Johnsons first troubled war: https:www.theatlantic.compastdocspoliti cspovertylemunf1.htm [605266]

American foreign policy – different topics for a complex analysis

Trump in a strategic framework created by other presidents (Wilson, Truman,
Roosevelt)

Every time a new U.S. president is elected, it is impossible not to compare him with some
of his most notable predecessors. In its rather short – when compared to other nations – history,
the United States have become a major force in the international are na, actively shaping the course
of the world in the last century. For these reasons, it is only fair to analyse and compare current
president Donald Trump with former US heads of state from the twentieth century.
Woodrow Wilson served two terms as presiden t, between 1913 and 1921, leading the
nation throughout the First World War. When assuming office, he was sure that his role would be
to reform the country, rather than involve himself in the affairs of other nations: "[i]t would be the
irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs"1. His plans were
drastically changed by the start of WWI in 1914. At first, he strongly argued for a position of
neutrality in the conflagration, promoting a unilateral view under the “America First ” slogan.
Throughout the neutrality period, the Americans favored However, the activity of German
submarines (“U -boats”) and the Zimmerman telegram forced a change of heart on the issue, and
the U.S. entered the war in 1917.
Even before his presidency, he proposed the idea of “moral diplomacy”, which implies that
the U.S. support should only go to countries with similar beliefs, those of democracy. His idea also
involved that his country has a special “mission” to support and spread democracy throughout the
world, and oppose imperialism and other authoritarian forms of rule.
After the end of the war, Wilson saw the opportunity to accomplish his international ideals
from the victor’s table. He justified that U.S. involvement in the war was needed because “Th e
world must be made safe for democracy”2. The President proposed the Fourteen Points as a set of
principles that would come to revolutionize the world, from a diplomatic standpoint. He hoped to
bring an end to secret negotiations and promote open, transpa rent discussions between the nations.
Among other things, the Fourteen Points addressed to solve as equitable as possible various
territorial claims all around Europe, taking into account the numerous nationalities and former

1 https://edsitement.neh.gov/curriculum -unit/woodrow -wilson -and-foreign -policy
2 http://theconversation.com/woodrow -wilsons -influence -on-us-foreign -policy -will-outlast -donald -trump -77514

2
conflicts. Other points were dedicated to the problem of free navigation outside territorial
waters and the removal of the barriers against free international trade. The most ambitious point,
however, was the creation of the League of Nations, an international association with the pu rpose
of maintaining peace, “political independence and territorial integrity [of] great and small states
alike”.3 This organization would disappear in 1946, but it set the foundation for the United Nations.
Although his ambitious plan was, in many ways, d isregarded, Woodrow Wilson remained
an example for many of his successors, who would further promote the idea of America’s mission
to spread and maintain democracy throughout the world .
In terms of foreign policy, the next major name on the list is Preside nt Franklin Delano
Roosevelt. As is the case for Wilson, FDR is well known for his domestic policies. He is the
president who led the United States out of the Great Depression, thanks to his “New Deal”
program, but also the one who guided the nation throug hout the Second World War. The support
of his citizens was clear, having won four consecutive presidential elections.
In the context of the Great Depression, at the beginning of his presidency, Roosevelt
announced an isolationist strategy to combat the dif ficult situation of his nation: “our international
trade relations, though vastly important, are, in point of time and necessity, secondary to the
establishment of a sound national economy”4. Still, even though he acted upon these principles on
most occasi ons, there were still signs of internationalism present: he appointed Senator Cordell
Hull, a supporter of liberalized international trade, as secretary of state and he fought against
overly -nationalist policies.
An important aspect of Roosevelt’s foreign policy was the implementation of the “Good
Neighbour Policy” with the states of Latin America: he consistently sustained that the USA
shouldn’t be allowed to intervene in the affairs of another country, ended the American military
presence in Haiti and Nic aragua, and retracted the right of intervening in Cuban affairs.
Furthermore, in this spirit, he did not intervene when Mexico decided to nationalize its oil industry,
confiscating American properties.
The president’s involvement outside the Americas was minimal before the Second World
War. Struggling to reshape and consolidate his own country, Roosevelt preferred to focus on
domestic reforms and let the significant isolationist fraction of the Congress to pass a harsh

3 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914 -1920/fourteen -points
4 https://www.presidentprofile s.com/Grant -Eisenhower/Franklin -D-Roosev elt -Foreign -policy.html

3
Neutrality Act in 1935. This law mean t that the United States were not allowed to sell any military
equipment to any warring nation and, after some subsequent changes, were not allowed to give
loans or credits to any warring nations. In its 1937 form, the law forbade the sale of every other
kind of goods, if the interest party could not pay cash and transport them with their own ships.
This amendment may have sounded harsh by today’s standards, but Roosevelt knew that this could
help supply Great Britain and France in the event of a war with t he Axis Powers, since they were
the ones to control the oceans.5
Even though the “cash -and-carry” provision was rejected for renewal in 1939, this was
rectified with the spread of war in Europe. In November 1939, the Neutrality Act was changed in
order to permit the sale of all goods (including arms) within the “cash -and-carry” rules. Still, the
Act stated that the U.S. would continue to impose a ban on loans, which would prove an issue
during the war.
To combat the restriction on loans of the Neutrality Ac t, FDR created the Lend -Lease
initiative. The main idea was to create a means for America to aid Great Britain with supplies. The
initiative stated that the U.S. would loan supplies, without immediate payment. Furthermore , the
payment should not be necessa rily made in dollars, but rather a sort of promise of joint action in
order to rebuild the postwar economy.6
Roosevelt was president when the United States entered the war, following the attacks on
Pearl Harbor, but he did not live to see its end. The task of rebuilding Europe fell to his successor,
Harry S. Truman. He faced unprecedented challenges, with the beginning of the atomic age, and
the spread of communism throughout the world. In this climate, he consolidated the idea that, as a
superpower, the U. S. had a moral obligation to the rest of the world. They should actively pursuit
of spreading and maintaining, where necessary, the ideas of democracy, in face of the communist
threat. These ideas were formally stated in the Truman Doctrine, in which it wa s made clear that
America should support any nation threatened by both internal and external factors, which could
endanger their freedom. This was the beginning of the new American foreign policy known as
containment. Although America would involve itself in stopping the spread of communism
wherever possible, it wouldn’t use military force if the regime was already established. 7

5 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921 -1936/neutrality -acts
6 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937 -1945/lend -lease
7 https://study.com/academy/lesson/president -harry -s-trumans -foreign -policy.html

4
Although much of Truman’s presidency revolved around the problem of the Soviet Union,
the beginning of his mandate was marked by the problem of atomic weapons. The Manhattan
Project had begun in secrecy, when Roosevelt was still president. Soon after Roosevelt’s death,
the new president had the difficult choice whether to use atomic weapons or not. He ultimately
decided to bomb Japan with the new weaponry, attracting harsh criticism from many for this
action.8
The switch to a more active role in leading the world, marked by the Truman Doctrine, was
the foundation for the Marshall Plan. The European Recovery Program (the off icial name given to
the Marshall Plan) was intended to help rebuild the nations of Europe, after the ravages of World
War II9. In the end, the program was a success, with a rebirth of Western European economies,
which was a factor leading to the creation of both NATO and the European Union.
The presidents following Truman continued the struggle against the Soviet Union, along
with other particular crisis. President Eisenhower offered indirect aid to the French in Vietnam,
which was a factor which led to th e military involvement in the Vietnam War one decade later.
Kennedy brought special attention to Latin America, where communism began to take roots. He
authorized the CIA to intervene in the Bay of Pigs and had to confront the Cuban Missile Crisis.
After h is assassination, Lyndon B. Johnson decided to send troops to Vietnam, a hugely
controversial decision. After him, Nixon tried to relax the tensions with the Soviet Union and
China. Jimmy Carter declared that he promoted a more humanitarian approach to for eign policy,
followed by Ronald Reagan who intensified the fight against the soviets, in a strong contrast with
his predecessor.
After the fall of communism, U.S. presidents have had to confront the shift from the Soviet
Union with new tensions in the Midd le East. The present is marked by the continuous war against
terrorism. It is unlike other wars in the past, terrorism being able to infiltrate itself throughout
many nations.
President Donald Trump’s election came in the midst of the war against the Isla mic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). The whole world wondered how the new
American head of state would act in this delicate conflict. During his presidential campaign, Trump
had repeatedly stated that the attacks against the terrori sts should be swift and brutal, targeting

8 https://www.presidentprofiles.com/Grant -Eisenhower/Harry -S-Truman -Foreign -policies.html
9 https://www.marshallfoundation.org/marsha ll/the -marshall -plan/history -marshall -plan/

