instead brought their families to live with them,
‘France suddenly found itself concerned with the integration of Muslims
of all ages and backgrounds into what was previously a predominantly
Catholic Christian nation’ (Fetzer and Soper, 2005: 65). A series of
unsuccessful efforts to cut back on the number of North Africans
followed, ranging from paying migrants to leave the country, to
deportations, to revisions to the French Code of Nationality in early
1990s ( Hargreaves, 1995 ). The 1980s saw the rise of Le Pen’s Front
National, a far -fight anti -immigration and anti -Muslim party, whose racist
and neo -Nazi rhetoric generated considerable electoral support in years
to come ( Marcus, 1995 ). Although Le Pen never succeeded in
presidential elections , his far -right views on immigration influenced
national debate around Muslim communities. The wearing of all visible
religious symbols in public schools was banned in 2004 followed by a ban
on face veils in public places in 2010 ( Allen, 2010 ). The relatio nships

between the French society and Muslims became characterised by
mutual suspicion: the French exhibit taste -based discrimination against
Muslims and Muslims perceive French institutions as systematically
discriminatory and therefore dislike the French (Adida et al., 2014 ).
Today, national discourses in France portray Muslims as a mostly
homogenous group, unwilling to integrate with the wider population.
Lamont (2003) notes that while the American ‘them’ are Blacks, the
French ‘them’ are Arabs. Fredette (2014) discovered that an identity for
the Muslims has been constructed in France by a small, yet highly
influential group of people, with centralised media at its forefront. This
elitist discourse disregards the diversity of the Muslim communities and
defines them exclusively by their religious background. This reductionist
view asserts that Islamic values and traditions are in opposition to
French republicanism and that it is Islam that keeps Muslims from
becoming fully French.
Terrorism on the French so il and its connection to Islam
Islam was linked to terrorism in French discourses during the Algerian
war of independence throughout the 1950s. With a series of street
assassinations ‘the war rapidly degenerated into a gruesome, civil -war-
style conflict of indiscriminate, merciless terrorism pitted against
horrific, systematic torture and counterterror’ ( Fetzer and Soper, 2005 ).
The Algerian Front de libération nationale (FLN) drew much of its
rhetoric and motivation from Islam, and many French soon develop ed a
tremendous fear of this religion. A wave of terrorist attacks throughout
19901 and rapidly rising crime rate – blamed largely on immigrants –
further aggravated the already tense relations between ethnic French
and residents of North African heritage. The riots in predominantly
immigrant suburbs ( banlieues ) in 2005 were not classified as acts of
terrorism. A state of emergency was introduced for 3 months, but no
direct relationship was established between mostly ethnic -based riots
and radical Islamism or jihadism.
French Muslims, who have been involved in terrorist attacks, are
usually from immigrant communities, predominantly Algerian, they
have very low level of education. At least 70% of them have been
unemployed and the remaining 30% had basic manua l jobs ( Marret,
2010 ). Only a handful of individuals reached graduate level of
education. According to Marret, ‘French Jihadists’ suffer from long
periods of unemployment, display various forms of delinquency and

