World Conflict over Religion: [606854]

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World Conflict over Religion:
Secularism as a Flawed Solution1
Ole Wæver
‘Political solutions to cultural conflict’ is the unifying theme of this book.
‘The security problems of a political “solution” to cultural/religious con-flict’ could have been the title of this chapter.
A global outburst of anger and violence triggered by 12 cartoons of the
Prophet Mohammed published in a Danish newspaper showed in 2005–6how religion can generate political conflicts that follow particularly easilythe globalized patterns linking local struggles in one place to local actionin distant parts of the world (Wæver, 2006). This specific incident clearlygained such momentum because it was both fed by and fed back into apattern of global conflict where Muslims and Western publics cumulatemutual grievances and concerns. The present chapter analyses the natureand dynamics of this wider conflict and its implications for political con-cepts to guide interaction within and among societies. As an aside, theanalysis argues that it was far from a coincidence that this crisis started ina country like Denmark, and that it was so thoroughly mishandled there.Beyond that, the chapter will not analyse the specific cartoon crisis assuch, but the reader is welcome to think about this case periodically, andI am certain the analysis and the case will illustrate each other nicely.
The main emphasis of the chapter is the global conflict between ‘the
West’ and radical Islamists. However, this is not a purely ‘international’issue, but a transnational one involving domestic politics in Islamiccountries and within the West. At both levels, the political principle ofsecularism is argued to be at the heart of the conflicts.
Conflict analysis and security theory will be used to analyse the global
level, while political theory and the role of religion in politics will be themain focus when discussing the domestic arena in the West.
The first section looks at the way religion has become part of global
security affairs. A central argument is that we routinely misrepresent this9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 208

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through the historically inspired term ‘wars of religion’, although most
of the conflicts take place between secularists on one side and actors whowant a stronger role for religion in politics on the other. This points to thecentrality of the principle of secularism. The next section problematizesthe way the concept is treated as both simple and given. The third sectionthen looks at where in the global conflict constellation the principle ofsecularism is most importantly at stake. This section serves to explain howthe internal arrangements in Europe influence the global conflict relatingto Islam. The following two sections address the practice of secularism inEurope – first discussing tensions and restrictions produced by the current,increasingly militant form of secularism as a ‘European value’, and thenexploring the possibility of a more pragmatic approach to religion/politics.The conclusion turns the discussion back on the terms of the question: arewe looking for political solution to cultural conflicts, or is this questionpart of the problem?
Wars of religion or wars against religion?
The word ‘religion’ appears increasingly frequently in contemporary secu-rity affairs. Many conflicts are interpreted as being ‘about religion’ or drivenby groups of strong faith – whether inthe Middle East, in the relationship
between Middle Eastern actors and the West, as well as domestically within
a number of countries, which happen to include the four most populatedcountries in the world: China, India, the United States and Indonesia.
Religion is on the verge of becoming the common denominator in
world politics, which is why it is all the more important to understandit correctly. The quick and expedient categorization is wars of religion .
This categorization is not only evident, it is also wrong.
However, it is hardly surprising that it is seen in this way when we
recall Europe’s history of crusades, wars and civil wars fought over religion.The words ‘religion’ and ‘conflict’ appearing in the same sentence instant-aneously trigger an image of two groups pitted against each other, motiv-ated by the force of their respective strong convictions – a war of religion ,
or to use a more modern expression, ‘the clash of civilizations’. However,this is a quite misleading image today (Juergensmeyer, 1993). We rarelywitness one deeply religious group engaged in conflict with another;rather, the battle is between those who want more religion in politics,and their adversaries, the secularists, who insist on a strict separation ofreligion and politics.
My focus is on secularism rather than secularization. Secularization is a
societal process in which the influence of religion on society is weak ened.
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210 Ole Wæver
Secularism is an – ism, a doctrine for how society ought to be . Religion and
politics ought to be separated – and be protected against one another inorder to ensure freedom of religion as well as religion-free politics.Ultimately, the aim is to ensure peace. For – the argument goes – faith is,naturally, a matter of faith; it is not rationally determinable. And if fightingis permitted over such questions, we will never have peace because thereis no rational way to reach an agreement on matters of faith (Hobbes,1969). Such is the credo of secularism and it is the justification for thecrusade to end all crusades . To foreshadow my argument, here lies the risk of
our contributing to a new cold war in which we – as in the former coldwar – clearly perceive the threat against us, but are unable to see how ourcounterpart can perceive us as being dangerous, thus rendering us unableto understand the dynamic of the conflict.
Radical Muslims are engaged in a war, not with another religion, but
against ‘anti-religion’. They fear that faith is about to be quashed bymoder nity. The neutral, Western-style state does not set the limits on sin
and decadence, which Western culture, science and economics actually
encourage. T rue practice and life conduct cannot survive in such a world.
A good s ociety, for them as for anti-secularists across the world, requires a
political order that is value-able ; fundamental values must be built into a
political order. Conversely, this understanding is perceived as exception-
ally threatening by the representatives of the worldly, secular order. Since
the Peace of W estphalia, 1648, rule 1 has been: ‘no encroachment in the
name of religion in international politics’. The most dangerous of all is the
coup ling of religion and politics. Conversely, it is secularism itself which
religious political actors fear. Here are two parties, both extremely afraid of
what the other stands for. They perceive one another as a mortal threat,and the conflict can therefore escalate out of control. One party feelsthreatened by religion, while the other feels that their religion is threat-ened. Both lead security policy . Both believe that something fundamental
is being threatened and therefore feel justified in doing whatever they
deem necessary. This is brought out most clearly by drawing on the the-
ory of securitiz ation (also known as ‘the Copenhagen School’) (Wæver,
1995; Buzan et al., 1998). This theory does not define security by the useor threat of force, but more generically as a move that takes an issuebeyond normal politics and places it as an issue of survival and neces-sary defence; a securitizing actor declares a given referent object (state, nation,
the environment, economic welfare) existentially threatened and gainsacceptance by the relevant audience of the ensuing legitimacy of extraor-
dinary measures (violence, secrecy) to ward off the threat. In this way,
the theory highlights how an issue and its social dynamics are trans-formed when reconstituted as an existential threat; securitization9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 210