5
their oil infrastructure. He also controversially said that in order to defeat people without regard
for their own lives, their families should be targeted. This comment has attracted criticism, since
it is in dire ct violation of the Geneva Convention, but he has avoided specifying what was to
happen to the families in that case10.
After being invested as president, Trump’s foreign policies have attracted new waves of
criticism for reversing opinions regarding the in volvement in the fight against ISIL11. This is just
one of many instances in which the new president has been accused of being inconsistent in his
statements.
From the standpoint of former presidents, Trump’s election brings an unprecedented
scandal: he ha s been accused of being helped by Russia to gain the office12. This alleged
involvement seems incredible, especially taking into account the decades in which former
presidents have actively fought against foreign interference in democratic states. Besides the
Mueller report, many argue that Trump’s continuous praising of Vladimir Putin13 is possible
evidence to these allegations. Furthermor e, accusations that Donald Trump supports radical
movements and more authoritarian leaders put him in clear opposition to former U.S. presidents.
From the perspective of trade policies, the current president’s tactics are in clear
contradiction to some of his predecessors: Wilson strongly supported free trade, whilst Roosevelt
tried to maintain trade as free as possible given the Neutrality Act. Meanwhile, president Trump
is a known businessman, a fact which many hoped to help U.S. economy, but he has shown to be
against many of the already established trade policies. He has proposed a number of tariffs which
would discourage imports from China and Mexico. It is argued that the new trade policies would
resemble those of Nixon or Hoover.
Another sensitive sub ject in today’s world is climate change, Donald Trump’s opinion
being in a clear antithesis to those of most nations. While most countries strive to achieve strict
climate goals, the president has presented more than one opinion on this issue: during his e lection
campaign, he declared that climate change is “a hoax”, but has changed his status on this matter14.
The discussion regarding climate change is an important one, as most of U.S. allies strongly believe

10 https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/03/politics/donald -trump -dodges -questions -terrorist -families/
11 http://time.com/5240164/syria -missile -strikes -donald -trump -chemical -weapons/
12 https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/04/22/mueller -report -what -know -russian -election –
interference/3538877002/
13 https://edition.cnn.com/2016/07 /28/politics/donald -trump -vladimir -putin -quotes/
14 https://www.bbc.com/news/world -us-canada -46351940

6
that drastic measures must be taken in order to preserve our planet, and the president’s promise to
back out of the Paris climate agreement might bring new tensions in foreign affairs.
While it is clear for many that Trump’s presidency is in no way similar to any other in the
past, there are some who ar gue that some of his claims are fair, but were poorly approached, due
to a lack of political experience. The pressure put by the U.S. president on the EU regarding the
problem of military spending and personnel, accusing allies of depending on American pro tection,
rather than trying to solve the issue. Some believe that this issue needs to be addressed and
commend Trump’s decision to speak freely on the matter15. However it may be, and how atypical
it might seem, the current U.S. president’s mandate could an d probably will influence the state of
most nations, as it has before.

15 https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/the -tragedy -of-trumps -foreign -policy/

7
Explain the role of different strategic concepts during the Cold War and after it

“The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want” (Truman Doctrine). In
general, the Cold War was a conflict between communists and anticommunists in a battle for the
“hearts and minds of people throughout the world”. In 1947, President Harry Truman changed the
ideology surrounding American foreign policy with a speech known as the Truman Doctrine. During
a period in which the threat of communism was tremendous, the policy of containment ensured that
the United States would execute all necessary actions in order to prevent the spread of Soviet
influence .
The Cold War was a period of “ideological struggle” between the communist Soviet Union
and the twelve countries of NATO. Both sides of the war sought to spread principles of their
governments to surrounding areas of the world, and the east was in danger of falling completely
under communist influence. The Soviet Union threatened to “expand their power throughout the
world ”, and the United States seized much of the responsibility to prevent this expansion.16
In Truman’s opinion, the United States’ strategy consisted i n supporting “national integrity”
in Turkey, meaning that without assistance the country was likely to become communist. Truman
did not simply ask for the funding of Turkey and Greece, but also for training and instructing
personnel of the countries in ord er to help them become “stable” and “self -sustaining (Truman
Doctrine).
In international context, the Truman Doctrine set a precedent for American foreign policy
and aiding anticommunist countries. Without help, countries such as Greece and Turkey would have
been subjected to the influence of the Soviet Union, thus promoting the expansion of communism
throughout the world. The war of contrasting ideology could have ended much differently if the
United States had denied assistance to other anticommun ist regimes. Harry Truman’s speech
succeeded in persuading both sides of the bipartisan Congress in providing assistance to Greece and
Turkey, thus supporting the policy of containment and preventing the spread of communism.
In this context, d uring the Col d War, American foreign policy had taken on many different
forms as the issue dragged on through 1989. Two of those key forms were d etente and containment.
Detente was a less aggressive approach to communism compared to the tactics used by the Truman

16 Amadae, Sonja Michelle. Rationalizing capitalist democracy: The cold war origins of rational choice liberalism .
University of Chicago Press, 2003. P 85

8
admin istration, and proved to be far more successful.17 Several ideas stand out the most when
considering the foreign policy of the country during this tumultuous time. The first regards U.S.
leaders who believed that constant bombardment would eventually break communist regimes that
were uprising in third world countries. The second idea, after the adoption of d etente, was to maintain
the status quo of power between first world nations, including Russia. The final idea expressed by
foreign policy advisors during the end of this era was disarmament of intermediate nuclear warheads
which would soon lead to the erosion of the Soviet Union.18
Although d etente was a strategy with much less assertive policies, compared to those
instituted by John F. Kennedy and Lindon B. Johnson whose, strategies ultimately led to a long
drawn out war in Vietnam, it still had many critics who questioned the effectiveness of the policy.
Critics often point out that d etente required the recognition of the Soviet Union as a super po wer,
something many politicians refused to do. D etente was supposed to establish a stable relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union, which to some extent it did, but it did not end the
Cold War. However, d etente was not a complete failure .
The policy put forth aided in taking those first steps towards cooperation with the Soviet
Union, it just wasn’t fully accomplished. The signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 was one the
most shining achievement of this policy, which recognized the leg itimacy of Easter European
communist governments. The Helsinki Accords was vital in creating balance between communist
and capitalist powers that realist Henry Kissinger had been pushing towards.19 Another achievement
by detente was the signing of the Strat egic Arms Limitations Treaties, or SALT, for short.20
Before d etente the United States enforced the very different policy of containment. The
purpose of containment was to prevent the spread of communism into third world countries, in
replacement for democr acy. In order to prevent this spread, military action was often necessary and ,
in many cases , resulted in humiliation and failure, particularly during the Bay of Pigs, the Korean
War, and Vietnam. Before the Korean War, containment often was enforced throu gh the support of

17 However, detente was not a perfect policy, and most certainly had its flaws, but detente was the first attempt since
WW II to try and negotiate with the Soviet Union.
18 Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of American national securit y policy during
the Cold War . Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp 380 -383
19 https://www.history.com/this -day-in-history/helsinki -final-act-signed
20 https://www.britannica.com/event/Strategic -Arms -Limitation -Talks

9
leaders in third world countries, the United States government would support anyone as long as they
were not a communist regime.21
In places like Guatemala, dictatorships were supported in order to protect their interests
overseas, in this case the United Fruit Company. In order to do this the U.S. tasked the C.I.A. with
sponsoring a coup against Jacobo Arbenz in 1953, even though he was elected into his office by
democratic means. This was not the only case in which the U.S. supported dict atorships rather than
democratically supported leaders, they did so in both Iran, Cuba and Indochina. This form of
containment was only successful in the short term, as time went on the actions taken in these
countries destabilized and were the start to pr oblems which are still evident to this day.22
At the end of the Korean War, containment had officially taken on a militarized form.
Containment in this form suggested that as long as the United States assumed first strike capacity ,
they would maintain the a dvantage over the Soviet Union and communism. Leaders of the United
States were naïve in believing that simply because a nation was far less advanced then themselves,
it would be a simple task in destroying communism and establishing democracy. The U.S. di d not
take into consideration the culture nor political history of these nations and a perfect example of this
is Vietnam.
There were also many other strategic concepts used during the Cold War. The Cold War
pitted superpower against superpower, as the Uni ted States and the Soviet Union committed to the
longest arms race in history. The conflict spanned over forty years, despite no direct battles between
the two parties. Through proxy wars and nuclear weapon development, the two nations polarized the
rest o f the world, and most began to side one way or the other. Though the Cold War did not
culminate in one final brawl to end all brawls, its ending was a long time coming. Three distinct
movements in history all influenced one another, and effectively led to the end of the cold war; those
being the power of Cold War alliances, the rise of consumeristic capitalism, and the collapse of the
Soviet Union.23
Both superpowers sought to wield global power and influence by manipulating smaller
nations. They did this in many ways: through diplomacy, treaties and alliances , by providing aid

21 Garthoff, Raymond L. A journey through the Cold War: A memoir of containment and coexistence . Brookings
Institution Press, 2004.p 175
22 Garthoff, Raymond L. A journey through the Cold War: A memoir of containment and coexistence . Brookings
Institution Press, 2004. p 141
23 Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Laia Balcells. "International system and technologies of rebellion: How the end o f the
Cold War shaped internal conflict." American Political Science Review , 2010 . p 415-429.

