A Report of the CSIS Americas ProgramDo the BRICS Still Matter? 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW | Washington, DC 20036 t. 202.887.0200 | f. 202.775.3199… [604033]

OCTOBER 2015AUTHOR
Marcos Degaut
FOREWORD
Carl Meacham
A Report of the CSIS Americas ProgramDo the BRICS
Still Matter?
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Do the BRICS Still Matter?

Author
Marcos Degaut

Foreword
Carl Meacham

A Report of the CSIS Americas Program

October 2015

About CSIS
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develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today , CSI S scholars are
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| III Contents

Foreword IV
Acknowledgments VI
Do the BRICS Still Matter? 1
Introduction 1
The BRICS and Their (Dis)similarities 3
BRICS Cooperation 9
Strategic Culture 13
Conclusions 21
References 23
About the Author 26

IV | MARCOS DEGAUT Foreword

This study addresses the future of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa),
the members’ social, political, economic, and diplomatic disparities, and how these
differences could prevent the BRICS from proving a coherent and effective strategic
alliance. The analysis of the group’s common features and differences, strategic culture,
and foreign policy suggests that despite their potential, the BRICS are not likely to deliver a
new interna tional system.
The BRICS made headlines throughout the 2000s, as the member states experienced a
significant economic boom. Their growing economic (and thus geopolitical) relevance
motivated the five to work more closely together, largely in an effort to s hift influence
away from the Group of 7 (G7) developed economies toward the developing world. But
more recently, Russian military escalation in Syria and the crisis afflicting many emerging
market economies have called into question the growth model of the BRICS nations.
Though the impact of China’s economic slowdown and financial turmoil on the global
economy is not yet clear, the same cannot be said for its repercussions for the developing
world —including China’s fellow BRICS.
Ultimately, this all points to an alarming reality: the foundation of the BRICS concept is
beginning to crumble. So are the members strong enough to absorb this blow? And even if
the individual members emerge intact, can the BRICS remain viable?
Despite the efforts to create an insti tutional framework that facilitates cooperation among
the BRICS —through, for example, the launch of the New Development Bank and the
Contingency Reserve Arrangement—the grouping remains primarily rhetorical, not
concrete. And the lack of tangible achieveme nts bodes ill for the group’s long -term
survival.
Conflicting interests and the indisputable political, social, and cultural differences among
the group’s members have kept the BRICS from translating their economic force into
collective political power on the global stage. And with economic prospects decreasingly
promising, the notion of the BRICS as a political project seems too fragile to stand on its own. As the economic crisis develops, these contradictions will likely become still more
apparent, exposing the inconsistencies and lack of cohesion that characterize the group’s
positions. Even as the BRICS claim to advocate for a new global system, for example, the biggest obstacles to United Nations Security Council reform remain China and Russia —
themselve s both BRICS members.
Each of the group’s members faces a distinct domestic reality, as well —realities that can
variably bolster and hinder the priorities of the BRICS.
As a Latin America expert, I’ve focused primarily on the case of Brazil and its
governm ent’s efforts to tackle pressing domestic issues, which has become the country’s
number- one priority. The economy is in recession, Brazilians are engaged in protests all

DO THE BRICS STILL M ATTER ? | V across the country, and the political elite seem closer every day to facing the widesp read
corruption that has long plagued the Brazilian system. Entangled in a debilitating political
and economic crisis that has damaged public confidence at home and credibility abroad,
Brazil seems stuck in a quagmire with no end in sight. But as discourag ing as the current
scenario appears, it also provides the country with an opportunity to reassess its priorities
and implement the reforms it has long needed. How Brazil faces its current situation will
prove a deciding factor in the country’s future. And only by setting realistic and pragmatic
goals can the country get itself back on track.
Brazil has put a lot of effort into building and bolstering the BRICS —and into selling the
idea that the group is a viable alternative to the global system. But the gro up seems
increasingly like a sinking ship, even as other global economies continue to recover and
grow.
All signs, it seems, point to Washington. The United States and Brazil have shared a largely
productive partnership for decades. They share common value s and overlapping histories,
and they are the biggest countries by far in the Western Hemisphere. They are natural partners, and they are historic ones. Strengthening that bilateral relationship —even at the
expense of the BRICS —could prove vital to restori ng Brazil’s economic vigor and to
advancing its interests in the international arena. But sticking with the BRICS will do neither.
The potential when the two vibrant, multiethnic democracies cooperate is inestimable —
domestically, regionally, and globally. U.S.- Brazil ties are a sure bet—and a far cry from the
BRICS, which, after several false starts, may never take off.
Carl Meacham
Director, Americas Program
CSIS

VI | MARCOS DEGAUT Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Carl Meacham, director of the CSIS Americas Program, for
opening the doors of the Center for Strategic and International Studies to my research. It represented an inestimable opportunity. I would also like to thank Jillian Rafferty for coordinating this project’s logistics and elaboration.
I would l ike to acknowledge Professors Roger Handberg and Michael Mousseau, from
the University of Central Florida, for providing valuable comments and critiques of
this report. Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Hussein Kalout,
Research Schol ar at Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, for his
strategic insights on Brazilian foreign policy and for his never- ending support. The
views expressed in this report, however, are solely those of the author.
This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship
contributed to its publication.

| 1 Do the BRICS Still Matter ?
Marcos Degaut

Introduction
Not many concepts have done more to muddle strategic and academic thinking about the
global economy and international politics in the last decade than that of the BRICS. The
term was initially coined in 2001 by Jim O’Neill, then -chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset
Management, in a paper titled “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” as an acronym for the rising global economic power of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the ra pidly emerging
countries that would be the “strategic pillars” of a renewed international system by 2050.
Since then, the term has also been used without much consistency as a symbol to designate the hopes of a shift in global economic power away from the G7 developed economies
toward the developing world. Atale (2012:16) argues that “[T]he BRICs concept has just
reinforced the fact that investors of all sorts use it as acronym for all emerging markets.”
Ünay (2013:83) contended that the term, “indicating the emerging actors of a multipolar global political economy, was indiscriminately adopted by policy -makers, academia and
mass media outlets in the 2000s despite its shaky analytical underpinnings.” To Pant (2013:92), “[T]he term ‘BRICs’ soon became a brand, a near ubiquitous financial term,
shaping how a generation of investors, financiers and policymakers view the emerging
markets.”
Actually, many international politics analysts have held in recent years that the economic
rise of the BRICS might herald a major shift in global power. The message being forwarded
is that the American moment is coming to an end and power will be no more concentrated in Washington. Rather, a new global balance would emerge, based not upon American hegemony, but on the distribu tion of power among several different countries, in a context
where the BRICS would assume their place as great powers. The United States would
continue to keep a prominent position, but the international system would revolve no
longer around a U.S. -centri c basis.
O’Neill’s central idea concerned merely the individual economic trajectory of four rapidly
expanding emerging countries grouped by common features. It was not intended to create an analytical category or imply any formal diplomatic alliance or strategic articulation
among these countries. However, their impressive economic performance, fueled by expanding domestic markets, and their more independent and assertive foreign policy made the term BRICs to become globally known. Pant (2013) contends tha t it did not take
much time for these countries to realize the importance of taking advantage of the
opportunity to promote their political interests and ch ange global perceptions about them,
using it to structure a new group to highlight their growing wei ght in global politics and
economics.