World Conflict over Religion 211
removes otherwise binding constraints and justifies extraordinary meas-
ures, such as the use of force or secrecy. Applying this theory helps us
understand the escalatory dynamics of securitized religion (Laustsen andWæver, 2000; Kjølberg, 2003; Madsen and Ottosen, 2003; Sheikh, 2005).
3
The theory can also be used for a relatively straightforward empirical
investigation into what kinds of religion/security links dominate. There
are three main types of securitizations in relation to religion: the secular
state fears religious politics; religio-political movements fears the secularstate; and religion fears religion. While the third occurs,
4the two first are
much more common ( Juergensmeyer, 1993; 2000), and it becomes clear
how they are two sides of the same conflict, as mutual security fears.
Conflicts are often exacerbated by what has become known as the
security dilemma. We find it hard to understand how others can fear us,since we think we know our own motives, while we find it similarly diffi-cult to be reassured about the intentions of others (Butterfield, 1950). Ourown fear is easy for us to see. The worldly society fears religious politics;
al-Qaeda represents an external threat to the West; and the secular elitesin, for example, Turkey and Algeria, regard Islamists as a domestic threat.
The other side is more difficult to understand. What drives the people
we refer to as fundamentalists? It is crucial to understand the degree towhich fundamentalism is security policy . They act because they feel threat-
ened, indeed, under attack.
5
Both parties in the secularist-religiopolitical macro-conflict regard one
another as a threat. Both are thinking in terms of security policy. Bothhold religion to be the core of the conflict – the one threatened by politi-cizing religion, the other because their religion is threatened. Both regardsecularism as the pivotal point, i.e. the principle at stake. When the reli-gious actors lead security policy, it is called fundamentalism. When secu-larists lead security policy, we call it defence of freedom or somethingsimilarly heroic.
Mark Juergensmeyer, professor of sociology and religious studies, has
interviewed a vast number of activists from militant religious groupsrepresenting various faiths (unsurprisingly, often in prisons). A recurringstatement he heard was: ‘We are already at war’. In February 1998, Osamabin Laden issued a ‘fatwa’ a few months prior to the embassy bombingsin Kenya and Tanzania. ‘The world is at war’, he declared; and the pointwas to explain that he was not to blame for starting it. US Middle Eastpolicies constituted ‘a clear declaration of war against God, his messengerand Muslims’, he said (bin Laden et al., 1998; bin Laden, 2005: 60; cf.Juergensmeyer, 2000).
This is the significant difference between being a traditionalist or a
fundamentalist. If one believes that one’s faith is threatened; that people9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 211

212 Ole Wæver
are not faithful enough or following the correct path, the natural response
is to pore over one’s holy scriptures, attend church/mosque more often,pray or appeal to others to do so. It is not to fly a plane into a tall building,but instead to seek a purely religious remedy. But fundamentalists arguethat this amounts to betrayal. Why? Because, we are sothreatened, the
attack on our faith is soserious, that we must venture out in the world and
act in defence of our faith. A purely religious answer is unable to succeedwhen the enemy is so powerful. Thereby, a strange hybrid emerges wherebythe fundamentalists work to defend the traditional , but via the means of the
modern world (cf. Marty and Appleby, 1995; Almond et al., 2003). Whether
piloting planes into skyscrapers or disseminating messages via video andsatellite television, bin Laden & Co. reportedly want in some respects tore-establish the Muslim world as in Mohammed’s day, but they are hardlyLuddites. Karl von Clausewitz said: in war, the two sides write the law forone another,
6i.e. in war one cannot choose to do what one prefers; rather,
one must do what is necessary. The logic of war leads to a focus on theefficiency of the means.
Fundamentalists and militant Islamists thus do not constitute a ‘reli-
gious awakening’ as such. They are no more ‘religious’ than many others.They do not possess an original theology; rather, they are political activistsin a struggle for an alternative relationship between religion and politics.
The micro-dynamics of mobilization go a long way to explaining the
shift from religion vs. religion to religion vs. secularism. During the cru-sades and the early modern period, the struggles were over spreading (or protecting) the right faith, and the social and political power tied to
these related primarily to overall hierarchies in society, including the legit-
imacy of state power. This was promoted by mobilizing against an external
enemy in religious terms. In today’s world, the main social and powerissues at stake, gender in particular, are to a larger extent local and societal.Fundamentalist movements can reasonably be seen as ‘radical patriar-chalism’ (Riesebrodt, 1993; cf. Ruthven, 2002) and are often involved inconserving social structure and social privileges. Therefore, the threat issecularization, not another (conservative) religion. What is at stake polit-ically and socially helps to explain how the threat is articulated.
The level of macro-explanation, on the other hand, looks at the larger
historical forces and patterns. Allow me to put this in the form of a basicmacro-historical periodization:
 World History, Part I, before secularization and secularism: All societies
were permeated with what we today call ‘religion’. Political struggleswould regularly make appeals to religion, often in terms of one creed9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 212

against another. The motives of these struggles would mix ‘genuinely
religious’ ones with political and other interests, as thoroughly as reli-gion, politics, society and law were intertwined in general.
 World History, Part II: Secularism was a disciplinary project closely
linked to state- building (Asad, 2003). Gradually, the most politicallysalient expressions of religion shifted towards indirect presence as ‘civilreligion’ (Burleigh, 2005). Action directly in the name of religion mostlyoccurred as rearguard resistance to increasing immorality.
 World History, Part III: Secularism became hegemonic in Europe’s
intellectual avant-garde from at least the mid-nineteenth century,within broader European society and politics during the first half of thetwentieth century, in the US when the court imposed legal secularismafter World War II and in the decolonizing Third World as an ideologyof the first-generation state-building, typically Western-trained elites.
 World History, Part IV: With ‘the return of religion’ (or ‘the revenge of
God’; Keppel, 1995), it became possible to articulate conflict religion vs.religion or secularism vs. religion, but the micro-dynamics push towardsmostly secularism as a threat to religion (and religious mobilizationas a threat to the secular state).
Against my argument about secularism, not Christianity, being one side
of an escalating conflict spiral, it may be pointed out that some Islamistsperceive the threat as a Christian crusade . Bin Laden systematically refers
to the ‘Zionist–crusader alliance’. But even they do not depict an attackin the form of proselytization, i.e. that there is too much religion among us.
Instead, the Christian crusade is proceeding in a more devious mannerin the form of secularism and moral decay aimed at destroying Islam. (For
a more complex analysis, see Wæver, 2006.)
The Pew Global Project Attitudes has conducted global surveys on,
among other things, the view of the US in different parts of the world.Apparently, Muslim countries do not share the Western European imageof George W. Bush as a Christian crusader. Massive majorities in Islamiccountries see the US as ‘not religious enough’, as Americans do to a lesserextent, while a majority of Europeans see the US as ‘too religious’ (Pew,2005). The predominant view of the US among the people in Muslimcountries is the one the founding fathers of militant Islamism, mostnotably Sayyid Qutb, built on. Not only is the US degenerate, licentious,but it has more generally sacrificed morality and values to science, tech-nology and efficiency. During a visit to the US in the late 1940s, Qutb
wrote: ‘I wish I could find somebody to talk with about human affairs,morality and spirit – not just dollars, movie stars, and cars’ (quoted inWorld Conflict over Religion 2139781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 213