10
or trade deals , by supporting friendly political groups or leaders , and by supplying arms, military
equipment and training. The US and USSR also exerted pressure on “unfriendl y” foreign
governments. In extreme cases, American and Soviet agents worked to change or overthrow these
governments. In Europe, the Soviets installed socialist regimes loyal to Moscow, while elsewhere
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) orchestrated or su pported coups that displaced socialist or
left-leaning government s (such as Augusto Pinochet’s removal of Salvador Allende in Chile in
September 1973 ). These interventions often brought about disruption, conflict and significant
human suffering. During the Cold War, several democratically -elected leaders were replaced with
puppet governments, military juntas or dictators who were authoritarian, violent and corrupt.
As an example, o ne of the most infamous Cold War coup d’etats occurred in the South
American nation of Chile. Neutral during World War II, Chile’s government later aligned with the
United States, signing treaties for financial ai d and military assistance. This alliance was threatened
by the rise of Salvador Allende , a moderate socialist who had served as a minister in previous
governments. Allende stood several times for the Chilean presidency, coming close to victory in
1958. This rang alarm bells in Washington, leading to a CIA -funded propaganda campaign to
undermine and discredit Allende. When Allende was elected, CIA agents began bribing Chilean
politicians and agitating for a military coup . He also opened diplomatic relations with communist
nations, including Cuba, Chin a and North Korea. Most concerning to Washington was Allende’s
plan to nationalise Chilean industries, including several American -owned copper mines. US
president Richard Nixon ordered his adv isors to lead to economic boycotts and the suspension of
foreign aid. In 1973 Chilean military officers, backed by the CIA, overthrew Allende.24
Furthermore, in the context of proxy wars, n uclear deterrence has been also a central
element of American security policy since the Cold War began. The deterrence concept is straight –
forward: persuade a potential adversary that the risks and costs of his proposed action far outweigh
any gains that he might hope to achieve. To mak e deterrence credible, the United States built up
powerful strategic, theater and tactical nuclear forces that could threaten any potential aggressor
with the catastrophic risks and costs of a nuclear retaliatory strike against his homeland.
During the Co ld War, the primary focus of this deterrent was the Soviet Union. The Soviets
built their own nuclear force targeting the United States, producing a situation of mutual

24 https://alphahistory.com/coldwar/coups -proxy -wars/

11
deterrence, often referred to as “mutual assured destruction” or MAD.25 Many argue that MAD
worked and kept the United States and Soviet Union from an all -out war , despite the intense
political, economic and ideological competition between the two , as the horrific prospect of
nuclear conflict gave both strong incentives to avoid conflict. Oth ers note that it was too often a
close thing: crises, such as those over Cuba and Berlin, brought the two countries perilously close
to nuclear war.
On the other hand, regarding USSR, I think it is important to mention some key -strategies;
based on which R ussia build their national image in Cold War period. We could name five major
periods: the full mechanization, the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the nuclear euphoria, the
“descent to earth” and intercontinental ballistic missiles and last but not least, the strategic balance.
In the end, this was a long period of rough parity in strategic systems with the United States,
rapid growth in the size of the strategic forces, and strong technological competition. Soviet
doctrine underwent three major changes during this period (the strategic balance) . From 1975 -80,
limited nuclear war was officially rejected, however, it was considered possible for the war to
remain conventional from beginning to end. From 1980 -85, limited nuclear was accepted and
presented in planning documents presented to the political leadership. Different options were
presented for the limited use of nuclear weapons: only on the battlefield, only against military
targets, limited strategic strikes, and proportional retaliation to l imited strikes (either with
escalation or de-escalation ). Finally, from 1985 -91, there was the adoption of defensive doctrine
and realization that a nuclear war cannot be won.26 Preemptive strike was ruled out, and only the
retaliatory strike remained. If w ar must be fought, the new foundations of doctrine became
deterrence, war prevention, and limited war.

25 http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/coldwar/page15.shtml
26 Hopf, Ted. "Polarity, the offense -defense balance, and war." American Political Science Review 85.2 (1991): 475 –
493

12
Bibliography
• Amadae, Sonja Michelle. Rationalizing capitalist democracy: The cold war origins of rational
choice liberalism . University of Chicago Press, 2003
• Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of American national
security policy during the Cold War . Oxford University Press, 2005
• Garthoff, Raymond L. A journey through the Cold War: A memoir of containment and
coexistence . Brookings Institution Press, 2004
• Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Laia Balcells. "International system and technologies of rebellion:
How the end of the Cold War shaped internal conflict." American Political Science Review ,
2010

13
Richard Nixon and Kissinger as a team for s trategic think ing regarding American
Foreign Policy ; case of Vietnam: from decision to effects
Prior to Richard Nixon’s inauguration in January of 1969 there were a plethora of issues on
the table, but in foreign policy the most pressing issue was the American involvement in Vietnam.
In an attempt to predict the main goals, current realities of the war and possible options for a “victory”
in Vietnam a committee was commissioned, named RAND, to layout those predictions. At the head
of this RAND committee was Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s national security advisor and
later Secretary of State.27
Dr. Kissinger led this study to predetermine Nixon’s foreign policy plan towards Vietnam,
and at the heart o f this committee were a series of studies that broke down Vietnam War policies of
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. This corporation represented a stronghold for Nixon with
his anticipated struggles, and major problems in foreign policy. The number one problem was clearly
American involvement in Vietnam. This also allowed President Nixon to get a jumpstart creating
solutions to these struggles when he would actually take office.
Defining the word “victory” for the Unites States in Vietnam was one of the major struggles
and stresses of Nixon in 1969 and something that would stay with him throughout his presidency.
With this came to what was attainable for the United States to accomplish “victory”, which was the
major objective of the RAND committee. W hat was found for attainable victories ranged from the
Government of Vietnam (GVN) having independent control of the South, to mere territorial
accommodations in the South for the GNV. Though all of this the RAND study was an attempt to
have an idea how to seek control politically, militarily and territorially to the South Vietnamese under
their President Theiu in 1969. On the outset of this committee was that President Nixon would have
a preliminary plan in place to end American involvement in this war thr ough forceful military actions
leading to peace negotiations in Paris .
As Richard Nixon’s state in his memoirs there had been previous peace negotiations in Paris
prior to April 1970 between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. At the present time of May 1970 the
negotiations had reached a staggering halt and no progress was being made for a peace settlement.
So the inevitable had to happen and a very tough choice had to be made by Richard Nixon and his

27 Chapte r nine The Pentagon Papers
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/cp564rc.18?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents

14
team to go to military actions against the communist. The first of these major forceful military actions
was an invasion of Cambodia by a combined force of the American military and the Army of
Southern Vietnam (ARVN).
The reason Nixon decided on a neutral country like Cambodia was not to widen the war , but
because a major problem that the Unites States struggled with throughout the Vietnam conflict was
the infiltration of communist support of the Viet Cong in the South. The invasion, at its entirety, was
a devastating on many different levels. In order to de stroy the communist infiltration into South
Vietnam, Richard Nixon believed that the full out invasion of specific parts of Cambodia would stop
this and destroy any communist nerve centers in Cambodia, and thus was a necessary invasion.
On the onset of the invasion President Nixon saw positive opportunities on two levels: one,
to help a pro -American Prime Minister Lon Nol and two invading the NLF (National Liberation
Front) in Cambodia would destroy and halt any communist nerve centers and communist infiltr ation
in the South. Thus , victory could be accomplished in two ways: one, the invasion would help an
American ally, Lon Nol with communist infiltration in Cambodia and setting down the Khmer
Rouge, and secondly it would stop the communist influence in Sout h Vietnam.
Communist insurgence into the south had been successful due to the development of the Ho
Chi Minh Trail earlier in the war. By destroying this “nerve center” for the communist in South
Vietnam would cut off all of their connections with the Vie t Cong in the south. Also, the section of
the Ho Chi Minh Trail that traveled through Cambodia would be destroyed in this invasion. All of
these opportunities for success resulted in Nixon’s final decision to invade Cambodia in May 1970.
The actual invasio n was one of the largest military efforts up to this period of the war since
Operation Rolling Thunder of the Johnson administration in 1965. A ground attack involved 18,000
total troops , 12,000 of which were American, and the other were ARVN. The two forc es combined
struck along the Cambodian border that stretched over 100 miles, but the invasion was split into two
specific areas on the border.
American forces stuck along what was called the “Fishhook”, and the ARVN forces
concentrated mostly on the “Parro ts Beak” of Cambodia. The “Fishhook” area that the Americans
attacked was fifty -five miles from the capital of Saigon, while the ARVN attack was thirty -five miles
from Saigon. Attacking at such a close distance from the capital was a strategic move by the military
because the communist insurgence was coming into South Vietnam and supporting the Viet Cong
communist mainly though these two areas close to Saigon. Along with the 18,000 ground troops