often undergo radicalisation process in pri sons. Due to this very low
level of education and minimal technical ability, French terrorist
‘soldiers’, as Marret argues, are not in a position to co -ordinate and
carry out sophisticated operations, such as American 9/11, that require
highly skilled, edu cated, financially well -off and well -informed
masterminds.
The path to terrorism
Defining ‘terrorism’ and a ‘terrorist’ is not an easy task. Le Sage (2007)
argues that terrorism is a manifestation of political violence that is
distinct from other types of violence, such as organised crime, mass civil
conflict, riots or uprisings. It is characterised by deliberate premeditation
with the aim of creating a climate of extreme fear. According to
Crenshaw (2002) , terrorist aims exist at several levels: it targets a wider
audience to attract attention at one level, but conveys a political or
ideological statement beyond its immediate victims, at another. Its
targets are often symbolic, frequently not aims in themselves. The acts of
terrorism are planned to be spectacular in an effort to capture the public
and media attention. Through its choice of symbolic targets of
representative meaning and shocking methods terrorism is repeatedly
used to influence broader political behaviour a nd advance a particular
set of political and social objectives.
Scholars agree that no one is born a terrorist and that individuals
become terrorists through a comprehensive process of radicalisation
(Ranstorp, 2010 ). Dannin (2005) has examined recruits’ p ath to
terrorism through their conversion to Islam and the role of religion in
the process. He observed that the instructions given to new converts do
not necessarily allow them to distinguish between the sectarian
divisions of Islam. In some cases, recrui ts were motivated exclusively by
a ready -made Islam, an adaptation reduced to basic practices related to
clothing, food or prayers, rather than a thorough study of the faith.
Many new converts are recruited in prisons, but the self -imposed
discipline that restructures their lives down to the way they eat, dress,
break up their day, study and think also attracts individuals outside of
prisons who are to some extent socially frustrated.
Terrorism also needs an environment in which it can thrive: the
possible root causes that encourage individuals to lead or support
terrorist enterprises and permissive factors allowing terrorist groups to
perform operations on a given territory (Le Sage, 2007: 6). The two

common root causes that are believed to fuel terrorism i nclude lack of
democracy and desperation associated with extreme poverty.
Undemocratic rules with repressive or under -representative
governance, combined with popular resentment towards a
government’s inability to effect change, preclude options for peacef ul
solutions and lead to violent efforts to overthrow the existing political
establishment ( Windsor, 2003 ). Furthermore, poverty and
unemployment may lead to marginalisation of entire social groups and
serve as fertile ground to breed potential recruits ( Piazza, 2006 ; UN,
2004). Permissive factors often consist of physical, economic,
institutional and political weaknesses in countries where terrorist acts
are carried out, as well as low capacity of security forces to prevent
terrorists from entering their t erritories. Anger at unpopular policies of
governments may also clash with sympathies worldwide and lead to
increased ideological support for terror. No single aspect can explain
why terrorism happens and multiple reasons may lead to the feelings of
aliena tion and antagonism that make terrorist recruitment possible.
Discourse as theory and method
The article examines the discursive formation of terrorism by F24
(English) in its reporting of Charlie Hebdo attacks. It draws on the daily
online stories and broadcast news bulletins recorded for 2 weeks after
the January attack on Charlie Hebdo magazine. From the overall 78
online stories tagged ‘Charlie Hebdo’ in the examined period, 28 news
items were select ed on the theme directly related to the attacks and the
persons of the attackers. Discourse analysis were conducted on the
stories and footage gathered. The article explores discourse productivity
of F24’s particular representation of the attacks, the way the broadcaster
produces (or re -produces) the problem it explains. The article
investigates the voices that speak in the stories, as well as their ‘truths’
on the attacks. It looks at the production of publics (audiences), the
public’s common sense and rea ctions in which the publics are expected
to act ( Keeley, 1990 ). This is to discover the conveyed meanings that
render certain policies logical and proper and, thus, influence and
legitimise practices ( Campbell, 1993 ). According to Foucault (1980) , those
who produce discourse have the power to produce a ‘regime of truth’, to
enforce its validity, its scientific and factual status. Through the study of
discourse, this article enquires into the knowledge/power nexus
(Campbell, 1993 ; Foucault, 1980 , 1991 ). It w ishes to expose to critical