Gerges, 2006: 151).7His book The America I Have Seen (2000[1949]) is still
widely seen as an analysis that captures the view which is shared by the
broad popu lation and strongly motivates the extremists (Gerges, 2006:
145). The main reproach against the US is moral depravity rather than
missionary zeal.
The fact that Westerners tend to overlook how religio-political activists
can feel threatened by ‘the anti-religious’ owes to media images of wars
of religion . At the sight of a new conflict in the contemporary world, one
of the first things a journalist will typically check is whether the partieshave opposing religious convictions – because, if so, that must be thecause of the conflict – just as journalists in the 1990s looked for ethnicdifferences between parties in wars in order to label them ‘ethnic conflicts’as if this necessarily explained what people were fighting for and against.Quite comfortable indeed to the secular West – the nature of the problemis that some people ‘have too much religion’. Secularists, on the other hand,
have apparently found the solution: the separation of religion and poli-tics. The image of bitter wars of religion confirm the righteousness of theWestern model, and places secularists in the privileged position of waitingfor everyone else to catch up and end their conflicts once they learn tokeep politics and religion separate. Conversely, if the majority of conflictsare actually between the religiously political vs. the secular, then Westernsecularists are not above the conflict but one half of it.
This party to the conflict even goes so far as to promote secularism as
the framework for conflict resolution, as neutral rules of play within whichit is possible to maintain religious freedom, pluralism and a place foreveryone. What we promote as the neutral framework – as the solution –is the very same one part of the conflict is afraid of.
There is a significant risk of contributing to a vicious circle of mutual
fear and conflict escalation if the West continues its self-assured – evenself-righteous – promotion of secularism as a doctrine, raised above politics,as a precondition for politics, as the path to a peaceful, free and successfulsociety – as something the others simply must learn.
One possible misunderstanding must be avoided. While it may appear
that I objectify ‘religion’ and ‘secularism’ and treat them as homogeneousand given, I really study the processes whereby they become constitutedand operate as if homogeneous and given objects (cf. Wæver et al., forth-
coming). In line with securitization theory, the issue is not ‘religion’ assuch as a causal factor, but what can powerfully be invoked as a basis forextreme action. Therefore, the important point here is the power of theidea of religion – as an object to be defended and as an object of fear.
8
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World Conflict over Religion 215
there is such a thing as an important principle of secularism. Quite the
contrary – I shall argue that most suffer from the illusion that there is
such a principle – the idea of it is strong, but the actual consistency of
any doctrine is much weaker, as we shall see. Consequently, it is importantto specify the powerful effects of two parties building a conflict on theshared assumption that there is a strict principle.
Secularism, the principle
All too often the doctrine of thee separation of religion and politics is takenfor granted as though ‘religion’ and ‘politics’ are given entities. Their sep-aration in the sixteenth/seventeenth centuries is often claimed to be thepremise for modernity’s success in Europe, from societal peace over science,well-functioning markets and democracy to individual freedom. The prob-lem is that there is no entity called religion. The abstract, general concept
‘religion’ was not widespread before that point. People were religious, but‘religion’ as an abstract and distinct entity was only invented when the sep-aration was made (Smith, 1991; Asad, 1993; McCutcheon, 2003). The sameis the case with politics – it is not a stable entity either. At the same his-torical moment, the idea was forged of politics as free rational discussion,without reference to metaphysical and religious arguments (Berg-Sørensen,2004). ‘Religion’ and ‘politics’ do not simply exist ; what is more, they can
be mixed or separated. Indeed, early modern Europe created a specificconstruction, invented entities such as religion and politics (and eco-nomics, the public and law), as a way of organizing society. It might wellbe a good way – but it is not a given. It is highly political to do so.
Secularism is treated as being apolitical, but it might just be the mostpolitical of all, the most significant, most fundamental decision.
9
And it is a form of politics that is more compatible with some religions
than with others. It is more compatible with Protestantism, because thevery point is that one defines religion in a specific manner. Religion is
defined as private. For this is the other aspect of secularism: politics is tobe free of religion, but religion must be kept away from the political.Where? Within the individual person. It is more difficult for religions inwhich the outer trappings – the external and often collective practicesand social organization – are a far more constitutive aspect of the religion.This, of course, is not to say that all Protestants agree with secularism,nor that secularism is somehow a natural product of Protestantism, as isoften argued. All religions are malleable and at any given time they arewhat their practitioners make of them. Still, it might be vaguely assertedthat the move to secularism as we know it was shorter for Protestants9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 215

216 Ole Wæver
than for some other religions – not surprising given that the secularism
we are measuring up against is the one that emerged from a Protestantstarting point.
Debates between religious politics and secular politics are between two
competing worldviews, and it is a secularist illusion to assume that oneis a neutral framework, which the other should accommodate to. EvenJürgen Habermas (2006) acknowledges that one has to take the challengeseach worldview poses seriously.
Parallelism in contrast to the hierarchy – or radical incomparability –
assumed by secularists is also visible in the paradoxical dependence ofsecularism on religion. Because secularism is defined in relation to religion, religion is always present in secularist arguments (Sørensen,2004). Ironically, secularism does not mark an ‘absence’ of religion inpolitics – it constantly imports religion into politics in order to oppose it.This is not the secularist self-conception because it focuses on an ideal,ongoing religion-free process, but whenever secularism needs to be jus-tified or defined to manage its boundary, the principle cannot be definedwithout reference to religion, or rather a specific concept of religion.
To follow Talal Asad (2006), secularism is not just a separation between
religion and politics, it is a more general project shaping subjectivity toenable given kinds of society; it is a productive practice, not meaningfullyunderstood only as an absence (‘no mixing of religion and politics’).
Another way to show how secularism is not a simple principle is through
the comparative study of secularism s. Simultaneous ‘headscarf debates’ as
well as the EU countries’ attempts to draft a common constitution revealedthat even though France, England, Poland and Turkey refer to themselvesas secular, it actually means something very different. A distinction has
been drawn between religion and politics – but it has been drawn in dif-ferent places and according to different principles. Every country historic-ally arranged itself with its own distinction, which could take the statusof thegeneral principle, as long as only one country was observed at a time.
Globalization and Europeanization are in the process of coupling secu-larisms that require isolation to maintain their innocence. Secularism canno longer be regarded as though it is raised above politics as an obviousprinciple. A real-historic process is in play that positions ‘comparativesecularism’ as a privileged object of study with political potential. Com-parative secularism reveals how differently the limits are drawn instead of
philosophically demonstrating that these constructions are contingent.
In real-world practices, secularism is a complex field of political-cultural
constellations, but in contemporary struggles and especially in the escal-ating Cold War between the West and radical Islamism this complexity9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 216