15
there was also a great deal of air support that resulted in a push of the attack over thirty miles into
Cambodia.
This invasion was particularly important in order to carry out Nixon’s a forceful
demonstration to Hanoi; showing them that the America would uses forceful military action to end
communist insurgence i nto the south. Combining the American forces along with the ARVN was a
demonstration that implementation of Vietnamization was in effect . The thinking process for the
invasion was that in order to restore peace in Vietnam it was necessary to invade Cambodi a in order
to fulfill the ultimate goal. Although this was very unpopular within the American public Nixon still
believed that at this point in American involvement force was the only option left in creating peace.
When this attack concluded in June 1970 President Nixon was slightly disappointed in what
was found in Cambodia. This attack resulted in 2,000 Viet Cong casualties, which was a success for
the Americans and ARVN. But what he and his administration assumed about the COSVN was
slightly overblown. In reality , what Nixon thought was a central nerve center to communist influence
in South Vietnam was actually a series of shacks, used command posts with a plethora of ammunition
and supplies in each. But even though what was found was not as large of a n erve center as previously
thought, these posts were still communist command centers providing the southern communist with
ammunition and supplies. Thus , this part of Cambodia was still responsible for communist influence
in the south.
Therefore, what Amer icans thought was and a prolonging and widening of the war by Nixon ,
was actually a success for the Nixon administration in four different ways. Firstly, the American and
ARVN troops successfully invaded and destroyed a part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail as wel l as
destroying command posts, and thus cut off communist insurgence in the south for the time being.
Secondly, President Nixon sent a forceful message to the DRV in the north by using military force
with the ARVN to send a message that they will do anythi ng to stop communist in the south. Thirdly,
with the help from the ARVN this was a positive step towards Vietnamization for Nixon. And lastly,
this forced the North Vietnamese back into secret negotiations in a serious manner between Henry
Kissinger and Le Duc Tho in Paris .
There were many positive as well as negative impacts of invading Cambodia both affecting
the communist in North Vietnam as well as on the home front in America. The major impacts of the
invasion of Cambodia ranged from getting the commun ist to negotiate peace more seriously to
having an impact on the anti -war protest for the American public. Up to this point , the anti -war

16
movement in America was increasingly getting more and more intense from just picket sign to full
out riots and violenc e. These protests were responses to what was thought to be Nixon widening the
war into neutral countries.
The decision that President Nixon made in May 1970 to invade Cambodia resulted in some
of the biggest anti -war protests of the war. The most evident and impactful protest was at Kent State
University where the National Guard had to be sent in to handle the situation as it escalated. What
resulted was four students shot and killed as well as nine wounded in the riot. The result of this
incident was a cl ear representation that the Cambodian invasion was not a popular event of the war
to the public, but it was truly affecting American citizens in America. In reaction to this situation
President Nixon held a press conference in the oval office assuring Amer icans that the invasion of
Cambodia was a necessary action to insure the peace and security of South Vietnam from the
communist of the North ; as well as showing the American people that America will not give up a
single mile of territory to any such commun ist regime.
What the Cambodian Invasion re -ignited, and made more serious, was the continuation of
peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam. The peace talks were known as the “Paris
Peace Talks”, and the two major diplomats were American na tional security advisor Henry Kissinger
and the North Vietnam negotiating representative Le Duc Tho. There had been prior peace
negotiations in previous years during the Johnson era as well as the beginning of the Nixon era but
never could really agree on a strong settlement that benefited the two countries as they wanted.
Therefore , President Nixon decided to make the crucial decision to invade Cambodia in order
to fulfill his promise when he came into office, to create “peace with honor” in Southeast Asia .
Peace in Vietnam in 1972 was Richard Nixon’s primary goal under a larger context of the Cold War
between the United States and communist nations. The Cold War was always on President Nixon’s
agenda and in a sense, he was fighting the war in Vietnam under the context of the Cold War. But
this never really proved to be a major issue in Nixon’s actions in the Vietnam War.
This was true up until March 1972 when the communist went on an offensive similar to the
Tet Offe nsive known as the Easter Offensive. This was the first time that President Nixon really took
into account the implications of a Cold War policy to a military action in Vietnam. As it was in
March of 1972 Nixon had made significant strides in the right dir ection to end the Cold War, and
the Easter Offensive provided an obstacle for this to be accomplished. He would have to then make

17
a critical decision in how he was to respond to such an offensive by the North Vietnamese as well as
continue these positive m ovements towards ending the Cold War.
Up to the this point in the war the North Vietnamese always had the backing of two
communist countries, the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union (USSR). While President
Richard Nixon traveled to China and pl anned to travel to the USSR to discuss a limitation of nuclear
arms between communist nations and the United States, the North Vietnamese made a major
offensive across the demilitarized zone known as the Easter Offensive. This threw a wrench into
Nixon’s t hinking across the board for relations with China and the USSR as well as protecting a
communist takeover of Vietnam, and how he was going to react to this offensive would prove to be
crucial in his foreign policy.
Richard Nixon was most concerned that a major response would devastate his prior
negotiations with China and upcoming negotiations with the USSR as well as continuing peace talks
with North Vietnam. His reaction to this was one of the biggest and most debated issues far in his
presidency up to M arch 1972 between himself and many of his key advisors and Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Nixon had two options in this case, one would be not to react and have a legitimate reason to
pull America out of Vietnam. This would be a positive in the case of the America n public and thus
ending American involvement which was not popular to this point and getting less popular as the
war progressed. But there also were negatives to this plan; this could show the USSR and China that
they are in a sense weak. His second optio n would be to react with major air and naval power in the
port of Haiphong with very little ground forces. As his first option had negatives and positives , this
option also proved that way. Nixon thought that this could possibly upset his upcoming negotiat ions
with the USSR by destroying ships they had in the port.
In the end, the ultimate fact that fueled President Nixon’s final decision to send major air and
naval forces into the Haiphong Harbor was that he had to do anything in his power to prevent a
collapse of South Vietnam to communist. This would prove to be President Nixon’s motive to
respond to this attack with enormous military force onto the Haiphong Harbor in North Vietnam .

18
Bibliography:
➢ Nixon, Richard M. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978.
➢ Anderson, David L. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York: Columbia UP,
2002.
➢ Kimball, Jeffrey P. The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon -era
Strategy. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2004.
➢ Lawrence, Mark Atwood. The Vietnam War: A Concise International History. Oxford
Univ., 2010.
➢ Edmonds, Anthony O. The War in Vietnam. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1998.
➢ Pratt, John Clark. Vietnam Voices: Perspectives on the War Years, 1941 -1982. New
York, NY: Penguin, 1984.

19
The personality of an American senator – Lyndon Johnson, the “man” in
“statesman” (senator period)
Johnson was much loved and greatly hated , not just liked and disliked but adored by some
and despised by others. Some people remember him as kind, generous, compassionate,
considerate, decent, and devoted to advancing the well -being of the least advantaged among us.
Others describe him as cruel, dictatorial, grandiose, and even vicious.
The journalists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak have given us an indelible picture of
Johnson applying “The Treatment ” to people who needed persuading. It was,
supplication, accusation, cajolery, exuberance, scorn, tears, complaint, the hint of threat.
It was all these together. It ran the gamut of human emotions. Its velocity was breathtaking, and it
was all in one direction. Interjections from the target were rare. Johnson anticipated them before
they could be spok en. He moved in close, his face a scant millimeter from his target, his eyes
widening and narrowing, his eyebrows rising and falling. From his pockets poured clippings,
memos, statistics. Mimicry, humor, and the genius of analogy made The Treatment an almo st
hypnotic experience and rendered the target stunned and helpless….28
From early in his childhood he manifested character traits that shaped his behavior
throughout his life. As a boy and a man, he suffered from a sense of emptiness: he couldn't stand
to be alone; he needed constant companionship, attention, affection, and approval. He had
insatiable appetites: for work, food, drink, conversation, and material possessions. They were all
in the service of filling himself up , of giving himself a sort of va lidity or sense of self -worth.
Johnson's neediness translated into a number of traits that ha d a large impact on his political
actions. He had a compulsion to be the best, to outdo everybody, to eclipse all his predecessors in
the White House and become th e greatest president in American history. As journalist Nicholas
Lemann says, Johnson wanted to set world records in politics, as a star athlete would in sports.
“Get those coonskins up on the wall ”, he would tell people around him.29

28 Connect the Dots – https://www.economist.com/node/21590358/comments
29 Title: Johnson's first troubled war: https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/politi cs/poverty/lemunf1.htm

20
As a senator, he had to be “top dog ”, and drove himself to become Majority Leader. He
turned a post with limited influence into the most powerful position in the Senate, from which he
directed the passage of significant laws affecting labor, the elderly, h ousing, civil rights, defense,
and space exploration. As Majority Leader, he was thrilled to be the first legislator in Washington
with a car phone. When Everett Dirksen , Republican Minority Leader and a friendly rival, also
acquired one, he telephoned Johnson's limo to say that he was calling from his new car phone.
“Can you hold on a minute ?” Johnson asked. “My other phone is ringing. ”30
After Johnson won electio n to the vice presidency in 1960, he “looked as if he'd lost his
last friend on earth . I don't think I ever saw a more unhappy man, ”31 one of his secretaries
recall ed. He found it hard to explain how John Kennedy, a more junior and less accomplished
senator, could have bested him for the presidential nomination. He expressed his distress and
rivalry with JFK during a telephone call on the evening of the election. “I see you are losing Ohio ”,
he told Kennedy.
He was a reluctant Vice President. He had hoped and planned for the presidency, but fate
or the limitations of his time, place and personality has cast him in the second spot. And he despised
it. The same neediness that made Johnson so eager for personal grandeur contributed to his desire
to help the least advantaged. Throughout his life he identified with poor folks who has neither the
material possessions nor the social regard held by and accorded to the most affl uent members of
society.
He remembered his first teaching job at Cotulla, Texas, in an elementary school with
Mexican -American students as an awakening of his desire to help “those poor little kids. I saw
hunger in their eyes and pain in their bodies. Tho se little brown bodies had so little and needed so
much. I was determined to spark something inside them, to fill their souls with ambition and
interest and belief in the future. ”32 Both in Cotulla and later, there was an almost desperate urgency

30 Purdum, Todd S. An idea whose time has come: two presidents, two parties, and the battle for the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 . Henry Holt and Company, 2014. p 269
31 Dallek, Robert. Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908 -60. Oxf. UP (NY), 1994.p 589
32 Lerner, Mitchell B., ed. A companion to Lyndon B. Johnson . Vol. 87. John Wiley & Sons, 2012.