2 | MARCOS DEGAUT As a matter of fact, BRICs countries’ economic evolution during the first decade of the
twenty -first century —when their combined growth rate represented nearly 60 percent of
the global growth rate1—seemed to indicate t heir emergence as relevant actors on the
world stage. The data presented in Table 1 show that the relative resistance to the effects of the world economic crisis of 2001 (the Asian Crisis), which severely hit the most developed
countries, suggested that th is group was about to play an entirely new leading role in the
world economy. Their figures were even more impressive when compared to the poor
economic performance of the nations that make up the G7.
Table 1. G7 Countries and BRICs GDP Annual Growth Rates in Percent, 2003– 2008
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

BRICs Brazil 1.1 5.7 3.2 4.0 6.1 5.2
Russia 7.3 7.2 6.4 8.2 8.5 5.2
India 7.9 7.8 9.3 9.3 9.8 3.9
China 10 10.1 11.3 12.7 14.2 9.6

G7 Canada 1.9 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.2 0.7
France 0.9 2.5 1.8 2.5 2.3 -0.1
Germany -0.4 1.2 0.7 3.7 3.3 1.1
Italy -0.1 1.7 0.9 2.2 1.7 -1.2
Japan 1.7 2.4 1.3 1.7 2.2 -1.0
United Kingdom 3.8 2.9 2.8 2.6 3.6 -1.0
United States 2.6 3.5 3.1 2.7 1.9 -0.4
Source: World Bank, “Data: GDP growth (annual %),” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG .
It appeared that in a world marked by financial instability, economic uncertainties, and
poor growth in the most developed countries, the BRICs would have a “remarkable
opportunity to coordinate their economic policies and diplomatic strategy not only to enhance their position as a grouping in the international economic and financial system,
but also to be a stabilization factor in the world economy as a whole” (Pant 2013:93).
However, it was only after a series of informal parallel meetings held on the sidelines of
the United Nations General Assembly 61st session, in 2006, that officials of those countries,
driven by dreams of beco ming the new superpowers that would help shape a new
international system, agreed to effectively set the stage for global collective action. What
was then a mere ideational construct began to be transformed into a diplomatic forum
founded on the shared perception that, due to their political, economic, historical, and
diplomatic heft, those nations had more in common than merely demographic and economic features, especially their belief in an inalienable right to play a more influential

1 Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=3672&catid=159&Itemid=436&lang=pt -BR.

DO THE BRICS STILL M ATTER? | 3 role in world affair s (Hurrel 2009). As the spearhead of developing countries, the BRICs
would speak on behalf of them in the main international forums, advocating a more
legitimate, representative, and symmetrical international order.
The first formal summit meeting of the B RICs was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in July
2009, in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. Amid mutual promises of political convergence and harmonization of conflicts of interests, those countries issued a vague
joint communiqué expressing the ir concerns about the world economy and committing to
undertake the necessary efforts to reform the global economic governance system,
objectives that remained largely in the realm of rhetoric.
After six summit meetings and the incorporation of South Afri ca as the “S” of the acronym
in April 2011, the mechanism has made little progress toward building a collective identity or an institutional apparatus. It has also failed to set up a strategic agenda, with concrete
propositions and actions, or a new concep tual framework for trade negotiations. Beyond
diplomatic rhetoric, the BRICS have not proved a very useful instrument for pursuing
foreign policy objectives and interests.
The purpose of this study is to provide a critical account of the BRICS as an analytical
category, examining some of its constitutive dimensions, with a main focus on the political
and economic relations among its members, within the context of current debates on
paradigm shifts in the global political economy . The objective is to examine whether the
possibilities of an effective multilateral intra -group cooperation are real and whether this
multilateral cooperation could lead to a major change in world power distribution.
The first section examines some of the common features shared by th e BRICS and their
differences. It puts into perspective their relative weaknesses and strengths and tries to
explain to what extent they affect their mutual relations and their relations with other
actors. The second section analyzes whether, how, and why these countries have
cooperated in the main international forums. The third section examines the countries’
strategic cultures and how those contribute to mold political thoughts and behaviors that
shape their foreign policies, in order to see if some form of collective action can really be
part of their political repertoire. That section also analyzes each country’s individual
motivations for joining the BRICS. The study concludes by arguing that social disparities,
diplomatic divergences, and political an d economic differences between the BRICS will
likely prevent them from forming a coherent, effective, and consolidated strategic alliance that goes beyond a narrow set of shared beliefs and objectives.
The BRICS and Their (Dis)similarities
O’Neill envisage d the BRICS as the future engine of global growth, a view shared by a
significant part of the mainstream economics literature. Those countries were expected to
create and sustain economic miracles and lead the world toward a new economic and
political para digm. This association of emerging powers —though scholars are not certain
whether they should consider Russia an “emerging power”—was conceptually based upon
the existence of some common features. First, they are all large in terms of both size and

4 | MARCOS DEGAUT populat ion, with large and rapidly expanding domestic markets and an untapped labor
reservoir. Second, they have displayed impressive growth figures over the course of the
last decade at least and have a great manufacturing potential. Brazil, Russia, India, and
China are among the 10 largest economies in the world, ranking 6th, 8th, 10th, and 2nd,
respectively in December 2013.2 Third, they are largely the most important countries in
their respective regions. And finally, they are all “undergoing a military modernization effort aimed at preserving their strategic interests” (Darling 2010).
However, the BRICS also share some negative common characteristics, to which much less
attention has been paid. As developing countries, they have to urgently overcome
structural issues that contribute to undermine their economic potential. Broadly speaking,
they all have been exposed, at different levels, to endemic corruption, high rates of
illiteracy, poverty, regional income and economic inequalities, overexposure to
commodities and dependence on commodities exports, dependence on foreign direct
investments, vulnerability to asset bubbles, poor institutional and regulatory quality, and a
relatively small opening to the global economy. However, since these characteristics can
usually be attributed to most developing countries, they cannot be considered defining
features of the BRICS.
It could be said that these countries have never had much in common, which is not surprising given their extreme disparities. To Bremmer (2013:180), “it has become all too
clear that the acronym no longer holds water because these four countries are so
dramatically different on virtually every metric.” It really seems to be about a fragile
community of specific interests made up of countries with huge and almost
insurmountable differences regarding economic and structural issues, production
endowment, development models, political settings and traditions, public policies, social
formations, military capabilities, and developmental challenges, as well a s radically
distinct conceptions about the role of the state and life in society. These issues, coupled with their distinct foreign policy priorities, severely limit possibilities for collective action.
Sharma (2012) argues that the problem with thinking i n acronyms is that once one catches
on, it tends to lock analysts into a worldview that may soon be outdated. This might already be the case with the BRICS, despite its short lifespan. From an economic
standpoint, the initial hype and euphoria with which the BRICS was received is no longer valid today. There is not a single reliable indicator supporting the claims that this group of
countries tends to become and remain the locomotive of global economic growth in the
next years, as evidenced by their decreas ing GDP growth rates (Table 2).

2 Sam Ro, “The 40 Biggest Economies in the World,” Business Insider , June 15, 2013,
http://www.businessinsider.com/largest -economies -world -gdp-2013- 6.

DO THE BRICS STILL M ATTER? | 5 Table 2. BRICS GDP Annual Growth Rates in Percent, 2009 –2013
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Brazil -0.3 7.5 2.7 0.9 2.3
Russia -7.8 4.5 4.3 3.4 1.5
India 8.5 10.5 6.3 6.2 4.4
China 9.2 10.4 9.3 7.8 7.7
South Africa -1.5 3.1 3.5 2.5 1.8
Source: World Bank, “Data: GDP growth (annual %),” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG .

China is already a global economic power, with great impact upon world trade; however,
its annual GDP growth rate has fallen from 12 percent in the last 20 years to 7.7 in 2013,
and to 6.9 percent in 2014,3 numbers still excellent, though not to Chinese standards. It
reveals a soft -landing strategy needed to shift the dynamic axis on which the Chinese
economy turns. This planned slowdown is intended to move the country away from a credit -backed growth model to a more sustained economy, promoting measures to foster
domestic demand, in order to lift large contingents of people out of extreme poverty, and placing higher emphasis on value -added exports, while reducing its dependence on
international markets.
These are not good news to a globalized world economy that has been struggling for over
four years to ove rcome another crisis. It also represents a serious blow to countries like
Brazil, which set their hopes in China as an engine of growth recovery. Not only Brazil, but
the rest of the world will have to recalibrate and learn to deal with a new China. As the
country’s growth has slowed, so has its demand for commodities and other key products.
The World Bank estimates, for example, that an annual GDP growth rate in China around 8
percent can reduce Brazilian potential economic growth as much as 10 percent.
Brazil’s GDP growth has also experienced a downward trend. After averaging 4.5 percent
between 2005 and 2010, the country registered rates as low as 0.9 percent in 2012, 0.3 percent in 2014,
4 and an estimated negative growth of 1.9 percent in 2015.5 The country’s
GDP grew by an average 3.6 percent between 2000 and 2011, far behind China (10.2
percent) and Russia (5.3 percent). These modest numbers are much below the country’s
needs and too little for a country that aims to rewrite the “economic geography” of the
world, as former President Lula da Silva (2003–2010) used to say.
It is known that the Brazilian industrial sector suffers from lack of competitiveness, yet
there are virtually no signs of a coherent and systematic national industrial policy. On the
contrary, what can be seen is a host of diffuse and disconnected measures, which are
sometimes contradictory and very often poorly elaborated. The country’s infrastructures

3 Ibid.
4 Brazilian Central Bank, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/update/01/.
5 Trading Economics, “Brasil –Taxa de Crescimento de PIB,” http://pt.tradingeconomics.com/brazil/gdp –
growth.

6 | MARCOS DEGAUT are still highly deficient. The quality of roads, port, air, and rail infra structures is very
poor. Brazil ranks only 107 out of 144 countries in an infrastructure ranking, according to
the World Economic Forum.6 Without industrial dynamism, Brazil is still largely
dependent on commodities exports. As a consequence, the country r anked only 24 among
the world’s largest exporters, with a modest share in world total exports of 1.32 percent (US$242 billion), much below China, the world’s main exporter with a share of 11.13
percent (US$2.05 trillion).
7
After running a trade surplus for much of the past decade, thanks to strong demand for its
commodities from China, Brazil is once again starting to buy more than it sells abroad and
ran a trade deficit in 2014.8 The country’s increasing reliance on protectionist measures
has also contribu ted to substantially impede growth, and it concerns investors to such an
extent that the International Chamber of Commerce ranked Brazil 70th out of 75 countries
for openness to trade, foreign direct investment, and infrastructure competitiveness.9 In
the 2014 Index of Economic Freedom, a ranking designed by The Heritage Foundation,
Brazil ranks only 118 out of 178 countries, which is certainly not good news, as some argue
that economic freedom can exert a positive impact upon investment levels,
entrepreneu rial business activity, economic growth, and per capita income.10
The increasing importance of China as leading investor and trading partner to Brazil since 2009 has not been a process without tensions between the two countries. The main concern is about the “deindustrialization” of the Brazilian economy. Due mainly to China’s
imports, primary products have come to make up an increasing share of Brazil’s export,
“revoking the effect of two decades of sustained efforts to strengthen the manufacturing and hig h tech export industry” (Bull and Kasahara 2011:1). Likewise, the Brazilian
manufacturing sector has found out that low -priced Chinese imports are an unwelcome
source of competition, and is now extremely worried about how to compete directly
against the Ch inese invasion of manufactured goods. For example, a survey published in
February 2011 by the Brazilian National Confederation of Industry (CNI 2011) revealed
that 45 percent of Brazilian firms that face competition from Chinese products had lost domestic market shares, while nearly 67 percent of Brazilian exporters had lost market
shares abroad to their Chinese counterparts between 2006 and 2010 (Bull and Kasahara 2011).
Pereira and Castro Neves (2011) contend that the weakening of Brazilian manufacturing
has led to a trade relationship with China best depicted as a “North -South” exchange, in
which Brazil exports commodities to China and receives manufactured goods in return,

6 Rémy Carasse and Yves Zlotowski, “Brazil’s Economy: Worrying Weaknesses?,” Coface Group, July 15,
2013, http://www.coface.com/News -Publications/Publications/Brazil -s-economy -Worrying -weaknesses.
7 World Trade Organization, “Members and Observers,” http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm .
8 Trading Economics, “Brazil Balance of Trade, 1959– 2015,” http://www.tradingeconomics.com/brazil/
balance -of-trade .
9 International Chamber of Commerce, http://www.iccwbo.org/global -influence/g20/reports -and-
products/open -markets- index/.
10 Heritage Foundation, “2015 Index of Economic Freedom: Coun try Rankings,” http://www.heritage.org/
index/ranking .

DO THE BRICS STILL M ATTER? | 7 rather than a more equitable “South -South” exchange. As a result, the Brazilian ec onomy
has become more and more dependent on the Chinese appetite for its primary goods.
In Russia, the challenge is to reduce the economy’s dependence on oil, so that the country
can grow in a sustained manner. Holding the largest amount of natural gas res erves in the
world, about one -quarter of the total, and the second -largest oil reserves, Russia is highly
dependent on revenues from gas and oil exports, which represent over 60 percent of its exporting agenda and nearly 44 percent of all state budget inco mes. These revenues not
only ensure political and economic stability, but also allow the country to build its
international position based on its vast raw material and energy potential (Konończuk
2009).
Despite the importance of these revenues for the country’s budget, the massive inflow of
petrodollars also has a number of negative consequences for the rest of the Russian
economy, such as the loss of competitiveness of the industry, since the ruble has become stronger against other currencies. Even worse i s that the Russian government
systematically ignores the urgent need to take effective measures aimed at promoting much -needed economic and structural reforms. Konończuk (2009:13) contends that
The increasing dependence of the Russian budget on oil -genera ted incomes and its
sensitivity to price changes has brought about a situation wherein maintaining the oil price at a high level has nearly become a raison d’État in Russia . . . . According to
estimates by the Russian government’s experts, a price fall to US$80 would lead to a
reduction in economic growth of 2.5% of GDP and a significant decrease in investments. Should the oil price fall to US$60, Russia’s GDP would shrink by 1.4% and investments by 6.5%.
Russia has perhaps been the BRICS country most seve rely hit by the 2008 global financial
crisis, which has shown the vulnerabilities of its economy to external turbulences. In 2007,
its GDP growth rate reached 8.5 percent, the highest in a decade. It then fell to 5.2 percent
in 2008, signaling a cooling. I n 2009, it shrank nearly 8 percent. Since then, despite high
international oil prices, the country has experienced only modest growth, expanding 0.6
percent in 2014.
11 The extreme dependence in oil revenues poses a threat not only to the
country's financial stability, but also to its social stability, as the capacity of the
government to perform its core functions, provide basic social welfare services, and meet
the increasingly heightened social expectations of its population depends to a large extent
on th ose revenues.
Economic slowdown has also hit India. The country’s GDP growth rate has averaged 6
percent in the past three years, falling from an average 8.4 percent recorded before the
2008 financial crisis12 to 5.3 percent in 2014.13 Although these numbers look good, they are

11 Trading Economics, “Russia GDP Annual Growth Rate, 1996 –2015,” http://www.tradingeconomics.com/
russia/gdp -growth -annual .
12 Thomas Richardson, “World Economic Outlook, January 2014 Update,” January 2014,
https://www.imf.org/external/country/IND/r r/2014/020314.pdf .
13 Trading Economics, “India GDP Annual Growth Rate, 1951 –2015,” http://www.tradingeconomics.com/
india/gdp -growth -annual.