questioning the discursive and social practices that discourse enables, as
well as the ideological consequences it carries.
Discourse analysis follows the three -dimensional model suggested by
Fairclough (1995) : (1) textual, (2) inter -textual and (3) contextual.
Textual analysis concentrates on the formal/linguistic features of the
text and examines texts for their common lexicon of terms (labels and
attributes ascribed to things). It allows for the uncovering of
relationships in which things are placed in a discourse, where one
object is distinguished from, or privileged, over another, usually in
binary oppositions, to ultimately uncover the relation of power (De
Saussure, 1974; Derrida, 1981 ). Inter -textual analysis examines how
authors of texts draw on already existing discourses to create their
texts. Contextual analysis puts text into context and explores the links
between language use and social practice.
Coverage of terrorism by F24
In the first days after the attacks, co verage by F24 tended to lean
towards episodic reporting focusing exclusively on reporting the
incidents of the day. Episodic coverage directly follows an event, while
thematic coverage generally occurs later, after time has passed ( Iyengar
and Simon, 1993 ). Episodic reporting is usually event or case oriented
and focuses on concrete incidents, with no connections between
isolated cases. The cameras, which followed the ‘manhunt’ ( France 24 ,
2015c) for 3 days, did little more than document the developments
unfolding. The coverage concentrated on incidents of terrorism rather
than on comprehensive exploration of the phenomenon, its root
causes, convictions, motives, intentions of terrorist agents and the role
of enabling environment. As days passed, the coverag e became more
thematic. Terrorism was interpreted by F24 as Muslim -related activity
and as an external activity threatening France from outside. Terrorism
was not seen as home -grown phenomenon whose advent and presence
in France might have been caused and accelerated by domestic
conditions.
Construction of terrorism acts
The immediate coverage by France 24 (2015a) defined the act as a
‘terrorist attack’ on the day of its occurrence, before the act was
established by investigators as terrorism or any arrest or formal action

was undertaken by the authorities. The first reports depicted the
shootings as a ‘bloody attack’ and a ‘deadly rampage’ ( France 24,
2015b). The use of heavily charged descriptors intensified as the police
search for the attackers continued . The attacks, viewed as the ‘worst
assault on France’s homeland security for decades’ ( France 24, 2015d),
were quickly described as the ‘French September 11’ ( France 24, 2015e)
and ‘the country’s deadliest terrorist attack in half a century’ ( France
24, 2015f).
The only footage available to television channels was an amateur
video by a local resident filmed on his mobile phone from the window
overlooking the scene. The uncredited video captured two men in
black, wearing balaclavas, on their way from the ma gazine’s
headquarters to the car, with machine guns in their hands. Their
anonymous identity was partly revealed by their own words, ‘Hey! We
avenged the Prophet Muhammad! We killed Charlie Hebdo’. Subtitles
translated their French words into English for F24’s global viewers. The
suspense, mystery and the unknown identity of the two gunmen were
further increased by images of blood on the street and the sound of
gunshots in the background. The graphic record of their act
perpetuated the feeling of horror amo ng the broadcaster’s global
audience.
It was evident from the follow -up reporting that broadcasting media,
F24 included, thrived on the coverage of terrorism. According to
Neumann and Smith (2005: 583) ,
sophisticated terrorists recognize that there is a potentially symbiotic
relationship between themselves and the media. All they need to do
is to satisfy the media’s appetite for a ‘good story’, which means
providing the ‘mystery, quick action, tension [and] drama’ for which
the big television networks are longing.
F24 indulged in live coverage of the events unfolding and what was
described as the ‘day of terror in Paris’ ( France 24 , 2015d) turned into a
live soap -opera of ‘53 hours of terror’ ( France 24 , 2015f). Journalists
took their viewers on a drive ar ound the French countryside in the
chase for the two attackers on the run. They reported the police
operations, road blockades and home searches from their cars, talking
to the camera positioned on the back seat. Landscapes passing by the
side-windows and wipers clearing the front screen gave viewers the
impression of physical presence in the heart of the chase. The raids on a