21
to Johnson 's desire to give sustenance to the poor, as if he were filling himself with the attention
and affection he so badly craved .
On the other hand, t he Vietnam war brought out the worst in Johnson. His failure to deal
effectively with the conflict partly rested on his character flaws: his grandiosity that could
overcome every obstacle and his impulse to view criticism of his policies as personal attacks which
he would overcome by increasing his efforts to make his policies succeed. Johnson fought in
Vietnam for many reasons. He genuinely believed it essential to hold the line in Vietnam against
Communist advance. Otherwise, the United States would face the loss of all of Southeast Asia to
a hostile ideology.
He also believed that a failure to stop the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in South
Vietnam would embolden Moscow and Peking and raise the likelihood of another larger, possibly
nuclear war. Johnson saw liberal oppo nents of his Vietnam policies as disloyal to him and the
country. Vietnam was a war he believed in; it was nothing he wanted to do, but he felt he had no
choice, it was vital to the country's well -being.
The only satisfactory explanation he saw for the dis sent was Communist influence. He
believed that the driving force behind the marches, rallies, draft -card burnings, and written and
oral expressions of oppositio n by intellectuals and prominent public officials like Senators George
Aiken , J. William Fulbright , Eugene McCarthy , George McGovern , and Wayne Morse33 were the
Communists . In 1965 -66 the war became a personal c rusade for Johnson.
In the end, it was his war, being fought by his “boys ”, with his helicopters and his planes
and guns. Withdrawal and defeat became unthinkable. In 1967, when Leonard Marks, Johnson 's
director of the United States Information Agency and a close friend whom Johnson had always
treated with consideration and respec t, privately suggested that the President follow Senator
Aiken's advice in Vietnam (declare victory and leave ) Johnson glared at him until Marks asked:
“What do you think? ”; Johnson shouted at him: “Get out. ” As increasing numbers of Americans

33 https://www.pbs.org/newshour/spc/character/glossaries/johnson.html#PROTESTS

22
died in the fighting and Johnson couldn't appear in public without risk of protests, he became
emotionally distraught.
Bibliography:
➢ Wilson, Robert A., ed. Character above all: Ten presidents from FDR to george bush .
Simon & Schuster, 1995.
➢ Lerner, Mitchell B., ed. A companion to Lyndon B. Johnson . Vol. 87. John Wiley & Sons,
2012.
➢ Purdum, Todd S. An idea whose time has come: two presidents, two parties, and the battle
for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . Henry Holt and Company, 2014.

23
American foreign policy in different regions – present some examples: Middle
East, Asia Pacific, Africa
It was the Americans have called the Berber areas of the Mediterranean Sea the "Middle
East" for the first time. And it if this region that became bound the United States – from its
revolutionary origins to their strange relationship based on fascination, confrontations and complex
collaboration.
When at the end of 1914, British soldiers were protecting Iraqi oil supplies fr om Persia, the
United States of American had little interest in the Middle Eastern resources or any imperial designs
in the region. They were focused on Latin American, the Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific. That
changed in 1928 and again in 1944 when t he Americans signed the Red Line Agreement and the
Anglo -American Petroleum Agreement. And after World War II , the US minor involvement was
strengthening its roots, starting with Truman solidifying the US presence in Iran and taking the lead
away from the Soviet Union. Finally , the US understood what is really important in the Persian Gulf
region: oil. But this realization not only pushed toward a pursuit for power and influence but it also
led to many conflicts and unanswered questions in the Middle East. Oil gave and gives immense
wealth, but is has often proved to be a curse to the country that possesses it.
This essay will try to elucidate and analyze if in fact it is accurate to assume that American
foreign policy became shaped by its dependence on imp orted oil and thus not by the idea of spreading
democratic ideology in the Middle East region. This essay will look into causes and assumptions of
why the Iraq invasion by the US took place. It will also examine America’s shifting relationship with
Saudi A rabia and growing connection with Israel that damaged the relations with Iran.
• The Iraq War: simple thirst for oil?
On March 20th, 2003, sixteen years ago, American planes and ground units attacked Iraq in
“Operation Iraqi Freedom ”. Fast forward since that landmark event and it is safe to say that this
operation was a strategic failure of Washington and a huge blow to its policy of democratization in
the Middle East. According to the declarations of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld the
key offi cial objectives of the invasion of Iraq were: military (finding and eliminating weapons of
mass destruction and terrorist databases; gaining valuable information on the relationship of
international terrorist organizations ), humanitarian , liquidation of t he regime of Saddam Hussein ,

24
assistance in the establishment of democracy in Iraq , and economic (securing the oil fields of Iraq
and other natural resources of the country ).34
Unfortunately , the United States did not achieved any of its objectives set befor e deploying
troops to Iraq, which were supposed to be useful for the regional governance of that area. In pursuing
these aims, the Bush Administration was blamed for negligence, as it ignored warnings of post -war
violence while planning for the Iraq war. T he Bush Doctrine was too dependent on success in Iraq
and on rebuilding the Iraqi oil sector. The post -war instability led to the failure of the Bush Doctrine’s
plans for the region, meaning that the Bush Administration had to return to supporting undemocr atic
regimes in the Middle East.
Moreover, they did not built a stable government. Its democratic nature was illusory. Even
today, Iraq is not (as it was) part of the balancing power of Iran, but rather it produces a vacuum that
the Iranians are managing efficiently. Furthermore, the US did not achieved a peaceful coexistence
between the Shiites and Sunnis. And on the contrary, the religious conflicts took on the nature of a
civil war with hundreds of victims from daily bombings and street battles.
Additi onally, the Kurdish issue was only alleviated, but not solved, despite strong U.S.
support for Kurdish aspirations. And lastly, the objectives in the field of energy security were only
partially achieved. Overall, it would be too simplistic to define the i nvasion as a ‘war for oil’ but
unfortunately it does seem that one of the evident reasons for the US, as a world leading consumer,
producer and importer, to fight the Gulf War in 1990 -91 and Iraq war in 2003 was oil.
• US relationship with Saudi Arabia: fri endship based on money?
In 1940 the United States and Saudi Arabia established their diplomatic relations based on
an enduring security relationship. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers play ed a role in military and
civilian construction activities in Saudi A rabia. This friendship became very important to the United
States over the years because not only does Saudi Arabia have a strategic and significant location in
the Middle East, it also possesses the largest world reserves of oil.
As David Ottaway said, a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and a former
correspondent for the Washington Post, “There have been two constants in U.S. -Saudi relations for
decades: oil and security, particularly the security of the Saudi royal family. Our two societies hav e

34 Bromley, S. (2005). The United States and the control of world oil , Government and Opposition, Vol. 40, pp. 225 –
255

25
had little in common, and yet despite deep differences, we have had a “special relationship ” with the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for over sixty years.” What is not surprising is that this relationship started
in the 1930s when American petroleum companies discovered vast resources of oil.
Nevertheless, it was not only the oil that played a role here . Since security was and is also a
big linking point between the two nations, the US believed that Saudi Arabia would be able to tame
any Iranian actions and uprisings. Moreover, their relationship was even stronger because Saudi
Arabia buys arms from the United States and thus contributing even more than oil to their economy .
Until 1992, both the Americans and Saudis were thrilled about their relations which served
their common interests. The George H.W. Bush administration and Gulf War I in 1990 -91 marked
the apex in the relationship. The Saudis allowed President Bush to send 500,000 soldiers into the
kingdom in order to protect it and liberate Kuwait, because there were doubts whether Saddam was
going to stop at Kuwait, which of course a U.S. -led coalitio n liberated in 1991.
But from 1992, everything started going downhill, with 9/11 being an important trigger in
US foreign policy toward the Middle East and especially Saudi Arabia because some of the attackers
were from that region. It is important to note that although the relations with Saudi Arabia were
driven by the thirst for oil, it seems that after terrorist attacks on World Trade Center the relationship
weakened to a point where it is really hard to amend. And if America was really following a singl e-
minded oil doctrine then it would not allow such a “friendship ” the deteriorate. It can be observed
that oil was and is important to the United States but it would seem that counter terrorism movements
seemed as important at the time of the Bush Administ ration. Nevertheless, the slip of Saudi Arabia
from under the control of the United States was a very strong blow for them.
Regarding the following example, because the history of America and Korea is so vast, I
chose to present a single episode, turning it in the form of this question :
• To what extent did the American foreign policy in southern Korea , before the outbreak of
the Korean War , contribute to North Korea’s decision to invade the South?
To assess the degree of success to which the policy affected the communists’ decision to
invade the South, various U.S. documents, especially the official U.S. government policy documents
on Korea, w ere evaluated for their effectiveness, as well as their role in Korea.
American military force took control o f the southern zone of Korea in 1945, while the Soviets
took over the northern zone, in which the country was divided in half by the 38th June 1950. It will