8 | MARCOS DEGAUT largely insufficient to promote long -term sustainable development in a country where
nearly 33 percent of the population fall below the international poverty line of US$1.25 per
day, while almost 70 percent live on less than US$2 per day.14 As it happens to Brazil and
Russia, India struggles with very poor productive infrastructures. A weak currency, high
inflation rates, low agricultural productivity, and a small manufacturing industry
contribute to decelerate growth.
Even though the country is considered a technology solutions provider, it suffers with
extremely high illiteracy levels. India’s fast growth in the past two decades seems to have
obscured the fact that the country is near the global bottom in literacy, as, in sheer
numbers, it has by far the largest illiterate population15 in the world. As literacy is an
indicator of economic development, one of the main consequences of illiteracy is poverty.
India is estimated to have one -third of the world’s poor, a fact that certainly ne gatively
influences the country’s potential for growth.
Although South Africa is the largest African economy and the only African member of the
G20, its economic dimensions, industrial capacity and production, exports level, growth
potential, and politica l clout cannot be compared to those of the other BRICS members. Its
economy is much smaller than those of the other members, and its regional influence is
really tenuous when compared to the degree of regional influence exerted by the other
BRICS. Thus, its entry into the association in 2010 should be seen more as a symbolic political initiative, aimed at expanding the geographic and intercontinental reach of the
group into that strategic continent. However, the country does have some characteristics in
com mon with Brazil, Russia, and India: Its current economic growth is lackluster,
economic freedom is at a very low level, and industrial infrastructure and business
environment are fragile.
As Sharma (2012) noted, it is easier to grow rapidly from a low starting point, which was
the case with the BRICS countries, even China. These countries have also generated growth
in different ways, at different paces, and often in competing ways. Commodity markets, for
example, can cause divergence in economic priorities. Brazil and India tend to focus more
on their domestic markets, while China is heavily dependent on foreign markets. Brazil
and Russia are important energy producers that benefit from high energy prices, whereas
China and India, as major energy consumers, suffer from them and want prices low. These
cross -cutting interests have impeded progress in the energy cooperation area. Brazil is a
leading global exporter of numerous agricultural commodities, while Russia and China are
major importers. China’s manufacturing sector contributed to decimate inefficient
industries in Brazil, India, and South Africa. Brazil has also suffered with the weak Chinese
yuan , which has “dampened Brazil’s manufacturing export potential by reducing its
capacity to compete with Chines e exporters” (Luckhurst, 2013:256). Furthermore, the
BRICS countries are also competitors in attracting foreign direct investment from wealthy
states , among many other examples of competing economic strategies.

14 World Bank, “Poverty & Equity: India, ” 2015, http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/IND.
15 Ibid.

DO THE BRICS STILL M ATTER? | 9 Considering all these aspects, most economic indicators suggest that economic growth in
this group will not be impressive. Not only are they expected to register only modest
growth rates, in different ways and at different paces, but also they are not likely to grow
in unison, which has profound imp lications for their ability to shape the global economic
balance of power.
BRICS Cooperation
The BRICS is considered by its members a platform for dialogue and cooperation not only
in economic, financial, and development spheres, but also in the politica l domain. A n
analysis of some central issues shows points of diplomatic and political convergence and
divergence. The main concern seems to be whether, despite their different development
strategies, foreign policy priorities, negotiation styles, and repertoires, they will be able to
coordinate their actions and interests to formulate and implement a concerted strategy
regarding their relations with the leading industrialized states.
The BRICS members have indeed shown a convergence of interests in a numbe r of
important issues. They have worked as a group to foster reforms in the existing
multilateral financial institutions and the global financial architecture to make them more
representative; they have reaffirmed their joint support for an open, transpare nt, and
rules -based multilateral trading system ; they have issued repeated warnings over the
potential for capital inflows from developed nations to destabilize emerging economies;
they tend to resist “interventionist foreign policy doctrines such as the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P) emanating from the West, particularly from the United States, and display conservative attitudes on the prerogatives of sovereignty” (Pant 2013: 95); and they
opposed the U.S. war in Iraq and have expressed their concerns abo ut the international
preeminence of the United States, as well as about the U.S. use of military power around
the world.
They also have tried to increase coordination and strengthen cooperation on issues of common interest. During the BRICS Leaders Meeting in Sanya, China, in April 2011, which
focused mainly on the governing structure of multilateral financial institutions, they
formulated an “Action Plan,” laying the foundations of the BRICS cooperation, which
identified 14 programs that should be enhanced , four new areas of cooperation, and five
new proposals to explore.
16 As a whole, the initiatives of the “Action Plan” should be seen
more as a diplomatic statement of intent than a detailed strategic plan. It reflected a broad
consensus that member countri es had to work more closely if they were to further deepen
multilateral cooperation.
The New Delhi summit in 2012 concentrated on how to further develop and operationalize
those ideas. Perhaps the most noteworthy result emerging out of this meeting was the idea
of establishing a development bank that might enhance economic ties between them and
smaller developing nations, though no further details were provided.

16 “Full Text of Sanya Declaration of the BRICS Leaders Meeting,” April 14, 2011, http://www.gov.cn/misc/
2011- 04/14/content_1844551.htm .

10 | MARCOS DEGAUT At the 5th BRICS Summit, held in Durban, South Africa, in 2013, member countries
announced the establishment of a new development bank (NDB), whose main task would
be to mobilize resources from BRICS nations for infrastructure and sustainable
development projects in developing countries. They also proposed to set up a US$100 billion currency stabili zation fund to serve as a form of insurance against volatility in
international markets.
The 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, in July 2014, was marked solely by the signing of an agreement to set up the NDB bank and the signing of a protocol setting up an
additional capital reserve of US$100 billion, known as Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), which is intended to work as a multilateral
currency swap among BRICS central
banks and to forestall short- term liquidity pressures, providing additional liquidity
protection to members during balance of p ayments problems. The NDB, designed to have
an initial capital of US$50 billion, allocated in equal parts by the five founding countries, each possessing equal voting power, is expected to begin operating in 2016, after approval
of the agreements by the re spective parliaments of each country.
These initiatives are clear attempts to exhibit some degree of coordination in order to show
that they are also able to set up the agenda for global economic governance and that they
deserve, as a group, to have greate r voice on global issues. However, BRICS actions have
rarely gone beyond the issuing of joint press statements, and certainly the exercise of
global leadership demands behavior and concrete actions that go much beyond merely
pointing out failures in the international system. Despite effusive mutual praises on the
group’s apparent achievements, their relations could hardly be described as harmonious.
Brütsch and Papa (2013:301) contend that “well -choreographed encounters, handpicked
initiatives, or lofty pla ns [don’t] signify that diverse and potentially antagonistic states are
either willing or able to translate their combined economic prowess into collective
geopolitical clout.”
The lack of common ground became evident during the G20 summit in the Australia n city
of Brisbane on November 15–16, 2014, when the BRICS neither exhibited a common
agenda nor presented any joint proposal. The relations between member countries can be
simultaneously characterized by competing ambitions at the regional and multilatera l
level and a high degree of lack of interest in strengthening political ties at the bilateral
level, as it became clear during the visit to Russia by Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, in
November 2012, in an episode where the Brazilian delegation felt s o humiliated and
frustrated by the lack of interest shown by Russian authorities that it decided to return
home earlier than scheduled. According to Almeida (2010), the BRICS actions are probably
led more by a narcissistic drive for contesting the United S tates and the G7 than by the real
intention of establishing a political community united around a common agenda.
In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the then BRICs not only gave a clear demonstration of lack of coordination of macroeconomic po licies, but also made it clear
that they do not speak the same language when it comes to the harmonization of financial,
investments, and trade policies. Since the BRICS economies were still strong, their banking
sectors had performed well, and they had ac cumulated substantial foreign currency