print factory in one part of Paris and on a supermarket in another
televised live gave the ‘dramatic climax’ ( France 24 , 2015f) to t he story,
‘the bloody climax with not one, but two hostage sieges’ ( France 24 ,
2015g). Suspense was maintained by the lack of footage from inside the
locations of the two police takeovers and by the use of short
statements for dramatic effects: ‘gunfire ra ng out, followed by blasts,
and then silence, as smoke could be seen billowing from the roof of the
print shop’ ( France 24 , 2015f). Images of smoke, sounds of gunshots,
hostages running out in fear kept audiences central to the broadcaster’s
reporting. The meaning of images was manifest in the interpretation it
generated in viewers. The old battle between good and evil was
televised live in an unscripted string of events.
Construction of terrorism agents
Four people were implicated in two separate attacks. Said and Cherif
Kouachi, two brothers were behind the attack on the Charlie Hebdo
satirical magazine. Amédy Coulibaly was responsible for the attack on
the kosher supermarket. Hayat Boumeddiene, Coulibaly’s female
companion, was believed by the police to b e his assistant in the attack.
Journalists remained cautious with the application of the term
‘terrorist’ and used ‘suspects’ instead to describe the attackers.
Captured by the amateur video, perpetrators’ claim, ‘We a venged the
Prophet Muhammad!’ left no doubt about the connection between the
killings and Islam. Without verification, media organisations quickly
assumed that the attackers were Muslims, and the Muslim connection
was the only thread pursued by F24’s reporters. It was discussed,
however, not in relation to faith, but in relation to Islamism as a
terrorist force.
The two attackers on the satirical magazine were introduced to the
public as Cherif (32) and Said (34) Kouachi. The family relationship
between the pair became clear from day 2, after their identities had
been established on the basis of an ID card left by one of the brothers
in the abandoned getaway car. The broadcaster briefly mentioned that
both men were born in Paris, after which attention was swiftly directed
to one of the brother’ s ‘record of funnelling jihadi fighters to Iraq’
known to the French intelligence services ( France 24 , 2015f). For F24’s
global audiences who might be unfamiliar with the French jus soli , no
effort was made to explain that a person’s place of birth determines
citizenship. Having been born in Paris made the two brothers French

citizens, a fact never mentioned by F24 in the period covered. Instead,
frequent references to their ‘Algerian ori gin’ and status of ‘off -spring of
Algerian parents’ ( France 24 , 2015h) portrayed them as foreign. The
suspects were depicted as extreme, professional and very well -trained
killers who carefully planned and executed their attack. Their ‘cold –
blooded profess ionalism’ ( France 24 , 2015j) remained unspoiled by the
news emerging about an ID card left, perhaps by mistake, in the
abandoned car after the shooting. The clumsy conduct did not lead the
broadcaster to doubt the quality of their expertise.
Amédy Coulibal y was the third suspect, who ‘clearly linked’ to the
Charlie Hebdo shootings, ‘threatened to kill the hostages if police
launched an assault on the Kouachi brothers’ ( France 24 , 2015i).
Described by the broadcaster as the ‘gunman’ ( France 24, 2015h),
‘host age-taker’ ( France 24, 2015i) or an ‘Islamist militant’ ( France 24,
2015q), he was portrayed as a criminal, ‘jailed several times for petty
crimes, including theft and drug dealing’ ( France 24, 2015f). Apart from
references to Boumeddiene, his wife and all eged partner in the attacks,
no background was explored. Family, friends, childhood, education or
professional activities were omitted from the image that F24
constructed. References to his ‘African descent’ and Malian parents did
not bring his French citi zenship to audiences’ attention ( France 24,
2015g).
Hayat Boumeddiene, a Paris -born 26 -year -old woman, was the fourth
suspect in the attacks. F24 described her as ‘wanted by police in
connection with the deadly attacks’ ( France 24, 2015l), committed
together with Amédy Coulibaly, her married partner. Considered by the
police as ‘armed and dangerous’ ( France 24 , 2015k), she allegedly fled
the crime scene after the supermarket standoff, left France and
remained ‘France’s most -wanted woman’. By contrast to the three
male attackers, she was attributed human characteristics. One of her
childhood friends was quoted recalling Boumeddiene’s attendance of a
‘girls’ dinner’ and describing her as someone who was ‘emotionally
fragile’ who ‘often cries and has litt le confidence in herself’ ( France 24,
2015d). The origin of her parents was not mentioned, nor was her birth
place and citizenship, a manoeuvre that silenced her connection with
France.