26
be limited parallel, only to speed up the disarming of the Japanese troops after WWII. South Korea
(Republic of Korea), the only recognized government in the Korean Peninsula by the United Nations,
was promised American foreign economic aid in order to stabilize their economy and stay
independent from foreign powers35. In the National Security Council re port of 2 April 1948, The
Position of the U.S. with Respect to Korea, American government extended the aid, training, and
equipping the Korean armed forces only with an intent to keep its forces “capable of protecting the
security of South Korea against an y but an overt act of aggression by North Korean or other forces”.36
The Truman administration at the time believed that the South Korean President Syngman
Rhee, who was known for constantly threatening the U.S. with “bukgin” slogans, might use the
heavy we apons to unify Korea by force, creating tensions between neighboring nations such as the
USSR. This led American government decision to keep South Korea in check by keeping its military
capability as minimal as possible . 37
The American foreign policies in Korea proved to be considered one of the worst disasters
of U.S. So, although President Truman was a staunch anti -communist at the time, he failed to protect
allied countries that were vulnerable to fall under the influence of communism. Instead, the presi dent
focused tremendously on helping France fight communist insurgency in Indochina by giving military
aid, leaving the South Korean aid package with less money . Without enough money to fund and
sustain its armed forces, the South Korean military was weak, without much weapons and
equipment. Some Korean soldiers were even armed with left over Japanese weapons. Although
South Koreans latitude, with performed outstandingly against communist rebellions, proving South
Korea’s combat capability, America still re fused to give Koreans heavy equipment like tanks and
fighter aircrafts. One of many reasons for this denial was the problem with the South Korean
president Rhee.
The U.S. government believed that his slogan “bukgin” would later result in invasion of
North Korea by force and cause troubles with neighboring states of communist China and Soviet
Union. The denial of heavy weapons most definitely created serious deficiencies of South Korean
combat capabilities on the day of the invasion. The U.S. government als o failed to predict the
intentions of the North Koreans even though the CIA accurately estimated the force of the North

35 Leckie, Robert. Conflict: The History of the Korean War . New York, 1990. p 14
36 Tucker, Spencer C. Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History . Santa Barbara, 2000.
p 808
37 Leckie, Robert. Conflict: The History of the Korean War . New York, 1990. p 36

27
Koreans on its 19 June 1950 report. The decision to essentially abandon Korea was the biggest
strategic mistake the U.S. made for South Korea. American administration clearly had faith in South
Korea’s combat capabilities, even though they lacked support and firepower.
The U.S. strategic commanders’ lack of interest in Korea left South Korea defenseless
against the North Koreans, as they f ailed to understand the strategic importance of the Korean
Peninsula. When Acheson announced that U.S. defense lines didn’t include Korea anymore and the
American troops completely withdrew from South Korea in 1949, despite the South Koreans’ refusal
for U .S. troops to not leave South Korea, certainly assured the North Koreans that it was safe to
invade the South. This made it look like to North Koreans that U.S. had no wish to support its Korean
ally and abandoned them to their own fate. Historian Allan Mi llett supports this view of failed U.S.
policies, such as Acheson’s speech as the leading cause of the Korean War, while historian Robert
Leckie argues that it was the North Korean’s communist agendas to force unification of the country
by superior militar y might.
So, the U.S. administration’s lack of interests in South Korea resulted in unstable and weak
Korean armed forces. Although the U.S. initially had good intentions to support their Korean ally in
the South, the lack of proper government funding/aid made the South Korean military ill -equipped
and poorly trained, making it vulnerable to enemy invasion. While it is true that South Koreans
proved capable of defending its own borders against communist insurgents, the U.S. intelligence
failed t o predict the coming North Korean invasion, although they accurately predicted North
Korea’s far superior military strength. Without a doubt, the U.S. foreign policy on South Korea had
the most significant impact on the North Korea’s decision to invade.
Regarding the third example, i n an article warning about a looming clash of civilizations,
Huntington said “and possibly Africa” . As Huntington illustrated, the United States never
historically regarded Africa as serious or significant. Thus, it never set Af rica as a priority of its
strategy or of its foreign policy, which hindered its actions and achievements on the continent.
Consequently, the US military never had a strong footprint, and never did actually well there.
Until the late 60s, internal racial te nsions in the United States itself simply prevented policy makers
from considering a change of priority with respect to Africa. After the 60s, the government had just
too full an agenda with the Cold War, the Vietnam War, the two oil shocks and then the co llapse of
the USSR. Nonetheless, finally acknowledging Africa’s potential and taking advantage of a
relatively quiet and favorable period, the United States chose to change its approach and

28
consequently created Africom in 2007. Interestingly enough, not to say awkwardly, it based this
Geographical Combatant Command in Europe. Even though it is already effective, Africom could
do much better given some minor adjustments.
Understanding the tenets of American exceptionalism and the importance and challenges of
cross -cultural communication should lead the US military to reconsider its basing in Africa, which
will increase its military effectiveness on the continent in the short term.
When operating abroad, especially when doing nation building, American forces a re so
tempted to promote American institutions and values that they actually do so or, at least, try to do
so, by projecting their own reality on that of foreign grounds and populations. Naturally influenced
by their commendable patriotism, troops are also subject to trends of thoughts conveyed in the
military and in the US population as a whole. Indeed, as pretentious as this may be, galvanized and
compelled by the concept of American exceptionalism, a too large fringe of the US population argues
that the United States, as a nation, is divinely chosen. But, such views totally misunderstand the
legitimate sociological foundation of the original concept, and thus forget its essential idea. The
conditions which led to the building of the United States are unli kely to repeat again. It is therefore
illusory to consider reproducing political institutions mirroring those of the United States elsewhere,
especially in Africa today.
Furthermore, in Africa, regime change can occur without notice. Historically, it has o ften
been through bloody ethnic conflicts. By disregarding this reality, isolating its troops and betting
only on ruling elites and/or on ethnic groups in power, the US military somehow precludes the
success of its future actions.
Moreover, by living isola ted in their camps with few or no contacts with native populations,
the US military neither develops proper cultural awareness nor cross -cultural communication skills,
which are yet crucial when operating in irregular warfare scenarios. This hinders US mil itary
effectiveness in Africa. Recent successes and achievements of African, European, and even Chinese
alternatives, closer to, more compatible with or more aware of indigenous cultural frameworks,
reinforce the setbacks experienced by the US forces in mi litary operations in Africa.
Cultural awareness does not ensure success; it increases the probability of success. It also
decreases the probability of doing something unforgivable that would preclude any further
cooperation or collaboration. Cultural knowl edge does not entail cultural competence. Likewise,
communication knowledge does not mean communication skills, and vice versa.

29
In other words, practice is preferable to theory in order to acquire intercultural competence.
Hence the Department of Defense s hould prefer cultural immersion to academic teaching when it
comes to fostering cross -cultural skills among its personnel. A simple way to do so is to allow and
encourage military personnel assigned in Africa to move in with their families; at least in “sa fe
places”.
A common trend across Africa is the importance of family. In this typical high cultural
context, children, especially young children are loved, almost venerated . While living among locals,
military personnel and their family will certainly consume and spend money in their community.
They might also hire some people for gardening, housekeeping or other minor domestic tasks. Doing
so, they will inject money into the local economy, which positively impacts indigenous populations.
Indeed, unlike foreign subsides moving from government to government or from multinational
organizations to governments, which never benefit to poor people, local economy directly reaches
the needy. As a result, local exchange emphasizes the sympathy towards f amilies, and consequently
towards the US.
Such practices are in no way incompatible with direct strong relations with local
governments at the strategic level. Interacting at both levels provides the US with more options and
lessens vulnerabilities to unex pected regime changes.
Finally, having families “in town”, the US military could also allow personnel on temporary
duty to exit the base for entertainment or commodities. Having Americans unarmed in town will
foster a positive atmosphere. Africans will become used to a more human US military presence on
their soil. Reciprocally, and more importantly, Department of Defense personnel will learn how to
interact with other cultures, which might be of use in future operations in Africa or elsewhere in the
world. This will attract sympathy and therefore legitimacy to US forces. In addition to cultural
awareness, this will increase Africom’s military effectiveness on the continent in the short term.