World Conflict over Religion 217
is reduced to a binary question. Conflicts are organized around the idea of
(some kind of ) separation, despite the fact that its concrete meaning variesdrastically. The idea has become the focal point for struggles.
Where is secularism at stake?
Secularism is politically on the agenda in numerous places in the worldand for different reasons:
 Failure of the postcolonial state in much of the Third World. Secularism
was part of the ideology for the first postcolonial state-building elite,because it struggled to weaken local and traditional authorities and to find a path to Western-style modernization (Juergensmeyer, 1993).Anti-secularist movements have defined local politics in many places,but primarily in the Middle East it spilled over into transnational andinternational action.
 In the US due to domestic dialectics of the ‘church/state’ question.
Domestic securitization has generated the pattern of ‘culture wars’,where the religious Right has mobilized against a perceived destructionof tradition and virtue by a secularist elite who (according to the Right)upset the balance of politics especially through the post-1945 SupremeCourt concept of total neutrality. Liberals in turn have seen this revoltas a threat to the separation of church and state (Gunn, 2004; Feld man,
2005).
 In Europe, secularism has become an issue due to the pressures of glob-
alization, first, migration (Islam), second, Europeanization (cf. aboveabout comparative secularisms). Only as a weak third comes the limited‘religious revival’ in Europe, which does not in itself put much pressureon secularism, because it generally stays off limits in relation to politics –and in Northern Europe often even reinforces secularism because secu-larism is seen as part of Protestantism and (thereby) part of nationalidentity (cf. Sheikh and Wæver, 2005; Mouritsen, 2006).
So secularism is at stake politically in many places. Most important,
however, is where it intersects with the ‘new cold war’ between the Westand militant Islamism. When does secularism/religion become a securityissue domestically, internationally and transnationally? And how doessecuritization in one place tie in to other parts of the world?
 The securitizing discourse of the militant Islamists is an obvious, though
complicated, starting point. Traditionally, the main threat according9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 217

218 Ole Wæver
to both mainstream (non-violent Islamists, for example the Muslim
Brotherhood today) and violent ‘jihadists’ have been the apostate (in their view) secular regimes. The strategic aim is to gain political
power in their home countries. But from the late 1990s some (the
‘transnationalist Jihadis’, spearheaded by Osama bin Laden; Scheuer,2002; Gerges, 2005; 2006; bin Laden, 2005; 2005; Sheikh, 2005)shifted the ‘centre of gravity’ from ‘the near enemy’ (domestic regimes)to ‘the far enemy’ (the US and Israel). Basically, this is still justified on
regional (Middle Eastern) grounds and the conflict is not global inthat sense (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 206–10). The reason why they
focus on ‘the far enemy’ is that the ‘Jewish–crusader alliance’ will not
allow Islamists to gain power in Muslim countries, and therefore they
have to be dealt with first (Gerges, 2005: 31f, 144–50; 2006; bin
Laden, 2005; Wæver, 2006). In addition this is seen as a way to mobilize
and unify the Ummah , especially if the US assists by fighting back. One
might argue that this pulls the rug from under the argument aboutthe Jihadists fighting W estern secularism, because their quarrel is not
with what the West is, but with its military presence in the Middle
East and its support of Israel. However, their understanding ofWestern policy is anchored in the image of what the West is – and thedefining trait here is neither economic imperialism nor religiousexpansionism, but moral decadence, materialism and anti-Islamisthostility. The ultimate enemy is secularism – at home.
 Conversely, Western policy towards Islamic countries is part of the
constellation, including US policy towards Israel/Palestine, Afghanistanand Iraq, but also EU’s reaction to Turkey’s infidelity law (more onthis below), and the place of religion/secularism in Iraq’s constitution.Most interesting in order to tie the combined conflict constellation is the general discourse about ‘what is wrong with Islam’ and ‘what is wrong with the Arab world’, and thus the overarching attitudetowards the region. Here, revealingly, any role of religion in politics istreated as a problem and carefully weighed in terms of an occasion-ally necessary, but by definition wrong concession (Gerges, 1999;Hurd, 2004). This is ironic given the unstable balance between secu-lar and religious politics in the US. But vis-à-vis the Muslim world,the US appears and acts like a distinct representative of internationalsecularism.
 Since the general perception the Muslim world is one of Western hos-
tility towards Muslims and Islam, Europe becomes important, as wit-nessed in the conflict over the Mohammed cartoons. In Europe,migration and religion have become two sides of the same coin, because9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 218

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the largest immigrant groups are Muslims, and religious controversies
focus on Islam. This in contrast to the US, where the two issues arelargely separate – migration being mostly about Hispanics, and religiouscontroversies mostly about the Christian Right (Casanova, 2005).Europe is the best place for Muslims to observe what place for religion insociety the West offers . This chapter will now concentrate on how secular-
ism is practised in Europe, followed by a discussion on how it couldbe done.
One way to view the larger constellation is as a triangle, where the US
is central in terms of foreign policy, but the most complicated part asconcerns religious/secularist action (Wæver, 2006). In contrast, Europeand the Islamists mirror each other more evenly.
The radicalization of secularism in twenty-first-
century Europe
Instead of self-critically examining the political dogma of secularism,
the tendency in contemporary Western society is the very opposite, par-ticularly since 9/11. European politicians especially insist on secularismin an increasingly doctrinarian manner. Those who want to be inclusive,open and pluralistic say: ‘Religion is all right, as long as it is private’, ‘allreligions are acceptable, as long as they don’t play an active role’, ‘peoplemust give their word that democracy is above religion’ and ‘you have toswear that the constitution comes before the Quran’. This sounds tolerant,but one is actually solidly planted in the most sensitive spot while utteringthese otherwise friendly words. The central challenge in Europe in theyears to come is to be innovative regarding the relationship betweenreligion and politics – to fulfil the values of secularism more discreetly.Security policy therefore cannot simply be handled as a question aboutwhat to do about distant countries and peoples. It also accentuates a diffi-cultquestion among Europeans.
Reacting to the challenge of religion’s increasing visibility, the European
debate has become more reflective, and this makes things worse. The dom-inant approach has changed from a vague sense that religion does not
belong in politics, (back) to the principle of ‘secularism’. By being formu-
lated as a principle, the arguments against religion become self-reinforcing.
Secularism appears to be a clear principle; apparently simple, tolerant
and equal for everyone. It therefore serves as the line in the sand for
many Europeans: ‘We must stand our ground, we must defend a funda-mental principle that our society is built upon’. Upon closer examina tion,9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 219