Construction of Muslims
In its coverage of Charlie Hebdo attacks, the broadcaster associated
being Muslim with being a terrorist. The Kouachis statement ‘We
avenged the Prophet Muhammad!’ captured by the amateur video,
used and re -used in all news bulletins after the shootings reinforced the
stereotype that ter rorists are Muslim. All suspects were quickly
identified as Muslims and quickly linked to jihadist cause through their
allegiance to terrorist groupings and military training. Belonging to
foreign terrorist groups was suggested by F24 from the outset despi te
the lack of evidence or verification ( France 24, 2015h, 2015m).
Anonymous ‘police source’ was quoted saying that Coulibaly, the
hostage -taker, ‘was a member of the same jihadist group as the two
suspects in the Charlie Hebdo attack’ ( France 24, 2015i). Yet, Coulibaly
was later connected with the Islamic State (IS) and the two brothers
with Al Qaeda ( France 24, 2015d , 2015r ).
The suspects’ past was thoroughly explored by F24 reporters in
search of evidence for their Muslim connections and radicalisation
process that led them to the attacks. The younger brother Cherif
Kouachi was described as ‘known to the counter -terrorism authorities’
for his involvement in a ‘recruitment pipeline for Muslim holy war in
the multi -ethnic working -class 19th arrondissement o f Paris’ ( France 24,
2015h). He was said to have travelled to Yemen for training, and ‘it was
the teachings of a firebrand Muslim preacher that put him on the path
to jihad in his rough -and-tumble neighbourhood of north -eastern Paris’.
F24 found evidence t hat Cherif had ‘appeared in a 2005 French TV
documentary on Islamic extremism and was sentenced to 18 months in
prison in 2008 for trying to join up with fighters battling in Iraq’ ( France
24, 2015h). According to his lawyer, however, Cherif was a ‘relucta nt
holy warrior, relieved to have been stopped by French
counterespionage officials from taking a Syria -bound flight that was
ultimately supposed to lead him to the battlefields of Iraq’. The
evidence gathered by F24 thus did not clearly suggest that the
purported military training directly transformed Cherif into a terrorist
soldier. The cloud of doubt over Cherif’s prior involvement in terrorist
combat was quickly dismissed by the reporters, who sealed his
devotion to jihadi cause with official statements . The Minister of
Interior was quoted saying that ‘Kouachi had been described by his
fellow would -be jihadist at the time as “violently anti -Semitic”’ ( France
24, 2015h). Comment from another lawyer followed on Cherif’s

subsequent time in prison was, ‘Koua chi became closed off and started
growing a beard’. The lawyer also wondered ‘whether the stint behind
bars transformed his client into a ticking time bomb’ ( France 24,
2015h).
Exploration of the brothers’ private lives in the broadcaster’s efforts
to buil d their terrorist profile also evolved around their Muslim
connection. The younger brother, Cherif, was described as a person
with ‘criminal record’, arrested for ‘conspiracy to prepare acts of
terrorism’ back in 2005. French news reports ‘from that time’, wrote
France 24 (2015j ), ‘described Kouachi, a pizza deliveryman, as being a
one-time pot smoker who “even had a girlfriend before marriage”’.
According to France 24 (2015h), Cherif ‘was keener on spending time
with pretty girls than on going to the mosqu e’. In the video obtained by
the broadcaster, Cherif was seen ‘relaxed and smiling as he pals around
with his friends’, and at one point, ‘with his baseball cap worn
backward, Kouachi belts out some rap music and breaks into a joyful
dance’ ( France 24 (201 5h). He was not portrayed as in possession of
human characteristics such as joy, or having friends, in the period after
receiving ideological instructions from the preachers. According to
Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2009: 82), this ‘clustering’ of terms and
‘retrospective pre -mediation’, the use of self -recorded footage can be
imposed by media and public officials retrospectively, ‘rendering what
the individual considered to be an innocent life one of criminal guilt’,
illustrating one’s ‘propensity towards viol ence and/or its justifications’.
Little was said about the older brother, Said Kouachi. The lack of
criminal records, however, did not prevent Interior Minister from
describing Said as ‘the jobless resident’, who was also ‘known to the
authorities’, despit e having never been prosecuted, because he was ‘on
the periphery’ of illegal activities his younger brother was involved in
(France 24 , 2015h). Out of its own initiative, F24 conducted a check at a
mosque in the brothers’ hometown to verify Said’s regular attendance.
Local Imam confirmed that Said ‘frequented a prayer room’ and ‘wore
traditional North Africa clothes to prayers’ ( France 24 , 2015h). This
search for links with Islam was the only exploration of Said’s life which
neatly connected Said’s suggeste d involvement in his brother’s criminal
life to a Muslim environment. It further solidified the perception that
crime and terrorism must indeed have a Muslim background.
Hayat Boumeddiene is another example of a ‘terrorist’ produced by
the mix of official and media discourses. Portrayed by F24 as Muslim