DO THE BRICS STILL M ATTER? | 11 reserves, the international community expected them to have a more active role in helping
developed countries to overcome the financial tsunami that shook the world economy.
Despite diplomatic rhetoric and endless mee tings on the issue, the group’s contribution to
the efforts to overcome the crisis was almost nonexistent.
So far, BRICS members have only allocated scant resources to collective multilateral
actions. BRICS governments have offered financial and development assistance mostly on
a unilateral basis, which gives them greater individual influence, but little collective clo ut.
The same lack of initiative and collective action capacity that has characterized the bloc can be seen in the ongoing economic and financial difficulties experienced by European
countries, as they struggle to save the euro. The talks about the BRICS De velopment Bank
follow the same pattern and are far from being conclusive. There are issues to be solved on
which the member countries have not yet reached an agreement and that pose a challenge
to that initiative's effectiveness, such as the bank’s precise role, funding, and structural
issues. Since, for example, any United Nations member state is allowed to join the NDB as a
nondebtor member, there exists the real possibility that developed countries come to
influence and even dominate the decisionmaking p rocess. Likewise, the existence of strict
borrowing limits may undermine the potential of these institutions as alternatives source
of funding (ECLAC 2014).
The BRICS also have different perspectives regarding talks on climate change. The Russian
governme nt has systematically diverged from the others on core aspects of the
environmental negotiations known as “post- Kyoto Protocol,” in calling for binding targets
for every country, a feature that the Chinese and Indian governments reject.
Likewise, the prel iminary talks regarding the creation of a BRICS Defense Council, which
should serve as the foundation of a future military alliance, has shown how divided those countries are when it comes to security and defense issues. This military forum is almost exclu sively a Russian aspiration, aimed at counterbalancing American influence in the UN
system and, more particularly, NATO’s expansion and operations. The idea is not entirely discarded by China, and might even be considered one more element in China's strate gic
competition with the United States. However, Chinese leaders feel that it might end up
undermining its well -established position and privileges in the UN Security Council. India
and South Africa seem to reject the idea, on the grounds that it would pro bably be
pointless and counterproductive, and that it would only serve to weaken international law. While not endorsing the proposal directly or unreservedly, Brazil might, from a more
pragmatic standpoint, take the opportunity to use it as a bargaining ch ip to pressure the
United States into supporting its longstanding aspiration to a permanent seat on a
reformed UN Security Council. Therefore, while some agreements on cooperation in issues
like cybersecurity and information exchange might be reached, the establishment of a formal defense council, security forum, or military alliance does not appear feasible any
time in the near future.
Much in the same vein, they have not been able to fashion a coordinated strategy at the
World Trade Organization (WTO), w here their interests are mostly divergent. While Brazil
and South Africa adopt a more aggressive stance in defense of rapid trade liberalization

12 | MARCOS DEGAUT for agricultural products, India and China seek to ensure the continued protection of their
agricultural sectors, although they would benefit greatly from the reduction of agricultural
subsidies on a global scale. Likewise, when it comes to the liberalization of manufactured
goods, in the context of the Non- Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations, the
BRICS have been at odds. In order to protect their domestic markets, Brazil and India have
adopted a defensive stance, while South Africa and China, whose domestic tariffs are, on
average, much lower than those of the other BRICS, have pushed for further reducti ons.17
Differences in domestic circumstances, political practices, and traditions influence BRICS
relations and also help to explain divergences in their strategic priorities. China is an
authoritarian, one -party state, and has been facing challenges coming from a rapidly
changing economy and society; while some might consider Russia a formal democracy, it is
in fact a corruption- plagued state run by an authoritarian oligarchy averse to freedom of
speech and other civil liberties; Brazil and India are young, Western -style multiparty
democracies, but have to deal with problems arising from high levels of illiteracy and
poverty; South Africa is also considered a stable young democracy, despite concerns about
corruption.
The regional role played by the Asian BRI CS and their geopolitical ambitions also are
central to their relations. Regional rivalries feed mutual distrust and resentment and pose significant risks to inter- BRICS relations in Asia. China, Russia, and India compete for
influence and resources in the Central Asia area. In East Asia, although China and Russia
have common concerns over the deteriorating political situation on the Korean Peninsula,
they have pursued largely different policies toward North and South Korea. Likewise,
Moscow and Beijing hav e adopted divergent positions on critical issues in South Asia. The
two countries also disagreed over BRICS enlargement.
The increasing economic and strategic influence of China in Asia, as well as its growing
defense capabilities, is a source of unrest fo r Russian leaders, who believe that they could
still maintain military superiority over China. However, China’s evolution in all domains has forced the Russians to accept the blunt reality that, for the first time in their recent history, “they will have to deal with a China that is more powerful and dynamic than their
own country” (Trenin 2012:1). So far, although fearing China's rise, Moscow has found a
way to maintain an acceptable modus vivendi with Beijing and continue to value it as a
political partne r and a global balancer. However, growing pressures from the Russian
military to increase arms expenditures and retain tactical nuclear weapons, and the
country’s failure to live up to its great power ambitions in the Asia -Pacific area, might
poison the Si no-Russian relationship. In fact, many in Russia, particularly in the military
establishment, feeling uneasy with their junior- partner status, believe that China could
eventually pose a greater threat to Russia's security than the United States ever did.

17 On average, Brazilian bound rates for manufactured goods is 30.8 percent, close to Indian bound rates
of 34.6 percent. On the other hand, China and South Africa present much lower bound rates, of 9.1
percent and 15.7 perce nt, respectively. See World Trade Organization, “World Tariff Profiles 2014,”
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles14_e.pdf .

DO THE BRICS STILL M ATTER? | 13 Tensions also exist in China’s relations with India, which is to some extent due to
competition over influence in states as Cambodia, Nepal, and Myanmar. Beijing does not
intend to feed a geopolitical rival whose power and influence might come to match its own,
which is why it does not officially endorse India’s claim for a UN Security Council seat. Russia follows the same reasoning. In return, fearing that China might monitor and control
its foreign policy initiatives, India has systematically blocked the a dmission of China in the
India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) initiative, a forum for political consultation.
Strategic Culture
Culture has a profound impact in many different fields of human activity, from political
and ideological preferences to religious practices and social habits. It influences the way
policymakers and strategists think about matters of war and peace, since a deeper understanding of cultural issues can reduce policy failures and advance national interests.
In general, the literature pre sents two distinct approaches to analyze strategic culture. The
most accepted concept is presented by scholars who tend to define strategic culture almost
exclusively in terms of military strategy and the use of force in international relations
(Snyder 1977; Gray 1981; Booth 1991; Johnston 1995). This view understands strategic
culture as a deeply held cultural predisposition for a particular military behavior or
thinking, derived from a country’s history, geography, national myths and symbols, and politica l traditions and institutions, among other sources. Booth (1991:121) believes that
it has influence on the form in which one state interacts with the others concerning
security measures . . . . It includes national traditions, habits, values, attitudes, wa ys
of behaviour, symbols, approaches and special processes chosen to influence
external environment and the ways of solution of problems face to face to threats or
to using of force.
Johnston (1995:46) emphasizes the role of military influence and grand strategy doctrine in
the study of culture. He sees strategic culture as an integrated “system of symbols which
acts to establish pervasive and long lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts
of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs.”
However, strategic culture is not just a product of military culture, and this is not the only
area where its influence is felt. It also influences a country’s political and foreign policy traditions and practices, which is why the sec ond approach has broadened its concept and
has preferred to focus on the “grand strategies of states and include aspects such as economics and diplomatic ways of attaining a state’s objectives in addition to military ones” (Howlett 2005:2). Eitelhuber (2009:4 –5) contends that “how political power is
defined, acquired, legitimized and used and how the outside world is regarded and addressed are thus decisive factors in shaping a state’s strategic culture.”
Duffield (1999) argues that the foreign policy goals to be pursued by a state, which reflect
its identity and interests, are defined by its strategic culture. In this line of thought, the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) defines strategic culture as “the combination of internal