220 Ole Wæver
however, this line in the sand turns out to be a line drawn in water (Sheikh
and Wæver, 2005). There is no simple principle, nor a given place to draw
the line – and it is anything but innocent or neutral. Nor is it necessaryto operate a strict principle.
A frequent argument is that if we give in here, the foundations of the
Western democratic order disappears. The imagery is almost invariablymodelled on time travel: giving in will send us back to the Middle Ages.This is because we do not concretely discuss what would happen if religious
arguments were in play together with the many others in the democraticdebate. Instead, we see ‘a principle’ at stake, and so regard any single, small‘violation’ as the first domino capable of toppling the entire arrangement.‘Secularism’ is at stake. The rhetoric of ‘values’ and especially ‘principles’tends to support securitization, because instead of a given case carrying itsown intrinsic importance, it becomes loaded with long-term implications(Buzan et al., 1998: 148f, 154, 161f). Principles do exist, and sometimessingle instances should be treated according to their role as a barrier againstgeneral chance, but the politics of the ‘principlification’ of issues is usuallytreated too lightly given the power of such framing.
The image of a return to a world of religion-against-religion (World
History, part I; cf. above) seems deeply implausible. In any conflict withtwo religions, a powerful third – and often the main opponent of both – issecularism. There is no way to get back to a pre-secularist situation, wherethe world will consist of only different religions.
In much of Northern Europe, it is widely observed that religious faith is
gaining ground. In TV and magazines, celebrities talk about their belief insomething or other – in striking contrast to say ten years ago. Faith is in.
It has generally been treated as a good thing, a welcome and innocentspice – with politics as the big exception. In politics, the ideal to keepreligion and politics separate remains. A possibly increasing role of faithin politics is playing out in inverse form: faith is having an increasingimpact on European politics for the very reason that the fear of faith has
become more acute. Religious arguments are not received into a pragmatictussle of various religious, economic, society-ideal and self-interest argu-ments; instead, there is a strong, reflex-like reaction when religion isbrought into politics. If a local Imam defends the stoning of women inNigeria, there are few who explain why stoning is wrong. The majoritysimply say: ‘That just goes to show how crazy things get when they basetheir arguments on religion.’ They attack the form instead of arguing fortheir own viewpoint.
Is this wise? Those who draw their political conclusions on a partly reli-
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in the public sphere. When arguing, you must use other reasons than your
actual motives. It is not self-evident how this is supposed to provide fora particularly rich democratic conversation.
Would it be possible simply to drop this manner of treating religion in
politics? Is it not better if the secular voices in the debate openly expresswhat they want and what they don’t want instead of telling others thatthey are not allowed to argue ‘their way’?
Rendering religion private is simple, as seen from the secularist side, but
for many people of faith it is both an amputation of religion (because a fullreligious life cannot be private only) and an artificial requirement aboutassuming political positions without including significant elements ofwhat matter most (Habermas, 2006). The secular state boasts about treat-ing all religions equally. However, the system is anything but equal andneutral in the relationship between the religious and the secular . Nor are the
different religions treated equally in practice. To varying degrees, the dom-
inant conceptions about justice, guilt, human values, etc. have religiousroots in all societies. But this form of influence merely seeps into the debatewhen values cannot be justified without drawing on tradition. Religiousarguments are not noted in Western politics when they stem from major-ity groups; they are only conspicuous when they are rare – when they stemfrom the minority (or a radical fraction within the majority population).The idea of ‘secularism’ as a limiting principle is so problematic in Europetoday because it is an impossible ideal, which the majority group has noproblem breaking most of the time, and then use to belabour specificgroups with.
The main problem with secularism is the notion that it is a principled
either/or – should we separate or mix religion and politics? Ironically,framing the matter in this way unites ardent secularists and Islamists(Hurd, 2001). Both talk about abstract separation/non-separation and ineither/or terms – one group simply chooses one, ‘either’ (separation), andthe other group ‘or’ (non-separation). Both Western and Islamic traditionscontain complicated discussions about the relationship between religionand politics, but today’s hard-line secularists and Islamists dodge difficultquestions with reference to an apparently simple principle about ‘separ-ation’. Contemporary Islamists avoid living up to the Islamic traditionsof engaging in reasoned debate regarding the relationship between religionand politics by replacing the debate with a simple negation of the We stern
position – ‘we reject the Western, un-Islamic distinction between reli-gion and politics’. And the contemporary Western debate (particularly inEurope) regards this distinction as the proverbial ‘line in the sand’ the Westmust draw in relation to Islamism, presenting it as a ‘yes/no question’ as9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 221

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opposed to a ‘how question’. The respective parties reflect themselves in
one another and use a one-dimensional ‘secularism’ to do so.
Western declarations of war in defence of the holy principles of secular-
ism render it unnecessarily provocative, threatening and intolerant inter-
nationally, and they legitimize genuine discrimination in the name oftolerance in domestic politics. Ironically, this entails a particularly aggres-sive politicization of religion as opposed to the limited effects it would haveif religious arguments became yet another dimension in the diversity of thepolitical debate. By warring with those instances, secularists create a moreproblematic mix-up, a suspicious politicization of certain groups’ religionand the possible influence of this religion on their political opinions.
Recent years have offered a number of examples, particularly in Europe,
of an increasingly heavy-handed campaign against religion in politics.Since 9/11, terrorism has been interpreted as the ultimate expression ofreligious politics, and any coupling of religion and politics thus becomesdemonized on account of the relation to terror that has been imposed onit. In cases like the Turkish infidelity law and Buttiglione’s candidacy as EUCommissioner, the secularists effected a coupling of religion and politicsbecause they believed they saw a religious influence, which they tookupon themselves to expel from people who themselves claimed to be ableto distinguish it. Let me use the Turkish case to illustrate this.
In 2004, the ruling post(?)-Islamist party in Turkey proposed a law
against adultery. The reaction was unified condemnation in Europe andTurkey’s application for EU membership was jeopardized. Interestingly,this reaction was at the same time unanimous and assumed not to needany justification. It raises the question of whether adultery is defining forEuropean identity. Many Americans will probably answer yes, not onlybecause adultery is illegal in 24 states, but because Europe is seen as tooimmoral, relativist and godless. To illustrate, the closest European polit-icians came to arguing their case was that the law ‘gave an impression of’Turkey heading towards Sharia. There is nothing Islamic about the lawas such, except that – as New York Times remarked (14 September 2004) –
‘adultery is forbidden in Islam, as it is in most religions’. There is nothingin the law about granting religious authorities any competences. Why,then, wasn’t it a domestic issue? When legitimizing international criticismand even sanctions, such as denial of EU membership, one should thinkthe law violated clear criteria, such as the Copenhagen Criteria for mem-bership. However, this is not the case, and the right to adultery is notmentioned in the European convention of human rights either. Also, itis unlikely that the reaction can be explained by the law being regardedas inappropriate state intervention in family matters; many countries9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 222

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have laws proscribing parents’ physical punishment of children, and the
state generally regulates laws about marriage. The Turkish law did noteven equip an external actor with powers of intervention – only the partiesto the marriage could present cases. Therefore, the problem seems to be‘the impression of’ this relating to religion, maybe even to Sharia law. Butfamily law in general, as in European countries, is in one way or otherinspired by religion. Rules about marriage, adoption, artificial insemin-ation and divorce are not based on abstract political reason, but comefrom dominant conceptions in a given society about human beings, lifeand love. The fact that family law draws on ideas with religious antecedentscan hardly be the issue. Instead, it appears that Europeans link the rul-ing AKP party, due to its Islamic roots, to the dreaded Sharia law, andwant to monitor this party, even if there is no clear connection or a vio-lation of international rules. It is very likely that feminists were right in
believing that the law would have had negative effects, and Turks were
well advised to join the demonstrations against it. But the fact that
European politicians drew heavy politi cal implications without any legal
or principled basis (and almost without critical commentary in thedomestic press) reveals how strong the dogma of banishing religionfrom politics has become. This episode clearly contributed to polishingthe enemy image in the Muslim world of Europe as crusadingly anti-reli-gious and in favour of all kinds of decadence.
These cases probably relate to the issue of European identity. A search
has been on for a while for values which define Europe and can carryfuture integration after the completion of projects like the internal marketand monetary union. Not that adultery is the new candidate, but an influ-ential article by Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (2003) is representa-tive of ideas that circulate among intellectuals around the EU Commission.The three most recurrent ideas are the welfare state, international law (in contrast to power politics) and secularism. They all seem selectedwith the criteria of demarcating Europe vis-à-vis the US. Secularism goeswell with the widespread perception in Europe that Bush and bin Laden
are two religious fundamentalists dragging the world into a dangerous
confr ontation. Hereby, the process where secularism hardens through
reflectivity and self-reference attains a third layer. First, it goes from being
a preference as such to becoming a principle, and therefore defended ‘as
such’ and not only according to the specifics of the case. When this princi-ple then becomes a value for wider purposes, it becomes increasingly
entrenched and objectified. A specific question at the first level (e.g.should schools accommodate Muslim demands for separation of thesexes in swimming classes?) is answered not concretely but in terms of9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 223