who as an adult ‘converted to Islam, started wearing a niqab and
consequently lost her job as a cashier’ ( France 24, 2015k). Weaving
Islam into her alleged participation in the attacks ultimately
pronounced her guilty. This was evident when in a sudden twist of
events, Boumeddiene’s status of a ‘suspected accomplice in the killing
of a young female officer’ dramatically changed, with media reporting
that she had in fact not been present in the country at the time of the
attacks. F24 admitted that ‘she had left France for Turkey on January 2’
(6 days before the killing of the policewoman and a week before the
supermarket hostage crisis). The broadcaster did not question,
however, why she remained France’s ‘most wanted’ despite her clear
absence from the scene of the crime. Instead, the broadcaster brought
up a photograph of a fully veiled woman, allegedly Boumeddiene,
posing with a cross -bow, in what was referred to as a ‘2010 training
session in the mountainous Cantal region’ ( France 24, 2015k). The
insertion of the picture of an armed Muslim woman immediately after
the comments on her absence from the attacks served as the
broadcaster’s apparent verdict. It directed viewers’ attention towards
her potential guilt and further cemented the connection between
Muslims and terrorism.
Construction of causes of the terrorist attacks
According to F24, there were four causes behind the attacks:
vengeance, pure cruelty, overseas training and influence of foreign
terrorist groups. Revenge on the cartoonists was the prime motive
driving the killings at Charlie Hebdo magazine. The Kouachis directly
admitte d it in their claim, ‘we avenged the Prophet Mohammed!’
captured in an amateur video. The broadcaster also acknowledged that
‘the Kouachi brothers are thought to have carried out the attacks in
revenge for the weekly’s repeated publication of cartoons mock ing the
Prophet Mohammed’ ( France 24, 2015f).
The attackers were also portrayed as having killed for the joy of
killing. Their triumphant confession ‘we killed Charlie Hebdo!’ openly
confirmed it. They were portrayed as carrying their plan with extreme
cruelty when they ‘slaughtered 12 people’, and as leisurely confident
and utterly fearless perpetrators who ‘strolled out … calmly shooting a
wounded police officer in the head as he writhed on the ground’
(France 24 , 2015f).