14 | MARCOS DEGAUT and external influences and e xperiences —geographic, historical, cultural, economic,
political, and military —that shape and influence the way a country understands its
relationship to the rest of the world, and how a state will behave in the international
community” (Bitencourt and Vaz 2009:1). Thus, for the purpose of this study, strategic
culture can be understood as a deeply held cultural predisposition for a particular strategic
behavior or strategic thinking.
Scholars acknowledge that strategic culture is a product of historical e xperience. Since
these experiences differ across states, different states have different strategic cultures.
Johnston (1995:34) claims that “different states have different predominant strategic
preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experie nces of the state, and are
influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive
characteristics of the state and its elites.” Broadly speaking, strategic culture is more than
an alternative way of explaining strategic behavior. It seeks to explore causal explanations
for regular patterns of state behavior and to generate generalizations from its conclusions.
It is a concept that can be more useful when used as a complement to other theoretical
traditions. Desch (1998:166) conten ds that, as a supplement to existing theories, cultural
theories have at least three potential contributions to make:
First, cultural variables may explain the lag between structural change and
alterations in state behavior. Second, they may account for wh y some states behave
irrationally and suffer the consequences of failing to adapt to the constraints of the
international system. Finally, in structurally indeterminate situations, domestic
variables such as culture may have a more independent impact.
Desch’s arguments help to explain why the rise of emerging powers has the potential to
affect the balance of power in the international system. Analyzing these countries’
strategic culture can help policymakers and scholars to understand the rationale behind
their perceptions, the reasons why each country decided to join the BRICS, what influences
their foreign policies, how they see the world and why they behave the way they do.
China
Ancient China was traditionally depicted as a nonviolent defensive -minded country, with a
feeble warlike tradition, and a cultural preference for peaceful solutions over
expansionism. However, the present image of the country is completely opposed to that
perception, as China has been considered an increasingly aggressive, assertive, and belligerent nation.
Scobell (2002) argues that both views on the Chinese strategic culture are flawed, as it
cannot be accurately characterized either as pacifist or belli cose, as China has an
apparently paradoxical “dualistic” strategic culture based at the same time on conflict-
averse and defensive -minded Confucian -Mencian principles and on realpolitik tenets,
which favors military solutions and is offensive oriented, cou pled with a strong
nationalism. Scobell argues that both lines of thought are operative and influence and
combine in dialectic fashion to form a Chinese “cult of defense.” In consequence, Chinese
leaders tend to “pursue offensive military operations as a p rimary alternative in pursuit of

DO THE BRICS STILL M ATTER? | 15 national goals, while rationalizing these actions as being purely defensive and last resort”
(Scobell 2002:1).
According to Kenneth Johnson (2009:10), this Chinese cult of defense means that even though
Chinese strategic cu lture is primarily pacifistic, defensive, and nonexpansionist, its
leaders are nevertheless predisposed to deploy force when confronting threats to China’s core interests. When doing so, any war China fights would be seen as “just” and any military action defensive, even when it is offensive in nature.
China’s main strategic interest is to modernize. Within this strategy, its number one priority is economic development. To achieve this goal, the country has adopted a pragmatic approach, greatly reducing the role of ideology in economic policy. As a result,
China has been the world’s fastest- growing economy for over three decades. Its foreign
policy reflects this pragmatism and this priority. Its efforts are directed toward promoting the country’s economic growth, maintain access to markets both to imports and exports,
acquire and develop new technologies, and ensure the supply of much -needed raw
materials.
The country’s leaders are aware that Chinese economic development will not only increase its influence w orldwide, but can also generate concerns about the country’s capabilities
and intentions. For these reasons, China’s foreign policy has been built around two
concepts: “peaceful development” (or “peaceful rise”) and international engagement
(Johnson 2009). The idea behind these concepts is that Beijing is committed to show the
international community that the country’s military and economic prominence will not
pose a threat to peace and stability to any country, and that other nations will benefit
China’s growing power and influence.
These concepts also stress the importance of soft power in the country’s foreign relations
and are partially based on the premise that good relations with its neighbors can enhance
China’s power rather than diminish it. In consequence, the country should never seek
hegemony or superpower status. It does not mean, however, that the country will not use
force or coercion to advance its national interests if these measures are considered
defensive.
As Chinese leaders seem strongly committed to discredit the “China threat” theory, the
country has not only continuousl y built and expanded its web of relationships with other
nations, but also adopted a more proactive and cooperative stance in multilateral
institutions such as the WTO and the IMF.
The fact is that China has little or no incentive to promote a change in the international political system, to create a new world order, or to challenge U.S. hegemony. On the
contrary, in order to achieve its main objective, economic development, the coun try is
probably more interested in preserving the status quo. A plausible explanation about why
China bestows some value to the BRICS is because, consistent with the principles of
“peaceful development” and “international engagement,” it can use the group to “reduce

16 | MARCOS DEGAUT the impression it is seeking a superpower role in world affairs by emphasizing
multilateralism and its status as a developing nation” (Luckhurst 2013:259). By adopting
such behavior, China conveys the message that it does not want to be seen as a revisionist
country, which acts driven by its own individual interests, but as a moderate country that, within the framework of a collective action, can contribute to the reform and improvement
of the global governance, without fundamentally challenging the status quo. Cooperation is
possible, but within the framework of the current world order.
While some analysts argue that China remains confused and hesitant in participating in
international affairs, evidence indicates that, on the contrary, the country is well aware of
its political, economic, and geostrategic weight, which is why it does not need, does not want, and does not seek to harmonize its policies with the interest and priorities of its
emerging partners. It acts just like the United States, a nd avoids forging alliances and
partnerships that could impose some kind of restraint in its freedom of action. Its
economic development is its top priority and its geopolitical neighborhood is the focus of
its power projection; global issues remain secondary. In this context, as China proceeds
steadily in its path to become a superpower, it is likely that the country will attribute less importance to the BRICS when that group is no longer needed to shield China's emergence.
Brazil
Two of the most important traits of the Brazilian strategic culture are that the country sees
itself a peaceful nation and a deeply held belief that the country is destined for greatness. These two ingrained and intertwined cultural values have a profound impact upon the
country’s security thought and foreign policy.
Over time, Brazil has unequivocally expressed its reliance on and preference for
negotiated solutions for conflicts. Actually, both the country’s constitution and the national
defense strategy explicitly “underscore and build perceptions of security upon peace and
the peaceful resolution of conflicts” (Bitencourt and Vaz 2009:4). Due to its economic weight, Brazil has been actively seeking to raise its profile on the international stage, in
order to have a greater voice in global affairs, but it has done so through political and
diplomatic channels, never resorting to the threat or use of force.
As meaningful examples of this political determination, Brazil, which once was on the
verge of acquiring offensive nuclear weap ons, “communicated its decision not to pursue
them in the interests of fostering regional and global peace” (Bitencourt and Vaz 2009:9) in
the early 1990s. Likewise, the country was the driving force behind the creation of the
South American Defense Counci l, a mechanism established in 2009 whose main objective is
to consolidate the region as a zone of peace and democratic stability. The Council also
seeks a South American identity in the field of defense, through the strengthening of
cooperation, military e xchanges and exercises, and the implementation of confidence –
building measures. Furthermore, over the course of its more than 500 -year history, Brazil
has not had any serious military conflict with its neighbors, with the exception of the
Cisplatine War (1825–28) and the War of the Triple Alliance (1864 –70).