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defending (at the second level) the principle of secularism, and defending
this principle becomes even more important at the third level, when it isseen as a defining European value that helps to give Europe its identity.
A particular version of this layering has been seen in Denmark and goes
quite a long way to explaining the crisis in connection with the cartoons.As argued by Karen Wren and Per Mouritsen, liberal values have increas-ingly become the anchor for national identity in Denmark, and immi-grants are faced with difficult demands based on criteria that in the Danes’self-conception are universalistic and inclusive, but de facto are presentedin particularistic and often inaccessible ways (Wren, 2001; Mouritsen,2006). More specifically, it was suggested – before the cartoon crisis – thatDenmark was constructing a particularly militant secularism as part of a crisis over national identity (Sheikh and Wæver, 2005). Denmark’s self-image was historically constructed against its neighbours, Germany/Prussia and Sweden, who were defined as hierarchical, humourless,authoritarian and elitist, while the Danish were egalitarian, easygoing,liberal, pragmatic and tolerant. However, the increasingly restrictive policytowards immigrants has been difficult to square with this self-image.Dialectically, this tension has been resolved by metonymically redefiningliberal and enlightenment values as expressed in two areas: gender equal-ity and secularism. A particularly intolerant tolerance emerged from thisdefensive upgrading of these particular values as essential to fight for. Inthe case of the cartoons, this attitude explained the widespread perceptionin Denmark that it was necessary to take even quite provocative steps todefend crucial principles, where many others would be worried aboutother liberal enlightenment values that Danes have recently downplayed
and therefore removed from the relevant criteria.
Religious democratization of democracy
Lifting the exclusion of religion from politics could promote democrati-zation and integration in Western society. The dangerous thing aboutthe pseudo-rule is that it is selectively employed to attack some andthereby exclude them instead of engaging them in debate. This distin-guishing between those who are part of the ‘reasonable conversation’and those who aren’t is far less constructive in relation to forging aninclusive political community as opposed to a continued democratizationin which we include a greater number and greater variation in the com-mon conversation.
As argued by William Connolly (1995; 1999), this is about a paradox
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Whom is this pluralism and influence in effect for? Roughly speaking,
debates about who is included are less relevant in an authoritarian regime,because the people have no influence or rights anyway. The more plural-istic the society, the stronger the pressure to draw a line. This limit istypically defined in terms of who is reasonable enough to qualify. Can
participation include women, the poor, the mentally ill? Over time, thelimit has expanded. Connolly therefore depicts a process demanding bothpluralism and pluralization. Pluralism must not coagulate and form aclosed circle; instead, it must be constantly challenged so that new iden-tities are allowed to form and become a part of the community. It is precisely because this delineation is conceived in terms of reasonable/unreasonable that religion becomes the primary Other for politics. Plur-alizing pluralism so that it includes religious arguments is therefore aparticularly daunting challenge.
Some of the explanations and justifications for secularism turn into a
mechanism of further hardening and further insult. The most commonargument for keeping religion out of politics is that political conversa-tion suffers when we plant our positions in something beyond discussion.The debate would die. This is a pseudo-justification. It assumes an infin-itely high ideal for politics as the rational conversation. This ideal is notordinarily maintained and implemented. In debates, justifications tussleon the basis of such different sources as self-interest, tradition, societalphilosophy and which politician to trust. Not only could one part findthe other part’s argumentation quite ‘unreasonable’, but the interplay itselfbetween different ‘reasonable’ arguments does not proceed as the rationaltesting of justifications, for the disagreement is often precisely about wherethe question begins and what it is about. In practice, however, these con-trasting forms of argumentation in democracy interact, and one occasion-ally finds oneself slowly shifting from one position to another – albeitrarely because the other’s argumentation ‘forces’ one to do so (cf. Rorty,1989). The others’ arguments are not dismissed as disqualifying the speaker.Rather, they are compared and weighed against other types of arguments.We do not generally lead a hyper-rational conversation in which we testthe foundations of one another’s political positions. Arguments are notdeemed unacceptable on the grounds of being ‘too illogical’ – but a jus-tification with a religious basis willprecisely be rejected as a matter of
principle. This reveals that we are not dealing with an ordinary, high stand-
ard that faith arguments fail to live up to – we are dealing with a special banagainst religious justifications in politics . To pretend that political debate
generally operates from this high standard – and only religious argumentsfail the test – is to add injury to insult; it is to brand religion as particularly9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 225

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irrational. It would be more fair and honest to openly discuss the special
rule against religion. It probably was justified and progressive 400 yearsago, but today it ought to be reassessed openly.
In the secularists’ horror scenario, reasonable conversation is positioned
up against the literalist dogmatism. Debate stalls because one part merelypoints at a holy book. Does it? In practice, it is far from unequivocal whatone ought to think on the basis of a given religious point of departure. Agood example is Jim Wallis’s book, God’s Politics: Why the Right Gets it Wrong
and the Left Doesn’t Get It (2005). Here, a progressive American minister
attempts to convince Democrats that Christianity can be mobilized fortheir benefit. As he writes: ‘How did Jesus become pro-rich, pro-war, andonly pro-American?’ Who is to say that ‘value politics’ are supposed tomean opposition to homosexual marriage, when it can alternatively meanpeace, equality and social justice? Religion is not necessarily a ‘debate stop-per’. First, this makes for new debates within the religious community;
second, it can give an interesting interplay between secular and religiousparticipants. The American political scientist Thomas Banchoff (forthcom-ing) has recently pointed out that there are endless writings about what
would happen if religion were to come into play in politics. However,there is hardly any research concerning actual courses of events where thereligious and the secular interact. Drawing on the example of stem cellresearch in the US and France, he demonstrates how this can provide asatisfactory course of events. Even secular participants can benefit frominspiration from religious debate partners once the limit has been reachedfor what the current rationalistic language can handle, as seen mostclearly in connection with bio-ethical questions (cf. Habermas, 2006).
These examples illustrate that the contrast between a rational secular
conversation modelled on an inquiry amongst philosophers against rigiddoctrinaire religious believers is problematic on both sides: the existingpolitical debate is very different from this ideal (and this much more trivialreality, which we all take for granted on all other occasions, than the con-trast to religion) and religion can be involved without closing the debate.
This does not mean that dropping the ban on religion in politics is an
easy solution. The religion/politics will continue to raise thorny ques-tions. The main question is whether they should be addressed throughthe ordinary, ongoing political process or through special limitations onreligion in politics. Do we need a special ban (formal or informal) onreligion in politics, or should religious activists be met with exactly thesame requirements and bans as everyone else? They are not allowed touse violence in politics and we do not allow democracy to be used toabolish democracy, i.e. ‘overthrow the public order’. Or must we – as a9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 226