France 24 (2015j) also pointed to the ideological guidance from
‘Islamic preachers’ that the attackers received and to links with foreign
terrorist organisations as factors directly contributing to the attacks.
The attackers ‘epitomized Western authorities’ greatest fear: Islamist
radic als training abroad and returning to stage attacks on home soil’
(France 24, 2015f).
Discussion
The Foucauldian ‘regime of truth’ produced by F24 in its coverage of
January 2015 attacks clearly linked terrorism to Muslim communities.
The broadcaster also l argely reflected the official message. Powell
(2011) argues that news coverage of terrorism has become thematic
and siding with governments. This is not surprising, because of the
media reliance on the ‘framework of interpretation offered by public
officia ls, security experts and military commentators, with news
functioning ultimately to reinforce support for political leaders and the
security policies they implement’ ( Norris et al., 2003 : 1). The
broadcaster also seemed to employ a relatively narrow defini tion of
terrorism. From the outset, the attacks were linked to Islam and
Muslims and were portrayed as an external to France threat coming
mainly from foreign extremist organisations, such as Al Qaeda and the
IS. No reasons for the attacks were sought insi de France. No internal
developments, such as discrimination, youth marginalisation, lack of
employment opportunities, humiliation, relations between law
enforcement and the Muslim community that could potentially
contribute to the acts, were explored.
Included in F24 discourse of terrorism: The Muslim and jihadi connection
The broadcaster portrayed the attackers as de -personalised, with no
references to personal relationships, or displaying human
characteristics. Other than the obvious brotherly link between the
Kouachis, as well as marriage relationship between two other su spects,
Ahmed Coulibaly and Boumeddiene, there were no other relationships
explored by the broadcaster. Parents were mentioned for the sole
purpose of emphasising the suspects’ foreign, Algerian and Malian,
background. This, combined with the consistent la ck of references to
the French citizenship of all involved, allowed the broadcaster to
distance the suspects from France and silence the French traits present

in their upbringing. They emerged from F24 stories as foreigners,
strangers to the country. Their attacks were seen as an external
undertaking, not directly produced by France and its people.
All attackers were linked to Islam by word and image, and, in return,
Islam was linked exclusively to terrorism. The only coverage of Muslims
on F24 after the at tacks portrayed them as violent, blood -thirsty
perpetrators already involved in, or on the way to, jihad. Being Muslim
inevitably leads to radicalisation and becoming a terrorist as a result of
the process, ‘the radicalisation pattern apparent from his [Ko uachi’s]
criminal record is a familiar one in France, home to Europe’s largest
Muslim population’ ( France 24 , 2015j). F24 probably saw no
contradiction in putting ‘radicalisation’, ‘criminal record’ and ‘Muslim
population’ into one sentence. Yet, by doing so, the broadcaster neatly
and conveniently linked the three very different phenomena and
introduced the causal relationships between them for the consumption
of its global audience. In the eyes of the broadcaster, the meaning of
‘Muslim’ coincided with cr iminal and military interpretation. Muslims
and cross -bows, Muslims and black masks, Muslims and guns, Muslims
and military training and Muslims and Al Qaeda were the only
associations proposed by F24 through text and image. This is consistent
with, explor ed by Nurullah (2010) , dominant media logic in the West
according to which terrorism = Islam = terrorism. The broadcaster did
not make an effort to portray Muslims as in possession of, or
association with, qualities conveying messages other than violence.
The good ‘other’
The only stories that could potentially propose a different image of
Muslims were the national burial of the police officer killed in the
attacks and the citizenship granted to the immigrant from Mali who
saved the lives of several hostage s during the attack on the
supermarket ( France 24 , 2015n, 2015o , 2015p ). The policeman was also
of Muslim background. Assigned to protect the magazine and the
cartoonists who frequently offended his faith, he died while on duty,
protecting French values. T he Malian immigrant, whose Muslim faith
was briefly mentioned, saved lives of Jewish shoppers in the same
supermarket where another gunman, whose ‘Malian origin’ – not the
fact that he was a Frenchman, born and bred in France – was frequently
emphasised by the broadcaster, killed other Jews due to his ‘anti –
Semitic’ feelings.