DO THE BRICS STILL M ATTER? | 17 At the same time, although the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, known as Itamaraty,
traditionally depicts the country as a satisfied or status quo nation, deprived of major
ambitions, the country is anything but satisfied with the current global order, a stance consistent with its drive for greatness. Eakin (2009:12) argues that “Brazilian elites began the twentieth century very unsure of themselves and in their place in the larger world.
They begi n the twenty -first century with a growing self -assurance and self -confidence that
Brazil is now becoming not only a regional, but also a world power.”
As Brazil struggles to have a bigger influence on global issues, and tries to make the
transition from “rule -taker” to “rule -maker” in international affairs (McCoy 2009), the
Itamaraty seems to understand that there are only two ways to achieve this objective,
which are complementary rather than antithetical. The first one is to adopt a more
proactive foreign policy and to engage actively in the activities of multilateral
organizations within the framework of the current international order. The country has
been an active member of the WTO, IMF, and World Bank, has been a constant presence in
the UN Security C ouncil, has led the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and has
been a key member in the discussions on climatic change, for example. This multilateral
approach does not mean the adoption of a new political or economic agenda, but it is
merely an attempt to gain leverage within existing mechanisms.
The second strategy is twofold. On one hand, the country vigorously advocates reforms in
the global governance system, which might favor its interests. Brazil has worked hard to
push for reform of the U N Security Council structure in order to get a permanent seat, it
has been a longtime supporter of a radical overhaul of the international financial
architecture and multilateral financial institutions, and is one of the most active
supporters of a global trade system that provides more benefits to both developing and
least -developed countries. On the other hand, Brazil tries to take the lead in building
political and economic alliances, partnerships, and integration blocs in order to multiply,
maximize, an d spread its influence. The Common Market of the South (Mercosur), the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the IBSA Forum, the South American- Arab
Countries (ASPA) initiative, and the BRICS are examples of this strategy. Brazil sees its BRICS affilia tion as a passport to global leadership and as one of its top priorities. In this
context, it might adopt any necessary measures to reach its objectives, as contradictory and
inconsistent with the country's traditions and beliefs as they might be.
Russia
Contrary to the Brazilian and Chinese strategic cultures, Russia displays a propensity to use
force to achieve its strategic objectives. However, even though the country’s strategic culture can be considered “stable with respect to the prevailing threat perception and
Russia’s quest for great power status” (Eitelhuber 2009:2), some changes have been going
on after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Most conspicuously, the perceived role of military strength as the only source of power has declined, insofar as economic power has become
more important. It does not mean that Russia has abandoned military strength as a source
of power and political influence and as an important tool in its international relations.
Rather, military power is still the chief institut ional foundation of Russian statehood.

18 | MARCOS DEGAUT However, economic development can also be considered one of the main driving forces
behind its foreign policy. After abandoning its ambitions to spread communist revolution
around the world, Russia appears to exhibit a behavior in its foreign affairs that is not
different from what would be expected from a country that once was a superpower, declined sharply, and is now, after recovering some strength and influence, trying to find
its place in the international order.
It must not be forgotten, however, that by its own nature, Russia is a revisionist country
and is extremely sensitive to Western actions aimed at promoting liberal democratic
principles and forging military alliances in what it still perceives as it regio nal “sphere of
influence.” The Russian state was born and expanded in a state of semi -permanent
warfare. Over the course of the country’s history, from Imperial times to the Soviet era, the notion that its territory and resources were the object of neighbo ring and enemy states’
expansionist and bellicose ambitions not only shaped Russian threat perceptions, but also
contributed to forge a strong nationalism, which is part and parcel of the Russian national
identity. The country’s strategic culture and its g reat-power aspirations are thus founded
upon “an almost obsessive perception of a general threat toward Russian sovereignty and
territorial integrity” (Eitelhuber 2009: 27), and an exacerbated nationalism, centered on
the country’s interests, security, and global influence. The annexation of Crimea, in March
2014, and the ensuing support to separatist movements in Ukraine clearly follow this
pattern. Other elements also contribute to shape the country’s strategic culture, such as the
deeply rooted authorita rian leadership style and the political culture. To Ermarth (2006:6)
Russian political culture has been a major contributor to strategic culture, especially
to its militarization. Political culture is itself very “martial” or harmonious with
military value s in that it is grounded on the principle of kto -kovo (literally “who –
whom), i.e., who dominates over whom by virtue of coercive power or status
imparted by higher authority.
Russian political elites tend to see the characteristic traits of democracy, such as freedom
of political expression, political pluralism, freedom of speech, and the due process of law “not as the enabling conditions of a legitimate polity, but as instruments to be manipulated,
controlled or combated for the benefit of the central auth ority” (Ermarth 2006:6). This
specific feature has important implications for Russian foreign policy. Now that the
country has overcome the chaotic period that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Russian leaderships have systematically manifested th eir desire to restore their nation
back to its former great- power status, which is a major driving factor in Russian foreign
policy. The country not only wants to increase and project its influence and power in its
geographic region, but also aims to be a more significant actor in the international arena.
Russian leaderships appear to see the world primarily through a realist prism, in which the
search for a balance of power is a permanent feature. To them, Russia’s mission is to
promote the emergence of a multipolar world, in order to contain and counterbalance the
magnitude of the American power. The main elements of Russia’s strategic culture —
combativeness, competitiveness, political assertiveness (Ermarth 2006) and a tough stance

DO THE BRICS STILL M ATTER? | 19 against what is perceive d as the greatest threat to its security and ambitions, the United
States —are present in the country’s renewed aspirations for great -power status.
To a large extent, Russian foreign policy mirrors its political culture. The kto -kovo tradition
has implications for the country’s international relations, as it represents a tendency to see
“foreign states or actors as either enemies, or subjects, or transient allies, or useful fools to
be manipulated” (Ermarth 2006:6). That helps to explain why Russia manifests a
preference for developing its multipolar strategy on the level of other major powers, be it
through bilateral agreements or through forming a variety of coalitions, rather than
through the framework of international institutions.
That is why Russia high ly values its BRICS membership, especially because the bloc’s
approach coincides perfectly with Russia’s vision of a multipolar world. The group can provide Russia with a geopolitical cover, as it is considered not only as another instrument
to help counte rbalance U.S. power, while avoiding a direct confrontation, but also as a
platform to advance other Russian geostrategic interests, such as balancing China’s rise.
This is even more evident now that Russia has been excluded from the G8 after the
invasion o f Crimea, and might feel tempted to use the BRICS as an indication that it did not
become isolated internationally. There is, however, a clear mismatch between Russia’s
intentions and the immediate aims of the other members. Contrary to their expectations
and interests, Russia has pushed for further integration and wants to provide the bloc with
a more defined institutional structure and even a defense council, but it has not been
successful so far.
India
Discerning the underlying traits of India’s strategi c culture is not an easy task, due to the
extreme diversity of the Indian society, marked by ethnic, religious, linguistic, caste, and
regional differences. At least three different streams of thinking, namely Nehruvianism,
Neoliberalism, and Hyperrealism (Bajpai 2002), vie for dominance and try to explain the nature of the national strategic culture, which raises questions about its existence. These
approaches, however, share some basic assumptions, which represent the core of the
national strategic thinki ng and will be briefly examined here, while acknowledging that
there may exist some other elements in common.
The first trait is the deeply rooted conviction that India is not merely another nation- state,
but a distinct civilization, with a rich and old hi story. The main implication of this
characteristic is that India sees the international system as hierarchical, not anarchic or
egalitarian. The “singularity” of the country means a natural claim to greatness and
cultural superiority. Its major- power statu s should thus be given, not earned. According to
Jones (2006:7), “India’s strategic culture sees status as an objective reality, a matter for
other states to recognize and act in accordance with, not a favor for other states to confer.”
Consistent with th is notion of uniqueness is the perception that the country has the
mission to bring to the world its distinct voice, whose political expression is its traditional
neutrality. This is why India avoids being closely tied to countries or blocs. Actually, with
the exception of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), India is not