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weakened special rule – make an explicit requirement about accepting
contradiction? And how do we permit faith-related arguments whilesimultaneously preventing religious institutions from gaining powerand undermining democratic institutions? Such questions are difficult
and must be handled as such – not regarded as simple and solvable via a
declaratory ‘separation’ of religion and politics.
Especially in situations where religious politics on behalf of a majority
population wins influence, it will be important to protect: 1) freedom ofbelief including that of atheists; 2) protection of the supremacy of democ-racy’s institutions (i.e. no ‘Council of the Guardians’); and 3) protection ofhuman rights, not least those related to gender. These are mostly relevantin connection with the risk of a majority imposing their religiously baseddecision on a minority and building them into state structures. However,the early American experience was that with societal pluralism (in thatcase different Protestant denominations; today different religions), suchmodels become less and less feasible (Feldman, 2005). Globalization meansthat we will all be Americanized, and this is a good thing (in this context).
Going beyond these standard demands on all political actors means
raising problematic limitations. If put up against a majority, it tends tobe anti-democratic and elitist; if in relation to a minority, it becomes a repressive lack of pluralism. One can, for instance, not demand of reli-gious activists an ‘openness’ to the argument of others, because that issomething that most politicians already fail to deliver. Nor should wedemand that religious actors assume the principled fallibility of their ownpositions because the secularists typically combine the demand for thisby insisting on certain ‘unnegotiable’ human rights and political values.We should stick to demands that are actually abided by (or are attainable),such as following decisions made by the majority, even when voted down.
But aren’t high ideals always good? If good rules are ignored by secular
politicians, why not just strengthen efforts in demanding it of both secularand religious actors? No, because demands that are out of touch with real-ity become an instrument used disproportionally against minorities. It ismore conspicuous when Muslims use religious arguments than when a‘native’ politician draws on widespread, religiously rooted perceptions. Themajority also has greater access to political resources and are better able touse the political opportunity offered by nonconformity to rules by others.
The idea that political theorists should promote ideals if they are philo-
sophically justifiable rests on a specific model of the relationship betweentheory/philosophy and practical politics. Theory is assumed to be able toarrive at general conclusions independent of any specific society, and theseprinciples are later introduced to actual po litics without consideration9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 227

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of the forces at play and their likely effect on political constellations. As
universally valid, they are above such considerations. With a more polit-
ical view – an emphasis on politics as action, interaction and constant cre-ativity, not problem resolution – the truth in any given political situationdepends on what the other actors are doing and saying (Arendt, 1968). Thedominant view of the relationship between theory and politics isindebted to secularism, because it assumes supremacy of independentreason as pure authority – the structure that was installed to replace reli-gion as justification for political authority. In contrast, I think theoreticalinterventions have to be calibrated with an eye on the existing politicalstruggles and power relations in the relevant arena.
I therefore neither agree with those demanding that we must ‘get reli-
gion back into politics’ nor with the ‘normal’ European argument that wemust maintain the distinction between politics and religion. It is not anobjective – not an unequivocal gain – to introduce more religion into thepolitical life; it would have advantages as well as disadvantages. Amongthe advantages is a greater capacity for dealing with difficult ethical andexistential questions, where the narrowest understanding of politics fallsshort, and we can benefit from drawing on more diverse experiences andtraditions. Among the disadvantages is increased fragmentation of thepublic into groups that do not acknowledge each other’s fundamentalviews. But when the goal is not ‘more religion in politics’, then what isthe point? It is to avoid a ban on religious arguments in politics, to stopbeating people with a ‘principle’, a criterion for access. Those who mightwant to argue on the basis of religion have the right to try to do so. Theywill undoubtedly often find that it is not the most efficient approach inEurope, and it will therefore not make a significant difference in termsof the outcome of the respective debates; conversely, it wreaks considerablehavoc to prohibit them from doing so.
The ‘negative’ effects of allowing religion will be limited, simply because
the use of religion as form of argumentation is self-limiting due to thenature of politics. It is rarely wise to use arguments that only make sense toa limited section of the population. At the same time, there could begreat advantages, not least because this would weaken the militantlyanti-religious image of the West.
Conclusion
Naturally, reckoning with secularism is not the solution to terrorism, but
only a small piece in the puzzle. Terrorism has many causes – economic,geopolitical, social, gender policy. Correspondingly, there must be many9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 228

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elements in the campaign, including the military, because the leader-
ship cannot be affected. The image of the West influences recruitment tomilitant groups, which possibly is the most important in the long run.For this purpose, it makes sense to listen to how terrorists formulatetheir arguments and with reference to what/whom they justify theiractions. Particularly important is the point at which security and reli-gion meet – religion defended and religion feared.
This point can be influenced by how Europe deals with secularism. It
affects the conflict in two ways: by modifying the images of an amoralsociety and its suppression and persecution of Muslims. As a bonus,Europe gains further development and expansion of its own democracyas well as its concepts of reason and rationality.
10
Removing the superfluous, heavy-handed ‘rule’ – informal but strictly
enforced – would serve to muffle conflict. First, internationally, we canhelp break the spiralling conflict between secularists and religious politics.Second, removing the special ban can promote democratization and inte-gration in our own society. The pseudo-rule is selectively used againstcertain people and thereby exclude them instead of engaging in debatewith them. Drawing the dividing line between those who are part of the‘reasonable conversation’ and those who are excluded is less constructivethan a continued democratization that includes a greater number.
The degree to which ‘the West’ constitutes an enemy for the Islamic
world is not merely a question of ‘what we directly do to them’, but alsoa matter of ‘how things are done at home’. The more we fortify ourselvesin a self-satisfied manner with secularism as a glossy non-debatable prin-ciple, the more we confirm the enemy image. Conversely, if we engage indebates amongst ourselves that are not necessarily about them, but merely
the way we debate politics, it would show that we too are struggling withdifficult, as yet unanswered questions. By thus permitting ‘value-full’access to political debate, we would appear less threatening.
This chapter’s focus on problematizing a political principle in one sense
fits into the format of the book, the idea of ‘political solutions to culturalconflict’. It is a critical discussion of the current political solution andpoints towards a refashioned form of (post-)secularism; a new ‘politicalsolution’. However, the argument also raises questions about the generalformat of ‘political solutions to cultural conflict’. To ask and answer a ques-tion, one must grant it terms. The terms of this question imply that (sub-
political) society is the source of conflict and divisions, and the role ofpolitics is to regulate and contain these conflicts. The present chapterillustrates why this is a problematic, overarching approach. The subjectsand subjectivities constituted in a given time and place are the product9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 229