It was perhaps the first time in the history of terrorism in France that
the two opposing forces of good and evil converged in the same
incidences of the two attacks. In both cases, it was the attackers, only
vaguely connected in the coverage to Islam as a religion and more to
the Islamist indoctrination, who took lives on one side. It was pure and
practising Muslims who protected and saved French lives on the other.
In the F24’s event -driven coverage, however, the broadcaster’s
narrative did not link Islam and Muslims to saving lives. There were no
journalists’ visits to the local mosques of the killed policeman or the
Malian immigrant, no conversations with Imams that would present
Islam as a religion producing noble people or generating virtue. It is a
shame that Islam’s contribution to peaceful society in France was not
given the coverage it deserved.
Excluded from F24 discourse of terrorism: The French connection
The ‘common sense’ p roduced by F24 portrayed terrorism as external
to France and largely unrelated to the domestic environment. Yet,
pointing the finger at the brothers’ jihadi connection and loyalty to
foreign terrorist groups mutes several French aspects of the story. The
root causes , such as under -representative governance, or individuals’
resentment towards a government’s inability to affect change (Le Sage,
2007; Piazza, 2006 ; Windsor, 2003 ) that might also have been at play,
were absent from the reporting. Was there a ch ance that the attackers
felt oppressed, under -represented, desperate, alienated or disillusioned
about their life and opportunities in France? Could they have resented
the government and society’s inability to offer equal opportunities?
Likewise, the permi ssive factors existing in France were not explored by
the broadcaster, either. Apart from a brief mention of a failure of the
French intelligence, other physical, economic, institutional or political
weaknesses that could have enabled the attacks were not investigated.
Therefore, the political and socioeconomic conditions within France
that make young French citizens take up arms and willingly undergo
ideological and military training were swept under the carpet in F24’s
discourse of terrorism. The broadcas ter merely reported the Prime
Minister’s concerns about the ‘social apartheid’ of migrant
communities 2 weeks after the attacks, a type of reporting not
empowered by the broadcaster’s own investigation.
Another puzzle missing from the big picture sketched by France 24 is
the gap between the timing of the attackers’ ideological indoctrination

and the attacks they orchestrated in January 2015. In that unexplored
gap of almost 10 years in one case and 6 year s in another, the suspects
did not travel overseas to join the holy war despite the numerous
opportunities presented by ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya
or Syria. All suspects remained in France, still inactive when in 2011, the
same satirical magazine published cartoons of the prophet Mohammed.
The incident did not provoke an extremist reaction from the already
indoctrinated and trained in combat techniques Kouachis and Coulibaly.
Why then did they not utilise their skills over the years? What was the
direct trigger in 2015?
Perhaps F24 could have investigated the experience of three young
men in France and how it affected their lives. Exploration of this period
could have proved crucial to the understanding of the wide range of
terrorist cause s. This could lead to directing eyes onto the political,
economic and social setting within the French society that could have
contributed to the trends in radicalisation across the country.
Conclusion
The narrow understanding of terrorism employed by French
international broadcaster, which points to recruitment of ‘soldiers’
from Muslim communities, their Islamic indoctrination and overseas
training, further alienates Muslim communities in France’s alre ady
divided society and does not fully explain the problem. It solidifies the
image of Muslims as radicals and terrorists and promotes the discourse
of Islam as posing threat to western societies. This view reinforces the
explored by Fredette (2014: 81) dominant perception of Muslims in
France and reduces Muslims to ‘religious beings’, who isolate
themselves from the society. As a result, she believes, although French
Muslims are no longer immigrants, they are not fully French either and
become the ‘undeser ving citizens’ of France. This discourse is almost a
self-fulfilling prophecy which marginalises Muslims socially, politically
and legally. The knowledge produced by F24, the broadcaster’s
emphasis on the connection between Islam and terrorism perpetuate
the image of Arabs and Muslims as a negative ‘Other’. It maintains
observed by Said unequal relationship between the West and the East
and propels the fear and discrimination of Muslims into the future.

Note
1. Five groups have been identified as main perpet rators of terrorist acts
in the past: (1) Action Direct, a far leftist group; (2) The State –
sponsored FATA J-RC (Abu Nidal Organisation); (3) The Armenian
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA); (4) ‘The Lebanese
Connection’ ( Fractions arm ées r évolutionnaires libanaises/ FARL,
Comit é de soutien avec les prisonniers politiques arabes et du
Moyen -Orient/ CSPPA, Hezbollah); and (5) the Islamist Armed Group
(Groupe Islamique Arm é/GIA), considered the deadliest and
responsible for assassination of 41 Fr ench citizens in Algeria between
1992 and 1996, as well as for the bombing of Paris metro in 1996.
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