30
Bibliography :
• Bromley, S. The United States and the contro l of world oil , Government and Opposition, Vol.
40, 2005. Available on: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1477 –
7053.2005.00151.x/full ;
• Brzezinski, Z. The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership , USA , 2009 ;
• Chomsky, N. ‘US Foreign Policy in the Middle East’ . Text of lecture delivered at the UNESCO
Palace, Beiru t, Lebanon, May 25 , 2010 Available on:
http://www.chomsky.info/talks/20100525.htm ;
• Hollis, R. (2004) ‘The U.S. role: helpful or harmful?’ in Potter, L. G. Sick G. (eds). Iran, Iraq and
the Legacies of War. London: Palgrave Macmillan;
• Mahdi, A. S. S. US foreign policy and energy resources during the George W. Bush
administration . 2010. Available on: http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/748/ ;
• National Intelligence C ouncil . Mapping the Global Future . Washington, DC, 2004 p. 116;
• Sébe, C. and Le Bras, W . Indomptable Iraq . Paris: Le Sémaphore, 1999, p. 111 ;
• SPIEGEL Interview with Madeleine Albright. Available on:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview -with-former -us-secretary -of-state-
madeleine -albright -a-865308.html ;
• Transcript of Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Dona ld H. Rumsfeld before the House
Armed Services Committee regarding Iraq. Available on:
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/useur/rumsfeld180902.html
• Tristam, P. The U.S. and the Middle East Since 1945: A Guide to Mideast Policy from Harry
Truman to George W. Bush . 2014. Available on:
http://middleeast.about.com/od/usmideastpolicy/a/me070909b.htm ;
• Watkins, E. The Unfolding US Policy in the Middle Eas t, International Affairs, 1997. p. 1-14.
• Cumings, Bruce. The Korean War: A History. Modern Librar y Chronicles, 2010.
• Leckie, Robert. Conflict: The History of the Korean War . New York, NY: Da Capo, 1990.
• Millett, Allan R. The War For Korea, 1945 -1950: A House Burning . University Press of Kansas,
2005.
• Tucker, Spencer C. Encyclopedia of the Korean War : A Political, Social, and Military History.
Santa Barbara, CA: ABC -CLIO, 2000
• Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2 , 1993, p.25
• James. W. Ceaser, The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism , American Political
Thought 1, no. 1 (2012), p.4 -10

31
Present an American intelligence agency / organization – Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI)

There’s more th an CIA and FBI.
To understand the depths of this position, we must first understand what the Intelligence
Community is and who is in it. With so many different organizations running around in the
intelligence field, there needed to be someone who could reel in the reigns over this vas t array of
different sources.
According to the Office of Director of National Intelligence, the number of agencies in the
intelligence community is seventeen total organizations, including such organizations as the Federal
Bureau of Investigations, the Cen tral Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Department of Homeland Security and obviously the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(Members of the Intelligence Community). These are just a handful of agencies/ organizations th at
make the whole of the intelligence community. 38
Just the sheer number of people, operations, and intelligence within these 5 organizations
alone is enormous. He hasn’t only watched over these different intelligence agencies, but as well as
any military intelligence agencies, such as the Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, the Marine
Intelligence, and other agencies like these. The position of the Director of National Intelligence was
not just a position of great responsibility, but of great power that wielded a tremendous amount of
resources at his or her disposal. With just this, the DNI has an incredible amount of power at his
ease. Because of this, the DNI also has organizations that oversee the DNI to keep the reigns on this
new agency. The DNI is held with such a high standard. Because of this, they are held accountable
by the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board, Office of Management and Budget, President’s
Intelligence Advisory Board, both Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, and other committees, according to the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence . The President obviously has power in this too.39

38 https://www.slideshare.net/roycekitts/office -of-the-director -of-national -intelligence
39 Ibidem

32
The Office of Director of National Intelligence serves “to effectively integrate foreign,
military and domestic intelligence in defense of the homeland and of United States interests
abroad ”.40 He is a personal advisor to the President for all these different agencies and departments
in the Intelligence Community. He makes sure that these agencies are behaving and acting
efficiently. In essence , whoever takes this position must be the “parent ” of all these different agencies
and departments. Very few people could be able to handle this position. As a matter of fact, this
position was such a huge load of responsibilities that an ambassador asked the first soon -to-be
Director of National Intelligence whether he should “congratulate you or offer condolences on your
nomination ” (Eisenberg, 2005). This weighty position ha d the pressure of not only being able to
handle all of the organizations within the Intelligence Community, but also be able to prevent any
type of incident similar to 9/11.
Both the CIA and the FBI had Intel prior to 9/11, but because the FBI and the CIA wanted
the recognition, nobody talked with each other. The final straw that opened the eyes of everybody
was the debacle of the Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq due to false information.41 This became
apparent when the caller who called this tip in actua lly fibbed about the whole thing but wanted to
manipulate the United States into doing exactly what happened in Iraq, according to John D.
Negroponte in an interview. “There was no stopping reform once that became publicly known,” said
Negroponte.42 Again, the CIA had to get disciplined and the only way to do that was to relinquish
power from the Director of Central Intelligence to this new position.
The position of the DNI came into play when the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 bec ame approved by Congress. Now that the United States knew they needed
a position, the question now became, who would fill it?
Only someone who was well -experienced in intelligence should be able to run it, and John
Dimitri Negroponte was seemingly the flaw less nominee that nobody had questioned would do a
terrible job. Negroponte got his education at prestigious Phillips Exeter Academy. He, soon, went
on to graduate from Yale University with his bachelor degree, and, later, went to Harvard for a short
amoun t of time before went into the U.S. Foreign Service . As a matter of fact, according to the

40 https://www.dni.gov/icjointduty/vacancies/odni -19-0345u.htm
41 https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad –
compound/F6/F693879994199D612C64EE9A4666E8EE_Crossing_The_Rubicon_Part_1.pdf
42 http://thepolitic.org/an -interview -with-john-negroponte -former -u-s-ambassador -to-the-united -nations -and-u-s-
ambassador -to-iraq/

33
Department of State, he worked not only as “ambassador to Honduras, Mexico, the Philippines, the
United Nations, and Iraq” (Biography), but also “in Washington he se rved twice on the National
Security Council staff, first as director for Vietnam in the Nixon Administration and then as deputy
national security advisor under President Reagan” (Biography).43 According to The Washington
Post, even the brilliant Henry Kissi nger wanted a little bit of Negroponte . He was so overwhelmingly
the senate’s choice that only two senators voted against the decision to make Negroponte the Director
of National Intelligence .44
As the first Director of National Intelligence, Negroponte had a behemoth of a challenge. His
goal, whether he wanted to or not, was to create transparency within the brothers and sisters of the
intelligence community. This was most likely his biggest “enemy ”; one way he made a bridge
between the agencies is in 2006 .
Another challenge of his was making sure the budget for the intelligence community would
be spent wisely. This is because he controls the budget of the intelligence community because the
DNI is in charge with NPI, which is the National Intelligence Agency. As a matter of fact, one of his
challenges was trying to budget a program called the “Future Imagery Architecture ”, which would
prominently help out with intelligence.45 The only problem was the fact that it was extravagantly
over-priced, putting it shortly. Negroponte had to make the big call of shutting the program down .
He made that call justly, because the money was just going to be waste d. According to The New
York Times, this was “perhaps the most spectacular and expensive failure in the 50 -year history of
American spy satellite projects ”.46
John Dimitri Negroponte did an excellent job at maneuvering the way he did. He was able
to quickly adapt to his job and be able to lead these agencies to become more transparent.47 This line
of thinking is bec ause of this, there hasn’t been another 9/11. The best jobs are the ones we don’t
hear about. Negroponte should be considered a legend for this one reason. He accomplished his goals
of building transparency within his agencies, or at least started the brid ge that other DNIs will take
care of.

43 https://www.britannica.com/biography/John -Negroponte
44 https://fas.org/irp/congress/2005_cr/s042105.html
45 https://www.revolvy.com/page/Future -Imagery -Architecture
46 https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/washington/11s atellite.html
47 Bonner, Raymond. "New York Times staff reporter as quoted in" The Horror Of John Dimitri Negroponte And
Everything He Represents", by SR Shearer."

34
He not only did that, but he succeeded without a blueprint to tell him where exactly to go,
who exactly to talk to, what to do in this situation. He set the pillars that other DNIs will build upon
to prevent another disaster such as 9/11. Also, there hasn’ t been a scandal with his name attached to
it, at least, that we know of. All in all, he has done superb job at handling his. This job has only lasted
for 10 years, and only a handful of men have been in position over this job, such as Vice Admiral
John Mi chael McConnell, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, the extremely quick David C. Gompert, General
James Clapper, Dempsey and the current Dan Coats . The position of the Director of National
Intelligence is one that requires highly experienced people who can listen to all the experience they
have developed and be able to make the right call that could potentially lead to another Iraq fiasco
or could prevent the epitome of what this position was created for.