20 | MARCOS DEGAUT a member of any economic bloc or formal regional grouping. The essence of Indian
security and foreign policies lies in “its quest for strategic autonomy. To unders tand this, it
must be realized that India is largely friendless in the world today. India has friendly relations with many states but friendship with none” (Singh 2009:5).
Far from meaning that India rejects the current world order and refuses to engage i n
international institutions and norms, which would be an entirely wrong proposition—as
the country has been a strong advocate of the United Nations, the global trade system, and the international law and principles, especially when they work in its favor —this means
that India has a pragmatic approach to international relations. Its strategic culture posits no permanent enemies or friends; it is “flexible rather than doctrinally prescriptive on specific issues of war and peace, foreign or defense policy” (J ones 2006:28). Driven by its
aspirations to be a great power, India’s actions are taken and adopted according to the probability that they have to increase its international status.
Even though it shares a border with two potential “enemies,” India tends to give priority to
dialogue over the use of military power in foreign policy. For this reason, Jones (2006:24)
argues that “India has been prudent in seeking a nonconfrontational relationship with China in which trade channels and other forms of exchange a re growing.” If, however, the
use of force is deemed necessary, as last resort, the country will not refrain from using it, as several skirmishes with Pakistan along the common border over the course of the last
50 years have shown.
India is not a revision ist country and, despite its age -old history and culture, it is not yet a
major global military or economic power, with the ability to project its influence beyond its
immediate neighborhood. The country not only lacks the strategic weight required to
shap e global affairs, but to some extent, it also seems not to have a culture of strategic
planning. Indian leaders usually limit themselves to pursue short- term opportunistic
policies, for immediate benefit, rather that identifying potentially more useful and
profitable longer -term objectives and the means to achieve them. By joining other
important emerging powers, Delhi appears to see its BRICS affiliation as a useful
instrument to obtain the international respect it thinks it deserves, without having to inc ur
the risks and costs of joining a more formal economic or political bloc.
South Africa
Due to a lack of historical perspective and an almost absolute absence of literature on the subject, South African strategic culture is not analyzed in this paper. Eve n though
emerging practices may be discernible in the post -apartheid South African society, it is too
early to state that they form a consistent pattern. However, South African membership to the BRICS club is not irrelevant. Its addition in 2010 helped to strengthen the group’s image
as a legitimate representative of the developing world. The incorporation of South Africa
contributed to give the BRICS greater representativeness and even legitimacy, and made more credible the claims that the group arguably s tands for the aspirations and interests of
developing nations. To the country, its membership helped to strengthen its claim to
continental leadership.

DO THE BRICS STILL M ATTER? | 21 Strategic culture matters. It can represent an invaluable tool in helping to explain strategic
behavior and foreign policy preferences. It has shown that the BRICS nations display
completely different patterns of strategic thinking, reflected in different political systems, world views, and foreign policy practices, which makes it difficult for them to imple ment a
partnership based upon shared beliefs and norms that might encourage them to undertake
a much -needed vertical cooperation. All of them show some degree of a desire for
“greatness,” but they pursue different paths and approaches to reach their objectives.
Although this shared ambition can “inspire coalitional cohesion sufficient for soft
reformist targets the prospects for community building remain elusive” (Brütsch and Papa
2013:325). Most importantly, these nations do not present the strategic postu re, resources,
willingness, and the global commitments needed to forge a new international order.
Conclusions
Individually, the BRICS have become relevant actors in the international arena and cannot
be ignored any longer. Their attempt to boost economic and political cooperation in the
South -South axis is laudable and necessary, as it represents a strategy of div ersification of
partners in a context of crisis. Furthermore, the group has adopted and advocated some
bold and important measures to foster multilateral cooperation and to reform the global
governance architecture. These measures, however, are limited in their depth, scope, and acceptance, which reflect the group’s lack of cohesion, resources, priorities, economic
models, foreign policy interests, and, consequently, their incapacity to shape their own
international agenda. While the group may be able to bu ild consensus on softer reformist
issues, it has become increasingly clear that the possibilities of a BRICS concerted action
toward the making of a new international order have become less and less compatible
with reality.
It certainly does not mean that analysts and policymakers should disregard the BRICS
potential as a political partnership or its usefulness as a diplomatic tool, since its members
combine considerable assets. It also does not mean that the association is doomed to be only a bargaining c oalition. However, the BRICS should not be portrayed as the center of a
future political community that heralds a true shift in global power from a U.S. -centered
basis to a world with multiple emerging centers of power. It is more adequate to
understand th e BRICS as a “relatively successful ‘international regime’ operating in a
specifically designated field, rather than the harbinger of a profoundly novel global order” (Ünay 2013:79).
Even adopting a more limited perspective, centered on bringing gradual im provements to
the global political economy, its alignment prospects depend largely on four factors. First,
the political willingness of those countries’ leaders to make the association a priority; second, the ability of those leaders to overcome and reconc ile diverging interests and
ambitions between countries with different resources, strategic cultures, and diplomatic practices; third, their ability to withstand the political and economic costs of countering
U.S. power; and finally, the adoption of concre te measures to deepen cooperation and
effectively develop strategic intragroup relationships. Without this combined set of

22 | MARCOS DEGAUT variables, the BRICS may be doomed to be only another good idea that did not work out as
it was expected.

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26 | MARCOS DEGAUT About the Author

Marcos Degaut is a political adviser at the Brazilian House of Representatives and
former intelligence officer at the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN). He has served
as assessor to international affairs at Brazil’s Institutional Security Cabinet at the Presidency of the Republic, as deputy head of international affairs at the Superior
Court of Justice, and as secretary general of the National School of Magistrates
(ENFAM). He is also co -president of the Kalout- Degaut Institute for Politics and
Strategy, a private consulting firm in Brazil.
Degaut is currently a Ph.D. candidate in security studies at the University of Central
Florida. He holds a master ’s degree in international relations, a bachelor’s degree in
international law, and a bachelor’ s degree in international relations from the
Universit y of Brasilia . Additionally, Degaut completed a specialization course in
intelligence (National School of Intelligence) and a specialization course in international political economy. As an expert in emerging countries and Latin
American politics, he has been invited regularly to give courses, seminars, and
workshops in several universities and other institutions in Brazil and abroad. He has conducted research and analysis in economic development, trade and finance,
international security, and terrorism. He is the author of Terrorismo: características,
tipologia e presença nas relaçõesinternacionais (Presidência da República, 1999) and O
desafio global do terrorismo (CSI Publishing, 2014) and has contributed on a regular
basis to newspapers and journals.

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OCTOBER 2015AUTHORS
Marcos Degaut
FOREWORD
Carl Meacham
A Report of the CSIS Americas ProgramDo the BRICS
Still Matter?
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