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of large-scale practices and disciplinary patterns – such as secularism
(cf. Asad, 1993; 2003; 2006) – that have to be recognized as political.
There is no such thing as purely ‘cultural’ conflicts, they are already polit-ical, long before the political ‘solutions’ enter the frame. Correspondingly,political solutions will be indebted to and shaped by particular cultural orreligious roots.
This might sound like the trivial ‘everything is connected to everything’
spoiler, but the argument is more precise than that. The strategy of‘political solutions to cultural conflict’ is not only impossible, but alsopart of the problem. It draws on the basic secularist, Hobbesian narrativeof the modern state and state system: differences among people are theproblem; and if not contained by politics, will generate war. The role ofpolitics, in turn, is to organize and constrain these subterranean forces andestablish order. But today, most of the important conflicts derive fromthe inadequacies of this Hobbesian, Westphalian (secularist) model. It isnot differences as such that generate conflict, but rather the blurring ofdifferences and distinctions in a globalizing world and the ensuing, desper-ate attempts to mark out new differences through ethno-nationalism,fundamentalism and violence (Appadurai, 2006). The conflicts are politicalthrough and through – they are about the delineation and organizationof communities and states, not about inter-human, local relations as such.Maybe the next volume should be on ‘cultural solutions to political con-flict’ or even ‘religious solutions to political conflict’.
Notes
1. This chapter is partly based on a lecture given at the University of Cope nhagen
Annual Awards Ceremony 2004, together with excerpts from articles printedin Weekendavisen (no. 52, 24–30 December 2004), Berlingske Tidende (24 July
2005) and Salt(Vol. 14, September–October 2005, pp. 14–18). In addition,
I have held variations of this text as lectures numerous times in recent years,and I thank the many, many insightful critics who have contributed to thesharpening and development of the argumentation. Thanks to Jon Jay Neufeldfor translating the Danish texts and to Per Mouritsen for unusually helpfulquestions and suggestions.
2. Secularization is obviously the object of an extensive literature. A recent and
useful status on a part of the debate is Davie et al. (2003, especially Casanova’schapter). See also Asad (2006).
3. The theory of securitization is particularly useful for the current project for
two reasons. First, it is an ‘open’ theory in the sense that it does not try on the-oretical grounds to decide what is security or is not, as done by both traditionalones (the answer being military state security) and critical security theory(answer: human needs). Securitization theory defines security as form, as thelifting of issues above normal politics to a sphere of urgency and necessity.9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 230

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This theoretical openness allows empirical studies of variation in security both
over time and across places (Buzan and Wæver, 2003), and in this case to makeit an empirical question how religion enters the security picture: what isdeemed threatened by what? The second reason to choose this theory is thatit seems to be able to link up constructively with the main theories of funda-
mentalism and religious radicalism (more on this below), and thus foster thenecessary interdisciplinary synergy.
4. Two of the most important examples today of religion-against-religion conflicts
is the competition between Islam and Christianity (both expanding in manyplaces) in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, and the increasingly emerging shape of theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict, which originally was run by secular actors on bothsides, but now is kept confrontational by religious fundamentalists on both sides(although it is still only a partial shift in this direction, because even the religiousgroups on both sides define the conflict in terms of territory more than faith).
5. Many analysts have given good arguments for avoiding the term ‘fundamen-
talism’: it is misleading to extend a term originating with a specific early twen-tieth-century American Protestant movement to other religions; the similaritiesacross religions are not strong enough; it is a political tool more than an ana-lytical one; and most of the movements labelled this way do not use the termthemselves. Most important in the present context is to note that using thelabel ‘fundamentalism’ is in itself a securitizing speech act: To label a move-ment ‘fundamentalist’ is to say ‘they are instances of a known syndrome, andwe know they can’t be included in normal politics – they should be eradi-cated’ (Juergensemeyer, 1993; Laustsen and Wæver, 2000). Juergensmeyer haspointed to the widespread political misuse of the label by governments tocrack down on oppositions and limit democracy. However, I continue to usethe term here while observing critically i ts political us age, because it is the
most widespread term in the West, and it is therefore helpful to be able to dis-
cuss directly how to interpret ‘the phenomenon known as fundamentalism’.
6. ‘[W]ar is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds; as one side dictates
the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which logicallymust lead to an extreme’ (Clausewitz, 1982 [1832]: Book 1, Ch. 1, p. 103).
7. A Gallup World Poll conducted in 2005 among 8000 women in eight predom-
inantly Muslim countries found that the most frequent response to ‘What doyou admire least about the West?’ was ‘the general perception of moral decay,promiscuity and pornography that pollsters called the “H ollywood image”
that is regarded as degrading to women’ ( New York Times , 8 June 2006: A5).
According to the majority, the best aspect of their own societies was ‘attach-ment to moral and spiritual values’.
8. Although the argument here is not substantialist in itself, in the sense that
religion is ascribed specific powers, I cannot resign myself to a total abstentionfrom using the concept of religion as demarcation, or nominalistically stick towhen the actors call things ‘religion’. Since I make a distinction between secu-
rity in the ‘religious sector’ in contrast to, say, political security or enviro nmen-
tal security, this has to draw on some criteria, and I use here a relativelystandard definition that religion involves a belief in (and some add: a commu-nication or interaction with) supernatural beings or objects. This, however,means that ‘religion talk’ can be distinguished from, say, ‘identity talk’, not thatthe definition captures ‘what religion is’ or ‘the essence of religion’.9781403_997432_11_cha10.qxp 9/25/2007 6:00 PM Page 231

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9. Political twice: first, because ‘secularism’ as a general aspiration or idea has
far-reaching implications through its general organizing principles of ration-ality/sup erstition, political/non-political, public/private, and this-worldly/
other-worldly. Second, because, as I show later, there is not one standard formof secularism but numerous versions, and thus a choice of ‘secularism’ is alwaysalso a choice of one specific model to the exclusion of other ones.
10. My argument is not a plea to compromise on fundamental Western principles
in order to dismantle a conflict. The West will gain too, because we in theWest have imposed a limitation upon ourselves by cultivating a particularlynarrow form of political rationality. In order to drive out religion from politics,everything with a hint of the existential or metaphysical has gone too. Mostpeople experience in unofficial (e.g. private) political discussions that if pur-sued long enough, a big political issue engenders reflections or arguments of ageneral, principled or personal nature that cannot be articulated in e.g. a Parliament. The West could gain a richer and more productive political lifeby problematizing secularism, which, ironically, is the most sacred of all polit-ical principles in con temporary society.
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Appadurai, A. (2006) Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger .
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Arendt, H. (1968) Men in Dark Times . New York: Hartcourt.
Asad, T. (1993) Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity
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