35
The institutional analysis of American fore ign policy establishment – history and
present
“Donald Trump is undermining the rules -based international order .”48 The Economist ’s
headline summarized a common refrain within America’s foreign policy establishment . Trump is
certainly hostile to what he sometimes refers to as “globalism”: multilateralism, free trade
agreements, international institutions, and any intern ational legal regime that could impose
constraints on U.S. power. He is antagonistic toward allies and treaties, withdrawing the U.S. from
the Paris climate agreement, the Trans -Pacific Partnership , the Iran nuclear deal, the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces Tr eaty, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization , and the UN
Human Rights Council.
And while the foreign policy establishment is firm in its condemnation of Trump’s turning
away from global engagement , as Richard Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations put it49, their
harshest criticisms seem reserved for those few sporadic instances in which Trump tries to jettison
lengthy and failed military deployments, as in Syria and Afghanistan .
President Trump is not the first president to weaken the international liberal order.
The politicians that make up the foreign policy establishment have rarely respected the non –
interventionist principles at the core of the United Nations, an institution exemplifying the liberal
rules -based international order that the United States helped establish following World War II.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter says “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any st ate…”50
According to the Charter, which American post -war planners helped write, the use of force is
illegal and illegitimate unless at least one of two prerequisites are met: first, that force is used in
self-defense; second, that the UN Security Council a uthorizes it.
This prohibition against war is not some trivial aspiration. Non -intervention is the centerpiece of
international law and the United Nations has repeatedly sought to underline its significance.
The United States was (and is) engaged in activ e military hostilities in many countries , as
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Niger. That include drone strikes in

48 https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/06/07/donald -trump -is-undermining -the-rules -based -international –
order
49 https://www.cfr.org/event/path -forward -conversation -richard -n-haass -and-council -councils
50 https://www.un.org/en/sections/un -charter/chapter -i/index.html

36
Pakistan , combat operations in Kenya, Cameroon, and Central African Republic, or other
interventions of unknown magnitude. The White House was also explicitly threatening U.S.
military action to change the regime in Venezuela and against Iran for a host of spurious reasons.
Not one of these cases meets the prerequisites for legal military intervention (a plausible self –
defense case ca n be made for the war in Afghanistan, but it expired a long time ago).
No other state in the international system uses force more than the U.S. has . Throughout
the Cold War, the United States used military means to interfere in other countries about twice as
often as did the Soviet Union . This doesn’t include interventions below the threshold of military
action: from 1946 to 2000, Washington medd led in foreign elections more than 80 times . Covert
operations to overthrow democratically elected governments, as in Iran, Guatemala, and
Chile, were a staple of U.S. conduct in this perio d. The Congressional Research Service lists more
than 200 i ndividual U.S. military interventions from 1989 to 201851, a rate that no other country
even comes close to matching. It’s hard for America to act as the guarantor of a rules -based order
that it consistently violates.
When President Obama condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 201452, saying
international law prohibits redrawing territorial borders at th e barrel of a gun, it was somewhat
awkward: The United States did exactly that in the 1999 Kosovo war, which lacked Security
Council approval, and successive administrations have similarly supported Israel as it annexes and
occupies territory in violation of international law.
Washington often appeals to international law to justify military action against despots who
commit atrocities, as it did when it secured UN Security Council approval in 2011 to bomb Libya.
But even there, when the initial use of force was authorized, the Obama administration rapidly
exceeded the mandate of the resolution by pursuing what amounted to a regime -change strategy.
And su ch appeals to humanitarianism are highly selective: U.S. military power has also been
used to assist Saudi Arabia, one of the worl d’s most regressive authoritarian regimes, commit war
crimes and keep an impoverished and largely defenseless population in Yemen under siege.
Saving the liberal order means adhering to the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force
except in self -defens e or unless authorized by the Security Council. It means rolling back our
global military footprint and adopting a more restrained foreign policy that at least approximates

51 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf
52 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/25/barack -obama -russia -regional -power -ukraine -weakness

37
the manner in which we expect other nations to behave. It means recognizing that th e United States
is not exempt from the rules and norms it often punishes others for transgressing, and it means
acknowledging that the foreign policy establishment has done at least as much damage to the rules –
based order as has President Trump.
Bibliograp hy:
• Roberts, Priscilla. “All the Right People”: The Historiography of the American Foreign Policy
Establishment. Journal of American Studies 26, no. 3, 1992.
• Porter, Patrick. How the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment Constrains American Grand Strategy.
International Security . 20018.
https://www. belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/ispb%20porter%20 –
%20draft%205.pdf

38
Congressional diplomacy – present an important case of the Congress in the
process of A merican foreign policy and the activity of intelligence involved in it

When talking about issues regarding American foreign policy, the discussion is usually
centered on the opinions of the acting president. It is only natural, since he is the representative of
the U.S. with foreign nations. However, since the president has t o convince Congress to support
his decisions, it is apparent that, although not direct, the Congress has a powerful say when it
comes to what the head of state is allowed to do. The clearest action which can be made to stop
the president from acting to his accord is the refusal of any proposed treaty. In order to circumvent
this course of action, the “weapon of choice” of presidents is the use of executive agreements.
They have the same constitutional status as treaties, but in many cases are not subject to
congressional approval. This is the reason why many international deals in the twentieth century
were executive agreements, and not treaties. Still, it is not possible to use this method in any
situation, thus retaining the Senate’s powers in this issue.53
The indirect nature of the powers the Congress has in foreign issues prevents them from
completely controlling the negotiation process. The president is still the sole representative of the
nation and is the only one authorized to engage in negotiations a nd propose different offers. Even
more so, individual members of Congress may become involved in diplomatic negotiations.
Members may occasionally try to forward their own diplomatic opinions in opposition to the
president’s. Even though this tactic has a history, it has been shown that is not effective in most
cases. Private diplomacy is frowned upon in American political culture, so any proof of such
endeavors are severely criticized by othe r politicians or the population.
Based on the presented aspects o f American foreign policy, clearly it is important that the
president convince Congress to approve his proposed course of action. A relevant example in this
sense was the Congress’ decision to grant President Johnson the authority to use armed force in
Vietnam, following the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Up to that point, the United States did not directly
involve itself in the Southeast Asian conflict, limiting its support to m ilitary advisors and
resources.

53 https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13379/backseat -driving -the-role-of-congress -in-american –
diplomacy

39
The spread of communism to Vietnam was seen as a major threat by the U.S., which
followed the ideas of the “domino theory”: if communism was left to spread unopposed in
Vietnam, then it would surely engulf most of Asia, first to Laos, the Cambodia, Thailand and most
other nations in the area.
The Gulf of Tonkin incident refers to two separate events that happened on the 2nd and 4th
of August 1964, in which an American vessel, the USS Maddox , was attacked by North
Vietnamese forces. In the first confrontation, the destroyer was on a signals intelligence patrol
when it was engaged by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The second one, however, became
subject to controversy, after the emergence of claims that a second attack never occurred. After
initial reports of hostile activity, upon more thoro ugh analysis, the initial report could have been
ignored, but Secretary of Defense McNamara disregarded this aspect , which lead to suspicions of
distorting evidence in favor of entering the conflict with armed forces54. Furthermore, even the
first conflict was initiated in a suspicious manner: the first to fire were the Americans (a warning
shot), and after the USS Maddox had actually provoked the North Vietnamese during their
mission. It also coincided with South Vietnamese raids on enemy shores, which cou ld have led to
the idea t hat it was directing the raids.
After the NSA declassified a large number of top secret documents in 2005, it had become
clear that the events which occurred on the 4th of August 1964 were subject to both faulty and
“skewed” intelligence55. This incident is of major importance to the U.S. in that period, since it led
to a large number of troops being dispatched to Vietnam an d, by extent, to the deaths of tens of
thousands American citizens.
In the afternoon of August 4, the CIA expert analyst on the issue of North Vietnam
concluded that the attacks weren’t real and tried to send the message to the White House and other
agencies. However, he was stopped from this endeavor b y the Director of the Office of Current
Intelligence , who argued that President Johnson had “already decided to bomb North Vietnam”56.
The result of this action was that Secretary McNamara was able to testify to Congress that
the second attacks were real and thus convince them to approve direct military intervention in
Indochina. It is also believed that he also decided not to inform Pres ident Johnson of the recent

54 https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval -history -magazine/2008/february/truth -about -tonkin
55 https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/press20051201.htm
56 https://consortiumnews.com/2008/011108a.html

40
developments. This is probably one of the most well-known cases in which false intelligence
reports led to disastrous consequences. If the claims that the president was not informed of the
uncertainty of the attack, his decision to press for military action could be more understandable.
Whatever the circumstances may be, the outcome cannot be changed.
This event had a series of reveals long after it took place, and so the importance of
intelligence and of the Congress in foreign affairs should be addressed. When the incident
occurred, the government was inclined to aggressive action, driven by upco ming elections, later
that year: “During the summer of 1964, President Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were eager
to widen the war in Vietnam. They stepped up sabotage and hit -and-run attacks on the coast of
North Vietnam” 57. The lack of care in treating this delicate issue prevented the Congress from any
kind of proper analysis. Representatives of the government found themselves willing to lie in order
to get the support needed from Congress in order to implement their foreign policy. The outcome
of the Gulf of Tonkin incident underlines the power that Congress indirectly holds in the U.S.
foreign policies.

57 https://consortiumnews.com/2008/011108a.html